MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESFor our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).AntecedentsThe property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.SO ORDERED.3The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5(Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.Petitioners Motion for ReconsiderationIn their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7Menguito v. Republic8and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.The Republics Motion for Partial ReconsiderationThe Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.RulingWe deny the motions for reconsideration.In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.Classifications of land according to ownershipLand, which is an immovable property,10may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17Classifications of public lands according to alienabilityWhether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.Disposition of alienable public landsSection 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:(1) For homestead settlement;(2) By sale;(3) By lease; and(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;(a) By judicial legalization; or(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:x x x x(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28to wit:1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35As such, prescription can now run against the State.To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

Director Of Lands vs. ReyesThese cases are interrelated, and so are decided jointly.In his application originally filed on February 24, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast tract of land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less, situated at the municipality of Laur, province of Nueva Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay.1On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the President.2On May 10, 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties, requesting that the Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation be considered as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the property subject matter of the application.3The motion was granted by the lower court in its order dated June 10, 1966.4It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the area reserved for military purposes under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 19, 1955, of the President. The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber of commercial quantities.5Except for a small area cultivated for vegetation by homesteaders issued patents by the Director of Lands, there were no occupants on the land.6It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death sometime in 1944.On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land applied for, described in the technical description Plan II-6752, is adjudicated to and ordered to be registered in favor of (a) Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, a Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with address at Manila, Philippines, two-thirds (2/3) portion, subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos per Joint Manifestation of Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion Caballero-Alinsunurin, Ariosto Santos and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation dated July 19, 1966 and marked as Exhibit "AA-4 "7and (b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit, Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property.On December 12, 1966, the oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said decision to the Supreme Court,8copy of which notice was furnished counsel for the applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation; however, no copy was furnished to counsel for Roman C. Tamayo, to whom one-third (1/3) portion of the land was adjudicated.On January 18, 1967, within the extended period granted by the court, the oppositors-appellants filed the corresponding Record on Appeal, copy of which was duly served upon appellees Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo.By an order dated March 8, 1967, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain orders and pleadings, within ten (10) days from receipt of the order.9On March 16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies served upon the appellees.Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration. Both motions were opposed by the Government.On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C. Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land, one-third (1/3)pro-indivisoin favor of Roman C. Tamayo, and two-thirds (2/3)pro indivisoin favor of Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the appeal.On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration forthwith issued Decree No. 113485 pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15, 1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija.On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on Appeal which, together with the evidence and transcripts, was forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal.As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration, on May 29, 1967, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines instituted before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction (L-27594), seeking to nullify the order dated March 11, 1967, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967) and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija, and to command the respondent court to certify the entire proceedings and to allow appeal to the Supreme Court from its decisionin totoin LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.On June 5, 1967, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You (respondent Judge) are hereby restrained from issuing a writ of possession in Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. 25545 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled "Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation versus Director of Lands, et al."; You (respondent Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo), your agents or representatives are hereby restrained from taking possession and/or excercising acts of ownership, occupancy or possession over the property in question subject matter of Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545; and You (respondent Register of Deeds) are hereby restrained from accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land until petitioners shall have filed a notice oflis pendensas to the title certificates of Roman Tamayo and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, under Sec. 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.Accordingly, petitioners-appellants caused the entry of a notice oflis pendensto be duly inscribed in the primary entry book of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151.In due time, the respondents filed their answers to the petition forcertiorari. The parties having filed their respective memoranda, the case is deemed submitted for decision.At the outset, We shall resolve the petition forcertiorariandmandamus(L-27594).IUnder the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to the counsel for adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended Record on Appeal in both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. 10 Hence, such failure cannot impair the right of appeal.11What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision.12In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decisiona quo.IIIn the instant case, as a precaution, oppositors-appellants caused notice oflis pendensto be duly inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, thereby keeping the whole land subject matter of the appeal within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated.13Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the final termination of the litigation. The notice of lis pendens must be carried over in all titles subsequently issued, which will yield to the ultimate result of the appeal.14During the pendency of the appeal, it appears that Honofre A. Andrada, et al., filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Branch I, not the land registration court), a complaint against the appellee Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, Rodolfo A. Cenidoza and Roman C. Tamayo, for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question (Civil Case No. 4696). The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case despite the pendency of the appeal involving the same land, and decided the case in favor of plaintiffs. In violation of Our injunction adverted to above, Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation executed a subdivision plan of the original single parcel of land subject of the land registration proceedings covered by Original Certificate of Title No.0-3151, and deeded over six (6) lots of the subdivision plan to plaintiffs Honofre A. Andrada and Nemesio P. Diaz. By an order dated September 23, 1968, entered in Civil Case No. 4696, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija was directed to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue new titles to the above-named transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances." Immediately, transfer certificates of title were issued to them and other transferees in which the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija did not carry over the notice oflis pendensoriginally inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151. Subsequently, other transactions were entered into involving portions of the land reconveyed in Civil Case No. 4696, including a transfer of about 4,000 hectares to the Land Bank of the Philippines in consideration of P8,940,000.00.We find the order to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 03151 and to issue subsequent titles free from all liens and encumbrances to be voidab initio.Civil Case No. 4696 is an action inpersonamto which the appellants are not parties; its object was to decree reconveyance to plaintiffs of a portion of the area adjudicated to the Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo in Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, which is subject to the outcome of the appeal. Such action is barred by the pendency of the appeal. In that case, the court is without jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue titles to transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances ."15Nor can such order be construed to authorize the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice oflis pendens, which was not entered by virtue of the reconveyance case. Thus, the Register of Deeds was duty bound to carry over the said notice of lis pendens on all titles subsequently issued. But, in plain violation oflis pendensin said titles; such act constitutes misfeasance in the performance of his duties for which he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third parties, but cannot affect the petitioners-appellants who are protected by Our writ of injunction and the notice oflis pendensinscribed in the original title. It must be remembered that Our injunction restrained the Register of Deeds "from accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land until the petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman C. Tamayo and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation under section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. 25545." Its plain meaning is to enjoin registration of documents and transactions unless the notice oflis pendensis annotated and so subject the same to the outcome of the litigation. In such case, subsequent transferees cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.On the other hand, the lower court's order dated September 23, 1968, in Civil Case No. 4696, cannot overrule an injunction of this Court (in L-27594). As a result, We consider the notice oflis pendensentered in virtue of this litigation to remain in full force and effect, and affects all subsequent transferees of the title of the land subject of this appeal.At any rate, it is well-settled that entry of the notice oflis pendensin the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim.16IIIWe now consider the appeal on the merits.1. To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.17Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.18It is true that blueprints of two survey plans were presented before the trial court (both marked Exhibit "D"). The first blueprint copy of a plan of land as surveyed for Maria Padilla (Exhibit "D", p. 4, Exhibits of Applicant), was not formally offered in evidence. The second plan of the land, as surveyed for Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation (also marked as Exhibit "D", p. 3, Exhibits of Applicant) was submitted by the said applicant, but it lacks the approval of the Director of Lands.Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which checked or verified the survey plan and the technical descriptions thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it has no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done.It is also asserted that a blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) was superimposed in the military plan of the reservation under Proclamation No. 237, which military plan was presented in evidence by the oppositors-appellants (Exhibit "6"), and it was agreed by the parties that the plan, Exhibit "D", superimposed in the plan of the area covered by the proclamation, is the plan of the land applied for (p. 15, Brief for Applicant-Appellee).Obviously, the superimposition of the copy of the survey plan of land as surveyed for applicant in the military map of the area under Proclamation No. 237 was for the sole purpose of showing that the land applied for is situated within the area covered by the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay appropriately indicated in the perimeter map of said reservation (Exhibit "6"). But the applicant is not relieved from the original tracing cloth plan approved by the Director of Lands as required by law. One of the distinguishing marks of the Torrens System is the absolute certainty of the identity of a registered land. Consequently the primary purpose of the aforesaid requirement is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical descriptions. Hence, the applicant is not relieved of his duty of submitting the original tracing cloth of the survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands.It will be noticed that the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) does not bear the approval of any officer authorized by law.In similar manner, the surveyor's certificate, also required in original land registration proceedings, was not offered in evidence.2. We next consider the question of whether the applicant has a registerable title to the land applied for.The applicant relies on a purportedtitulo de informacion posesoriaissued in the name of Melecio Padilla (Exhibit "T" pp. 64-68, Exhibits of Applicant). However, neither the original of the saidtitulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the document, as in the circumstances surrounding their execution. Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of the saidinformacion posesoriatitle materially differ on the date when saidinformacion posesoriawas issued. One copy showed that the said document was issued on March 5, 1895 (Exhibit "T") while the other indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5, 1883 (Exhibit "2").Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, on the basis of the "List of Possessory Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the corresponding supporting documents of which are kept in the vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla does not appear among those listed as holders ofinformacion posesoriatitles as of the year 1898 covering lands situated in Santor (now Laur) Nueva Ecija. According to said document, the name Melecio Padilla appears only in the list of holders of possessory information titles over lands situated in Pearanda, Nueva Ecija, but of a substantially smaller acreage.19Thus, the seven (7) parcels recorded in the name of Melecio Padilla covered only a total area of 49 hectares, 18 acres and 325 centares.20In addition, the list of property owners in Santor (now Laur), Nueva Ecija existing in the Division of Archives does not include the name of Melecio Padilla.21It is true that an alleged copy of aninformacion posesoriain the name of Melecio Padilla, was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds on November 10, 1942 by one Rodolfo Baltazar, Register of Deeds (Exhibit "H"), but the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija could not certify to its veracity, as the supposed document does not exist in their records.22There is another factor which weighs heavily against the claim of the applicant. The allegedinformacion posesoriacovers an area of "seis mil quiiones, poco mas e menos" or an equivalent of 16,800 hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the time of the supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land in excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of public land in excess of one thousand (1,000) hectares.23Besides, the document described in Exhibit "H" is not thetitulo de informacion posesoria, because it was merely a certification of possession of Melecio Padilla over the property, and was issued without prejudice to a third party or parties having a betterright.24Thus, it states: "En su virtud habiendo examinado el Registro nuevamente formado por la perdida o destruccion del mismo y no hallando en ningun asiento contrario a lo relacionado reinscribe la posesion de la finca de este numero a favor de Don Melecio Padilla sin perjuicio de tercero que puede tener mejor derecho a la propiedad." Under Spanish law, in order that aninformacion posesoriamay be considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that the holder thereof has complied with the provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been legally converted into a registration of ownership because Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has been in open possession of the land; that an application to this effect be filed after the expiration of 20 years from the date of such registration; that such conversion be announced by means of a proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court order the conversion of the registration of possession into a record of ownership; and that the Registrar make the proper record thereof in the Registry."25Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion posesoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.One year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or on April 17, 1895, the right to perfect possessory information title under the law expired. After that date, full property right of the land reverted to the government and the right of the cultivator and possessor to obtain gratuitous title was extinguished.26Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the "kaingin" system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose.27During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion Caballero took possession of the land approximately in 1950, but they had to abandon the place due to the unsettled peace and order conditions in the area. In 1955, entry by them was prevented by the Army.It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that neither applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's predecessors-in-interest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation" of the property in question, "under abona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title."28A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.29While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.30The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.31Apart from the aforesaid inconclusive evidence of possession to support the applicant's claim of title, it does not appear that the said property has ever been declared for taxation purposes by either applicant or applicant's predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the only tax declarations submitted were those of Mamerto Garcia and Honofre Andrada, et al. (Exhibit "G", Tax Declaration No. 5576, covering an area of 7,340 hectares) and Mamerto Garcia, et al. (Exhibit "H-1", Tax Declaration No. 5577, over an area of 9,547 hectares) but both were filed only in 1958. The latter declaration contains an annotation that the property described therein is an unidentified property, as the declarant failed to identify the same, and it "was only through his insistence" that it was assessed. Neither applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation nor its predecessor, Alipio Alinsunurin had submitted any tax declaration supporting its/his claim over the property. It is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.It is obvious that the applicant has failed to submit convincing proof of actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the entire area in question during the period required by law. This is especially true in view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible."32Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forest are excluded.33It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title.34Finally, the applicant urges that Proclamation No. 237 recognizes the existence of private property within the military reservation. It is true that the proclamation states that the same is subject "to private rights, if any there be", but applicant must prove its private rights over the property, which said party failed to do.35For it is well-settled that, unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicant or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain.36WHEREFORE, decision in the above case is hereby rendered:(1) in G. R. No. L-27594, the petition for certiorari is granted; the order dated March 11, 1967 in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967), and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija are all declared void; the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija is ordered to recall and cancel all transfer certificates of title, including owners' duplicates and mortgagees' copies, if any, arising out of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151; the preliminary injunction issued on June 5, 1967 and the temporary restraining order issued on June 1, 1973 are made final and permanent, with costs against respondents (except respondent Judge); and(2) in G. R. No. L-28144, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside, and judgment is rendered dismissing the application for registration. Costs against appellee.

Diaz vs. RepublicThis is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land[1]located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976.[2]She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)[3]in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled inDirector of Lands v. Reyes[4]that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and void.Reyesnotwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision[5]dated July 1, 1981.The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its decision[6]dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),[7]the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found thatReyeswas applicable to petitioners case as it involved the same property.The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court inReyes,and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.[8]Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza asponente, issued a resolution[9]upholding petitioners right to recall the records of the case.Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize the same.The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.[10]On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.[11]On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioners favor.[12]However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration.The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended resolution)[13]annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:ACCORDINGLY,the Court resolves to: (6)REVERSEthe Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;](7)ANNUL and SET ASIDEthe Amicable Settlement dated May 18,1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is herebyDECLAREDto be without force and effect;(8)GRANTtheMotion for Reconsiderationfiled by the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently,SET ASIDEthe Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;(9)SET ASIDEthe Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and(10)REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz registration herein.SO ORDERED.Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CAs amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion was denied.[14]Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari[15]in this Court. It was denied for raising factual issues.[16]She moved for reconsideration.[17]This motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.[18]Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Courten banc.[19]The Court denied[20]it considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.[21]Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to thebancwas likewise denied as thebancis not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be appealed.[22]We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course.Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.[23]The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety:This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence, that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Courten banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID,ab initio.It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render impartial justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza became theponenteof the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost.In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same case.In the case of the Alabang Boys[,] the public was outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice.In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which he had lost.If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.I fully support your call for moral force that will slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves.I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces that surround us everyday.I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable.It is a thinly veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public.This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners letter/third motion for reconsideration.APPLICABILITY OFREYESThe Court agrees with the Republics position thatReyesis applicable to this case.To constituteres judicata, the following elements must concur:(1)the former judgment or order must be final;(2)the judgment or order must be on the merits;(3)it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and(4)there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[24]The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.[25]This contention is erroneous.The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those inAquino v. Director of Lands.[26]In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the public domain. Quintins successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constitutedres judicataas against his successors-in-interest.We ruled there, and we so rule now, thatin registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutesres judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also againstallpersons.[27]We also declared inAquinothat:From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the law of the case or at least falls within the rule ofstare decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x[28]Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, inReyes, already made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the courta quoto respect this Courts ruling inReyes, and not the other way around.However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings inReyes(which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision inReyes,declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.By not applying our ruling inReyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.[29]Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation.[30]All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."[31]ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTSPetitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity is subject to private rights, if any there be.By way of a background, we recognized inReyesthat the property where the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact,at the time of the hearing, it was conceded thatapproximately 13,957 hectares ofsaid land consist of public forest.x x x (Emphasis supplied)[32]Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141.[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded.It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title.(Emphasis supplied).[33]However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienableby the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands)[34]coupled withpossession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest.Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land,any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.[35]This was our ruling inAlmeda v. CA.[36]The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[37]Coming now to petitioners contention that her private rights to the property, meaning her and her predecessors possession thereofpriorto the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated,we had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x xTherefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership.But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. InReyes, we noted:Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x xA mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.[38]Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent inReyes,[39]thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for registration.NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTOn the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the same was null and void. An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which provides:Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:(1) Consent of the contracting parties;(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through the appropriate government agencies,i.e.the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with her.[40]The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the Philippines.[41]In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires special authority for attorneys to bind their clients.Section 23.Authority of attorneys to bind clients.Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients litigation,or receive anything in discharge of a clients claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 1347.All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract.All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied)Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of petitioners withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion of the property located within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of man.PETITIONERS CONTEMPT OF COURTThis Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating:This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence, that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she perceived as this Courts failure to exercise utmost prudence in rendering impartial justice in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at themiscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petitionfor Review.Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Courten banc.I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea.For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID,ab initio.It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to renderimpartial justice,because Mr. Justice Mendoza became theponenteof the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.But she hastens to add in the same breath that:I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the Alabang Boys case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court.Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and threats of going public with this case. We are not blind to petitioners clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this Court.It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this Court in their respective resolutions.As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulateponencias, extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.[42]Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case. Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although the tone of petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court.A FEW OBSERVATIONSIf petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that:It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appealsthat places in doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision,a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz,who died in 1993,and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel forFlora L. Garcias successor-in-interest,herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.[44](Emphasis supplied).The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.SPS. Fortuna vs. RepublicTHE BACKGROUND FACTS

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed anapplication for registrationof a 2,597-square meter land identified asLot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed asLRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned byPastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have beenin quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment.

Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the application,5it did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.6crallawlibrary

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna.The RTC declared that [the spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50)years.

The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortunas evidence -Tax Declaration No. 8366- showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or theProperty Registration Decree(PRD).

In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land,10they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republics argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortunas predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land only since 1948.

The CA denied the spouses Fortunas motion for reconsideration of its decision in its resolution dated June 27, 2006.11crallawlibrary

THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.

They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or thePublic Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942.RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring30 yearsof open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain.This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should besince June 12, 1945.The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12crallawlibrary

The spouses Fortuna point out thatPD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Courts ruling inTaada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastoras possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457before 1948. The failure to present documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the Provincial Assessors Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II.

Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948.First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration.Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]14Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of the lot before 1948.Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores inLRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to registerLot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,15which were also originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her way to school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latters family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of Macarias testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortunas application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision o