Claudio v. SubidoG.R. No. L-30865 August 31, 1971

40 SCRA 481

FACTS: The Municipal Board of Pasay City enacted an ordinance creating the position of the City Legal Officer, in accordance with the Decentralization Act of 1967. By virtue thereof, petitioner Mastrili was, on January 6, 1969, duly appointed to such office by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, the City Mayor. The very next day, he took his oath of office and began discharging its duties. There is no question as to his being qualified for such a position, having been a law practitioner for over twenty-five years. Respondent Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved such an appointment. The basis for such action was explained by him in his fifth indorsement of July 9, 1969, relying on Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185 which, insofar as pertinent, reads thus: "In cases of vacancies in the offices of heads and assistant heads of local offices, the governor or mayor shall fill them by appointment from a list of the five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified by the Civil Service Commissioner: Provided, That these five persons shall have stated beforehand that they will assume the position, if appointed." 4 There was no question either that petitioner Mastrili was appointed without such prior certification by respondent Commissioner.

ISSUE: WON respondent Commissioner of Civil Service could render nugatory the choice by the Mayor of Pasay City of the principal petitioner, Segundo C. Mastrili, as the City Legal Officer, unless it could be shown that such appointment was from a list of five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified to by respondent official.

HELD: No legal justification exists for the obstacle thus interposed by respondent Commissioner. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185 cannot, be relied upon by him. That provision of law clearly does not call for application. The position in question, that of City Legal Officer, is one that requires the utmost confidence on the part of the Mayor. The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected. The choice of whom to appoint then is his, and not that of the respondent. Once exercised, and there being no dispute about the qualifications of the person appointed, the duty of respondent Commissioner is clear.

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PAFLU v. SUGARG.R. No. L-23959. November 29, 1971

42 SCRA 302

FACTS: On 29 March 1961, the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Complainants Entila and Tenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning's petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.

ISSUE: WON a non-lawyer can recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered.

HELD: Since respondent Muning is not a lawyer, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

The ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an unlawful act or an act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.

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SEBASTIAN v. CAG.R. No. L-41862. February 7, 1992

206 SCRA 28

FACTS: Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein, B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court, he was substituted by

his heirs — Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Reyes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition. On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply. Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief resulting to the dismissal of the appeal.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

HELD: In the instant case, there was simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner

provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

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LEDESMA v. CLIMACOG.R. No. L-23815. June 28, 1974

57 SCRA 473

FACTS: On October 13, 1964, petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: WON petitioner be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.

HELD: Petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For

those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated.

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

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BERENGER v. CARANZAA.C. No. 716 . January 30, 1969

26 SCRA 673

FACTS: Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception practiced in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the introduction of an

Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer of Title subscribed and sworn in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Carranza claimed that he took no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the said falsehood, whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for lack of prudence and meticulous take on the matter, and as it had caused unnecessary delays in the administration of justice.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood committed in court.

HELD: Respondent was reprimanded. There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursued by the respondent in introducing the document that turned out to be false.

Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned.

Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not willful and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity.

A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if courts cannot rely

on the submission as well as the representations made by lawyers, insofar as the presentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this case, even without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable event did occur, he must not be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.

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BARRAMEDA v. CASTILLOG.R. No. L-27211. July 6, 1977

78 SCRA 1

FACTS: Eusebia Barrameda sued Engracio Castillo in the municipal court of Lopez, Quezon Province in Civil Case No. 269. A copy of the court's decision, which was adverse to Barrameda, was sent by registered mail on January 28, 1966 to her lawyer at San Pablo City. That mail was received in the city post office on the following day, January 29. On that day and on February 3 and 9, 1966 the city postmaster's office supposedly sent to Barrameda's counsel three notices regarding the registered mail. Barrameda's lawyer did not claim that mail. It was returned to the municipal court and was received there on March 3, 1966 as unclaimed mail.

ISSUE: WON the appeal was illegally dismissed.

HELD: YES. In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. The exception is that when the addressee does not claim his mail within five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, then the service takes effect at the expiration of such time. If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also

deemed complete on December 6, as provided in the exception to the general rule. If he receives his mail two months after it is registered and there is no proof of the first notice, then service is complete on the date of actual receipt, following the general rule.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the first notice was sent to Barrameda's lawyer and that it was delivered to him or should have been received by him. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail was presented in court. The face of the envelope contains the notation "Returned to sender. Reason: Unclaimed". Above the stamp, on the back of the envelope, with the legend "City of San Pablo, Philippines, Jan. 29, 1966", are written the dates, "2-3-66 and 2-9-66". Written also on the back of the envelope are the following: "R to S, notified 3/3/66".

Relying on those notations on the envelope, the trial court literally and rigidly applied the presumption as to constructive service. It did not require appellee Castillo to present the postmaster's certification that a first notice was sent to Barrameda's lawyer and that the notice was received by the latter. Under those circumstances, the trial court's order dismissing Barrameda's appeal is fraught with injustice.

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MALIPOL v. TANG.R. No. L-27730. January 21, 1974

55 SCRA 202

FACTS: In the evening of February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan was hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right wheel that got detached from its axle. Malijan's

companion, with the aid of the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City Hospital where he died that same night. The gasoline tanker was driven at the time of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto Labsan, was being used in connection with the gasoline business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim Tan. Representations and demands for payment of damages having been ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, praying that appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the damages as specified in said complaint.

Appellants were duly served with summons on May 19, 1966, but they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period because Atty. Chavez committed suicide on June 17, 1966 and the case was passed on to Atty. De Castro. Upon appellees' motion of June 8, 1966, the trial court, in an order dated June 10, 1966, declared the appellants in default, and appellees were permitted to present their evidence in the absence of the appellants.

ISSUE: WON appellant can claim force majeure as cause of the default.

HELD: The Court found that appellants have not shown that they exercised such diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise, to have the answer filed within the reglementary period. Said appellant should have checked before the expiration of the period for filing the answer whether the complaint was really taken care of, or not. But this, appellant Lily Lim Tan failed to do, and this is another instance showing her lack of concern over the complaint. There was, therefore, no showing of due diligence on the part of appellants which would excuse their failure to file their answer on time. There is no showing either that the other appellant, Ernesto Labsan, had

taken any step to have an answer filed in his behalf — evidently he was relying on his employer.

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DOMINGO v. AQUINOG.R. No. L-28078. April 29, 1971

38 SCRA 472

FACTS: On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate by ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay from the available funds of the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino." The estate's counsel of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court.

HELD: The petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs. Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition in Pajares vs. Abad Santos, 6 and other cases cited therein, to wit, that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading

and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.'"

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MANALOTO v. REYESA.C. No. 503 . October 29, 1965

15 SCRA 131

FACTS: Sixto L. Reyes, a member of the Philippine Bar, was legal counsel for the Manaloto family. He also undertook to help said family to secure a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines. For his services, the Manaloto family allegedly paid him not less than P1,000.00 exclusive of travelling expenses. He, however, admits having received only a total of P590.00 and two sacks of rice as his fees in the above cases.

On October 13, 1961, Maria Cristina Manaloto instituted disbarment proceedings against Sixto L. Reyes for abandonment of the above-mentioned cases and conversion of sums of money entrusted to him by the petitioner and her sister, Rosario. This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation. After hearing the parties, disciplinary action was recommended by him against respondent.

ISSUE: WON defendant is guilty of malpractice.

HELD: The Court ruled that respondent is not guilty of abandonment in the cases of petitioner. However, the Court found him guilty of malpractice when respondent, upon making assurance that he will file an action to the court to stop the auction sale of petitioner’s property and filing a loan with DBP

for petitioner’s behalf, failed to do what he promised and instead appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one year and return the money to petitioner.

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GUTIERREZ v. CAG.R. No. L-39124. November 15, 1974

61 SCRA 85

FACTS: Private respondent, through Atty. Viola, filed an appeal in the CA but his lawyer failed to pay the docket fee on time. The CA dismissed the case but was later reopened due to the motion of reconsideration filed by private respondent. Atty. Viola said that he wasn’t the lawyer of private respondent at the time the notice of appeal by the CA was sent but it was Atty. Baizas. And the death of Attorney Baizas (the new lawyer) on January 16, 1974 was the reason why the docket fee wasn’t paid on the reglementary period. The CA ruled in favor of private respondent, hence this petition for review.

ISSUE: WON CA made an error in reopening the appeal after private respondent’s failure to pay the docket fee on time.

HELD: The Court reversed the ruling of CA and reinstated the dismissal of he appeal due to the failure to pay the docket and legal research fees within the reglementary period. Attorney Viola was negligent in not apprising Alvendia of the notice to pay the docket and legal research fees and to file forty copies of the printed record on appeal. Alvendia is bound by his lawyer's negligence. The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to

Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.

Under the environmental circumstances of this eleven-year-old litigation, it was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals to reinstate Alvendia's appeal and to relax the rule regarding dismissal of an appeal for appellant's failure to pay on time the docket and legal research fees and to file forty copies of his record on appeal within the sixty-day period

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ARO v. NANYAWAG.R. No. L-24163. April 28, 1969

27 SCRA 1090

FACTS: The services of petitioner, as practicing attorney, was engaged by respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, which were in the possession of the other respondents. Atty.Aro tried to make an amicable settlement with the other party when the court dismissed the case. But Aro got surprised when he received another copy of a second motion to dismiss when it having been made appear that Aro made an extrajudicial partition between respondents Magtibay and Martinez. This deprived him of his contingent fees, hence the petition for review.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Aro was deprived of his contingent fees.

HELD: The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. The client cannot, by settling, compromising, or dismissing his suit during its pendency, deprive the attorney of his compensation for the agreed amount, unless the lawyer consents to such settlement, compromise or dismissal, for the attorney is or "shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation (not more) for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney," albeit, under Canon 12 of the Canon of Professional Ethics, "in fixing fees, it should not be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade."In the case at bar, by entering into the compromise agreement in question and even inserting therein a prayer to the court to dismiss the case filed by petitioner, petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed him. Such implied dismissal appears to Us to have been made without justifiable cause, none is urged anywhere in the record, and so Section 26, Rule 138 applies here. Hence, petitioner is entitled to recover the full compensation.

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FRANCISCO v. MARTIASG.R. No. L-16349. January 31, 1964

10 SCRA 89

FACTS: On July 16, 1952, said Aurea Matias engaged the services of Atty. Vicente Francisco, who, with the assistance of Atty. Agbunag and of Attorneys Alberto J. Francisco and J. Gonzales Orense, personally handled the case before three different judges — successively. After the decision of this Court had become final, said attorney in the testate proceeding, motion to fix his attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit.

He alleged, among other things, that the Supreme Court had approved the probate of the will of Gabina Raquel, that he had agreed to receive a contingent fee of P15,000.00 under his erroneous belief, due to misrepresentations of Aurea Matias, that Gabina Raquel had left properties worth only P167,000.00; that he learned, after the decision of the Supreme Court that the said properties actually amounted to much more than that sum; and that, consequently, he was not bound by his agreement to receive a contingent fee of P15,000.00 only. Atty. Francisco prayed that his compensation be fixed at 30% of the market value of the estate. Resisting this motion, Aurea Matias averred that appellee was bound by the contract that they agreed as stipulated and should not be made to get more other than stated.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff can asked the 30% compensation based on the actual value of the property, not the agreed amount as stated in the contract.

HELD: Considering the circumstances and the previous rulings of the Court on contingent lawyer's fees, 12.5% of the market value of the probate estate is deemed reasonable in the case at bar. Although a written contract for attorney's fees had been made, quantum meruit became the issue, because the lawyer had been misled as to the value of the estate, and the parties had practically agreed to debate the question of reasonable value of the lawyer's services. And in fixing contingent attorney's fees, the Court considered that had the will been disallowed, appellant and the other legatees would have received nothing.The appellate court, in "revising" the attorney's fees set by the lower court, works under the restraint of the doctrinal injunction to yield to its solution in so far as possible.

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QUILBAN v. ROBINOLA.C. No. 2144. April 10, 1989

171 SCRA 768

FACTS: To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979.

The Samahan members gave the money to Atty. Robinol to pay Rivera and Colegio de San Jose Inc. for the land but they discovered that no payment had been made by Atty. Robinol. The members sent him a letter informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand.

ISSUE: WON Atty.Robinol should be disciplined for refusal to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession.

HELD: The Court ruled that Atty. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs. the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself

with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.

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MATUTE v. MATUTEG.R. No. L-27832. May 28, 1970

33 SCRA 35

FACTS: Respondents Matute y Candelario, prayed that the former administrator, Matias S. Matute, be ordered to surrender 17 titles to various properties of the Estate to the assistant clerk of court, from whom said Matias had received them on 28 September 1966. The motion was vigorously resisted by the co-administrators Matias and Carlos Matute and several other heirs (through counsel Paterno Canlas), who pleaded that the removal of Matias as administrator and his replacement by Jose S. Matute were still under appeal; that the titles aforesaid had been delivered to both Matias and Carlos Matute; that the latter "is at present and from time to time in possession of the said seventeen (17) titles", and "the co-administrator Matias S. Matute is no longer in possession of said titles" (Record on Appeal, page 6); that Attorney Paterno Canlas had a pending claim for P261,000.00, on account of legal services rendered to the estate for the study, preparation, drafting, due execution and probate of the 1962 testament of the deceased; that the claim was later compromised for P2,000,000.00.

The probate court granted the motion to surrender the documents to the clerk of court for safekeeping, "in order to prevent any possible controversy regarding any transaction

involving the remaining properties of the estate," and denied the Court ordered Attorney Paterno S. Canlas to surrender said documents "immediately . . . upon receipt hereof."

ISSUE: WON Atty. Canlas has rights to his liens.

HELD: The explicit terms of Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court afford no other alternative but to uphold the claim of appellant Paterno Canlas with respect to the seventeen documents of title to diverse properties of the estate of the deceased which are in his possession. His right, as counsel for the deceased and his estate, "to retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid" is incontestable, and under the rule and section aforesaid, the attorney cannot be compelled to surrender the monuments of title mentioned without prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied.

The courts, in the exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the court, are bound to respect and protect the attorneys' lien as a necessary means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the profession. If it be entirely indispensable for the court to gain possession of the documents that have come to the attorney and are held by him in the course of his employment as counsel, it can require surrender thereof by requiring the client or claimant to first file proper and adequate security for the lawyer's compensation.

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AMPIL v. AGRAVAG.R. No. L-27394. July 31, 1970

34 SCRA 370

FACTS: Petitioner was the counsel for Angela Tuason de Perez in several cases. On November, 1966, Angela, acting through a new attorney in-fact in the person of her daughter, Angela Perez y Tuason de Staley, terminated his services as counsel without just and lawful cause and without paying him for his professional services, for which he presented his bill in due course, as well as asserted his retaining lien over the three titles entrusted to him by Angela in the course of his professional employment in his letter of February 16, 1967 to respondents' counsel.

Overruling petitioner's opposition asking the court to respect his right to retain the titles until the value of the professional services rendered by him to Angela shall have been paid in full by the latter, respondent court ordered under date of March 8, 1967 petitioner to surrender the titles to respondents Perezes within five days from notice, holding that "(A)s the Compromise Agreement has already been approved, it is believed that the Court can have it enforced and, in connection therewith, can compel Atty. Ampil to deliver the owners duplicates of T.C.T.'s Nos. 24927, 24928 and 34769 to the Perezes . . . Any attorney's lien in favor of Mr. Ampil, as attorney of Tuason should be enforced against his client. and not against the Perezes."

ISSUE: WON the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in having granted the motion to surrender the titles in his possession

HELD: The Court ruled that a counsel's right to retain muniments of title in his possession until payment of his lawful fees and disbursements is effected "is incontestable, and under the rule and section aforesaid, the attorney can not be compelled to surrender the muniments of title mentioned without prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied. The courts, in the exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the court, are bound to respect and protect the attorneys' lien as a necessary means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the profession.

The attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his employment. The attorney's retaining lien attaches to the client's documents and funds in the attorney's possession regardless of the outcome, favorable or adverse, of any cases he may have handled for his client. Called upon at all times to exert utmost zeal with unstinted fidelity in upholding his client's cause and subject to appropriate disciplinary action if he should fail to live up to such exacting standard, the attorney in return is given the assurance through his liens — retaining and charging — that collection of his lawful fees and disbursements is not rendered difficult, if not altogether thwarted, by an unappreciative client. He is thereby given an effective hold on his client to assure payment of his services in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court.

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TAJAN v. COSEG.R. No. L-28899. May 30, 1974

57 SCRA 154

FACTS: Petitioner was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false. Not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had his letter filed against petitioner for disbarment.

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge has jurisdiction for disbarment proceeding.

HELD: The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by acts of misconduct that he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.

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GONZALES AUSTRIA v. ABAYAA.M. No. R-705-RTJ. August 23, 1989

178 SCRA 634

FACTS: Petitioners charged respondent Judge Abaya for Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants and illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and condition of his continued employment. Based on the evidence presented by the parties, CA Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them.

ISSUE: WON the CA decision was committed with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: The office of a judge exists for one solemn end — to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system. By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and perquisites attached to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except earned leave credits, as recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera.

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground.

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CUARESMA v. AGUILARA.C. No. RTJ-92-845. September 3, 1993

226 SCRA 73

FACTS: Complainants, Joey and Abraham Cuaresma, charged respondent judge with grave abuse of authority. They claim that respondent judge has no right to order the release of Banite since the latter's case was being tried in the sala of Judge Tarriela. They also aver that the release of Banite has endangered their lives. Respondent judge justifies his action under Section 14(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. He also invokes good faith.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of authority.

HELD: The SC ruled that respondent judge had no power to act on the request to release on bail accused Banite. The record does not show that at the time respondent judge ordered Banite's release, Judge Tarriela was absent or unavailable and could not have acted on the request. It was also irregular for respondent judge to entertain the request considering that it did not appear that a formal motion had been filed by the accused to that effect. Indeed, respondent judge did not even examine

the records of the case as he merely signed the Orders allegedly prepared by Prosecutor Olarte. His indifference to duty prevented him from discovering that at the time he ordered the release of accused Banite, the Information charging the latter with Murder with no recommendation for bail had not been properly amended.

Judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice. Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, enjoins judges "to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct that they be exemplars in their communities and the living personification of justice and the Rule of Law." Respondent judge's action shows such lack of familiarity with our laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public confidence in the integrity of our courts.

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PARAS V. PARASA.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000

343 SCRA 414

FACTS: A disbarment case was filed by Rosa Y. Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras, charging the latter for forging her signatures in the bank in loan documents and for immorality for siring a child with another woman. After the parties submitted their pleadings and other pieces of evidence, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: WON the CBD is correct in ruling the penalty against Atty. Paras.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the findings and recommendations of the CBD, finding the evidence against the respondent overwhelming. Continued possession of good moral character is essential to remain in the practice of law. Disbarment, however, should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the desired end.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife.

However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired.

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FULE v. CORDEROA.C. No. 284 . July 29, 1977

78 SCRA 88

FACTS: Respondent, Solon F. Cordero, a member of the Philippine Bar and Auxiliary Justice of the Peace of San Pablo City stands charged — by his first cousins, namely, Attorneys Hector C. Fule and Conrado C. Fule (brothers), the latter being

the Justice of the Peace of Alaminos, Laguna — with violation of his attorney's oath, allegedly by blackmailing the Fule brothers.

The alleged blackmail consists in respondent's threat to file criminal and administrative charges against Conrado C. Fule for alleged falsification of public documents if Hector C. Fule would not desist from pursuing his application for the position of solicitor in the Solicitor General's Office, Department of Justice, because respondent was himself interested in said position. Despite the threats made by respondent, however, petitioner, Hector Fule, pursued his application for the position of solicitor in the Solicitor General's Office, and was, in fact, appointed solicitor. Whereupon, respondent made good his threat and filed five (5) separate administrative charges with the Department of Justice and a criminal complaint on five (5) counts with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna, against Conrado C. Fule. A series of charges and countercharges were thereafter filed by respondent against petitioners and vice-versa, ranging from criminal cases to administrative charges, coupled with an exchange of unsavory vilifications. The administrative charges resulted in admonition to Municipal Judge Conrado C. Fule.

ISSUE: WON the instant petition should be dismissed due to the death of respondent Cordero.

HELD: In view of the death of respondent, Solon F. Cordero, on January 9, 1977 (as reported by Cordero's counsel) the instant petition should be dismissed as moot and academic.

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PROVINCIAL BANK v. GRECIAA.C. No. 2756. December 18, 1990

192 SCRA 381

FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Grecia was ordered disbarred last November 12, 1987 by the SC. He filed a petition for reinstatement to the Bar. On 17 October 1990, the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar, submitted to the Bar Confidant for the Court's consideration, reasoning among others, that he has been "sufficiently punished," has reformed and rehabilitated himself, and can again be entrusted with the exercise of the noble profession of law.

In a letter, dated 21 November 1990, addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Court, respondent Grecia pleaded anew that once the Court restores him to the practice of law, he "unreservedly bind(s)" himself "henceforth to act and behave carefully as a worthy member of the Philippine Bar."

ISSUE: WON respondent Grecia should be reinstated

HELD: The Court ruled that cognizant, therefore, "that the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle," we heed respondent's plea for reinstatement. His expiation subsequent to his disbarment; his realization of his mistake and the gravity of his offense; the testimonials from exemplary members of the Bar as to his fitness to resume the practice of law; and his solemn pledge to the Court, that if his disbarment is lifted, he will always closely and faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession, call for this affirmative response.