IGNACIO MESINA,plaintiff-appellant,vs.EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL.,defendants.EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA,defendant-appellee.Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.Luis Manalang and Associates for appellee.G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960

BAUTISTA ANGELO,J.:Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case pending before the same court covering the property described therein be given due course and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations. The reasons advanced are: the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration or issuance of patent over the property was issued "sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout", while the transfer certificate of title covering the same was issued on September 16, 1953. The present action which calls for the cancellation of said decree and title has, therefore, been filed after the elapse of more than four years, which cannot be done, because the title has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence the present appeal.Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world and up to the present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at present the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238; that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands, without exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their favor as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their name by the register of deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land because it is a private property of plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff prays that said decree and title be cancelled.Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section 48-bof Commonwealth Act 141), provides:(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceeding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.In the case ofSusi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Thus, the following is what this Court said on the matter:It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. ... When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-forty years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. ... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover the presumptionjuris et de jureestablished paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874.If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. (Emphasis supplied)Such is the situation in which the plaintiff claims to be in his complaint. He alleges that he is the owner in fee simple of the lot in question, with the improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to the present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof. He further claims that said lot is present the subject of a registration proceeding pending in the same court, known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238. If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,1which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outrightwithout giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would have been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial court.Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes1Sorsogonvs. Makalintal, 80 Phil., 259; 45 Off. Gaz., 3819; See also G. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.vs. Quirino Bolaos, 95 Phil., 106; Aguilar, et al.vs. Caoagdan, et al., 105 Phil., 661; 56 Off. Gaz. (28) 4546; Hendersonvs. Garrido, et al., G.R. No. L-4913, December 28, 1951.

FIRST DIVISION

THE HEIRS OF EMILIOG.R. No. 160832SANTIOQUE, represented byFELIMON W. SANTIOQUE,Petitioners,Present:

PANGANIBAN,CJ.,- versus -Chairperson,YNARES-SANTIAGO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., andTHE HEIRS OF EMILIO CALMA,CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.FABIAN CALMA, AGATONACALMA, and DEMETRIACALMA, represented by LOPEAKOL and LUCIA CALMA-AKOL,and the REGISTER OF DEEDSOF THEPROVINCEOFTARLAC,Promulgated:Respondents.October 27, 2006--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR.,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65352 affirming the Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 8634, as well as the Resolution datedNovember 21, 2003which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.OnMarch 31, 1932, the Governor General granted a homestead patent over a 20.9740-hectare parcel of land located in Barrio Tibag, Tarlac, Tarlac.On the basis of said patent, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1112 was issued by the Register of Deeds onApril 21, 1932.The title was cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13287.OnNovember 27, 1953, TCT No. 13287 was cancelled by TCT No. 19181 under the names of Agatona Calma, Fabian Calma, Emilio Calma and Demetria Calma.[3]OnSeptember 23, 1954, the parties executed a contract of lease in favor of the Spouses Lope A. Akol, who then executed an Assignment of Leasehold Rights under the Contract of Lease in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) onJanuary 26, 1955.[4]In the meantime, Fabian Calma died intestate.A petition for the administration of his estate was filed in the RTC of Tarlac docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1262. Lucia Calma was appointed as administratrix of the estate.The heirs executed a Deed of Partition over the property onApril 17, 1967.OnSeptember 13, 1967,[5]TCT No. 19181 was cancelled by TCT No. 71826 in the names of Agatona Calma, Emilio Calma, Demetria Calma and Fabian Calma.Meanwhile, in 1967, a 20.564-ha parcel of land located in Tibag, Tarlac and identified as Lot No. 3844 of Pat-H-132104 - prt. was declared for taxation purposes under the name of Emilio Santioque (Tax Dec. No. 19675).[6]However, the declaration did not bear the name and signature of the declarant.OnJune 3, 1973, Santioque died intestate.His children, Felimon, Rose, Filomena, Jose, Josefina, Ana, Rufino, and Avelina, all surnamedSantioque, filed on February 29, 1998, a complaint in the RTC of Tarlac for declaration of nullity of title, reconveyance, with damages, over a piece of land situated in Tibag,TarlacCity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8634.The heirs claimed that on March 31, 1932, Emilio was awarded Homestead Patent No. 18577 by virtue of Homestead Application No. 132104 over a lot located in Barrio Tibag, Tarlac City; the said lot was identified as Lot No. 3844 of the Tarlac Cadastre No. 274, with an area of 20.5464 hectares; OCT No. 1112 was issued to Emilio on April 21, 1932, and from then had enjoyed full ownership and dominion over the said lot; and prior to his death, Emilio ordered Felimon to work for the recovery of the said property.[7]They further averred that when Felimon went to the Register of Deeds of Tarlac for a final verification, he discovered that the lot covered by OCT No. 1112 was already registered in the names of Agatona, Fabian, Emilio and Demetria, all surnamed Calma, under TCT No. 19181 issued on November 27, 1953. It appeared from the said TCT No. 19181 that the title was a transfer from TCT No. 13287.[8]The heirs contended that Emilio was the first registrant of the subject lot and, as such, was its lawful owner. The land could no longer be the subject matter of subsequent cadastral proceedings, and any title issued pursuant thereto would be void. They prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, as follows:WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered ordering the nullification of TCT No. 19181 and TCT No. 13287 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac and upholding and declaring the existence, legality and validity of the Homestead Patent bearing No. 18577 and OCT No. 1112 issued in the name of the late Emilio Santioque and 1. Ordering Defendants to reimburse to the Plaintiffs the income, profits or benefits unjustly derived by them from TCT No. 19181 and 13287 the estimation of which is left to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court;2. Ordering the Defendants to pay to the Plaintiffs the amount ofP50,000.00 as attorneys fees;3. Cost of suit;4. Any and all remedies just and equitable under the premises.[9]The heirs of Calma filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that (a) the action had prescribed and was barred by laches; (b) the claim has been abandoned, and (c) the complaint stated no cause of action.[10]The court denied the motion.The heirs of Calma filed their answer, reiterating the grounds and allegations in their motion to dismiss by way of special and affirmative defenses.[11]During trial, Felimon Santioque testified for the plaintiffs.He admitted that they had no copy of OCT No. 1112; the Register of Deeds likewise had no record of the said title, nor TCT No. 13287.[12]He discovered from the said office that the subject lot was covered by TCT No. 19181 with the names of Agatona Calma and her co-heirs as owners.[13]The title was, in turn, cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 71286 also in the names of Agatona Calma and her co-heirs.On cross-examination, Felimon declared that his father, Emilio, mentioned the property to the plaintiffs sometime before he died in 1973. From that time on, he tried to ascertain the particulars of the property and succeeded in 1990 only when he went through the records at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO).[14]Felimon declared that, onAugust 4, 1992, he secured a document from the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) stating that onMarch 1 to 6, 1930, a parcel of land with an area of 209,746 square meters located in Tibag, Tarlac, Tarlac, was surveyed byW. Santiagoand approved onFebruary 27, 1932.[15]However, the document was not certified by the Chief Geodetic Engineer.Neither did the plaintiffs present the employee of the Bureau who prepared the document to testify on its authenticity.Felimon admitted that Amando Bangayan,Chief, Records Management Division of the LMB certified that, based on the survey records of Cadastral Survey No. 274 and as indicated in the Area Sheet of Lot 3844, Cad. 274, Emilio Santioque was the claimant of the lot. However, the Bureau had no available records of Homestead Application No. 132104 and Homestead Patent No. 18577 datedMarch 31, 1932.[16]Felino Cortez, Chief, Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), certified that after due verification of the records of the Book of Cadastral Lots, Lot 3844 had been the subject of Cadastral Case No. 61, LRC Cad. Record No. 1879; the case had been decided but no final decree of registration had been issued; and the lot was subject to the annotation con patent No. 18577 segunreportof B.L.[17]The Register of Deeds of Tarlac stated that, onJanuary 25, 1998, despite diligent efforts, he could not locate TCT No. 13287 and OCT No. 1112 or any other document leading to the issuance of TCT No. 19181. He explained that in 1987 and 1988, his office had to be reconstructed, and titles and documents had to be moved from one place to another.[18]The Register of Deeds issued a certification[19]datedSeptember 10, 1998stating that despite diligent efforts, he could not locate OCT No. 1112 or any document showing how it was cancelled.The Records Officer of the Register of Deeds inTarlac Cityalso certified that OCT No. 1112 and TCT No. 13287 could not be found despite diligent efforts.[20]After the heirs of Santioque rested their case, the defendants, heirs of Calma, demurred to plaintiffs evidence and sought its dismissal on the ground that the latter failed to establish a preponderance of evidence to support their ownership over the property.[21]OnAugust 11, 1999, the trial court issued an Order[22]granting the demurrer and dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish their case.The heirs of Santioque appealed said order to the CA claiming thatITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO PROVE THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1112 WAS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF EMILIO SANTIOQUE, THE PLAINTIFFS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUFFICIENT, ADEQUATE AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO PROVE THAT SAID OCT 1112 WAS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF EMILIO SANTIOQUE.IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESORTING TO SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES WHEN IT RULED THAT OCT 1112 COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO ANOTHER PERSON OTHER THAN THE LATE EMILIO SANTIOQUE.IIITHE TRIAL COURT ALSO RESORTED TO SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT PATENT NO. 18577 WAS ISSUED TO EMILIO SANTIOQUE, THUS DISREGARDING THE COMPETENT AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS TO PROVE THAT SAID PATENT WAS ISSUED TO EMILIO SANTIOQUE.IVTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TCT NO. 19181 ISSUED TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WAS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS WHEN IN FACT ITS ISSUANCE IS PLAINLY FRAUDULENT AND EVIDENTLY ANOMALOUS.VTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES HAVE ACQUIRED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS HAVE SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHT FOR MANY YEARS AND THAT THEY HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ISSUANCE OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES TITLE, THUS THEY ARE ESTOPPED BY LACHES.VITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING WITHOUT VALID CAUSE TO ISSUESUBPOENA DUCES TECUMANDAD TESTIFICANDUMTO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TARLAC AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN ORDER TO SHED LIGHT ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF OCT 1112 AND THE ISSUANCE OF TCT NOS. 13287, 19181 AND 71826.[23]On August 30, 2000, Felimon Santioque wrote to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Federico Opinion, Jr., requesting for his assistance in investigating the disappearance of the copy of the Registrar of Deeds of Tarlac of OCT No. 1112 and TCT No. 13287.[24]Attached to the said letter were the following certifications and investigation reports of the LRA:1.Xerox copy of TCT No. 71826 datedSeptember 13, 1967under the names of Agatona Calma, Emilio Calma, Dorotea Calma and Lucia Calma.[25]2.Certified xerox copy Tax Declaration No. 22116 in the name of Agatona Calma, et al;[26]3.Certified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 39766 in the name of Agatona Calma, et al;[27]4.Certified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 35226 in the names of Agatona Calma, et al;[28]5.Certified xerox copy of the Investigation Report of Mr. Felix Cabrera Investigator, Land Registration Authority, dated September 30, 1999, finding that there are no documents in the Registry supporting the cancellation of OCT 1112 and the issuance of TCT Nos. 13287, and that TCT No. 71826 is irregularly issued inasmuch as no transaction which would justify its issuance appears in the Primary Entry Book;[29]6.Certification of Mr. Andres B. Obiena, Records Officer I of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, Tarlac, dated April 5, 1999, that OCT No. 1112 could not be located in the archives;[30]7.Certification of Mr. Meliton I. Vicente, Jr., Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR, Region III, that Lot No. 3844 is already covered by Homestead Application No. 132104 with Patent No. 1877 issued to Emilio Santioque on March 31, 1932;[31]8.Certified xerox copy of Record Book Page 383 signed by Florida S. Quiaoit, Records Management Unit, CENRO III-6,TarlacCity, showing that Emilio Santioque is a claimant of Lot No. 3844 under Homestead Application No. HA-132104 and Patent No. 1877;[32]9.Certified xerox copy of Area Sheet overLot3844 prepared for Emilio Santioque, certified by Emilanda M. David, Record Officer 1, DENRO,San Fernando, Pampanga datedFebruary 29, 2000;[33]10.Certified xerox copy of Case No. 6, Cad Record No. I, showing that Emilio Santioque was the claimant of Lot No. 3844, under Pat-H-132104 Part.[34]The heirs of Santioque did not present the said documents at the trial below but they included the same in their appellants brief.Without waiting for the report of the NBI on their request, the heirs of Santioque filed a motion with the CA for the early resolution of the case.[35]OnJune 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the appealed decision.[36]The appellate court did not give probative weight to the certifications and other documents submitted by the heirs of Santioque, as their authenticity had not been established and the signatories therein were not presented for cross-examination. It noted that none of the crucial documents were presented in the trial court.Assuming that OCT No. 1112 was indeed issued to Emilio Santioque, the claim of his heirs was nevertheless barred by laches; the latter must bear the consequences of their fathers inaction.The heirs of Santioque filed a motion for reconsideration,which the CA resolved to denyonNovember 21, 2003.[37]The heirs of Santioque, now petitioners, seek relief from this Court on the following issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE CERTIFICATIONS, DOCUMENTS, RECORDS AND PICTURES SUBMITTED BY PETITIONER BEFORE THE SAID COURT ON THE GROUND THAT THEY WERE NOT SUBMITTED IN EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL AND THAT THEIR AUTHENTICITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE SAME AS EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND TO ESTABLISH THEIR AUTHENTICITY WAS DUE TO THE PREMATURE AND UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSAL OF THEIR COMPLAINT, WHICH WAS TANTAMOUNT TO DENIAL OF THEIR RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND TO DUE PROCESS.II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO PRESENT THEIR ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, OCT NO. 1112, SUFFICIENT AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE WERE ADDUCED BY PETITIONERS TO PROVE THAT SAID TITLE WAS ISSUED TO THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, EMILIO SANTIOQUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, SINCE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON RESPONDENTS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, THE RESPONDENTS FAILED EITHER (1) TO CONTROVERT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONERS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CLAIM OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OR THEIR PRETENSION OF FACTS.III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THE CASE WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENTS ARE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, DESPITE CLEAR ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENTS TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM OF POSSESSION AND AS EVIDENCED BY THE PICTURES SUBMITTED BY PETITIONERS.IV.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS DID NOTHING TO RECOVER THEIR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, OCT NO. 1112, IN A DIRECT ACTION IF INDEED SAID OCT NO. 1112 WAS ISSUED TO EMILIO SANTIOQUE AND INVALIDLY CANCELLED AND REPLACED WITH TCT NO. 13287 IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS, AND THAT THE PETITIONERS SHOULD BEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR FATHER EMILIO SANTIOQUES INACTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS HAVE BEEN VIGILANT OF THEIR RIGHTS AND, HENCE, PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES DO NOT BAR PETITIONERS COMPLAINT.V.WHETHER OR NOT REMAND OF THE INSTANT CASE TO THELOWER COURTIS PROPER, INSTEAD OF A DECISION ON THE MERITS.[38]Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in not giving credence to the certifications, records, documents and pictures they attached to their appellants brief. They aver that they had not yet discovered the said documents when they presented their evidence at the trial court; hence, they could have presented the documents and their affiants during the rebuttal stage of the proceedings had the trial court not prematurely aborted the proceedings before it. They insist that they were denied their right to due process when the trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case.[39]Petitioners aver that they have clearly shown and proven their claim over the property, particularly through Tax Dec. No. 19675 and the contents of the Record Book. They posit that judicial notice should be taken that tax declarations are usually issued in the name of the prospective owner upon a showing of the basis of ownership. On the other hand, respondents have no factual and evidentiary basis to support their claim over the subject property since they have not adduced before the trial court any documentary and testimonial evidence to support ownership of the property. Petitioners further contend that they have clearly shown, through the pictures they submitted before the appellate court, that respondents have not been in actual possession of the property; hence, it cannot be presumed that respondents, as registered owners, are likewise in possession of the subject property.[40]Petitioners aver that prescription and laches do not bar their complaint since they have been vigilant in protecting their rights. They contend that Emilio was old and sickly and died at an old age. Laches presupposes negligence, and neither Emilio nor his successors were negligent in protecting their rights over the subject property.It took sometime before they could lodge a complaint against respondents because they had to make inquiries first and retrieve documents from different offices to support their claim.[41]For their part, respondents aver that there were noindiciaof proof that OCT No.1112 was really issued to Emilio. The evidence proffered by the petitioners only tends to prove that Emilio was a mere claimant. It is not incumbent upon the respondents to present any proof that they are the owners of the subject lot because the property is registered in their name. The mere fact that the records are not available would notipso factomean that the transactions made affecting OCT No. 1112 were irregular.[42]Respondents further aver that the appellate court was correct in not giving credence to the documents, which were not submitted during the trial even though they were obtainable at that time. To allow the introduction of these documents on appeal would violate the essence of due process as the respondents would not be able to interpose objections to their admissibility. Even if these documents were admitted, they would not help petitioners case since they would still not prove that Emilios claim ripened into full ownership. Respondents likewise agree with the finding of the appellate court that the complaint is already barred by prescription and laches.[43]The petition is without merit.The core issues in this case are: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence of respondents, and (2) whether petitioners claim is barred by prescription and laches.On the first issue, the Court holds that CA ruling which affirmed that of the RTC granting the demurrer is correct.Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part as he would ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by plaintiffs evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief sought. The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which a court or tribunal may either grant or deny.[44]A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.[45]Where the plaintiffs evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained.[46]A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case,[47]or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim.[48]It should be sustained where the plaintiffs evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.[49]Petitioners, as plaintiffs below, were obliged to prove their claim in their complaint that their father, Emilio, applied for and was granted Homestead Patent No. 18577, and that OCT No. 1112 was issued by the Register of Deeds in his name on the basis of said patent.Petitioners had the burden of proof to present evidence on the fact in issue to establish their claim by their own evidence required by law.[50]More so, where, as in this case, on the face of TCT No. 19181 under the names of the respondents, it was derived from TCT No. 13287, which in turn cancelled OCT No. 1112 issued on April 21, 1932 on the basis of a homestead patent.It must be stressed that the original certificate of title carries a strong presumption that the provisions of law governing the registration of land have been complied with.The OCT enjoys a presumption of validity.Once the title is registered, the owners can rest secure on their ownership and possession.[51]Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with law is registered, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of aTorrenstitle issued under the land registration law.[52]In the present case, petitioners failed to prove the material allegations in their complaint that Emilio Santioque applied for and was granted Patent No. 18577 and that OCT No. 1112 was issued on the basis thereof.We quote with approval the ruling of the RTC:The plaintiffs failed to prove that OCT [N]o. 1112 was issued in the name of Emilio Santioque. It was issued all right, but there is no evidence it was in the name of Emilio Santioque. OCT [N]o. 1112 could have been in the name of another person. Exhibit B merely shows that Emilio Santioque is a survey claimant.Exhibit A contradicted all these claims of plaintiffs. It is stated therein that Lot No. 3844 of Tarlac Cadastre, Cadastral Case [N]o. 61, L.R.C. Record No. 1879 was previously decided but no final decree of registration has yet issued thereon. Hence, there was already a decision by the cadastral court. In whose favor the land was awarded is a mystery up to the date.There is also no evidence that [P]atent [N]o. 18577 was issued to Emilio Santioque. In fact, there is no available record to prove that [P]atent [N]o. 18577 was in the name of Emilio Santioque. (Exhibit B-1) It is safe to assume that the decision of the cadastral Court awarded the land to a person who was also the awardee of [P]atent [N]o. 18577, because of the entry said lot is subject to annotation quote: con patent no. 18577 segun report of the B.L. , this being the very reason why no decree of registration was issued pursuant to the cadastral proceeding.[53]Petitioners even failed to present Homestead Application No. 132104 allegedly filed by Emilio with the Bureau of Lands.In fact, as evidenced by the Certification of the LMB, it had no record of said application and patent.The records of the LMB relative to Cadastral Case No. 61 and LRC Cad. Record No. 1879 were, likewise, not presented.It should be noted that, under Section 14 of Commonwealth Act 141, The Public Land Act, there are certain requirements that a homestead applicant should comply with before a patent could be issued to him, thus:SECTION 14.No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until at least one-fifth of the land has been improved and cultivated. The period within which the land shall be cultivated shall not be less than one nor more than five years, from the date of the approval of the application. The applicant shall, within the said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is ready to acquire the title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same, and has cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the application, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has complied with all the requirements of this Act, then, upon the payment of five pesos, as final fee, he shall be entitled to a patent.Petitioners failed to present competent and credible evidence that Emilio Calma complied with the aforesaid requirements before his death.Petitioners rely on Tax Dec. No. 19675 to substantiate their claim over the subject property. However, it is axiomatic that tax receipts and tax declarations of ownership for taxation purposes do not constitute sufficient proof of ownership. They must be supported by other effective proofs.[54]The appellate court was also correct in not giving credence to the certifications which petitioners submitted before it on the ground that thesaid documents were not presented in the trial court.Petitioners, thus, failed to prove the authenticity of said documents because they failed to present the government officials who certified the same.It is well settled that courts will consider as evidence only that which has been formally offered,[55]otherwise, the opposing party would be denied due process of law.[56]Thus, the Court explained in one case that A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment onlyand strictlyupon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.[57]Petitioners, however, contend that they could have presented the said documents during the rebuttal stage of the proceedings before the trial court. It bears stressing, however, that a plaintiff is bound to introduce all evidence that supports his case during the presentation of his evidence in chief.[58]A party holding the affirmative of an issue is bound to present all of the evidence on the case in chief before the close of the proof, and may not add to it by the device of rebuttal.[59]After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.[60]Generally, rebuttal evidence is confined to that which explains, disproves, or counteracts evidence introduced by the adverse party. It is not intended to give a party an opportunity to tell his story twice or to present evidence that was proper in the case in chief.[61]However, the court for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. This is usually allowed when the evidence is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered.[62]It is true that petitioners failed to adduce rebuttal evidence becauserespondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence. However, petitioners should have filed a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence under Rule 37, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure after the trial courtgranted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint.Petitioners aver that the documents they submitted on appeal were not yet discovered during the presentation of their evidence before the trial court.[63]Assuming this claim to be true, the Court notes however, that petitioners nevertheless failed to establish that they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the documents at the trial, and prove that such documents would probably alter the result, if presented. The documents belatedly submitted by petitioners on appeal can hardly be considered newly discovered since they are public records.Petitioners could have earlier secured copies thereof during trial.Moreover, a perusal of these documents reveals that even if admitted, they would not, in any way, bolster petitioners case, or remedy the vacuum in their evidence-in-chief.Further, we agree with the appellate court that petitioners complaint is barred by prescription and laches. An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.[64]Even if we reckon the prescription period from TCT No. 19181 issued onNovember 27, 1953, the only title verified to be in the name of respondents, more than ten years have already elapsed since then until the time the petitioners filed their complaint onFebruary 29, 1998. An action for reconveyance is imprescriptible only when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the property.[65]In the present case, there is no showing that petitioners were in actual possession of the subject property.In any event, petitioners cause of action is likewise barred by laches. The essence of laches or stale demands is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[66]Petitioners right of action had long been barred by laches during the lifetime of their father, their predecessor in interest; petitioners must necessarily bear the consequences of their predecessors inaction. We quote, with approval, the following ruling of the CA:The trial court further held that There is also no evidence that patent No. 18577 was issued to Emilio Santioque. In fact, there is no available record to prove that patent No. 18577 was in the name of Emilio Santioque. (Exhibit B-1). We add that nowhere in the certificates of title presented by appellants is the source of OCT No. 1112 indicated as Homestead Patent No. 18577.Even assuming that appellants constructive notice of another title overLotNo. 3844 could be reckoned only from 1953 when TCT No. 19181 was issued to replace TCT No. 13287, still appellants and their predecessors-in-interest waited 45 years before bringing the action below.Meanwhile, Lot No. 3844 became the subject of various litigations among appellees and with third parties, as well as several transactions, such as the contract of lease between Emilio Calmas heirs and spouses Lope A. Akol from 1954-1964 (Entry No. 46563); the Assignment of Leasehold rights to Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 1955 (Entry No. 53205); the Termination of Lease (Entry No. 1-7584; the Partial Release of Leasehold (Entry No. 65888).No proof was submitted in the court below to belie the actual possession of the subject lot by the appellees, who as the registered owners are also presumed to be in possession of the same.While the indefeasibility of theTorrenstitle of appellees can be claimed only if a previous valid title to the same parcel does not exist (Register of Deeds vs. Philippine National Bank, 13 SCRA 46), appellants have failed to establish that OCT No. 1112 was issued in their fathers name and was later invalidly cancelled in 1947 and replaced with TCT No. 13287.Only in 1998 was an action brought to directly question the validity of TCT No. 13287.The principle of laches has indeed come into play. Laches or stale demand is based upon grounds of public policy which requires for the peace of society the discouragement of stale actions, and unlike the statute of limitations is not a mere question of time but primarily a question of the inequality or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted (Pangilinan vs. Court of Appeals,279 SCRA 590).InAgne vs. Director of Lands,181 SCRA 793, 809 [1990], it was held that the failure of the registered owners to assert their claim over the disputed property for almost thirty (30) years constituted laches.The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Laches being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations, although the better rule is that courts under the principle of equity will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or doctrine of laches when to do so would result in manifest wrong or injustice result (Santiago vs. Court of Appeals,278 SCRA 98).We are aware of rulings to the effect that even if the defendants have been in actual possession of the property for more than ten (10) years, the registered title of plaintiffs over the property cannot be lost by prescription or laches (Board of Liquidators vs. Roxas,179 SCRA 809); or that an action by the registered owner to recover possession based on a Torrens title is not barred by laches (Dablo vs. Court of Appeals,226 SCRA 621). However, the laches committed by the appellants pertained to the establishment of their very title itself. Only after they have recovered their title could they then have standing to question the title of the appellants and recover possession of the subject lot. Besides, it has been held that an action for reconveyance or quieting of title instituted only after thirty (30) years could be barred by laches (City Government of Danao vs. Monteverde Consunji, 358 SCRA 107).This being so, all the more should an action to recover title, filed after 45 years, be barred by laches where the complainants title is itself clearly doubtful.[67]IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65352 areAFFIRMED.Cost against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

[1]Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos, with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (retired) and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring;rollo, pp. 60-72.[2]Penned by Judge Arsenio P. Adriano.[3]Exhibit I.[4]RTC records, p. 99.[5]Exhibit I (dorsal portion).[6]Exhibit D.[7]Records, pp. 1-2.[8]Id.at 2-3.[9]Id.at 4.[10]Id.at 39-43.[11]Id.at 54-60.[12]TSN,November 24, 1998, pp. 10-11.[13]TSN,January 14, 1999, pp. 9-14.[14]TSN,March 25, 1999, pp. 2-4.[15]Exhibit C.[16]Exhibits B and B-1.[17]Exhibit A-1.[18]Exhibit G.[19]Exhibit H-2.[20]Exhibit J.[21]Records, pp. 106-108.[22]Rollo,p. 114.[23]CArollo,pp. 34-35.[24]Id.at 73.[25]Id.at 76-77.[26]Id.at 79.[27]Id.at 80.[28]Id.at 81.[29]Id.at 82-83.[30]Id.at 84.[31]Id.at 85.[32]Id.at 86.[33]Id.at 87.[34]Id.at 89.[35]Id.at 158-159.[36]Rollo,p. 72.[37]Id.at 74.[38]Rollo,pp. 343-344.[39]Id.at 347-348.[40]Id.at 353-355.[41]Id.at 361-362.[42]Id.at 387-388.[43]Id.at 390-392.[44]Nepomuceno v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-60601,December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 472, 478.[45]Section 1, Rule 33,RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[46]Boles v. Johnson, 205Okla.356, 237 P.2d 620 (1951).[47]Carver v. Farmers & Bankers Broadcasting Corporation, 162Kan.663, 179 P.2d 195 (1947).[48]Black v. Wickett, 127Okla.53, 259 P. 642 (1927).[49]State v. Goetz, 131 Mo. 675, 33 S.W. 161 (1895).[50]RULE 131, SECTION 1, REVISED RULES OF COURT.[51]Tichangco v. Judge Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629,June 30, 2004, 433 SCRA 324, 334.[52]Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49739,January 20, 1989, 169 SCRA 271, 275.[53]Rollo, p. 113.[54]Santos v. Santos, 418 Phil. 681, 689 (2001).[55]Section 34, Rule 132,RULES OF EVIDENCE.[56]Pigao v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 150712, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 546, 557.[57]Candido v. Court of Appeals,323 Phil. 95, 100 (1996).[58]Buckingham v. Buckingham, 492 So.2d 858, 861 (1986).[59]M.E. Crawford v. City ofMeridian, 186 So. 2d 250 (1966).[60]Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429, 434 (1948).[61]Wright v. Forney, 233Neb.258, 444 N.W. 2d 895 (1989).[62]Lopez v. Liboro, supra note 60.[63]Rollo, p. 347.[64]Leyson v. Bontuyan,G.R. No. 156357,February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 94, 113.[65]Id.[66]China Airlines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,453 Phil. 959, 971-972 (2003).[67]Rollo, pp. 69-71.

THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-69303 July 23, 1987HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN, namely, Teofilo, Isabel, Maximina, Anicia, and Francisco, all surnamed Marasigan,petitioners,vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MARIA MARRON,respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:Who has a better right to the property in question, the party who bought it with a notice oflis pendensannotated at the back of her title or the party in whose favor the notice oflis pendenswas made? The appellate court answered this question in favor of the party who had the notice annotated and who won the litigation over the property. We affirm.The disputed property in this case is a residential lot (Lot No. 2-A) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila in the name of one Fe Springael-Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazar.The pertinent facts as disclosed by the record are as follows:On April 24, 1975, Civil Case No. 97479 entitled "Maria Marron v. Felicisimo Bazar and Fe S. Bazaar" was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII. The action sought to compel defendants Bazar to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale of their lot covered by T.C.T. No. 100612 in favor of Maria Marron.On January 27, 1976, while Civil Case No. 97479 was still pending, the private respondent caused the annotation of a notice oflis pendensat the back of T.C.T. No. 100612.On February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 97479. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:a) Ordering the defendants Fe Springael Bazar and Felicisimo Bazar as vendors (1) to execute in favor of the plaintiff Maria Marron as vendee a Deed of Absolute Sale in a public instrument over the residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila to and in the name of Fe S. Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazaar; and (2) to deliver to plaintiff sufficient copies of such deed of sale, together with the Owner's copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612, in order that the plaintiff can register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila and secure a transfer certificate of title for the land in her name.b) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees; andc) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. (Rollo, p. 15).The above judgment became final and executory so Maria Marron filed a motion for execution which was granted. A writ of execution was issued by the court on July 12, 1976. The spouses Bazar, however, refused to surrender their title to the property in question and to execute the required deed of sale in Marron's favor. On November 29, 1978, the lower court finally ordered the Clerk of Court to execute the deed of sale in behalf of the erring spouses. When the said deed was presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein petitioner Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.It appears that on December 18, 1974, a deed of absolute sale of Lot 2-A covered by T.C.T. No. 100612 was executed by Fe S. Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan for and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). However, it was only on July 5, 1977 that said deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Consequently, T.C.T. No. 100612 was cancelled and a new title was issued in Maria Marasigan's name. When the Register of Deeds of Manila issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126056 naming Maria Marasigan as the new owner of Lot 2-A, the notice oflis pendenscaused to be annotated by Marron on the Bazar's title was carried over on the said new title.Meanwhile, on May 26, 1977, the Bazaars filed a petition for relief from the judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. While their petition was still pending, they moved to set aside the said judgment on June 22, 1979 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons.On the other hand, on February 24, 1979, Marron instituted L.R.C. Case No. 7680 captioned "Maria Marron v. Maria Marasigan" which prayed for a court order requiring the Register of Deeds of Manila to register the deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court in behalf of the Bazaars pursuant to the order dated November 29, 1978 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, Branch XIII. L.R.C. Case No. 7680 was tried by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV acting as a land registration court. Said case was dismissed for the following reason:... This court acting as a Land Registration Court, with limited and special jurisdiction cannot act on this petition under summary proceedings but (sic) should be ventilated before a court of general jurisdiction Branch XIII, which issued the aforesaid Order dated November 29, 1978, the said petition is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice on the part of the petitioner to institute the appropriate civil action before the proper court. ... (Annex "A," p. 4, Rollo, p. 138)On September 6, 1979, Marron filed another case docketed as Civil Case No. 126378 to have Marasigan's TCT 126056 cancelled conformably to the procedure outlined in the decision of the above land registration court. On July 30, 1980, the parties submitted said case for decision.On February 18, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV to which Civil Case No. 126378 was assigned dismissed Marron's complaint for being premature since the decision rendered by the CFI, Branch XIII in Civil Case No. 97479 had not yet become final and executory considering that it was still the subject of a petition for relief from judgment.On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on August 7, 1984, ruled that Marron is entitled to the property under litigation by virtue of the notice oflis pendensannotated at the back of Maria Marasigan's title. The appellate court further ruled that the decision in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and executory because the petition for relief from judgment of the spouses Bazar was filed out of time. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered (a) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel T.C.T. No. 126056 in the name of Maria Marasigan and issue another in the name of Maria Marron by virtue of the Deed of Sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch XIII;(b) Ordering the said Register of Deeds, during the pendency of this case, to refrain from registering any deed of sale pertaining to T.C.T. No. 126056 in the name of Maria Marasigan other than that of the herein plaintiff; and(c) Ordering the defendant Maria Marasigan to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00. (IAC, Decision. Rollo, pp. 17-18).Maria Marasigan who died in the course of the proceedings is now represented by her heirs in the instant petition which assigns the following errors:ITHAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE RIGHT OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT MARIA MARRON (AS PLAINTIFF) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAD PRESCRIBED AND SHE INCURRED IN LACHES.IITHAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT RESPONDENT ABANDONED OR WAIVED HER PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EFFECTS TO/OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479, WHEN SHE FILED CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378, DURING ITS EFFECTIVITY.IIITHAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.IVTHAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378 OVER THE PERSONS OF PETITIONERS.VTHAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF DEFENDANTS SPOUSES FELICISIMO BAZAAR AND FE S. BAZAAR.VITHAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY THE DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT, WAS NOT LEGAL AND VALID AND WITHOUT PROOF AND EFFECT. (Brief for the appellant, pp. 1 and 2)We find no merit in the present petition.There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on December 18, 1974 or a little over four months before the filing of Civil Case No. 97479, the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act 496, as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) provides:Sec. 52.Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance ... affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.Moreover, there is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her transfer certificate of title to the subject property (T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar of Deeds of Manila then carried over to the new title the notice oflis pendenswhich the private respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of the Bazar's title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice oflis pendenson all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if he cancels any notice oflis pendensin violation of his duty, he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third persons (The Director of Lands, et al. v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177).A notice oflis pendensmeans that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk (Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Morales, 101 Phil. 171). It was also a clear notice to Maria Marasigan that there was a court case affecting her rights to the property she had purchased.As earlier stated it was only on July 5, 1977 that the sale between Maria Marasigan and the Bazaars became effective as against third persons. The registration of the deed of sale over the subject property was definitely subsequent to the annotation made on January 27, 1976. Consequently, Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors. (See Rivera v. Tirona, et al., 109 Phil. 505).We reiterate the established rule that:... the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. ... (Laroza v. Guia, 134 SCRA 34 1)The late Marasigan's transferors did not interpose any appeal from the adverse judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. The 30-day period under the old rule (Rule 41, section 3 of the Revised Rules of court now amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, section 39) within which the Bazaars may have taken an appeal started to run from May 12, 1976 when they were served with a copy of the said decision. On June 11, 1976, the February 24, 1976 decision in Civil Case No. 97479 became final and executory. At this point after the finality of the said decision, the Bazaars no longer had the right to alienate the property subject of the litigation. Any transaction effective during the period of litigation is subject to the risks implicit in the notice oflis pendens and to the eventual outcome of the litigation.Moreover, we agree with the finding of the appellate court that the petition for relief from judgment by the Bazaars dated May 26, 1977 was filed beyond the two periods provided in Section 3 Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. There may have been some errors in the computations but the petition itself was out of time.Rule 38, Section 3 of said Rules provides, in part, that:Sec. 3. Time for filing petition. ... A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken. ...The 60-day period must be reckoned from May 12, 1976 when the Bazaars were served with a copy of the assailed decision. Therefore, the 60-day period expired on July 11, 1976. It was only after 379 days or more than 12 months after they learned of the judgment that the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from said judgment. (See Domingo v. Dela Cruz, 23 SCRA 1121) The appellate court computed the 6-month period from the date of the judgment was rendered. Rule 38 states that the counting should commence from the entry of the judgment or order. (See Dirige v. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840). A judgment is entered only after its finality and Civil Case No. 97479 became final on June 11, 1976. Since the records do not bear the exact date the questioned judgment was entered, the 6-month period can be counted for purposes of our decision from July 12, 1976 when the writ of execution of the final judgment was issued. The phrase "or other proceeding" in Section 3 of Rule 38 includes a writ of execution (Aquino v. Blanco, 79 Phil. 647). The 6-month period from July 12, 1976 lapsed on January 8, 1977. A period of ten (10) months had already lapsed when the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from judgment on May 26, 1977. Obviously, the petitioners cannot now question the effects of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 97479. In the words ofLaroza v. Guia (supra)they cannot render the final judgment abortive and impossible of execution. The deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court on behalf of the Bazar spouses pursuant to the court's judgment was valid and binding.The petitioners cannot also raise before us the issues of prescription or laches and lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the Bazar spouses in Civil Case No. 97479. This cannot be done in this petition which stems from Civil Case No. 126378 in the trial court and AC-G.R. No. 00183 in the appellate court. The Bazaars were the proper parties who ought to have raised them as defenses either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer. Since they did not do so, the same were deemed waived. (See Rule 9, section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court; MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Estrella, 113 SCRA 378; Torreda v. Boncaros, 69 SCRA 247; Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 SCRA 43; Republic v. Mambulao Lumber Company, 6 SCRA 858).WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concurBidin, J., took no part.

EN BANCG.R. No. L-14641 November 23, 1960THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner-appellant,vs.EUSTAQUIO DE LUNA, ET AL.,respondents.,EUSTAQUIO DE LUNA,respondent-appellee.Asst. Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor D.L. Quiroz for appellant.McClure, Salas and Gonzales for appellee.BARRERA,J.:On February 19, 1958, petitioner Director of Lands, filed with the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro a petition alleging,inter alia, that on April 28, 1955, respondent Eustaquio de Luna filed with his office, an application for free patent over a parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 4422, Cad. No. 200 Ext., in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro claiming that he (de Luna) is in actual occupation of said land, having acquired it from Eusebia and Bernardina Castillo, who had been in possession and cultivation thereof since 1943; that relying on the statements made by respondent de Luna in his said application that his occupation of the land was made prior to July 4, 1945, he (Director) approved it as Free Patent Application No. V-35154 (E-V-21291),on September 7, 1955 and thereafter gave it due course; that on October 4, 1955, he issued Free Patent No. V-21168 for the land, in favor, and in the name of respondent, and the same was transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, who registered it and issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-1537, in accordance with Section 122 of Act No. 496; that, subsequently, upon complaint made by one Igmedio Gaa against said free patent issued to respondent, he conducted an investigation thereon and, from the result thereof, it was found that respondent and his alleged predecessors-in-interest, have never been in occupation of the land covered by the patent and title, but on the contrary, it is in the actual and exclusive cultivation of said Igmedio Gaa, who has been in possession thereof since prior to the last war up to the present, openly, adversely, and in the concept of an owner; that said patent and title were issued to respondent by virtue of his said application, which was approved and given due course due to respondent's misinterpretation and false statement made in said application; and that inasmuch as respondents is not entitled to a free patent, on account of his failure to fulfill the conditions prescribed by the Public Land Act, said patent and title issued to him for the land, are null and void said patent and title issued to respondent.Respondent, on April 16, 1958, filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner has no legal capacity to sue, the real party in interest being Igmedio Gaa, whose rights are adversely affected by the issuance of said patent and title to him (respondent). On June 2, 1958, petitioner filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, which opposition was duly answered by respondent on June 30, 1958.On August 16, 1958, the court dismissed the petition filed, in an order which in part reads:The allegations contained in the petition clearly shows that the action for the reversion of the lot in question to the government is premised on the ground of false representation. However, action instituted pursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act must be in the name of the (Commonwealth) Republic of the Philippines and prosecuted by the Solicitor General. Since the present petition is instituted in the name of the Director of the Lands, it stands to reason that the petition is fundamentally defective. Hence, under Rule 8, the petition should be dismissed, on the ground that the Director of Lands is not legally authorized to institute the present petition.On September 3, 1958, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, but the same was denied by the court on September 30, 1958. Hence, this appeal.The only issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner had the authority to file the petition in question.It is not disputed that the free patent to the land in question was issued to respondent on October 4, 1955, on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1537 was, likewise, issued to him, pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act.1Well settled is the rule that once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land cases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. (Sumailvs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil., 946; 51 Off. Gaz. [5] 2413; Republic vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, 105, Phil, 1231).There is, likewise, no controversy as to the fact that the present action was instituted by petitioner on February 19, 1958, or more than 2 years after the issuance of the aforementioned free patent to respondent, or more than 1 year after the expiration of the 1-year period provided in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act for review of the certificate of title, on the ground of fraud. A public land patent when registered in the corresponding register of the deeds office, is a veritable torrens title(Dagdag vs. Nepomuceno, 105 Phil., 216; 56 Off. Gaz. [48] 7294) and becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title (Ramosovs. Obligado, 70 Phil., 86), upon the expiration of 1 year from the date of the issuance thereof (Lucasvs. Durian, G.R. No. L-7886, prom. September 23, 1957). As such it can no longer be cancelled or annulled. In the Sumail case(supra), we stated:We agree with the Director of Lands and trial court that the latter had no jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 4202which was filed for the purpose of cancelling the Patent issued by the Director of Lands on lot No. 3633, and, also for the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title V-23 issued to Gepuliano on the basis of his free patent. Under section 122 of Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act, when any public lands in the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of the said Act and shall become registered lands and that the instrument of conveyance in the form of the Patent, before its delivery to the grantee shall become registered therein a certificate of title shall be issued as in other cases of registered land. That is the reason why an original certificate of title was issued to Gepuliano sometime in 1950 on the basis of his free patent issued in 1994.xxx xxx xxxAs already stated, free patent No. 420 was filed in court only on July 21,1952, or almost three years after the issuance of the free patent. It is, therefore, clear that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in Civil Case No. 420 for the reasons already stated, but not as contended by the Director of Lands that it involved public land, over which he had exclusive and executive control, because once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and become private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.Notwithstanding the aforementioned doctrine of indefeasibility of a torrens title after the expiration of the 1-year period provided in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, Section 101 of the Public Law3provides a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded to the applicant maybe covered or reverted back to its original owner, the Government. Said section provides that:Sec. 101. All actions for the reversions to the Government of Lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the Officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts in the name of Republic (Commonwealth) of the Philippines.It is quiet clear from the provision just quoted that actions for reversions of public lands fraudulently awarded are to be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, and that the same must be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (See Sumail case,supra).In support of the view that petitioner may bring the present action, he cited Section 91 of the Public Land Law. Suffice it to say that said provision is only applicable where the patent or title is sought to be cancelled or annulled, for having been procured through fraud or misrepresentation, prior to the expiration of the 1-year period provided in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, from its issuance and registration, and not where, as in the instance case, said period had already elapsed.However, we note that petitioner's error in this case merely one of form which is non-prejudicial. In furtherance of justice, and to the end that the real matter in dispute within the parties may be completely determined in this proceeding (Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court), we have decided to remand this case to the court of origin for further proceedings, allowing petitioner to amend his pleadings accordingly, in compliance with the requirement of law. Without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes1Act No. 496 as amended.2Field almost 3 years after the issuance of the Free Patent.3Comm. Act No. 141, as amended.

THIRD DIVISIONJULIO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; BENITOFLORES(deceased), substituted by his heirs; DOLORES FLORES and VIRGINIA FLORES-DALERE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, JIMENA TOMAS,Petitioners,- versus -MARCIANO BAGAOISAN,Respondent.G.R. No. 173365Present:CORONA,J.,Chairperson,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,PERALTA, andMENDOZA,JJ.Promulgated:April 15, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA,J.:Petitioners seek a review of the March 29, 2006 Decision[1]and the June 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), denying their motion for reconsideration.The case involves a 13,552-square meter portion of a parcel of l-and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-11880[2]in the name of the Heirs of Victor Flores, namely: Julio, Benito, Dolores, and Virginia, herein petitioners. OCT No. P-11880 was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 138892, given on November 12, 1973. This property is located in theMunicipalityofPiddig, Ilocos Norte.On December 20, 1976, petitioners, together with their mother Luisa Viernes, executed a Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim[3]in favor of Vicente T. Lazo. Through this document, petitioners agreed to sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM the subject property to Lazo. Thereafter,respondent, Marciano Bagaoisan, bought the subject property from Lazo, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute SaledatedFebruary 20, 1977.[4]On April 4, 1983, Viernes and petitioner Virginia Flores-Dalere executed aPalawag A Nasapataan(Affidavit), attesting to the fact that they conveyed to Lazo the subject property through the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim. Affiants also attested that Lazo and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the disputed portion since 1940 and that the same was mistakenly included in the patent application of Victor Flores.On June 21, 1996, respondent filed an action for ownership, quieting of title, partition and damages against petitioners, praying that he be declared as the true owner of the subject property and that the entire property covered by OCT No. P-11880 be partitioned among them. In the Complaint, respondent asserted that he was a tenant of Lazo and that he had been working on the subject property since time immemorial. He said that, since he bought the property in 1977, he possessed the land as owner and paid real property tax thereon. He claimed that the subject property was erroneously covered by OCT No. P-11880 and that petitioners have previously recognized such fact, considering that they executed an affidavit acknowledging the erroneous inclusion of the property in their title. He averred that, lately, petitioners had denied his ownership of the land and asserted their ownership thereof by working and harvesting the crops thereon.[5]In answer, petitioners stated that they did not relinquish ownership or possession of the land to Lazo. While admitting that they executed the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Lazo, petitioners claimed that they were misled into signing the same, with Lazo taking advantage of their lack of education. Petitioners contended that it was too late for respondent to assert title to the disputed portion because the title covering the same had already become indefeasible one year after it was issued.[6]On February 3, 2000, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants, jointly and severally:1.To recognize plaintiff Marciano Bagaoisan as owner of the 13,552 sq.m. parcel of land situated in Barrio Maab-abucay (now Estancia)MunicipalityofPiddig, Ilocos Norte;2.To cease and desist from further possession of said parcel of land and to immediately reconvey the same to plaintiff;3.To pay said plaintiff such amount as would be the peso equivalent of 100cavanesof palay per year, for the loss of harvest he incurred in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, computed as the price then obtaining in said years; and4.To pay plaintiff the amount ofP20,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[7]On appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim. In light of petitioners admission that they signed the deed after it was read to them, the CA dismissed their assertion that they did not know the contents of the document. It further declared that the deed merely confirmed petitioners non-ownership of the subject property and it did not involve an alienation or encumbrance. Accordingly, it concluded that the five-year prohibition against alienation of a property awarded through homestead patent did not apply.The CA likewise rejected petitioners contention that the action was barred by prescription or laches. CitingVital v. Anore,[8]the CA held that where the registered owner knew that the property described in the patent and the certificate of title belonged to another, any statute barring an action by the real owner would not apply, and the true owner might file an action to settle the issue of ownership.The dispositive portion of the assailed March 29, 2006 Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of sufficient merit. The assailed 3 February 2000 decision by the Regional Trial Court,LaoagCity, in Civil Case No. 11048-14 is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.[9]The CA likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated June 20, 2006.[10]Consequently, petitioners filed this petition for review, insisting that the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim is void as its contents were not fully explained to them, and it violates Section 118 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), which prohibits the alienation of lands acquired through a homestead patent.The petition is meritorious.Without going into petitioners allegation that they were unaware of the contents of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim, we nonetheless hold that the deed is void for violating the five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through homestead patent as provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states:Sec. 118.Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent and grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after the issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.We do not agree with the CA that the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim merely confirmed petitioners non-ownership of the subject property. The deed uses the words sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer. These words admit of no other interpretation than that the subject property was indeed being transferred to Lazo.The use of the words confirmation and quitclaim in the title of the document was an obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibition imposed by law. Labeling the deed as a confirmation of non-ownership or as a quitclaim of rights would actually make no difference, as the effect would still be the alienation or conveyance of the property.The act of conveyance would still fall within the ambit of the prohibition. To validate such an arrangement would be to throw the door open to all possible fraudulent subterfuges and schemes that persons interested in land given to a homesteader may devise to circumvent and defeat the legal provisions prohibiting their alienation within five years from the issuance of the patent.[11]It bears stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.[12]Its basic objective, as the Court had occasion to stress, is to promote public policy, that is to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at providing a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.[13]Hence, any act which would have the effect of removing the property subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee will be struck down for being violative of the law.To repeat, the conveyance of a homesteadbefore the expiration of the five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the homesteadpatent is null and void and cannot be enforced, for it is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve.[14]There is, therefore, no doubt that the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim, which was executed three years after the homestead patent was issued, is void and cannot be enforced.Furthermore, respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to surmount the conclusiveness and indefeasibility of the certificate of title.An OCT issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the Director of Lands order for the issuance of the patent.[15]After the lapse of such period, the sole remedy of a landowner, whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name is to file an action for reconveyanceso long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.[16]In order that an action for reconveyance based on fraud may prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, his title to the property and the fact of fraud.[17]Respondent did not allege in his complaint or prove during the trial that fraud attended the registration of the subject property in petitioners names.In fact, there was no allegation as to how petitioners were able to secure title to the property despite the alleged ownership of respondents predecessor.More importantly, respondent failed to prove that he has title to the subject property. He merely asserted that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since 1940. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be well-nigh incontrovertible. The Public Land Act requires that the possessor or his predecessors-in-interest must be in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years.When these conditions are complied with, the possessoris deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant,without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.The land ceases to be a part of the public domainand beyond the authority of the Director of Lands,[18]such that the latter would have no more right to issue a homestead patent to another person.Respondent merely established that he had been in possession of the property and that he had been paying real property taxes thereon since 1977. The only evidence on record attesting to the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since 1940 was the affidavit executed by some of petitioners. This, however, would not suffice.In closing, it would be well to mention that the execution of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim within the five-year prohibitory period also makes the homestead patent susceptible to cancellation, and the subject property being reverted to the public domain.[19]It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the government, who is by law mandated to institute anaction for reversion.[20]Should the Solicitor General decide to file such an action, it is in that action that petitioners defenses, particularly their alleged lack of knowledge of the contents of the deed, will have to be resolved.WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. TheMarch 29, 2006Decision of the Court of Appeals and itsJune 20, 2006Resolution areREVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The complaint for ownership, quieting of title and damages isDISMISSED,without prejudice to an action for reversion that the Solicitor General may decide to file for the State.SO ORDERED.

[1]Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Mario L. Guaria III, concurring;rollo, pp. 92-99.[2]Exhibit A; Folder of Exhibits.[3]Exhibit B; Folder of Exhibits.[4]Exhibit A-5; Folder of Exhibits.[5]Records, pp. 1-2.[6]Id.at 17-18.[7]Rollo,pp. 60-61.[8]90 Phil. 855 (1952).[9]Rollo, pp. 98-99.[10]CArollo,p. 113.[11]Pangilinan v. Ramos,G.R. No. 44617, January 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 350, 358.[12]Heirs of Venancio Bajenting v. Baez,G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 531, 553.[13]Id.[14]De Romero v. Court of Appeals,377 Phil.189, 201 (1999).[15]Buston-Arendain v. Gil,G.R. No. 172585, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 561, 574.[16]Abejaron v. Nabasa,G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47, 56-57.[17]Id.at 57.[18]De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,442 Phil. 534, 548 (2002).[19]Section 124 of thePublicLandAct.[20]Abejaron v. Nabasa,supra note 16, at 67.

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 126875 August 26, 1999HEIRS OF MARIANO, JUAN, TARCELA and JOSEFA, all surnamed BRUSAS,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF SPOUSES INES BRUSAS and CLETO REBOSA, respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:This is a bitter dispute spanning more than two (2) decades of protracted legal entanglements and deep-seated enmity among the protagonists, even descending to their children, each claiming ownership over a 19-hectare land located in San Francisco, Baao, Camarines Sur. In view of the prolonged litigation, the original parties have since died and are now substituted by their heirs.Petitioners, heirs of Juan, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa, all surnamed Brusas, claimed that the disputed property, formerly a public land, was part of the 33-hectare land in the actual physical possession of their grandfather Sixto Brusas since 1924, having inherited the same from their great grandfather Pedro Brusas. Sometime in 1946 Sixto Brusas caused the property to be surveyed in the name of his five (5) children, namely, Juan, Ines, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa. The survey was approved as Psu-116520.1As indicated in the survey plan the property was traversed by the Barit River, and the eastern portion thereof with an aggregate area of 19.8992 hectares was denominated as Lots 1 and 2, while the western portion measuring 13.2439 hectares was designated as Lots 3 and 4. In the same year, the property was subdivided among the five (5) children of Sixto Brusas. The partition was made lengthwise so that each heir would have access to the river and, as was the custom of the place, the distribution was made according to their age: the southernmost lot was assigned to Juan being the eldest, followed successively by Ines, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa.2All of them purportedly took immediate possession of their respective shares.On 17 July 1968 Ines Brusas applied for and was granted a free patent over Lots 1 and 2 of Psu-116520 with an aggregate area of 19.8992 hectares for which OCT No. 23356 was issued in her name. Thus, when Mariano Brusas and Josefa Brusas filed their sworn statements of landholdings in 1973 they supposedly discovered that their properties were already titled in the name of their sister Ines. The discover1y triggered a controversy among the Brusas siblings and earnest efforts to settle the conflict before the barangay officials, the local police and the PC Provincial Commander proved futile.Private respondents, heirs of Ines Brusas and Cleto Rebosa, denied on the other hand that Lots 1 and 2 were owned and possessed by their grandfather Sixto Brusas during his lifetime. They asserted that Ines Brusas was the absolute owner having entered the property as early as 1924. Since then Ines Brusas and her husband Cleto Rebosa were clearing the land on their own by cutting down trees and removing their roots it being a forested area. In 1957 Ines Brusas applied for a free patent which was approved and the corresponding certificate of title issued in 1967.Sometime in 1974 Ines Brusas filed a complaint for recovery of six (6) hectares of land alleging that her brothers and sisters forcibly entered and deprived her of that portion of the property.3Juan, Josefa, Mariano and Tarcela countered by instituting in the same court an action for reconveyance imputing fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith to Ines Brusas in using a forged affidavit to obtain title over Lots 1 and 2 despite full knowledge that she owned only 1/5 portion thereof.4After the cases were consolidated trial dragged on for nineteen (19) years. The lower court finally rendered its decision in 1993 dismissing the complaint filed by Ines Brusas, declaring Lots 1 and 2 as thepro-indivisoproperty of the Brusas siblings, and ordering Ines Brusas to reconvey to her brothers and sisters their respective shares in the disputed property.On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals in its Decision of 16 July 1996 reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court thus WHEREFORE . . . . the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. In Civil Case No. IR-1058, ordering defendants and/or their successors-in-interest to vacate the land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint and/or to deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs or their successors-in-interest;2. Dismissing the complaint for reconveyance and damages in Civil Case No. IR-1059.The Court of Appeals ratiocinated Apart from the self-serving and bare allegations of appellees, no competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their claim of fraud on the part of Ines Brusas in her application for a free patent over the land in dispute. They submitted specimens of their signatures to the NBI office at Naga City for examination but failed to submit to the court the result thereof. Such failure indicates either that they did not pursue their request for examination or that, if they did, the result thereof is adverse to their cause.It is significant to note that aside from the supposedly falsified affidavit, Exhibit 4, another affidavit was executed by Ines, together with Tarcela, Juan and Josefa, all surnamed Brusas, renouncing their rights to Lots 3 and 4 in favor of Mariano Brusas (Exhibit 11). Both appear to have been notarized by the same Notary Public on April 22, 1960. The existence of the two affidavits, Exhibits 4 and 11, strongly suggests that the Brusas recognized Ines Brusas as the sole claimant of Lots 1 and 2 and Mariano Brusas, the sole claimant of lots 3 and 4.There is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. There is no showing that the grant of a free patent in favor of Ines Brusas was predicated solely on the affidavit of waiver, Exhibit 4, or that without it her application would not have been given due course.It must be borne in mind, in this regard, that the land in dispute was originally a public land. The occupation and cultivation thereof by Sixto Brusas, the father of Ines, Tarcela, Josefa, Juan and Mariano Brusas, did not make it a part of his hereditary estate. If