leveraging technology in the service of diplomacy ...academic.udayton.edu/richardghere/org theory...

The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for

The Business of Government

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Barry FultonResearch ProfessorSchool of Media and Public AffairsThe George Washington University

Leveraging Technology in theService of Diplomacy: Innovationin the Department of State

M A R C H 2 0 0 2

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Leveraging Technology in the Service of Diplomacy: Innovation in the Department of State

E - G O V E R N M E N T S E R I E S

Barry FultonResearch ProfessorSchool of Media and Public AffairsThe George Washington University

March 2002

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LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY IN THE SERVICE OF DIPLOMACY

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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Foreword ..............................................................................................5

Executive Summary ..............................................................................6

Introduction: The Digital Challenge ....................................................8

Case Studies: Using Technology to Improve Diplomatic Interaction ........................................................................................11

Consular Consolidated Database....................................................11Kosovo Repatriation Information Support ......................................13Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System........................15Dayton Peace Accords ..................................................................17

Case Studies: Using Technology to Improve Public Access ................19Kosovo Information Assistance Initiative ........................................19Digital Videoconferencing ..............................................................20FOIA Electronic Reading Room......................................................22Liquid State (Content Management System)....................................24

Case Studies: Using Technology to Improve Internal Communication..................................................................................26

Treaty Information Portal ................................................................26Worldwide Remote E-mail Network ..............................................28ChinaNet........................................................................................30Foreign Affairs Systems Integration ................................................31

Lessons Learned ................................................................................34

Recommendations..............................................................................37

Appendix: Glossary ............................................................................40

Endnotes ............................................................................................41

Bibliography ......................................................................................42

About the Author ..............................................................................44

Key Contact Information....................................................................45

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F O R E W O R D

March 2002

On behalf of The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government, we are pleased topresent this report by Barry Fulton, “Leveraging Technology in the Service of Diplomacy: Innovation in theDepartment of State.”

This report is aimed at several audiences. The first is government executives from all agencies and depart-ments. Professor Fulton has a powerful message for them: Technology is a crucial tool in enabling govern-ment managers to do their jobs more effectively and efficiently. Technology, according to the Fulton report,is not an end in itself but a tool for dramatically improving the performance of government activities.

The second audience is the State Department itself. By describing innovative uses of technology in 12 different State Department activities, the report can be used by other State Department bureaus and offices to “benchmark” their own use of technology. The report describes the significant progress that the State Department has made over the last several years in implementing technology solutions to betterdeliver diplomacy.

Finally, the report is aimed at technology executives across government. Professor Fulton describes howtechnology innovation occurs when technology executives and program executives forge close workingrelationships to implement technology to improve the delivery of services. The report also includes recom-mendations regarding which information technology requirements might best be centralized and how thedevelopment and support of information technology applications should be decentralized.

We trust that this report will be useful and informative to all three audiences outlined above: governmentexecutives, State Department executives, and technology executives. There continues to be many technol-ogy innovations ripe for implementation throughout government that promise to improve the performanceof activities and delivery of services.

Paul Lawrence Ian LittmanPartner, PricewaterhouseCoopers Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopersCo-Chair, Endowment Advisory Board Co-Chair, Endowment Advisory [email protected] [email protected]

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The Department of State is on the cusp of an inter-nal information revolution in support of diplomacy,driven by information-technology-savvy leadershipand an organizational restlessness with the statusquo. State’s IT epiphany followed a two-decade fallfrom digital grace. The frustration of its employeesand the consternation of the foreign affairs commu-nity signaled the call for action that is currentlyunder way. The IT budget has been doubled tobuild infrastructure and improve connectivity. Andit is increasingly understood that information tech-nology not only enhances financial and personnelmanagement, but also directly strengthens the con-duct of diplomacy.

The purpose of this study was to examine those ITapplications that directly support the conduct ofdiplomacy. Examples of best practices were soughtby word of mouth and documented by interviews.In a few cases, including the use of digital technol-ogy leading to the Dayton Peace Accords, pub-lished firsthand accounts were the primary source.

Twelve examples were chosen for review and elu-cidation. They were selected both for their contri-bution to diplomacy and for their variety. There arenumerous other examples that could have beenselected, particularly from innovations at overseasmissions. Even with all of the innovations that arechanging the face of diplomacy, it is only in thepast year that IT modernization has been broadlyappreciated as a critical enabler of diplomacy.

What made the difference? Leadership, resources,and staff impatience with the status quo. AsSecretary of State Colin Powell told employees on

September 6, 2001, “The tools that we now havethrough Net Diplomacy are just remarkable, in thesense that they can go over political boundaries,they can go over cultural walls, they can breakdown any barrier that is out there to communica-tion.” That is the kind of enthusiasm that had beenmissing. However, most of the examples in thisstudy preceded Secretary Powell’s arrival and theinfusion of new funds. So, their success representsa confluence of two factors: an inside championand an outside catalyst.

Key Findings The findings from this study include the following:

• Most of the innovations were driven by forcesexterior to the Department of State, includingthe 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,the fear of Y2K systems meltdown, and budgetreductions requiring great efficiencies.

• Practically all of the innovations were initiatedand developed by individuals who were partof the user community that they weredesigned to serve.

• Most of the applications were developed inareas of the Department of State traditionallythought to be out of the mainstream of politicaland economic analysis and policy making.

• Most of the innovations cannot be considered“mission critical”—that is, their developmentwas not driven by an expressed need toimprove the practice of diplomacy, even if thatsubsequently was the result.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

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The most important lesson from the 12 examples isthe need to ensure a close alignment between theuser community and the IT developers. The closestpossible relation results when the two communitiessubstantially overlap. Most of the innovations camefrom users who also have expertise in informationtechnology. The text includes numerous project-specific lessons and highlights those that werecommon to two or more innovations.

RecommendationsBased on this study, there are five key recommen-dations for introducing technology in support ofdiplomacy:

• Centralize common requirements such as net-work architecture, equipment procurement,security certification, and software standards.

• Decentralize the development and support ofIT applications.

• Encourage a cadre of IT-literate diplomats, offi-cers whose specialty is foreign affairs with ITcompetence.

• Share learning by encouraging user groups thatfunction across institutional lines.

• Promote innovation by funding pilot projectsand recognizing excellence.

Information technology is not a panacea. On theother hand, it is not an option in today’s competi-tive environment. If diplomats do not have real-time connectivity to stay informed, if they do nothave powerful tools to assist in analysis, if they do

not have the means to improve their productivity,then those who do will best them.

With its current leadership and the new funding ithas received, buttressed by a new focus on diplo-matic requirements, the Department of State is a strong candidate for a turnaround within 24months. It is, indeed, a plausible candidate toassume a leadership role in the use of informationtechnology in the foreign affairs community.

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The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and the remains of theCommunist revolution disappeared in the early1990s. The Information Revolution reached the tip-ping point as corporations embraced the new tech-nologies and the Internet began its rapid diffusionthroughout the industrial world. In the decade thatfollowed, globalization has driven the world econ-omy, new media have affected world politics, andprivate citizens have become increasingly engagedin international affairs.

The Department of State, while celebrating the end ofthe Cold War, was slow to apply the new technolo-gies to the conduct of diplomacy. Indeed, in the lastdecade of the 20th century, decision making becamemore centralized, physical access more restricted,and information flow more inhibited. In frustration, agroup of State Department officers issued a manifestoin which they wrote, “We are entering the unchartedwaters of the 21st century in a rusted-out diplomatichulk that is no longer seaworthy.”1

This state of affairs has been richly documented byseveral studies including Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,2 Equipped for the Future:Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century,3

and America’s Overseas Presence in the 21stCentury.4 In the first week of the George W. Bushadministration, former Defense Secretary FrankCarlucci presented to Secretary of State Colin Powell

a “resources-for-reform” proposal calling for theDepartment of State to undertake fundamentalchange, including upgrading information technologyand adopting modern management practices. Co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations andthe Center for Strategic and International Studies, thereview, State Department Reform,5 represents a con-sensus among research institutions, scholars, andprofessionals that the time has come for action. “Inshort,” the task force said, “renewal of America’s for-eign policy making and implementing machinery isan urgent national security priority.”

A common element in practically all of a dozenrecent studies is the State Department’s failure todeploy modern information technology in supportof diplomacy. As information acquisition, analysis,management, and dissemination are central toevery aspect of diplomacy, it is no surprise thatAmerican diplomacy has lost its primacy in theconduct of foreign policy. This criticism does notnecessarily reflect on the many able diplomats whoserve in the American Foreign Service; it is meantto highlight the inadequacy of the tools that areavailable to them, especially in a period whendiplomatic roles are rapidly evolving. In a world of ever increasing complexity, the national interestwill suffer unless the professionals who serve in180 countries are supported by the best availableinformation technology.

Introduction: The Digital Challenge

I am determined that I’m going to get an Internet-accessible computer, with pipes to support it, at everydesk in the State Department and every embassy in the world.

—Secretary of State Colin Powell, September 5, 2001

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Additional resources alone will not ensure success.Examples of colossal failures from both governmentand industry are plentiful. The U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID), for example,was forced to abandon a multi-million-dollar centralaccounting system several years ago when it failedto serve its employees. The Department of State’sonce planned three-enclave system, which requiredthree computers at every employee’s desk for fullconnectivity, would not have efficiently connecteddiplomats across borders or even within embassies.

If the status quo is unacceptable and can’t be curedby money alone, what is required? As this studysuggests, the answer is a combination of leadershipand grassroots initiatives. Secretary of State Powellset the tone in his first week in office when he toldemployees that he lived on the Internet. These werewords of appreciation for the innovators who werealready using the new technologies, and words ofencouragement for those who had been pushing for change.

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossmantold fellow diplomats that the revolution in infor-mation technology “is absolutely, utterly, and pro-foundly changing” the way diplomats do business.“Without the capacity to manage and master IT,”he said, “we will not succeed.” Under Secretary for Management Grant Green speaking of “e-diplo-macy” at a George Washington University forum,promised to “create a desktop for diplomats withinstant access to all the applications and informa-tion diplomats need to do their jobs.” As new funding was made available, the State Departmentbegan deploying the Internet to every desktop andincreasing its classified connectivity.

The Department of State identifies 57 major infor-mation systems6 that it maintains to support itsbusiness practices. They range from an unclassifiede-mail system to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centersystem—and encompass an array of functions fromcommunication to administration to the facilitationof diplomatic practices.

The single most important technological require-ment for the State Department is secure communi-cations between Washington and 250 embassiesand consulates abroad. Legacy telegram systemscontinue to serve as the primary means of official

secure communications, although an increasingamount of informal correspondence is carried overunclassified and classified e-mail systems.

Like most organizations, State’s first use of dataprocessing was in support of financial managementand payroll operations supported by mainframecomputers. Its initial foray into word processingwas taken in the mid-1970s when it awarded acontract for the worldwide installation and mainte-nance of Wang word processors. Although Statehas been rightly criticized for holding on to theWang technology for two decades, its initial deci-sion was prudent, as Wang offered a reliable, low-maintenance system that offered efficiencies inword processing over the Selectric typewriters theyreplaced. E-mail and the World Wide Web werenot candidates for diplomatic tools when the wordprocessors were first installed.

Moving from stand-alone Wang word processors to Pentium-powered computers running on LocalArea Networks (LANs) was a painful and time-consuming process because of budgetary limita-tions, personnel shortages, and security require-ments. Modern computers operating on robustnetworks are now the norm. The last Wang wordprocessors will soon be retired.

The purpose of this study was to look at recent ini-tiatives that promise to transform the conduct ofdiplomacy. While examples of excellence are notwidespread, there are a number scattered through-out the State Department that warrant recognition.Systems that support consular services, includingthe processing and issuance of visas, are veryrobust. Public diplomacy applications representstate-of-the-art technology. Refugee processing isbeing expedited by new IT applications. The studyis intended to expand the circle of supporters byillustrating that information technology is alreadyfacilitating the conduct of diplomacy. By stimulat-ing interest among diplomats, it is hoped that therewill be a further incentive for internal reform.

Diplomacy and information technology intersect atthree levels. The first is that which promotes effi-ciency in existing business practices including pay-rolling, accounting, and contracting. The secondlevel directly supports the conduct of diplomacyincluding reporting, negotiation, representation,

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and advocacy. The third level is the substancerather than the practice of diplomacy. It includesU.S. negotiations to open telecommunications mar-kets in China, analysis of the impact of softwareproduction in India, and advancement of telecom-munications deregulation in the Caribbean. TheState Department has applied its information tech-nology predominantly at the first level, directed atimproving administrative efficiency. The secondlevel, with the exception of word processing and e-mail, has been largely ignored. The third levelhas commanded U.S. government attention, but is not a priority at the Department of State.

This study focuses on the second level—diplomaticsupport—by seeking and reporting examples ofapplications that advance the practice of diplomacy.Best practices were sought to illustrate the cate-gories below:

• Knowledge management

• Database management

• Specialized intranets

• Multimedia reporting

• Customized hyper-linked virtual desktops

• Collaborative software

• Videoconferencing

• Digital imagery

• Presentation software

• Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), cellphones,and wireless applications

• Language translation software

• Speech recognition software

• GPS (Global Positioning System)

• GIS (Geographic Information System)

• Remote sensing

• Digital communication systems

• Encryption

Research was conducted primarily through per-sonal interviews, augmented by written exchangesand the examination of published accounts.Particular attention is given to the relation between

the IT applications and the diplomats for whom(and by whom) they are designed. Have the sys-tems enhanced the quality or efficiency of diplo-macy? Are diplomats better prepared to cope with the requirements of the 21st century? Is theDepartment of State better prepared to communi-cate outside of traditional government-to-govern-ment channels? In short, can it be demonstratedthat the national interest is served by the wise useof information technology?

The State Department’s messaging systems, includ-ing a legacy cable system and classified andunclassified e-mail systems, are ignored in thisstudy for two reasons. They are neither unique norimaginatively integrated, so do not serve to illus-trate the centers of IT excellence to which thisstudy is directed. Likewise, the department’snumerous administrative systems have not beenexamined, as the focus is on diplomatic practices.

Twelve examples have been selected to illustratehow information technology has been applied toenhance diplomatic practices. Ranging fromrefugee processing to the Dayton Peace Accords,the IT applications fall into three categories repre-sented in the chapters that follow: diplomatic inter-action, public access, and internal communication.None of the systems is universally used in theDepartment of State, and most are unknown exceptto the user community that developed the system.

To the extent that the cases illustrate excellence, thisreport may also serve to stimulate the transformationof American diplomacy, which would require chang-ing its closed culture, reshaping core processes, andaddressing third-level digital challenges.

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Case Studies: Using Technology toImprove Diplomatic Interaction

Consular Consolidated Database(CCD)The Consular Consolidated Database is a world-wide database of databases, consolidating datafrom every U.S. consular office in the world. Thedata is replicated in Washington and made avail-able to consular officers around the globe.

Built on an Oracle database, it operates over theDepartment of State’s sensitive but unclassifiedintranet known as OpenNet. All consular officershave had access to the CCD since mid-2001.Whenever an officer carries out any consular func-tion—such as receiving data from a visa applicantor issuing a visa—these actions are recorded in thelocal database. Within five minutes selected dataare available to authorized personnel worldwide.

The CCD serves several purposes critical to the efficient operation of American consular services.In the first instance, it provides a secure record of transactions in case local records are lost ordestroyed or unavailable in an emergency. Equallyimportant, it serves consular officers in sharing datawith their colleagues at other posts, in respondingto queries about the authenticity of questionablevisas, and in allowing a check of prior informationwhen a new visa application is received.

In case of emergencies, the CCD allows consularofficers to continue services to American citizensthrough the central database or by downloadingthe data to a mobile site. The CCD also makes itmuch easier to share information with other agen-cies, as the data are already in a format that can be

exported. The existence of the CCD has made itrelatively easy for State to begin sharing all of itsCCD-held visa information with the Immigrationand Naturalization Service (INS) in the Departmentof Justice.

A separate but complementary system is theConsular Lookout and Support System, which auto-matically notifies the consular officer when anapplicant has been previously turned down for avisa or when other lookout information is recordedin the system. This computerized system has beenin existence since the mid-1960s, but was moreextensively deployed by congressional mandate following the 1993 bombing of the World TradeCenter. It also operates on the same intranet plat-form, OpenNet, which hosts the CCD.

Diplomacy is far more than government-to-govern-ment interactions. Increasingly it involves the inter-actions of officials and publics. As one ForeignService officer said, “Being able to interact with thepublic as a representative of the United States andpresent official decisions of the United States con-cerning a foreign national’s application for a U.S.

Start Date: Fully operational in 2001

Originating Office: Bureau of Consular Affairs

Brief Description: Database aggregating datafrom all U.S. consular activities abroad includ-ing visa issuance, passport replacement, birthsand deaths of American citizens

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government service constitutes diplomacy. Themore informed a consular officer is, the better theinteraction will be, the better the service will be,the better perception the foreign public is going tohave of the U.S. presence there. A lot of it dependson the consular officer’s ability to express him orherself, but this gives the officer tools to make amore informed, authoritative decision.”

Since its introduction, the Consolidated ConsularDatabase has been well received by consular offi-cers. The use of the CCD is intuitive and requireslittle or no training. A systems integrator designedthe structure of the database and the replicationsystem, created the consolidated database, andthen created the web interface to the database.Since CCD’s launch, consular officers have filednumerous unsolicited reports of the system’s utility.

Other benefits to users are envisioned with thematuration of the system. Prior to the availabilityof the CCD, an ad hoc reporting tool (ART), basedon Microsoft Access, was developed to enable con-sular personnel overseas to query their local con-sular databases. Because of its complexity and the inadequacy of training, ART did not enjoy thereceptivity of CCD. As the CCD is not a data-miningtool, however, it cannot be easily queried for aggre-gate data. Although a small minority uses it foranalysis, new analytic tools will be better crafted to satisfy user needs.

CCD now includes photographs of all visa recipi-ents, and plans are under way to photograph allapplicants, against which facial recognition soft-ware could be run to detect known terrorists andcriminals. One-piece flat-screen computers are

Figure 1: Consular Section web page from the American Embassy in Paris

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being procured so that consular officers can accessrelevant databases during the visa interview andrecord adjudications and informal notes directlyinto the database. Both of these enhancements represent changes in work practices that will bewell received by some and resisted by others.Other future plans include eliminating paper filesby scanning documents and generating workloadstatistics centrally instead of tasking each post toproduce them.

Another related expansion of intranet use is inter-active collaboration, which some see as a primaryvehicle for consular officers to work with each otheracross distances. The question is how best to tapinto the reservoir of knowledge held by experiencedofficers. Several newsgroups were established, butafter a few comments, users stopped contributing.There was reluctance for officers to attach theirnames to documents going to an amorphous group,as well as a tendency not to read incoming post-ings. An ongoing experiment with an off-the-shelfcollaboration tool, E-room, is showing mixedresults. With projects or tasks moderated by aleader, collaboration has worked well. Collaborativegroups that do not have the focus of a project havebeen less utilized. With well-defined tasks andincreasingly heavy workloads, consular officershave been in the forefront of IT experimentationand adoption.

Lessons Learned• Simplicity, ease of access, and breadth of data

are far more beneficial than tools that providedeeper, more flexible, more complex analysis.Busy officers turn to the simpler systems. Theexperience in implementing CCD, as well asthe Lookout System and ART, suggests it is bet-ter to introduce applications that are simple but effective, without bells and whistles. To the extent that routine processes can be automated, user satisfaction is axiomatic.

• Systems, particularly in the introductorystages, should be built to accommodate existing work practices. After the system isaccepted it can be expanded to change exist-ing work practices. A new system (e.g., CCD)can be thought of as a stepping-stone on whichfuture development can be based.

Kosovo Repatriation InformationSupport (KRIS)Among the many initiatives to assist Kosovarrefugees after the withdrawal of Serbian forces in1999 was a multi-agency effort in integrating infor-mation in a common geographical database. It was,in the first instance, an attempt to use GeographicInformation System (GIS) software to catalog theextent of the humanitarian tragedy and to assist inthe safe return of refugees. In the simplest terms,GIS is a means of displaying information on a map.Better defined, GIS is a database management sys-tem for the display and analysis of digital geo-spatial data. It combines mapping capabilities,databases of geographic and other relevant infor-mation, and spatial analysis to allow users to lookat an area in relation to other areas, in relation tochanges over time, and in relation to other relevantfactors. By combining digital maps, satellite andaircraft imagery, and data collected from fieldworkers on the ground, a GIS-based network canprovide accurate and timely information for gov-ernments and nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) to respond to complex contingencies.

The State Department became involved in support-ing a GIS system in Kosovo through the Office of the Geographer and Global Issues, althoughthere were numerous other players including theNational Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA),the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the USAID, and the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The State Department’s contribution was to assistin the development of the Kosovo RepatriationInformation Support system (KRIS). The foundationfor KRIS was the construction of an electronic base

Start Date: Deployed in 1999

Originating Office: Office of the Geographerand Global Issues

Brief Description: Geographic informationsystem deployed to support the repatriation ofKosovars after the withdrawal of Serbian forcesfrom Kosovo

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map by NIMA in 1998. It included multiple datalayers such as topography, roads, place names, andadministrative units. OFDA commissioned aNIMA-produced “humanitarian-planning map”and distributed it in paper form to relief agenciesworking in Kosovo.

After the Yugoslav army withdrew from Kosovo fol-lowing its spring 1999 offensive against the ethnicAlbanians in Kosovo, UNHCR established a GIS unitin Pristina supported by a multi-agency team com-posed of U.N. agencies and OFDA. In June 1999,the State Department deployed the KRIS team toMacedonia. The team arrived with laptops loadedwith GIS software and updated data from NIMA. Itspurpose was to support UNHCR in developing datasets that would assist the repatriation process. Theteam was able to obtain and use U-2 photographicimagery depicting damage to homes in Kosovo.

The intention of using KRIS as a planning tool forrepatriation was overtaken by the spontaneousreturn of the Kosovars. Nonetheless, KRIS databasesassisted in coordinating repatriation activities andcontributed to a survey by UNHCR of the damageto housing and other infrastructure in Kosovowithin weeks after the Serb withdrawal. It served asa precursor to the U.N.’s Humanitarian CommunityInformation Center (HCIC), which represented amajor breakthrough in information sharing.

After repatriation, HCIC’s role changed to support-ing reconstruction planning and budgeting, electionplanning, and civil administration—all of whichcould be supported by the geographic databasesthat had been developed. The State officers whosupported the initiative report that an effort “todevelop a more systematic information-sharingregime for future complex contingencies has begunto gather momentum.” USAID has issued a draftinformation-sharing plan that anticipates require-ments for sharing geo-spatial data in future humani-tarian assistance efforts.

With scores of players involved in internationalhumanitarian relief, coordination between civilianand military agencies, between government andnongovernmental organizations, between interna-tional organizations and numerous governments is always a challenge. If they can all contribute to,and draw on, a common data set, coordination islikely to improve markedly. GIS software providesthe opportunity for unprecedented collaboration ifthe various actors can agree on common standards.

Lessons LearnedIn a presentation at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Col. Michael Dziedzic and Dr. William Wood drew the following lessons from their experience in Kosovo:7

Figure 2: GIS for repatriation planning

ROADCONDITIONS

TOPOGRAPHY

PROPERTY CLAIMSESTIMATED RETURNEESREFUGEE CAMPSADMIN. BOUNDARIESTHREATSROAD CONDITIONSTOPOGRAPHY

Attribute table forplace or area

Pristina

Pec

Total

THREATS-(landmines...)

TEXTTABLE

REFUGEECAMPS

ADMINISTRATIVEBOUNDARIES

PROPERTYCLAIMS

ESTIMATEDRETURNEES

3 12

1

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• Develop a strategic information plan. Use ofGIS alone does not mean there is an informa-tion-sharing regime. An information strategyneeds to be developed involving all major par-ticipating organizations to address data require-ments, information security, and fieldconstraints.

• Designate an information-sharing coordinator.Each organization should be responsible fordeveloping and maintaining its own data sets,using common standards for the data andplace names to ensure that the data sets canbe integrated.

• Build GIS foundation maps in anticipation offuture complex contingencies. This needs to be done by a technical agency such as NIMAin advance of a humanitarian interventionbecause of the time required.

• Improve response time. Major internationalrelief organizations need to develop emergencyresponse capabilities with the necessary GISexpertise, hardware, and communicationsequipment to facilitate the rapid establishmentof information-sharing networks in the field.

Worldwide Refugee AdmissionsProcessing System (WRAPS)The Worldwide Refugee Admissions ProcessingSystem (WRAPS) supports a network of 15 OverseasProcessing Entities (OPEs) that operate on contractwith the Department of State through the Bureau ofPopulation, Refugees, and Migration. From Havanato Moscow, the OPEs are the first point of contactfor the 70,000 refugees that immigrate to the UnitedStates each year. WRAPS is a virtual private networkfor capturing information needed to process refugeeapplications, track movement, and, finally, to re-locate refugees to the United States.

WRAPS also provides comprehensive information tovolunteer organizations (e.g., Church World Service,International Rescue Committee, U.S. CatholicConference) that help resettle the refugees in theUnited States after they arrive. WRAPS will provideaccess to case data on the refugees, so they can beefficiently assisted by the volunteer organizations.Each of the 10 volunteer agencies connected to thesystem have from 10 to 100 local affiliates, whichalso draw on the information. Other government

agencies that require access to WRAPS include theCenters for Disease Control, the Department ofHealth and Human Services, and the Immigrationand Naturalization Service. International partnerswith which interconnectivity will be possible in the future include the International Organization for Migration and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Data is encrypted, transmitted over the Internet,and accessed through a web browser. Because somany users are external to the State Department, itsproprietary connectivity has not been used to linkthe various system users. Necessary changes to thesoftware can be made centrally from Washington,thereby minimizing maintenance at the OPEs andvolunteer organizations.

This homegrown system was based on well-definedbusiness needs, triggered by the uncertain guess-work of estimating the number of refugees arrivingeach month, the requirements for making airlinereservations, and the need to comply with legis-lated ceilings. With thousands of employeesinvolved from contract organizations, NGOs, gov-ernment, and international organizations, it wasimpossible to plan and track refugee movementwith precision. A host of logistical, personal, andmedical problems had to be accommodated.

The project manager—whose expertise was ininternational relations, not information technol-ogy—proposed a real-time, centralized database.A consulting firm was engaged to develop baselinerequirements, a timeline, and a budget, whichwere completed in 1998. Through a competitivebid, a contract was awarded to build the system.Both the consulting firm and the contractor had

Start Date: First installation in 2001; addi-tional sites to be completed in 2002

Originating Office: Bureau of Population,Refugees, and Migration

Brief Description: Web-enabled database tofacilitate movement of refugees to the UnitedStates

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extensive and continuing contact with the endusers at the 15 OPEs and with the stakeholders.During the process of system design, there weresome organizational changes as well to better support the new processes.

WRAPS replaced a collection of disparate stand-alone systems that did not provide uniform data to those responsible for managing refugee resettle-ment. The new system was designed to allow amigration from uneven statistics and educatedguesswork to a uniform database. It was firstdeployed in Russia in December 2001, at an OPEthat processes some 16,000 refugees annually. The100 Moscow employees welcomed the new sys-tem, which began full operation as scheduled, withonly a few minor bugs. As of this writing, WRAPSremains to be deployed in the remaining 14 cen-ters, scheduled for completion by December 2002.Refugee referrals from the UNHCR, which are cur-rently processed manually, will also be electroni-cally processed in another 18 months when thetwo systems will be fully compatible.

For system users, WRAPS is a welcome tool forprocessing applicants. The bottom-line benefit,however, is for the refugees themselves, whoshould experience fewer delays in being resettled

in the United States. According to the project man-ager, “The whole procedure is shortened, and theyget here faster. That’s really been the goal of ours.”

Lessons Learned• User involvement is key to building a success-

ful system. A user group was created to pro-vide constant feedback as the system wasbeing developed. A system was established forcapturing, tracking, and responding to usercomments. A website was established to allowusers to track progress.

• Likewise, stakeholder consultation is a keyrequirement. Partners from the NGOs andgovernment offices had to be carefully con-sulted to ensure that the information and sta-tistics that WRAPS produces would satisfy theirrequirements.

• Defining system requirements and writingdetailed business rules for the programmerswas far more complex and time-consumingthan anticipated. It’s like building an additionon your house: It takes longer and costs morethan you think. In the last analysis, users werewell served because of the specificity of thebusiness requirements.

Washington, D.C.

Havana

Accra

Cairo

Nairobi

Frankfurt

ViennaMoscow

Zagreb

Damascus

Istanbul

AmmanNew Delhi

Islamabad

Ho Chi Minh City

Bangkok

10/24/00

Figure 3: Overseas Processing Entities for refugee admissions

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• Training is essential. A training manual waswritten, trainers visited field offices, and fieldofficers were brought to Washington for hands-on training and immediate feedback. A 16-hour-a-day help desk was established, andonline help screens were developed.

Dayton Peace AccordsThe virtual maps of Bosnia used by StateDepartment negotiators leading up to the 1995Dayton Accords represent the most widely chroni-cled use of information technology in the service of diplomacy. Although the Department of Defensemanaged the technology, its skillful use by StateDepartment negotiators helped conclude a peaceagreement that is still being maintained after morethan six years.

The Defense Mapping Agency (now a component ofthe National Imagery and Mapping Agency) createda virtual-reality version of the Bosnian landscapethat allowed negotiators to sit in front of a computerterminal and examine geographic features to adetail of two meters. The computer program thatsimulated the Bosnian countryside, the PowerSceneterrain visualization system, was developed byCambridge Research Associates of McLean, Virginia.

The negotiations took place November 1–21, 1995,at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio,for the purpose of forging a peace agreement andgaining agreement for a multi-ethnic Bosnian state.Territorial issues within Bosnia were among the mostintractable decisions facing the negotiators. Afteryears of bloodshed and centuries of ethnic rivalry,the stakes were extremely high. The three warringnations were represented in Dayton by YugoslavPresident Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President

Franjo Tudjman, and Bosnian President AlijaIzetbegovic. Assistant Secretary of State RichardHolbrooke headed the American negotiating team.

The virtual-mapping technology was supported by ateam of 55 military experts and civilian contractorsplus $4 million worth of map-making equipment.Bosnia had been completely filmed and stored toallow its virtual three-dimensional representation.The technology was originally developed for theDefense Department for use in Desert Storm.

One of the major challenges in Dayton was to convince all parties to agree to the same map andreach agreement on clear boundaries. Negotiatorswere able to pick a point on the map and simulta-neously show on a split screen a color aerial imageof the terrain. The principals were said to be aston-ished as they recognized familiar elements of theBosnian landscape, including the ancestral home of one of the Balkan presidents.

Holbrooke was able to sit down with the princi-pals and give them a virtual flight across disputedterritories with the use of PowerScene. At onepoint, American officials brought Milosevic to ahigh-tech auditorium to show an aerial view of adisputed corridor of Serb-held territory betweenSarajevo and Gorazde. After seeing that his pro-posed two-mile-wide corridor was renderedimpractical by the steep mountains, Milosevicagreed to widen the path to five miles. Holbrooke

Start Date: Used in peace negotiations in1995

Originating Office: Department of State nego-tiators, with facilitation by DoD

Brief Description: Virtual mapping technologyrendered three-dimensional views of disputedareas to assist in reaching agreement amongwarring parties

Figure 4: Digital map used in Dayton Peace Talks

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wrote that this high-tech video game played an important role in connecting Sarajevo withGorazde, the last Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia.

On a map scaled at 1 to 50,000, a slight shift mayrepresent hundreds of yards on the ground, unin-tentionally separating communities and families.Bringing the landscape to Dayton by virtual meansallowed all parties to understand without ambiguitythe extent of their compromises and the precisenature of their agreement. The technology allowedthe computation of the exact percentage of territoryeach side was given as various alternatives wereconsidered. State Department negotiators weretherefore in a position to build trust among the sev-eral parties. Technology removed subjectivity fromthe interpretation of the “facts on the ground.” Anynegotiator would benefit from having at his or herdisposal an indisputable set of facts (i.e., an objec-tive database) from which to forge agreement whenemotions are running high.

Would the Dayton Accords have been reachedwithout this technology? Holbrooke said: “It wasvery important, but I’m not going to sit here andtell you that we wouldn’t have gotten a deal inDayton without those computers. They made ourjob easier.” As the technology itself was a reminderto the Balkan participants of America’s technologi-cal edge, its impressionistic role may have beenevery bit as important as its facilitative role inestablishing the Sarajevo-Gorazde corridor or computing the size of territorial divisions.

Holbrooke’s masterful account of the negotiationsin his book To End A War devotes two pages to theuse of PowerScene at Dayton. In a 400-page vol-ume, this brief summary may well represent a fairaccount of its value—useful but not critical. It isinconceivable that the peace accords could havebeen reached without the negotiating skills of aHolbrooke, but entirely plausible that PowerScene,as useful as it may have been, was not the elementthat made a difference between success and fail-ure. Information technology, wisely deployed, canbe a useful tool in negotiations, but is not a substi-tute for the skills of a negotiator.

Lessons Learned• As any negotiator knows, trust building is an

essential element of success. The maps, virtualand real, that were generated by the DefenseMapping Agency in Dayton served as an impor-tant confidence-building measure. While therewere severe differences about where bound-aries should be drawn, the technology helpedsettle disagreements about the facts on theground. A 3-D virtual map manipulated by a joystick presents an image of verisimilitudethat is impossible with a paper map.

• The medium, as McLuhan asserted, is the mes-sage. A reminder of America’s high-tech capa-bilities at a peace conference may have hadthe unintended consequence of reminding thebelligerents that America’s power could beused in less benign ways. As participantRichard Johnson wrote, “Finding one’s ownhouse depicted on a tactical map at an airforce base in a foreign country can be sober-ing, and knowing that anything on such a mapcan instantly become a target is even moreunsettling.”8

• Although widely recognized by negotiators, itmay be instructive for others to recognize thattechnology can strengthen the hand of an ablediplomat, but cannot substitute for the skillshe or she brings to the table.

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Kosovo Information AssistanceInitiative (KIAI) Following the liberation of Kosovo, USIA’sInformation Bureau (now the State Department’sOffice of International Information Programs, IIP)established Internet connectivity in the KosovoRefugee Centers in Europe and the United States(e.g., Fort Dix, New Jersey). The Internet connectiv-ity was established to facilitate communicationamong families who had been separated by the warand to provide Albanian-language news and infor-mation to refugees who had been forced out oftheir homeland.

After repatriation of the Kosovars, IIP set up InternetCafés (or Community Internet Centers) in Pristinaand seven other Kosovo cities to provide connectiv-ity to the Internet and access to news and informa-tion about the outside world. The centers wereequipped with donated hardware and softwareincluding computers from Silicon Graphics,Gateway, and Apple. Each of the centers, with

about 10 terminals each, had two-way high-speedsatellite connectivity.

USIA gave a grant to the International Organizationfor Migration (IOM), which had offices on theground in Kosovo, to fund the satellite equipment,satellite time, installation, and salaries of local staff.A contract network engineer made arrangementswith the satellite provider, Hughes NetworkSystems, and a German subsidiary. His role was tonegotiate physical space for the centers throughcontacts with the local IOM offices, ensure thatthey were refurbished and had electricity, and getequipment into the country. Because of local limi-tations and the mountainous terrain, it was not fea-sible to use ISDN lines, microwave relays, orcombined satellite-telephone connections. The onlypractical option was two-way satellite connectivity.Each of the centers had its own connectivity, sothey could operate independently of the others.

Case Studies: Using Technology to Improve Public Access

Start Date: Initiated in 1999; concluded in2001

Originating Office: Office of InternationalInformation Programs (IIP)

Brief Description: State Department initiatedand supported program to bring Internet con-nectivity to Kosovars returning home after thewithdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo

Figure 5: Pristina Internet Café

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The centers attracted some 10,000 users a week,the majority of whom were teenagers and college-age students. Many had first used the Internet inthe refugee camps. The opening of the centers waswidely anticipated by word of mouth. When therewere no phone lines between cities, the InternetCafés allowed connectivity by Instant Messaging.Students used them for conducting research afterthe universities opened. Doctors used the centers tocommunicate with doctors outside of Kosovo. Andjournalists used them to download news for localbroadcast. Since users were not paying, half-hourtime slots were allocated. Still, there were far moredemands than the centers could satisfy. The centerin Pristina was booked three days in advance.

According to the contractor who oversaw the instal-lation, “the technical part was the easy part. We didnot deviate from our initial technical plan. It provedto be completely viable. The difficult part was logis-tical—getting the equipment, getting the facilities,getting the power, getting back and forth, travelingto the cities, getting the subcontractor in to set upthe antennas, getting technicians in the country, andgetting them from place to place.” The IIP represen-tative arrived in September 1999 and opened thefirst center in Pristina just before Christmas, whichhe described as “one of the most worthwhile thingswe could have done.” The last of the seven centerswas opened in Mitrovica in May 2000.

By August 2000, CNN reported that there were at least nine Internet Cafés in Pristina and 20 inKosovo region, charging $2 an hour and stillattracting crowds. “I have 15 computers now, andif I could buy another 15, they would all be busy,”said Luan Oruqi, one of Kosovo’s homegrownentrepreneurs, who is connecting Kosovo’s ethnicAlbanians to the world.

The centers set up by the State Department weretransferred to local NGOs or closed in 2001 whenthe original grant was exhausted and commercialalternatives had materialized. Even with limitedaccess, the Internet had played a role in keepingKosovars informed, from the day when they werefirst forced out of Kosovo until they returned. TheInternet Cafés demonstrated, particularly to youngpeople, the importance of information, the powerof free speech, and the role of technology as liber-ating forces against tyranny.

Lessons Learned• Most importantly, understand the complexity

of the environment in which you are operat-ing. IIP’s representative on the ground said thateverything took three to four times longer thanestimated, in part because of a shoestring bud-get that caused delays and compromises.

• Technology is the easy part; logistical andbureaucratic considerations are far more diffi-cult. The most difficult part was getting theequipment into the country. USIA had all theequipment, but had to wait several months forshipment by sea freight. Even the satelliteequipment was slow to arrive because of lim-ited shipments into Kosovo.

• Do contingency planning to shorten the leadtime in establishing similar centers in thefuture. By following the Defense Department’s(DoD) lead, computer and satellite equipmentcould be containerized for immediate shipment.The Kosovo experience showed that it took toolong to assemble the package from scratch.

Digital Videoconferencing (DVC)Digital videoconferencing between Washingtonand American embassies began in 1993 at a hand-ful of overseas posts. The purpose was to conductexpert exchanges in support of public diplomacyobjectives. When American experts were unavail-able to travel abroad to meet with foreign publics,digital videoconferencing appeared to be an alter-native—less expensive than travel and far lessexpensive than the broadcast-quality one-wayWorldnet video programs that had been in use fornearly a decade by USIA.

Digital videoconferencing requires an ISDN line or broadband IP line (Internet connection) between

Start Date: Initiated in 1993; continuallyupgraded and expanded since then


Brief Description: Digital expansion of publicdiplomacy program designed to create anopportunity for dialogue between Americanexperts and foreign publics

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two remote points to exchange video and audiosignals. Although the signal is not broadcast qual-ity, many prefer this medium to one-way broadcastquality video, because they can see their interlocu-tors. Conversation flows much more readily, andthe interaction approximates a face-to-face conver-sation. First-time users are frequently surprised athow natural their conversation becomes—unlikeone-way studio experiences, where the audiencecannot be seen. Overseas participants can sit in asmall conference room in front of a 27-inch moni-tor or view the exchange in an auditorium on alarge screen projection.

Twelve units were purchased by USIA in late 1992at a cost of $60,000 each and were installed at several major overseas locations including London,Paris, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. During this earlyexperimental stage, there was only one DVC permonth. After a few years, the number began toincrease, so that by the end of 2001, the Office ofInternational Information Programs was averagingthree DVCs per day. And that doesn’t include thevideoconferencing that is taking place in State’sother 20 locations, or in other government officeslike the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative thathave since obtained their own equipment. Basedon experiences with IIP’s system, NGOs are alsoinstalling similar systems. A recent example is theMiddle Eastern Institute in Washington, whichadopted the technology after one of its membersparticipated in a State Department program.

Three factors account for the growth. The cost hasdecreased from $60,000 a unit in 1992 to $6,500for a unit made by Polycom. ISDN lines are avail-able in many more locations, although their costshave decreased only slightly. Finally, users areincreasingly satisfied with the results as the picturequality and reliability of circuits have increased.

It is axiomatic that busy people whom the StateDepartment may wish to engage as expert speak-ers abroad can more easily spare an hour or twoin a studio than the several days required for travelto an overseas post. On the other hand, no onewould suggest that the experience of meeting oneon one can be completely duplicated by a video-conference. There is always a tradeoff between theideal and the practical. After eight years’ experi-ence it is clear that the effort has paid off. From

several posts in 1993 to 168 overseas sites today,videoconferencing is now accepted as a standardtool in the conduct of public diplomacy.

As the manager of the IIP facility said, it’s always apeople issue. “The sooner you get people meetingeach other and exchanging ideas, that furthersdiplomacy. You may not be able to get them at the same table, but this is a good way of starting.”Most of the exchanges are between an Americanexpert speaking on American policy or society andan international audience, but the medium hasserved other causes as well. For example, formerU. S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshevskyused the facility in a working meeting with theSouth African minister of finance. On anotheroccasion, a forensic scientist visiting the UnitedStates testified by DVC at a trial in Durban, SouthAfrica, concerning an apartheid-era murder.

The staff finds its continuing interaction withexperts to be a side benefit of the job. Expert participants, as well, find that the digital confer-ences leave them better informed through theirinteractions with international audiences. Since thisoperation began in a single room in 1993, smallstudios have been installed throughout the StateDepartment at nearly 20 different locations. Withno centralized coordination, each office manages itsown conferencing, although no others have a dedi-cated staff or the frequency of the IIP operation. In a new development, the Office of Verification andCompliance is currently testing a high-definition

Figure 6: Videoconference between Washingtonand Kiev

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video connection between Washington and Genevafor use by American arms control negotiators. AndG-8 principals have expressed an interest in usingvideoconferencing in lieu of travel to frequentpreparatory meetings.

IIP was planning to use Internet connections earlyin 2001 to transmit the DVCs, but has been at leasttemporarily restricted because of firewalls that blockvideo signals. When and if that option becomesavailable, sharply decreasing transmission costs will undoubtedly spur even greater usage.

The next phase, if the current firewall prohibitionsare removed, is to allow the interconnection ofposts with ISDN lines and IP lines through a gate-way, thereby adding even more flexibility to anoperation whose growth seems ensured. Plans arealso under way to add video clips from the DVCsto IIP’s overseas website. As long as new technolo-gies are incorporated into the operation, its utilityappears to be guaranteed.

Lessons Learned• Understand the environment. The informality

of the medium—which promotes conversa-tion—must not sanction inadequate prepara-tion or less than professional standards. In theearly years there were numerous problems toovercome including unreliable ISDN lines,poor video and sound quality, and inadequatetranslation facilities. Overseas employees wereoccasionally untrained, speakers were poorlybriefed on the use of the medium, and plan-ning was inadequate.

• Ensure that adequate resources are available.Because the medium was perceived as rela-tively inexpensive and less than professional(compared to broadcast quality video), theoperation has been shortchanged, from equip-ment to staff. As a consequence, in its earlyyears quality suffered. Since then, the staff hasupgraded its studios, routinely tests connectiv-ity well before the scheduled conference,establishes contingencies to ensure audio con-nections if the video circuits fail, and otherwisepromotes a professional production.

• Innovators must hold on to their convictionsuntil a new medium matures. Because of theconstraints of quality and cost, there was rela-

tively little usage in the early years. As equip-ment costs decreased and quality improved,the early champions of digital videoconferenc-ing have proven to be prescient. Digital video-conferencing has become a powerful medium.

FOIA Electronic Reading RoomThe Department of State website looks like manyothers in the federal government. But, one distin-guishing characteristic is the Freedom of Informa-tion Act (FOIA) collection, particularly as itconcerns key aspects of the U.S. government’s conduct of foreign affairs.9 Its Electronic ReadingRoom makes available to the public Department of State records that have been declassified andreleased under the Freedom of Information Act.

With a full- and part-time staff equivalent to 136full-time employees, the department considers sev-eral thousand requests each year at an annual costof more than $11 million. The staff includes scoresof retired Foreign Service officers who meticulouslyreview each document before release. The office issupported by an online archive of electronic diplo-matic communications, a case tracking/imaging/electronic redaction system, and several Internetand intranet websites. The archive includes morethan 25 million records.

The Electronic Reading Room receives 70,000 hitsper day, a measure of public interest in the govern-ment’s diplomatic relations. A well-indexed archiveprovides documents by subject and date in PDFformat through a Verity search engine. The systemis exceedingly responsive, even with a standarddial-up modem.

The current index of electronic documentsincludes CIA Creation Documents, El Salvador

Start Date: 1997

Originating Office: Bureau of Administration,Office of IRM Programs and Services

Brief Description: Web-enabled online data-base established to provide public electronicaccess to State Department documents

23


Churchwomen Documents, Guatemala Collection,Raoul Wallenberg Collection, El Salvador Collec-tion, and the Amelia Earhart Collection. The mostextensive files are those on U.S.–Chile relationsfrom 1968 to 1991, which include a total of17,413 documents. This collection of cables,memoranda, letters, and testimony includes docu-mentation on relations with the Pinochet govern-ment and the 1976 car bomb assassination ofOrlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington.

The Electronic Freedom of Information ActAmendments of 1996 (E-FOIA) established therequirement for all agencies to make available“copies of all records, regardless of form or format,which have been released to any person ... andwhich, because of the nature of their subject matter,the agency determines have become or are likely tobecome the subject of subsequent requests.” Amongother requirements, E-FOIA grants the public accessto government documents via computer telecom-munications. One of the amendments required thatthe first documents to be made available were those

released since November 1, 1966. It also requiredthat an index of such documents be made availableelectronically by December 31, 1999. The Depart-ment of State’s FOIA website, which was launchedin 1997, was one of the first FOIA sites availableelectronically in the federal government. And it maywell rank as the best.

There was a time when diplomats could assumethat their confidential communications wouldremain closed to the public. With the passage ofFOIA, individuals could request to examine anymaterials whose disclosure would not compromisenational security or violate privacy restrictions.Nonetheless, there were impediments includingcosts and time delays. Delays are still common, but once a search has been done, the documentsare now available to anyone with an Internet con-nection and a web browser.

That diplomats know their reporting will somedaybe public may restrain their candor or, more likely,will ensure the thoroughness of their documentationand the quality of their analysis. Furthermore, thosemembers of the public who care about an issue willbe able to examine its diplomatic nuances—and, inthe last analysis, hold the government accountablefor wisely representing the national interest.

When the Chile documents were released, forexample, the National Security Archive at GeorgeWashington University credited State Departmentofficials with a strong commitment to using declas-sified U.S. documents to advance the cause ofhuman rights abroad and the American public’sright to know at home.

Lessons Learned• The most important lesson to be learned by the

FOIA Electronic Reading Room is that it neverwould have happened without legislation. Theaverage cost of processing a single request isclose to $4,000. Only one-hundredth of onepercent of the costs is collected in fees. Theadministrative disincentive to offer such a ser-vice to the public is enormous.

• By posting these materials on the web, thebusiness of government is now much morebroadly shared with interested citizens. Theresidual effect on trust building may be well

Figure 7: Declassified document from FOIAElectronic Reading Room

24


worth the investment in opening these files topublic scrutiny. A better-informed citizenry willstrengthen the conduct of diplomacy.

• It requires subject specialists to review thedocuments to ensure that their release doesnot compromise national security. Althoughaided by information technology, there is no substitute for reading each document andexercising professional judgment on the meritsof its release.

Liquid State (Content ManagementSystem)Liquid State is the latest step in the StateDepartment’s continuing modernization of theWashington File and associated digital productsdeveloped by the International InformationProgram Office. The Washington File is a dailymulti-language product directed at foreign publicsto explain American foreign policy and Americansociety. It consists of speeches, texts, interviews,and summaries of U.S. issues produced in regionaleditions in print and web formats. Since it beganin 1994, its web-based version10 has garnerednumerous accolades including U.S. News & WorldReport’s recent list of top sites and the LibraryJournal’s citation that “the State Department’sInternational Information Program site is the bestgateway to the various federal agency responses,both domestic and international, to terrorism andthe September 11 attacks.”

Liquid State is a three-part initiative consisting of: a content management system for web and printpublications; a digital asset management system toprovide access to photography, video, and sound;

and the global graphics initiative to provide stan-dards and technology for image manipulation, pagelayout, web design, and electronic distribution.

The purpose of its key element, the content man-agement system, is to “let writers write and design-ers design.” Liquid State is a concept, a procedure,and a process wherein producers focus on the con-tent rather than the product per se. Writers entertext into a web-based content management systemfrom which a variety of products—from print toelectronic—can be produced, depending on the public diplomacy requirements in differentregions or countries. Hence, the raw copy mightform the basis for a press release, a pamphlet, aCD-ROM, an electronic file, or a web-based prod-uct. The content management system can beaccessed by writers from their desks at the StateDepartment, from their homes, or through anInternet terminal abroad. It not only allows fasterinput, but also eliminates the need for the writer or an associate to rewrite in HTML.

The content management system selected by theState Department for this application is eGrail.Using object-based architecture, eGrail offers con-tent flexibility, rapid development, and website uniformity. It allows users to manipulate distinct“objects” at a granular level (such as text, graphics,XML files, whole or partial client/server scripts,applications, etc.). With its point-and-click control,content management is nearly automatic. Its object-based, database-driven architecture allows writers to update pages quickly and easily, thereby ensuringthat information is current. XML files, instead ofPDF files, allow post-by-post customization.

The initiative was undertaken to provide more toolsto the producers and more flexibility to the over-seas missions. Attending a Seybold publishing con-ference to look at private sector initiatives providedthe encouragement for this initiative. The focus wasnot just on introducing new technologies, but alsoin identifying technologies that would support newprocesses. While IIP’s predecessor bureau in USIAhad been one of the first in the foreign affairs com-munity to use the World Wide Web, it was nowtime to adopt new technologies to support olderproducts as well. Print has not been replaced bythe Internet.

Start Date: Initiated in 2002 to improve publicaccess to numerous existing information services


Brief Description: Content management sys-tem to enhance production of public diplo-macy website, other electronic products, andprint publications

25


IIP’s focus on electronic delivery of its products hasleft many American missions in the developingworld without the print assets to communicate withpublics who do not yet have Internet access. LiquidState, through the content management system andassociated technologies, will give to overseas mis-sions not only the content, but also the technicaland design resources necessary to produce cus-tomized products. The information stored in eGrailcan be poured into customized templates to pro-duce print and electronic products that better sat-isfy different requirements in different countries.

Even as IIP looked at legacy products, it was looking ahead to new media including PersonalDigital Assistants (PDAs). An early adaptation of the Washington File was to produce a mobileedition that can be accessed on a Palm devicethrough a commercial provider, AvantGo. It hasalready enjoyed some early successes.

Lessons Learned• Stay on top of industry developments. The

developers have maintained close contact with commercial innovations by attendingtrade shows and professional meetings. Theyunderstand that in order to be competitive,they must stay in touch with emerging stan-dards and anticipate where the industry willbe by the time a project is finished.

• Focus on the requirements of the users—thewriters and designers who produce the dailyproducts—not on the hardware or software.The designers first went to the users and said,“Would you want to do this? What do you thinkabout this? What is the feedback?” To be sure toget buy-in from the users, the new process mustactually provide a benefit to the user.

Figure 8: Washington File

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Treaty Information Portal (TIP)The Treaty Information Portal (TIP) is the latestupgrade to the Arms Control Treaty NegotiationsDatabase, where negotiators and analysts can logon to a single network to access multiple databasescontaining all current arms control treaty records. It is managed by the Verification and ComplianceBureau of the Department of State, formerly part of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency(ACDA) until consolidation in 1999. The TreatyInformation Portal incorporates 12 libraries, includ-ing the official negotiating record archives; inspec-tion reports related to the Conventional Forces inEurope (CFE) and the Strategic Arms ReductionTreaty; and treaty exchange data from CFE, theOrganization of Security and Co-operation inEurope (OSCE), and Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measure (CSBM) data sets (including theglobal exchange of military information). Anotherlibrary contains weapons photos that account forexisting treaty-limited equipment. The photos areused to resolve disputes over weapons disposition.

The Treaty Portal also incorporates public affairsarchives of signing ceremonies and numerousunclassified photos of weapons systems. (This is theplace to go if you need a World War I picture of ahorse in a gas mask; see Figure 9.)

By far the most important database is the Negotia-tion Record Database. The usefulness is evident.Negotiators in Geneva or Vienna can refer back to the intent of the original negotiators. Even if the treaty language itself is vague, the negotiationrecord usually speaks to the intent of the negotia-tors—10, 20, or 30 years after the fact.

The data repository is managed in-house by a teamof data administrators who input data using high-speed scanners and electronic feeds from the cablenetwork. Programmers and engineers work on linksto existing databases outside of the State Depart-ment. Databases from DoD and other members ofthe arms control community are indexed within theState system to provide one-stop shopping for users.

The volume of new data exceeds 50,000 pagesannually, not all of which is in English. In the past,there were numerous sources of translation, whichoccasionally led to confusion. Now, through intera-gency coordination, all documents are translatedby one agency and shared by all. TIP, throughindexing, provides capabilities to all user agenciesto access their own data plus the data of others tothe extent that the originator allows. An importantelement of TIP is the software to provide differenti-ated access. Data providers are less willing to col-laborate if access to their data is unrestricted.

Case Studies: Using Technology toImprove Internal Communication

Start Date: Initiated in 2000 to improve staffaccess to numerous existing databases

Originating Office: Verification andCompliance Bureau

Brief Description: Web-based classified portalconsolidating numerous databases containingall current arms control treaty records

27


In 1982, Congress mandated that ACDA maintain a complete archive of the negotiating record to pro-vide the basis for accurate and effective treaty nego-tiations. An interagency body, the Arms ControlCoordinating Research Committee, decided to field two systems: ACCORD (Arms Control OnlineResearch Database, an unclassified system accessedthrough a dial-up modem) and a classified systemcalled ARENA (Automated Recourse to ElectronicNegotiation Archives). The dial-up speed was slow,and the data structures didn’t lend themselves toanalysis. So, the system was underutilized, and most users simply requested paper copies.

The Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations,which required exhaustive data exchange amongparties, created the next impetus for change. Aftersome debate within the arms control community, it was decided that ACDA would become the officialrepository of the exchanged data, inspection reports,and notifications—on the condition that it would be made available online. Subsequent legislationrequired ACDA to maintain both paper and elec-tronic records of treaty texts, negotiation records,research, and related arms control information.

Plans to migrate from a dial-up modem to a net-work system based on Internal protocol (IP) werecompleted in 1999, using Excalibur RetrievalWare.The proof of concept developed for the Y2K proj-ect gave the Verification and Compliance Bureau ahead start in building the data repository searchengine for the Treaty Information Portal. New datasharing agreements were signed with NATO, theOn-Site Inspection Agencies, and other membersof the arms control community.

The availability of DoD’s classified SIPRNET was a key element in the success of the project. It pro-vided adequate bandwidth and the ability to shareclassified data. With a common web interface andgraphical front end, SIPRNET was ideal for thisapplication.

The key attribute of the Treaty Information Portal isproviding timely and accurate information. It alsoeliminates duplication of effort among the thousandsof people who work on arms control by providingdata from all the data sets that are maintained andindexed. It makes everyone more efficient and elimi-nates unnecessary duplication of cost.

Prior to this system, arms control specialists wereunable to share data with other agencies in realtime. If an analyst at the Pentagon needed to knowthe U.S. position on a particular topic, he wouldcall and ask for a data search. Then ACDA wouldsend the data over by classified pouch, with adelay of a few days. Now the analyst searches thedatabase in real time. The State Department is moreefficient as well. By spidering all of the sites from asingle interface, there is no need to duplicate dataheld by other agencies.

With the Treaty Information Portal functioning well,the staff is now building expertise on, and testing,high-definition video systems between Washingtonand Geneva. Given the care that is evident in thedeployment of the new system, secure videoconfer-encing between policy makers in Washington andnegotiators overseas will likely be commonplacebefore long.

Lessons Learned• There are several important lessons to be

learned from the operation of this complex,classified interagency system, but none moreimportant than the insistence of the leadershipthat all senior members of the IT staff be alsoexpert in arms control. Diplomacy and infor-mation technology must be tightly aligned ifthe latter is to serve the former. “I tell my guys,if you’re not good enough to go work in thepolicy office, you’re not good enough to workhere. If you can’t go work in the chemicalweapons office or the nonproliferation office,that means you don’t know enough to do yourjob here.”11

Figure 9: WWI picture of horse in gas mask

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• The IT office must choose its core competen-cies. As the demands are so great, it has todecide what is most important, specialize inthat, and ignore the rest. “We succeed becausewe’ve chosen to ignore 90 percent of things wewere doing, but do a few things and try to dothem extraordinarily well.”12

• When working with the interagency commu-nity, draw up access agreements with greatspecificity, so that each agency will have theconfidence that its data will not be misused orend up with unauthorized users. Otherwise,agencies are reluctant to share their data.

• Economies of scale can be found when relatedelements are supported by a common IT shop.This is not an argument that the support ofbusiness functions should be centralized, butthat common business functions can be sup-ported by a single office large enough to haveexpertise in several related functions.

Worldwide Remote E-mail Network(WREN)The Worldwide Remote E-mail Network is a mobileLocal Area Network, or LAN, designed to supportthe Secretary of State during foreign travel. It pro-vides classified communications to the Secretaryand his immediate party from any point in theworld through encrypted messaging on ISDN lines,a dedicated V-SAT satellite, or leased time on a M-4 InMarsat satellite. Connectivity to the V-SAT isthrough a 1.5-meter dish carried on the Secretary’splane; the InMarsat connection is through an evensmaller mobile antenna. The systems, operated at aspeed of 256 Kbps, provide secure communica-tions to the State Department’s Operation Center—and from there to any embassy in the world.

The system, from laptops to generators, is com-pletely self-contained, so it can function in remotelocations. While worldwide connectivity is hardlya novelty in the 21st century, it is only recentlythat secure, high-speed, e-mail connectivitybetween Washington and any remote location wasroutine. In fact, the system was inaugurated in2001 during Secretary of State Albright’s officialvisit to Pyongyang. Its use has since become stan-dard operating practice.

WREN had its origins in Y2K preparations whenolder systems were subject to careful scrutiny.Legacy cable systems and classified fax were usedto connect the Secretary with the Department of State, each requiring several steps of process-ing, along with the attendant staff support. TheDepartment’s Executive Secretariat proposed anupgrade using secure computers and networkingsufficiently robust to satisfy the government’s high-est security requirements—without the intermediatedelays inherent in the legacy systems.

As cables had been circulated by e-mail within theSecretary’s inner office for several years, extendingthe same system to a mobile LAN did not representa sharp departure from standard practice. To thecontrary, information access on the road was thesame as in the State Department itself. The changein technology resulted, as well, in minor organiza-tional changes to better synchronize technical support with the operational requirements of theSecretary of State. Routines that were developed tosupport Secretary Kissinger during the Nixon andFord administrations have been abandoned.

With WREN, the Secretary and his traveling partyhave much faster access to information than with itspredecessor systems that required several intermedi-ate processing steps before reaching the principals.For both strategic and humanitarian reasons, min-utes lost may make a difference when the Secretaryis on the road. WREN has been designed to ensurethat information is available in real time.

In addition to classified e-mail, WREN also pro-vides full access to the State Department’s classifiedintranet—and through it to Defense Departmentand intelligence community networks. It offers peri-odic briefing materials and other information pre-pared in Washington to support the Secretary’s

Start Date: 2000

Originating Office: Executive Secretariat

Brief Description: Mobile high-speed Internetconnectivity enabled by satellite technology toallow broadband communications for theSecretary of State during international travel

29


travel. The occasional fax that is still sent is beingreplaced by e-mail attachments. Secure videocon-ferencing is a planned future application over thenetwork. For efficiency and thoroughness, plans arealso under way to replace e-mail messaging with e-mail alerts that will be hyperlinked to HTMLpages accessible through a browser.

WREN was designed to support the Secretary ofState and his immediate staff during official travelabroad. That it does well. Additionally, it also sup-ports the many others in the Department of Statewho are responsible for keeping the Secretaryinformed and for collaborating, advising on policy,and acting on instructions. While the system wouldnot surprise anyone familiar with modern commu-nications, it represents a significant advance overthe legacy system that it replaced. As one officer in the Executive Secretariat said, “It is much, muchfaster.” It is also easier to use.

Lessons Learned• The primary lesson learned is the need for the IT

developmental staff to be close to business prac-tices. Despite its centrality to policy making, theinnovation did not come from the department’scentral IT office, but from immediate users.While centralizing infrastructure, network man-agement, and standards may be advantageous,decentralizing IT applications is often the wisercourse. To centralize all IT support is to put atrisk the innovation that comes from those whoare responsible for business practices.

• Innovations built on systems familiar to userstend to reduce the resistance that oftenaccompanies change. The Secretary and staffwere comfortable with information provided infamiliar packages. The only change they sawwas greater speed and greater depth in whatthey could access. Familiarity with the lookand feel of the system output is particularlyimportant when there is little or no latitude for error. WREN feels comfortable to users.

Figure 10: Worldwide Remote E-mail Network

WREN TECHCONTROLISDN/KIV

ISDN/KIVISDN/KIV

ISDN/KIVISDN/KIVISDN/KIV

ATLAS MUX/KIV

ATLAS MUX/KIVATLAS MUX/KIVATLAS MUX/KIVATLAS MUX/KIV

ATLAS MUX/KIVROUTER

POEMSRRAS SERVER

POEMS

CLASSNET

WASHINGTON

DATASATTELEPORTLONDON

V-SAT WREN #3

V-SAT WREN #2

V-SAT WREN #1

WREN #4

WREN #5Router

Router

ISDN

30


ChinaNetThe American Consulate General in Hong Konghas transformed the way it does business by mov-ing many of its routine functions to Web-basedapplications. They include innovations in financialmanagement, human resources, and procure-ment—the usual focus of technological change in the State Department. But changes have alsobeen developed in the Public Affairs section, theEconomic-Political section, and the Protocol sec-tion. The key to this profusion of innovation was afunctioning real-time network and the availabilityof Web-based software. The transformation beganin 1999 with the arrival of a computer-savvy admin-istrative officer who joined with a forward-lookingcomputer systems manager and talented local staffto demonstrate that the Consulate General coulddevelop across-the-board efficiency gains. Theyexploited Internet-based software innovations todevelop new applications based on Web browsers(e.g., Netscape Navigator, Internet Explorer) thatwere already familiar to officers and staff.

In addition to increasing the efficiency of adminis-trative functions, the move to Web-based applica-tions has directly supported several diplomaticrequirements. The Public Affairs section is bettermanaging its database of press guidances, therebymaking them more useful to officers throughout the mission. The Economic-Political section put itsbiographic files online and substituted searchable,electronic record-keeping for traditional paper files.The Protocol section maintains a Consulate-widecontact list, searchable by staff, joined with anautomated system to manage Consulate representa-tional events. The Public Affairs and Administrativesections collaborated with the Foreign BroadcastInformation Service (FBIS) to replace the cable dis-tribution of FBIS news summaries and translations,press briefings and media reactions with a single

searchable database. This Web-based application is now routinely accessed by Missions throughoutAsia and by interested officials in Washington. Inthe words of the Consul General, “The entire insti-tution is transforming the way it does business.”

Over the past decade the Department of State hasbeen coping with an increasing workload in theface of reduced staffing. Long hours are accepted asroutine. Since the introduction of word processorsmore than two decades ago, there are few docu-mented examples of new information technologiesimproving staff efficiency. The Hong Kong consulateis one of the exceptions. The result has been theelimination of needless steps, a reduction in paperuse, and a much greater sharing of information.

Templates have been developed and networked to make forms easily available and ensure consis-tency in their completion. Directories, contact lists,and biographic files are shared across offices.Training has been made widely available.

One of the new applications, ChinaNet Procurement,has attracted interest outside of Hong Kong bydemonstrating that a Web-based application couldenhance productivity. Partly as a result, the StateDepartment is now developing Web-based softwarefor numerous other applications.

Many IT innovations result from the leadership of an individual whose passion for change is strongenough to overcome bureaucratic resistance. The

Figure 11: American Consulate General in Hong Kong

Start Date: 1999

Originating Office: American ConsulateGeneral in Hong Kong

Brief Description: Web-based diplomatic andadministrative applications to improve effi-ciency at the Hong Kong Consulate General

31


introduction of new IT practices at the AmericanConsulate General in Honk Kong was no exception.The State Department acknowledged that the post'sadministrative officer, Jay Anania, made the differ-ence, for which he was awarded the Innovation inthe Use of Technology Award for the year 2000. Itwas his leadership and inspiration that transformedthe Hong Kong Consulate General.

In recommending him for this recognition, theConsul General wrote: “Jay has been a catalyst forchange. He brought to his job a deep knowledgeof processes and an eye for how they could beimproved by advanced technology. Equally impor-tant, he recognized that his staff had the capabilityto generate substantial improvements on theirown. He therefore devoted his energies not only to hands-on exploration of opportunities for inno-vation, but to leading his staff, channeling theirenergies, and inspiring their creativity. Despitesome initial resistance, he drove through the ideathat we would transform the way we do businessin Hong Kong, and share that with our colleaguesin the region.”

Lessons Learned• The first lesson learned from the Hong Kong

experience is the key role of an IT championwho has the vision and force of personality toinspire, cajole, and lead the transformation ofwork practices. With the predictable resistanceto change, it takes a knowledgeable and persua-sive champion to introduce change successfully.

• The second lesson is that change agents mustunderstand the business practices well enoughto demonstrate that the recommendedchanges will improve efficiency or quality.And the advocate must offer training to give the new users the confidence that they canperform the new routine at or beyond their per-sonal standard of excellence. The technologiesthat were introduced were built to fit the user,not vice-versa. As the Consul General wrote:“If you build it, and show them how to use itwell, they will come—in droves.”

• A third lesson is that success breeds success.Hong Kong’s IT innovations, having receivedrecognition, are being propagated to otherAmerican missions. This summer the officer

responsible for these innovations is being transferred to a senior position in Washington,where his abilities and experience can be further exploited.

Foreign Affairs Systems Integration(FASI)Knowledge management (KM) systems have comeinto vogue in the last decade to permit large enter-prises to share intellectual knowledge among theiremployees. If the New Delhi office of an interna-tional consulting firm solves a local problem for aclient, it may benefit other consultants in the firmto apply the solution elsewhere or, conversely, tolearn what has not worked. While the line betweeninformation and knowledge is sometimes blurry,knowledge management systems are more thaninformation management systems. It may be helpfulto think of knowledge as what you have in yourhead, in contrast to information, which you keep in your file cabinet. Knowledge management sys-tems allow you to efficiently store, retrieve, andexchange knowledge. And knowledge managementsystems tend to be collaborative.

At one level, the Department of State can bethought of as a mega-knowledge management sys-tem—ceaselessly gathering, processing, and actingon information; building a reservoir of knowledgeabout nations, alliances, agreements, and threats;sharing knowledge with other elements of govern-ment and other nations.

Indeed, sophisticated messaging systems as well as routine meetings and conferences have servedthe purpose of exchanging knowledge. But, suchexchanges are often inefficient or even non-existent.What is known to a Second Secretary in Buenos

Start Date: Prototype tested in 2001; pilot tobe tested in 2002

Originating Office: Information ResourceManagement Bureau (IRM)

Brief Description: Web-based initiative to pro-vide knowledge management tools to all gov-ernment agencies operating in Americanembassies and consulates

32


Aires may never influence policy making inWashington. If he takes his knowledge with himwhen he departs post, it won’t even influence hissuccessor. Knowledge management systems aredesigned to give decision makers what they need to know to make wise decisions and to filter outthat which is irrelevant.

If the business of diplomacy is representation,negotiation, and advocacy, it follows that diplo-matic skill is a function of knowledge: knowledgeof the issues, knowledge of the environment,knowledge of one’s adversaries. It would be foolishto proceed to a diplomatic assignment without athorough knowledge of the issues and personalitiesthat one will confront.

The question is whether KM systems can bedesigned to improve either efficiency or quality—or perhaps even substantially change one’s con-duct of diplomacy. There will necessarily be an

investment in hardware, software, and training.Will the return to the diplomat warrant theresources (particularly time) that are required todesign, manage, and operate the KM system thatpurports to assist in the management of knowledge?

The Department of State has recently initiated thedesign of a worldwide, multi-agency knowledgemanagement system designed to serve StateDepartment employees as well as the overseasemployees of some 40 U.S. government agencies.The system, managed by Information ResourceManagement’s (IRM) Office of Foreign AffairsSystems Integration (FASI), grew out of a 1999 recommendation by the Overseas PresenceAdvisory Panel. The panel wrote that “managementof knowledge must be a central focus of ITupgrades ... to create a system that not only dis-tributes information but also captures and securelystores it for future retrieval….”

Figure 12: FASI Knowledge Management Project

• Common InteroperableEmail

• Shared InteragencyDirectories

• Collaboration Tools:Real-time ChatWhiteboardingVideoconferencing

• Advanced SearchCapabilities

• Access to News Feeds& other sources ofinformation

• Maps

• Unclassified Cables

• Group Calendaring

• Support forCommunities ofPractice, Purpose &Interest

• Virtual Workspace

• Support for MobileUsers

• WEB-enabled database of experts

• Full suite of document mgt. tools to include:version controlrecord mgt. Compliancevirtual file folders & cabinets

• Ability to “crawl” or “spider” accessible external WEB sites,creating indices

Interagency Collaboration Zone (ICZ.GOV)

33

A preliminary system design was completed byIRM in the spring of 2001 with the advice of out-side experts including KPMG, CSC, and Gartnergroup. Five vendors were invited to propose solu-tions. From their submissions, three industry teamswere selected for the prototype phase, which isunder way as this is being written. Members of thethree consortia include SAIC, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, SRA International, IBM, Accenture,General Dynamics, and Booz Allen Hamilton. After comparative testing, one of the three teamswill be selected for a more exhaustive pilot test tobe completed toward the end of 2001. It is sched-uled to involve up to 2,400 employees working inWashington, India, and Mexico. If the pilot is suc-cessful and funding is available, worldwide deploy-ment will begin in 2003 and will be completed intwo to three years. Designed to reach the desktopsof 30,000 State Department employees in 180countries with a full suite of software includingvideo, the FASI knowledge management project isan exceptionally ambitious undertaking.

Meanwhile, smaller KM initiatives have been initi-ated, driven by the business processes that they aredesigned to support. They include the Collation forAnti-Terrorism (CAT) Matrix, developed with theencouragement of the Under Secretary for PoliticalAffairs, to support the international coalition puttogether by Secretary Powell after the September 11terrorist attacks. Also, with the support of the UnderSecretary for Management, a demonstration KMsystem to support the G-8 process is under devel-opment. Not quite a thousand flowers, but knowl-edge management systems are clearly at theblossoming stage in the Department of State.

Unlike the other systems that have been described,KM systems are still in their pilot phase at the StateDepartment. With a 70 percent failure record inindustry, the risk of failure is appreciated. Yet, therisk of postponing a decision in a knowledge-inten-sive organization is also significant. As everyonewho has used a phone in the last several yearsknows, automated phone-answering systems savetime for the corporation, but seldom for the caller.KM systems must either save time or improve thequality of diplomatic work. No matter how sophis-ticated the system, it must enhance the conduct ofdiplomacy to be judged a success.

Lessons (to be) Learned• The Department of State faces the same ques-

tion as every large enterprise: Are new systemsbest built from the top down or from the bot-tom up—or is there an intermediate step thatcombines the virtues of both? The FASIKnowledge Management system, with deploy-ment costs estimated to approach $300 mil-lion, will be an expensive failure if it does notimprove the efficiency or the quality of diplo-macy. On the other hand, boutique applica-tions like the CAT Matrix and G-8 KM system,even if precisely tailored to the business needs,may not be scalable or adaptable to otherdiplomatic requirements. The lessons fromthese approaches remain to be learned as thesystems are deployed over the next severalmonths and years.


34


Despite its reputation as a laggard in the deploy-ment of information technology, the Department ofState deploys a sophisticated array of computer andcommunications technology to collect, analyze,archive, and disseminate information. It maintainssecure connectivity with embassies in practicallyevery country in the world. From issuing visas tonegotiating treaties, it is responsible for managingthe foreign policy of the United States.

This study was undertaken to examine the introduc-tion of information technology that has directlyadvanced the conduct of diplomacy (therebyexcluding an examination of systems for personnel,financial, and administrative management). Currentdiplomatic practices were examined in search ofapplications ranging from database management to geographic information systems. It was no sur-prise to find that most diplomatic practices havechanged little in the past decade, with the excep-tion of the dramatic growth of e-mail within theDepartment of State.

With little central direction, e-mail messaging iscompeting with, and in many ways supplanting,State’s legacy cable system. During this transitionalperiod, where new practices are being consolidated,it is premature to say that the conduct of diplomacyhas been enhanced by the introduction of e-mail. It has, nonetheless, introduced dramatic changes in business practices, producing positive conse-quences that will likely be manifest in the nearfuture. Until then, the advantages of speed havebeen tempered by the excesses of distribution andthe lack of connectivity among internal systems.

From the 12 discrete systems described here, thereare several lessons to be learned in designing futureapplications. Table 1 shows the common featuresof the 12 innovations.

The key findings drawn from Table 1 are:

• Most of the innovations were driven by forcesexterior to the Department of State, includingthe 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,the fear of Y2K systems meltdown, and budgetreductions requiring great efficiencies.

• Practically all of the innovations were initiatedand developed by individuals who were partof the user community that they weredesigned to serve.

• Most of the applications were developed inareas of the Department of State traditionallythought to be out of the mainstream of politicaland economic analysis and policy making.

• Most of the innovations cannot be considered“mission critical”—that is, their developmentwas not driven by an expressed need to improvethe practice of diplomacy, even if that subse-quently was the result.

Among the lessons identified for each of the 12innovations, there are several that appear frequentlyenough to warrant particular mention:

• During the developmental stages, the usercommunity and the IT developments must bevery closely aligned. System development mustbe driven by the business needs, not by thehardware or software.

Lessons Learned

35


• In addition to the technology, developers mustunderstand other environmental constraintsincluding logistical problems and bureaucraticresistance.

• Planners should be generous in estimating thetime and cost of systems development anddeployment. It’s like building an addition onyour house; it takes longer and costs more thanyou think.

• In the early stages of deployment, systemsshould be built to accommodate existing workpractices in order to overcome resistance tochange.

• Effective training should be offered to giveusers confidence in the new systems.

• Contingency planning should be undertaken to allow diplomats to respond swiftly to unfore-seen events including natural disasters and hostilities.

• Interagency agreements should be carefullycrafted to ensure that all parties are using compatible systems and common standards.

Drawing on these examples, the most important lesson is the need to ensure a close alignment

between the user community and the IT developers.The closest possible relation results when the twocommunities substantially overlap. Most of theinnovations came from users who also have exper-tise in information technology. The most compellingexample is from the Verification and ComplianceBureau, where senior IT staffers are required to beexpert in arms control negotiations as a comple-ment to their IT skills. Among the 12 examples,there is not a single case to be made for the separation of policy and IT competence.

Given the responsibility of leveraging technology to support core diplomatic activities, what can theDepartment of State learn from its current prac-tices? The lessons suggest that the most favorablecircumstance is one in which:

• The diplomatic requirement (i.e., businessneed) is well defined and well understood.

• There is a champion (e.g., project manager)within the user community who is also compe-tent in information technology.

• There is a catalytic force (e.g., crisis) outside of the Department of State that drives action.

Table 1: Common Features of the 12 IT Innovations to Improve Diplomacy

Outside Internal Non- MissionCatalyst Champion traditional Critical

Consular Consolidated Database √ √ √ √

Kosovo Repatriation Information Support √ √ √

Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System √ √ √ √

Dayton Peace Accords √

Kosovo Information Assistance Initiative √ √ √

Digital Videoconferencing √ √

FOIA Electronic Reading Room √ √ √

Liquid State √ √

Treaty Information Portal √ √ √ √

Worldwide Remote E-mail Network √ √

ChinaNet √

Foreign Affairs Systems Integration √ √

36


• Attention is given to inertial constraints (e.g.,employee resistance) through incrementaldeployment, reorganization, and training.

• Planning anticipates the real costs and timerequired for effective deployment.

The Department of State remains a backwater inthe deployment of information technology, but the underlying requirements for change are pre-sent: IT-savvy leadership and an organizationalrestlessness with the status quo. The innovationsillustrated do not yet form the critical mass thatensure success, but are certainly of sufficient con-sequence to encourage widespread innovation in the service of diplomacy.


37

The Department of State has received more atten-tion in its use of information technology than mostareas of government. That it fell behind the curve isno secret in Washington. That it is moving forwardis both a consequence of the attention it hasreceived from outside and a determination fromwithin to leverage technology in the service ofdiplomacy. The recommendations that follow arenot specific to the Department of State, but to anycomparable organization that needs to regain itsinformation edge in support of its core functions.

Based on State’s experience, the recommendationsshould apply as well to other foreign ministries, toother governmental organizations involved in theconduct of foreign affairs, and to NGOs with inter-national responsibilities. Although they may applymore broadly, since the lessons were drawn fromthe support of foreign policy, it is to that disciplinethat the recommendations are directed. Furthermore,they are restricted to what were identified as sec-ond-level functions that directly support the con-duct of diplomacy. Financial management, logisticalsupport, and administration are not included withinthe scope of the study, although each is critical tothe support of diplomacy.

First, it should be understood that information technology is no panacea, that it has no business in the workplace unless it supports core functions.Experience has shown that the payoff for new IT isslow, that new systems are subject to high failurerates. So, the first recommendation is to reviewand, if necessary, restate core business functionswith clarity. Answer the question: What product

do we make? Or: What service do we provide?Without clarity at this stage, it is difficult to designsupportive IT systems.

Second, before deploying information technology,ask how existing business processes might beimproved to yield greater efficiency or higher quality.

Third, apply information technology.

It is the third step in which the State Department’sexperience may be of value. How one applies newinformation technology is not, however, as clear asthe need to keep core business functions in focus.For example, even if a diplomat understandsclearly that his or her role is to issue visas, and toensure that they are issued expeditiously to appli-cants who satisfy specified legal requirements, it isnot self-evident how information technology is tobe applied.

Should a central IT office manage it all to ensureefficiencies of scale? Or, should each consular officer be given a laptop and asked to figure outhow to improve his or her work? The second solu-tion is obviously inefficient. Although less obvious,for a large enterprise the first solution may be onlymarginally better. A hybrid solution, respectingefficiencies of scale, the uniqueness of differentdiplomatic functions, and the hands-on innovationof diplomats is suggested by the 12 cases that have been reviewed.

The five key recommendations for introducing infor-mation technology in support of diplomacy are:

Recommendations

38


Recommendation One: Centralize commonrequirements such as network architecture, equip-ment procurement, security certification, and soft-ware standards. IT specialists should design and maintain stable net-works that serve a variety of different user needs.That is, a central IT office should keep one stepahead of users by rapidly adopting industry stan-dards to ensure that the networks are sufficientlyrobust to support new requirements. Because of thelead time for evaluating new technologies, ensuringcompliance with security requirements, and con-tracting, government IT managers must remain cur-rent with industry developments and move rapidlyto adopt new technologies to satisfy users at theworking level.

Recommendation Two: Decentralize the develop-ment and support of IT applications. For example, the unique technology requirementsof consular affairs should be supported by consularaffairs IT specialists, the requirements for arms control verification by arms control IT specialists,and so on. While central networks and standardsmust support these and other unique diplomaticpractices, it is the diplomats themselves who bestunderstand the requirements of diplomacy. As this study has demonstrated, many of the StateDepartment’s diplomatic applications have origi-nated with the users—when funds, equipment, and networks were available.

Recommendation Three: Encourage a cadre of IT-literate diplomats, officers whose specialty isforeign affairs with IT competence. These are officers whose IT expertise—whether theresult of serendipity or design—is recognized as anasset in the conduct of diplomacy. They are theboundary spanners who work across the lines ofdiplomacy and technology. IT literacy should not bea requirement for most, but the State Departmentshould recruit and train a cadre of skilled diplomatswho have the confidence to drive IT innovation. The more diplomatic practices can be enhanced byinformation technology, the more time officers willhave to attend to the core elements of diplomacy.

Recommendation Four: Share learning byencouraging user groups that function acrossinstitutional lines. For example, ensure that political officers understandhow consular officers have deployed technology to satisfy their diplomatic requirements. Encourageone area’s success to be adapted by others. TheDepartment of State has long encouraged such shar-ing, although most of the applications have been insupport of administrative practices. The next step isto encourage the sharing of IT innovations in thepractice of diplomacy. In a profession where thereare few textbook solutions to unique diplomaticchallenges, the more sharing of IT solutions, themore agile will be the practice of diplomacy.

Recommendation Five: Promote innovation byfunding pilot projects and recognizing excellence. As the examples have shown, the State Departmentrecognizes excellence through its awards and fundspilot projects to test their merit. Both have undoubt-edly encouraged the IT breakthrough that is underway. Nonetheless, more should and can be done.As the lead foreign affairs agency, the Departmentof State must become the preeminent agency in the deployment of information technology—notbecause it is trendy, but because the raw material of analysis and advocacy is information. To ensurethe quality and speed of its information, the depart-ment should expand its recognition of innovativetechnology.

The Department of State should not wait for crises,which have driven some technological develop-ments, or rely on individuals to champion them. It needs to aggressively create the conditions thatreward innovation. To this end, it may wish to consider a planning office which operates at theintersection of diplomacy and technology. Staffedby policy officers, IT specialists, and outside acad-emicians, it could accelerate the deployment ofinformation technology in support of diplomacy.

To repeat, information technology is not apanacea. On the other hand, it is not an option intoday’s competitive environment. If diplomats do

39


not have real-time connectivity to stay informed, ifthey do not have powerful tools to assist in analy-sis, if they do not have the means to improve theirproductivity, then those who do will best them.That will include not only diplomats from othernations, but also colleagues from other areas ofgovernment and competitors from the NGOs.

Neither the Office of Management and Budget northe General Accounting Office currently gives theState Department high marks on its use of infor-mation technology. But, with its current leadershipand the new funding it has received, buttressed bya new focus on diplomatic requirements, a turn-around within 24 months is a strong possibility forthe Department of State. It is, indeed, a plausiblecandidate to assume a leadership role in the useof information technology in the foreign affairscommunity.

40


Appendix: Glossary

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

CCD Consolidated Consular Database

CFE Conventional Forces in Europe

CSBMs Confidence and Security Building Measures

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DVC Digital Videoconference

FASI Foreign Affairs Systems Integration

FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

GIS Geographic Information System

GPS Global Positioning System

HCIC Humanitarian Community Information Center (United Nations)

HTML Hyper Text Markup Language

IIP Office of International InformationPrograms (State Department)

IOM International Organization for Migration

IRM Information Resource Managementbureau (State Department)

Kbps Kilobits per second

KIAI Kosovo Information Assistance Initiative

KRIS Kosovo Repatriation Information Support

NGO Nongovermental Organization

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)

OPE Overseas Processing Entity

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PDA Personal Digital Assistant

PDF Portable Document Format

SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (DoD)

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TIP Treaty Information Portal

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USIA United States Information Agency

USIP United States Institute of Peace

USTR United States Trade Representative

WRAPS Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System

WREN Worldwide Remote E-mailNetwork

XML Extensible Markup Language

41


1. SOS for DOS: Call for Action, an appeal to theSecretary of State signed by some 1,500 employees ofthe Department of State, January 2001.http://www.afsa.org/c-street/topicPF.cfm?ThreadID=8#12

2. Center for Strategic and International Studies,Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age.Washington: Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, 1998. www.csis.org/ics/dia

3. Henry L. Stimson Center, Equipped for the Future:Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century.Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998.http://www.stimson.org/pubs/ausia/ausr1.pdf

4. Department of State, America’s Overseas Presencein the 21st Century. Washington: Department of State,1999. http://www.state.gov/www/publications/9911_opap/rpt-9911_opap_instructions.html

5. Council on Foreign Relations, State DepartmentReform. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001.http://www.cfr.org/p/resource.cgi?pub!3890

6. http://www.foia.state.gov/MajorInfoSys.pdf7. Michael J. Dziedzic and William B. Wood,

“Kosovo Brief: Information Management Offers a NewOpportunity for Cooperation between Civilian andMilitary Entities,” Washington: United States Institute ofPeace, August 9, 2000. http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/dziedzic-wood.html

8. Richard G. Johnson, Negotiating the DaytonPeace Accords through Digital Maps. Washington:United States Institute of Peace, 1999. http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/rjohnsonISA99.html

9. http://foia.state.gov10. http://www.usinfo.state.gov11. Glen Johnson, Director of Verification Operations,

interview by the author, December 31, 2001.12. lbid.

Endnotes

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Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. The Emergenceof Noopolitik. Santa Monica: Rand, 1999.http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1033/MR1033.pdf/

Center for Strategic and International Studies.Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age.Washington: Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, 1998. http://www.csis.org/ics/dia

Cooper, Jeffrey R., “The CyberFrontier and Americaat the Turn of the 21st Century: ReopeningFrederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier,” First Monday,July 2000. http://FirstMonday.org/issues/issue5_7/cooper/index.html

Council on Foreign Relations. State DepartmentReform. Task Force Report by the Council onForeign Relations and the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies. New York: Council onForeign Relations, 2001. http://www.cfr.org/p/resource.cgi?pub!3890

Department of State. America’s Overseas Presencein the 21st Century. Washington: Department ofState, 1999. http://www.state.gov/www/publica-tions/9911_opap/rpt-9911_opap_instructions.html

Dizard, Wilson, Jr. Digital Diplomacy: U.S. ForeignPolicy in the Information Age. Westport, Conn.:Praeger, 2001.

Dziedzic, Michael J. and William B. Wood,“Kosovo Brief: Information Management Offers aNew Opportunity for Cooperation between Civilianand Military Entities,” Washington: United States

Institute of Peace, August 9, 2000. http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/dziedzic-wood.html

Fulton, Barry, ed., “Diplomacy in the InformationAge,” iMP: Information Impacts, July 2001.http://www.cisp.org/imp

Fulton, Barry, “The Information Age: NewDimensions for U.S. Foreign Policy,” GreatDecisions 1999. New York: The Foreign PolicyAssociation, 1999, pp. 9-18.

Henry L. Stimson Center. Equipped for the Future:Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century.Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998.http://www.stimson.org/pubs/ausia/ausr1.pdf

Henry, Ryan and C. Edward Peartree. TheInformation Revolution and International Security.Washington: Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, 1968.

Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York:Random House, 1998.

Information Age Diplomacy: a symposium orga-nized by the National Defense University andNorthwestern University, April 5-6, 2001.http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/nwc/Public/SymposiumWebsite/symposium_main.htm

Johnson, Richard G. Negotiating the Dayton PeaceAccords through Digital Maps. Washington: UnitedStates Institute of Peace, 1999. http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/rjohnsonISA99.html

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Moose, Richard M., “From U2 to URL: Technologyand Foreign Affairs,” Georgetown Journal ofInternational Affairs, Summer/Fall 2000, pp. 15-22.

National Foreign Intelligence Board. Global Trends2015: A Dialogue About the Future withNongovernment Experts. Washington: NationalForeign Intelligence Board, December 2000.http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/global-trends2015/index.html

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. and William Owens, “America’sInformation Edge,” Foreign Affairs, March/April1966, pp. 20-36.

Ronfeldt, David and John Arquilla, “What If Thereis a Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs?” UnitedStates Institute of Peace, Virtual Diplomacy SeriesNo. 4, February 2000. http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/ronarqISA99.html

Rosenau, James N., “States, Sovereignty, andDiplomacy in the Information Age,” United StatesInstitute of Pace, Virtual Diplomacy Series No. 5,February 2000. http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/jrosenauISS99.html

Rothkopf, David J., “Cyberpolitik: The InformationRevolution and U.S. Foreign Policy,” summary of a presentation at the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, March 22, 2000. http://www.ceip.org/programs/info/rothkopf.htm

Solomon, Richard H., Walter B. Wriston, andGeorge P. Shultz, Keynote Addresses from theVirtual Diplomacy Conference. Washington: UnitedStates Institute of Peace, 1997. http://www.usip.org/pubs/pworks/virtual18/vdip_18.html

44


Barry Fulton is a Research Professor at George Washington University andDirector of the University’s Public Diplomacy Institute. He teaches publicdiplomacy at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute and recentlyserved as a Yale-Stimson Senior Fellow. He is an expert consultant to theUnder Secretary of State for Management and serves periodically in theState Department’s Office of the Inspector General.

He is an associate of Global Business Access, a member of the Board ofDirectors of Info/Change—a nonprofit consortium founded to expandaffordable access to information and communication technologies indeveloping countries—and a member of the Washington Institute ofForeign Affairs. He recently served on the Defense Science Board TaskForce on Managed Information Dissemination.

Professor Fulton was associate director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) from 1994 to 1997,when he joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies to direct a project on “ReinventingDiplomacy in the Information Age.” Prior to his presidential appointment, he was acting director of USIA’sBureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. During a 30-year career with USIA, he served in diplomaticassignments in Brussels, Rome, Tokyo, Karachi, and Islamabad. He retired from the Foreign Service with thegrade of Minister-Counselor.

He established and directed the American Forces Radio and Television Service in Turkey, where he servedas a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force. He has been an adjunct professor at American University; has taughtpart-time at the University of Maryland, University of Illinois, San Antonio College, and the PennsylvaniaState University; and has lectured at numerous universities and organizations.

Professor Fulton holds a Ph.D. in communications from the University of Illinois, and an M.A. in broadcast-ing and B.S. in electrical engineering from Penn State. He is the recipient of the Presidential MeritoriousHonor Award, the Vice President’s Hammer Award for Reinvention in Government, and the Edward R.Murrow Award for Excellence in Public Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

A B O U T T H E A U T H O R

45


To contact the author:

Barry FultonResearch Professor & DirectorPublic Diplomacy InstituteSchool of Media & Public AffairsThe George Washington University805 21st St., NW, Suite 400Washington, D.C. 20052(202) 994-0389

e-mail: [email protected]

K E Y C O N T A C T I N F O R M A T I O N

46

ENDOWMENT REPORTS AVAILABLE

To download or order a copy of a grant or special report, visit the Endowment website at: endowment.pwcglobal.com

GRANT REPORTS

E-Government

Managing Telecommuting in theFederal Government: An InterimReport (June 2000)

Gina VegaLouis Brennan

Using Virtual Teams to ManageComplex Projects: A Case Study ofthe Radioactive Waste ManagementProject (August 2000)

Samuel M. DeMarie

The Auction Model: How the Public Sector Can Leverage thePower of E-Commerce ThroughDynamic Pricing (October 2000)

David C. Wyld

Supercharging the EmploymentAgency: An Investigation of the Useof Information and CommunicationTechnology to Improve the Serviceof State Employment Agencies(December 2000)

Anthony M. Townsend

Assessing a State’s Readiness forGlobal Electronic Commerce:Lessons from the Ohio Experience(January 2001)

J. Pari SabetySteven I. Gordon

Privacy Strategies for ElectronicGovernment (January 2001)

Janine S. HillerFrance Bélanger

Commerce Comes to Governmenton the Desktop: E-CommerceApplications in the Public Sector(February 2001)

Genie N. L. Stowers

The Use of the Internet inGovernment Service Delivery(February 2001)

Steven CohenWilliam Eimicke

State Web Portals: Delivering andFinancing E-Service (January 2002)

Diana Burley GantJon P. GantCraig L. Johnson

Internet Voting: Bringing Electionsto the Desktop (February 2002)

Robert S. Done

Leveraging Technology in theService of Diplomacy: Innovation in the Department of State(March 2002)

Barry Fulton

Financia lManagement

Credit Scoring and Loan Scoring:Tools for Improved Management ofFederal Credit Programs (July 1999)

Thomas H. Stanton

Using Activity-Based Costing to Manage More Effectively(January 2000)

Michael H. GranofDavid E. PlattIgor Vaysman

Audited Financial Statements:Getting and Sustaining “Clean”Opinions (July 2001)

Douglas A. Brook

An Introduction to Financial RiskManagement in Government(August 2001)

Richard J. Buttimer, Jr.

Human Capita l

Profiles in Excellence: Conversationswith the Best of America’s CareerExecutive Service (November 1999)

Mark W. Huddleston

Leaders Growing Leaders: Preparingthe Next Generation of PublicService Executives (May 2000)

Ray Blunt

Reflections on Mobility: CaseStudies of Six Federal Executives(May 2000)

Michael D. Serlin

A Learning-Based Approach toLeading Change (December 2000)

Barry Sugarman

Labor-Management Partnerships:A New Approach to CollaborativeManagement (July 2001)

Barry RubinRichard Rubin

Winning the Best and Brightest:Increasing the Attraction of PublicService (July 2001)

Carol Chetkovich

Organizations Growing Leaders:Best Practices and Principles in thePublic Service (December 2001)

Ray Blunt

A Weapon in the War for Talent:Using Special Authorities to RecruitCrucial Personnel (December 2001)

Hal G. Rainey

A Changing Workforce:Understanding Diversity Programs in the Federal Government(December 2001)

Katherine C. NaffJ. Edward Kellough

Managing for Resul ts

Corporate Strategic Planning in Government: Lessons from the United States Air Force(November 2000)

Colin Campbell

Using Evaluation to SupportPerformance Management:A Guide for Federal Executives(January 2001)

Kathryn NewcomerMary Ann Scheirer

47To download or order a copy of a grant or special report, visit the Endowment website at: endowment.pwcglobal.com

Managing for Outcomes:Milestone Contracting in Oklahoma (January 2001)

Peter Frumkin

The Challenge of Developing Cross-Agency Measures: A CaseStudy of the Office of National DrugControl Policy (August 2001)

Patrick J. MurphyJohn Carnevale

The Potential of the GovernmentPerformance and Results Act as a Tool to Manage Third-PartyGovernment (August 2001)

David G. Frederickson

Using Performance Data forAccountability: The New York CityPolice Department’s CompStatModel of Police Management(August 2001)

Paul E. O’Connell

New Ways to Manage

Managing Workfare: The Case of the Work Experience Program in the New York City ParksDepartment (June 1999)

Steven Cohen

New Tools for ImprovingGovernment Regulation: AnAssessment of Emissions Trading and Other Market-Based RegulatoryTools (October 1999)

Gary C. Bryner

Religious Organizations, Anti-Poverty Relief, and CharitableChoice: A Feasibility Study of Faith-Based Welfare Reform inMississippi (November 1999)

John P. BartkowskiHelen A. Regis

Business Improvement Districts and Innovative Service Delivery(November 1999)

Jerry Mitchell

An Assessment of BrownfieldRedevelopment Policies: The Michigan Experience(November 1999)

Richard C. Hula

Determining a Level Playing Fieldfor Public-Private Competition(November 1999)

Lawrence L. Martin

San Diego County’s InnovationProgram: Using Competition and aWhole Lot More to Improve PublicServices (January 2000)

William B. Eimicke

Innovation in the Administration of Public Airports (March 2000)

Scott E. Tarry

Entrepreneurial Government:Bureaucrats as Businesspeople (May 2000)

Anne Laurent

Implementing State Contracts forSocial Services: An Assessment ofthe Kansas Experience (May 2000)

Jocelyn M. JohnstonBarbara S. Romzek

Rethinking U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Policy: ManagementChallenges for a NewAdministration (November 2000)

Dennis A. Rondinelli

The Challenge of Innovating inGovernment (February 2001)

Sandford Borins

Understanding Innovation:What Inspires It? What Makes ItSuccessful? (December 2001)

Jonathan Walters

A Vision of the Government as a World-Class Buyer: MajorProcurement Issues for the Coming Decade (January 2002)

Jacques S. Gansler

Contracting for the 21st Century: A Partnership Model (January 2002)

Wendell C. Lawther

Franchise Funds in the FederalGovernment: Ending the Monopolyin Service Provision (February 2002)

John J. Callahan

Managing “Big Science”: A CaseStudy of the Human GenomeProject (March 2002)

W. Henry Lambright

Leveraging Networks to MeetNational Goals: FEMA and the Safe Construction Networks(March 2002)

William L. Waugh, Jr.

Government Management ofInformation Mega-Technology:Lessons from the Internal RevenueService’s Tax Systems Modernization(March 2002)

Barry Bozeman

TransformingOrganizat ions

The Importance of Leadership:The Role of School Principals(September 1999)

Paul TeskeMark Schneider

Leadership for Change: Case Studies in American LocalGovernment (September 1999)

Robert B. DenhardtJanet Vinzant Denhardt

Managing DecentralizedDepartments: The Case of the U.S. Department of Health andHuman Services (October 1999)

Beryl A. Radin

48 To download or order a copy of a grant or special report, visit the Endowment website at: endowment.pwcglobal.com

Transforming Government: TheRenewal and Revitalization of theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency (April 2000)

R. Steven DanielsCarolyn L. Clark-Daniels

Transforming Government: Creatingthe New Defense ProcurementSystem (April 2000)

Kimberly A. Harokopus

Trans-Atlantic Experiences in HealthReform: The United Kingdom’sNational Health Service and theUnited States Veterans HealthAdministration (May 2000)

Marilyn A. DeLuca

Transforming Government: TheRevitalization of the Veterans Health Administration (June 2000)

Gary J. Young

The Challenge of Managing Across Boundaries: The Case of the Office of the Secretary in theU.S. Department of Health andHuman Services (November 2000)

Beryl A. Radin

Creating a Culture of Innovation:10 Lessons from America’s Best Run City (January 2001)

Janet Vinzant DenhardtRobert B. Denhardt

Transforming Government:Dan Goldin and the Remaking of NASA (March 2001)

W. Henry Lambright

Managing Across Boundaries: ACase Study of Dr. Helene Gayleand the AIDS Epidemic (January 2002)

Norma M. Riccucci

SPECIAL REPORTS

Government in the 21st Century

David M. Walker

Results of the GovernmentLeadership Survey: A 1999 Surveyof Federal Executives (June 1999)

Mark A. AbramsonSteven A. ClyburnElizabeth Mercier

Creating a Government for the 21st Century (March 2000)

Stephen Goldsmith

The President’s ManagementCouncil: An Important ManagementInnovation (December 2000)

Margaret L. Yao

Toward a 21st Century PublicService: Reports from Four Forums (January 2001)

Mark A. Abramson, Editor

Becoming an Effective PoliticalExecutive: 7 Lessons fromExperienced Appointees (January 2001)

Judith E. Michaels

The Changing Role of Government:Implications for Managing in a NewWorld (December 2001)

David Halberstam

BOOKS*

Transforming Organizations(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)

Mark A. Abramson and Paul R. Lawrence, editors

E-Government 2001(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)

Mark A. Abramson and Grady E. Means, editors

Managing for Results 2002(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)

Mark A. Abramson and John Kamensky, editors

Memos to the President:Management Advice from the Nation’s Top PublicAdministrators (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001)

Mark A. Abramson, editor

Innovation(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002)

Mark A. Abramson andIan Littman, editors

Human Capital 2002(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002)

Mark A. Abramson andNicole Willenz Gardner, editors

* Available at bookstores, online booksellers, and from the publisher (www.rowmanlittlefield.comor 800-462-6420).

For additional information, contact:Mark A. AbramsonExecutive DirectorThe PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for The Business of Government1616 North Fort Myer DriveArlington, VA 22209(703) 741-1077, fax: (703) 741-1076

e-mail: [email protected]: endowment.pwcglobal.com

About PricewaterhouseCoopersThe Management Consulting Services practice of PricewaterhouseCoopers helps clients maximize theirbusiness performance by integrating strategic change, performance improvement and technology solutions.Through a worldwide network of skills and resources, consultants manage complex projects with globalcapabilities and local knowledge, from strategy through implementation. PricewaterhouseCoopers(www.pwcglobal.com) is the world’s largest professional services organization. Drawing on the knowledgeand skills of more than 150,000 people in 150 countries, we help our clients solve complex business prob-lems and measurably enhance their ability to build value, manage risk and improve performance in anInternet-enabled world. PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to the member firms of the worldwidePricewaterhouseCoopers organization.

About The EndowmentThrough grants for Research and Thought Leadership Forums, The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment forThe Business of Government stimulates research and facilitates discussion on new approaches to improvingthe effectiveness of government at the federal, state, local, and international levels.

Founded in 1998 by PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Endowment is one of the ways that PricewaterhouseCoopersseeks to advance knowledge on how to improve public sector effectiveness. The PricewaterhouseCoopersEndowment focuses on the future of the operation and management of the public sector.

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