To what extent are the core perspectives of constructivism

able to account for contemporary international relations?

- A neorealism comparison.

Essay by: Preben Gloersen

PPR: 410d: Major Approaches to the Study of International Relations

MA Diplomacy and International Relations

Word count: 5375, including paraphrasing text, excluding front page and bibliography

Michaelmas Term, 2014

Introduction

In today’s world, the understanding of different states’ behaviour, policies and decision-

making processes is as important as ever. This is for example based on interdependent

domestic and external spheres (Sterling-Folker, 2002:20), increased transnational influence of

non-state actors in diplomatic processes (Stoltsfuz, 2008:347), and a global instability that has

not been seen since the late 1970s (Solomon & Lee, 2014). Consequently, the relevance of the

conceptual framework of theories of international relations is underlined.

Within this framework, constructivism has established itself as an integrated part of the

contested debate. By promoting a notion of a socially constructed reality, constructivism

seeks to frame analyses of foreign affairs (Adler, 1997:319).

This essay discusses to what extent the core perspectives of constructivism, compared to

neorealism, are able to account for contemporary international relations. It firstly presents a

brief overview of constructivism, and secondly contrasts constructivism’s empirical viability

to that of neorealism with regards to the occurrences of the Arab Spring and Russia’s

intervention in Ukraine. Thereafter, constructivism’s ability to balance empirical and

theoretical validation is considered.

The essay concludes that the precise capacity of the core perspectives of constructivism to

account for international relations, compared to neorealism, is individually interpreted and a

product of policymakers’ actions. Nonetheless, the capturing of complex events like the Arab

Spring and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine makes constructivism a valuable approach for

analysts and the theoretical international relations discipline as a whole.

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Constructivism - a Brief Overview

Much of the theoretical debates of international relations have revolved around the school of

realism. Its prominent strain of neorealism is no exception, as it has been criticised for being

unable to clarify significant occurrences within international relations. This includes a lack of

sufficient explanations of why the Cold War ended shortly after neorealism’s founder Waltz

(1988:628) predicted that it would last as long as the structure of post-war global politics

endured. The following figure, based on content from Reus-Smit (2013:217-223), illustrates

how constructivism emerged as an approach to analyse foreign affairs in the theoretical

aftermath that followed the ending of the Cold War:

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Figure constructed based on the content of Reus-Smit (2013:217-223).

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Within the theorisation of international relations, the “constructivist turn” (Checkel, 1998:324) has been considered as either reaction to the third debate or as a source of a fourth debate (Fierke, 2010:179). The constructivism term was introduced to the discipline by Onuf (1989) and popularised through Wendt’s (1992) article Anarchy is what states make of it. While Wendt’s title maintains the idea of an anarchical international system, it underlines an alternative perspective to neorealism on reality and structure. His objective is to bridge a “cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction” with “a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous” (Wendt, 1992:394). Hence, across interpretivists and positivists, systemic, unit–level and holistic theorists (Reus-Smit, 2002:487), there are some consolidated elements that make constructivism a distinct form of international relations theorisation (Copeland, 2006:3):

Table constructed based on the content of Copeland (2006:3).

The social aspects of these elements have resulted in realists criticising constructivism. This

includes attempts to associate it with the utopian idealism of the Interwar Period (Phillips,

2007:64). Still, constructivism can be used to criticise idealist thinking on ontological,

epistemological and normative grounds (Steele, 2007:23). Moreover, constructivists’ work on

issues like cultures of insecurity (Weldes et al., 1999) and ethnic cleansing (Rae, 2002:165-

212) prove that an analytical focus on the social construction of identity and interests is not

antithetical to a comprehension of the often grim realities of international relations (Phillips,

2007:65). In sum, constructivism’s theoretical foundation arguably constitutes a framework

for answering Pouliot’s (2004:320) questions about how social facts are socially created and

how they affect global politics. This will be further outlined in the next two sections of this

essay, as the main constructivist principles are contrasted to neorealism in the contemporary

international relations contexts of the Arab Spring and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.

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The Arab Spring

Manfreda (2015) defines the Arab Spring as “a series of anti-government protests, uprisings

and armed rebellions that spread across the Middle East in early 2011”. Davidson (2012)

illustrates the geographical ramifications:

Map constructed based on the content of Davidson (2012).

When he describes the preconditions for the Arab Spring, Andersen (2011) refers to the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as “the world’s tyranny belt”. At the same time,

several countries in the region experienced imbalances between growth in macroeconomic

Gross Domestic Product and Gross Domestic Product per capita, and between the number of

university graduates and vast unemployment (Momani, 2012). According to Gurr (1970:13),

the urge for human beings to revolt is psychologically rooted in a gap between what they

think they are able to achieve given the available means and what they believe they are

rightfully entitled to.

The neorealist view that the function of individuals is to be components in the creation of

tangible material capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2010:78-79), arguably illustrates some of the

challenges a system-based approach faces in capturing international relations events.

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Conversely, one could suggest that the constructivist notion of “discursive power” (Lawson,

2013:29) proves its value by explaining the intrastate dynamics of the Arab Spring. This is

evidential through interpretations of the term itself, the uprisings’ perceived starting point and

the methods of how they prevailed.

Alhassen (2012) considers the Arab Spring term to be misleading as its portrayal of a renewed

identity insinuates that the Arab population was indifferent for decades. She further states that

in the MENA region, the most popular words used to describe the revolts are: karama, thawra

and haqooq (dignity, revolution and rights). It can be propounded that the widespread use of

these words illustrates the presence of ideational values, norms and meanings. Moreover, the

apparent pervasiveness of the underlying knowledge that typically is associated with the use

of such words indicates that the relevant ideational elements have existed for a while.

One could suggest that the way the aspirations of the Arab people surfaced reflects a reality

where the ideational structure and its agents mutually constitute each other. The Tunisian

street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s decision to set fire to himself to protest against the

treatment he received from the Tunisian regime is commonly seen as igniting the Arab Spring

(Andersen, 2011, Leraand, 2014A, Fisher, 2011). The mythical tendencies that characterise

the narratives of the Bouazizi event (Day, 2011) underline the presence of the creation of

impactful social facts. Hence, the personification of the frustration arguably rooted the

demand for change in the communal identity to an extent where the demand was reinforced

rather than rejected by the following surge in communication.

Since the Arab people’s desires initially received little encouragement from established

political parties, citizen journalism became a vital platform for communication (Andersen,

2011). This type of entrepreneurship was, with the use of the transformative power of new

technologies (Guéhenno, 2011) and social media, able to achieve breakthroughs against the

state-run media (Tufekci, 2011). On the one hand, the prominence of this social infrastructure

is often associated with the ideational aspirations of the Arab youth (Leraand, 2014B). On the

other hand, it scaled out of such boundaries as Andersen (2011) emphasises that ideas were

shared across socio-demographical parameters, geography and level of dictatorship.

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As a result of the outlined mechanisms, Ritzer (2015:441) indicates that when analysing the

MENA events, it is in addition to the concept of social movements relevant to consider the

sociological elements that revolve around the concept of collective action. By identifying the

Arab Spring’s ideational components which neorealists deem unnecessary to explain, a

constructivist approach to the dynamics of collective action potentially accounts for the

rationality related factors that neorealism actively seeks to address.

Sharing the costs in order to solve a collective action problem appears to be at the core of

rational behaviour. Yet, the neorealist-embraced rational choice theory may struggle to

capture the premise and characteristics of this kind of cooperation based on the presence of

irrationality and altruism. The Arab Spring uprisings took place in unitary states whose

autocratic leaders, according to Andersen (2011), were reassured of their positions through

the Iranian regime’s suppression of the Green Revolution. Hence, the people of the MENA

countries arguably complied with what Shapiro (2000) defines as irrationality from the

standpoint of strategic rationality. Such irrationality means that individuals do not follow a

self-gain rationale since they choose the risk of being killed, wounded or imprisoned, rather

than to be a “free rider” that reaps the public benefits of the collective revolutionary activities

(Salert, 1976:34-35). Scott (2000:131) believes that the norm-based prevalence of altruism

that hampers rationalists’ explanations of collective action comprises “what Parsons (1937)

called the Hobbesian problem of order: if actions are self-interested, how is social life

possible?” Hence, the Arab Spring arguably supports Fiorina’s (2000) acknowledgement that

rational choice theory is less useful in contexts with a relatively high number of actors.

However, it can be propounded that neorealism is able to account for some key rationality

aspects of the Arab Spring. While the sources of the MENA violence are debatable, the

violence potentially reflects what Wallace (2012:37) calls social agents’ inability to fully

endorse the overall envisions they pursue. The “I know what I don’t want” quote of a

protester that took part in the events at Cairo’s Tahir Square (Brinjy, 2011) could therefore be

interpreted in a way that facilitates an understanding of the dissatisfied population as merely

troublemakers. Such image of the population is arguably reinforced by the enduring turmoil

that surrounded the post-revolution elections in Egypt. Furthermore, it may fit within the

neorealist view of the society as a strategic domain for the pursuit of predefined interests.

These conceptions are reasonably challenged through the notion that the plurality of

ideational elements produces different perspectives amongst the individuals that seek societal

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change. Nonetheless, the consequence appears to be a status quo that hampers constructivists’

explanations. This is potentially evidential in the outcomes of the MENA events.

According to Tufekci (2011), “united we stand, divided we fall” is the scenario that arises

from the rational choice theory related game theory calculations. And one could suggest that

this dynamic captures the conclusion of the Arab upheavals. Yemen continues to struggle

with the creation of societal stability (Kechichian, 2014), and The Economist (2014A) refers

to the post-protest developments in Algeria as stagnation. “Egypt’s old regime is back in

power” (Steinberg, 2013), and the leadership of Jordan used the chaotic situation in the region

to strengthen its position (Murad, 2014). The systemic-level approach of neorealism

apparently accounts for such reality through two elements highlighted by Barnard (2013): the

entrenched interests and outside manipulation of the Arab countries.

In terms of entrenched interests, the MENA region lacks de facto and de jure regionalisation

(Talani, 2014:70) due to flimsy institutionalisation (Fawcett, 2013:189). This may represent a

form of marginalisation of societal potential, which is further enhanced by element number

two, the outside manipulation. Germond (2014A) points out the realist view of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Libya, which holds that the alliance

promoted the interests of its member nations, such as the control of oil resources. This

perspective is strengthened by the United States of America’s (US) support to the Arab Spring

surviving regimes of Bahrain (Dooley, 2014) and Djibouti (Suqi, 2014), based on own

military interests. Moreover, the outreach of protestors to the Western world could be seen as

enhancing the visibility of the Western states’ manipulative power throughout the whole Arab

Spring. Hence, it can be propounded that neorealism is correctly explaining how the MENA

countries end up in their pre-Arab Spring material-based structural positions, without any

influence of an ideational structure between the domestic environments and the states, or the

states and the international system.

Still, when the end result of the Arab Spring is considered, constructivism arguably illustrates

its value. One could suggest that in several of the MENA nations, the presence of an

ideational structure is mainly identifiable in the potential for change, since “the Arab world’s

transitions are a process that will take at least a decade to unfold” (Alterman, 2013).

Additionally, democratic reform policies have already been implemented in Tunisia (Sadiki,

2014) and Morocco (Tawil, 2013:18). Even in Syria, where the Arab Spring ended in an

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enduring Civil War, Saad-Ghorayeb (2012) concludes that it is wrong by neorealists to reduce

the actions of the regime to crude power politics. Specifically, she emphasises the need for a

constructivist approach, in order to capture the mechanisms that surround the role of identity

within the historically rooted anti-imperialist Syrio-centric Arabism that influences the Syrian

regime.

Finally, an analysis of the Arab Spring may need to address the role of religion, as Zubaida

(1993:140) points out that within the MENA region, modern Islam has developed alongside

the state system. Such need naturally applies to considerations regarding the implications of

the Arab Spring, and neorealism could be able to account for some relevant aspects. Firstly,

Esposito (1995:202) underlines that states traditionally act as the determinant of the region’s

foreign policy. Secondly, it can be suggested that religious extremists’ exploitation of power

vacuums that arose in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, has the potential to contribute to real

world evolvements along the lines of Huntington’s (1993) theory of a “Clash of

Civilizations”. Milani & Gibbons (2001) find that this theory of a clash between supra-

national civilisations unintentionally fits neorealists’ understanding of the behavioural

patterns of states.

Still, constructivism arguably adds to the explanatory power by embracing the diversity of the

ideational factors that surround the state and religion both individually and together. The

relevance of this aspect is for example evidential in Labott’s (2014) highlighting of the fact

that several Arab Spring countries take part in an international military coalition in the battle

against the Islamic State (ISIS). Such efforts could also reflect elements of a sociological-

based regionalisation and globalisation. These regionalisation and globalisation dynamics are

similar to the ones that developed the pan-Arabian meanings that, according to Andersen

(2011), were shared around the world and led to the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US

as well as protests across Europe including Russia. The authoritarian way in which Russia

dealt with those demonstrations apparently resembles characteristics of its current view on

foreign affairs. This authoritarian context will be further explored in the next section of this

essay, based on Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.

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Russia’s intervention in Ukraine

The on-going Russian-Ukraine conflict started with the uprising of the Ukrainian public

against Ukraine’s decision to abandon a European Union (EU) partnership deal in November

2013 (Yuhas, 2014). In February 2014, the Russian-friendly President Yanukovych was

ousted as a result of the revolts (Amos & Walker, 2014), and days later, Moscow-backed

separatists had used force and questionable local parliamentary voting to practically hand over

Crimea to Russia (Carbonnel, 2014). The annexation was manifested through a dubious

Crimean referendum held on March 16 (Somin, 2014). In the early fall of 2014, both NATO

(2014) and Western media like The Economist (2014B) reported that Russian troops were on

the ground in the eastern parts of Ukraine to support Russia-friendly separatist movements in

the Donbass region. September 5th marked the start of a ceasefire that has been maintained

sporadically in the affected areas (Reuters, 2014). Hartley-Parkinson (2014) points out these

areas:

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Map constructed based on the content of Hartley-Parkinson (2014).

Russia’s foreign policy is generally guided by realpolitik (Doctorow, 2013), and one could

suggest that this characterises the country’s intervention in Ukraine. The intervention’s

violation of international law (Voeten, 2014, The Nation, 2014) and morality (Spencer, 2014)

appears to strengthen such view and naturally provide a foundation for the neorealist

paradigm. The relevance of neorealism’s explanations is additionally reinforced through their

application of Waltz’s (1979) concept of balance of power and Walt’s (1985) modified theory

of balance of threat.

The US and the United Kingdom, the world’s two great liberal democracies, have fought

numerous wars together since the Cold War ended (Mearsheimer, 2010:92). Consequently,

several realists believe that the imperialists are in Washington and Brussels, not Moscow

(Kirchiek, 2014). While the recent efforts of the EU to incorporate Ukraine into its sphere of

influence increased Russia’s distrust of the Western world (Evans, 2014), Russia is less

concerned about Ukraine’s economic relations with the EU than the expansion of NATO

(The Nation, 2014). NATO’s encirclement of Russian territory (Doctorow, 2013) now

includes eight former members of the Warsaw Pact and three of the former Soviet republics

(Goodman, 2014). NATO has been close to offer both Georgia and Ukraine membership, and

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 was in accordance with Russia’s Foreign Secretary

Lavrov’s conception that the West forced his country to go to war somewhere (Stacey, 2014).

Russia’s resistance to NATO is arguably further reflected in the view that the West instigated

the Ukrainian protests, and Walker (2014) finds this perception to be predominant amongst

Russian foreign policy officials. Still, Germond (2014B) points out constructivists’ belief in

the need to open the black box of the state, in order to explain national interests rather than to

take them as an explanatory factor. And regarding Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, there are

interconnected aspects between elitist behaviour, the creation of Russia’s identity-based

interests, and the place of the Russian intervention within the international system that prove

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the value of the constructivist approach.

The crackdown on the demonstrations against the legitimacy of the inauguration of Putin as

president for a third term in 2012 (Carbonnel & Tsvetkova, 2012) could illustrate Shevtsova’s

(2005:106) notion that Putin’s policies are guided by l’état, c’est moi principles. Yet, while

such state-president identification apparently fits neorealism’s conception of a unitary state

actor, this does not exclude the presence of distinct ideational structures. Putin is often

associated with seeking to restore a fallen empire (Radia, 2014). Still, his power base has

fundamentally been built on consolidating the Russian society around the idea of stability

through economic development in his first two periods, and a more conservative focus on the

country’s security in his third period (Lukyanov, 2014). It can be suggested that a common

characteristic in the selection of these stability measures has been that Putin’s own

identity-based perceptions interact with the construction of national interests. This dynamic is

arguably further evidential in the ideational elements that surround the role of identity in

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.

Nichols (2014) believes that the key to understanding the intervention is that Putin is a so-

called sovok (Soviet guy), a man of the old system. He has for example restored the Soviet

National Anthem as Russia’s national anthem (Warren, 2000) and been criticised for his

desire to change school books to invoke nostalgia for the Soviet Union (Baczynska, 2013).

Consequently, Putin’s rhetoric in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation seemed

predictable. Referencing Russian history and the dubious Crimean referendum, Putin (2014)

has talked about unified national values for a divided people. Specifically, his idea of national

identity includes protecting the interests of ethnic Russians (Spencer, 2014) as well as

creating a sense of post-Cold War victimisation and a shared perception that Crimea is a

primordial part of the Russian territory (Western, 2014).

Moreover, the fact that the interaction between Putin’s identity and national interests is rooted

in changeable ideational elements within the broader Russian society, arguably hampers the

reasoning of neorealism in various ways. Overall, in terms of the need for Putin to justify the

stability measures (Trudolyubov, 2014), and secondly, through explanations of the

circumstances and the rhetoric that are involved in the justification of the intervention in

Ukraine. On the one hand, the Ukrainian coup and Kiev’s contemporary Western orientation

could be viewed as a result of Ukraine giving up its nuclear deterrence capabilities

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(Mearsheimer, 2014). Additionally, the conflicting nature of Putin’s referral to both

sovereignty norms and humanitarian intervention norms may demonstrate the presence of a

rational hypocrisy that fits the explanatory framework of neorealism. On the other hand,

Western influence apparently reflects the dynamics of what D’Anieri (2002:43,54) finds to be

an enduring Ukrainian identity crisis based on the country’s relations with Russia. Moreover,

regarding Putin’s conflicting norm referrals, it is relevant to consider Reus-Smit’s (2013:226)

outlining of the general constructivist perspective that norm rationalisation relies upon an

established moral force within a given social context.

Finally, in terms Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, neorealism struggles to account for the

outcome of the justification process independently of the direction of the outcome. If the

justification is widely accepted, which seems to be the case based on Putin’s record-high

domestic popularity rating (Birnbaum, 2014), this underlines the presence and power of the

construction of social facts. If the justification is to be rejected, as The Economist (2014C)

predicts will be the reaction to the growing effects of the West’s economic sanctions that

target Russia, it would demonstrate the risk of playing on emotions and thereby contradict

realism’s belief in states as capable of balancing strengths against wishes (Lukyanov, 2014).

Both the perspective of the presence of social facts, and the perspective that their

construction may result in costs outweighing the benefits, are arguably strengthened through

Western’s (2014) conclusion that there are no clear geostrategic advantages of Russia’s

intervention in Ukraine.

Although the end result of the intervention will not impact the international balance of power

(Lukyanov, 2014), one could suggest that it reflects it. Russia’s use of force seems to support

Mearsheimer’s (2010:92) view that globalisation has not crippled the state. Additionally,

Russia’s primary partners are to be found amongst the BRICS countries and within the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Eurasian Union (Doctorow, 2013). Today’s world

order may therefore equal the multipolarity that Wohlforth (2012:49) points out was predicted

by neorealism as a response to the end of the Cold War. However, it can be propounded that a

sphere of more dispersed meaningful power challenges the traditional role of the state. Haass’

(2008) outlining of a contemporary nonpolar world involves the influence of militias and

terrorist organisations. The potential impact of such groups is arguably compatible with

Germond’s (2014C) conceptual broadening of the security agenda to include the security

object of societal identity in today’s deterritorialised and destatilised security environment.

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On the one hand, the foreign state-sponsored military activities of the rebels in eastern

Ukraine may to some extent fit within this context. And the implications for Ukrainian

societal identity apparently prove the value of constructivism in explaining contemporary

dynamics within international relations. On the other hand, one could point out Russia’s

influence on the rebels’ activities, in what neorelists therefore will deem as a conflict between

rational states.

Nonetheless, a broad representative survey of American international relations scholars

showed that both realists and constructivists mostly failed to predict the Russian intervention

in Ukraine (Maliniak et al., 2014, referred by Voeten, 2014). This illustrates the general need

to explore the balance between theoretical and empirical validation, and in terms of

constructivism such exploration will be conducted in the next section of this essay.

Theoretical and Empirical validation

According to a quote often attributed to Emmanuel Kant, ”experience without theory is blind,

but theory without experience is mere intellectual play”. In the quest for balancing theoretical

and empirical evidences, constructivism may erode from the inside and out. Hopf

(1998:199,181) points out the difference between “conventional” constructivists whose

orientation is geared towards the recast of mainstream international relations puzzles, and

“critical” constructivists whose work is to a larger extent rooted in critical social theory. And

based on Reus-Smit’s (2013:229-233) description of constructivism and its discontents, one

could suggest that an internal ambiguity over the purpose of theory, relationship with

rationalism, methodology and contribution to critical theory, results in an absence of unity that

makes it harder to absorb external criticism.

In terms of the nature of social agency, Zehfuss (2006:94) highlights a fundamental contradiction

in constructivists’ potential dependency on an identity, in the shape of an actor, being given.

Furthermore, Phillips (2007:65) underlines constructivists’ challenge of establishing the relative

importance of ideational structures, due to a lack of explanations of the selectivity that surrounds

the use of logic of appropriateness and norm compliance. Constructivists’ diverse approach to

issue like these may, together with constructivist’s frequent application of intangible words like

“social learning” (Checkel, 2000), validate the realist notion that constructivism is “too abstract”

(Flockhart, 2012:79). Firstly, this potential weakness could illustrate that constructivism

struggles to meet the purpose of theorising international relations, which according to Germond

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(2014D) consists of explaining the facts out there, understand and improve global politics, and

change the world. Overall, the potential abstractness apparently strengthens Brown & Ainley’s

(2009:48) view that constructivism is unable to establish itself as a genuine theoretical approach.

However, by applying the same form of criticism, the existence of various realism strains implies

to some extent that the whole realist school is intangible. Moreover, a lack of internal

constructivist unity could enable academic progress within the field of international relations

theory. The reason for this is that, rather than a general theory, most constructivists confine their

ambitions to an analytical framework of “heavily qualified contingent generalisations” (Reus-

Smit, 2013:230). Such possibilities for theoretical manoeuvring have arguably resulted in

descriptions of constructivism as a paradigm with “something for everyone” (Weber, 2014:60)

and an “almost frightening potential” (Waever, 1997:25). Beyond increasing the opportunities to

provide valuable perspectives on cases like the Arab Spring or Russia’s intervention in Ukraine,

the fact that the looseness of constructivism revolves around constructivism’s common main

principles may facilitate some form of theoretical synthesis. This is evidential in constructivism’s

natural prospect for cooperation with liberalists, international society theorists, neo-Marxists

(Jackson & Sorensen, 2007:174-175) and poststructuralists (Pouliot, 2004:327). At the same

time, Guzzini & Leander (2006:89) emphasise that for reflective scientists, a synthesis only

makes sense if scholars in the end depart from it. Hence, in sum, constructivists’ approach could

be seen as a way to maximise the potential of theoretical analysis of international relations

through an understanding of constructivism and its role within the discipline.

Still, a framework based around the possibility of always being able to identify a referable norm

or identity, inhibits characteristics that facilitate for total post-hoc explanations and non-

falsifiability (Phillips, 2005:123). The negative implications of the non-falsifiability are for

example empirically evidential in Snyder’s (2009) finding that the constructivist theoretical

approach shapes components in many policymakers’ decisions. Theoretically, the referencing to

norms and identities that constitutes the foundation for such non-falsifiability criticism may

reflect the incommensurability of the ontological and epistemological positions of constructivists

and rationalists (Phillips, 2005:123). The fundamental difference between the positions regarding

the role of norms may be summed up in the sociological notion that the theoretical paradigm of

international relations is a social fact in itself.

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However, while rationalists’ non-falsifiability criticism is strengthened by the sociological view

that the criticism reflects a misguided understanding of what science should be rather than what

it is, the inclusion of material structures in constructivism’s core perspectives illustrates the

complementary potential of the two approaches. And by combining this type of non-entrenched

exploration with “substantive empirical contributions” (Adler, 2010:103) and essential

descriptive links (Choi & Caporaso, 2010:489), constructivism is arguably collectively revolving

around the kind of midrange theorising that, according to Rose (1998:168), “often is the best

social science can hope to achieve”. It could be suggested that such midrange theorising enables

a reduction in the tensions between theorists and practitioners, who Guzzini & Leander

(2006:92) believe “are drifting apart”, and that constructivism therefore is suitable for the “fox

analysts” defined by Berlin (1953). Hence, although “realist and liberal perspectives are still the

theories of choice among foreign policymakers and scholars of international relations”

(Flockhart, 2012:79), constructivism has arguably been established as a legitimate alternative.

Conclusion

States’ behaviour constitutes the fulcrum of the academic field of international relations, and

various theoretical paradigms seek to account for the relevant processes, patterns and events.

Within this context, the prominence of neorealism is based on some distinct notions. They include

states’ focus on survival in a power oriented anarchical international system. Still, neorealism’s

rigid emphasis on materialistic structures within this system has hampered its explanations of

significant occurrences like the ending of the Cold War. The result has been a theoretical space,

which constructivism’s core perspectives have aimed to fill by applying ideational structures in an

attempt to bridge the views of rationalists and critical theorists.

The contemporary need for a constructivist approach is evidential throughout analysis of the Arab

Spring and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The Arab people’s focus on dignity and rights

reflects the existence of an ideational structure that revolves around knowledge and values.

Moreover, the personification of the perceived inception of the MENA events and the way the

aspiration of change was socially reinforced across society and societies prove the interaction

between identity and interests, ideational structures and actors. Ideational elements are also visible

in the shared ideas and norms that surround president Putin’s domestically accepted justification

of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The definability of these ideational elements’ characteristics

is to some extent enhanced by Putin’s attempt to merge his own and the national identity.

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Still, there are factors that apparently promote neorealist explanations through a state actor’s

marginalisation of the role of society. In terms of the Arab Spring, this could be found in a lack of

a fully endorsement of change, resulting in a dissatisfied population being viewed as merely

troublemakers. Regarding Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the marginalisation may be reflected in

Putin’s hypocritical referral to conflicting sovereignty norms and humanitarian intervention norms

within the domestic environment. The neorealist framework is potentially further validated by the

apparent outcome of systemic status quo in the balance of power within the international system.

In terms of the MENA region, this argument is rooted in minimal regionalisation and considerable

Western influence. In the case of Russia, the argument builds on the country’s partnership with

non-Western states due to the fear for the very same kind of influence.

However, constructivism’s main perspectives do not exclude materialistic structures, and they

account for what could be deemed as at least complementary necessities. The existence of

ideational structures in autocratic regimes like Russia and the Arab states hampers neorealist

assumptions. Specifically, there are evidences that apparent rational behaviour is characterised by

ideational forces within a given social context. The people of the MENA region approached a

collective action problem through the selfless behaviour of socialised individuals. In Russia, the

possibility that the Western economic sanctions will lead to a rational domestic rejection of the

justification of the intervention in Ukraine, just underlines the presence of an irrational strategy

based on emotions. Moreover, an understanding of the construction of social facts can be

necessary for explanations that target the international system. The ideas of the Arab Spring were

globalised, and some Arab countries’ post-Arab Spring implementation of publicly welcomed

policies points to dynamics of regionalisation. The emergence of ISIS and the role played by

rebels in Ukraine may to various extents illustrate the threat of non-state actors to societal identity

in a non-polar world.

Still, empirical validation does not equal theoretical validation, and constructivism faces criticism

in terms of the balance. There is a contradicting potential dependency on the existence of actors’

identity in order for it to be created, and the relative importance of the ideational structure seems

blurred. Furthermore, the sociological orientation could naturally make constructivism non-

falsifiable. Constructivists’ diverse approach to issues like these apparently strengthens the view

of constructivism as an abstract paradigm. However, most constructivists confine their ambitions

to an analytical framework of contingent generalisations. Collectively, such theorisation could

18

through a natural internal diversity, possibilities for cooperation with scholars of other theoretical

schools, and the reflectivist notion that a potential theoretical synthesis is not and end, maximise

explanatory opportunities based on an understanding of constructivism and its role within the

discipline.

In the end, to what extent constructivism’s core perspectives are able to account for contemporary

international relations, compared to neorealism, depends on policymakers’ actions. Nonetheless,

the sum of their actions constitutes patterns and constructivism captures significant and complex

events like the Arab Spring and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Constructivism is therefore a

viable approach for “fox analysts” who seek to get the right answer by defining instead of

defending. Hence, the application of constructivism could reduce the tension between theory and

practice, depending on “what analysts make of it”.

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