measuring variability in color semantics

8/9/2019 Measuring Variability in Color Semantics

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MEASURING VARIATION

IN COLOR SEMANTICS

The main

topic yields

four

spin-offs.

First,

methods

are

presented

here

in

detail

(?3),

and there

is

a

review of

questions regarding reliability

in the

Ap-

pendix.

Second,

intercommunity

variation and

category change

are

addressed

with a

dynamic cognitive

model, which,

in

turn,

is based

on

a

distinction

be-

tween

cognition

and

perception

(?4).

The difference is

readily

definable

in

the

color

domain,

because its

neurological

bases are

known. Without this

distinc-

tion,

an

explanation

of

change

within universal constraints

would

be

impossible.

The model attributes both the structure and the

process

of

categorization

to

a

selective

emphasis

on different

perceptions;

but a further

construct of

social

variables

completes

the

account

of

intercommunity

differences

(?5.4). Third,

the data substantiate in detail the incremental nature

of

category change

and

variation

(?5).

And

fourth,

the

explanation

of

individually

compelled change

unites Berlin & Kay's BASICCOLORTERMwith Rosch's BASICLEVEL,which has

been

a

long-standing

desideratum

in

the

theory

of

categorization.

Its

resolution

deflates the

mounting

pressure

to redefine 'basic color

terms',

and it

recognizes

that the basic level of

categorization

is mutable

(?6).

THEORY

2.1. The data

from

Tenejapa

Tzeltal and

Navenchauc Tzotzil

offer an

op-

portunity

to

assess

the

explanatory capacities

of two

theories that model the

relation between

linguistic

variation and

change. One theory, articulated in

Weinreich et al. 1968, holds that change is socially motivated: any language

harbors a

range

of

variation,

and

change progresses when particular variants

are

assigned prestige

and

favored as markers

of

social

identity. The other theory

was

developed

in

MacLaury

1986

to

account for variation among basic color

categories:

each

individual

adopts

a

private strategy

for

coping with the novelty

that

impinges upon

him

or her

throughout daily life;

the

strategy always involves

attendance

both

to the

similarity

and

to the

distinctiveness of the entities that

he

or she

categorizes

and

names;

some

individuals attend more strongly to

similarity

and

others

attend

more

strongly

to

distinctiveness. The latter group

of

individuals will

name more

color

categories during standardized experi-

ments, such as the one that is used to determine how a subject categorizes and

names the

330-chip

Munsell color

array.

The

INDIVIDUALIST HEORY

was

devised

to

address

situations encountered

widely

and

repeatedly by

the

Mesoamerican

Color Survey (MCS).2 The survey

found that

as

a

rule

people

who

interact

daily

differ

in

the ways that they

categorize color,

even

though

shared

color

categories would facilitate the ex-

and

The

American

Heritage Dictionary (p. 263) explains

it

briefly.

See

MacLaury (1987a,

n.

2)

for

technical

specification

of stimulus

materials

used

in this

study.

2

The MCS was conducted during 1978-81 in Mexico and Guatemala in collaboration with eighty

teams of

language specialists

who interviewed

900

speakers

of

116

languages.

Some data were

pooled

with

the

World

Color

Survey (WCS)

of

1976-78,

in

which 25

speakers

in each

of 100

American, African, Austronesian,

and Asian

languages

were interviewed

by

members of the Sum-

mer

Institute

of

Linguistics

under an NSF

grant

to

Berlin, Kay,

and Merrifield

(see

Berlin

et al.

1985).

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LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER

1

(1991)

change

of

information.

To

illustrate with a

typical

case,

speakers

A

and

B

are

adults

in

middle

age

who have conversed

throughout

their

lives;

speaker

A

has

three basic color terms and

speaker

B

has

ten,

neither

seems

to

be

aware of

the

difference,

and

they

appear

to talk

past

each

other when

casually handling

the

Munsell color

chips. Rampant intracommunity

variation

was

described

pre-

cisely by

the

Munsell metric when it was

systematically applied

over a

wide

region by

putting

hundreds of

subjects,

one at a

time,

through

a

formal two-

hour

interview.

It is

essential to draw

upon

both

theories to

explain

variation

and

change

in

Tzeltal

and Tzotzil color

categorization.

The social

theory explains

the dra-

matic

difference between the

ways

that

color is

categorized

in

Tenejapa

Tzeltal

and

Navenchauc

Tzotzil,

but the

individual

theory

addresses the

astounding

range of nonagreement in each community.

2.2.

PRIOR

WORK. The

body

of

theory

has roots in two

traditions.

Weinreich,

Labov,

and

Herzog

(1968)

are

among

the

most recent

scholars who

demonstrate

that

linguistic change depends

on

variation.

Labov,

in

his classic

study

of

vowel

raising

on

Martha's

Vineyard

(1963),

shows

that

change

focuses on a

prestigious

variant

that native

Vineyarders

adopted

as

a

symbol

of social

membership.

In

an

independent tradition,

Berlin &

Kay (1969)

define

the

concept

of

BASIC

COLOR

ERMS

nd

show that their focal

referents

and

order

of evolution

are

universal; any language

increases

its stock of

basic

color terms in

response to

societal

complexity

or culture

contact

(cf.

Berlin & Berlin

1975, Dougherty

1975). Kay (1975) and Dougherty (1977) further note the relation of variation

to

basic

color-term

evolution:

different

speakers

of one

language can manifest

distinct

stages

of that

process,

with

younger speakers usually showing later

stages; yet

each

individual

system represents

some

stage

of the

predictable

sequence.

But

Kay

and

Dougherty

further

imply

that

each

individual passes

through

the

sequence

at a

different

pace,

sharing cognition only partially with

other

speakers

of the

language.

That

is,

either

color-term evolution

is privately

motivated or

the

shared

social

motive,

whatever

it

might

be, does not

foster

uniform

cognition.

DESCRIPTION

ND

DISPLAY

OF DATA

3. Before I

discuss

data,

it is

essential

to outline how

they

were

collected,

how

they

are

displayed

in

a

black-and-white

medium,

and

why they

constitute

an

advance over

prior

collections.

Earlier

fieldworkers

placed

acetate over

the Munsell

spectrum

and

asked an

interviewee

to circle with a

grease pencil

the

range

of each

native

color term

from

a

previously

elicited

list; further,

the interviewee

marked

the

focus

of

each term

(Lenneberg

&

Roberts

1956,

Berlin

&

Kay 1969, Dougherty 1975,

Berlin & Berlin 1975). Other researchers upgraded the method or experimented

with

options (Collier

et al.

1976, Hage

&

Hawkes 1975,

Berlin et al.

1985).

During

the

Mesoamerican

survey,

a

final

procedure

was added

and

refined

(Burgess

et al.

1983,

Greenfeld

1986, MacLaury

1986,

1987a-b).

36


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MEASURING

VARIATION

IN

COLOR

SEMANTICS

The

combinedefforts

have resulted

n a

particularpackage

of

equipment

and

procedures

for its use. Stimulus materials consist

of 330

Munsell

colors

or

'chips'.

Oneset

comprises

oose

chips

thatare

separately

numberedand

aligned

in random order. Two additionalsets are glued to a neutralmatte in spectral

order of lettered rows from

light

to

dark, B-I,

and numbered olumns

through

the

hues,

1-40;

each is called an

'array'.

One

arrayplaces green-blue

at

center;

the

other centers

red-yellow.

Both include achromatic

white-grey-black

n

an

unnumbered

eft

column, A-J,

in which

row

A is

pure

white,

row J is

pure

black,

and

rows B-I match the

eightbrightness

evels of the hue

columns

(see

n.

1).

Data are

elicited from an individual

speaker by

three

independent

proce-

dures.

First,

an

interviewee names the 330 loose

chips

one

by

one

in

their

random order. The investigatorrecordson a numberedsheet each nameas a

head lexeme with

any qualifiers

that

might accompany

it.

Second,

the inter-

viewee selects from one

of the

arrays

he best

example

or 'focus' of

each head

lexeme.

Third,

the interviewee

maps

the

range

of each head lexeme

by

placing

a

grain

of rice on each

color of

the

array

that the lexeme can name.

When the

interviewee

stops

mapping

he

range

of a

term,

the

investigator

requests

that

he

or she

place grains

on more of

the

colors that

the

term

can

name. The

request

is

repeated

for one

term until

the

interviewee insists that it can name

no color

chips

that

have not

already

been

covered with

rice.

Thus,

a

mapping

can

progressthrough

one or more

'steps',

which the

investigator

ecords

separately

in reference to the row letters and columnnumbers hat borderthe array.

Ultimately,

the

three

types

of

independently

elicited

data are

derandomized

and

organized

on

graphs

that

represent

the

Munsell

array.

In

their

organized

form, they

are

called, respectively, (1)

NAMING

RANGES

and

QUALIFIER

DISTRIBUTIONS, (2)

FOCI,

and

(3)

MAPPINGS

nd

MAPPING

STEPS.

A

mappingcan

consist

of

only

one

step

or of several. It

shows the full

extent of a

color category;

and,

if it

consists of

more than one

step,

the

order in which

the

steps were

executed

suggests

how the

category

s

internallyorganizedby

the

interviewee.

Correspondence

between

independently

elicited orders of

data

verifies the

accuracyof each in any set froman individual.Matchescan occur between a

naming range

and

its

mapping,

a focus and

a

first

mappingstep, a particular

mappingstep

and

the

distributionof a

qualifier,

and

many

other

possible pairs.

Analyses

of

individual

cognition

are

always

based

on such correspondences,

never

on

naming ranges alone,

foci

alone,

or

mappings alone. The various

responses

to

the

330 stimuli

produceamplequantificationor statisticalanalysis

of

patterns

shared

between

individuals.

(See

the

Appendix.).

Figure

1

provides

the

English-speaking

eader

with a reference by which to

gauge

the

Munsell

system

and

to

assess

how

speakers

of

Tzeltal and Tzotzil

have

named it.

The

figure

shows

derandomized

namingranges and the foci of

one English speakerwho used eleven termsto namethe 330 chips one by one.

Figures

2

and

3

show that two

Tzeltal

speakerseach used five terms to name

the

same

chips during

he

same

procedure.

Their

data can be directlycompared

with that

of

Fig.

1.

37


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LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER 1

(1991)

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ocus

FIGURES -3.

(1)

American

English

color

categories: naming ranges

and

foci; male,

age

35,

1980.

(2)

Tzeltal color

categories,

San Ildefonso

Tenejapa, Chiapas,

Mexico;

naming ranges

and

foci;

female, age

60,

1980.

(3) Tzeltal,

Tenejapa; male,

age

65,

1980.

Figures 4a-d show all naming ranges, foci and mappings from one

Tzeltal

speaker.

The

figures fully

exemplify techniques of elicitation and

display, and

they

reveal

characteristics of

early-stage color categorization that turned up

time

and again during the Mesoamerican survey. Figs. 4b-d represent

mappings

with lines, which allows the

display of two mappings in one diagram

so as to

show their

relationship and overlap. Mapping steps are bracketed by

numbers

embedded in

each line.

Mappings can also be depicted by shaded quadrates,

as in

Figs. 8b-c below.

Usually the mapping of a category covers more colors than its naming range

does;

a

category has greater

breadth than the normal use of its name

would

suggest,

and

the

mapping brings out this fact. Often a few uses of a

name fall

outside

of

the normal range,

where they correspond to the peripheral steps of

the

broad mapping. For

example, in Fig. 4a sak names bright red

(Gl); k'an

38


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LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER 1

(1991)

trials

during

the interview.

This

semantic relation is discussed in another

study,

where

it

is called

COEXTENSIVITY.3

ost

Tzeltal and Tzotzil consultants

mapped

both red-focused

?ah

or

?oh

and

yellow-focused

k'an or k'on

throughout

one

warm category, although some did not commingle the terms throughout red

and

yellow

colors

during

the

naming

procedure.

Coextensivity

occurs in

many

languages

of the Mesoamerican

sample;

it

is

reported

in color

naming by

other

investigators

both in Mesoamerica

and elsewhere

(Merrifield

1971:264;

Hage

&

Hawkes

1975:297),

and it is not confined

to the warm

category.

(See

Figs.

8b-c below for coextensive

mappings

of the cool

category.)

For reasons

that

are

explained

in

the work on

coextensive

ranges

(cited

in n.

3),

one

range

is

always

slightly

smaller

and more skewed than the

other;

the smaller

range

has

a less central focus or even a

polarized

focus,

which occurs

on the

periphery

of the category-as in Figs. 4a-b at 140-or even outside of the category

margin,

as in

Figs.

8a-b at H38.

Fig.

4c shows the

mappings

of sak and

2ihk',

'light-warm'

versus

'dark-cool',

which

together

cover all but ten colors of the Munsell

array

in a

relation

of

complementation;

neither

range

covers

the

opposite

focus,

unlike the

mappings

of k'an

and

?ah.

The

light-warm mapping

of

sak

is

unique

to Tzeltal

speaker

#4

in this

sample

from

Tenejapa.

Yet

speakers #2, #3,

#4,

and #5 all rendered

the

dark-cool

mapping

of

2ihk',

two of

the three

Tzeltals who were interviewed

in

Amatenango mapped

2ihk'

in

the same

way,

and

five of the

six Navenchauc

Tzotzil

speakers

rendered

a

dark-cool

mapping

of

2ik'.

Fig. 4d shows that the mapping of 2ihk' encompasses the mapping of yas,

revealing

a relation

of inclusion between the black-focused

dark-cool

category

and the

green-focused

cool

category. Yet,

in

Fig. 4a,

the

naming range

of

yas

is

highly salient;

the

green

and blue

portion

of the

mapping

of

pihk'

is not

corroborated

by marginal

uses of

that

name.

However, Figs. 2, 3,

and 5a

pro-

vide

better evidence

in

naming

data of the Tzeltal

dark-cool

category. For

example, speaker

#5

(Fig. 5a) applies

2ihk' to

J0, F17,

and

F29,

the colors on

which the

English speaker (Fig. 1)

focuses

black, green,

and

blue.

The

Tzeltal

dark-cool

category

is

more salient

in

dark than in

cool colors.

In

sum, Figs. 4a-d demonstrate three types of semantic relation: (1) coex-

tensivity (Fig. 4b), (2)

inclusion

(Fig. 4d),

and

(3) complementation (Fig. 4c).4

Identification

of Tzeltal basic color

categories

is far

from straightforward,

3

During

the

Mesoamerican Color

Survey,

the

coextensive relation between color terms first

emerged

in

Uspantec

data

(MacLaury

et

al. 1979), and it seemed very odd at the time. It took

three

years

thereafter to

develop the hypothesis that coextensive terms each name the same cat-

egory,

but

from

different mental

vantages.

It

took even longer to devise a numerical test (MacLaury

1987b).

The

results

eventually

led to

a

theory regarding the role of spatial analogy and viewpoint

in

categorization

and

cognitive change (MacLaury 1992).

4

MacLaury

1987b

relates these

semantic types to a continuum of change in the order stated

here-(l), (2), and (3)-and adds a fourth type, 'near synonymy', to the earliest end of the con-

tinuum. All

four

types

are most

exhaustively demonstrated in the warm category as it evolves

internally

toward a

complete

division

into basic red and yellow categories, although the types

pertain

to

categories

of

other

colors as

well. For the immediate purpose of comprehending the

Tzeltal

data,

it

is

sufficient to

note

that

each type of semantic relation differs from the others and

that

one of

them, coextensivity, has not been recognized as a distinctive type in prior literature.

40


9/30

MEASURING VARIATION

IN

COLOR

SEMANTICS

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FIGURES 5a-b.

Tzeltal,

Tenejapa,

(a)

naming ranges

and

foci,

(b)

mappings;

male,

age

90,

1980.

using

Berlin&

Kay's

criteriaof

(a)

salience

and

(b)

not

being

encompassed

by

another

category

(superordination, nclusion,

nonhyponymy).

Tzeltal

speaker

#4

(Fig.

4)

probably

has three

basic

color

categories

of

white,

dark-cool,

and

warm,

although

she names

color with

five

salient

terms.

Two

terms coexten-

sively

name

one

warm

category,

k'an

and

?ah. The cool

category

yas

is not

basic,

because the

basic

dark-cool

category

pihk'

ncompasses

all

of

yas;

how-

ever,

the

interpretation

s

complicated

by

the

low

salience of

2ihk'

amonggreen

and blue.

The

white-focused

light-warm

category

might

be

vestigial;

at

least,

unlike

dark-cool

2ihk',

the

light-warm

range

is not

shared

with

other

Tzeltal

interviewees.It

is

interpreted

as

a basic

white

category

n

spite

of its

nonsalient

range

throughout

yellow

and red.

The

interpretation

f

three

basic

categories

classifies Tzeltal speaker#4 at Berlin& Kay's StageII, andspeakers#2, #3,

and

#5 are also

at

Stage

II.

(See

n.

14

below

for a

description

of the

stages.)

But

this

classification s not

clear-cut,

becauseall

the

individuals

are

advancing

to the

next

stage,

IIIa,

and

each shows

a

different

degree

of

progress.Likewise,

Tzeltal

speakers

#6,

#7,

and

#8

represent

distinct

phases

of

Stage

IIIa.

Before

further

analysis

of the

Tzeltal

data

(in

?5.3),

there

should

be some

attempt

to

account

for these

dynamics.

COGNITIVE

DYNAMICS

4.

Why

do

languages

differ n

number

of

basic

color

categories?

For

example,

why does English have eleven basic color categories while Tzeltal only has

about

three?

Although

'societal

complexity' might

have

much to

do

with

it,

that

notion in

itself

does

not

provide

a

cognitive

explanation

of the

differences.

Why

do the

Tenejapa

Tzeltal

speakers

differ

from

each

other,

even

when all

reside in

the

same

small

hamlet?

m

41


10/30

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER 1

(1991)

During analysis

of results

from

the Mesoamerican Color

Survey,

a

dynamic

model

of color

cognition

was

developed

to address the

question

of

category

change

and a host of

related observations

(MacLaury

1986)-including

differ-

ences

among

individuals

in

single

communities

as well as more dramatic

dif-

ferences

between related

languages,

such as Tzeltal and

Tzotzil,

and also

including

maximal

differences,

such

as those between

Tzeltal and

English.

The model rests on four axioms:

(1)

people perceive

six

purest-possible

colors,

fifteen

potential pairs;

(2)

the members of each

pair

are to

an

extent

similar and

to

an extent

distinct;

(3)

each

pair

differs

in these

extents;

and

(4)

an individual attends

simultaneously

to

similarity

and to

distinctiveness,

and

can

reciprocally

shift the

strength

of

the

attendances.

For the

purposes

of this

model,

PERCEPTIONs the automatic

registration

by

the visual cortex

of

pre-

cortical neural response to wavelength, including the similarities and differ-

ences that inhere

among

those

signals.

COGNITIONs

the

active

devotion of

attention

both

to

similarity

and to

distinctiveness,

and

it

is

the

selective em-

phasis

that

a

person places

on the two attendances.5 The

cognition

is

ceaselessly

asserted and unconscious.

Axioms 1-3

pertain

to

perception.

They

are

actually supported independently

by research

in

visual physiology.

Evidence

in

their

support

and their

effect

on

human color categorization are detailed

in De

Valois

& De Valois

1975, Kay

&

McDaniel

1978,

and

MacLaury

1987a.

In

short,

the

purest imaginable

ex-

amples of red, yellow, green, blue, white,

and black are the

only unique

color

percepts; others, such as brown, purple, orange, pink, and grey, are perceptual

blends

of unique hues.6 Colors

of some

pairs, e.g. red/green

and

yellow/blue,

cannot

be

seen

in the same

place

at

once

and, thus, they

contrast more

than

other colors. Among the

hues

of lesser contrast, yellow/red differ more

than

green/blue; green

and blue are the most similar of

all

unique pairs.

Since human

visual physiology is invariant throughout

the

species,

axioms

1-3

explain why

there

are

universals of human color

categorization (Berlin

&

Kay 1969, Kay

&

McDaniel 1978).

Axiom

4

is

cognitive,

since

only

the

mind

elects to attend 'more or

less'

to

what one sees. The axiom is truly a postulate, because it is supported only by

its

success

in

uniting disparate observations regarding the composition, se-

mantics, variation, and change of color categories (MacLaury 1986).

Individuals divide broad color categories into two or three narrow categories

as

they foreground perceived differences and suppress similarities; the pro-

cesses are

necessarily reciprocal. Thus broad categories, such as Tzeltal dark-

cool, red-with-yellow, and green-with-blue, divide into categories equivalent

to

English black, red, yellow, green,

and blue.

Coupling

of axioms 1-3

(invariant perception)

with

axiom

4

(mutable cog-

5

'Attend'

and 'attendance' have a precedent in psychological literature as technical terms (see

e.g. laccino & Sowa 1989, abstract). The more widely used equivalent, 'attention' (e.g. Wright et

al.

1990), cannot be pluralized as 'attendance' can be, which is why the rarer term is used here.

6

'Unique

hue' is

used

loosely.

The

term strictly pertains only to yellow, green, and blue; pure

white and pure black are extremes of reflectance, and purest red contains a slight input of yellow.

42


11/30

MEASURING

VARIATION IN COLOR

SEMANTICS

nition)

allows

change

that,

nevertheless,

progresses

according

to

universal

reg-

ularities.

Berlin &

Kay

note that the

maximally

contrasting

colors,

such as

red/

green

and

yellow/blue,

are never

categorized

under the same name in

any

language.

A

language

that includes red and

yellow

in one

category

will

always

categorize green

and

blue

together, although

the reverse

prediction

does

not

hold;

since

red and

yellow

look

more

distinct,

they

will be

separately

cate-

gorized

prior

to

green

and

blue

in an

implied evolutionary

order as

speakers

of a

language increasingly

attend

to distinctiveness.

The same

engagement

of

perception

and

cognition

explains

other

regularities

of color

categorization.

First,

change

in

color

categorization

is

always

contin-

uous;

it never

progresses

by quantum

jumps.

Although

Berlin

&

Kay

classify

evolving

color-category systems

in seven

stages,

an individual can show

a

system that is between stages; for example, in Figs. 4a-d, superordinate light-

warm and dark-cool

categories

are less salient

than the cool and warm

cate-

gories

that

they

subsume.

Smoothly advancing change

conforms to the

model,

which

stipulates

that

people

decrease

their

emphasis

on

similarity

as

they

em-

phasize

distinctiveness

more;

the counterbalance of

strength

between the

two

attendances

prevents

change

from

surging

ahead

by

a

leap

from

an

old

system

to

a radically

different

new

system.

Second, as

systems

evolve

by division

of broad

categories

into

narrow

ones,

every

category undergoes

internal

reorganization.

For

example, the focus

and

judgments

of higher

membership

within

a category

gradually

migrate from

its

center to its edge; as attendance to distinctiveness is enhanced, half of a cat-

egory

is increasingly

contrasted

against the

other.

This

process is seen in

Figs.

4a,c-d,

where

the lighter

half

of the

dark-cool

category

is

nonsalient.

It is

also

seen in

Figs.

4a-b, where

the focus

of ?ah

is placed

at the

outer extreme

of

the warm

category-at

140 in

dark

maroon.

Third,

reorganization

involves

an evolution

of

semantic

relationships

within

a

category

from

near-synonymy

to coextensivity

to

inclusion

to

an

eventual

division and subsequent

complementation.

Each

semantic type

requires

stronger

attendance

to distinctiveness

than

its predecessor.

Evolution

of

se-

mantic relationships passes through a continuum of variants that are inter-

mediary to ideal

types.

Good

examples

of

ideal types

are

rare (see

n. 3

for

references).7

Fourth,

individuals

shift

toward stronger

attendance

to

distinctiveness

when

they

are

exposed

to novelty

at an

increasing

rate.

They

emphasize

distinc-

tiveness to sort

out new

experience

and

are

thereby

motivated

to evolve

color

7

As

a

category gradually

divides,

it

is not compulsory

that

it be named

with

two terms

at

any

specific point

in

its development.

But

whenever a

second

name is

adopted to

supplement

an

older

name,

the two

names must assume

a particular

semantic

relation

on the

continuum

of types.

The

segment of the continuum that the relation represents-that is, the type of relation-will be de-

termined

by

the

cognition

of the individual

who uses

the names,

that is,

by the

balance

of attend-

ances that he

or she

maintains.

For example,

Figs.

8b-c

below show

that speaker

#8 uses seleste,

which is

derived

from Spanish

celeste

'sky-blue'.

But she

accommodates

the loan

word to a coex-

tensive relation throughout

the cool

category.

The

other Tenejapa

Tzeltal speakers

of this

sample

have

opted

not

to apply

a second

term

to the cool

category.

43


12/30

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER

1

(1991)

categories

as

part

of a

general adaptive

strategy

of

regarding

the

world

more

analytically.

Exposure

to

novelty accompanies

societal

complexity

and

culture

contact,

although

it

can

also arise in small societies under harsh

conditions

where

people

must

improvise

by many

means from one

day

to

the

next. Novelty

directly

links all such situations

with

the

cognition

that

propels

change

in

color

categorization.8

Fifth,

different

members of

a

society

are

exposed

to

different

amounts

of

novelty,

and some will notice

novelty

more

than others.

Thus,

individuals

are

motivated

nonuniformly

to

attend to distinctiveness such that each

will

attend

at a

different

strength.

Although

each

person

is constrained

by physiology

to

conform to

a universal

order

in

subdividing

broad color

categories,

each

will

fall

out at a different

point

along

the

evolutionary

path.

The foregoing provides a very 'individualist' account of the rampantvariation

that is attested in the color

domain,

throughout

Mesoamerica

and

elsewhere.

Under that

explanation,

the

only

coherence within the domain

is

determined

by physiology.

Social factors

do not stabilize

color-category

evolution

at

a

predominantly

uniform

stage throughout

a

community.

Only

unvarying

ex-

posure

to

novelty might

tend to stabilize at one

stage

a

large

proportion

of

a

particular

population.

However,

the

individualist account

does not

explain

the

qualitative

differ-

ences

among

some societies.

Tenejapa

Tzeltal and

Navenchauc Tzotzil

exhibit

that

type

of

difference,

as

will

be shown

in

?5.3

and

?5.4.

Their

disparity

is

of

interest, because it does not follow from axioms 1-4. The difference suggests

that,

in

some

cases,

the individualist model

might

be combined with a

socially

oriented

account of

the kind

proposed

in

Weinreich et al.

1968.

ANALYSIS

5.

Before

describing

color

categorization

in

the two

communities,

and

before

attempting

to

integrate

individual and

social

models,

I will

provide

some

rel-

evant

ethnographic

information

in the

form of a

sketch of

social

differences

between

Tenejapa

and

Navenchauc

that

seemed

to

be

apparent

during

my

visits

there. These

differences

might

influence the

process

of

attending

increasingly

to distinctiveness.

5.1. DIFFERENT OCIETIES.

an

Ildefonso

Tenejapa

and

Navenchauc

are

corn-farming

communities located about

twenty

miles

apart

in

the state

of

Chia-

pas,

Mexico. Tzeltal

is

spoken

in

Tenejapa

and

Tzotzil is

spoken

in

Naven-

chauc. The

two

languages

are

closely-related

members of

the

Mayan

family

8

Languages

in

harsh

environs, such as

Eskimo

(Heinrich

1974)

and

Kung

Bushman

(Berlin

&

Kay

1969:33,

75),

have

more basic color

terms than attendant societal

complexity

might

predict.

The MCS found that

languages

in

isolated,

backland

villages

have more

basic

color

terms

than

languages of large, prosperous farming towns in the orbit of a city; the isolated areas are of poor

soil,

which

forces

people

to

improvise

diverse

livelihoods. Baines

(1985:283)

makes the amazing

observation that

Egyptian

color terms

remained at

Stage

lia 'from the

mid-3rd millennium

B.C.

to the Middle

Ages',

in

spite

of

vast societal transformation

over the

3000-year

period.

However,

although

the

change

was

great

and

the

society complex,

the

pace

of

change probably

was slow

in

comparison

to that which

pervades contemporary

Mesoamerica.

44


13/30

MEASURINGVARIATION N

COLOR

SEMANTICS

which have

been

in situ for

at least 1500

years

and

which sharea

pre-Columbian

heritage. Radically

distinct circumstances

mpinge

on the two

communities.

Tenejapa

s

at

the

end of

a

twenty-mile

road

(paved

the

year

after

this

field

work

was

carried

out)

from the nearest

Hispanic

center,

San Cristobalde las

Casas.

Althoughmany

outsiders

visit,

the

remoteness

of

Tenejapa

has

shielded

it

from other

parts

of the

country.

In the

context of the heretofore slow

pace

of

change,

its

inhabitants

are

unlikely

to sense

destabilization

and are

either

neutral n their

attitudetoward

ncorporating ovelty

or

eager

to do so.

During

this

fieldwork,

a

preservation

officer from the

National Institute of

Anthro-

pology

and

History

informed

disappointed

ocal officials that

they

could

not

pave

asphalt

over cobbled streets or

replace

the

beam-and-Spanish-tile

oof of

the colonial

church with

two-by-fours

and

corrugated

tin.

Middle-aged

and

older people are monolingualand wear indigenousdress, althoughmen have

shed

broad-brimmed ibboned

headgear

or commercialhats.

People

under

age

thirty

are

bilingual

and wear

commercial

clothing.

Old and

young

women

alike

comfortably

underwent

the color interview

without

seeking

consent

from

a

husband or father. A few

men and women have

married

oreigners

without

even

minor social

consequence.

Thirty years

before this field

work, the Pan-American

highway was cut

through

Navenchauc; the village was

catapulted rom the

isolation of

a

moun-

tain

valley into the

twentieth-centurymainstream.

Interviews

were

arranged

by

a

native

interpeter-spokesman,

who

had

troublefindinganyonewho would

participate. He summonedfive of his young female relatives, two of whom

would not

volunteer until

others had gone first.

The man'smother,

about sixty

yearsold,

steadfastly

declined to be interviewed n

spite of

the

generous

wage,

and

a fifty-year-oldwidow

consented

hesitantlywith an eye

toward hereward.

Business was

conductedin a house

compound

within close earshot

of diesel

trucks passing on the

highway.

Despite the presence of a

primaryschool in

Navenchauc, all but the

spokesman

and

youngest

interviewee were monolin-

gual, and all

wore traditional

dress to the last

stitch. Elsewhere all

but a few

young construction workers wore

indigenous clothing,

including the broad

Tzotzil hat. In sum, it appears that the people of Navenchauc are trying to

maintain

inguistic and cultural

continuity while

undergoing

ntensive, unso-

licited

contact with

national society.

5.2. EMBLEMS F

IDENTITY.

avenchauc is more closely

engaged with the

world at large

than is Tenejapa.

Inhabitantsof

Tenejapamight still

take their

society for

granted,but outside

influence ntrudeson

Navenchaucto the

extent

that

no one can

ignore it or turn it

away. Its inhabitants

must

self-consciously

observe

tradition f they

are to maintain t at all.

Such a view can foster

socially

shared

emblems or symbolic practices

that shapethe

cognitive

organizationof

color categorization.

Tenejapadoes not broadcastthe

presence

of

any particular

value or shared

point

of reference that would

channel

the

organization

of color

cognition,

al-

though

an

acceptanceof

the

outside world

might encourage

some Tzeltals to

develop color

categories

toward the

number

used

in

Spanish.

Color

categori-

45


14/30

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER

1

(1991)

zation

is

evolving

in

Tenejapa

in much

the same

way

that it

is observed in

most

other

communities

visited

by

the

Mesoamerican

survey,

with neither

clear

incentive

to

speed

it

along

nor desire to

hold it back. It

might

be that

the

individualist

model

pertains

fully

to

Tenejapa.

In Navenchauc

the emblem

probably

is tradition itself. The

socially

shared

conservativism

might

encourage preservation

of an archaic

system

of

three

essential

categories

and

thereby shape

the

cognition

of color.

But the

shaping

of

cognition

involves

further

complexity:

abundant

novelty

has fostered

strong

attendance

to

distinctiveness,

which is

uniformly

evident

among

the data

from

all five Tzotzil interviewees

under

age

thirty.

The enhanced attendance to

dis-

tinctiveness

is in conflict

with the social

requirement

to

maintain

three

super-

ordinate terms. The

result is

a

shared

system

of color

categorization

that

is

unparalleled by other survey data: highly salient Tzotzil categories named with

Spanish

loanwords

are subordinated

to the archaisms at a taxonomic

depth

of

four

levels,

two levels

deeper

than

any

known

system

in Mesoamerica.

Broad

mappings

of

archaic

categories

are executed

fully,

but with a

multitude

of

tiny

steps-often

a dozen

or

more-and,

again,

the

numbers are

unprecedented

elsewhere.

The

tension

between

a

cognitive adaptation

and

a

socially

pre-

scribed emblem

gives

rise

to an

extraordinarily complicated system

of

color

categories,

described

in ?5.4.

5.3.

TZELTAL

COLOR

ATEGORIES.

ata

from seven Tzeltal speakers,

dis-

played in Figs. 2-8c, represent the way that color-category evolution usually

proceeds.

That

is,

they

show

the

range of

variation and taxonomic depth

that

was observed in

most

of the

communities

that

were surveyed

in

Mesoamerica.

The

demonstration

is valuable

for two

reasons:

it

exemplifies

the five

principles

of

change

that are

outlined

in

?4; and

this

typical case from Tenejapa

contrasts

with the

extraordinary

case

from

Navenchauc,

where

the same

principles

op-

erate

under a socially

enforced

distortion.

In

review, the

mainspring

of change

is shift

in strength

of attendance

from

similarity

to

distinctiveness,

a balance

that each

person

manipulates

in a

private

effort to

accommodate

novelty

in

general.

In

the color

domain,

the

chosen

balance concentrates ease of categorization at a particular point either on one

level or

between two

levels

in

a perceptual

hierarchy

of

potential

degrees

of

inclusion.

Among

dark-cool

colors,

the

potential

levels

of inclusion

are,

from

broad to

narrow, BLACK-WITH-GREEN-WITH-BLUE

t

level

1, BLACK

gainst

GREEN-WITH-BLUE

t level

2,

and

BLACK

gainst

GREEN

gainst

BLUE

t level

3.9

9

A

reviewer asks,

'What does

it mean

to be

at level

1 or level

2? How

does one

demonstrate

that

there

is

a

hierarchy,

and what

exactly

constitutes

inclusion?'

Inclusion

means that one

category

encompasses

the entire range

(or 'contents')

of another

category

plus more.

In the

cognitive

branches of

anthropology,

psychology,

and

linguistics,

relations

of inclusion

are

conventionally

discussed and diagrammed as a taxonomic hierarchy, with the most inclusive category highest

(Berlin

et al.

1974, figs.

2.1-6; Rosch

et al. 1976:386;

Taylor

1989, fig.

3.1). In that

view,

'level

1'

is

highest,

'level 2'

is next down,

and so forth.

Although

representation

of a taxonomy

as a

hierarchy

displays

relations of inclusion more

perspicuously

than does

any

other

schema, it

is not

proven

to

be

more

psychologically

real than

the alternatives,

such as

horizontal

nesting

of categories.

At

this

point

in the

discussion of color,

the levels

consist

of

the potential

groupings

and contrasts that

are

46


15/30

MEASURING

VARIATION

IN COLOR SEMANTICS 47

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FIGURES a-b.

Tzeltal, Tenejapa, (a) naming ranges

and

foci, (b) mappings;

male, age 75,

1980.

An individual who strongly attends

to

similarity

maintains

one

basic

category

at level 1, a dark-cool category as in Figs. 4b-c. An individual who attends

less to similarity and more to distinctiveness

maintains two

basic categories

at

level 2, one black and the other

cool,

as do the Tzeltal

speakers

of

Figures

6a-

8c. An

individual who

attends

weakly

to

similarity

and

very strongly

to dis-

tinctiveness maintains

three

basic categories

at level

3; so,

for

example, English

speakers

contrast

basic

black, green,

and blue.

By establishing

a

certain

balance

of

attendances,

an individual

determines where in the

hierarchy

he

or she will

make basic contrasts most

naturally.

Since

the two attendances are

recipro-

cal-one weakens while

the other

strengthens-the preference

for basic cat-

egorization can slide smoothly through the perceptual hierarchy and can reside

between the

levels at

any particular

time. In that

case,

Berlin &

Kay's

char-

acteristics of a basic category, such as superordination and salience, will be

split

between levels.

For

example,

a

superordinate

dark-cool

category

will be

named with less salience than

the

cool

category

that it

encompasses,

as

in

Figs.

4a,c-d.

based

on

perceived

likenesses and differences

among black, green,

and

blue; they

are

perceptual

levels to which

categories

can

pertain. However,

the 'basic

level'

of

categorization

is

cognitive,

because it is the

point

within the

hierarchy

where an individual

categorizes

with least effort. Some

Tzeltals situate their basic level between perceptual levels 1 and 2. Furthermore, 'level' in Figs.

9-10

below refers

to

actual relations

of inclusion between

categories,

not to

perceptual

levels

per

se.

Since these relations of inclusion are

cognitive, they

do

not

match the three

perceptual

levels

one-to-one

in

every

case.

For a

distinction

between

perception

and

cognition,

see

?4.

Since

'per-

ceptual

levels' and

'cognitive

levels' can be

differentiated,

I

call

them both 'levels'

throughout

the

discussion rather than

designating

them

by separate

terms.


16/30

48

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER

1

(1991)

+

.1A

E

jua;

'~

G

+?i~~?~?~

,: H i |.s.s.ska pel.s.

W

.

*ihk?

l

1

1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12222222222

3 3 rm

^

+

1 2345678901234567890

1 2345678901

11I

rosado

asul

B

54

im

'1

111''lllllElE

'*lll5 a aai aa ii11*

111ia' B

'

aa 11 11 115 DII

E

516111114

II

lIIII

11111111111 111111111111 1 11111

ii1ii i

i

4 11111 111111

15

4'

11''"|4

iiiii

ii

liiiiiiiiii

i

i iii ii

liiliii

5

F

6- 4

111.. . . .

.1 1 1 111111111111

4

aa

l .ai .i .i

a

i .i

a

a . . .a.a a

111111116a

3-

G 7>

11?~~:111115 11iiiiiiii>11111f1) iiiiaiiaiai::ia::iii:i:iiiiiiiiiaiiiip1111111111

11a1111'6aa

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11111111111111111111111111111111a

11

a

ia~ 111111111111

1 1 1

11

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

16

F

4

7

...................................................................

?

ihk'

naming

mapping

ya

ffj

naming

111i1111a11

apping

?

focus

FIGURES a-b.

Tzeltal,

Tenejapa,

(a)

naming ranges

and

foci, (b)

mappings;

female,

age

70,

1980.

@

1111111111222222222233333333334

1

A

1 2345678901234567890

1 234567890

1

234567890

B

W?Iz

focus

H iQA3rsaoO oad

seleste

?~

@

H38

C

-

Bseeste

mapped|

seleste

:

.

D. . .

-

five steps

|

............4g

rH

?:

h

mapped

^

@

J

1111111111222222222233333333334

+

1234567890123456789012345678901234567890

r

age

apped0.

E..

. .... ...~ - 2 - ,.,--_>-....

G

Hl 7.S

*-

nI-g

~ZZZC

~~r~C

I I I . ......................., ;

C

|if

age

37 1980

E~~~~~~~~~~~fiiiiPi

i

el est

tiiiiiiiiiiiiiifemale,g 7 90


17/30

MEASURING VARIATION

IN COLOR SEMANTICS

The Tzeltal

speakers

constitute two

groups:

speakers

#2,

#3,

#4,

and

#5

maintain a

black-focused

dark-cool

category,

whereas

#6,

#7,

and

#8

do

not.

The first

group,

as mentioned above

(?3),

represents

Stage

II,

the second

Stage

IIIa.

Data from another

individual,

Tzeltal

#A,

are

not

shown;

she

falls

into

the second

group,

although

she alone

represents

Stage

IV.

Speaker

#8

differs

from

the

other members of

the second

group,

because

only

she names the

cool

category

with coextensive terms.

A

numerical

correspondence

among

different data

suggests

that

they

accu-

rately

reflect

cognition.

The four who

mapped

the black-focused

category

2ihk'

throughout

dark-cool colors

designated

the cool

category yas

with a

smaller

naming

range

than those who

mapped

the black-focused

category

over

only

dark

colors.

Speakers

#2, #3, #4,

and

#5

named the cool

category,

respec-

tively, 80, 101, 102, and 86 times-an average of 92 color chips per individual

that

were named with the

term

yas during

the

first

part

of the

interview.

Speak-

ers

#6,

#7, #8,

and

#A

named the

cool

category

124,

152,

119,

and 160

times,

an

average

of 139 uses

of

yas

(or

coextensive

seleste)

per

individual.

The

between-group

difference in the

size

of the

cool-category

naming

range

is

explained

by

the

model

of a

sliding

preference

for basic

categorization:

the

four

individuals

of the first

group

named

the

cool

category

fewer

times

because

it was more

difficult and

less

natural for them to differentiate at that level

than

it

was for

the

four members

of

the

second

group.

The

cognitive shift

between

attendances

to

similarity

and to

distinctiveness accounts for

variation in the

level of basic

categorization

and

the

consequent presence

or absence

of the

dark-cool

category;

and

the

shift

simultaneously accounts

for the further

cor-

ollary

of a

difference

in

size

of

the

cool-category

naming range.

This

model

of

cognitive

shift

predicts,

further, that a

degree of precision

that

is

sufficient

for one

individual who attends strongly

to similarity

is

deficient

for

another

individual

who

attends

strongly

to distinctiveness.

The difference

in

overview

surfaces

in

the

color naming of the

Tzeltal

speakers at earlier

and

at

later

stages,

who

appear

to name

colors

sloppily

versus

neatly; compare

Figs. 2, 3,

4a,

and 5a with

Figs.

6a and 7a.10

'Sloppiness',

however,

is

an

interpretation that would stem from the assumption that individuals directly

categorize

perception

and name what

they perceive,

either accurately

or less

so. But

the

stronger

attendance

to distinctiveness that

is characteristic

of later

evolutionary stages

simultaneously promotes

a sharper notion

of accuracy,

even

when all

speakers

name

colors with what seems

to be

equal care for

exactitude.

Finally,

the

model

addresses the grades

of

variation within

each group. In

the

first

group,

only speaker #4

maps the white-focused

category

with

a ves-

tigial

light-warm

range,

and

speakers #2,

#3,

and #4 map the

dark-cool cat-

egory

over

lighter

colors

(rows B-J) than

does speaker

#5 (rows

D-J). Speaker

#5 appears to be retracting his dark-cool category toward the restricted dark

range

that

characterizes the

second group.

10

The

naming ranges

of

speaker

#8,

like those

of

speakers

#2, #3, #4,

and

#5,

also

appear

'sloppy',

but for

a different reason.

Speaker

#8

adopts

seleste

and asul

as additional

names

of

the

cool

category,

and she

applies

coextensive

tah

to

yellow

more

than

do the other

Tenejapa

Tzeltals.

49


18/30

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER

1

(1991)

Speaker

#6,

who

is at

Stage

la,

belongs

to the second

group.

However,

his data show

qualities

that are intermediate to the two

groups:

he

has

retracted

the

black-focused

category

to

exclusively

dark

colors,

but he

has

not

added

terms

in

excess

of the five

that are shared

by

all

speakers.

Speakers

#7,

#8,

and

#A

have added words for blends

of

color,

such

as

kape

'brown'

(from

Spanish

cafe

'coffee/brown'),

rosa

'pink'

(Sp.

rosa

'rose/

pink'),

'in

'purple'

(Tzel.

'yucca

root'),

and

limun

'chartreuse'

(Sp.

limon

'lime/chartreuse')-a

further

corollary

of

stronger

attendance

to

distinctive-

ness.

Speakers

#7

and

#8

are more

discriminating

than

#6;

they

map

the

black-

focused

category

over

fewer

colors.

Speaker

#8

shows

exceptional

discrimi-

nation

by polarizing

all foci

except

that of coextensive

k'an;

she

placed

her

other six

chromatic foci

in the darkest

rows,

H-I.

In sum, the cognitive model of reciprocal strengths of attendance to similarity

and to distinctiveness accounts for the smooth

gradient

of variation

throughout

stages

and

substages

of Tzeltal color

categorization.

Theoretically,

different

individuals have

balanced the

strengths

of attendances as a

personal

adjustment

to

the

novelty

that each confronts

in a

day.

Differences between

the

privately

attained

balances cause each

person

to fall out at a different

point

along

a

continuous

sequence

of

color-category

evolution that is

constrained only

by

physiology.

The

Tenejapa

Tzeltal

might

aspire

to some emblem

of social

identity

in

their

use of

color

names,

although

such

a

construct

is not essential

to

explain

the

current variation in Tenejapa.

5.4.

TZOTZIL

COLOR

CATEGORIES.Color

categorization

in

Navenchauc

Tzotzil

is

very

different from that of

Tenejapa

Tzeltal.

Four

of

the six Tzotzil

interviewees

preserve

the

three-category system,

and five retain

the

dark-cool

category.

But

they preserve

it at

low salience and

as

the

highest

level of

a

four-

tier

taxonomy.

All three

levels of subordinate

categories

are

of

greater

salience

(see

n. 9).

The

Navenchauc

system

is

unique

among

the

Mesoamerican

data. An

ex-

planation of its unusual character requires some special construct in addition

to

those of

the

individualistic

variety,

perhaps

a

social variable. Labov

(1963)

puts

forth the

notion of

a

prestigious

variant in

his model

of

socially

motivated

phonological

change.

The

concept

of a

socially

valued

linguistic

form

fits well with

the hypothesis

that the

people

of

Navenchauc value the

maintenance of

many

sorts of

tradition,

including

early-stage

color

categorization.

Traditional

practices

might

provide

a

source of social

identity

under

the

relentless

encroachment of

outside

influ-

ences.

Labov

notes

that

'the

linguistic

form

which

began

to

shift was

often

a

marker of

regional

status'

(1972:178).

His idea

is

amplified

here to

construe

any time-honored behavior as a potential marker; the Navenchauc Tzotzil

might

seek to

stabilize

such markers as

islands of

identity

in

a

world

that

shifts

around

them.

Tzotzil

data

are

represented by

Figures

9-11,

speakers

#9, #10,

and

#11;

data

from the

other

three

speakers

(#C,

#D,

and

#E)

are

omitted.

Speaker

50


19/30


20/30


21/30

MEASURING

VARIATION IN

COLOR

SEMANTICS

53

+;;

A

Ba

B

H

| ,dh I

: .

7

D

7

jF

1 1_

-

1111111111

S F

1234567890123456789 iS

3

(

focus

asul

d

kafe

morero

.

B

. : : : : : : :

: : : : : : ; ;

: : : : : : : : ; : : : : : : : : :

: : : : : : .

b

C

8

Ilf4-I4w4.4

3

Illll

lllllll

1 6

il

1111111

111

3

DH11lf


22/30

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER 1

(1991)

uba,

kafe,

selestre, limun,

and

asul

(whose

forms

derive from

Spanish

uva

'grape/purple',

'cafe

'coffee/brown',

celeste

'sky-blue',

limon

'lime/char-

treuse',

and

azul

'blue').

According

to this

model,

if the broad

categories

had

not

been

adopted

as emblems of

identity,

by

now

they

would

have

retracted

to narrower

ranges;

that

is,

dark-cool and

coextensively

named

warm

would

have retracted to

black, red,

and

yellow.

Since

the retraction is

discouraged

by

a social

value,

other

terms have

been innovated to name the

finer

order

of

differentiation mandated

by

current

thinking.

Tzotzil

speakers

#10

and

#11

show variants of

the

emblematic

dark-cool

category

that is retracted to row

D

or

E,

and

#10

shows

a variant

of

the

subordinate

complexity.'3

Speaker

#11,

age

50,

shows

only

two

taxonomic

levels;

she

established color

categories

as

an adult before intrusion

of

the

high-

way.

5.5.

INDEPENDENTEVIDENCE

OF

COGNITIVE

IFFERENCE.

The

Tzotzil

speak-

ers

map

color

categories

with

more

steps

than do the Tzeltal

speakers,

as

is

shown

by

the

following comparison.

The

comparison presents,

first,

the

range

of each

category

that is shared

between the

two

languages

(e.g.

'dark-cool');

second,

the

name of the

category

in

Tzotzil

and in

Tzeltal

(e.g.

2ik'/2ihk');

and

third,

the

average

number of

steps

with

which

the

speakers

of

each language

mapped

the

category (e.g.

13.5:8.5),

always

in the order

Tzotzil:

Tzeltal

for

each name and

each

average:

'dark-cool'

2ik'/2ihk'

13.5:8.5;

'cool'

yo?/yas

7.4:5.0; 'warm' with red focus?ohl/ah 5.6:4.0; 'warm' with yellow focus k'on/

k'an

7.8:4.0; 'white

sak/sak

4.5:2.8.

The

consistently larger

number of Tzotzil

mapping steps

indicates

that,

on

the

average

and within the

present

sample,

the Tzotzil

speakers

attend to

dif-

ferences

among

colors

more

strongly

than do the Tzeltal

speakers.

These

num-

bers are

consistent with the

greater

taxonomic

depth

of Tzotzil

color

categorization,

which

I

have also attributed

to

a

stronger

attendance to

dis-

tinctiveness. The

taxonomic

depth

and

the

average

number

of

mapping

steps

per category

are

independent

orders

of

data.

The

averages

are based

on

the

Tzotzil data

from

Navenchauc and

on

the

Tzeltal data both from

Tenejapa

and from

Amatenango

del

Valle,

where three

individuals

were interviewed. The

differences

in

averages

between

Tenejapa

and

Amatenango

are as

follows:

'dark-cool'

2ihk'

9.0:7.5;

'cool'

yas

5.75:4;

'warm'

with red

focus

?ah

4.5:3.0;

'warm'

with

yellow

focus

k'an

4.25:3.5;

'white' sak

2.75:3.0.

The

Amatenango

averages

are

lower

than

those

of

Te-

nejapa,

except

for

the

sak

averages.

However,

each

Tenejapa

Tzeltal

average

is lower

than

its Navenchauc Tzotzil

counterpart.

The

averages

of

mapping

steps

for

'dark-cool',

'warm',

and

'cool'

can

be

calculated

only

from the data

representing

the

stages

that

contain

those

cate-

gories, basic or secondary.'4 Two speakers at Stage IV, Tzotzil #E (with a

13

Tzotzil

speakers

#C

and

#D,

whose data are

not diagrammed,

show

similar

complexity

to

a

depth

of

four and three

levels

respectively,

and

speaker

#E

shows a

Stage-IV

system

with

two

taxonomic

levels.

14

Stages

II-IV

contain

the

following

basic

categories:

II [white,

warm,

dark-cool],

as

mapped

54


23/30

MEASURING VARIATION

IN

COLOR

SEMANTICS

total of

37

mapping

steps)

and Tzeltal

#A

(with

17

steps),

are

excluded

from

the

calculations,

although

their

relevant numbers

are: 'cool'

yoslyas

15

steps:

7

steps;

'white'

saklsak

2:1; 'black' 2ik'/2ihk'

11:3. The three

Stage-IIIa

Tzeltals

mapped

black

2ihk'

with

3, 2,

and

2

steps, respectively.

DISCUSSION

6.

The

cognitive

model of

gradual change

has

implications

for the

growing

theory

of

categorization

(e.g.

Rosch et al.

1976,

Medin & Smith

1984,

Taylor

1989).

These

implications

concern

the

basic

level of

categorization

and

the

definition

of basic color

terms.

6.1.

MOBILITY

OF THE BASICLEVEL

OF CATEGORIZATION.erlin

et al. 1974

find that

biological

folk taxonomies

can

have as

many

as

five

major

levels. But

the middle level-which Berlin calls FOLKGENERICCATEGORIES is learned first

by

children. It

pertains

to concrete

and

imageable meanings,

and it is

named

with

simplest

terminology,

named with the

largest

inventory

of

terms,

most

frequently

named,

and

named with least effort. This is

the level

of

cognition

on which

people

achieve

basic

partitions

of their environment

and

interact most

directly

and

comfortably

with

it;

for

example,

tomato

is a

'folk-generic'

cat-

egory,

as

opposed

to

the

superordinate

category vegetable

or a

subordinate

category

such as

Roman tomato.

Rosch

et al.

(1976; cf. Taylor

1989:46-51)

rename

this concept

the BASIC

EVEL

f categorization.

They

couple

the

concept

with prototype

theory by

showing

that a

BASICOBJECT

ategory

constitutes

the

most

abstract

level on

which

prototypical

members

manifest

the maximum of

attributes that typify

the category

and

a minimum

of attributes

that

characterize

prototypes

of other

categories.

Berlin

and his

coworkers

further

show that

the

'generic'

or basic level is not

immutably

pegged

to physical

form,

and

others

have

repeated

the

finding (Rosch

et al

1976:432,

Dougherty

1978,

Mervis

&

Rosch 1981:93).

Thus,

some items

that are originally

classified

as subtypes

of

basic concepts

are later

promoted

to basic

status.

For example,

a few

Tzeltals

have

promoted

a divergent

species

of oak to the

generic level,

while

the majority

of

speakers

classify

that

taxon on

the specific

level

(Berlin

1972:74-79).

Or,

from another perspective, it could be said that some Tzeltals have moved their

basic level 'downward'

to incorporate

the

divergent

taxon.

The

data regarding

Tzeltal color

categorization

shows that

in this domain

the

basic level

is

highly mobile.

As individuals

shift

the

strength of

cognitive

attendances from

similarity

to distinctiveness,

the

basic level

of color

cate-

gorization

moves toward

greater differentiation

and specificity.

Superordinate

categories

fall into disuse and

diminish

in range;

for example,

dark-cool

pihk'

in

Fig. 9b;

IlIa [white,

warm, black,

cool]; IIIb [white,

red,

yellow, dark-cool];

IV [white,

black,

red, yellow,

cool].

Stages II

and

IIIb

can include

cool as a nonbasic

category,

as mapped

in Fig.

4d. For these reasons, mapping steps are counted for dark-cool categories only from Stage-lI and

Stage-IIIb

data,

for warm categories

only from

Stage-lI and Stage-IIIa

data, and

for white and cool

categories

from data of

Stages

II, liIa, and

IIb. Likewise,

mapping

steps of

black categories are

counted

only

from

Stage-IlIa

and Stage-IV

data. Data

regarding

Stage-IV

cool and white

categories

are

counted separately,

and data regarding

red and yellow

categories

of Stage

IIIb

and Stage

IV

are not

counted.

55


24/30

LANGUAGE,

VOLUME

67,

NUMBER

1

(1991)

retracts from

green

and from

blue toward its black focus. Subordinate cate-

gories

gain

in

usage

and

expand

in

range;

for

example,

cool

yas

broadens its

range

and is named

more often

during

the Munsell interview. In

effect,

the

basic

categorization

shifts

from the level of

combining

BLACK-WITH-GREEN-

WITH-BLUE to

the level of

contrasting

BLACK

against

GREEN-WITH-BLUE. In

the

future,

Tzeltal

speakers might

move

their

basic color

categorization

to the level

of

maximum

contrast

of

BLACK

against

GREEN

against

BLUE,

as have

speakers

of other

Mesoamerican

languages

after

they

innovated a term for a

separate

basic

category

of

BLUE

MacLaury

1986,

figs.

8.12a-c).

6.2.

SPLITTING

CRITERIAOF BASICCOLORCATEGORIES.Berlin

&

Kay

identify

the

basic

status of

a

color

category-a

BASIC COLOR

TERM-with

operational

criteria:

(1)

monolexemic,

(2)

non-context

specific,

(3)

not included in the

range

of another term, and (4) highly salient.'5 Criteria (1) and (2) are not proble-

matical

here,

but

(3)

and

(4)

warrant

discussion.

In

Tzeltal,

as the basic

level

of

categorization

moves from the level of

BLACK-WITH-GREEN-WITH-BLUE

o the

level

of BLACK

against

GREEN-WITH-BLUE,

riterion

(3)

continues to

pertain

at

the broader level

while criterion

(4)

gains prominence

at the

more

specific

level.

That

is,

'dark-cool'

2ihk'

of uneven salience

continues

to

encompass

consis-

tently

salient 'cool'

yas.

When

does one

stop

calling

'dark-cool' a

basic

category

and start

thinking

of 'cool' as

basic?

This question has no clear answer, because change

occurs

gradually as the basic level continuously moves. Many Tzeltals place the basic

level somewhere

between

the

tight

grouping of

BLACK-WITH-GREEN-WITH-BLUE

and the unequivocal

contrast

of BLACKagainst GREEN-WITH-BLUE;

few

have

arrived at the

latter,

Stage

lia.

For this reason, it is difficult

to specify

the

exact

number

of

basic

color

categories that each Tzeltal speaker

maintains.

The fact that

there

is flux

in

basic status is not

an

indictment

of the

measuring variability in color semantics

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