mood,modality and modal verbs (autosaved)

7/27/2019 Mood,Modality and Modal Verbs (Autosaved)

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Mood, Modality and Modal Verbs

1.Introduction

A distinction should be made between moodand modality.Modality is a semantic/

pragmatic concept while mood is a grammatical category. This distinction is similar to the

one between tense and time orgenderand sex oraspectand aspectuality.The primary function of mood is to express modality and refers to specific linguistic

forms or paradigms of forms, typically in verb inflection (Palmer 2001:4;

Huddlestone&Pullum 2005:172), as in the contrast between indicative (realis mood) ,

subjunctive, imperative, infinitive (irrealis mood).

Modality is defined as a linguistic category that refers to thefactual status of a state

of affairs/situation.Modality, hence, does not relate semantically to the verb alone but to the

whole sentence.

However, moodand modality are not always co-extensive . In many languages, not

mood but certain modal systems (e.g. modal verbs in English; cf. Palmer, 2001:4) are the

typical means of expressing modality.

On the other hand, not all functions of mood markers necessarily express modality;we also have the other side of the coin, namely markers of grammatical categories other than

moodmay help to express modal notions, e.g. the past tense form of the verb is used for

irrealis marking in English.

As far as English is concerned historical change has more or less eliminated mood

markers from the inflectional system (the only remnant is 1st/3rd person singularwere), the

mood system being ratheranalytic than inflectional(Huddlestone&Pullum 2005:172).

Modal concepts and attitudes can be expressed in English by:

(a) mood/inflectional markers : factual (indicative), non-factual (subjunctive,

infinitive form, imperative form)

(b) lexical modals:

(i) adjectives: able, bound, certain, compulsory, imperative, likely, necessary,

possible, probable, supposed, etc.

(ii) nouns: allegation, assumption, certainty, likelihood, necessity, possibility,

probability

(iii) verbs: assume, believe, declare, fear, hope, imagine, insist, permit,

presume, require, suspect, think, etc.

(iv)adverbs: allegedly, certainly, possibly, probably, presumably, undoubtedly,

(c) true modal auxiliaries: can, may must, shall, will, could, might, should, would,

ought to, need, dare.

(d) semi-modal verbs: have (got) to

Roughly, modality is centrally concerned with thespeakers/subjects attitude towards

the factuality oractualization of the situation expressed by the non-finite part of the clause

(the proposition p) (H&P:2002:173).

Consider the following sentences:

(1) (i) He wrote it himself

(ii) He must have written it

(iii) He must help him

(iii) He may help him

(iv)He may have written it


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A declarative clause like He wrote it himself is an unmodalised assertion : the

speaker is committed to the factuality of the proposition expressed (he write it) , i.e. the

proposition is taken as a factin the real world. Hence, the indicative moodis used.

On the other hand, a sentence like He must have written it is modalised ; the truth

of the sentence is presented as something that isinferredand not as something that is directly

known (epistemic modality)A sentence like You must help him expresses a different kind of modality which is

concerned with the actualization of a future situation, namely, you help him: I impose on

you the obligation to bring this situation about. (deontic modality)

The two modalised examples involve different kinds of modalities

(epistemic ,deontic) but they express the same concept, namely the concept ofnecessity.

The concept ofnecessity and the related concept of possibility are core concepts in

modality.

Modal possibility is illustrated in examples corresponding to the ones above by

replacing mustwith may.

The sentence He may have written it himselfexpresses thepossibility of his having

performed the eventuality described, i.e. it indicates an open attitude of the speaker towardsthe truth of the proposition (epistemic modality). Similarly, You may help him expresses the

possibility of your helping him, i.e. the speaker gives permission and thus a potential barrier

to the actualization of the situation is removed (deontic modality)

2.Distinctive syntactic and morphological properties of Modal Verbs

2.1. Modal verbs form a special class of auxiliary verbs, given their particular morpho-

syntactic properties which distinguish them not only from lexical verbs but also from other

auxiliaries such as aspectual be and have. (Avram, 1999).

(A) The NICE Constructions - Negation, Inversion, Code and Emphasis - distinguish between

modal verbs and lexical verbs, placing modals within the class ofaspectualauxiliaries:

(i) Negation can attach to the modal without do-support:

(1) It willnot work

(ii) Subject-auxiliary inversion is obligatory in questions and in tags, without do-support:

(2) Willit rain?

(3) She can walk, cant she?

(iii) Modals can appear in the code construction without do-support:

(4) Susan can help them andI can too /andso can I.

(iv) Emphatic polarity is possible without do-support:

(5) I WILL be there.

Besides the NICE properties, modal auxiliaries share the following properties with the

aspectual auxiliaries be and have:

(v) Stranding:

(6) He cantcome, but I can.

(vi) Precede adverb/quantifier:

(7) They willprobably/all come

(vii) Reduced forms:

(8) Shellcome later/ She wontcome later

(viii) Combinatorial and order restrictions; have, be and modals exclude any combination

with do (see III above); there are also rigid restrictions on the sequence of auxiliaries; this

indicates that auxiliaries have fixed positions:(9) She may have arrived/*She have may arrived


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She may be coming soon/*She is may coming soon

She has been reading/*She is having read

B) Properties that distinguish between modal verbs and the aspectual auxiliaries be and have:

(i) Modals show no person-number agreement:(10) *She cans do it

(ii) Modals cannot co-occur:

(27) *She must can help you vs. She must be able to help you

(iii) Modals lack non-finite forms, consequently are excluded from constructions that

require one. From a syntactic point of view modal verbs occur only in finite clauses:

(12) to have had had - having

to be -was been being

(*to) can could- *could *canning

*I regret not canning swim vs. I regret not being able to swim

*I have could swim since childhood vs. I have been able to swim since

childhood.*Id like to can swim vs. Id like to be able to swim

(iv) Modals can only select a bare infinitive as complement (except ought):

(13) They may come/be coming/have come

(v) The present /past distinction ; only some modal verbs exhibit a present/past

alternation (which is semantically neutralized in many

contexts):can/could/shall/should, will/would, may/might:

(14) She couldalready swim when she was seven. vs. She could have told

me the truth.

3. Types of Modality

As already mentioned Modality is realized in standard English mainly by the use of

modal verbs.

It has long been acknowledged that modal verbs are ambiguous along at least two

dimensions: (i) the root modal meanings and (ii) the epistemic modal meanings.

According to Kratzer (1991), In using an epistemic modal we are interested in what

else may (i.e. is possible) ormust (i.e. is necessary) be the case in our world given all the

evidence available. Epistemic modality is the modality of curious people like historians,detectives and futurologistsA historian asks what might have been the case, given all the

available facts. Using a circumstantial (=root) modal, we are interested in the necessities

implied by or the possibilities opened up by certain sorts of facts Circumstantial (=root)

modality is the modality of rational agents like gardeners, architects and engineers. An

engineer asks what can be done given certain relevant facts. This kind of information will

generally be supplied contextually.

The rootmodal meanings subsume deontic modality and dynamic modality.

Deontic is derived from the Greek for that which is binding, so that it refers to

concepts like obligation, permission. Deontic modality is concerned with the possibility or

necessity of acts performed by morally responsible agents. The authority (person,

convention, etc) from whom obligation, permission emanates is known as the deontic


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source.. Prototypically, deontic modality refers to the speakers attitude to the actualisation

offuture situations (H&P 2005:178)

Dynamic modalities are concerned with properties and dispositions (such as ability

and willingness) of persons referred to in the clause, especially by the subject NP.

Prototypically, no person or institution is identifiable as a deontic source. The boundary

between dynamic and deontic modality is often fuzzy, hence they are grouped together underthe heading root modality oragent-orientedmodality. Compare:

(15) (i) She can stay as long as she likes (deontic - permission)

(ii) She can easily beat everyone else in the club (dynamic- ability)

(iii) She can speak French (ambiguous) (H&P 2005:178)

Example (15i) gives permission, (15ii) is concerned with the subjects ability, while

(15iii) can be interpreted in either way, deontically, as permitting her to speak French or

dynamically as reporting her ability to do so.

Epistemic is derived from the Greek for knowledge and roughly deals with the the

possibility or necessity of an inference drawn from available evidence as to the truth(factuality) of past or present situations. Epistemic modalities arespeaker-oriented.

It is not the case that what is known is taken in the strong sense, but it should be

understood as what evidence the speakerhas in making an inference or drawing a conclusion.

This personalized kind of knowledge reduces in fact to the belief-sets of the speaker.

Epistemic modality involves thespeakers mental representation of reality and the evidence

he has for that representation based on inferential processes. The speakers mental

representation of reality is a meta-representation of reality (cf. Papafragou, 2000).

From the speakers point of view, the employment of epistemic modality rests

crucially on his ability to reflect on the content of his own beliefs. The speaker takes into

account the reliability of these beliefs and performs deductive operations on them. On this

picture, in the epistemic interpretation of modal verbs, the speaker uses the embedded

proposition (the non-finite partof the sentence) as a representation of an abstract hypothesis

he makes (i.e. meta-representation) and sees whether this abstract hypothesis is compatible

with, or entailed by his set of beliefs.

Note that an epistemically modalised assertion is weaker in strength than its non-

modalised counterpart (i.e. in the modalised sentence the speaker is less committed to the

truth of the sentence) although mustconveys epistemic necessity. Compare:

(16) San Marino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

(17) San Marino must be the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

Sentence (16) offers a piece offactualinformation and the speaker trusts it to be true.

In (17), the speaker possesses compellingevidence about the country with the highest life

expectancy in the world but the possibility that there are pieces of evidence beyond the

speakers beliefs is left open. These extra pieces of evidence may disconfirm the fact that San

Marino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world. That is why sentence (17)

is felt as weaker than (16) in spite of the fact that mustconveys epistemic necessity.

One obvious consequence of the fact that epistemic modality involves the speakers

mental representation of reality and the evidence he has for that representation is based on

inferential processes is that epistemic modals, unlike rootmodals, cannot appear sentence-

initially inyes-no interrogatives:

(18) May the race start?


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Is there permission for the race to start?

*Is it possible that the race starts?

(19) Should John leave?

Is it required that John leave?

*Is it predictable that John will leave?

In general, it is assumed that the rootuses of modal verbs are more basic, with the

epistemic uses rising by extension to the domain of reasoning of concepts primarily

applicable in the domain of human interaction, such as compelling and permitting (H&P

2005:178).

The sentences below are examples of root and epistemic uses of the modals mustand

may:

(20) (i) You must do as you are told (root necessity)

=you are required/obliged to do as you are told

(ii) She must have already left (epistemic necessity)

=it is a necessary assumption that she has already left(iii) John must be in class today (ambiguous)

(21) (i) You may go if you wish (root possibility)

=you are allowed to go if you wish

He may have left (epistemic possibility)

=it is a possible assumption that he has left

He may sleep downstairs (ambiguous) (H&P:178)

As the examples show, both epistemic and root interpreted modals show a two-fold

distinction between some kind of necessity (e.g. must, should, ought to, have to, need) and

some kind ofpossibility. (e.g. may, can).

According to H&P (175) the core modal concepts ofnecessity andpossibility concern

the strength of commitment (prototypically the speakers commitment) to the factuality

(epistemic)oractualization (root) of the situation: necessity involves a strong commitment,

possibility a weak one.

Deontic necessity, i.e. obligation (which may range from strong to weak) is expressed

by must,should , ought to, have to, need, while deontic possibility i.e. permission, is

expressed by may orcan.

Epistemic necessity is expressed by must, need, have to, should, ought to, while

epistemicpossibility is expressed by may and can. In its epistemic use, can, just like need, is

restricted to non-affirmative contexts.

3.1Root-Epistemic Contrasts.

In the literature on modal verbs, it has long been assumed that we can identify

grammatical features that distinguish between rootand epistemic readings of modal verbs. In

what follows we shall present a summary of the arguments for a structural epistemic-root

split, following Papafragou (2000)

3.1.1Properties of the Subject. It has long been noticed (Hoffman 1976, Jackendoff, 1974,

etc) that root readings of modal verbs, unlike epistemic readings of modal verbs impose

selectional restrictions on the subject. Utterances with expletive or inanimate subjects are


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anomalous with root modals, (irrespective of whether they denote necessity orpossibility),

while epistemic modals do not impose any restriction whatsoever:

(22) (i) It may be raining (It is possible/* is allowed)

(ii) The political uncertainty may lead to early elections (It is possible/* is

allowed)(23) (i) There must be a demonstration today (it is certain/*..is required)

(ii) The political uncertainty must lead to early elections (it is certain/*..is

required)

The distinct behavior of root vs epistemic modals was accounted for by assuming that

rootmodals involve requiredorpermissible actions performed by agents (hence in their root

interpretation modals take two arguments: subject NP and complement clause), while

epistemic modals involve the evaluation of a proposition aspossible ornecessary (hence they

take one single argument, namely the proposition as such)

The assumption that rootmodals have the ability to assign a subject role seems to be

supported by the fact that root readings undergo a meaning shift in passivisation, whileepistemic readings are unaffected:

(24) (i) Relatives may visit the students on Monday (permission)

(ii) Students may be visited by relatives on Monday

(25) (i) The home team may win the game (possibility)

(ii) The game may be won by the home team

The root readings of may in (24) differ in meaning: (24i) refers to the rights of relatives

while (24ii) involves the rights of the students. The epistemic use ofmay in (25) does not

show any meaning difference: both utterances communicate that there is a possibility that the

home team will win the game.

The generalizations concerning the properties of subjects are not absolute: expletives

and inanimate subjects may occurin root (deontic) statements:

(26) (i)There must be law and order in the country (it is required that; *it is

certain that)

(ii)The table should be ready for dinner at 7 (it is required that; *it is certain

that)

Root readings permission and obligation- require a responsible agent for carryingout the activity and in these cases the agent is identifiedpragmatically.

As far as the alleged meaning shift which root readings undergo in passivization is

concerned, it is to be noted that notall root statements undergo such a shift (examples from

Newmeyer,1970) :

(27) (i) Sam must shovel the dirt into the hole

(ii) The dirt must be shoveled into the hole

(28) (i) Visitors may pick flowers

(ii) Flowers may be picked by visitors

3.1.2. Properties of the Verbal Complement.


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It has also been noted that root and epistemic readings of modal verbs impose

different restrictions on the verbal complement from an aspectualpoint of view.

Viewpoint aspect: Epistemic interpretations allow the presence of perfect and

progressive aspectin the complement. Root interpretations exclude these forms. The

following examples only allow the epistemic reading:

(29) (i) He must have been very tired/She may have left

(ii) John must be joking/She may be sleeping

A consequence of the aspectual restriction is that epistemic readings have presentand

past orientation, i.e. the speaker evaluates propositions about past (29a) or present (29b)

events.

Lexical aspect: Individuallevel states (i.e. inherent properties of individuals: have

green eyes, be a native speaker, believe, know, etc) in the complement of the modal

force an epistemic reading, not a root reading of the modal verbs; root readings

broadly involve stage-level predicates (activities, events or stage-level states).These

predicates refer to situations that can be brought about by an individual:

(30) He must have green eyes like his mother (it is certain that.*it is required

that)

They may be native speakers of Dutch (it is possible that*it is allowed that)

People in this part of the world may believe in strange gods.

He must know the answer.

(31) You must behave yourself (it is required that..*it is certain that)You may go now (it is allowed that*it is possible)

Note, nevertheless, that once the above state predicates are coerced into an

achievementoractivity reading (contextually) the rootreading becomes available (examples

from Papafragou and Barbiers 1995); the second condition to obtain a deontic reading with

individual level states is that no co-reference be established between the subject and the

bearer of obligation (see example (32iv,v):

(32) (i) I must be the best chess player there is (i.e. become)

(ii) You must be honest . Do you understand? (i.e. act)(iii) You must believe in God or theyll burn you on the stake

(iv) The new professor must be a native speaker of Finnish

(v) My blind date must be tall.

Zagona (1990) remarks that when the complement of an epistemic modal is stative,

the eventuality-time of the verbal complement may be understood to be simultaneous with

the modal time (i.e. the time at which the modal evaluation obtains) ; a future-shiftedreading

is also possible . When the complement of the modal is eventive, its eventuality-time is

understood to be future-shifted with respect to the modal evaluation time (actually the

interpretation is ambiguous between a root and epistemic reading). Habituals and progressiveeventive predicates behave like stative predicates. Compare:


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Epistemic reading:

(33) (i) Jeremy must/should be in class today (simultaneous or future-shifted)

(ii) Jeremy must/should leave today (only future-shifted)

(iii) Jeremy must/should be lying on the beach by now (simultaneous)

Most root modals favour a future-shifted reading of the eventuality-time of the

complement relative to the modal evaluation time regardless of the aspectual class of the

complement of the modal, exceptin the case ofability readings ofcan and could.:

(33) (i) You may go now (the event of going isfuture)

(ii) She can swim (generic ability)

(iii) She could swim when she was five (generic ability)

3.1.3. Ordering Constraints . When an epistemic and a root modal co-occur, the epistemic

reading always scopes higher than the root, i.e epistemic > root.

In English, the co-occurrence of two modal verbs is syntactically constrained but wemay usesemi-modals and othermodal constructions (examples from Papafragou 2000):

(34) epistemic > root

They may have to go soon

He ought to be able to do it

He might be allowed to go there

According to Cinque the epistemic > root constraint belongs to Universal Grammar

(i.e. it is valid cross-linguistically). There are no co-occurrence restrictions if the modal

expressions are both root or both epistemic.

(35) root> root

You must be able to prove your innocence

Epistemic > epistemic

Necessarily, the solution to this problem may be false

3.1.4. Interrogatives. Epistemic modals, unlike root modals, cannot appear sentence-

initially inyes-no interrogatives:

(36) May the race start?

Is there permission for the race to start?

*Is it possible that the race starts?

(37) Should John leave?

Is it required that John leave?

*Is it predictable that John will leave?

Papafragou (2000) argues that it is hard to construct a context in which it would be

felicitous for the speaker to ask whether a conclusion is possible ornecessary with respect to

his own set of beliefs.


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However, once such a context becomes available, interrogative-initial epistemics

become acceptable. Consider:

(38) Might John be a liar?

Must John be a liar?

Such sentences involve deliberative questions in which the speaker addresses a

question to himself in an attempt to elaborate the evidence he has for a certain conclusion.

3.1.5.Negation. According to Coates (1983) negation affects the modal predication if the

modal has root meaning (in this case we speak of external negation), while it affects the

mainpredication if the modal has epistemic meaning (in this case we speak of internal

negation)

(39) You may [not be given this opportunity again] (epistemic) may [not ]

It is possible that you will notbe given - internal negation

You [may not ] enter (root) not [may]You are notallowed to enter -external negation

An exception is root mustwhere negation affects the verbal complement and the suppletive

form needis used (40):

(40) You mustnt eat it all must [not] (root)

It is necessary [that you noteat it all]internal negation

You neednt eat it all not[need] (root)

It is notnecessary [for you to eat it all]external negation

The above stated claim turns out to be wrong when other modals are taken into

consideration. Consider the examples below, where should, ought to (Cormack &Smith

2002) are interpreted outside negation (assume wide scope over negation, i.e. the negative

morpheme negates the predicate) irrespective of their interpretation:

(41) Alfred shouldnt eat nuts (root) should [not]

It is advisable [for Alfred notto eat nuts]internal negation

Bob shouldnt be late (epistemic) should [not]

It is predictable [that Bob will notbe late]- internal negation

Mary ought not to leave (root) ought [not]It is required [that Mary does notleave]- internal negation

There oughtnt to be a problem finding the way. (epistemic) ought[not]

it is predictable [that there will notbe a problem] - internal negation

A second group of modals consistently fall undernegation,i.e. it is the modal that is negated;

in these cases we have externalnegation: can, could, need, dare:

(42) George cannot swim (root) not [can] external negation

George is not able to swim

George cant be coming late (epistemic) not [can] -external negation

It is notpossible that George is coming late


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Hugh neednt leave (root) not[need] - external negation

Unicorns neednt exist (epistemic) not [need] - external negation

You dare not resign (root) not [dare] - external negation

In what follows we shall have a closer look at the way modal readings pattern withrespect to negation adopting the claim put forth by Cormack and Smith (2002) according to

whom the scope divide relative to negation seems to be broadly along the distinction

necessity vspossibility.

4. Modals and negation and the logical relation between necessity and possibility

4.1. It has long been noticed that necessity andpossibility are logically related.

In order to describe the logical relation between necessity and possibility we need to

consider their interaction with negation (H&P 175). As has been mentioned above, we need

to distinguish between internalnegation and externalnegation.

Whenever the negative applies semantically to the complementof the modal we speakof internal negation. We say in such cases that the modal has scope overthe negation or that

the negation falls within the scope of the modal.(as in (43i) below; the paraphrase with the

lexical modal is illuminating).

Whenever the negative applies to the modal itself we speak of external negation

since the modal falls within the scope of negation.(as in43 ii below). There are cases when

the two types of negation can combine(as in 43 iii). Consider the examples below:

(43) (i) He may [not have read it] (internal negation)

It is possible [that he didntread it]

(ii) He [cant ] have read it (external negation)

It is notpossible [that he has read it]

(iii) He cant not have read it.

It is not possible that he didnt read it

A second example is (44) below:

(44) (i) You mustnt eat it all (internal negation)

It is necessary [that you noteat it all]

(ii) You neednt eat it all (external negation)

It isntnecessary [for you to eat it all]

The equivalence between pairs of clauses expressing modal necessity (irrespective of

how they are expressed: must, need, necessarily, necessary etc) and possibility (irrespective

of how they are expressed: can, may, possible, possibly, perhaps, etc) is illustrated in the

examples below (H&P 176) where we use Nec for necessity, Pos forpossibility and P for

thepropositional contentHe be guilty; not-Nec and not-Pos indicate external negation

while not-P indicates internal negation:

Necessity Possibility

(i) He must be guilty He cant not be guilty [NecP]=[not-Pos not P]

(ii) He must be not guilty. He cant be guilty [Nec not-P]=[not-Pos P]


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As can be noticed from the examples above necessity modals scope over negation i.e.

not negates the complement of the modal (we speak of internal negation); possibility

modals scope under not (we speak of external negation). The paraphrases with lexical

modals are relevant and illuminating as we can see in (43) and (44).

According to Cormack and Smith (2002) the two exceptions would be:

(i) May, a possibility modal, where the relevant distinction is that between

epistemic and rootreading.

e.g.You may not leave = You are notallowed to leave; not [may] P

He may not be coming tomorrow=It is possible that he is not coming;

may [not P]

(ii) the necessity modal needwhich should be considered a negative polarity

item so it will always appearunder negation.

The pre-negative modals are labeled as Modal1 while post-negative modals as Modal2

in Cormack& Smiths analysis (2002). The positions for modals relative to NEG is givenbelow

PRE-NEG necessity: shall, should,must, will, would, ought to, be to, have to

Modal [Not] Possibility: epistemic reading only: may,might

POST-NEG possibility: can could, dare (only root)

Not [Modal] root reading only: may, might

necessity: need

5. The semantics of modal verbs

5.1 The most natural question that arises on the root-epistemic shift is: are modals

lexically ambiguous (e.g Palmer 1990, Coates, 1983), polysemous (e.g. Sweetser 1990) or

unitary in meaning (monosemous) (e.g. Wertheimer (1972) Perkins, 1983, Haegeman (1983),

Kratzer 1977,1981, 1991, Papafragou, 2000) ?

The root/epistemic alternation has been given various explanations:

(i) the distinction is determined at the syntactic level (e.g. Picallo, 1990): epistemics

are inserted at sentence (IP) level while root modals are inserted within the VPlevel;

(ii) the difference is determined in the lexicon (e.g. Ross, 1969,Jackendoff 1971,

Huddleston 1974): epistemics are lexically one place (intransitive) predicates,

corresponding to raising verbs, while roots are two-place (transitive) predicates

corresponding to control verbs. This would mean that root modals and epistemic

modals are distinct lexical items.

(iii) the distinction is determined contextually in the semantic/pragmatic component

(e.g Wertheimer (1972) Perkins, 1983, Haegeman (1983), Kratzer 1991,

Papafragou, 2000), i.e. the interpretive differences are determined by the

conversational background.


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The solution we adopt is the third one, namely a unitary semantic approach, i.e. a

common core for the meaning of each modal. The different interpretations modal expressions

acquire are context-dependent. The theoretical framework is the one suggested by Kratzer

(1991) and Papafragou (2000).

Lets take the following set of examples:

(45) (i) I must go on a diet

(ii) You ought to be ashamed

(iii) You may go home only if you have finished your work

(iv) You should acknowledge the authorities effort to fight crime.

(46) (i) You must be Johns wife.

(ii) That problem ought to be easy for a genius like you.

(iii) You may find that your love for opera is not widely shared here.

(iv) Since you are interested in industrial design, this course should be

useful. (Papafragou 2000:520)

Broadly speaking, the utterances in (45) involve a root modal base and convey that a

given state of affairs is consideredpossible (permissible) ornecessary (obligatory) in view of

some physical, moral, legal, social circumstances in the real world; on the other hand, the

utterances in (46) involve an epistemic modal base and convey that a given proposition

presents itself as a possible ornecessary conclusion in view of the evidence available to the

speaker . The evidence can be explicitly stated or inferred: e.g. in (46ii) in view of the fact

that you are a genius it is a necessary assumption that the problem is easy for you.

In the logic of modality, modal expressions in general are treated as propositional

operators (i.e. quantifiers) which quantify over a set of possible worlds (identified by the

non-finite part of the clause/the VP complement , i.e. the proposition) and relate to the

proposition under question. Modal operators express different types of commitment to the

truth of the proposition, i.e. a modal operator expresses an attitude towards the proposition it

operates on. This attitude is determined by the contextual and pragmatic information

required to understand the utterance.

5.2. All conversation presupposes a common conversational background (ormodal base).

The propositions in the conversational background are taken as premises in the

judgements people make about the truth of the utterance.1 To quote Papafragou a first

approximation to the meaning of modal verbs is that they express possibility or necessity with

respect to different types of modal base.

1 The propositions in the conversational background play an important role in human reasoning, since they are taken as implicit premises in the judgements

speakers make. These implicit premises are sometimes explicitly signalled by using phrases of the type: by virtue of what is known, by virtue of what is

reasonable/lawful, etc. For instance, all speakers/hearers in our real world interpret a sentence such as (1) as true in our solar system:

(1) Nothing can travel faster than light

When we talk to other people we generally suppose that they share with us a common ground, which is the same for all community members. As a rule, we do

not suppose that a person we address comes from another solar system regulated by other physical laws and where sentence (1) can be false.


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Consider the following set of examples that contains the various modal meanings of

the verb MUST (Kratzer (1977). In all the examples below the modal expresses some kind of

necessity and the paraphrases with the phrase in view of(in 43)give the preferred modal

base for the interpretation of the utterances :

(47) a. All Maori children must learn the names of their ancestors

b. The ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti

c. If you must sneeze, at least use your handkerchief

d. When Kahukura-mir died, the people of Kahunguru said: Rakaipaka must be our

chief

The verb MUST in (47a) has a deontic reading: it refers to a duty. The verb MUST in (47b)

is used epistemically: it refers to a piece of knowledge. The verb MUST in (47c) has been

called dispositional must: it refers to dispositions people have. The verb MUST in (47d) is

sometimes called preferential must: it refers to preferences and wishes.

(47) a.In view of what their tribal duties are, all Maori children must learn the names of

their ancestors

b.In view of what is known, the ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from

Tahiti

c. If in view of what your dispositions are - you must sneeze, at least use your

handkerchief

d. In view of what is good for us, Rakaipaka must be our chief

In order to account for the utterances in (47) Kratzer adopts a number of ingredients.

The three factors that are important and which underlie modal operators are:

the modal relation,

the modal base and

the ordering source

The modal relation is basically the relation of compatibility or logical consequence

(or entailment); this relation underlies the notion ofpossibility ornecessity.

The modal base and the ordering source are the two parameters along which the

conversational backgroundis defined.

The modal base is the set of possible worlds/domains where the propositions

considered as premises in the modal inference are true, i.e. worlds compatible with what isknown, worlds compatible with what is believed, worlds compatible with what is the norm,

etc. Such a background may be signalled by phrases such as in view of what is reasonable, in

view of what is desirable, orin view of what is known. The modal bases form the restrictions

for the particular modal expressions they are relevant to. According to Kratzer, the epistemic-

root distinction arises from the kinds of facts that are considered salient in forming a

particularmodal base.

Modal bases are generally inferredfrom the conversational context. As we can

notice, modal bases are organized in various domains: the factual domain (i.e. propositions

that describe the factual worlds), the regulatory domain (i.e., propositions that include legal

rulings, social regulations, religious rules, chess rules, etc.), the domain of moral beliefs (i.e.,

propositions that are descriptions of states of affaires in ideal worlds), the domain of


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desirability (i.e., propositions that are descriptions of states of affairs in worlds desirable from

someones point of view), thesocial domain, the biological domain, etc.

A particularly salient ingredient in interpreting modality is that it may have a strong

normative component. Modal judgements of the type exemplified so far imply not only a

modal base but also an ordering source, i.e., a set of principles that impose an ordering

among the considered alternatives.The ordering source is some ideal world with respect to which the worlds (i.e.

alternatives) in the modal base are to be considered, The ordering source further delimits the

domain over which the modal relation is taken to quantify.

In the examples below both should and must are necessity modals. The difference

between them is given by the ordering source :must is a strong necessity (NecP entails P)

modal ( the modal base is compatible with different domains, as in (47)), while should is a

weaker necessity modal ( in view of what is the norm ), i.e. the modal base is compatible only

with the normative domain:

(48) (i) Jeremy must be at Heathrow by now

(ii) Jeremy should be in class

As we have seen above (ex.47), one and the same modal verb can be evaluated with

respect to various modal bases. In the following examples (taken from Anna Papafragou,

2000) the verb CAN is evaluated in the pre-posed modal bases, which are thus made explicit;

in these contexts, CAN conveys different types of possibility (potential) :physical,social,

legal, biological:

(49) a.As a former champion, John can lift heavy weights

b.As a simple guest, John can dress casually

c.As a University employee, John can get health benefits

d.As a human being, John can have conscious mental states

To conclude, modal operators express different types of commitment to the truth of

the modalised proposition. The modality of the sentence signals the context in which it is

evaluated; this context is determined by the modal operator. What changes is the kind of

world or situation where the proposition is evaluated (i.e., what changes is the modal base,

that is, situations compatible with what is known, situations compatible with what someone

believes, etc.). More often than not modal bases are inferred from the pragmatic

/conversational context..

Modal expressions have incomplete orunder-specifiedcontent; we say that they aresystem-neutral. Their contents need pragmatic/contextual support on the basis of which

speakers process inferences that ensure the recoverability of modal verbs meanings. This

contextual support is assumed to be given by the modal base, the in view ofphrases, which

are contextually given or inferred.

Thus, a sentence that contains a modal verb is tripartite; it contains a modal operator

(i.e., the modal verb), a modal base/domain (i.e., a contextually specified set of propositions)

and the proposition p (i.e. the verbal complement). The introductory phrases in the sentences

in (49) above actually spell out the modal bases. This tripartite structure can be formalized as

follows:

(50) Operator (Restrictor, Matrix)


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In the case of modals the operator is the logical relation of entailment or

compatibility, the matrix is the proposition p (the complement of the modal) and the restrictor

is the modal base/domain (the restrictor may be either linguistically indicated or

pragmatically inferred) .

To exemplify, the meanings of CAN generally cover the notion offactual possibility

(potentiality) in the sense that factual circumstances in the modal base/domain do notpreclude an event x from happening (Klinge 1993, Papafragou 2000). A state of affairs is

potentialwhen it is compatible with the state of affairs in the real world and, hence, may

itself be actualizedat some point in the future. The introductory sentences in (49) spell out

the factual circumstances in the modal bases that underlie the interpretation of the modalised

sentences.

Operator Restrictor (Modal Base/domain) Matrix (Proposition p)

CAN in view of his physical ability John lifts heavy weights

In view of the social requirements John dresses casually

In view of university regulations John gets health benefits

The semantic/grammatical information of modal CAN spelled out above may be

formally stated as below (where p stands for the proposition while D for the modal

domain/restrictor):

CAN p is compatible with Dfactual

There are instances when the speaker - hearer misunderstand each other because they

may be mistaken in the recovery of the modal base/domain. Jokes are a good example to

illustrate misunderstanding in the identification of the right modal base/domain. (cf.

Papafragou, 2000:50). Suppose that a zookeeper says sentence (51) to his new assistant:

(51) The monkey can climb to the top of the tree

Later on in the day, the monkey is missing and the zookeeper is angry with the

assistant because he warned the assistant that the monkey was able to climb to the top of the

tree and so could escape. The assistant replies that he interpreted the sentence to be about

what the monkey was allowed to do, and was therefore not worried when the monkey

behaved in just this way. The misunderstanding is due to a modal domain/ base mismatch: the

zookeeper had in mindpotentiality in terms of the monkeysphysicalabilities (ability), while

the assistant had in mindpotentiality in terms of thezoos regulations (permission).

A further piece of evidence, which shows that interlocutors are sensitive to subtleaspects of the modal bases, is that speakers and hearers frequently shift and modify modal

domains/bases during the same conversational exchange. Imagine that Alice and her lawyer

have been discussing the prospect of Alices having a divorce. Alice utters sentence (52a) and

her lawyer replies as in (52b):

(52) a) I cant leave my husband penniless

b) Of course you can the law allows you to

The modal domain/base in (52a) includes assumptions about Alices feelings and moral

profile whereas in (52b) it includes assumptions about legal regulations. This example is a

clear demonstration of how the modal base/domain affects the truth-conditional content of amodalised sentence.


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In what follows we shall adopt the view that modal verbs have a core meaning on the

basis of which one can derive the vast range of possible interpretations that modals may

contextually receive (cf. Perkins, 1983, Kratzer, 1977, 1991, Papafragou, 2000).

To quote Kyle von Fintel (2006) ...in other words modal expressions have in of

themselves a ratherskeletal meaning and it is only in combination with the background

context that they take on a particular shade of meaning (such as epistemic or deontic).

5. Root and epistemic necessity . (must, need, need to, have(got) to, should, ought to ).

5.1 ROOT MUST

5.1.2. Of all the modals conveying deontic necessity, deontic MUST conveys strong

obligation. It is a typical member of the class of modal auxiliaries with all properties

applying unproblematically.

According to Papafragou (2000) the grammatical information that musthas is the one

in (53) below:

(53) must: P is entailed by Dunspecified

What this formula actually says is that must conveys necessity and (just like

possibility may) is semantically more general than other necessity modals (shouldorought

for instance) in the sense that it admits a variety of domains as restrictors and the

unspecified domain D has to be narrowed down pragmatically to sub-domains. Recall that

should, another necessity modal is restricted to a normative domain.

Coates (1983) interprets Root mustas being related to a cline extending from strong

to weak obligation (from it is obligatory/imperative to it is important/appropriate ).

The interpretation of must is complicated by the presence or absence of another

feature: the speakers involvement in the utterance. Consider the following examples:

(54) (i) You must be back by ten.

(ii) The president must formally approve the new Government before it

can undertake its duties.

(iii) The accused must remain silent throughout the trial.

(iv) In opening a game of chess, the players must move a pawn.

The most commonly conveyed type of necessity with must is purely deontic, the

obligation-imposinguse. This use arises in case :

(i) the modal restrictor involves a set of regulatory propositions which the

speakeris entitled to enforce;(ii) the speakerhas authority over the hearer

(iii) the heareris in a position to bring about the situation described.

The example in (54i) is prototypical deontic modality with the speaker as the deontic

source: the speaker is the one who imposes the obligation. Palmer (1986) calls this discourse

orientation while Lyons (1977), Huddlestone and Pullum (2000) as subjective, while

Coates (1983) calls it performative.

The interpretation of (54ii,iii,iv) requires regulatory domains of different types,

hence the sources of obligation are different: (54ii) expresses necessity with respect to the

Constitution, (54iii) a necessity with respect to judicial rules, (54iv) a necessity with respect

to the rules of chess. In all these case, therefore, the deontic source is not assumed to be the


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speaker but rather rules, regulations , law or even custom. Some grammarians call this

objective necessity.

In order to understand the distribution and interpretation ofmustvs have (got) to we will

assume with Palmer (1986), among others, that in the case of deontic mustthere are degrees

to which the speaker may be involved:

he may be totally involved;

he may be involved as a member of the society or body that instigates the action; or

he may not be involved at all.

Palmer (1979:93) correlates the degrees of speaker involvement as:

discourse-oriented deontic source

neutral oriented deontic source

external oriented deontic source

In example (54i) must is discourse-oriented in (54ii,iii,iv) the deontic source is

neutral (rules, regulations; the speaker is part of the system or he states what the rules,

regulation or law deontically requires).

5.2 . Generally speaking, in the case of deontic mustwe speak ofobligation which can be

defined associally-oriented deontic necessity. We have argued that with deontic mustwe can

identify different deontic sources:

the deontic source is the speaker/hearer who imposes an obligation on the subject to

bring about the situation described (the paraphrase could be I order/oblige you); with

first person subjects the speaker expresses self-imposed obligation (self-compulsion);

Coates (1983) argues that in this case we speak of weak obligation which simply

comes from the speakers sense of the importance of some action, the paraphrase

being it is important/appropriate :

(55) You must concentrate on one thing at a time

Tell him he must stop this dishonest behavior at once

You must clean up the mess right away

Must I answer all the questions?

If I must go there, why dont you say so?

I must remember to feed the cat later

I must work hard if I want to be a studentWhat I have promised I must do

I must do something about that leak

I must lose weight.

Anyway, we must consider seriously the Prom programme

Generally, the imposition of an obligation by the speaker involves animate subjects,

typically human, who are capable of performing the action.

Contextually, the force of obligation may be weakened to express emphatic advice,

invitation,suggestion, in contexts where the hearer/addressee is the beneficiary of the action

described; the state of affairs described by the proposition is desirable to the hearer and

beneficialto him..


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(56) I absolutely must walk home with you

You must see this movie.

You must come round and see us.

You mustnt miss this show.

You must keep everything to yourself, be discreet.

We must get together for lunch sometime.And you mustnt miss the Shakespeare play thats on at the Everyman Theatre

in Liverpool when you are there.

With first person subjects mustcan be used in a hedged performative sentence (the

speaker is performing what he is in the act of urging himself to do) with a limited number of

verbs, all related to the act of conversation: admit, say, confess, promise, warn, etc:

(57) I must admit that I was wrong

I must order you to leave the building at once

I must beg you to help me out of this mess

the necessity arises from some internal need, the subjects dispositions orproperties,

or by force of circumstances; we can speak here of self-compulsion as well. (Leech

1971) , H&P call this use ofmustdynamic must while Kratzer calls it dispositional

must. This use of must is sometimes found in the harmonic idiom must

needs(H&P:185)

(58) Eds a guy who mustalways be poking his nose into other peoples business.

(H&P)

Now that she has lost her job she mustlive extremely frugally.

I mustsneeze.We mustremember that the peasantry in those days didnt live on wages alone

(Coates)

They will eventually split, because either of them must needs have his own

way

This use can be pragmatically exploited in sarcastic questions conveying different

speech (i.e. non-literal) acts such as indirect directives. The subject is you and must is

invariably stressed; must could easily be replaced by will in the sense of insistence Leech

1971):

(59) 'Must you make that dreadful noise? (for heavens sake stop it)If you 'must smoke (='will smoke), use an ashtray

If you 'must behave like a savage, at least make sure the neighbours arent

watching.

the deontic source is objective(rules, regulations, custom, fate; the speaker is part of

the system or he states what the rules, regulation, law, etc deontically require); in this

case the obligation use ofmust may be found with inanimate orimpersonalsubjects

(among others Coates 1983, Papafragou (2000) in warnings, rulings and rules of the

type exemplified below:

(60) We must make an appointment if we want to see the Dean.Passengers must cross the line by the footbridge.


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Door must be closed when machine is in operation.

If you commit murder, Charlotte, you must be punished

Women must cover their heads in church.

Clay pots must have some protection from severe weather .(Coates)

Students must pay course fees before attending classes.

In England traffic must keep to the left.In a pessimistic assessment of the cold war, Eden declared There must be

much closer unity within the West before there can be effective negotiation with the

East

But with all due respects and allowances, it must truthfully be said that what

they heard was more syrup than sweet, more mannered than musical.

There must be a solution to this problem on my table this morning.

In such cases, mustcan be replaced by have to under certain circumstances which

will be stated when we discuss the semi-auxiliary have to.

5.2.1.Scope of negation with deontic mustAs already mentioned root must normally takes internal negation (i.e. mustnt = must [not P] or Nec

[not-P], the negative affects the main predication) and is interpreted as obligation not to do

something.

To negate the modality for necessity there is no appropriate form for must but

neednt may be used. In English, the negative form mustnt is generally used only

deontically. Hence, obligation can be externally negated by using need which takes external

negation (neednt=not Nec P) and which is interpreted as lack/absence of obligation. (The

semi-auxiliaries have to orhave got to also take external negation). Consider the examples

below borrowed from J. Coates (1983:39), Stefanescu (1988:455):

(61) You mustntput words into my mouth Mr. Williams

You are obliged,/ required notto put words

The present overdraft must notbe increased

We musttake no risk

Caravans must notbe parked here

Vs

(62) You needntanswer that question

you are notobliged/required to answer

The politics of the party does not and need notconcern them

I dont think we needworry about it

5.2.2 Temporal reference

As already mentioned, as far as temporal reference is concerned a distinction should

be made between the modal time, i.e. the time at which the obligation is issued, and the

situation/eventuality time, i.e. the time of the complement of the modal.

Generally, in the case of deontic modality (obligation, permission), the modal time is

presentwhile the time of the situation/eventuality is future: one can impose an obligation/or

grant permission on the animate subject to do something in the future but one cant impose

an obligation/grant permission in the past. Moreover, musthas no past tense (historically it is

itself a past tense form (Coates 1983:40).


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Whenever the sentence combines with a future time adverb, the adverb as such

qualifies as reference time for the event described by the VP complement of the modal e.g.

This must be discussed next week

In the discourseoriented deontic interpretation must needs no past tense. In the

neutral (objective)necessity interpretation, have(got) to is used to renderpast necessity or if

necessity isfuture orconditional. Consider the following examples, borrowed from differentsources:

(63) (i) I must have all your news: how long have you been there, and hows

that fabulous husband of yours.

(ii) You must tell me at once.

(iii) This must be discussed next week.

(iv) and we must do something about it.

(v) He gave the children their presents in early December but they didnt

have/hadnt got to open them until Christmas Day

(vi) Well,Ill have to think about it.

(vii) The next time you can take the exam is April. Otherwise, youll haveto wait till September

(viii) Yes well have to go out, if youre really going to do it, darling.

(ix) How long do they reckon were going to have to wait to find out if the

mortgage advance is forthcoming?

However, must can be used in reported speech where the context is past or with

internal monologue. Consider the following examples borrowed from different sources

(e.g.Jespersen, 1931, part iv:7; Coates 1983:40):

(64) (i) I told him he must either apologize or go away immediately

(ii) One thing was certain: the Government must make a distinct move of

some kind

(iii) Sapt began to know exactly how far he could lead or drive, and when

he must follow

(iv) Bill had reluctantly decided that Kay must be left in the dark

Quite exceptionally, deontic modality may combine with present or past situations

only withgeneral requirements, conditions, options, etc as in (65i) (present) or (65ii) (past)

(H&P 2000:184); in such cases musttakes the perfect infinitive:

(65) (i) We must make an appointment if we want to see the Dean.(ii) Candidates must have completed at least two years of undergraduate

studies.

It is required that candidates have completed 2 years of study

6.Epistemic Must : logical necessity, probability

6.1. In the case of epistemic must the modal base is assumed to consist of the speakers

belief-set, i.e. the speaker reasons (domain of the laws of reason) on the basis of evidence

reconstructed from encyclopedic and situation specific information.

According to Coates (1983), in its most normal usage, Epistemic MUST conveys the

speakers confidence in the truth of what he is saying, based on a logical process of deductionfrom facts known to him (which may or may not be specified). So, in the case of must, a


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necessity modal, knowledge-oriented necessity is interpreted as conclusion. According to

Leech (1976:72) Must is used of knowledge arrived at by inference or reasoning rather

than by direct experience.In each casea chain of logical deduction can be postulated.

Along the same lines, according to Palmer(1986:64), it is the notion of deduction or

inference from known facts that is the essential feature of MUST. Consider the examples

below:

(66) (i) Look at that house! Those people must have a lot of money.

(ii) It must be hot in there without air-conditioning.

(iii) The computer is on so someone must be using it.

(iv) What a sensible Mum she must be.

(v) It must surely be just a relic from the past.

(vi) She is a bridesmaid and she must be all excitement at the moment.

(vii) In such a war he must have been the captain of the protestant armies.

(viii) He must be working late at the office; the lights are on.

(ix) His teeth were still chattering but his forehead, when I felt it, was hot

and clammy. He said I must have a temperature (Coates 1983:41)

Must represents the strongest epistemic judgement one can make, nevertheless a

factual assertion makes a stronger claim than the strongest of all epistemic judgements.

Compare the following examples borrowed from Papafragou (2000:73):

(67) (i) San Marino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

(ii)San Marino must be the country with the highest life expectancy in the

world

(67i) states a fact, while (67ii) conveys that the speaker makes his assertion based on

evidence which may be incomplete.

Leech (1976:72) remarks that the knowledge arrived at indirectly by

inference/deduction is felt to be different from knowledge acquired by direct experience;

hence the sense of logically inferred can be weakened to logically assumed or even a

guess:

(68) (i) You must be Johns brother

(ii) You must be tired/thirsty

(iii) You must be a foot taller than I.

(iv) He must be well over 80 .

Epistemic mustcan also be used to express pure logical necessity with no element of

speaker-involvement as in the examples in (69i,ii).

(69) i) If it is a bird, it must have wings.

(ii) He is a bachelor, so he must be unmarried.

6.2.Temporal reference

6.2.1 With epistemic must, as already mentioned, the modal time is always present, while the

main predication usually refers to states or processes/events in the present, as the examples

below indicate; please notice the progressive form of the predicate:


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(70) (i) Judging from the noise , the children must be playing upstairs.

(ii) There must be some mistake.

(iii) He must be working late at the office.

Epistemic must very rarely occurs with future time reference, since a future time

reference would be open to a deontic interpretation e.g. He must come tomorrow/Thegovernment must act soon.

According to Huddlestone&Pullum (2001:182) the future+epistemic combination is

more likely in conjunction with harmonic surely (which is not used deontically): It must

surely rainsoon.

Palmer (1979:45) shows that be bound to could be used to express epistemic

necessity when the main predication refers to states or events in the future; according to

Coates (1983), Palmer (1979) the interpretation in such cases is it is inevitable that:

(71) (i) Its bound to come out though, I think.Its received such rave notices that

somebodys bound to put it on.

6.2.2.Must, as already mentioned has no past form, but sentences with epistemic mustmay

refer to situations that occurred in the past, since we can make judgements, at now, about past

situations. In such cases, the perfect infinitive (have-en) is used. Perfect have, just like

negation, belongs semantically in the complement; in such cases we speak of internal

perfect, i.e. the time reference of the modal is unaffected (i.e. present), while the time

reference of the verbal complement is past:

(72) (i) She must have arrived late last night

I confidently believe/I am sure that she came last night

(ii) She must have been such a pain in the neck to her Mum and vice versa

(Coates (1983)

(iii) He must have been dishing up the same lectures for 30 years at a

gradually slower and slower speed (Coates (1983)

(iv) I mean there must have been an awful lot of hit and misses, mustnt there?2

6.3. Negation

6.3.1 As already mentioned, in terms of negation, mustis anomalous : (a) with root meaning,

must takes internal negation, i.e. negation affects the main predication [Nec not-P], lack of

necessity (not-Nec P) being rendered by the suppletive form neednt(external negation); (b)

epistemic musthas no morphologically related negative .

For epistemic must, the more natural expression of impossibility in English is cantInfrequently, neednt can also be used (with a different meaning though). In colloquial

English neednt is replaced by not necessarily. (e.g.He neednt be guilty = He isnt

necessarily guilty) Compare:

(73) (i) He must have done it deliberately

it is certain that he did it

(ii) He cant have done it deliberately

it is not possible that he did it=it is necessarily the case that he didnt

do it

(iii) He neednt have done it deliberately

2 Note: mustntnever occurs with epistemic meaning except in tag-questions i.e. in what Halliday (1970:333)calls verbal crossing-out) (apud Coates 1983:44)


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it is not certain/necessary that he did it deliberately

6.3.2.Must, like all epistemic modals, does not occur in interrogative sentences. If it

does it is under very restricted circumstances. Papafragou (2000) argues that it is hard to

construct a context in which it would be felicitous for the speaker to ask whether a conclusion

ispossible ornecessary with respect to his own set of beliefs. More often than not, needmaybe considered the interrogative counterpart of epistemic must.

6.4. Harmonic combinations.

The term modally harmonic was introduced by Lyons (1977) and describes the

combinations that a modal verb may have with expressions (words or phrases) which

convey the same degree of modality; the modal expressions are said to be mutually

reinforcing:Im sure, surely, certain, necessarily, of necessity, inevitably (Coates 1983:46):

(74) (i) It mustsurely be valid.

(ii) It must necessarily have involved deception.

(iii) Anyone who says that must inevitably and of necessity be wrong.

7. NEED and NEED TO

It is important to make a distinction between the auxiliary verb needand the related

full or lexical verb need to. The modal needexhibits the modal properties described in 2.0

above and expresses both rootand epistemic necessity (Leech 1976, Coates 1983, etc).

Need to, on the other hand, forms interrogative and negative forms employing the

auxiliary DO and takes tense morphemes. The main verb to needfollowed by the to-infinitive

has practically the same meaning as when it is followed by a noun or gerund: e.g. He needs

to practice more=He needs more practice./My pen needs filling(Leech 1976:96).

7.1. ROOT NEED

7.1.1 As a modal auxiliary, need is a necessity modal and is characterized by all the

properties which define a modal. Needoccurs infrequently in affirmative contexts (mainly if

the context is non-assertive), i.e. this verb is chiefly restricted to non-assertive contexts, to

sentences containing a negative form or an adverb like only or hardly, or interrogative

sentences. In such contexts needsmain function is to provide the negative counterpart of

deontic must.

Deontic needntexpresses lack of obligation, and generally expresses the authority

of the speaker, being in complementary distribution with need to and have to (where the

deontic source is an external authority or circumstances). The paraphrase in such cases is it

isnt necessary/obligatory. Consider the examples below, borrowed from different sources(e.g. Coates 1983):

(75) (i) Im very grateful to you.

You neednt be. I told you. Im glad to do it.

(ii) I need hardly tell you that it was a most gratifying experience

(iv) He need have no fear.

(v) I do not think I need read subsection 2.

(vi) You neednt take that medicine any more

(vii) All you need do is go there and pay the money.

(viii) I wonder if I need be present.


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Needalso provides an additional interrogative form for the mustparadigm. Root needI/he

etc. is especially used when a negative answeris expected.Must I/he etc. does not have this

implication, i.e. we have an open question. Compare:

(76) (i) Must I wait for her now? (open question)

(ii) Need I wait for her now? (hoping for a negative answer)

7.1.2.Time reference

Neednt+short infinitive has only present (or extended present) reference , although

it can occur in indirect speech:

(77) (i) He needntcome tomorrow.

(ii) Need I say more?

(iii) I toldhim he needntcome if he didnt want to.

Just like must, needlacks a past tense (preterite) counterpart, so if we wish to refer to

real past time we use need to or have to instead. The same verbs are used for all thesituations where neednt lacks the necessary verb forms; if the absence of obligation or

necessity will exist only eventually or is dependent on some other event, need to orhave to is

used:

(78) (i) I didnt need/have to see him immediately

(ii) When you get an assistant, perhaps you wont have to work quite so

hard yourself.

(iii) I havent had to see a doctor for years now

(iv) We may not need to bring the subject up.

Deontic needntmay occur in the context of aperfect infinitive (have-en) to indicate

absence of obligation/necessity in the past, which was neverthelessfulfilled ; in the case of

deontic neednt have the proposition of opposite polarity is actually true3. In this case we say

that the perfect (have) has scope over the modal, we speak ofexternal perfectrendering what

is known as unreal pastor contrary to past fact. Hence, neednt+perfect infinitive always

expresses unreal past and contrasts with didnt need to/didnt have to which expresses real

past(i.e. the event described did not take place, as it was not necessary).

(79) (i) I neednt have gone there (but I went)

it wasnt necessary for me to go (but I did)

(ii) I didnt need/have to go there (so I didnt go)

7.2.EPISTEMIC need

Epistemic need is the interrogative and negative counterpart of logical necessity

must. It is quite infrequent. In colloquial English epistemic neednt is replaced by not

necessarily. (e.g.He neednt be guilty = He isnt necessarily guilty). According to Coates

(1981) epistemic need x? means is x inevitable?and can often be paraphrased with bound

to. Here are some examples borrowed from different sources Coates 1981, H&P 2001):

(80) (i) A: oh gosh, getting married is an awfully complicated business

3

Shouldnt have/ oughtnt to have/could have/might have are similar in sense to neednt have: with allthese modals there is an implication of the unreality of the event, with the further implication that the event didtake place.


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B: actually, it neednt be; it can be very straight forward

(ii) The basic questions for the new American administration are two: need the

quarrel with Cuba everhave happened, and can it be put into reverse?

(iii) I need look changed for I have been through much suffering, both in mind and

body

(iv) He neednt have told her(a) It isnt necessarily the case that he told her (epistemic-internal perfect)

(b) he wasnt obliged to tell her (but he did) (deontic-external perfect)

Past reference is rendered by need+perfect infinitive, as the example (80ii) shows.In

the epistemic reading ofneed the perfect auxiliary have is internal, i.e.it isnt necessarily

the case that/it isnt inevitable that x happened. This use is very rare and somewhat formal or

literary in style. In negative contexts need+have-en is usually interpreted deontically.

Actually the example in (80iv) is ambiguous between the epistemic and deontic reading, as

the paraphrases indicate.

7.3.NEED TOAs already mentioned need to is a regular verb having none of the properties of modal

verbs: it forms the interrogative and negative with the auxiliary do, it takes the whole range

of verb forms and assigns theta roles.

Semantically, need to, alongside need, expresses obligation/necessity, but while

needntgenerally expresses the authority of the speaker, (dont) need to parallels (dont) have

to/havent got to in expressing that it is an external authority or circumstances that

impose/remove the obligation or necessity for action.

The distinctions in meaning between needand need to occur only in the present tense

in view of the fact that the deficiencies ofneedare supplied by need to/have to, as already

mentioned.

With need to the deontic source is an external authority or circumstance. Compare:

(81) (i) You neednt cut the grass.

(ii) You dont need to cut the grass.

Sentence (81i) involves the authority of the speaker who exempts the subject from

cutting the grass; a possible paraphrase would be I allow you not to cut the grass; in (81ii) it

is the circumstance of the grass not having grown to need cutting that exempts the subject

from cutting the grass; a possible paraphrase would be it is not necessary ..

With past time necessity, as already mentioned, there is a sharp contrast between need

and need to illustrated below:

(82) (i) He neednt have gone there. (*so he didnt)

(ii) He didnt need to go there. (so he didnt)

In (82i) the deontic interpretation of need+have-en implicates that he didgo there, i.e.

it wasnt obligatory for him to go, but he did; (82ii) only conveys that it wasnt necessary for

him to go there; so the addition of so he didnt is possible for (82ii) but not for (82i).

Need to just like have to are more suited to expressgeneral, habitualactions; mustor

need (as well as have got to) are more suited to occur in statements referring to particular

occasions:


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(83) (i) Do I need to/have to show him my ID card every time?

(ii) Need/Must I show him my pass now?

8. HAVE (GOT) TO

8.0.Have to and have got to are not true modals but no discussion of mustor of the modals of

necessity would be complete without reference to them.Semantically, have (got) to is very similar to must. It can express both root and

epistemic meaning. It is acknowledged that have (got) to is most commonly used for deontic

necessity, and, unlike must, it is never discourse-orientedwith respect to the deontic source.

According to Leech (1976) the two meanings of have (got) to (deontic, epistemic) are

scarcely distinguishable in scientific and mathematical writing where the author is

expounding an abstract system of thought. To take an example, borrowed from Leech

(1976:73) Every clause has to contain a finite verb can be interpreted either as: every

clause is obliged (by the rules of language) to have a verb or It is necessary for every

clause to have a verb.

As already mentioned, the meaning ofhave (got) to is different from that of mustin

thepresentdue to the fact that , unlike must, it is not discourse-oriented, but ratherexternal-orientedwith respect to the deontic source, i.e.the subject is bound to do something because it

is the only course of action, the obligation being imposed by circumstances/authority which

are independent of the speaker or the addressee. Nevertheless, must and have(got)to may

share the same contexts, whenever the deontic source is neutral (H&P 2001:205; Coates

1981:55):

(84) Now that she has lost her job, she has (got) to live extremely frugally.

There is already a great imbalance between what a student has to pay if hes in

lodgings and what he has to pay if he is in a hall of residence.

Weve got tobear in mind that there is not one healthy fox.

In the examples above mustcan be substituted forhave (got) to. Must, however, is

not very frequent in such cases.

8.1. HAVE GOT TO

8.1.1. Have got to is generally substitutable for have to in colloquial English, except that

there are no non-finite forms (*to have got to; *having got to; *will have got to). Thus have

got to cannot occur in the following: We may/will have to leave early; I regret having to

refuse your offer.

Semantically, have got to is similar to must in expressing both root and epistemic

meaning; the latter, though, occurs only rarely in Br.E. In American English, though, havegot to is common in epistemic interpretation. Consider the following examples, borrowed

from different sources:

Root

(85) (i) There is a whole lot of literature youve got to read

(ii) Oh, well, hes got to go into hospital, you know.

(iii) This, I think, is something on which universities have got to begin now

to take a stand.

(iv) A really healthy effective Opposition which youve got to have if

youre going to shake the government.

(v) I began to beat my hands against the slime-covered wallsDontCharlotte. Youve got to stick it out for another few minutes.


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Epistemic

(86) (i) If youve seen all the old Frankensteins youve got to know all the

jokes.

(ii) Something has got to give in this second half, I think.

(iii) Youve got to be joking.(AE) vs. You must be joking (Br.E).(iv) Someone has got to be telling lies.

(v) This has got to be the worst restaurant in town.

(vi) There has to be some reason for his absurd behavior

(vii) Somebody had to lose the game.

8.1.2. Root meaning.

It is generally agreed upon that have got to, just like have to, indicate external

compulsion/obligation, i.e. have got to/have to is either neutral or external-oriented with

respect to the deontic source, but neverdiscourse-oriented.

Palmer (1979:93), Coates (1981:53) remark that, in certain contexts there is semantic

overlap between mustand have got to; actually, in all the examples in(85) above mustcan besubstituted freely (Coates 1981:53). The examples above do not indicate a discourse-oriented

statement, rather all the examples suggested are neutralwith respect to the deontic source

(see also Coates 1981). Consider, also, the following examples (offered by Palmer (1979:93))

that share similar contexts forhave got to and mustand which justify the belief that in such

cases the deontic source is neutral:

(87) (i) I musthave an immigrants visa. Otherwise theyre likely to kick me out, you

see.

(ii) Ive reallygot to know when completion date is likely. Otherwise I might find

myself on the streets.

Consider the example below which is a clear case of external compulsion/obligation

and hence rules out mustwhich is neverexternalwith respect to the deontic source:

(88) Theyre obliged by the curriculum in force to pass in various ways; theyve got

to/*must pass our section of it.

It should be noted that Root have got to, like must, is preferred in statements referring

toparticular occasions, i.e. have got to and mustare notused in habitual, general statements :

(89) (i) I must/have gotto feed the baby now; shes been crying for half and hour.(ii) I have to/*have got to/ *must feed the baby six times a day.

In the present, have got to (and have to), unlike must, implies actuality, i.e. the event

denoted by the verbal complement is under way at now. With must, on the other hand, the

event denoted by the verbal complement could only occur in thefuture.(Palmer 1979 apud I

Stefanescu 1988:455). This accounts for the use ofhave got to in the example below, where

mustcannot be used:

(90) Its slow walk down. Hes got to fight his way through the crowds.

Palmer (1979) shows that the sentence describes a boxer actually in the process of fightinghis way through.


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8.1.3. Temporal reference

Have got to, like must, has no non-finite forms, hence only have to can be used in contexts

requiring this form. Have to is also employed to supply for the whole range of verb forms

that have got to lacks.

Have got to may occur in the context of future time adverbs (alongside have to ) toindicate that the situation described is already planned and arranged for the future:

(91) We have got to be there at ten tomorrow

As mentioned above, in the present tense have got to implies actuality/accomplished

situation (see example 90).

The past tense form had got to is rarer and is suggested to be acceptable only in (free)

indirect speech contexts in BrE; moreover, had got to lacks the implication ofactuality, i.e.

the implication that the event actually took place. Compare the following examples (Palmer

1979:97):

(92) (i) We had to make a special trip down to Epsom to collect the bloody thing.

(ii) Wed got to make a special trip down to Epsom anyway, so it did not matter

very much.

(iii) She had got to think of some way out.

(v) I told him hed got to hurry up.

8.1.4.Negation

Dont have to/have not got to , like neednt, take external negation, i.e. the modal predication

is negated; do not have to/have not got to mean it isnt obligatory/necessary for.

(93) (i) They havent got to juggle about. Theyve got the total page copy.

8.1.5.Epistemic meaning

Have got to may occur in epistemic context but only rarely, as in (94) below:

(94) (i) If youve seen all the old Frankensteins youve got to know all the

jokes.

(ii) Something has got to give in this second half, I think.

In American English, however, have got to is common in epistemic interpretation,

where British English is likely to use must:

(95) (i) Youve got to be joking.(AE) vs. You must be joking (Br.E).

(ii) Someone has got to be telling lies.

(iii) This has got to be the worst restaurant in town.

In British English there is a difference of meaning between have (got) to and must.

Epistemic must is used of knowledge arrived at indirectly by inference orreasoning, i.e. a

chain oflogical deduction.

According to Coates (1983), in its most normal usage, Epistemic MUST conveys the

speakers confidence in the truth of what he is saying, based on a logical process of deductionfrom facts known to him (which may or may not be specified). Hence, logical necessity


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can easily become weakened to logical assumption or even guess. In the case of epistemic

mustwe speak of factual necessity (Leech 1976:73).

Epistemic have (got) to, on the other hand, never appears to be far away from its

deontic use; in this case the necessity is imposed by an idea, circumstances and hence we can

speak of theoretical necessity; as theoretical necessity means that the possibility of the

opposite state of affairs cannot even be conceived of, have (got) to has a stronger force thanmust and cannot be weakened, like must, to the interpretation of logical assumption.or

guess. (Leech 1976:73).

Compare the following examples:

(96) (i) Someone must be telling lies.

(ii) Someone has (got) to be telling lies.

(iii) You must be mad to do that.

(iv) You have (got) to be mad to do that.

While (96i) voices a mere suspicion, (96ii) sounds more like an accusation. What (96iii)

conveys is that the speakers conclusion from the evaluation of the subjects action is that thesubject is mad; (96iv) states that being mad is a necessary condition for acting in a certain

way. We notice that the difference in the epistemic interpretation ofmustand have(got)to is

given by the fact that in the case ofhave(got)to the deontic use is never far away.

According to Leech (1976), Huddlestone and Pullum (2001, Coates (1981), etc.

epistemic have(got) to is much less frequent, in British English at least, than must, because it

is frequently unidiomatic. A roundabout way of expressing theoretical necessity would be

the following negative alternatives:

(97) These lines cant be by anyone but Shakespeare

Nobody but Shakespeare could have written these lines.

8.2. HAVE TO

Have to has none of the properties of modal auxiliaries; it forms negation and

inversion with the auxiliary do and it is fully inflected (similar to need to with which it shares

a lot in common semantically and formally). Given its regular behavior have to acts as a

suppletive form of modal must/have got to, when the latter lack the necessary verb forms.

(98) (i) Im having to read this very carefully

(ii) I have had to give up the idea

(iii) I told him I had had to give up the idea(iv) We may have to change our plans

(v) Its a pity to have to give up the idea

(vi) No one likes having to pay taxes

Semantically, have to is similar to must/have got to; is has a deontic (obligation) and

an epistemic interpretation (logical necessity), the latter being infrequent, according to

different scholars. It is acknowledged that have to is most commonly used for deontic

necessity, and, unlike must, it is neverdiscourse-orientedwith respect to the deontic source,

but rather external-oriented orneutral-oriented with respect to the deontic source i.e. with

have to the authority comes from no particular source.


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(99) (i) You have to file a flight plan before you start,give an estimated time of

arrival,stick to certain heights,routines and landing drills

(ii) Will you say to him that I cant come to the meeting next Wednesday because

I have to go to a Cambridge examiners meeting.

As already mentioned, Palmer (1979:93), Coates (1981:53) remark that, in certaincontexts there issemantic overlap between mustand have to; actually, in all the examples in

(100) below mustcan be replaced freely by have to. As already mentioned, there are cases

when the speaker reports what someone else deontically requires or is himself/herself

committed; in such cases we said that the deontic source is neutral:

(100) (i) The verdict of a jury must/has to be unanimous:if its members are unable to

reach agreement , the case must/has to be retried before a new jury.

(ii) The University is sayingthese people must/have to be expelled if they disrupt

lectures

(iii) A new insistence from President Nixon that Hanoi government must/has to

negotiate if there is to be any settlement.

Epistemically, have to just like have got to expresses theoretical necessity (see 8.1.5)

8.3.Summary ofhave to/have got to in relation to must

The distinctions in meaning and usage between mustand have to/have got to occur

only in the present tense in view of the fact that the deficiencies of mustare supplied by

have to/need to as already mentioned:

Mustand have got to lack verb forms; have to supplies for the missing forms (101);

the variant withgotis more colloquial (101iv):

(101) (i) We may have to change our plans

(ii) Its a pity to have to give up the idea

(iii) No one likes having to pay taxes

(iv) Pensioners have (got) to be careful with their money.

Have to (similar to have got to) is neverdiscourse-orientedwith respect to the deontic

source; mustis neverexternal-orientedwith respect to the deontic source; it is only inthe neutral necessity

mood,modality and modal verbs (autosaved)

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