language-based generation and evaluation of nids signatures shai rubin somesh jha barton p. miller...

Language-Based Generation and Evaluation of NIDS Signatures

Shai Rubin

Somesh Jha Barton P. Miller

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Rubin, Jha, Miller 2

Attacker

“TYPE A \n CWD <long arg>\n”

NetworkNIDS

Signature database

Misuse Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)

Problem: A single attack might have many forms: – Ptacek and Newsham, 1988– Handley and Paxson, 2001– Marty, 2002– Mutz, Vigna, and Kemmerer, 2003– Vigna, Robertson, and Balzarotti, 2004– Rubin, Jha, Miller, 2004 – And others...

“TYPE A \n (.)* CWD <long arg>”

TYPE A \n LIST \n CWD ...


Attacker NetworkNIDS

Signature database

Problem: Accurate Signatures

• Today, we construct signatures in an ad-hoc manner• Challenges: complex protocols, redundancy• Questions:

– Can we systematically construct an accurate signature?– Can we systematically evaluate a signature?– Can we systematically compare signatures?

“TYPE A \n (.)* CWD <long arg>”

TYPE A \n LIST \n CWD ...


Contributions

• Practical: provide signature writers a methodology and a tool that enables them to systematically construct a signature, evaluate its accuracy, and compare it to other signatures

• Conceptual: – a session signature, – a semantic model for an attack protocol, – a language-base approach for signature construction


A NIDS Signature

• Attack: a set of TCP streams• Signature: a set of TCP streams

TCP Streams

ASig


A NIDS Signature

• Attack: a set of TCP streams• Signature: a set of TCP streams• A prefect signature: Sig=A

TCP Streams

ASigSig=A


A NIDS Signature

• Attack: a set of TCP streams• Signature: a set of TCP streams• A prefect signature: Sig=A • Problem: most of the time A is

unknown. Difficult to: – construct accurate a signature– evaluate changes to the

signature– compare signatures

TCP Streams

ASig


A NIDS Signature

TCP Streams

ASig

• Attack: a set of TCP streams• Signature: a set of TCP streams• A prefect signature: Sig=A • Problem: most of the time A is

unknown. Difficult to: – construct accurate a signature– evaluate changes to the

signature– compare signatures


Language-Based Approach

TCP Streams• Attack: the language Aghost

• Signature: the language Lsig

• Goal: compare the language• Problem: difficult to determine

containment Aghost.

• Ideas: 1. Abstraction: over-approximate

Aghost, such that it is easy to determine containment

2. Automation: Use an automatic tool to compare Lsig and Ainv

Lsig

Aghost

Ainv


Language-Based Signature Construction

TCP Streams

Lsig

Aghost

Ainv

Conclusion Action

fp

fn



TCP Streams

Lsig

Aghost

Ainv

Conclusion Action

LsigAinvA false positive

Shrink signature

fp

fn



TCP Streams

Lsig

Aghost

Ainv

fp

Conclusion Action


Shrink signature

LsigAinv

Ainv fn



TCP Streams

Lsig

Aghost

Ainv

fp

Conclusion Action


Shrink signature

LsigAinv

A false negative

Expand signature

Ainv fn



TCP Streams

Lsig

Aghost

Ainv

fp

Conclusion Action


Shrink signature

LsigAinv

A false negative

Expand signature

A spurious sequence

Refine Ainv

Ainv fn

sp



TCP Streams

Lsig

Aghost

Ainv

fp

Conclusion Action


Shrink signature

LsigAinv

A false negative

Expand signature

A spurious sequence

Refine Ainv

LsigAinv

Discussion in the paperLsigAinv

Ainv fn

sp


Outline

• Goal: develop methodology to construct and evaluate signatures

• Main idea: use a formal language to approximate Aghost and automatically compare this language to Lsig

• The languages• The signature construction process


Lsig: A Syntactic Representation of the Attack

• Our signature is a regular language• Alphabet: application-level events. For example,

FTP commands• A session signature: a string in the language

represents the entire attack.• Each signature is a concatenation of three

languages: preparation (Lpre), exploitation (Lexp), and confirmation (Lconf)


ftp-cwd [CAN-2002-0126]

• Preparation: FTP login

loginL

logoutQ

QL

Token Description

L Login confirmation

Q Connection termination


ftp-cwd [CAN-2002-0126]

• Preparation: FTP login

• Exploitation: A CWD command with a long argument

loginL

logout

Q

QL

attack

A such that (length>100 && data (.)*/bin/sh(.)*

Clogin

Token Description

L Login confirmation

Q Connection termination

C CWD command

A CWD argument


Lftp-cwd: ftp-cwd Session Signature

• Non-recursive hierarchical state machine• Constructed automatically• Can be analyzed

intrusion

logout 2

1 attack

A,IR,L

IRA,L

C

IR ,LC

A,C,IR,Q

Q

QCQL

A

accept

start

reject


Lftp-cwd: Vs. Snort

• Non-recursive hierarchical state machine• Constructed automatically• Can be analyzed

intrusion

logout 2

1 attack

A,IR,L

IRA,L

C

IR ,LC

A,C,IR,Q

Q

QCQL

A

accept

start

reject



TCP Streams

Session Signature

Aghost

Ainv

fp

Conclusion Action


Shrink signature

LsigAinv

A false negative

Expand signature

A spurious sequence

Refine Ainv

LsigAinv

Discussion in the paperLsigAinv

Ainv fn

sp


Ainv: Semantic Representation of the Attack

• Another regular language• Models semantics properties:

– “Requires FTP login”– “Requires ASCII FTP mode”– “Requires HTTP 1.1”

• Using an FSM we model the semantics of the application-level protocol that the attack uses


FTP Semantic Model

Variable Description Values

X1 User logged in {0,1}

X2 FTP transfer mode {‘A’,’B’,0}

Name Token Description Precond. Postcond.

SLOGIN L Victim indicates successful login - X1=1,X2=‘A’

BINARY B Attacker issues TYPE B command X1=1 X2=‘B’

ASCII A Attacker issues TYPE A command X1=1 X2=‘A’

VQUIT Q1 Victim terminates connection - Xi=0

UQUIT Q2 Attacker terminates connection - Xi=0

FTP State variables

FTP Transitions



TCP Streams

Session Signature

Aghost

Semantic model

fp

fn

Semantic Model

Signature

Spin

String/NULL

SPFN or FP

Manual refinement (currently) Automatic comparison


TCP Streams

Constructing a Signature for ftp-cwd

login=1

Lpre Lexp False Positive

L1 (.)* CWD <long arg>

Semantic ModelSignature

Spin

String/NULL


TCP Streams


login=1

FP1

L1


L1 (.)* CWD <long arg> FP1=“CWD <long arg>”


Spin

String FP1


TCP Streams


login=1

FP1

L1



L2 L(.)* CWD <long arg>


Spin

String/NULL


TCP Streams


L1

login=1

FP1 FP2

L2



L2 L(.)* CWD <long arg> FP2=“LUQUITCWD <long arg>”


Spin

StringFP2


TCP Streams


login=1

FP1

L1

FP2

L2




L3 L(UQ)* CWD <long arg>


Spin

String/NULL


TCP Streams


login=1




L3 L(UQ)* CWD <long arg> FP3=“LVQUITCWD <long arg>”

FP1

L1

FP2

L2

FP3

L3


Spin

String FP3


TCP Streams


login=1




L3 L(UQ)* CWD <long arg> FP3=“LVQUITCWD <long arg>”

FP1

L1

FP2

L2

FP3

L3


Spin

NULL



TCP Streams

login=1

FP1

L1

FP2

L2

FP3

L3

L1L2L3L4

L4

More false positives Less false positives

• Comparing signature:

• It is possible to show that L4 does not miss more attacks than L1 (under certain assumptions)


Constructing a Signature for pro-ftpd

Session Signature (simplified) False Negative/SpuriousL TYPEA ST RET RET

TCP Streams

login=1TYPE=‘A’


Constructing a Signature for pro-ftpd

Session Signature (simplified) False NegativeL TYPEA ST RET RET FN1=L ST RET RET

TCP Streams

login=1TYPE=‘A’

FN1

Two signatures based on the configuration of the FTP server


Lessons to Take Home

• A methodology to construct and evaluate signatures

• Able to detect loopholes in signatures, loopholes that we did not anticipate

• The accuracy of the signature depends of the accuracy of the semantic model

TCP Streams

Session Signature

Aghost

Ainv

fp

Ainv fn

sp

language-based generation and evaluation of nids signatures shai rubin somesh jha barton p. miller...

Documents

signature writers

session signature

signature construction

set of tcp streamssignature

tcp streams asigsig

n list n cwd

cwd type

languagebased generation