mission planning1

Issue: Final Draft December 2013

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CHAPTER 4

MISSION PLANNING1

"Planning is an unnatural process; it is far more fun to do something. The nicest thing

about not planning is that failure comes as a complete surprise, rather than being preceded by a period of worry and depression". Anonymous

INTRODUCTION

1. The success of a peace support operation (PSO) will generally be related to the achievement of a number of predetermined strategic objectives, which form elements of the overall political end-state that should be stated in the operation’s mandate. The nature of PSO is such that these objectives will generally relate to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment that would contribute to lasting peace for the local population. 2. The achievement of milestones and the other strategic objectives related to the political end-state requires adequate funding, perseverance and the collaborative efforts of a wide range of civilian organisations and local agencies. The achievement of the strategic objective is, however, not accidental, but involves many detailed plans and the alignment thereof into an integrated mission plan. 3. This chapter covers the requirement for coherence in the planning and provision of support to ASF-led multidimensional PSOs, which is essential for achieving maximum effectiveness, avoiding conflicting priorities between the various components of the mission and reducing duplication of effort. Many role-players within the AU are involved in pursuing the AU objectives and efficient management of these departments/divisions is critical to mission success.

TYPES OF MISSIONS

4. Article 13 of the AU Protocol on Establishing the Peace and Security Council identified the following types of missions the AU can conduct or be involved in:

a. Observation and monitoring missions.

b. Other types of peace support missions, like intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.

c. Preventative deployment to prevent a dispute or a conflict from escalating, or an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, or the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement.

d. Post-conflict reconstruction and development, including security sector

1 This chapter is an adaption from the current ASF PSO Doctrine, Considerations for Mission

Leadership in the UN Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Peacekeeping Operations [does this duplication mean that there should have been something else instead?] – Principles and Guidelines (“Capstone Doctrine”), and other relevant documents.


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reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) (these activities would usually resort under a UN mandate, but ASF forces, serving a UN mission, could be involved).

e. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters.

f. Any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace or Security Council (PSC) or the AU Assembly.

SCENARIOS

5. The different scenarios initially envisaged for ASF involvement include limited military and/or policing advice to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), co-deployment with the UN, an observer mission and the more complex multi-dimensional PSO. The ASF must also to be capable of early intervention in cases of gross violation of human rights. 6. During the implementation phase, the redefinition of the ASF scenarios was deemed necessary to acknowledge the importance of different scenarios. The following were proposed:

Scenario Description Timelines for deployment

(from mandate to in-mission area)

1 AU intervention in cases of gross violations of human rights or genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly (a typical Chapter VII operation).

2

14 days

2 A complex multi-dimensional peace support operation (a typical Chapter VI mission that can involve preventative deployment with an observer mission, election monitoring, etc.)

30 days (military component ready to deploy and the remainder of the force on a gradual role-out over 90 days)

3 Assistance during major natural disasters

Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in a conflict area

As early as possible

Note 1: Any one of these missions can be co-deployed with the UN or other authorised forces. Note 2: Regional organisations can initiate a regional PSO initiative, such as election monitoring, but should keep the PSC/AU Commission (AUC) informed.

ROLE-PLAYERS 7. The following key role-players are intimately involved in the mission-planning process (this list reflects sequential involvement rather than the importance of the action):

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The AU Political Affairs Department is a vital role-player as it continuously monitors the external environment for any incident that might lead to instability or conflict. It collaborates with regional and national early warning centres. As far as possible, the CEWS desk officers will corroborate their findings with other entities such as the UN and its agencies, or any other relevant international organisations IOs, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs. The CEWS staff will regularly inform the PSC of their findings and developments.

2 All forceful interventions require the sanction of the UN Security Council (UNSC), This implies that the

PSC needs to keep the UNSC informed on a continuous basis about potential threats in order not to delay quick deployment.


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The Peace and Security Council (PSC), a 15-member body that on behalf of the AU Summit initiates responses to address conflicts or crises situations. The AU Commission (AUC) has to execute PSC decisions/ recommendations.

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) comprises senior military officers from PSC-member embassies and is headed-up by the Head of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). It advises the PSC on possible military intervention options. PSOD staff and experts from other relevant AU departments may be co-opted for quality advice on the options available to stabilise conflict situations.

The Chairperson of the AUC (CC), under the direction of and mandated by the PSC, must initiate actions to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, and achieve successful missions. The CC will consult and collaborate with all parties involved in a conflict (the UN, international organisations, NGOs, etc.), as required. The Peace and Security Department (PSD) is the lead department.

The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is responsible for managing the approved AU PSOs and will coordinate the activities of the ASF.

The African Standby Force (ASF) was established to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the conduct of PSO missions and interventions pursuant to Article (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act. The ASF shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents comprising civilian, police and military components from the Regional Economic Communities/regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) such as ECOWAS, SADC, EASBRICOM, ECCAS and NARC. In undertaking its functions, the ASF shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the UN and, its agencies, other relevant international organisations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs. The detailed tasks of the ASF and its modus operandi for each authorised mission shall be considered and approved by the PSC upon recommendation of the Commission. The AU and the RECs/RMs have planning elements (PLANELMs) that will conduct day-to-day planning with regard to AU PSO commitments.

8. The AU’s mission mandating process. Two key aspects make the mandating process unique to the AU, namely its relationships with the regions and its ”outside” partners, as follows:

a. The relationship between the AU and the regions, where the RECs/RMs provide the PSO capability through a combination of standby forces on roster system rather than by means of direct AUC negotiations with member states. The RECs/RMs are also the “first responders” should a crisis develop. Hence, a strong relationship between the AU and REC/RM leadership, and close cooperation between their early warning and planning elements are essential. b. Because of the challenges it currently faces with regard to funding and supply of the required force enablers for its missions, the AU depends heavily on international organisations, agencies and donor nations for such things as strategic lift, strategic enablers, humanitarian support capacity and general funding, amongst others. This often necessitates the involvement of outside agencies in the planning process.


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INTEGRATED MISSION PLAN 9. Many stakeholders are involved in the various activities that encompass PSOs and a thorough understanding of the integrated planning process is thus important. The different role-players may have alternative or preferred planning models and the intention is therefore not to have a ”one size fits all” model, but rather to ensure the alignment of activities and flexibility in collaboration, so that participants can focus on the end result. The sharing of information and transparency in the planning process are thus essential. However, past experience indicates that effective peacekeeping requires some alignment between the principle role-players during the PSO in order to achieve an integrated approach. 10. An integrated mission is where all components work to a single plan and answer to one authority, and where political, humanitarian, developmental and security initiatives can be focused on a common strategic objective. A shared understanding of the priorities and the interventions to be undertaken at each stage of a peace process is essential. Achieving this will require interaction at a number of levels, ranging from the PSC, the AUC and the PSD to the mission itself. This should lead to an agreed common approach in which the activities of all actors towards achieving a clear strategic objective complement each other. 11. This common vision should clearly define the quality, quantities and timelines of the exact objectives to be achieved. Each partner may have a different approach, but alignment thereof is essential. Integrated management does not mean that one entity should prescribe to another, but rather lay down how boundary issues will be managed to achieve the same overall objective. The mission planners in the PSOD should therefore not try to prescribe separate planning initiatives, but rather test, in collaboration with the different entities, whether their plans will support the overall objectives. The planners furthermore have to identify gaps in the combined plans and initiate action to address those. 12. Planners should consider the use of, amongst others, the following planning models: the Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal/Consolidated Appeal, Common Country Assessment/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Joint Assessment Missions/Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.3 Any activity within these plans that would contribute to the AU’s overall vision for a mission should be recognised and included in the master plan. Planners should thus not ignore the planning efforts and plans of other organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO when planning a mission. 13. The last few years also saw increased collaboration between the AU and the UN in situations where the initial peacekeeping initiatives of the AU could result in a subsequent changeover to the UN. Many challenges arise in this regard and require the early involvement of the UN to define the strategic direction and plan the joint efforts. It is important that the PSC informs the UN Security Council (UNSC) about its initiatives to manage instability or conflict on a regular and transparent basis. Draft communiqués and resolutions should be discussed directly before mission mandates are finalised in order to identify areas for collaboration and support. Integrated planning is essential not only between the AU and the UN, but also between the AU

3 Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations. 2010. International Forum for

the Challenges of Peace Operations.


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and other partners, as well as the RECs/RMs that may be responsible for providing the required manpower.4 THE AU PSO PROCESS − RESPONDING TO CRISIS 14. The CEWS, which continuously monitors situations/activities that might be a cause of instability or conflict, constantly informs the PSC about any such activities. A variety of responses are open to the PSC and the AUC, and these should cover the full range of conflict prevention and conflict resolution activities. It is probable that various agencies or organisations engaged in many different initiatives and activities will have been involved long before any requirement for a PSO has been identified, and these should be considered. 15. Planning needs to start at the earliest opportunity and run concurrently with diplomatic and political efforts, particularly as many of the key actors and potential partners, specifically the humanitarian and development agencies may already be quite well advanced in their own planning, or even have deployed. 16. Stabilisation of a conflict situation will almost always be the task of the military with support of the police and political officers in order to create the space for a political peace process to start. Stabilisation of a post-conflict situation does, however, depend on the extent of collaboration between the military, police, civilian components and other stakeholders. The role of the security forces would gradually diminish whilst the role of the civilian participants would increase proportionately. It should also be recognised that the earlier comprehensive engagement takes place, the greater the benefit in terms of preventing further destabilisation, both within the country in question and in neighbouring countries. It is important that the different parties to the conflict assume responsibility for the implementation of peace agreements as soon as possible.

17. Although it is essential to achieve short-term solutions, the long-term strategic objectives must always be kept in sight. Failure in this respect will quickly undermine the legitimacy of the mission, its acceptance in the country in which it is deployed and the degree to which it can meet expectations.

INTEGRATED MISSIONS

18. An integrated mission requires an in-depth understanding of the specific country setting and the evolving imperatives facing the security, political, humanitarian and developmental pillars of that country. An integrated mission is the initiative of authorised institutions that have available a specific mix of assets and capacities to achieve the desired impact. 19. The desired impact must be derived from strategic guidance and have a long-term perspective that addresses the causes of conflict and not just the symptoms. Such an approach will extend beyond the immediate demands of peacekeeping and is likely to involve a number of transitional periods when responsibility shifts from one organisation to another. It is in this context that planning should not become inhibited by the objectives of any single phase.

PRINCIPLES 20. In determining the planning principles for integrated missions, it is important to

4 APSA Assessment Report, 2010.


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recognise that this will always involve a number of different planning processes, many of which will operate entirely on functional lines. Not only would it be inappropriate to attempt to absorb these into a single process, but it would be practically impossible as many will occur outside the ASF planning process. For this reason, the approach is oriented to addressing the various functional objectives and priorities, and then to synchronise these to achieve mutual support and maximum coherence to an agreed objective. In this respect the following principles have been established:

a. Strategic direction. The starting point of all planning should be a clear understanding of the desired outcome. This will guide the strategic direction and reflect in the mandate and the purpose of the mission in the context of long-term objectives. It will follow consultation with key actors, while strategic direction will be given by the CC in the form of a directive following a detailed consultation with key stakeholders.

b. Inclusiveness. All stakeholders should be involved in the planning process. Effective integrated planning will only be achieved through early consultation with all internal and external partners. Failure in this respect will lead to plans that are unbalanced.

c. Visibility. Some elements of the planning process may be sensitive and should best be treated with confidentiality. Nonetheless, the principle of maximum visibility is important and should apply to both to those involved in the planning process and to those who need to ensure that the objectives of a mission are clearly understood by all.

d. Flexibility. Plans must be balanced and flexible both in their capacity to reflect

the short-term objectives of a peacekeeping or stabilisation phase, and as regards the long-term peace-building requirements. Plans can be updated whenever there is a need, but this should always be the result of fresh analysis and a clear decision.

e. Validation and review. The mission management team that has to implement plans should be part of the whole planning process. Plans should also be reviewed if any of the initial circumstances change.

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

21. There is no single template for ASF missions. The functional planning requirements will vary according to the scope and mandate of the mission in question. Multi-dimensional PSOs require a vast variety of expertise, which is not necessarily available within the ASF, and use should be made of expertise that can be found in the various departments of the AUC, the RECs/RMs and the agencies managing the standby rosters. 22. Where the important principle of inclusiveness and early involvement of all key actors is applied, the following elements/dimensions need to be considered for incorporation in the plan:

a. Political b. Military c. Police d. Human rights e. Rule of law


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Establishing a body of law

Establishing police primacy

Establishing a judiciary f. Establishing a penal system g. Humanitarian affairs h. DDR and security sector reform (SSR) i. Gender j. Child protection/trafficking k. Legal l. Public Information m. Civil affairs n. Electoral Affairs o. Environmental Affairs

23. In addition the process will require close collaboration with:

a. Donors/partners b. RECs/RMs c. Member states/national authorities d. UN agencies, funds and programmes e. Humanitarian NGOs f. Other international organisations

FACTORS AFFECTING PLANNING

24. The integrated mission plan will draw together different strands, both the functional plans of individual mission components and the existing plans of external agencies, thus reconciling different timescales and potentially competing priorities to produce a clear roadmap for the mission to follow in achieving the strategic objective. While this may be obvious in principle, the fact is that in the majority of cases no single component or external agency can achieve its functional objectives by relying on its own means. Inevitably this means that a degree of compromise is needed as lower priorities may have to be sacrificed in the interests of the mission as a whole, the sum of the whole being greater than that of its constituent parts. If any one component takes an independent approach, the overall structure will be weakened. While this does not necessarily imply that a mission will fail, it does mean that synergy from collaboration will be lost and that it will take longer to succeed. An essential way of overcoming this problem is to clearly identify the various steps or benchmarks that need to be achieved within the overall roadmap, to determine who contributes to this process and by when actions need to be accomplished. The mission plan should also identify the critical path for capabilities to be in place and tasks to be completed so that others can proceed with their activities. 25. Achieving a balance between the functional plans of the respective components gives the integrated mission plan its strength. It is, however, equally important for balance to be achieved between the different levels of operation as each successive level flows from the previous one. This will require good communication between all the components involved in the planning process so that everyone is aware of how the individual activities contribute to the achievement of the mission’s strategic objective and how they link to other components. This can be accomplished by ensuring that standard operating procedures (SOPs) are clear and responsibilities are well understood. 26. Operational environment. The operational environment of a PSO will include tangible and intangible aspects, as follows:


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a. Tangible elements will include topography, communications and

infrastructure, climate, general living conditions, ethnic distribution, languages, religion, customs and respect for human rights, amongst others.

b. Intangible elements of the operational environment will include the cultures of indigenous and displaced groups, their perception of the mission’s authority, the potential for a sudden and unexpected instability or return to conflict, and the degree of the leadership’s control over the military, paramilitary, criminal and other elements of the population.

27. Parties to the conflict. Planning will be affected by the degree of active involvement by the parties to the conflict, their motives and aspirations, their support for a ceasefire or a peace agreement, and their acceptance of the PSO. In this respect it is essential that the responsibilities of national authorities are clearly identified and that mission planning never loses sight of the need for those authorities to fully assume identified responsibilities as they become capable of doing so. 28. Legal. The multinational nature of a PSO and the changes that will take place in any post-conflict situation demand that legal advice is readily available to the SRCC as the head of mission (HOM) and heads of mission components. The legal status of those directly engaged in the PSO under the terms of the mandate should be secured by a legal instrument with the ”host” government, where one exists. 29. The formulation of the legal instruments is an important process in achieving mission success. Details of the legal documents would depend on various factors. The concept of operations (CONOPS) for mission success would be the basis for all subsequent documents. The CONOPS is formulated to determine what activities are necessary to achieve the mission’s success. This is an integrated process where the various force components (military, police and civilians) consider the most likely method for achieving the envisaged mission objectives, based on the desired political outcome – the mandate. The type of legal agreement depends on the degree of accord between the parties to the conflict and with the Strategic Mandating Authority. A large measure of accord is normally reflected in a Status of Force/Mission Agreement (SOFA/SOMA), which has the standing of a treaty. When such an accord is not realistic, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or an exchange of letters (letters of agreement), may serve instead. When no local accord can be negotiated, the 1946 UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities may serve as a basis for the protection of personnel and materiel. The four fundamental issues to be addressed are:

The independence of the mission in relation to the authorities of the host country, where such an authority exists

Freedom of movement

Arrangements for the criminal jurisdiction of the mission

Rules of Engagement (ROE)/AU directives to the military/police on the use of force

30. Legal advice would also be required prior to and throughout the mission’s operation on such issues as:

The mandate

The Law of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law


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The applicability of the AU Charter on Peoples and Human Rights

The jurisdiction, authority and accountability of the SRCC/HOM/heads of mission components

War crimes and war criminals

International monitors and inspectors

Protection of sites of cultural, archaeological and ecological significance 31. Public information and media. In accordance with AU guidelines, the SRCC/HOM should issue specific guidance on relationships with the media. Fiercely and rightly independent, the media will resist all attempts to ”manage” their involvement, except when cooperation proves to be the only realistic means of access to information. Few media agencies can claim to be fully impartial. Some will be selective in their representation of the truth for their own ends and those of the party they have elected to support. Others may have a particular line they wish to promote, such as increased international involvement for humanitarian reasons. Despite the apparent moral ascendancy of ”must do something” or ”must do more” headlines, the secondary impact of the media must be considered carefully. 32. Other organisations and agencies. Planning should take account of the identities, roles, interests, intentions and methods of operation of all actors within the area of responsibility. This will include national authorities and agencies, as well as international organisations, interested member states, international financial institutions and NGOs. All of these will conduct specific activities according to their own vision and objectives. Mission management must acknowledge their efforts, determine what else needs to be done (identify gaps) and align initiatives to achieve mission objectives. 33. Resources. The effectiveness of a mission will be directly proportional to the resources available to it. This applies both to the need to ensure that overall capabilities are commensurate with the mandate, and the ability to sustain the mission once it has deployed. Failure in either will lead to expectations that cannot be met and a mission whose credibility will increasingly be called into question. PLANNING PROCESS 34. The planning process usually begins before a mandate is given with a political agreement by international/African communities that “something” should be done. The AU/REC/region consider the contribution they can make to an international or continental response and plan their strategy. Subsequently, the AU/RECs/RMs refine their plan on how they intend to meet the political objectives. 35. Planning takes place at different levels and follows the general approach that the strategic level is represented by the AUC/PSD, the operational level by the SRCC/HOM and the tactical level by those elements of the mission deployed in the mission area. This being said, the reality is not quite as straightforward since the distinctions between the various levels will be blurred for a number of reasons. In particular, the SRCC’s responsibilities will straddle the strategic and operational levels, as


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will those of a force commander (FC) who may be deployed in a first response to a crisis before a fully integrated plan is effective. The situation can be complicated further when it is not possible to appoint key mission personnel early in the process and strategic-level planners are as a result involved in issues that should rightly be addressed at lower levels. 36. Determining the responsibility for planning and ensuring that a coherent plan is produced calls for a process that is understood by all. The planning process should not be over-complicated and must follow certain key steps to avoid a loose set of possibly ambiguous or contradictory decisions coming into effect. To this end the process is divided into four main steps, as follows:

a. Direction. As outlined above, one of the key principles is to ensure that planners receive clear direction so that they are able to produce a coherent plan. Such direction must come from the highest political level and must reflect long-term strategic objectives, regardless of whether it is envisaged that the ASF will remain responsible in the long term. Direction can always be updated at a later date should a transition to the UN or another organisation become a possibility. b. Development of the plan. Invariably development of the plan will involve a number of different stages, starting with an initial draft, which is likely to precede any mandate given by the PSC, followed by a technical assessment of the mission area and various updated drafts that are developed as more information becomes available and the mandate is confirmed. As the likelihood of a PSO increases, the PSD will direct the PSOD to take the lead in planning. Bearing in mind that mission personnel may or may not have been appointed at any stage of this process, PSOD is likely to retain the lead for planning until such time as a viable mission headquarters (HQ) assumes its responsibilities. Close coordination with all actors, both within the AU and external to the AU, including international organisations, donors, international financial institutions, etc., is essential throughout the development of the plan. c. Transition to the mission. The date the mission is to assume its responsibilities represents one of the biggest challenges to the planning process. This is precisely the time when a strong and developed mission HQ is needed, yet this is rarely the reality as the HQ will still be in the process of deployment and establishment. The HQ is likely to need assistance from the PSOD in the form of a temporary detachment of personnel that has been involved in developing the plan. d. Implementation. As the mission implements its plan, the plan must be developed continuously to reflect changing demands. While this may seem obvious, it is important to ensure that there is a clear process for reviewing the plan in the light of the original strategic direction and to make changes only when these are consistent with that direction. Failure in this regard may well lead to additional tasks being added for which resources have not been allocated.

e. Contingency planning. A contingency plan serves to guide alternative actions if a mission plan does not deliver the anticipated results. Contingency plans are also required to prepare for possible humanitarian or natural disasters, or for the eventuality that an existing mission develops an emergency. Contingency planning result from a process that prepares the AU to respond coherently to unplanned events. The process of developing


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contingency plans follow a specific set of procedures, as follows:

Develop scenarios of what could go wrong with a mission plan and decide on the disasters to plan for (a brainstorming session with experienced people can develop various scenarios). Focus on the likelihood of something not going according to plan and weigh the impact it would have on the mission or incident. Prioritise those and focus on the top five to seven scenarios.

Identify the key issues that have to be addressed in each of the scenarios and determine how quickly corrective action would be required.

Identify the ”ways” that would be adopted to rectify the situation and the ”means” (assets) that would be required, and ensure that the assets are available on standby or on contract.

PLANNING TOOLS Note: Refer to the Aide Memoire on the AU Planning and Decision-making Process5 37. The integrated mission plan provides the roadmap on how the AU plans to employ its capabilities to achieve the stated objectives of a PSO, and on how national authorities, other organisations and agencies will contribute to the process of addressing both the immediate symptoms of the crisis and the long-term resolution of its causes. 38. Development of the integrated mission plan needs to be supported by processes that ensure that all relevant issues are addressed. The starting point is clear strategic direction, which should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of the situation and its implications from the perspective of the integrated mission. It is important to bear in mind that both routine and specific analyses will be conducted in a number of quarters, and that this will provide useful input to the process. The military estimate described later in this chapter provides one model that can be applied in approaching this requirement. 39. Thorough analysis will begin to identify the desired outcomes that will be essential to support the achievement of the strategic objective. It will also start identifying the constraints that will come into play, the resources required, the potential tasks and benchmarks, and areas of risk. Given the breadth of requirements, it is easy to overlook issues. To help overcome this a matrix has been developed to guide planners through the detail (see Annex A). This matrix is comprehensively discussed in the ASF Aide Memoire5 and consists of the following elements:

Statements of the strategic objective and the assumptions that are being made

The key outcomes that will be required to achieve the objectives

The desired time by which outcomes should be achieved

5 African Union Mandating Process for Peace Support Operations, Aide Memoire, The AU Planning and

Decision-making Process, Version 3, 30 October 2009.


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The element of the mission that has lead responsibility for achieving specific outcomes

The factors that constitute success in achieving specific outcomes

The resources that are needed to achieve specific outcomes 40. The completed matrix reflects input from all elements of the integrated mission and it will provide the ingredients for the integrated mission plan. The plan should only be seen as outlining the objectives to be worked towards as it is clear that while some desired outcomes will be achieved as envisaged, others will not. The matrix provides the means of measuring the degree of success and acts as an indicator that either an assumption was incorrect or the desired outcome was unrealistic. In either case it will point the way to reviewing the issue in question and looking at other ways of achieving the outcome. 41. Using the matrix to provide the basic input for the integrated mission plan, planners will develop a draft that will act as the basis for a technical survey of the mission area. This survey should have clear terms of reference and planners will need to consult widely as the draft plan is developed and submitted for approval. Although consultation with the military and the police will have taken place earlier, it is especially important that they be kept abreast of developments at this stage of the process. Equally important is the need to include key partners and major donors to support the development of a joint approach and to contribute to the process of integration from the outset. 42. The use of simulation in planning should not be underestimated as it will indicate planning shortfalls without jeopardising the operations. Planning aspects must also be realistic and be supported by the required capabilities, which implies that force generation, deployment and utilisation must function optimally. These processes must be tested regularly to ensure that a credible response is available to react speedily to address conflict or turmoil. PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION 43. Once the AUC has approved the integrated mission plan, the process of transferring responsibility for its implementation to the mission should start. As mentioned previously, this is always a difficult time and the mission may need assistance for it to take place smoothly. During this transition it will be useful to revisit the planning matrix to confirm that the original assumptions are still valid. The situation in the mission area should also be reviewed to ensure that changes are factored into the plan. Thereafter the plan should be endorsed by the SRCC/HOM and be implemented. 44. Implementation does not mean an end to the planning process. It is essential that the plan is examined on a continuous basis, is evaluated against the original strategic direction and takes into account the inevitable new circumstances that will arise. Changes should be made following a clear decision that they are necessary to support the achievement of the objective. This will be crucial to ensure that the mission is not subjected to numerous additional tasks for which it is not resourced. In the event of an additional task that is essential to the success of the mission having to be catered for, it may be necessary for the PSC to amend the mandate and for additional resources to be obtained. 45. Implementation will involve the transfer of a number of responsibilities as directed by the AUC in line with the PSC mandate. Such transitions happen when the


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mission deploys, when it transfers responsibility to another organisation or when functions, such as the peacekeeping/stabilisation phase, are concluded satisfactorily. In each case the transitional arrangements need careful planning and need to be factored into the process at the earliest opportunity. MILITARY PLANNING 46. The nature of the military’s role in PSOs demands an approach to planning that is somewhat different to that of the other components. Within the proposed three scenarios, the military component of the ASF may deploy as the basis of the mission (all three scenarios), or it may support a deployment in advance of what could evolve into an integrated mission, particularly under scenario 1. Consequently it is essential for the military to undertake a planning process that focuses not only on military requirements, but is also capable of being subsumed into the integrated mission’s overall planning process. 47. The process will begin with the same requirement for strategic direction from the AUC that is needed for the integrated mission. There is likely to be some overlap between the planning processes for the integrated mission and the military functions by virtue of the fact that the latter may be the first formal representation of a PSO in a country or region in crisis and will require the military to play a leading role in the early stages of the mission. Under these circumstances it is likely that military planners will have to interface directly with UN agencies, international financial institutions and NGOs that are already on the ground. Until such a time as a SRCC is appointed, the commander of the military component may also have to act as the HOM. In some circumstances, military planners may even be required to develop both an integrated mission plan and a military plan. 48. Military forces will be deployed to achieve specific objectives within the context of the overall strategic objective set by the PSC and the AUC. They will be organised and structured to enable them achieve these objectives and towards that end their activities will be integrated with other components of the mission. Given the multiple demands likely to be placed on the military component and the need to achieve a level of stability that sustains other activities, military planning must be highly developed. At the same time, such planning must not inhibit the force’s flexibility to act in situations that will often change quite quickly. To meet this requirement, the military will develop its own campaign plan that outlines how it will support the integrated mission plan, identifies key benchmarks and end-states, and under what conditions military operations will no longer be necessary. This being said, it is crucial that any military end-state is developed as part of an integrated approach and not independently. 49. Individual functional plans are likely to be at different stages of development: some will be in existence and others will develop concurrently with the integrated mission plan, thereby exacerbating the difficulties of achieving maximum complimentarity between them. This is a particular issue in the development of the military campaign plan, where considerable care has to be taken to reconcile, for example, potentially conflicting requirements between the need to stabilise an area and to deliver humanitarian assistance. Consequently, it is important that those developing both the campaign and the supporting tactical plans do so on the understanding that the plans will be modified and refined as the overall intent becomes better defined, the constraints and difficulties become more obvious, and requests for additional information and resources are either satisfied or rejected. 50. Typically, the campaign plan will have lines of operation (defined in Annex B)


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where capabilities are used in conjunction to realise decisive points or benchmarks towards arriving at a military end-state. 51. The military campaign plan articulates the overall scheme of operations. It is based upon a detailed operational estimate and uses a number of military planning tools or theoretical building blocks collectively known as campaign planning concepts. These support the identification of critical strengths and weaknesses, both with regard to the mission and to potential spoilers, and are covered in detail in Annex B. Once the military campaign plan is complete it provides clear guidance on how the military force’s activities will be co-ordinated with other components, and its priorities. POLICE PLANNING 52. The police component will be deployed by the AUC following a mandate from the PSC and consultation with member states. The component should ideally be on the ground very early in the life of a mission. Given the role played by the police and the wide-ranging implications for other components, it is essential that police planning is carefully coordinated for it to achieve the level of integration necessary to be effective. This is also to ensure that it supports the achievement of the strategic objectives. The police component will start its own internal but coordinated planning process, which should cover the following specific aspects:

a. Internal security situation

b. Indigenous police force

c. Refugees/internally displaced persons

d. Rule of law

e. Support of the police legal system

f. National police law/criminal code

g. Implication of customary law and the role of tribal leaders, compensation, etc.

h. National political, administrative and police structure

53. The police will participate in a fact-finding mission − the technical assessment mission − with the other envisaged mission components. The findings will be incorporated into the analysis, which will result in a proposal for the police aspects in the political mandate and in a recommended CONOPS for the police, which will include all aspects for the particular PSO. It could also include strategies, tactics, management structure, the resources needed (human, financial, materiel and infrastructure) and other mission requirements. 54. Fact finding mission. Prior to the planning of any PSO, an assessment will have to be made of the prevailing conditions likely to be met by the PSO components, including the political and security situation and local infrastructure and capabilities. The police may have a central role in establishing the facts that may have an impact on determining the type of PSO that may need to be put into place. Areas to be investigated in a fact finding mission could include:

a. The capabilities of the local police and law enforcement agencies

b. The existence of rule-of-law infrastructure


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c. The potential for the development of an indigenous police and law-enforcement capacity in the short, medium and long-term

d. The demands and needs of the police component of the potential PSO

Subsequently, the reports and recommendations that need to be compiled for political decision-making must be determined, and an initial CONOPS for the police in conjunction with other elements of the PSO must be created.

LOGISTICS AND BUDGETARY PLANNING 55. General. The ASF logistics concept paper outlines the logistical framework for supporting an AU PSO. The Logistics Manual contains details of logistical planning and implementation. It is sufficient in this document to highlight some of the key logistical considerations that will affect mission planning. The first aspect that needs to be underlined is that logistical planning must be integrated in two ways: first, across the components that support an integrated mission (military, police, civilian, etc.) and, secondly, as an integral part of the overall comprehensive mission plan. This implies that the chief logistics officers must be part of the mission planning process from the start and that implementation of the logistic plan must be managed from the Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC). 56. Principles. Two key principles of logistical support provide the overriding consideration for logistical planning, namely timeliness and flexibility. Timeliness implies the need for logistical planning and preparation before the start of any operation, whereas flexibility is required to support changes in plans, which are bound to occur. What is thus required is the right support, on time and in the required area. Mission support will have budgetary implications and will be a major influence on the logistical plan. For this reason, the availability of resources is a main consideration in the integrated planning matrix.

a. Planning and preparation. The development of the ASF capability is predicated on the Standby Brigades producing the necessary formed units and individuals being in the required state of readiness and sustainability. Preparation anticipates the training requirements and the support needed to deploy the ASF capability to the operational area, as well as its sustainability for the requisite period of time. This will entail, inter alia, equipment procurement and preparation, MOUs on reimbursement, and plans for mounting and strategic lift. Planning the logistical requirement to support the ASF capability is necessary to allow the PLANELMs to prepare the force for deployment. Part of the planning process includes decisions on equipment to be held in depots, plans and draft contracts for rapid procurement of equipment and supplies from commercial sources, draft SOFA and SOMA agreements, and draft MOUs covering partner support. Planning and preparation will usually lay a sound foundation for mounting an operation. However, plans are always likely to change and flexibility thus needs to be built in.

b. Flexibility. Despite the best-laid plans, the logistical requirements will

change over time and the delivery of mission support may also change in emphasis from military to civilian actions as the mission evolves. Because of this there is a clear need for logistics planners to be an integral part of the mission planning process at all stages, and for the implementation of services to support the mission to be managed on an integrated basis. Resources will always be limited and so a flexible


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approach to the provision of support is essential and will entail the sharing of equipment and services across the various components.

c. Resources and budgeting. Resources need to match the planning

assumptions, hence the importance of logistics in the planning matrix during the development of mission plans. In most cases, the availability of resources and the ability to pay for them will be important aspects. Budgets and cash flow need to be coordinated with the mission support required. Planning logistics and budget support is one of the key aspects of integrated mission planning and will need to take account of regional funding, international donor funding, reimbursement mechanisms, government-to-government arrangements through bilateral agreements, and contributions by national governments.

CIVILIAN COMPONENTS 57. Many specialist civilian personnel are required for the successful completion of a mission and such personnel must be carefully selected and adequately trained. The various civilian components required during a PSO must be intensely involved in the planning of their roles in a particular mission and should, as far as possible, join the planning team early on. CONCLUSION

58. At all levels the peace mission planning process must strive to identify the real underlying causes of a conflict and identify associated dependencies and linkages in a ”cause and effect” analysis. The PSO environment will be complex and the heads of civilian components and commanders at all levels must endeavour to identify where power and influence resides. They must also factor in society’s perceptions. Having gained a comprehensive understanding, they can set about creating the environment for reconstruction by other agencies. The military component of a PSO may support, but should not lead reconstruction efforts. Over and above this, a robust and carefully considered information campaign will be required to guard against the undermining effect of negative perceptions taking root both locally and internationally.

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