lexical semantics 6

8/16/2019 Lexical Semantics 6

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1. Introducing Prototype Semantics

Prototype semantics suggests answers tosome of the tantalizing dissatisfactionsinherent in the necessary and sufficient

conditions model.It is fair to say that many researchers use

the term prototype for both thepsychological concept (best example of,or typical member of, a category) and forthe lexical concept (bundle of features)describing it.


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Wittgenstein’s games and family resemblance

!ames are li"e families. #here is no simple

collection of properties that all games

share, the category is united by family

resemblance. $hess and go both in%ol%ecompetition, s"ill and the use long&term

strategies. $hess and po"er both in%ol%e

competition. Po"er and old maid are bothcard games. In short, games, li"e family

members are similar to one another in a

%ariety of ways'


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Austin’s “The meaning of a word” (194019!1"Problem hy do we call different "inds of thin"s by the same name* #he

senses of a word represent a category with a prototypical zone, i.e., aprototypical sense.

#he ad+ecti%e healthy' when I tal" of a healthy body, and again of a

healthy complexion, of healthy exercise the word is not +ust used

eui%ocally- there is a primary nuclear sense of healthy/, the sense

in which healthy/ is used of a healthy body/. I call this nuclearbecause it is contained as a part in the other two senses which may

be set out as producti%e of healthy bodies/ and resulting from a

healthy body'- 0ow are we content to say that the exercise, the

complexion and the body are called healthy/ because they are

similar* 1uch a remar" cannot fail to be misleading.'

#he three meanings form a category with healthy bodies as central

meaning and the other two meaning deri%ed on the basis of

metonymic extension.


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2.2 #he standard version of prototype semantics corresponds to the

statements first proposed by 3lanor 4osch in the early se%enties.

#hese statements put forth a conception of the category and of

categorization which concerns the internal structure of a category,

as well as its place in the hyponymic %ertical hierarchies.

a) 4osch spea"s of the internal structure of the category. 5n thehorizontal dimension, a category is structured into a center and a

periphery, ha%ing central and less central members.

b) the theory also puts forth a hierarchical %iew of the system of

categories categories are structured on the %ertical dimension.0ot all the le%els of a hyponymic hierarchy ha%e the same

cogniti%e rele%ance.

e will examine the internal (horizontal) structure of the category first.


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2.7 hat is a prototype* In the se%enties 4osch conducted a series of

celebrated experiments that challenged the classical %iew of

categories and categorization, producing the 4oschean re%olution.

#he central idea is that categories are structured aroundprototypes. 8 prototype is usually defined as the best example of a

category.

#he centrality of the prototype was first apparent in naming tas"s. #hus,

the sub+ects were as"ed to name, say birds, according to their

degree of birdiness/, i.e., the degree to which they matched theideal of a bird. 4osch soon established hierarchies of birdiness,

%egetableness, etc., which indicated that categories li"e bird,

%egetable are internally structured

(2) 9irdiness hierarchy :egetableness hierarchy

robins carrots, asparagus

eagles celery

chic"ens, duc"s, geese onion

penguins, pelicansparsley

bats pic"les


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#he prototype is not any particular example of a bird, but rather it is a well&defined subcategory; moreo%er, it is the most typical subcategorycommonly accepted as such by the community of spea"ers.

#he prototype is the most representi%e subcategory.


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1. Category and Categorization

#he new conception of categories and categorization is founded on the following theses

2) #he category has an internal prototypical structure.

7) #he degree of representati%ity of an indi%idual corresponds to its degree of membership

in a category.

>)


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1.! The "mental# representation of a prototype

#he (mental) representation of a prototype typically consists

of (one of) the following

a) a list of typical features (bird, lie)

b) features plus an image schema (often a shape

9I4A is prototypically described as below2. It can fly. B. 0ot domestic

7. It has feathers. 6. It lays eggs

>. It is typically shaped li"e ℘ C. It has a bill.

?. It has wings

#he schema below shows which features are shared by the

"inds of birds illustrated below. It appears that there no

01$ for membership in the category bird.


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"iwi sparrow ostrich chic"en

penguin

2

2

7>

?

B6, C


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$DPthe prototypes also includes a shape of

a cup and saucer. 0otice the presence of

functional features in artifacts.

2. It is a recipient for drin"ing

7. It is as tall as it is wide.

>. It has a handle.?. It has a saucer.


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$%&e will consider this as an example of how to deal with an abstract

term. 8s shown so far, a semantic prototype associates a word or

phrase with a (prelinguistic) image or a %erbal schema. 1pea"ers

are euipped with an ability to +udge the degree to which an

ob+ect matches this prototype schema or image. #he particular

prototype schema that $oleman and Eay propose for LI3 has the

following semi&formal characteristics.

(a) it contains a finite list of properties

(b) the indi%idual properties in the list are each treated as

dichotomous, i.e., as either satisfied or not. e en%isage that

prototype schemata may in general contain gradient properties.(c) membership in the category LI3 is a gradient phenomenon.

(d) satisfaction of each property on the list does not necessarily

contribute eually to the degree of membership of an indi%idual in

the category. Properties may be of differential importance in

constituting the prototype.


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$efining %I&S

(B) a. P is false. (falsehood)

b. 1 belie%es P to be false. (deliberatefalsehood)

c. In uttering P, 1 intends to decei%e 8 (intended deceit)

Dtterances which ha%e all the three Ps are full&fledged lies.

Dtterances which lac" one or more of the elements inthe definition might still be classified as lies, though

less clearly so.

#he experiment 8 uestionnaire was constructed with eight

stories, each of which had a different configuration ofthe three elements. 3ach story contained a uestion,

rating the story as an instance of lie, as indicated in (6)

(6) It was a lie.= It was not a lie.= I can/t say.


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@ere are fi%e of the storiesfi%e of the stories, part of the experiment.

(C) i.


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(G)

Heatures in the definition of lie #otal

1tory P is false 1 belie%es P is false 1 intends to decei%e

(i) ?6

(%) 1chmallowitz & >2B

(%i) >

(%iii) 1uperfan & & >K

'esults of the e)eriment

2. #he general rule is that the more prototypical elements a story contains, the

higher it scores on the LI3 scale.($ompare stories (i%)= (%) to stories %i=%iii)

where only one feature is satified)7. #he data indicate some ran"ing of the three elements in terms of their

importance in determining whether or not an utterance was a lie. ($ompare

stories %iii and %i).

Halsity of belief is the most important element, intended deception is the next

most important element and factual falsity is the least important.


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1.' (hat )ind of properties ma)e up the prototype.*

#he study of the prototype is a matter of linguistic and psycholinguistic in%estigation. #he

basic idea that meaning is decomposable and structured continues to be %alid. 9ut

now conceptual analysis is underta"en with a) linguistic methods (syntagmatic,

paradigmatic (setting oppositions, lexical decomposition, etc); b) experimentalmethods, which test, refine linguistic methods.

#he study of the prototypes (stereotype) with PL means has brought to light a number of

interesting aspects regarding the relation extension= intension.

a) It is the actual nature of the ob+ects in the extension of the concrete terms which is

fundamental in explaining their semantics. #he extension will determine the nature of

the feature in the stereotype, as well as the richness of the stereotype=prototype. #hus,

expectedly, the stereotype for dog is richer than for )laice* #his idea is illustrated inchart II (from Aahlgreen ()

b) #he attributes P2, P7-.Pn do not occur independently. #here is a percei%ed correlational

structure of real world ob+ects, such that some combinations are more expected than

others, some are rare and some are logically impossible. Hor example, a creature that

has feathers is more li"ely to ha%e wings than a creature that is endowed with fur.

c) #he prototype includes those features that ha%e a high cue +alidity . $ue %alidity is theconditional probability that some ob+ect is in a particular category, gi%en the possession

of a particular feature (the cue'). #he best cues are those that wor" all of the time for

categories at gi%en le%el. Hor example, if you see a li%ing thing with gills, you may be

certain that it is a fish. #hus gills will represent a cue %alidity of 2K (the highest on a

scale from K to 2K) for the category fish and a cue %alidity of K for other categories.


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()

Type of features

Type of term in the stereotype &+ample Stereotypical features

$olor perceptual red physiologically based

properties (heat, emotion, anger-)

artifact perceptual, functional chair seat, legs

motor, mo%ement you sit on it with bended "nees

social ran" social function, relati%e professor educates

ran", typical trait of middle class, erudite,

beha%ior, income well&paid

fruit perceptual orange color, shape, fla%or


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,edges

Languages possess resources for expressing degree of category membership, linguistic de%ices

commonly called category hedges.

@edges represent a semantic, not a syntactic class, that is why they formally belong in %arious

grammatical categories

ad+erbial )hrases (including participial constructions)

loosely spea"ing, technically spea"ing, technically, par excellence, etc

modifiers (of different "ind of predicates)

so&called, sort of, "ind of

con,unctions

in that

1emantically, hedges are (metalinguistic) de%ices for spea"ers employ for commenting on the language

they are using. hen they are employed in categorization, they focus on an area in the internal

structure of the category, pushing the referent to that area.

-ar ecellence& is a category hedge whose function is to pic" out only the central members of a category.

(2K) 8 robin is bird par excellence.

**8 tur"ey is a bird par excellence=

5ther hedges restructure the category by excluding the central members loosely s)ea#ing. in a way. etc*(22) a. **Loosely spea"ing, a chair is piece of furniture.

b. Loosely spea"ing a telephone is a piece of furniture.

c. MLoosely spea"ing, a six&sided figure is hexagonal

d. Loosely spea"ing, Hrance is hexagonal.


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/trictly s)ea#ing is similar in that this hedge also excludes the central

members.

(27) a. *1trictly spea"ing beans are %egetables.

b. 1trictly spea"ing, rhubarb is a %egetable.

Net, strictly s)ea#ing restructures the category in a different manner from

loosely spea"ing, introducing expert criteria. It remo%es the

fuzziness from the category boundary, by pic"ing out non&central

members and gi%ing full status. In contrast, loosely s)ea#ing

extends the category by pic"ing out things that would not ordinarily

be considered members, but which might be associated with the

category on the basis of one or two non&essential attributes.

(2>) a. *8 bat is a bird (false)

b. M1trictly spea"ing a bat is a bird.(false)

c. Loosely spea"ing, a bat is a bird.


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%n that restructures the category pic"ing out peripheral members that satisfy a particularcriterion. #hus it spells out reasons for assigning an entity to a particular category.

(2?) Loosely spea"ing, a bat is a bird in that it has got wings and it can fly.

(2B) a. M@e "illed 8lice in that he murdered her.

b. @e "illed 8lice in that he did nothing to "eep her ali%e=

c. 1he/s a friend of mine in that I/%e "nown her for years, but we are really not thatclose.

1entence (2Ba) sounds odd since it is not usually necessary to state the reasons forcategorizing murder as "illing. ill prototypically denotes an action that causes loss oflife, and murder is a central instance of "illing. 1entence (2Bb) in contrast denotes anon&prototypical instance of "illing, with the conseuence that in that is felicitous.1entence (2Bc) focuses on a single attribute which is freuently associated with

friendship (long acuaintance), but which does not guarantee friendship. %n that isagain called&for.

@edges also differentiate between %arious non&members of a category, in that a categorycannot be extended too much. $onsider strictly s)ea#ing and as such

(26) a. 1trictly spea"ing, a bat is not a bird.

b. M1trictly spea"ing, a #: set is not a bird

(2C) a. 8n octopus is not a fish as such.

b. M8 bicycle is not a fish as such.$onsider finally the hedge technically s)ea#ing . #echnically spea"ing, li"e strictly spea"ing,

remo%es the fuzziness from a category, and in many contexts, the two hedges areinterchangeable. 9ut technically in%o"es a technical or expert definition of a categorysetting it off against the fol" dimension. $onsider (2G), which is issued from a tax&payment expert point of %ies

(2G) 4eagan is technically spea"ing a cattle rancher.


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. -asic %evel Terms

>.2. #he concept of basic le%el term has to do with the hyponymic

structure of the %ocabulary, i.e. with the %ertical hierarchies.

(2) artifact

tool furniture dwelling place

table chair bed

hot chair dining chair "itchen chair dentist/s chair


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!i%en such a hierarchy, the same entity, this particular chairmay be labeled in many different ways #itchen chair.chair. )iece of furniture. artifact. entity . #a"en in itself,

this hierarchy does not grant any pri%ileged position toany le%el of categorization in the hierarchy.

3xperimental psychology has pro%ed beyond any reasonabledoubt that the facts of cognition and language show theexistence of a le%el of categorization which is cogniti%elymore salient. #his is the so&called basic&le%el ofcategorization. #he basic le%el should be opposed to thesuper&ordinate le%el and to the sub&ordinate le%el, intriplets li"e (7K)

(7K) superordinate asic level suordinatefurniture chair dining chair

animal cat manx

animal dog boxer

plant tree oa"


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9asic&le%el categories are basic in at least four respects

2. It is this le%el at which members ha%e similarly percei%ed o%erall shapes; it is thele%el of perceptual templates (!estalts). 8ll chairs loo" ali"e, but all pieces of

furniture do not; hence the difficulty of drawing a piece of furniture/, asopposed to trying draw a chair= bed, etc.

7. It is the highest le%el at single mental image can reflect the entire category.(compare "itchen char=chair %s. furniture item=chair; fruit=apple, etc.

>. It is the highest le%el at which a person uses similar motor programs forinteracting with category members. e interact in a particular ways withbeds, chairs, des"s, buses, dogs, but we ha%e no particular motor programs

for furniture, animal, "itchen chair ?. 4egarding language structure, it is the le%el with the most commonly used

labels for category members. 9asic le%el terms are used in natural contexts,since they are stylistically neutral. 9asic le%el terms are freuently short, rootforms, while terms below the basic le%el are freuently compounds table="itchen table= whist table=dining table, etc. #erms abo%e the basic le%el aresometimes grammatically mar"ed thus furniture is uncountable, similarly

pairs li"e footwear==shoe, boot, headgear== hat,cap, etc.; often the super&category term is missing; **colored== red, blue, technically created; spouse==husband, wife; sibling== berother= sister, etc.

B. #he basic le%el terms are extremely useful in the organization of our "nowledgeof the world. #he basic le%el is the le%el at which most of our "nowledge isorganized. 9asic categories most fully exploit the correlations of attributes inthe real world wings=feathers=Mfur; animal=mo%e=Mdwelling places, etc. 1uch

clusters of concepts characterizing categories are called frames.


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9asic le%el terms a) maximize the number of attributesshared by members, b)


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The second Stage of

Prototype Theory. Thee+tended Theory. Cognitive

Semantics: /Prototypeeffects of Idealized

Cognitive models "frames#

Lecture 6&C


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#he empirical facts that prompted this theoretical reorientation are the following

a. 0ot all categories ha%e prototypical structure. 8 case in point is that oflinguistic categories the %arious meanings of a lexeme may be relatedamong themsel%es, e%en though they need not all be related to a central

prototypical sense. K KKK feet.

b. #he locomoti%e climbed to the mountain side.

c. Prices are climbing day bay day.

d. #he boy climbed the tree.

e. #he boy climbed down the tree and o%er the wall.f. #he boy climbed into car= under a table = out of his sleeping bag.

hile a&c are related, meaning ascend, and d&e are also related meaning,clamber, using limbs), a and e are not necessarily related. #he differentdiscrete meanings are related through meaning chains, according to thefamily resemblance/ model. hile any two ad+acent meanings are related(one meaning can be inferred from the other), resemblance is not transiti%e.

(77) 8 9 $ A

b. 8 second empirical problem since not all categories ha%e prototypicalstructure, perhaps prototype are not psychological real/ entities; perhapsone can explain the prototypical effects in other terms. 9asically, theproposal is that prototypical effects are deri%ed from the organization of"nowledge into conceptual frames, also called idealized cogniti%e models.


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?.2 #he most interesting and well spelled&out proposal is La"off/s experiential internalrealism'.

a. #his position implies a commitment to the eistence of the real world , both external tohuman beings and including the reality of human experience;It also presupposes an acceptance of truth as reflecting a certain corres)ondence between what we say, that is, between our "nowledge, and the world.

b. #he position of internal realism (a %ariety of which is experiential realism) grants an acti%epart to the epistemic sub+ect in the constitution and functioning of conceptualsystems. #he idea is that different languages cut the world out into ob+ects in different

ways.Putnam (2G7) adopts the position of internal realism'. 8ccording to him, the characteristic

of this %iew is to hold that what ob+ects the world consists of is uestion that it onlyma"es sense to as" within a theory or description ( a science, a language, etc.)


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!.0. Idealized Cognitive Models as Means of Storing no2ledge

#he central hypothesis of cogniti%e semantics is that "nowledge isorganized in idealized cogniti%e models (O I$


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?.7.2 -ro)ositional models specify a class of elements withthe properties and relations holding among them(taxonomies, partonomies, scripts, scenarios, etc.). @ere

are a few examples(7>) Tuesday can be understood only with respect to an

I$< that includes the natural cycle defined by therotation of the 3arth around the sun, with the fourseasons, etc.

waiter can only be understood w rt the restaurant script

buyer seller presuppose the "nowledge of thecommercial e%ent.

?.7.7 %mage schematic model

these are schematic images, non&%erbal elements, suchas tra+ectories, containers, orientational images ( u),down. to). bottom) which may structure concepts andhold them together


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?.7.> 2eta)horic models are mappings from one propositional or imageschematic model in one domain the base domainQ to correspondingstructure in another domain the target domainQ.


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(76) 8nger is the heat of a fluid in a container

Nou ma"e my blood boil.

I had reached the boiling point.

Let him stew.

#he source domain has cogniti%e priority because it is more accessible. 1pea"ersha%e detailed "nowledge of the source domain. 9y metaphorical entailmentthis "nowledge is transferred to the target domain, that of emotions. #hus, itis "nown about fluids that that when they start to boil, the fluid goes upward.Li"ewise, when the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises

(7C) @is pent up energies welled up in him.

I was in a towering rage.


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(7) intense anger produces pressure on the container

@e was bursting with anger.

I could barely contain my rage.

I could barely "eep it in any more.

8 %ariant of this in%ol%es refers to "eeping the pressure down

(>K) I suppressed my anger.

@e turned his anger inward.

@e was blue in the face.

hen anger becomes too intense, the person explodes

(>2) hen I told him the truth, he +ust exploded.

1he blew up at me.I blew my top = hit the roof = the ceiling.

0otice the %ery interesting fact that an abstract, potentially unstructureddomain acuires a detailed (familiar) structure through metaphoricalentailment.


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?.7.? 2etonymic models A metonymic model has the following characteristics

#here is a target' concept= domain 8 to be understood for some purpose in some context. #here is someconceptual structure containing the target concept 8 as well as another concept 9.

9 is either a part of 8 or closely associated with it in that structure. $ompared to the target 8, the source9 is either easier to understand, or easier to remember or to recognize.

8 metonymic model is a model of how 8 and 9 are related in a conceptual structure; the relation betweenthem is specified by means of some function from 9 to 8.

It has been noticed that many metonymic models actually in%ol%e indi%iduals that stand for/ the wholecategory. 1e%eral such situations ha%e been described

a) social stereoty)es these can be used to understand the category as a whole.

(>7) the stereotypical politician conni%ing, egotistical, dishonest

the stereotypical bachelor is macho, dates a lot of different women, is interested insexual conuest, hangs out in single bars, etc.

b) ideals 3 many categories are understood in terms of ideals abstract perfect cases

(>>) the ideal husband a good pro%ider, faithful, strong, attracti%e, etc.

the stereotypical husband dull, pot&bellied,

8pparently, in 8merican culture, there are many "inds of ideal models for marriges

(>?) successful marriages those where the goals of both partners are fulfilled

good marriages those where both partners find the marriage beneficial

strong marriages those which are li"ely to last

8 lot of cultural "nowledge is organized in terms of ideals ideal families, ideal mates, ideal +obs, idealbosses, ideal wor"er, etc.


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$ultural "nowledge about ideals leads to prototypical effects. #here is an asymmetry between ideal andnon&ideal cases. 5ne generally ma"es +udgments of uality and sets goals for the furutre in termsof ideal cases.

c) -aragons e also comprehend categories in terms of concrete indi%iduals members who representeither an ideal or its opposite. #hus, there are institutions li"e the ten&best and ten worst lists, 8cademy 8wards, #he !uiness 9oo" of orld 4ecords, etc.

e ha%e dicator paragons @itler, 1talin, $eausescue ha%e paragon ma"es of cars,as testified by adds li"e #his is the $adillac of %acuumcleaners'

d) enerators #he natural numbers are the best "nown examples K&. #he category as a whole isdefined metonymically. e start from the single digit numbers and the simple rules of arithmeticand ad%ances to more difficult' higher numbers.

e) /ubmodels Hor natural numbers the most common submodel is the subcategory of thepowers of tesn 2K, 2KK, 2KKK, etc. e use this sub&model to comprehend the relati%e size of

numbers.#hey function as cogniti%e reference points', which ha%e a special place in reasoning, particularly inma"ing approximations and estimating size. #hus we say /G is approximately 2KK/, rather than2KK is approximately G/.

1ome submodels ha%e a biological basis the primary colors, the basic emotions, others are culturallystipulated e.g. the se%en deadly sins (Pride, !luttony, 1loth, Lust, 8%arice, rath, 3n%y)

f) Ty)ical eam)les these are what is usually meant by a prototype

(>B) 8pples and pears are typical fruit.1aws and hammers are typical tools.

g) /alient eam)les It is common for spea"ers to use familiar memorable or otherwise salient examplesto comprehend a category. Hor instance, $alifornia earthua"es, the 2CC 9ucharest earthua"eare salient examples of natural disasters.

$onclusion e ha%e re%iewed the following "inds of metonymic models spscila stereotypes, ideals,paragons, generators, subomodels, typical examples, salient examples, all of which gi%e rise toprototypical effects.


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?.? The ac3uisition of concepts. #he formation ofconceptual systems. #he experientialistapproach attempts to characterize meaning in

terms of the nature and experience of theepistemic sub+ect. #he fresh insight of thisapproach is to characterize meaning in terms ofembodiment, i.e., in terms of our collecti%e

biological capacities and our physical and socialexperiences as beings functioning in ouren%ironment. #here are two problems here

a) one that we ha%e already discussed, that of thestructure of the conceptual system; specifically,

"nowledge is organized in I$


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2. Pre4conceptual e+perience.

#here are at least two "inds of structure in our pre&conceptual experiences

8) 5asic le+el structure 8s already seen in the study of the prototype, experience isstructured in terms of the way we are handling basic le%el ob+ects. e interact inspecific ways with certain classes of ob+ects in our en%ironment. 8s discussed abo%e,

basic le%el categories are precisely defined by specific gestalt patterns, by specificmotor programs and functional patterns in our interaction with them. e thus formrich mental images of these categories. #he le%el of basic terms is the le%el where wepercei%e the sharpest discontinuities. It is the le%el of

(>6)

a) the le%el of natural "inds;b) the le%el of basic actions sit. drin#. run, etc.

c) the le%el of basic properties soft. hard. hot. cold , etc.

Pre&conceptually, experience is structured at this le%el.

b) inesthetic image schematic structure #he second "ind of pre&conceptual structure is the

le%el of "inesthetic image&schematic structure. #he child possesses certain imageschemas which structure his experience. Image schemas are relati%ely simplestructures that constantly recur in our e%eryday bodily experience containers, paths,lin"s, balance, and in the %arious orientations and relations of daily life up=down,front=bac", part=whole, center=periphery, etc.


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7. 5stract concepts

8s to the abstract concepts, the claim is that they arise from basic&le%eland image&schematic structure, basically in two ways

a. by metaphorical pro+ection from the domain of the physical to abstractdomains;

b. by pro+ecting from the basic le%el to super&ordinate and subordinatecategories.

8bstract conceptual structures are indirectly meaningful; they areunderstood because of their systematic relationship to directlymeaningful categories.

#he study of taxonomies and partonimies has already shown how basicle%el terms pro+ect super&ordinate and subordinate categories

Let us now turn to imahe schematic models and the role they play in

concept formation. #he central hypothesis is once more that certainconceptual cogniti%e models deri%e their fundamentalmeaningfulness directly from their ability to match up with pre&conceptual structure. In domain where there is clearly discerniblepre&conceptual structure to our experience, we import such structure%ia metaphor


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4*6*1 The Container /chema

-odily e+perience 8s


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#he container schema is inherently meaningful to people by %irtue of theirbodily experience. #he container schema has a meaningfulconfiguration from which the basic logic follows, gi%en certain %asiccogniti%e operations such as superimposition and focusing

a. 8 8 is a container with content R

R

b. 8 9 is a container schema with contents 8

9

c. R 1uperimposition of 8 and 9

8

9

d. 9 is a container schema with contents R

R 9


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?.B.7 The -artWhole schema

9odily experience e are whole beings with parts that we can manipulate. 5urentire li%es are spent with an awareness of both our wholeness and our

parts. e experience our bodies as wholes with parts. e become aware ofthe part&whole structure of the ob+ects.

/tructural elements a whole, parts and a configuration.

5asic logic If 8 is part of 9, the 9 is not a part of 8.(asymmetry)

8 is not a part of 8 (irreflexi%e)

If the parts exist in the gi%en configurations, then and only then does the wholeexist.

If the whole is located at a place P, then the parts too are located at P. #his is atypical, but not necessary property. #he parts are contiguous to one another.

/am)le meta)hors Hamilies and other social organizations are understood aswholes with parts. Hor example, marriage is understood as the creation of a

family whole, with the spouses opiii, Ai%orce is thus %iewed as splitting up, InIndia the caste society is %iewed as a body (the whole) with castes as parts,the highest caste (the priests) being the head and the lowest case being thefeet. #he caste system is understood as being structured metaphoricallyaccording to the configuration of the body ; hence the belief that themaintainance of the caste structure (the configuration) is necessary to thepreser%ation of society (the whole).


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?.B.> The link schema

5odily e)erience 5ur first lin" is the umbilical cord.#hroughout infancy and early childhood, we hold ontoour parents and other things either to secure our locationor theirs. #o secure the location of two things relati%e toone another, one uses such things as strings, ropes orother means of connection.

1tructural elements #wo entities, 8 and 9 and a Lin"connecting them.

5asic $ogic If 8 is lin"ed to 9, then 8 is constrained by, anddependent upon, 9.

/ymmetry7 If 8 is lin"ed to 9, then b is also lin"ed to 8

2eta)hors 5ne ma"es connections, brea"s social ties,brea"s promises, engagements, we sstay in touch,connected, etc.


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?.B.? The Source/Path/Goal /chema (cf. Hillmore/s $ase for$ase, theta theory), there is relation between mo%ementin space, transfer of possession, and change of state.

(>C) @e wal"ed to the Post 5ffice.

@e lost his heart to her.

#he pump"in turned into a coach.

5ther image schemas include an up&down schema, a front&bac" schema, a linear order schema, etc.

8t present the range of existing schemata and of their

properties is still being studied. Image scgemataspro%ide particularly important e%idence for the claim thatabstract reasoning is a matter of two things (a) reasonbased on bodily experience, and b) metaphoricalpro+ections from concrete to abstract domains.


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?.6 People possess a conceptualizing capacity.

#his can be noticed in the following

a) !i%en basic le%el concepts and image schemta concepts, people buildup complex cogniti%e models= structured clusters of concepts.

b) Image schemas plus metaphorical pro+ections pro%ide the structuresused in the more abstract conceptual models.

#he presentation of the container schema, of the part&whole schema, ofthe center&periphery schema has already shown the relationbetween conceptual structure and the pre&conceptual imageschema.

$ategories are understood as containers (class membership),

@ierarchical structure is based on the part&whole schema.4elations between concepts are lin"s/ etc.

5n this basis La"off (2GC) proposes a 1pacialization of Horm@ypothesis.


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!.6. Concepts and Categories

$oncepts are elements of cogniti%e models. #he internal structure of concepts is different.1ome differences relate to the part of speech feature ( such as the differencebetween 0s and :s). 9ut cocncepts are also different function of the type of frame

they presuppose. $onseuently, there se%eral types of conceptual structure

2) #here are concepts which are understood in terms of scenario (script). #he concept waiter is understood in terms of the restaurant scenario. #he term constable is understoodfunction of the role it plays in the scenario pro%ided by the police institution. #he termsecond baseman is characterized relati%e to a baseball game scenario.

7) #here are radial concepts, those which in%ol%e the superposition of se%eral models theconcept itself is felt as basic/ and simpler/ despite its richness. 4adial concepts ha%ea center&periphery structure. 3lements that fit the central description are what weha%e called the prototypes/.

Hor instance mother/ in%ol%es the superposition of four I$


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>) generator conce)ts& these are based on prototypicalsubgroup plus a rule which generates other conceptsfrom the basic ones

(>G) odd number 2, >, B, C, ,--..

e%en number 7, ?, 6, G,--..

?) classical categories bundle of features which are 01$for membership in the category bachelor, %ixen, occulist,circle, suare, etc.

B) metonymic categories these are the categories which areunderstood in terms of subset which representstereotypes (e.g. the stereotype of the housewife

mother), paragons, ideals, etc.6) gradiant categories categories that form implicational

hierarchies, such as grammatical suishes;

(4ecall that suishes running from the participle to %erbalnoun in the grammar of ing&complements in 3nglish ).


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?.C Prototypical effects of ICMs

!i%en the different possible categorial structures s"etched abo%e,prototypical effects may arise of number of ways

a) metonymic categories gi%en category 9, when 8 is either amember or a subcategory of 9. suppose that 8 metonymicallystands for 9, i.e. it is a social stereotype, typical %ase, best exampleof 9,

b) radial categories gi%en category 9 with a radial structure and 8 at itscenter, 8 is the best example of 9.

c) generator categories 1uppose 9 is a category generated by rulesfrom a subcategory member 8. #hen, 8 is the best example of 9.

d) classical categories consider a cogniti%e model containing a featurebundle that characterizes a classical category 9. If 8 has all theproperties in the feature bundle, it is a best example of 9.

8onclusion Prototypical effects accompany the formation of a large

number of concepts, though not all of them.


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?.G Characterization y schema and y prototype.

#he fact that a concept may simultaneously be analyzed with respct to se%eralI$ .H4DI#Ʊ may emerge as a sub&schema for #4332, while #4337 may

function as a prototype for a number of metaphorical extensionsgenealogical tree, phrase mar"er, branching structure, etc.'

8s the example suggests, characterization by prototype is de%elopmentally prior.#he existence of both prototype and schema explains the existence ofprototypical effects e%en for classical categories li"e odd number= e%ennumber; another form of multiple concept formation is the dichotomy fol"category= expert category ( 9ats are birds=mammals, etc.)

lexical semantics 6

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