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iii. Abatement of Nuisance

Estate of Gregoria Grancisco v CA

Facts: A quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by

Gregoria Francisco. It stands on a lot owned by the PPA and faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of

Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared for the exclusive use of port

facilities. The PPA issued to Tan Gin San, spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where thebuilding stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the

quonset for the storage of copra.

On May 1989, the Mayor notified Tan Gin San to remove or relocate its Quonset building citing Ordinance No.

147, noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal

squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Since the notifications remained unheeded,

the Mayor ordered the demolition on 24 May 1989.

Petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Basilan. The RTC

denied the writ and upheld the power of the Mayor to order the demolition without judicial authority

pursuant to Ordinance 147. On 6 September 1989, petitioner's quonset building was completely demolished.

In its place sprang shanties and nipa huts.

The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that the mayor was not vested with power to order summarily without

any judicial proceeding to demolish the Quonset building which was not a nuisance per se. However, upon

reconsideration, the CA reversed itself and ruled that the deficiency was remedied when petitioner filed a

petition for prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral argument.

Issue: WON the Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's

quonset building.

Held: No

Ratio: Ordinance No. 147, enacted on 27 December 1977, and relied upon by respondents, is entitled "An

Ordinance Establishing Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for the Municipality of Isabela." It is not disputed

that the quonset building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is located outside the zone forwarehouses. It is referred to in Ordinance as a non-conforming structure, which should be relocated. And in

the event that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished, Sec 16 of the Ordinance

provides: A certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses shall be applied for by the owner or

agent of the property involved within 12mo from the approval of this Ordinance, otherwise the non-

conforming use may be condemned or removed at the owner's expense. Even granting that petitioner failed

to apply for a Certificate of Non-conformance, the provision should not be interpreted as authorizing the

summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck

down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the CA.

Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the Zoning

Administrator . It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings

to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning

Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals.

That a summary remedy can not be resorted to is further evident from the penal provisions. Violation of a

municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the

contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial

proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances".

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances

without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate

safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. The


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storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be

injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it

may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary

abatement without judicial intervention. While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a

nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 (ee) ), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se

and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the PPA when

demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was

entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did

constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that the

public officials of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset

building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner

filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the CA,

the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial

order being a prejudicial issue

Technology Developers, Inc v CA

Facts: Petitioner received a letter from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full

cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter requestedPlant Manager Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the

following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural

Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.

At the requested conference, petitioner undertook to comply with respondent's request for the production of

the required documents. Petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution Permit," although

among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit

to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission and is now at

a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-

pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office

of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained. On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonablenotice upon petitioner, respondent ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of

petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against

private respondent. The judge found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction upon posting of a bond worth P50,000. During the MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented his

evidence prepared by Marivic Guina, Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, thefumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the

people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is

installed and operational." The lower court then set aside the order which granted a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction and dissolved the writ issued.

Issue: WON the writ of preliminary injunction should be grantedHeld: No

Ratio: The matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial

discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it

acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the

same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances

may warrant.


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The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by

petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a

pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is

addressed to the National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the

Environmental Management Bureau, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much

responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny theapplication for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are

taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the

operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose

offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so

that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the

following: (1) Building permit; (2) Mayor's permit; and (3) Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution permit.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta.

Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. The NBI finding that some of the

signatures in the 4-page petition were written by one person, appears to be true in some instances,

(particularly as among members of the same family), but on the whole the many signatures appear to bewritten by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received any

complaint on the matter must be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting

Mayor.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina

who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and

that no proper air pollution device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a

building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control

Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exertedany effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent

any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court and the

appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower court. Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner

focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant

with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential

imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the

pollution of the environment.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency was supposed

to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces,cities and towns, in the act, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and

economic development.

PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan

Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses

of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like.

To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927 further

defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities


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The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases

against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs of

preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fishpens and similar

structures in question. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CA dismissed

the LLDAs consolidated petitions. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies ofgovernment appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial

functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishingprivileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in

view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective local government units

concerned.

Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region -

should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for

fishery privileges is concerned?

Held: LLDA

Ratio: Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that

the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or

activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish

enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities theexclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery

privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone

of the municipal waters.

The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water

rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly

repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the

legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and

expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It isbasic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot

be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute,

provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,

provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general

law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict between a

general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more

clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the

absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not

favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,

amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.

Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are enviromental protection,

navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for theAuthority to proceed with its mission.

We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water

has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the 8 major river tributaries and

several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or watershed transcending the

boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to

be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable

development. This is an exhaustible natural resource-a very limited one-which requires judicious

management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance.


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Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the

protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the

inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act

4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern the

management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to

fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive

dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lakewater resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop

Laguna de Bay."

The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident

from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue

fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific

Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.

On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture

structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region

and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the

most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of

taxation. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power shouldprevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the

Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.

In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,

considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927,

series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, there

is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to

pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of

illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense,

however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted

before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained.

On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided

for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850,

as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery

privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise

such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

iv. Power of Eminent Domain

Section 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant

to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of

the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitutionand pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a

valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,

further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of

the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent

(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be

expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be

determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Moday et al v. Court of Appeals


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Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-

89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of

Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers

Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." The Resolution was approved by Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and

was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that"expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment

of the government center."

The municipality filed a petition for eminent domain against Percival Moday before the RTC. The municipality

then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land upon deposit with the municipal

treasurer of the required amount. The RTC granted the motion. It ruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's

failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under

Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not

one of the acts enumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA held that the public purpose for

the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusandel Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.

Meanwhile, the Municipality had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay

Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal

Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA and a

declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void.

Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was

disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Held: Yes

Ratio: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is afundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the

nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by

the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other

public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking

must be for public use and there must be just compensation.

The Municipality's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided

for BP 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. What

petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Resolution

No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, Section 153 of B.P.

Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole

ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.

Velazco v. Blas: The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,

ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred

upon the council or president making the same." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A

strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance,

or order. The provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically

upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by

law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or

president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan


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was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan

clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to

promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that

Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the

condemnation of petitioners' property.

As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Moday incurred the ire of then MayorBustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim

that then incumbent Mayor Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if

there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they

allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by

a sketch plan.

The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made

and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the

adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking,

has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.

Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

Prov. Of Camarines Sur v. Court of AppealsFacts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988,

authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol

site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing

project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province through Governor

Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their

property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province to take

possession of the property upon the deposit of P5,714.00. The trial court issued a writ of possession. The San

Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both

motions were denied.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of

1988 be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the orderdated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province to take possession of

the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to

admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the

trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

The Province claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and

7 of Local Government Code and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. The Solicitor General stated

that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code, there was no need for the approval by the Office of the

President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the

Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the

Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing

project.

The CA set aside the order of the court and ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings

until the province shall have submitted the requisite approval of the DAR.

Issue: WON the expropriation was proper

Ratio: The CA did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints.

However, when the CA ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province shall have obtained the

authority of the DAR to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to


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non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose

or public use.

Public Purpose. Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public

purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that

the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.)

before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept,"public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare

and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The

establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of

the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community

invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the

livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the

public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, "Housing is a basic human

need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,

safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."

Eminent Domain vs CARL. It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the

power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the CARL, particularly Section 65, whichrequires the approval of the DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-

agricultural land. The CA, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of

Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the CARK and must first secure the approval

of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, while the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this

petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a

balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to

overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 sq m formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable

reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to

distribute lands under the land reform program.

The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing thefact that LGUs exercise such power only by delegation. It is true that local government units have no inherent

power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true

that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain

restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited

authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power

must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the

approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural

use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by

local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that

the CA could cite to justify the intervention of the DAR in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the CARL.The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under

the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A,

Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the DAR to determine the suitability of a parcel of

agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those

rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove

conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to

the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.


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Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or

constricted by implication. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the LGUs can no longer

expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without

first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the DAR, because all of these projects would

naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the DAR to scrutinize whether the

expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the

property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The

courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no

real or substantial relation to the public use.

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace

the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto. The Republic of the Philippines,

as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by

provisions of law couched in general term.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax

declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the PresidentialDecrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property

either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower. As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, the

rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow

private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their

property.

Barangay San Roque vs. Heirs of Pastor

Facts: Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the

respondents. In an Order, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned

that "[e) minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of

just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of

such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for

eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not withthis Court."

On appeal, the RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real

property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be

filed before the MTC or the RTC. The RTC concluded that the action should have been filed before the MTC

since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law. Respondents contend

that the Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or possession of real property. Thus, they argue

that the case should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of

RA 7691. This law provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions that

involve title to or possession of real property, the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty thousand

pesos or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs.

Issue: WON an expropriation suit is one incapable of pecuniary estimation and is therefore within the

jurisdiction of the RTC

Held: Yes

Ratio: "A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one

the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first

ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of


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money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal

courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic

issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely

incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his

part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to

foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may

not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale ofthe rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into

other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which

were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted

allocating jurisdiction.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals

with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. In

National Power Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two phases:

"The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of

eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with

an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to

take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon thepayment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order ofdismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves

nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one,

for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the

exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just

compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not morethan three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and

findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and

leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. "

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government orany of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the

courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the

observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise ofeminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound

to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.

Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within

the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case was

decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that

courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation isnot capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to

change these jurisprudential precedents.

We are not persuaded by respondents argument that the present action involves the title to or possession ofa parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in remedial

law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or

possession of a parcel of land.


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Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His

discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-

bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the

1997 Rules.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property

under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents title to or possession ofthe same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claimthat it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control

individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand.

Mun. of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp

Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque

filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the

complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing

homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan

Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property

with private respondent, which the latter did not accept.

The RTC authorized petition to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk ofcourt of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.

Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it

was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of

action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's motion, its Answer was

treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Issue: WON the resolution is different from the ordinance

Held: Yes

Ratio: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating

an expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms

"ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the localgovernment unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise

of the power of eminent domain." Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the

IRR of the Local Government Code, which provides: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public

use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the

Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings."

The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which

may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore

exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the

latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this

case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the

parameters for its exercise. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise

the power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the

LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private

property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor

and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and

other pertinent laws.


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4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,

but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a

resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be

authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. CA to show that a resolution may suffice

to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because theapplicable law at that time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a

mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160 explicitly required an

ordinance for this purpose.

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous.

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a

declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a

general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted

differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise

by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have

simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a cleardivergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the

local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from

the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied

according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation

would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the instant case, there is no reason

to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right

of the people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language - from "resolution" under the BP

337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 - demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by

individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right

to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes,

appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not beenlarged by doubtful interpretation."

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to

authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the

law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear

letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its

implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the

implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent

domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.

Issue: WON the complaint states a cause of action

Held: No

Ratio: In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present

any certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. In

fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. In any event, this allegation does not cure

the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23, 1993.

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was

based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of

action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's

Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.


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Issue: WON the action is bared by res juridicata

Held: No

Ratio: All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final

judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of

action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.

Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all

cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very

nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be

absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary

and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." "All

separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied

reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of

property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and

they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." Thus,

the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of

previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it

does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an

expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue;

it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed

by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the same token,

our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution

will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all

others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the

principle of "law of the case."

In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain

is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has

become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exerciseits right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise

will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

City of Cebu vs. CA

Facts: Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land in Sitio Sto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling. The City of Cebu,

filed a complaint for eminent domain against Cardeno with the RTC seeking to expropriate the said parcel of

land. The complaint was initiated pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418, dated February

17, 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate the said

parcel of land for the purpose of providing a socialized housing project for the landless and low-income city

residents. Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as there has been

negotiations for the purchase of the property without resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations failed.

Also, there was no compliance with the conditions to the exercise of the power of eminent domain (valid and

definite offer made to the owner and non acceptance).

The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the of the RTC. According to the CA, an allegation of

repeated negotiations made with the private respondent for the purchase of her property by the petitioner,

"cannot by any stretch of imagination, be equated or likened to the clear and specific requirement that the

petitioner should have previously made a valid and definite offer to purchase." It further added that the term

"negotiation" which necessarily implies uncertainty, it consisting of acts the purpose of which is to arrive at a

conclusion, may not be perceived to mean the valid and definite offer contemplated by law.

Issue: WON expropriation may be granted


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Ratio: An offshoot of the foregoing is the instant petition for review on certiorari which has essentially

become a battle of semantics being waged before this Court. While petitioner reiterates that paragraph VII of

the complaint sufficiently states compliance with the requirement of "a valid and definite offer", private

respondent insists that the term "negotiations" is too broad to be equated with the said requirement.

Elaborating, private respondent posited that by definition, "negotiations run the whole range of acts

preparatory to concluding an agreement, from the preliminary correspondence; the fixing of the terms of theagreement; the price; the mode of payment; obligations of (sic) the parties may conceive as necessary to their

agreement." Thus, "negotiations" by itself may pertain to any of the foregoing and does not automatically

mean the making of "a valid and definite offer."

At the outset, it must be said that without necessarily delving into the parties' semantical arguments, this

Court finds that the complaint does in fact state a cause of action. What may perhaps be conceded is only the

relative ambiguity of the allegations in paragraph VII of the complaint. However, as We have previously held,

a complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of

action stated thereinfor these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but rather for a bill of particulars. In

other words, a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the face of

the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved

within the facts alleged therein.

The error of both the RTC and respondent Court of Appeals in holding that the complaint failed to state a

cause of action stems from their inflexible application of the rule that: when the motion to dismiss is based on

the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the issue should only

be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint. However, this rule is not without exceptions. In

the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry, this Court departed from the aforementioned rule and held that, ". . .

although the evidence of the parties were on the question of granting or denying the petitioner-appellant's

application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the

resolution of the motion to dismiss."

Likewise, in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia, we sanctioned the act of the trial court in considering,

in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the

complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. This Court deemed such course of action but logical

where the trial court had the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer withcounterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission. The

same liberality should be applied in the instant case.

Furthermore, even on the face of the complaint alone, there is extant a cause of action. All documents

attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not detained under oath by the

defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.

Additionally, the general rule is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in

the complaint. Thus, Ordinance No. 1418 is not only incorporated into the complaint for eminent domain filed

by petitioner, but is also deemed admitted by private respondent. A perusal of the copy of said ordinance

which has been annexed to the complaint shows that the fact of petitioner's having made a previous valid and

definite offer to private respondent is categorically stated therein. Thus, the second whereas clause of the said

ordinance provides as follows: WHEREAS, the city government has made a valid and definite offer to

purchase subject lot(s) for the public use aforementioned but the registered owner Mrs. Merlita Cardeno hasrejected such offer.

The foregoing should now put to rest the long drawn argument over the alleged failure of the complaint to

state a cause of action. There is no longer any room for doubt that as alleged in the complaint, and as admitted

by private respondent, the petitioner had in fact complied with the condition precedent of "a valid and

definite offer" set forth in Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,

technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid

enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in


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importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice

of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced.

The doctrine finds compelling application in the case at bench. For as correctly averred by petitioner, nothing

else was accomplished by the dismissal of the complaint for eminent domain but a considerable delay in the

proceedings. The dismissal of the complaint did not bar petitioner from filing another eminent domain case

and from correcting its alleged error by the mere expedient of changing paragraph VII thereof. Indeed,precious time has been wasted while the salutary objectives of Ordinance No. 1418 of the City of Cebu have

been put on hold by a quarrel over technical matters.

Francia vs. Mun. of Meycauyan

Facts: On February 6, 2003, the respondent filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners.

Respondent needed petitioners' 16,256 sq. m. idle property at the junction of the North Expressway,

Malhacan-Iba-Camalig main road artery and the MacArthur Highway. It planned to use it to establish a

common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks.

In their answer, petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It was in fact

developed and there were plans for further development. For this reason, respondent's offer price of

P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square meter) was too low. After trial, the RTC ruled that the expropriation was

for a public purpose as the terminal would improve the flow of traffic during rush hours. Moreover, theproperty as the best site for the proposed terminal because of its accessibility.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. They claimed that the trial court issued the

orders without conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. The partially granted the

petition. Finding that petitioners were deprived of an opportunity to controvert respondent's allegations, the

appellate court nullified the order of expropriation except with regard to the writ of possession. According to

the CA, a hearing was not necessary because once the expropriator deposited the required amount (with the

Court), the issuance of a writ of possession became ministerial.

Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC's orders that, in expropriation cases, prior determination of

the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession.

Held: No

Ratio: Section 19 of Republic Act 7160[9] provides:

Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an

ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor

and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and

pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and

definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted; Provided, further,

That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the

expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of

the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated;

Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper

court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, itmust (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2)

deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax

declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the

issuance of a writ of possession.

Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation

of 282 ha of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City for the development into

integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The


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PTA will construct a sports complex, club house, golf course, playground and picnic area on said land. An

electric power grid will also be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary

support facilities (malls, coffee shops, etc) will also be created.

The defendants alleged that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution. Also,

assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as

a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant;and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the

Court of First Instance, that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority

having deposited with the PNB, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to

PD1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the

premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.

Issue: WON the public use requirement has been complied with

Held: Yes

Ratio: There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of

eminent domain. Sec 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon

payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to beoperated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon

payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and

conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation,

the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with

the power of eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far reaching

insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. We cite all the above provisions on the power to

expropriate because of the petitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision. The

thrust of all constitutional provisions on expropriation is in the opposite direction.

As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Samus categorized the restrictive view as wholly

erroneous and based on a misconception of fundamentals. The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in theConstitution. Understandably the search would be in vain. To freeze specific programs like tourism into

express constitutional provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of

the framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. In said case, this Court emphasized that the power of

eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in

government even in its most primitive forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to

provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. It is not a grant of authority .

The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public use" means literally use by the

public and that "public use" is not synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and

much less "public convenience." The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention which is

rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and

outmoded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that the power of eminent

domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism.

The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of

government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that

obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the

Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of

sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads, bridges,

ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets


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previously established, the issuance of the orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the

premises, as well as the corresponding writs of possession was premature.

Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or

instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take immediate possession,

control and disposition of the property and the improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding

the pendency of the issues before the court, upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amountequivalent to 10% of the value of the property expropriated. The issue of immediate possession has been

settled in Arce v. Genato. In answer to the issue: ". . . condemnation or expropriation proceedings is in the

nature of one that is quasi-in-rem, wherein the fact that the owner of the property is made a party is not

essentially indispensable insofar at least as it concerns the immediate taking of possession of the property

and the preliminary determination of its value, including the amount to be deposited."

Makasiar: It appearing that the petitioners are not tenants of the parcels of land in question and therefore do

not fall within the purview of the Land Reform Code, the petition should be dismissed on that score alone.

There is no need to decide whether the power of the PTA to expropriate the land in question predicated on

the police power of the State shall take precedence over the social justice guarantee in favor of tenants and

the landless. The welfare of the landless and small land owners should prevail over the right of the PTA to

expropriate the lands just to develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy only. Such a position would

increase the disenchanted citizens and drive them to dissidence. The government is instituted primarily forthe welfare of the governed and there are more poor people in this country than the rich. The tourism

industry is not essential to the existence of the government, but the citizens are, and their right to live in

dignity should take precedence over the development of the tourism industry.

Filstream International Inc. vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of the properties subject of this dispute consisting of adjacent

parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. Petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the

MTC against the occupants of the parcels of land (private respondents) on the grounds of termination of the

lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering private respondents

to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed.

However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents, a

complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner which was filed before the RTC. The City ofManila then approved Ordinance No. 7813, authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation,

expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of

petitioner then occupied by private respondents. The City approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the

expropriation of certain parcels of land situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerero streets in

Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierez, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. Thesaid properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use

Development Program of the City of Manila.

The City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of

the city which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. Petitioner

filed a motion to dismiss but the court denied th emotion.

Concerning the first case, the trial court issued an order commanding the demolition of the structure erectedon the disputed premises. To avert the demolition, private respondents filed before the RTC of Manila,

Branch 14, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction. The TRO was granted which was later lifted. The court the dismissed the

case on the ground of forum shopping. On appeal, the CA found merit in private respondents allegations insupport of their application of the issuance of the writ and granted the same.

The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely procedural and technical matter. Petitioner takes exception to

the resolutions of the CA which ordered the dismissal of its Petition for Certiorari for non-compliance with

Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals by failing to attach to its petition other


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pertinent documents and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred and unreadable.

Petitioner argues that respondent appellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to form rather than

the substance.

We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would

defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of

petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights overthe disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of

the City of Manila.

In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds

is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the

expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property

without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings which the

petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized that where substantial rights are affected, as in this case,

the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.

With regard to the other petition, G.R. No. 128077, petitioner Filstream objects to the issuance by respondent

CA of the restraining order and the preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the writ of demolition

issued in the ejectment suit as an incident to private respondents pending petition assailing the dismissal bythe RTC of Manila, Branch 33, of the consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by private respondents and theCity of Manila on the ground of forum shopping.

The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction is but a mere

incient to the actual controversy which is rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rights of the parties in this

case over the disputed premises. In order to determine whether private respondents are entitled to the

injunctive reliefs granted by respondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the source of discord.

Petitioner anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the properties and the existence of a final and

executory judgment against private respondents ordering the latters ejectment from the premises. Privaterespondents claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event which has rendered the

enforcement of petitioners rights moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the City of

Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit of herein private respondents. For its part, the City ismerely exercising its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioners properties

for public use.

There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner ordering the

ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this dispute. The judgment in the ejectment

suit became final after private respondents failed to interpose any appeal from the adverse decision of CA.

Petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already became final and executory.

However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of

eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for public use is expressly

granted to it under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code. More specifically, the City of Manila has

the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program as

explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409).

In fact, the City of Manilas right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final andexecutory judgment over the property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Court in the case of

Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis.

Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land

and landed estate. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less

than the half a hectare only.


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Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept,

influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or

advantage, including a particular, urban land reform and housing.

We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of the acute

shortage of decent housing in urban areas. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local

government units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain inpursuit of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: noperson shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be

denied the equal protection of the laws; private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation. Thus the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not withoutlimitations.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities

mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site

development of government lands.

Very clear from the provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private

lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in

the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to beresorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these

conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners

of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.

Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the above disquisitions, we now pose the crucial question: Did

the city of Manila comply with the abovementioned conditions when it expropriated petitioners properties?We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that would indicate the respondent

City of Manila complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioners properties were expropriated andordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other

lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner

Filstreams right to due process which must accordingly be rectified.

Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminentdomain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as

it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must

not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to

protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this su

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