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NapoleonA Biographical Companion


David Nicholls

BSanta Barbara, California

Denver, ColoradoOxford, England

Copyright © 1999 by David NichollsAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or other-wise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writingfrom the publishers.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNicholls, David, 1949–

Napoleon : a biographical companion / David Nicholls.p. cm. — (ABC-CLIO biographical companion)

Includes bibliographical references and index.Summary: Describes the life, achievements, rise to power, and

influences of the military leader who crowned himself Emperor of the French and established dominance over Europe.

ISBN 0-87436-957-6 (alk. paper); 1-57607-191-X (UK only)1. Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769–1821. 2. France—Kings

and rulers Biography. 3. Napoleonic Wars, 1800–1815—Campaigns.4. France—History—1789–1815. [1. Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769–1821. 2. Kings, queens, rulers, etc. 3. NapoleonicWars, 1800–1815. 4. France—History—1789–1815.] I. Title.II. Series.DC203.N53 1999944.05'092—dc21[B] 99–22535

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ABC-CLIO BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANIONSBenjamin Franklin, by Jennifer L. Durham

Thomas Jefferson, by David S. BrownSusan B.Anthony, by Judith E. Harper

Napoleon, by David Nicholls

ABC-CLIO Biographical Companions are encyclopedic guides to the lives of

men and women who have had a significant impact on the social, political, and

cultural development of the Western world. Each volume presents complete

biographical information in an easily accessible format.An introduction and a

chronology provide an overview, while the A-to-Z entries amplify a myriad of topics

related to the person.A collection of documents and extensive illustrations give the

reader an acute sense of the individual’s life and times.

CONTENTSCONTENTS

Preface ix

Introduction xi

Napoleon 1Documents 265

Chronology 285

Bibliography 291

Index 305

PREFACEPREFACE

There are innumerable biographies ofNapoleon, of all sizes, in all lan-

guages, and written from widely differentpoints of view, and the stream shows nosign of running dry. Bonaparte has dividedhistorians as much as he divided and ex-cited his contemporaries, and political andnational prejudices, as well as particular in-terests, continue to color assessments of hisextraordinary life and his place in history.For every admiring or heroic account ofthe “greatest general in history” or the glo-rious emperor there is a belittling attack onthe upstart Corsican nobody.This situationwill never change, nor should it. Napoleon’scareer and personality are so intimatelyconnected with the circumstances that pro-duced him and the consequences of his ac-tions and ambitions that no bland consen-sus can ever do justice to them.

No consideration of Napoleon can ig-nore his relationship to the French Revolu-tion, a cataclysmic event that, despite un-convincing attempts to deny its significance,continues to divide opinions far outside thesmall world of professional historians. Norcan it gloss over neutrally the horrors of theyears of warfare on an unprecedented scalethat he unleashed in Europe and beyond.The unparalleled rise and fall of NapoleonBonaparte belong to the histories of France,Europe, and the world, and historians ofRight and Left, French and non-French,whose principal interests are political, mili-

tary, social, cultural, or religious, will con-tinue to provide readers with a complex andsometimes bewildering variety of differentperspectives.

The alphabetical entries in this volumehave been conceived to provide readers withan understanding of Napoleon as politician,ruler, soldier, revolutionary, administrator,dynast, and myth. They therefore cover awide range of topics in several categories: theprincipal events of Napoleon’s multifacetedlife; the broader events, movements, and in-stitutions that helped to shape his career;particular aspects of his styles of governmentand waging war; his family and the numer-ous other major personalities whose livescrossed that of Napoleon in significant fash-ion; the impact of Napoleon in differentcountries and of Napoleonic rule in Europe;and the construction and components of theNapoleonic myth. While the main focus isfirmly on Napoleon himself, the attempt ismade to place him in the broadest possiblecontext, in terms of his place in the makingof modern France and the reshaping of Eu-rope.Where specific achievements, whetherin domestic reform or on the battlefield, areassociated with Napoleon, his personal con-tribution is placed in perspective and duecredit given to other figures, whose namesare perhaps less well known outside specialistcircles.

The entries, then, allow the reader toview Napoleon from various angles. For

Preface ix

example, he looks very different whenviewed from Spain or from Poland, fromwithin the Grande Armée or from the salonsof Paris, from the French provinces or fromthe chancellories of the European powers.The views of some notable contemporariesmay also be found in the entries and docu-ments. No final assessment is given, nor can

the picture pretend to be complete. But thecomprehensive nature of the entries, withsuggestions for further reading indicated foreach entry, should guide readers toward arounded view of one of the towering fig-ures of European history in the context ofthe continent during one of the most cru-cial and fertile periods of its history.

x Preface

INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

The figure of Napoleon Bonaparte hasalways sharply divided opinions and

elicited strong emotions. As he himself saidwith a characteristic lack of reserve:“I am nota man, I am a historical figure.” He createdhis own legend and legends were createdabout him.The story of his rise to power andhis dominance in Europe exerts a kind of fas-cination which was felt at the time even byhis most determined opponents and whichhas extended into the twentieth century infilm and popular fiction.As we approach thetwenty-first century the Napoleon web site(http://www.napoleon.org) receives 20,000hits a month. “The worldwide interest inNapoleon is staggering,” says its editor-in-chief, who adds, probably going to the heartof the matter: “I don’t think anyone reallyknows how he was so successful.”

Napoleon’s influence can still be seen incontemporary France and beyond, whetherit be in providing the basis of French lawand the law of other European countriesand former French colonies, in the central-ization of French government, or in thetourist sites of modern Paris. Napoleon hasbeen and still is held responsible for manythings, including the political unification ofGermany and Italy and every authoritarianturn and movement in French history. Na-tional and ideological prejudices are still tobe found in historical writing about him.Napoleon was the man who imposed orderon revolutionary chaos and led his country

to greatness, or he was the oppressive des-pot who imposed tyranny, bloodshed, andsuffering on Europe. Napoleon’s relation-ship with the great movements of the nine-teenth and twentieth centuries—national-ism, democracy, imperialism—will foreverbe controversial and ensure that the fascina-tion will continue.

The author of one of the greatest novelsever written, based around Napoleon’s in-vasion of Russia, was a determined memberof the anti-Bonaparte camp. Leo Tolstoy inWar and Peace called Napoleon “that mostinsignificant tool of history who never any-where, even in exile, displayed human dig-nity” (Tolstoy 1982, p. 1285). For Tolstoythe flow of historical events “depends onthe combined volition of all who partici-pate in those events,” and “the influence ofNapoleon on the course of those events ispurely superficial and imaginary” (p. 932).So-called great men “are merely labels serv-ing to give a name to the event, and like la-bels they have the least possible connectionwith the event itself ” (p. 719). Napoleonwas the contemptible instrument of themovement of peoples that makes up whatwe call history.

The opposite view would emphasize theexertion of Napoleon’s will for good or ill,the shaping of events by the force of per-sonality. His downfall becomes a satisfyingpunishment for hubris, but with a tragic di-mension. It was another great French sol-

Introduction xi

dier, though of more modest ambition,Marshal Ferdinand Foch, who observed ofNapoleon:“He forgot that a man cannot beGod” (Herold 1983, p. 407). Or as one ofhis most notable intellectual adversaries,Germaine de Staël, expressed it, “‘Hewanted to put his gigantic self in the placeof mankind” (Herold 1983, p. 7).“The forceof his will,” she wrote,“consisted in the im-perturbable calculation of his egoism: hewas an able chess-player for whom thehuman race was the opposite party”(Kafker and Laux, eds. 1989, p. 18). For Tol-stoy’s fellow Russian,Alexander Herzen,“Itis possible to lead astray an entire genera-tion, to strike it blind, to drive it insane, todirect it toward a false goal: Napoleonproved this” (Best 1982, p. 203). WhetherNapoleon was a mere tool of history or acolossus imposing his will upon it, his liferepresented the extraordinary culminationof an extraordinary age, the “Age of Revo-lutions.” The principle of hereditarymonarchy, still dominant over the vast ma-jority of the world’s population, had beenchallenged first by the Americans then bythe French Revolution. Out of the latteremerged a man leading a nation who car-ried the revolutionary challenge to the au-tocracies of continental Europe and theconstitutional monarchy of Great Britainand who set himself up as the equal of theemperor of Austria, the tsar of Russia, orthe king of Prussia, exposing the illusions oftheir absolute power.The question of howthis happened bound to fascinate eventhose who find it repulsive or dangerous.

For many of those in other countrieswho had welcomed the French Revolu-tion, Napoleon represented the ultimatedisillusion. But for strong minorities inGermany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Holland, andelsewhere he maintained the hope broughtby the armies of the Revolution, at least fora while.Yet for all he embodied somethingunique and unforeseen. Even Tolstoy, manyyears later and from the depths of his con-tempt for Napoleon, could not help testify-

ing, despite himself, to the remarkable na-ture of his appearance on the scene ofFrench and European politics: “A man ofno convictions, no habits, no traditions, noname, not even a Frenchman, emerges—bywhat seems the strangest freak of chance—from among all the seething parties ofFrance, and, without attaching himself toany one of them, is borne forward to aprominent position” (Tolstoy 1982, p.1344). How had this happened? “Why,how,” writes Alistair Horne, “could this lit-tle Corsican nobody have climbed fromnowhere to the top of the world and haveachieved so much?” (Horne 1996, p. xx).

Napoleone Buonaparte was born on 15August 1769 in Ajaccio, the capital ofCorsica, as the second of the eight chil-dren of Carlo Buonaparte and MariaLetizia Ramolino Buonaparte. The mo-ment was a crucial one in the history ofhis native island. Napoleone’s parents hadbeen supporters of the Corsican patriot,Pasquale Paoli, and the pregnant Letiziahad carried Napoleone in her womb asshe and her husband fled from Paoli’s de-feat by the Genoese rulers of Corsica.However, Genoa ceded Corsica to France,and Napoleon was born a subject of KingLouis XV. The Buonaparte family hadtheir claim to noble status confirmed bythe French, but they were far from rich.Until his death in 1785 Carlo made asometimes precarious living as a lawyerand cultivated connections with the newFrench rulers, which enabled him to sendhis children to be educated in France.

Accordingly, in January 1779 Napoleoneand his elder brother Giuseppe (laterJoseph) were sent to school at Autun, but inApril the nine-year-old who now calledhimself Napoleon entered the militaryschool at Brienne. During his five yearsthere he was distinguished chiefly by afierce Corsican nationalism and an aptitudefor mathematics. In October 1784 hemoved to the École Militaire in Paris, gradu-ating as a sublieutenant of artillery in Sep-

xii Introduction

tember 1785. Reports from his schools de-scribe the young Napoleon as “reservedand hard-working,” “extremely egotistical,”and “extremely ambitious” (Schom 1997, p.7), indicating possibly a sense of superioritycompensating for his outsider status as a rel-atively poor provincial, speaking Frenchwith a strong Corsican accent.

Napoleon spent the years between1785 and 1791 first with the La Fère Ar-tillery Regiment at Valence and then at theArtillery School at Auxonne. He thereforeobserved the early dramas of the FrenchRevolution at a distance.The monarchy ofLouis XVI, facing the last and most seriousof the interminable financial crises that af-flicted the ancien régime like a recurringcancer, had been forced to call the repre-sentative Estates General, which met forthe first time since 1614 on 5 May 1789.The storming of the Bastille on 14 July1789 marked the symbolic beginning ofthe Revolution. Under popular pressurethe Estates General, transformed into theConstituent Assembly, created a constitu-tional monarchy with the king as “the firstcitizen of France.” The abolition of nobleprivileges in the army was to open thepath to promotion to many an ambitiousjunior officer.

As the new revolutionary regime slippedtoward war with monarchical Europe, Na-poleon was promoted to first lieutenant inApril 1791, lieutenant colonel in April1792, and captain in May 1792. But thiswas no orderly progress. Napoleon’s boy-hood hero, Pasquale Paoli, had returned toCorsica in 1791, but soon showed that hewas prepared to shelter Corsican indepen-dence under either French or British pro-tection. Napoleon and his brother Lucien,on the other hand, had embraced Jacobin-ism, standing for popular government andcentralization. Napoleon was in Ajaccio inApril 1792, where the Second Battalion ofCorsican Volunteers of the National Guard,of which he was lieutenant colonel, was in-volved in rioting.

As France declared war on Austria, Na-poleon returned to Paris in time to witnessthe overthrow of Louis XVI when a revo-lutionary crowd invaded the Tuileriespalace on 10 August 1792.The king’s feeblebehavior in the face of popular unrest madea lasting impression on Napoleon.“If Louishad shown himself on horseback,” he wroteto Joseph, “he would have won the day”(Herold 1983, p. 40). By September Napo-leon and Lucien were back in Corsica, ac-tively agitating against Paoli in the Jacobinclubs, but the veteran patriot still enjoyedmajority support on the island. While inParis the French Republic was proclaimedon 22 September 1792, the situation inCorsica continued to deteriorate, culminat-ing in open revolt against France in March1793. In June the entire Buonaparte familyfled to the mainland, arriving in Toulon onthe thirteenth.

The events in Corsica had preventedNapoleon from being involved in the re-markable victory of the Revolutionaryarmy over the invading Prussians at Valmyon 20 September 1792. Now he returnedto duty with his regular rank of captain asthe Jacobins, dominated by MaximilienRobespierre, tightened their grip on powerin Paris.The beginning of the Terror in July1793 sparked the federalist revolt againstParisian rule. In September Napoleon wasassigned to the army besieging Toulon, thebiggest French naval base in the Mediter-ranean, where the federalist rebels werebeing supported by a British fleet. Whenthe French artillery commander waswounded, Napoleon, on the initiative of hisfellow Corsican, Antonio Cristoforo Sal-iceti, took his place and drove out theBritish fleet, enabling the recapture ofToulon. At the age of twenty-four, Na-poleon got his first taste of military gloryand popular acclaim, and was promoted togeneral of brigade.

But if the mass armies of the Revolutiongave unprecedented opportunities to ambi-tious soldiers, politics could still make the

Introduction xiii

life of a general difficult if not precarious.Assigned to the staff of the Army of Italy inFebruary 1794, Napoleon needed politicalprotection, principally from Paul Barras,when after the overthrow and execution ofRobespierre on 28 July 1794 (10 Thermi-dor Year II) he was briefly imprisoned atAntibes as a Jacobin. Back in Paris in May1795 Napoleon refused an assignment tofight against the royalist and Catholic rebelsin the Vendée and was instead transferredbriefly to the Topographical Bureau.

His next opportunity for fame was againprovided by the internal opposition. Unrestin Paris, arising from economic problems,turned in a royalist direction, aimed againstthe ruling Convention.When dangerous re-volt spread through the streets on 13Vendémiaire Year IV (5 October 1795) Na-poleon saved the Convention with his whiffof grapeshot, leaving up to four hundreddead. A grateful but nervous Barras securedhis promotion to general of division andcommander of the Army of the Interior.

At the age of twenty-seven Napoleonwas a Republican hero but in grave dangerof becoming an overmighty general. Hisambitious nature was evident for all to see.“It is said that I am an ambitious man,” hewrote later,“but that is not so: or at least myambition is so closely bound to my beingthat they are one and the same” (McLynn1997, p. 286). But what direction wouldthis ambition take? The new government ofthe Directory, installed in November 1795,inadvertently provided the answer. On 2March 1796 he was appointed commanderof the Army of Italy. In the continuing warwith Austria France had suffered some em-barrassing and potentially very serious de-feats in the Rhineland. Part of the responsewould be to seize the initiative from theAustrians in Italy. Young General Buona-parte could be the man to achieve this,serving the Directory while being kept at asuitable distance from Paris.

Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand in Sep-tember 1797: “All great events hang by a

single thread. The clever man takes advan-tage of everything and neglects nothingthat may give him some added opportu-nity” (Herold 1983, p. 72). He now madeuse of his extraordinary ability to inspire histroops and the willingness of the revolu-tionary French to ignore the “rules” ofeighteenth-century warfare to seize the op-portunity handed to him by his uneasy po-litical masters. Before setting off for Italy,Napoleon married Joséphine de Beauhar-nais, the Creole widow of an aristocraticplanter from the West Indies executed dur-ing the Terror, and one of Barras’s numer-ous mistresses. Hurrying from his weddingto Nice to take over his command, hechanged his last name from Buonaparte toBonaparte.

The Italian campaign of 1796–1797made Napoleon the military hero of Franceand alerted Europe to the new name ofBonaparte. Faced by superior Austrianforces, he fought a war of maneuver acrossnorthern and central Italy, preventing theenemy from ever concentrating his forcesand imposing a series of resounding defeatson separate Austrian armies. Napoleon en-tered Milan in May 1796, after the battle ofLodi, and brought the campaign to an endby finally securing Mantua in February1797. Striking north out of Italy toward Vi-enna, Napoleon, showing a haughty disre-gard for the hesitations of the Directory,forced Austria to sign the Treaty of CampoFormio, which ended the First Coalitionagainst France, leaving only Great Britainstill at war.

To the French people Napoleon seemedto bring glory in war and strength in peace,and for the first time he made use of armybulletins to promote his image.With his stir-ring speeches to his troops (some probablyconcocted after the event) and exaggerated ifnot downright fictitious accounts of his ownbravery, soon to be immortalized in printsand paintings, Napoleon re-created himselfas the incarnation of all the military virtues.More usefully for the Directory, he created

xiv Introduction

the Cisalpine Republic in northern Italy as a“sister,” that is subordinate, Republic toFrance and sent millions in treasure to re-plenish French coffers. For as long as hecould, he would continue to make con-quered peoples pay for their own subjection.

With only Britain left at war withFrance, plans were mooted for an expedi-tion against England, but cooler heads, in-cluding Bonaparte’s, prevailed. Instead Na-poleon, together with the Directory’sMinister of Foreign Affairs, Charles-Mau-rice de Talleyrand, urged an expedition toEgypt as a way of disrupting British rela-tions with India and possibly even invadingthe colony. Here again we may possibly de-tect the Directory wishing to dispatch thethreatening general as far away as possible.The Revolution’s obsession with the classi-cal past made the Directors nervous about apossible new Julius Caesar.

Napoleon’s Egyptian adventure prefig-ured the later Napoleonic Wars in thatwhile he won victory after victory on land,the British established domination of thesea. While Napoleon defeated the army ofthe Mameluke rulers of Egypt in the Battleof the Pyramids on 21 July 1798, theBritish under Horatio Nelson destroyed theFrench fleet at the Battle of the Nile on 1August. And while Napoleon busied him-self with completing the conquest of Egyptand reorganizing the country along Frenchlines, a new Coalition, including the Ot-toman Empire, nominal ruler of Egypt andSyria, was formed against France.The daysof the Directory were numbered.

In Paris a purge of the Directory on 18June (30 Prairial) 1799 had consolidatedthe position of Barras while promoting theveteran revolutionary Emmanuel Sieyès.These two and other conspirators wereconvinced that a change of regime,strengthening the executive power, wasnecessary. Napoleon too, whose sense of hisown destiny was swelling, was persuadedthat he could “save France.” Leaving hisarmy in Syria he sailed for France, landing

at Fréjus on 9 October. The events of 18Brumaire (18 November 1799) whichoverthrew the Directory started as a parlia-mentary coup and ended as a military coup.Napoleon’s personal conduct did not showthe sublime confidence that he doubtlesswished, and he had to be rescued by thequick thinking of his brother Lucien andJoachim Murat’s grenadiers. But his trumpcard with the people was that he could poseas a “savior above party,” putting an end tofactional strife. Sieyès and others may havewanted a new balanced constitution for thenew Consulate regime; what they got wasdictatorship.

The Constitution of the Year VIII, pro-claimed on 12 December 1799 and subse-quently approved by questionable plebis-cite, created a complex governmentalsystem, but First Consul Bonaparte ruled.An amended Constitution of the Year X in1802, similarly approved by popular vote,made him consul for life. But first heneeded a general peace in Europe to con-solidate his power, and that meant anothercampaign against the Austrians in Italy.Napoleon crossed the Alps again in May1800, and within a month the battle ofMarengo assured what the royalist agentHyde de Neuville described as “the bap-tism of Napoleon’s personal power” (Furet1992, p. 218). Now, he was later to claim,he fully saw his destiny stretching out be-fore him.

Peace was finally achieved with Austriaby the Treaty of Lunéville in February 1801and with Britain by the Treaty of Amiens inMarch 1802. As war staggered towardpeace, Napoleon and his supporters startedthe work of reforming France.Almost all ofNapoleon’s constructive work, the influ-ence of which is to be felt in France to thisday, was either completed or commencedin the years before the declaration of theempire in 1804. His purpose and historicalrole as he saw it was to bring the Revolu-tion to an end, to draw a line ending theturbulence of the revolutionary decade and

Introduction xv

place French government on new, stableground under his overall control.

Napoleon applied his own peculiar ideaof the democratic legacy of the Revolu-tion: “My policy is to govern men as thegreater number wish to be governed.That,I think, is the way to recognize the sover-eignty of the people” (Wright 1984, p. 26).His rule was authoritarian but inclusive: ca-reers were open to the talented, and mostroyalist émigrés were invited to return toFrance, with only the royal family and themost irreconcilable excluded. The finalamnesty of April 1802 excepted only abouta thousand émigrés. The administration wascentralized, with prefects appointed for alldepartments in March 1800.Work on newlaw codes began in August 1800, and thefinal Civil Code, known as the CodeNapoléon, ensured that those who profitedmost from the Revolution, the peasants andbourgeois who had acquired confiscatednoble and church lands, held onto theirgains. The various Napoleonic codes arestill the basis of French law today.

The most urgent act of reconciliationachieved under the Consulate was a newreligious settlement. The Catholic Churchhad been persecuted under the Revolution,and a short-lived attempt had been made toreplace Christianity with a new cult of theSupreme Being. The imposition of theCivil Constitution of the Clergy had cre-ated an underground refractory Church,and Catholicism was one of the main driv-ing forces behind counterrevolutionary re-volt in western France, principally in theVendée. The Revolutionary calendar hadeven abolished Sunday as a day of worshipand rest. However, within a few weeks ofthe coup of 18 Brumaire, on 28 December1799, churches were reopened on Sundays,and in November 1800 Napoleon begannegotiations with the newly elected PopePius VII for a fresh agreement with the pa-pacy.The signing of the Concordat in July1801 established a close relationship be-tween church and state which was to last

for over a century and reconciled theCatholics, the overwhelming majority ofthe population, to the regime.

The Church had, however, permanentlylost its monopoly control over French edu-cation. A new state system, designed to in-culcate young people with antimonarchistvalues and create a new governing elite forFrance, was initiated by the law on publiceducation of 1 May 1802. It was to be sixyears before a monopoly of teaching wasvested in the new Imperial University, andthe new centralized education structurenever functioned fully under Napoleon.But here again Napoleon’s scheme laid per-manent foundations.The new elite second-ary schools, the lycées, are still the lynchpinof the French educational system.

By the middle of 1803 Napoleon wasconsul for life and had taken the majorsteps in creating a new regime in his ownimage.There was no doubt that the Revo-lution was over. But there was no guaran-tee that the new order, resting in essenceon the life of one man, would last anylonger than its predecessors, nor that rela-tions with the rest of Europe could be any-thing other than an armed truce. Na-poleon’s stance remained aggressive. Hebecame president of the Republic of Italy,formerly the Cisalpine Republic, in Janu-ary 1802, annexed Elba and Piedmont toFrance later in the same year, and inter-fered with British trade.

War between Britain and France re-sumed in May 1803. French troops occu-pied Hanover, Britain’s only possession incontinental Europe, and in December theFrench army encamped on the Channelcoast near Boulogne was given the title ofArmy of England. But hostilities remainedat a low level in 1804, as Napoleon tookthe final step in consolidating his personalpower by declaring himself emperor ofFrance.

The discovery in February of a royalistplot, involving Generals Jean Moreau andCharles Pichegru, to kidnap First Consul

xvi Introduction

Bonaparte revealed both the vulnerabilityof the regime and the personal nature ofNapoleon’s power. Napoleon becamehereditary emperor of the French in May1804, proclaiming himself the heir ofCharlemagne, the great early medieval kingof the Franks and Holy Roman Emperor.The full extent of his overreaching ambi-tion stood revealed to the world.

Napoleon’s coronation in December1804 was a particular affront to the HolyRoman Emperor Francis II, head of thehouse of Habsburg and by tradition suc-cessor to Charlemagne. As Napoleon as-sumed the title of king of Italy in May1805, annexed Genoa to France, and ap-pointed Joséphine’s son, Eugène deBeauharnais, viceroy of Italy, a new Coali-tion of Austria, Britain, and Russia wassigned on 9 August 1805. Napoleon aban-doned the invasion of England, and theArmy of England became the GrandeArmée and marched into Germany.

In his campaigns of 1805 and 1806 Na-poleon transformed the map of Europe.After his victories at Ulm (20 October) andAusterlitz (2 December), he could imposehis terms on the defeated Habsburgs andgive a free rein to his dynastic ambitions.His elder brother Joseph was made king ofNaples, and a new kingdom of Holland wascreated with another brother, Louis, asking. The Holy Roman Empire was dis-solved and most of Germany reorganized asthe Confederation of the Rhine under Na-poleon’s tutelage.

All this provoked Prussia into action, butthe belated entry of the largest Germanstate besides Austria into the fight againsthim only succeeded in raising Napoleon tothe height of his power.The Prussians alliedwith Russia, but Napoleon acted with typi-cal speed, defeated the Prussians at the bat-tles of Jena-Auerstädt on 14 October 1806,and on 27 October entered Berlin, thePrussian capital. However, this was not theend of Prussian resistance. On 7–8 February1807 Napoleon fought the bloody but in-

decisive battle of Eylau against the Prussiansand Russians before on 14 June finallycrushing the Russians at Friedland. Hecould dictate his own terms to the otherpowers in the Treaty of Tilsit (July 1807),which allowed him without fear of contra-diction to call himself master of Europe. Hisyoungest brother, Jérôme, became king ofWestphalia, and a new duchy of Warsaw wascreated from lands held by Prussia inPoland. At a famous meeting on a raft an-chored in the river Niemen,Tsar AlexanderI of Russia was forced into an alliance withNapoleon which was destined to last until1812.

But even at the summit of his glory, Na-poleon’s empire was vulnerable to erosionfrom two sources, soon to be combined:Great Britain and Spain. Even before histriumph at Austerlitz, Horatio Nelson’s de-struction of the French and its allied Span-ish fleet at Trafalgar on 21 October 1805had confirmed British mastery of the seas.Having abandoned all plans for an invasionof England, Napoleon’s only weaponagainst his irreconcilable island enemy, theprincipal trading nation on the oceans, waseconomic warfare. The Continental Sys-tem, inaugurated by the Berlin Decrees of21 November 1806, was meant to prohibitall trade, even by neutral countries, withBritain, thereby sealing it off from conti-nental Europe. A reluctant Alexander wasforced at Tilsit to commit Russia to theblockade.

Although industry in some areas of Eu-rope, notably Belgium and the Rhineland,was to benefit from the ending of Britishcompetition, the System was doomed tofail in its goal of bringing Britain to itsknees by ruining its finances and provokingsocial unrest. Smuggling and other methodsof avoidance, often connived at by Frenchofficials, were rife; some countries, includ-ing Louis Bonaparte’s Kingdom of Holland,effectively ignored it; and its consequencesserved to heighten the unpopularity ofNapoleonic rule in Europe. Napoleon was

Introduction xvii

forced first to strengthen then eventually togrant exceptions to the ban. Britain repliedwith its own Orders in Council againstFrench trade, and in a commercial trial ofstrength there could in the long run beonly one winner.

Britain’s strategy in the struggle againstNapoleon was based on providing subsidiesto his opponents and harrying France onthe seas and in its colonies, but withoutcommitting British ground forces to fight-ing on the Continent.The only exceptionwas in the Iberian Peninsula. French inter-vention in Spain and Portugal began in late1807, and when on 30 November GeneralJunot’s forces occupied Lisbon, it markedthe beginning of the draining and bloodyPeninsular War, Napoleon’s “SpanishUlcer,” which was to last until June 1813.His decision to include the peninsula in hisdynastic plans was a necessary consequenceof the Continental System: Napoleoncould not allow the vast gap in his block-ade represented by an independent Spainand Portugal, free to trade with Britain, togo unplugged.

Napoleon deposed the Spanish Bour-bons and installed his brother Joseph asking of Spain, but the rising of the peopleof Madrid against Joachim Murat’s Frenchoccupation forces in May 1808 signaled thestart of a war which was to cost Francedearly in blood and money and badlyweaken Napoleon’s empire. When hebriefly took personal command in Spainbetween November 1808 and January1809, he left the country convinced that itwas pacified. But neither the emperor norhis Grande Armée could be everywhere atonce. Further victories and the extension ofhis power in Germany and Italy had to bepaid for by an ever increasing burden oftaxes and conscription imposed on thepeoples of the empire. Almost everywhere,this burden came to outweigh the liberat-ing effects of Napoleonic rule embodied inthe law codes and the abolition of outdatedsocial regulations and constraints.

Austria resumed hostilities against Na-poleon in April 1809, seeking to capitalizeon popular discontent with his imperialrule by proclaiming the German War ofLiberation. In a momentous few monthsbetween April and July, Napoleon defeatedthe Austrians in the campaign culminatingin the battle of Wagram on 5–6 July, aBritish army under Arthur Wellesley, the fu-ture duke of Wellington, landed in Portugal,Pope Pius VII excommunicated Napoleon,France annexed the Papal States, and thepope was arrested.

Napoleon was now in a position to at-tain the summit of his personal and familyambitions: to gain for the Bonapartes a per-manent place among the ruling dynasties ofEurope. He may have been master of Eu-rope, but his power was still personal, aheartbeat away from destruction. Heneeded an heir, and the Habsburgs, hum-bled once again by his military prowess,could be his instruments. There can be nodoubting Napoleon’s genuine affection andrespect for Joséphine, but such human con-siderations could not be allowed to influ-ence or to dim the glory of the self-styledsuccessor of Charlemagne.

The divorce of Napoleon and Joséphinewas pronounced on 15 December 1809,and in February 1810 Rome was annexedto the French Empire. Napoleon’s heir wasto bear the title of king of Rome, the sameborne by the heirs of the defunct HolyRoman Empire. On 1 April 1810 Napo-leon married the eighteen-year-old Marie-Louise, daughter of the former HolyRoman Emperor, now retitled Francis I,emperor of Austria, and their son, known tohistory as Napoleon II or the king ofRome, was born on 20 March 1811. ButNapoleon’s hope that the established mon-archs of Europe would recognize his heirwas not to be fulfilled. From the Austrianpoint of view the match with Marie-Louisehad been a marriage of convenience. Theoldest ruling house in Europe would neverconsider the Corsican upstart as an equal.

xviii Introduction

Meanwhile Napoleon’s system of satel-lite kingdoms ruled by members of hisfamily was beginning to crumble. Napo-leon’s displeasure at Louis Bonaparte’s tooindependent behavior as king of Holland,especially in circumventing the ContinentalSystem, led to his deposition and the an-nexation of the kingdom to France in July1810. His brother Joseph was merely ashadow king of Spain, where the tide ofwar ebbed and flowed between Napoleon’smarshals on the one hand and British,Spanish, and Portuguese forces supportedby Spanish guerrillas on the other. Napo-leon’s military strategy had always beenbased on concentrating his own and theenemy’s forces to his advantage and deliver-ing a decisive blow, as at Austerlitz or Wa-gram. Such an approach was completely in-applicable in Spain, where even at themoments of greatest French power therebels always held some territory, howeverlittle, and the guerrillas could never be de-cisively subjugated. Napoleon’s usual strat-egy was to prove equally inapplicable inRussia.

Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812,eternalized in Tolstoy’s War and Peace, hasbecome a byword for the nemesis of over-reaching power. Like Charles XII of Swe-den before him and Adolf Hitler in thetwentieth century, Napoleon was to facedestruction in the endless reaches of theEast. Contrary to one popular misconcep-tion, Napoleon’s Russian adventure waswell planned and supplied. Preparationsbegan in January 1811, immediately afterAlexander I had signaled the end of his un-willing alliance with Napoleon by breakingthe Continental System, and continuedthroughout the year.

A secret alliance between Russia andSweden in March 1812 was followed by theformal declaration of the Sixth Coalitionagainst France, in which the two northernpowers were supported by Britain and indi-rectly by rebel Spain. In May Napoleontook command of the multinational Grande

Armée, assembled in East Prussia andPoland, and on 24–25 June crossed theNiemen into Russian territory. Althoughpresented to the French people in grandterms as motivated by the desire to destroythe permanent threat to Europe posed byRussian power, Napoleon’s vast enterprisewas above all meant to punish the tsar forleaving the continental blockade. It was farfrom being the crazy or impossible enter-prise it may appear with the benefit ofhindsight. But the refusal of the Russianarmy to engage in the one big battle Napo-leon always sought rendered all his plansworthless. The only major battle of thecampaign, at Borodino on 7 September1812, was fought to a bloody stalemate.

The Russian refusal to talk peace whilehis army remained on their soil eventuallyforced Napoleon into the harrowing anddisastrous retreat from Moscow, less than amonth after his occupation of the ancientcapital of Russia in September 1812. Hisvulnerability was exposed to the world, andhis reluctant allies and satellites would notbe slow in abandoning him. Napoleon lefthis army on 5 December to hurry back toParis, where the conspiracy led by the half-mad General Malet had spread the news ofhis death in Russia. In the early months of1813, Prussia broke from its alliance withNapoleon and joined Russia against him;northern Germany rose against Napoleonicrule; Sweden, ruled by Marshal Bernadotte,reinforced the coalition; Austria broke theFrench alliance but remained neutral untilAugust; and the French finally evacuatedMadrid.

All Europe was now united against Na-poleon.The final Grand Alliance was com-pleted in August 1813 when Austria aban-doned its neutrality to take part in drivingNapoleon’s forces from Germany.Althoughhe showed all his old expertise and daringin the campaigns of Germany in 1813 andFrance in 1814, it was now acknowledged,not least by his marshals and his legislatorsin France, that Napoleon’s cause was lost.

Introduction xix

The “Battle of the Nations” at Leipzigon 16–19 October 1813 led to the collapseof the Confederation of the Rhine and theKingdom of Westphalia and Napoleon’s re-treat from Germany. With Wellington’s ad-vance through northern Spain to the Pyre-nees, Napoleon was having to fight on twofronts at once, and could rely on nothingbut his own boldness and rearguard actionsby his commanders. As the Allies crossedthe Rhine in January 1814 and JoachimMurat, king of Naples, defected in a desper-ate attempt to retain his throne, Napoleonstubbornly refused all offers of peace. Buteven his brilliant series of actions in easternFrance in February could not stop the Al-lied advances from east and south.

Wellington entered Bordeaux on 12March; Marshals Marmont and Mortiersurrendered Paris to the Allies on 31March; the marshals refused to continue thefight; and after a final attempt to preservethe dynasty by abdicating in favor of hisson, Napoleon abdicated unconditionallyon 11 April 1814. Marie Louise and theking of Rome were placed in the custodyof Francis I of Austria, and Louis XVIII be-came king of a France restored to its fron-tiers of 1792. Napoleon began his exile onthe island of Elba on 4 May.

Napoleon’s empire was thus reduced toa small island off the coast of Italy, but evenhere he kept up the illusion of power, witha court and a tiny army. He was denied anyaccess to his wife and son, and was sad-dened by the sudden death of Joséphine ather château of Malmaison on 29 May 1814.Meanwhile the powers of Europe met todecide the future political shape of theContinent at the Congress of Vienna,which opened in September 1814. It was tolast until June 1815. Die-hard conservativesmight delude themselves that the clockcould simply be turned back to the ancienrégime, but the effects of the Napoleonic“episode” had been too profound. TheCongress had to struggle toward a newconcept of the balance of power, with a

new order guaranteed by the great powers,including France.The erstwhile Allies eachpursued their own interests in the comfort-able but fallacious belief that Napoleon hadbeen dealt with once and for all.

The difficult negotiations at Vienna wereinterrupted in March 1815 by the astonish-ing news that Napoleon had sailed fromElba on 25 February, landed in France nearCannes on 1 March, and was marching to-ward Paris picking up soldiers on the way.The adventure of the Hundred Days, agamble that seemed as if it might succeed,shows Napoleon’s awareness of the divi-sions among his enemies. He could stillcount on considerable support in the army,whose officers and men were threatenedwith loss of pensions and unemployment.Disillusion with the restored Bourbons andtheir reactionary and vengeful supporterswas widespread, and peasants in particularfeared the restoration of the ancient rightsand privileges of the nobility. As far as onecan tell, however, among the bulk of thepopulation Napoleon’s return engenderedneither great enthusiasm nor great hostility.People were prepared to wait and see howthings turned out.

By the time Napoleon arrived in Parison 20 March and the Hundred Days, prop-erly speaking, began, Murat had already at-tacked the Austrians in Italy. An AdditionalAct to the Constitutions of the Empire(usually referred to as the Acte Additionnel),drawn up by Benjamin Constant, hithertoan opponent of Napoleon, created a newtheoretically liberal empire, guaranteeingbasic freedoms and a stronger representativeelement in government. But even if Napo-leon was serious about his new democraticfeelings, he was denied the opportunity toput them into practice. His return forcedthe Allies to put their quarrels aside and or-ganize new united action against the resur-gent usurper.

Acting quickly, on 13 March the Con-gress of Vienna declared Napoleon an out-law, banished from the empire.The Austri-

xx Introduction

ans defeated Murat in Italy, and Wellingtonwas given overall command of Alliedforces. Napoleon’s only hope lay in adopt-ing his old strategy, delivering a decisiveblow against the enemy’s forces, and forc-ing them to negotiate. The chosen battle-ground was the southern Low Countries.His army crossed into Belgium nearCharleroi on 15 June. If the battle of Wa-terloo was, in Wellington’s words, “a close-run thing,” this was because of Napoleon’sspeed of action. But the conjunction ofWellington’s British, Dutch, and Hanover-ian forces with the Prussians under Geb-hard von Blücher gave the Allies a defini-tive victory. Napoleon abdicated for thesecond and last time on 22 June 1815 andthe Allies entered Paris on 7 July.

Napoleon himself fled to Rochefort onFrance’s Atlantic coast, and surrendered toCaptain Maitland of the British shipBellerophon on 14 July.The problem of whatto do with the deposed emperor was off-loaded onto the British government. Hewas declared a prisoner in British custody,and on 7 August left Plymouth on boardHMS Northumberland for exile on the re-mote British Atlantic island of Saint He-lena. His final exile began on 16 October1815.

During his exile on Saint Helena Napo-leon clung stubbornly and arrogantly to hisdignity against the alleged persecution ofthe British governor, Sir Hudson Lowe. His“suffering”’ on his isolated place of exileand his death on 5 May 1821 mark the endof one story and the beginning of another—the Napoleonic legend. The fallen em-peror dictated his own particular version ofhis glorious but peace-loving career and hispresent miseries to his Irish physician, Dr.Barry O’Meara, and especially to his faith-ful attendant, the count of Las Cases. Themercurial nature of the Napoleon pre-sented in the myth as it took shape after hisdeath represented the contradictions andcomplexities of the real Napoleon in an ex-aggerated form, with the sufferings and de-

struction resulting from his actions forgot-ten.The combination of military glory, en-lightened government, and the “liberating”empire provided a ready arsenal for thoseopposed to the real and apparent conser-vatism and conformity of the restored orderin France and Europe.

Napoleon’s remains were returned toFrance and interred in the Invalides on 15December 1840. The July Monarchy ofLouis Philippe hoped by this gesture to rec-oncile Bonapartists to the Orleanist regime,but after the Revolution of 1848 the elec-tion of Napoleon’s nephew, Louis Napo-leon, subsequently the emperor NapoleonIII, as president of the Second Republicdemonstrated the continuing power of theNapoleonic idea, especially among theFrench peasantry.And elsewhere in Europenationalists and liberals in Poland, Italy,Spain, and other countries continued tolook back on the Napoleonic era as a pre-cursor of liberty. His blatantly dishoneststatement on Saint Helena that his GrandDesign had been to found a European Fed-eration of Free Peoples found a kind of val-idation in his legend.

Napoleon’s influence is deeply evidentin France to this day, and the effects of hislaw codes detectable throughout Europeand elsewhere in the world. The CodeNapoléon is still the basis of French law; thestructures of the administration and the ju-dicial and education systems are stillNapoleonic, despite the decentralization ofthe 1980s. The monuments he orderedform an indelible part of the urban land-scape of Paris. Napoleon had declared toGeneral Jean Moreau in 1800: “Greatnesshas its beauties, but only in retrospect andin the imagination” (Horne 1996, p. 14).He may be best remembered as a militarygenius, but his enduring greatness is as thelast of the enlightened despots. And a largepart of that greatness lay in providing stablegovernment for France so that the devisersof laws and administration could go abouttheir business.

Introduction xxi

Napoleon had come to power, astonish-ing though it may be to recall the fact, as apeacemaker.Yet he brought fifteen years ofintermittent but barbarous warfare to Eu-rope and was prepared to sacrifice the peo-ple in whose interests he was convinced heruled on the altar of military greatness. In-credibly hardworking, he declared thatpower was his mistress and had simple tastesand few amusements. He served power andglory while promoting his own family witha definite Corsican clannishness.

Yet Napoleon’s despotism revealed thecomplexities of his character as an heir to theEnlightenment and the French Revolution.The comparisons sometimes made with latertyrants of European history are misplaced.Napoleon inhabited a different mental uni-verse from an Adolf Hitler or a Joseph Stalin,and not only because of the genuine benefitsbrought by his rule to the peoples subjectedto it. His ideals were classical or inspired byCharlemagne: he was the great emperor who

was also the bearer of a theoretically humanecivilization. But these ideals were combinedwith a ruthless opportunism and pragmatismand an all too readily expressed contempt forother people and their motives.

The historian George Rudé sums upNapoleon well as “a man of action andrapid decision, yet a poet and dreamer ofworld conquest; a supreme political realist,yet a vulgar adventurer who gambled forhigh stakes” (quoted in Horne 1996, pp.28–29). There are many Napoleons, de-pending on the angle from which he isviewed—tyrant and liberator, cynic andRomantic, enlightened administrator andruthless soldier. Pieter Geyl’s Napoleon: Forand Against (1954) ends with the greatDutch historian’s famous statement thathistory is “argument without end” (quotedin Gates 1997, p. 1). The arguments aboutNapoleon are inherent in his character, inwhat he built and what he destroyed.Theywill surely go on “without end.”

xxii Introduction

AAbdication, First (April 1814)

N apoleon’s first abdication wasforced upon him by the Allies and

his own marshals after the surrender ofParis on 31 March 1814 by Marshals LouisMarmont and Joseph Mortier. Napoleonblamed Joseph Bonaparte for leaving Parisand authorizing Mortier to treat with theAllies, exclaiming: “He lost me Spain, nowhe has lost me Paris!” But the key playerswere Tsar Alexander I and Charles-Mauricede Talleyrand.

Napoleon, installed at Fontainebleau,decided to march on Paris, but on 1 AprilTalleyrand formed a provisional govern-ment in Paris with the support of the tsarand on 3 April persuaded the Senate to de-pose the emperor. On 4 April Napoleon’smarshals refused to march, and he reluc-tantly abdicated in favor of his son, Napo-leon II, king of Rome. However, his at-tempts to secure the continuity of theBonaparte dynasty were doomed to failure.Marmont and his corps had gone over tothe Allies on 3 April, and the tsar and Tal-leyrand backed the restoration of the Bour-bons in the person of Louis XVIII. Mar-mont was blamed by Napoleon’s supportersfor the seeming restoration of the ancienrégime, the order that had provoked theRevolution.

Napoleon vowed angrily to march onParis, but the marshals again refused to fol-

low him, and on 6 April he abdicated un-conditionally. By the Treaty of Fon-tainebleau (11 April 1814) Napoleon wasgiven sovereignty over the island of Elba,with an annual income of two millionfrancs from France. The Empress Marie-Louise was to be duchess of Parma, Pia-cenza, and Guastalla, and generous pensionswere provided for all the Bonapartes. Theempress’s feelings about possibly followingNapoleon into exile are unclear, but herfate was decided by her father, the EmperorFrancis I, who took her and her son to Vi-enna. Napoleon was never to see themagain.

On the night of 12 April Napoleon ap-parently tried to commit suicide, taking apoison capsule which he had carried withhim for two years, but he soon recovered.Nothing was left for him but to proceed tohis new tiny island empire. On 20 April hebade an emotional farewell to the soldiersof the Old Guard in the White Horse courtof the château of Fontainebleau, and on 4May was installed on Elba.

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Louis XVIII, King of France; Marmont,AugusteFrédéric Louis Viesse de; Marshals;Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de

Suggestions for further reading:Arnold, Eric A., ed. 1994. A Documentary Survey

of Napoleonic France. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, pp. 326–327.

Abdication, First 1

A

Hamilton-Williams, David. 1994. The Fall ofNapoleon:The Final Betrayal. London: JohnWiley.

Mackenzie, Norman. 1982. The Escape from Elba:The Fall and Flight of Napoleon, 1814–1815.New York: Oxford University Press.

Petre, F. Loraine. 1994. Napoleon at Bay, 1814.London: Greenhill.

Abdication, Second (22 June 1815)

A fter his defeat at Waterloo on 18June 1815, Napoleon hurried to

Paris, arriving on 21 June. Great crowdsgreeted him, shouting their support outsidethe Elysée Palace, where he was lodged.“The voice of the Nation speaks throughthem,” he declared to Benjamin Constant,but this was reckoning without the Cham-ber of Representatives established by theActe Additionnel of 22 April 1815. Napo-leon’s brother Lucien and Marshal LouisDavout, minister of war, urged him to de-clare the nation in danger, dissolve the leg-islature, and assume dictatorial powers tocontinue the war, but at the same time theChamber met and passed a decree makingit treason for Napoleon to dissolve them.

On 22 June Napoleon abdicated in favorof his son:“I offer myself as a sacrifice to thehate of the enemies of France” (Arnold1994, p. 357). But the Senate voted againstNapoleon II, while the Chamber of Repre-sentatives, led by Marie-Joseph de Lafayette,appointed a provisional governing councilheaded by Joseph Fouché. Fouché immedi-ately contacted Charles-Maurice de Tal-leyrand and arranged the restoration of LouisXVIII, who reentered Paris on 8 July. Napo-leon, meanwhile, had retreated to Malmai-son, where he bade farewell to members ofhis family, and from there to Rochefort,where his brother Joseph urged him to fleeto the United States. Napoleon, refusing tosneak away like a thief in the night, surren-dered to Captain Maitland of HMS Bellero-

phon and appealed for refuge in England. Hisappeal was denied, and he was exiled toSaint Helena.

The result of the second abdication wasthe second restoration of Louis XVIII and apartial return to the ancien régime underthe Bourbons.

Related entries: Fouché, Joseph; Louis XVIII,King of France;Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de



Brett James,Antony. 1964. The Hundred Days:Napoleon’s Last Campaign from EyewitnessAccounts. New York: Macmillan.



Thornton, M. J. 1968. Napoleon after Waterloo:England and the Saint Helena Decision.Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press

Aboukir Bay, Battle of

See Nile, Battle of the

Acte Additionnel (1815)

D rawn up by Benjamin Constant,the Additional Act to the Constitu-

tion of the Empire, usually referred to asthe Acte Additionnel, was meant as the newconstitution of the empire following Na-poleon’s escape from Elba during the Hun-dred Days. It guaranteed equality beforethe law, individual liberty, freedom of reli-gion, and liberty of the press. Executivepower rested with the emperor, whonamed and removed ministers, but waslimited by the Senate and a Chamber ofRepresentatives elected by electoral col-leges composed according to the Constitu-

2 Abdication, Second

tion of the Year X. Promulgated on 22April 1815 and approved by referendum(but with a huge number of abstentions),the new constitution was only applied fortwo months, in the period leading up tothe battle of Waterloo. Meant to be thebasis of a new, liberal empire, it satisfiedfew: republicans were angered by the lim-ited franchise and liberals by the extent ofthe emperor’s powers.

Related entries: Constant, Benjamin; HundredDays




Schom,Alan. 1992. One Hundred Days: Napoleon’sRoad to Waterloo. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Wood, Dennis. 1993. Benjamin Constant. Londonand New York: Routledge.

Ajaccio

N apoleon’s native town is situated onthe west coast of Corsica, over-

looking the Gulf of Ajaccio, the largest gulfon the Corsican coast. In 1793, on Napo-leon’s advice, Ajaccio was made capital ofthe new department of the Liamone, and in1811 when Corsica was united as one de-partment Napoleon made Ajaccio the capi-tal, which it remained until 1975, when theisland was once again divided into two de-partments. It is now capital of Corse du Sud(southern Corsica). Napoleon’s birthplace,the Maison Bonaparte, has been a museumsince 1923, while the Napoleonic Museumexhibits artifacts relating to the Bonapartefamily, including Napoleon’s baptism cer-tificate and the death mask made at SaintHelena.

Related entries: Corsica

Alexander I, Tsar of Russia(1801–1825)

B orn in 1777, son of Paul I and grand-son of Catherine the Great, Alexan-

der’s seemingly kaleidoscopic character hasled biographers to dub him “the enigmatictsar” and “the sphinx of the north.” He waseducated in the ideals of the Enlightenmentby his tutor, the Swiss philosophe Frédéric-César de La Harpe, but also inherited a loveof all things military and what turned outto be an unfortunate respect for Germanmilitary planning from his father.This dualinheritance left him “ever torn between theclassroom and the parade ground” or, in thewords of his reforming minister MikhailSperanski, “too feeble to rule and toostrong to be ruled.”

Alexander came to the throne as a resultof the overthrow and murder of his fatherin 1801. According to his friend, AdamCzartoryski, Paul’s murder, to whichAlexander seems to have assented, “settledlike a vulture on his conscience, paralyzedhis best faculties at the commencement ofhis reign, and plunged him into a mysticismsometimes degenerating into superstition atits close” (Saunders 1992, p. 9). His youthfulidealism for reforming his vast and back-ward empire came to little because of hisown character, the immensity of the prob-lems involved, and the war against Napo-leon, which occupied most of his time from1804 onward.

At first Alexander pursued a policy ofpeace, dealing impartially with France andBritain, but by 1803, with the influentialCzartoryski arguing that Russia could notstand aside from Europe, he was preparingfor war with Napoleon.The murder of theduke of Enghien and Napoleon’s assump-tion of the title of emperor in 1804 person-ally offended Alexander, and he determinedto oppose French expansion in alliance withAustria. Alexander commanded the Austro-Russian army at the battle of Austerlitz (2

Alexander I,Tsar of Russia 3

December 1805), where, ignoring the ad-vice of the experienced Mikhail Kutuzov,he was partly responsible for the disastrousdefeat. Austria made peace, but Alexandercontinued the war in alliance with Prussia,only suing for peace after the Russian defeatat Friedland in June 1807.

Peace with Napoleon was sealed by thecontroversial Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807.Al-though Russia lost little by the alliance withNapoleon, she was threatened by Napoleon’sgains in Germany and the creation of theDuchy of Warsaw. Above all, Russia wasforced to join the Continental System, whilevague plans were laid for the dismember-ment of the Ottoman Empire.Whatever thereality of Tilsit, Alexander’s subjects saw it asabject surrender. The tsar had abandonedPrussia to its fate; French principles wereanathema to the Russian nobility: the Conti-nental System had an extremely adverse ef-fect on Russian commerce; and the plans todivide the Ottoman Empire, if they had everbeen serious, came to nothing.At the end of1810 Alexander withdrew from the Conti-nental System, opening Russian ports toBritish trade, and war became inevitable.

Alexander could claim little personalcredit for the failure of Napoleon’s Russiancampaign of 1812, but by pushing forwardbeyond the boundaries of Russia he gainedenormous prestige in Europe and becamethe anchor of the coalition against Napo-leon. His final contribution to Europeandiplomacy was the creation of the Holy Al-liance with Austria and Prussia to impose anew Christian order upon Europe. He wasnow under strong religious influence, but itis doubtful whether his partners knew whatHoly Alliance was supposed to mean. Hehad, however, played a key role in therestoration of monarchy, not only in Francebut throughout Europe.

Related entries: Abdication, First;Austerlitz,Battle of; Bagration, Pyotr Ivanovich, Prince;Barclay de Tolly; Mikhail Andreas, Prince;Borodino, Battle of; Caulaincourt,ArmandAugustin Louis, Marquis de; Coalitions;

Continental System; Erfurt, Congress of;Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich; Ottoman Empire;Paul I,Tsar of Russia; Poland; QuadrupleAlliance; Russian Campaign; Suvorov,Alexander;Tilsit,Treaty of; Vienna, Congress of

Suggestions for further reading:Cate, Curtis. 1985. The War of the Two Emperors:

The Duel between Napoleon and Alexander,Russia, 1812. New York: Random House.

Hartley, Janet. 1994. Alexander I. London andNew York: Longman.

Niven,Alexander C. 1978. Napoleon andAlexander I. Washington DC: University Pressof America.

Palmer,Alan. 1974. Alexander I,Tsar of War andPeace. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Ragsdale, Hugh. 1980. Détente in the NapoleonicEra: Bonaparte and the Russians. Lawrence, KS:Regents Press.

Saunders, David. 1992. Russia in the Age ofReaction and Reform, 1801–1881. London andNew York: Longman.

Amiens, Peace of (1802)

N egotiated following the collapse ofthe second coalition and the fall of

William Pitt and signed on 27 March 1802,the peace of Amiens brought peace be-tween France and Britain for the first timesince 1793, and along with the peace ofLunéville marked the end of the revolu-tionary wars. But it was the product of ex-haustion, not reconciliation, and onlybrought a brief respite. France pledged torespect the independence and integrity ofNaples, Portugal, and the Batavian Repub-lic, while Britain agreed to restore its con-quests of possessions of France and its allies,except Ceylon and Trinidad, and to evacu-ate Elba and Malta. Malta was restored tothe Knights of St. John. But the discussionssurrounding the treaty had convincedBritish ministers of Napoleon’s inordinateambition, and with French hegemony inEurope left intact and no commercialagreement, there was little hope that thepeace would be lasting.

Related entries: Coalitions; Great Britain

4 Amiens, Peace of



Deutsch, Harold C. 1938. The Genesis ofNapoleonic Imperialism. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.

Mowat, R. B. 1924. The Diplomacy of Napoleon.London: Edward Arnold.

Ross, Steven T. 1981. European Diplomatic History,1789–1815. Malabar, FL: Krieger.

Arcola, Battle of (15–17 November 1796)

O ne of the most celebrated engage-ments of Napoleon’s Italian cam-

paign,Arcola played a significant part in thecreation of the Napoleonic legend, notablythrough Jean Antoine Gros’s dramatic butfanciful painting of Bonaparte at Arcola. In

order to defeat the Austrian army com-manded by General Josef Alvintzi, whichwas attempting to relieve the siege of Man-tua, Napoleon moved to cut Austrian com-munications at Villanova, seize their supplytrain, and prevent Alvintzi from joiningwith a second Austrian force that was ad-vancing down the river Adige. On 14 No-vember Generals André Masséna andCharles Augereau crossed the Adige atRonco and attacked the Croat forces de-fending the village of Arcola, but werethrown back from the wooden bridge overthe river Alpone.

Napoleon arrived and personally led an-other attack.This was also turned back, butGeneral Jean Guieu seized Arcola from therear. Alvintzi’s troops escaped, and thatnight the French were inadvertently with-drawn from Arcola. Two days of additionalfighting were necessary to secure control of

Arcola, Battle of 5

James Gillray’s satirical cartoon The Plum Pudding in Danger (1803) shows Napoleon and William Pittslicing up the globe between them. Bonaparte takes the continent of Europe and Britain takes the oceans, anaccurate enough view of what was to happen over the next four years. (The Trustees of the British Museum,London)

the village and bridge for the French. In thethree days of fighting the Austrians lost7,000 men and eleven guns, while Frenchcasualties amounted to over 4,500. TheFrench victory made the fall of Mantua in-evitable. Alvintzi’s army was defeated anddriven back to Montebello, and Napoleonoccupied Verona.

Related entries: Italian Campaigns; NapoleonicLegend

Suggestions for further reading:Burton, Reginald George. 1912. Napoleon’s

Campaigns in Italy, 1796–97 and 1800.London and New York: G.Allen.

Jackson, Sir William Godfrey Fothergill. 1953.Attack in the West: Napoleon’s First CampaignRe-read Today. London: Eyre andSpottiswoode.

Phipps, Ramsay Weston. 1926–1939. The Armiesof the First French Republic and the Rise of theMarshals of Napoleon I. London: HumphreyMilford. 5 vols.

Armed Neutrality

T he League of Armed Neutrality wasformed in December 1800 on the

initiative of Tsar Paul I as a result of Britishinsistence on searching neutral shipping forcontraband cargo destined for France. Rus-sia, Denmark, and Sweden were joined byPrussia in an attempt to keep British mer-chant ships out of the Baltic. The Leaguehalted shipments of corn to Britain at atime of poor harvests and dearth and cut offBritish supplies of Baltic timber and hempfor use in shipbuilding. It was dissolved afterthe British victory over the Danish fleet atthe battle of Copenhagen (2 April 1801)and the assassination of Paul I.

Related entries: Denmark; Paul I,Tsar ofRussia

Suggestions for further reading:Feldbaek, Ole. 1980. Denmark and the Armed

Neutrality 1800–1801. Copenhagen:Akademisk Forlag.

———. 1986.“The Foreign Policy of TsarPaul I, 1800–1801:An Interpretation.”Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 30, pp.16–36.


Army

N apoleon inherited his weaponryfrom the armies of the French an-

cien régime and his basic tactical forma-tions from those of the Revolution. TheRevolutionary army, however, had come tosee itself as an autonomous force standingapart from civilian society and dedicated tofighting against everything backward andfeudal in Europe.The army was dominatedby its generals; hence the importance Na-poleon gave to securing their personal devotion to him. His originality lay in or-ganization—detailed staff planning to con-centrate the greatest possible numbers ofmen at the probable site of battle—and inhis personal tactics, which were differentfor each battle. After 1805, under the em-pire, the standing army numbered between500,000 and 600,000 men. Napoleon usu-ally took the field with 200,000 French, re-inforced in the course of a campaign byforeign contingents raised by conscriptionin the conquered territories. For example,about half a million Italians served in thearmies of the Directory and empire, ofwhom about one quarter were volunteers.The Grande Armée of 1812 was 611,000strong, but two-thirds non-French. Theranks were augmented, when necessary, byconscription: Napoleon called up 500,000during 1811 and 1812 and 1 million in1813 and 1814.All officers and NCOs wereregulars, though many had begun as mem-bers of the National Guard or as conscripts.The Napoleonic army was probably at itspeak of effectiveness in 1805 and 1806:thereafter there was little time to train

6 Armed Neutrality

troops and massive avoidance of conscrip-tion. After 1812 recruits were lucky to getmore than a week’s training.

Napoleon’s greatest innovation was inmaking the corps, numbering 20,000 to30,000 men, usually commanded by a mar-shal, and capable of giving battle alone, thebasic unit of the army. A corps would ide-ally consist of two or more infantry divi-sions, a brigade of cavalry, six to eight com-panies of artillery, and a company ofengineers. A division, commanded by amajor general, comprised two brigades oftwo infantry regiments, one or two compa-nies of artillery, and a company of engi-neers. Each infantry regiment numberednearly 4,000 men all told, comprising fourbattalions of six companies, together withits headquarters, medical detachment, andband. Each battalion included in its num-bers a company of grenadiers, used as shocktroops, and voltigeurs or tirailleurs, used asskirmishers.

The cavalry was of two sorts, heavy andlight. The light cavalry, comprising dra-goons, hussars, and chasseurs, were distin-guished by wearing no armor, though, likethe heavy cavalry, they were armed withcarbine, pistol, and saber. Cavalry regimentsnumbered 1,200 to 1,800 men, with lightcavalry divided into four squadrons of twocompanies each and heavy into threesquadrons of two companies each.The lightcavalry used faster horses, like modernhunters and thoroughbreds, usually Euro-pean stock bred with Arabians. Reservetroops mostly came from the ImperialGuard.

Related entries: Conscription; Grande Armée;Imperial Guard

Suggestions for further reading:Bertaud, Jean-Paul. 1986.“Napoleon’s Officers,”

Past & Present, no. 112, pp. 91–111.Chandler, David G. 1979. Dictionary of the

Napoleonic Wars. London:Arms and Armour.Lachouque, Henry. 1997. The Anatomy of Glory:

Napoleon and his Guard. London: Greenhill.

Lynn, John A. 1989.“Towards an Army ofHonour:The Moral Evolution of the FrenchArmy,” French Historical Studies, 16, pp.152–182.

Rogers, H. C. B. 1974. Napoleon’s Army. London:Allen.

Art of Warfare, Napoleon and

N apoleon’s tactics in war were unpre-dictable, one reason for his success

and his reputation as a commander. Hemade no real innovations, building upon the“revolutionary warfare” of 1793 based onmass attack with fixed bayonets. Napoleonexploited the divisional system,originally in-troduced during the Revolution, so that hecould concentrate his army, by a few hours’march, at any point that he wanted to take orthat was in danger. He took calculated risksin order to be stronger than the enemy atthe decisive point:“All fire must be concen-trated on one point: the breach once madeand the balance broken, everything else isunnecessary.The place is taken.” Showing anunrivaled capacity for improvisation, Napo-leon engaged, held back a large reserve, andwaited for the enemy to make a mistake orexpose a weakness; then he struck hard withinfantry followed by massed cavalry, prepar-ing the way with artillery fire. Napoleon’sgenius lay in knowing when and where tostrike, and this, he said, could not be learned;it came from instinct.

Related entries: Artillery; Danube Campaigns;Germany, Campaigns in; Italian Campaigns

Suggestions for further reading:Chandler, David G. 1974. The Campaigns of

Napoleon:The Mind and Method of History’sGreatest Soldier. New York: Macmillan.

Connelly, Owen. 1987. Blundering to Glory:Napoleon’s Military Campaigns. Wilmington,DE: Scholarly Resources.

Epstein, Robert M. 1994. Napoleon’s Last Victoryand the Emergence of Modern War. Lawrence:University Press of Kansas.

Art of Warfare, Napoleon and 7

Gates, David. 1997. The Napoleonic Wars,1803–15. London: Edward Arnold.

Glover, Michael. 1980. Warfare in the Age ofBonaparte. London: Cassell.

Lachouque, Henry. 1966. Napoleon’s Battles. NewYork: Dutton.

Marshall-Cornwall, Sir James. 1967. Napoleon asMilitary Commander. London: Batsford.

Muir, Rory. 1998. Tactics and the Experience ofBattle in the Age of Napoleon. New Haven:YaleUniversity Press.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1980. The Art of Warfarein the Age of Napoleon. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press.

Artillery

N apoleon introduced no real innova-tions in the use of artillery on the

battlefield. Technology remained un-changed, and the average range of guns wasno more than half a mile. But he usedmassed fire better than previous command-ers had done. Senior artillery commanderswere appointed at army, corps, and (usually)divisional level, each with his own smallstaff and in close touch with the formationcommander he was supporting. For a time,also, guns were allocated permanently tobattalions as a way of installing confidenceinto troops, especially, after 1805, the in-creasingly ill-trained conscripts. “The lessgood troops are,” he said,“the more artillerythey require.” But this organization was notused in the Peninsular War or at Waterloo.

“Artillery,” said Napoleon, “like otherarms, must be collected in mass if one wishesto attain a decisive result.” He always soughtto concentrate his guns in large batteries withthe purpose of overwhelming a selected sec-tion of the enemy’s defense. He also usedconverging fire from several large batteries,which, as well as having a potentially devas-tating effect in its own right, also made coun-termeasures more difficult. But this tactic de-pended on suitable positions being available,which was not always the case.

Related entries: Army;Art of Warfare,Napoleon and

Suggestions for further reading:Glover, Michael. 1980. Warfare in the Age of

Bonaparte. London: Cassell.Marshall-Cornwall, Sir James. 1967. Napoleon as

Military Commander. London: Batsford.Quimby, Robert Sherman. 1957. The Background

to Napoleonic Warfare. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1980. The Art of Warfarein the Age of Napoleon. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press.

Auerstädt, Battle of

See Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of

Augereau, Pierre FrançoisCharles (1757–1816)

L ater given the titles of duke of Cas-tiglione and marshal of France,

Augereau was born of humble origins inthe popular Faubourg Saint-Marceau ofParis. Augereau’s early career as a soldier invarious armies between 1774 and 1791 isobscure; he certainly fought in and desertedfrom the forces of several countries, but hisown accounts of his exploits are unreliable.Back in Paris in 1792 he volunteered forthe German Legion, the start of a genuinemilitary career, which meant a rapid rise toprominence during the Terror and after.Augereau fought against the rebels of theVendée as a divisional general and thenwith distinction against the Spanish.

In 1795 Augereau transferred to theArmy of Italy and in 1796–1797 sharedwith André Masséna the position as Napo-leon’s leading subordinate, his most notableexploit being the defeat of the Austrians atCastiglione in August 1796. However, healso gained a well-deserved reputation forlooting and personal profiteering, and Na-poleon thought Masséna the better general.Between 1797 and 1804 Augereau filled avariety of posts, some of which at least were

8 Artillery

designed to keep him away from the cen-ters of political intrigue.The year 1799 sawhim as commander of the French forces inHolland, and he maintained a low profileduring the coup of 18 Brumaire.

He was named a marshal of the empirein 1804, and the years between 1805 and1809 were the days of Augereau’s glory. Ascommander of the Seventh Corps heforced the Austrian surrender at Feldkirchin November 1805 and played a significantrole in the victory of Jena in October 1806.He was wounded at Eylau in February1807, but his appointment to command theArmy of Catalonia in Spain was short-livedand he was replaced by Jacques Macdonald.He had finally overcome his freebootingtendencies, but from 1810 onward a declinein his abilities is evident.

During the invasion of Russia in 1812Augereau remained in Prussia on occupa-tion duty as commander of the EighthCorps, and he saw his last significant actionin 1813 as commander of the SixteenthCorps at Naumberg. Appointed as com-mander of the Army of the Rhône, based atLyon, in January 1814, he was again re-moved from the center of affairs. Augereaudenounced Napoleon in April 1814, butduring the Hundred Days tried to switchsides again. He was ignored by both sidesand struck from the list of marshals in April1815. He died at La Houssaye, reportedly ofdropsy, in June 1816.

A contradictory and somewhat unstablecharacter, Augereau undoubtedly per-formed great services to Napoleon fromthe turn of the century to 1809, but wasstruck by declining health during his lastyears and ended up as a virtual spectatorduring the dramatic events of 1814–1815.

Related entries: Castiglione, Battle of; Eylau,Battle of; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of

Suggestions for further reading:Elting, John R. 1987.“Augereau,” in David G.

Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Phipps, Ramsay Weston. 1926–1939. The Armiesof the First French Republic and the Rise of theMarshals of Napoleon I. London: HumphreyMilford. 5 vols.

Austerlitz , Battle of (2 December 1805)

The “Battle of the Three Emperors,”fought on the first anniversary of

Napoleon’s coronation as emperor, was oneof his most famous and decisive victories.Ajoint Russian and Austrian force wascrushed on the plateau of Pratzen above theMoravian village of Austerlitz, forcing theAustrians to sue for peace and the Russiansto withdraw behind their own frontiers.

The Allies outnumbered Napoleon’sforces, with 84,000 men and 280 guns fac-ing the French force of 73,000 men and140 guns. But Tsar Alexander I, the Alliedcommander in chief, played into Napo-leon’s hands by attempting a flanking ma-neuver, weakening his center, while Napo-leon, as always, was prepared to wait for thedecisive moment to attack.Turning for ad-vice to the Austrian chief of staff, Franzvon Weyrother, rather than the more expe-rienced and cautious Russian commander,Mikhail Kutuzov, Alexander committedboth Austrian and Russian forces to anoutflanking assault on the French lines ofcommunication, starting at half past six inthe morning. But a heavy mist shroudedthe battlefield, and when the sun roseshortly before nine o’clock Napoleon or-dered the cavalry under Nicolas Soult toattack the weakened Allied center.The tsarand his staff were forced to fall back, leav-ing the Allied vanguard isolated in an areaof ponds and marshes covered by a decep-tively thin layer of ice. Many Russians weredrowned when they were forced back ontothe ice.A Russian counterattack led by theGrand Duke Constantine was brave but dis-astrous: many more Russians were killed,

Austerlitz, Battle of 9

and the Austrians were thrown into confu-sion as their northward line of retreat wascut off. By midday, when snow began tofall, the Allied armies were in total chaos,with only the Russian cavalry of PrincePyotr Bagration managing to withdraw ingood order.

Around a third of the Allied forces hadbeen killed, wounded, or taken prisoner,and 180 cannon had been captured. TheFrench lost some 1,800 killed and 6,500wounded.Austria signed peace three weekslater by the Treaty of Pressburg, and theRussian army had been shattered. WilliamPitt is reported as having said after Auster-litz,“Roll up the map of Europe. It will notbe wanted these ten years.”

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Austria; Danube Campaigns; Kutuzov, MikhailIlarionovich

Suggestions for further reading:Chandler, David G. 1994.“Napoleon’s

Masterpiece:Austerlitz, 2 December 1805,” inhis On the Napoleonic Wars: Collected Essays.London: Greenhill.

Duffy, Christopher. 1977. Austerlitz. Hampden,CT:Archon Books.

Austria

W hat for convenience we call Aus-tria represented the heart of the

dynastic realm of the Habsburgs, who hadruled in Vienna since the thirteenth cen-tury.The Habsburg lands in central Europeincluded present-day Austria, Hungary, theCzech and Slovak lands, southern Poland,parts of western Romania, Croatia, Slove-nia, northeastern Italy centered on Milan,and regions of the southern Ukraine. In ad-

10 Austria

Napoleon ordered the triumphal Arc du Carrousel in honor of the Grande Armée after Austerlitz. It was erectedbetween 1807 and 1809 between the Louvre and the Tuileries. (Art Resource)

dition the Habsburgs, as Holy Roman Em-perors, held theoretical sovereignty overGermany and much of the rest of Italy.

Austria fought six wars with France be-tween 1792 and 1815. Its participation inthe First Coalition was ended by Napo-leon’s Italian victories at Arcola and Rivoli,resulting in the Treaty of Campo Formio(1797). Some successes during the SecondCoalition were followed by defeats atMarengo and Hohenlinden and the Treatyof Lunéville (1801). In 1804 Francis I as-sumed the new title of Emperor of Austriaand joined the Third Coalition in 1805. Butafter the French invasion of Austria, culmi-nating in the disaster of Austerlitz in De-cember 1805, he was forced to accept peaceby the Treaty of Pressburg.The title of HolyRoman Emperor, which had long ceased tohave much meaning, was finally abolishedon Napoleon’s insistence in 1806.

Seeking revenge for past humiliations,Austria again declared war on France,against Francis’s better judgment, in 1809.But despite army reforms and the Tyroleanrising of Andreas Hofer, the Austrians suf-fered defeat once more at Wagram, andwere forced to accept the harsh conditionsof the Peace of Schönbrunn. Now, on theadvice of his new foreign minister, Klemensvon Metternich, Francis became a nominalally of France, forming a dynastic linkthrough the marriage of his daughterMarie-Louise to Napoleon in April 1810.An Austrian auxiliary force took part inNapoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, butFrancis concluded a separate peace with thetsar at the end of the year and again de-clared war on France in August 1813. Aus-trian troops took part in the battle of Dres-den and Leipzig and in the invasion ofFrance. In 1815 an Austrian army crossedinto France five days after the battle of Wa-

terloo and participated in the second occu-pation of France.

The skilful diplomacy of Metternich en-sured that Austria played host to the Con-gress of Vienna, where the Habsburgs,though they lost Belgium, regained almostall their Austrian lands and gained territoryin Italy, including direct rule over Lom-bardy and Venice, and the Dalmatian coast.The Austrian Empire was now second inpopulation only to Russia in Europe, andthe lands lost to Napoleon had been re-gained. Austria emerged from the Napo-leonic Wars as a great power and enjoyed aflourishing cultural life in the age ofBeethoven and Schubert, but the hopes ofits subject peoples had been raised duringthe wars, planting the seeds of revolt anddissension for the future.

Related entries: Austerlitz, Battle of; Belgium;Campo Formio,Treaty of; Charles,Archduke ofAustria; Coalitions; Danube Campaigns; FrancisI, Emperor of Austria; Germany, Campaigns in;Hohenlinden, Battle of; Illyria; ItalianCampaigns; Leipzig, Battle of; Lunéville,Treatyof; Marengo, Battle of; Marie-Louise vonHapsburg, Empress; Metternich, KlemensWenceslas Lothar, Fürst von; Pressburg,Treaty of;Schönbrunn,Treaty of;Wagram, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Brauer, Kinley, and William E.Wright, eds. 1990.

Austria in the Age of the French Revolution,1789–1815. Minneapolis: Center forAustrian Studies, University of Minnesota.

Kohn, Hans. 1967. Prelude to Nation States:TheFrench and German Experience, 1789–1815.Princeton:Van Nostrand.

Kraehe, Enno Edward. 1963. Metternich’s GermanPolicy,Vol. 1:The Contest with Napoleon,1799–1814. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.

Langsam,Walter C. 1930. The Napoleonic Wars andGerman Nationalism in Austria. New York:Columbia University Press.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1982. Napoleon’s GreatAdversaries:The Archduke Charles and theAustrian Army, 1792–1814. London; Batsford.

Austria 11

BBagration, Pyotr Ivanovich,

Prince

D escendant of an ancient Georgiannoble family, Bagration entered the

Russian army in 1782 and distinguishedhimself in wars in the Caucasus and Poland,thereby attracting the attention of Alexan-der Suvorov, under whom he took part inthe Italian and Swiss campaigns of 1799against Napoleon. Widely regarded as Su-vorov’s heir, Bagration showed such tacticalskill, charisma, and commanding presencethat he earned the nickname of God of theArmy.

During the Danube campaigns of1805–1807 he proved his skill when hisrear guard of 6,000 men held off the 30,000commanded by Joachim Murat, so securingthe retreat of Mikhail Kutuzov’s main Rus-sian army and suffering heavy losses in theprocess. Bagration fought with courage atthe battles of Austerlitz, where he had com-mand of 13,000 men on the Allied right,Eylau, Heilsberg, and Friedland. After theTreaty of Tilsit freed Russia’s hands in east-ern Europe, he played a major role in theconquest of Finland by leading a daringmarch across the frozen Gulf of Finland andcapturing the Aaland Islands. He was pro-moted to full general and in 1809 com-manded the Russian forces in Bulgaria inthe war against the Ottoman Empire.

During the Russian campaign of 1812the Russian effort was hampered by thebad relations between Bagration andMikhail Barclay de Tolly. Tsar Alexander Ideclined to appoint a supreme com-mander, and Bagration was jealous of thefact that Barclay, though junior in senior-ity, commanded the First West Army whilehe had charge of the Second West Army,based on the Russo-Prussian border. Atfirst Bagration advocated a counterinva-sion, but was forced to retreat, evading theFrench forces of Louis-Nicolas Davoutand Jérôme Bonaparte and joined forceswith Barclay de Tolly at Smolensk.Alexan-der was wary of Bagration and dividedcommand between him and Barclay. ButBagration moderated his previously vi-cious criticism of Barclay’s policy andgradually came to espouse a similar strat-egy, acknowledging Barclay as effectivecommander in chief.

Bagration and Barclay overcame theiranimosity and cooperated fully in the cru-cial battle of Borodino. Bagration’s SecondArmy was responsible for holding the Rus-sian center and right engaged in bloodyhand-to-hand combat. Bagration waswounded when his left shinbone was shat-tered by a bullet, but refused to leave thefield. Three weeks later he died of hiswounds at the age of forty-six. Twenty-seven years later his remains were returnedto Borodino and buried there.

Bagration, Pyotr Ivanovich, Prince 13

B

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Austerlitz, Battle of; Barclay de Tolly, MikhailAndreas, Prince; Borodino, Battle of; RussianCampaign

Suggestions for further reading:Duffy, Christopher. 1972. Borodino and the War of

1812. London: Seeley.Riehn, Richard K. 1991. 1812: Napoleon’s

Russian Campaign. New York: John Wiley.Tarle, E. 1942. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 1812.

London:Allen and Unwin.

Bailen, Battle of (19 July 1808)

T his early engagement in the Spanishuprising against French occupation

decided Napoleon to assume personal com-mand in Spain. The French corps in An-dalusia, under General Pierre Dupont, wastrapped near the town of Bailen by an armyof 30,000 men commanded by GeneralFrancisco Castaños and forced to capitulate.Some 17,500 French surrendered, and,while senior officers were released, most ofthe men were imprisoned under harsh con-ditions and only one in seven survived.Thedefeat was a serious blow to French prestigeand encouraged Spanish resistance. JosephBonaparte fled from Madrid, where he hadrecently arrived as king, and Napoleon de-cided to take matters into hand personally.The Spanish exaggerated the significance ofBailen: Castaños had enjoyed numerical su-periority over Dupont’s raw conscripts.Thisvictory did not mean that the Spanishwould be capable of engaging Napoleon’scrack troops in open battle, but nothing likeit had previously happened to any of Napo-leon’s armies, and it inspired people in Spainand elsewhere in Europe out of all propor-tion to its true significance.

Related entries: Spain

Suggestions for further reading:Oman, Charles W.C. 1902–1930. A History of the

Peninsular War. 7 vols. Oxford: ClarendonPress.

Bank of France

E stablished by statute in 1800 as thecentral financial institution of France,

the Bank of France was a private stockcompany organized on Napoleon’s ordersby a group of Paris bankers headed by JeanFrédéric Perregaux, with the government asone stockholder among many others, andrun by a board of fifteen directors elected bythe biggest shareholders. The bank wasgiven a monopoly on the issue of papernotes in 1803, but in 1805 its existence wasthreatened by the expenses of warfare. In1806, therefore, Napoleon reorganized thebank, increasing its capital funds and assum-ing the right to appoint a governor and twoassistant governors. Under the supervisionof the new minister of the treasury, NicolasFrançois Mollien, the reorganized bank wasnow firmly established and by 1813 hadopened branches at Lille, Rouen, and Lyon.It was retained by Louis XVIII and becamea permanent institution.The lack of such abody had been a constant weakness ofFrench finances under the ancien régimeand during the Revolution, a weakness thatNapoleon rectified once and for all.

Related entries: Finance; Mollien, NicolasFrançois



———. 1996. A Documentary Survey of NapoleonicFrance:A Supplement. Lanham, MD:University Press of America, pp. 58–63.

Bergeron, Louis. 1981. France under Napoleon.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Holtman, Robert B. 1967. The NapoleonicRevolution. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Barclay de Tolly, Mikhail Andreas, Prince (1761–1818)

The strategist behind Napoleon’s de-feat in the Russian campaign of

14 Bailen, Battle of

1812, Barclay was an experienced soldierwho had first seen action in Russia’s Turk-ish War of 1787–1791. A major general by1799, he was in command of the Russianadvance guard that failed to reach Austerlitzin December 1805, but distinguished him-self as commander of the rear guard in theRussian retreat, struggling valiantly againstthe French at Frauendorf and Hof. Duringthe campaign of 1806–1807 Barclay waswounded just before the battle of Eylau andremained an invalid for fifteen months.During his convalescence he was visited byTsar Alexander I, and an immediate bondwas created, giving Alexander an advisorwho could be relied on for an honest as-sessment of the situation.

Following the disaster of Friedland inJune 1807, Barclay became convinced thatthe only way to defeat Napoleon was tolure him deep into Russia and attack himin strength only when he was isolated andhad used up his supplies.The Treaty of Tilsitin July 1807, however, deferred the oppor-tunity to test his theory. He was promotedto full general following his success in theconquest of Finland in 1808, while as gov-ernor-general of the newly conqueredcountry he showed himself an able admin-istrator and persuaded many Finns to be-come loyal to Russia.

In 1810 Barclay was appointed ministerof war and, convinced that war with Napo-leon was inevitable, reorganized the min-istry and almost doubled the size of thearmy. He imposed a simplified chain ofcommand and defined the functions of thefifteen branches of the army more precisely.Barclay’s contingency plan in the event ofwar consisted of defensive operations untilNapoleon had been weakened through at-trition and his supply lines had becomevulnerable.

When war broke out in 1812, Barclaywas given command of the First WesternArmy of 100,000 men. Outnumbered al-most four to one, he immediately set inmotion his planned withdrawal, denying

Napoleon the opportunity to force the de-cisive battle he always craved. But thispolicy attracted heavy criticism, reinforcedby Russian chauvinist suspicion of Barclay’sorigins as a Livonian of Scottish descent.The tsar, giving in to ultranationalist pres-sure, appointed the thoroughly RussianMikhail Kutuzov as supreme commanderin chief. Barclay remained in the field ascommander of the First Army, whichfought resolutely at Borodino, convincingmany of his critics that he was no cowardor traitor. But friction remained with Kutu-zov, and in September 1812 Barclay de-cided to go on leave, pleading reasons ofhealth. His strategy was now blamed for thefall of Moscow.

As Napoleon retreated, Barclay was re-called and given command of the ThirdWestern Army. Advancing into Germanyhe fought the battle of Bautzen in May1813, after which Alexander appointedhim commander in chief of the Russianand Prussian armies. And following thebattle of Leipzig, the tsar raised him to thedignity of count. He led his forces intoFrance and to Paris, where he was pro-moted to field marshal. Barclay accompa-nied the tsar to the victory celebrations inLondon and then led his troops tri-umphantly back to Russia.

The Hundred Days recalled Barclay toaction. Leading a Russian army towardFrance, he had reached the Rhine when hereceived news of Waterloo. When hereached Paris for the second time he wasgranted the title of prince, a very rarehonor. When he died three years later, hewas still supreme commander of all Russianforces.

Barclay was most responsible for Napo-leon’s defeat in Russia. Despite the badblood between them, Kutuzov on thewhole followed his strategy. The historianDavid Saunders has written: “Most Rus-sians thought Barclay pusillanimous, but thestrategy which saved them was his” (Saun-ders 1992, p. 52).

Barclay de Tolly, Mikhail Andreas, Prince 15

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Bagration, Pyotr Ivanovich, Prince; Bautzen,Battle of; Eylau, Battle of; Kutuzov, MikhailIlarionovich; Leipzig, Battle of; RussianCampaign


1812. London: Seeley.Josselson, Michael, and Diana Josselson. 1980. The

Commander:A Life of Barclay de Tolly. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Saunders, David. 1992 Russia in the Age ofReaction and Reform, 1801–1882. New York:Longman.

Tarle, E. 1942. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 1812.London:Allen and Unwin.

Barras, Paul François Jean Nicolas, Vicomte de (1755–1829)

O ne of the most powerful figures inthe Directory, Barras played a signif-

icant role, though not as important as heclaimed, in Napoleon’s rise to power.Theymet for the first time at the siege of Toulonin December 1793. Barras, as representativeon mission to areas in revolt, ensured thatNapoleon received due recognition for hispart in the victory and was promoted fromcaptain to brigadier general. After Toulonwas regained, Barras showed his ruthlessnessby ordering the execution of hundreds ofpeople who had supported the British.

Barras held several important posts dur-ing the Thermidorian period, effectivelycommanding the Army of the Interior andthe police. As such he employed Napoleonagain in the suppression of the rising ofVendémiaire in Paris on 5 October 1795.This action allowed him to engineer elec-tions to the Directory. He was the only di-rector of noble birth and the only one toserve throughout the five years of theregime. As “king of the Directory” Barrasfollowed the advice of Madame de Staël insponsoring the appointment of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand as minister of for-eign affairs and was instrumental in remov-

ing Lazare Carnot from the post of directorin September 1797. Royalist gains in theelections of 1797 impelled Barras to callonce again on Napoleon, then in Italy. ButNapoleon refused, instead sending CharlesAugereau to help in purging royalists fromthe National Assembly, bringing Barras tothe apex of his career.

When Napoleon returned from theEgyptian campaign in October 1799, Barrassuggested to him that he should win moremilitary glory and leave politics to thepoliticians. Napoleon had now come to de-test Barras for his shameless profiteeringand luxurious lifestyle, calling him a “rottenplank.” During the coup of Brumaire Bar-ras remained in his apartments, only signinga letter of resignation after he learned ofNapoleon’s success at the Tuileries. Napo-leon’s continuing suspicion of him led tohis exile to Brussels in 1801. He returnedto France in 1805 but was exiled again toRome in 1813.At Napoleon’s fall he failedto get the restored Bourbons to accept hissupport and spent the rest of his life on hismagnificent estate at Chaillot, living on hisill-gotten gains and dictating his memoirs.

Barras possessed genuine abilities butlived a life of unashamed corruption andluxury. During his years in power he grewwealthy by extracting money from militarycontractors and bribes from foreign gov-ernments. Among his many mistresses wasJoséphine de Beauharnais, and he claimedto have been instrumental in arranging hermarriage to Napoleon. But his memoirs, inwhich he viciously attacked all those withwhom he had fallen out, includingJoséphine, are full of distortions. Carnotsaid of Barras that he “masked the ferocityof Caligula behind a carefully assumed ca-sualness of manner” (Palmer 1984, p. 27).

Related entries: Beauharnais, Marie RoseJoséphine de; Directory;Toulon, Siege of

Suggestions for further reading:Lefebvre, Georges. 1965. The Directory. London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul.

16 Barras, Paul François Jean Nicolas,Vicomte de

Lyons, Martyn. 1975. France under the Directory.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Palmer,Alan. 1984. An Encyclopaedia of Napoleon’sEurope. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Bassano, Battle of (8 September 1796)

This engagement of Napoleon’s Ital-ian campaign was a disaster for the

Austrians, opening the way for the Frenchoccupation of Vicenza and Padua. Napo-leon trapped an Austrian force under Gen-eral Würmser in the town of Bassano delGrappa, nineteen miles northeast of Vi-cenza.The forces of Charles Augereau sur-rounded the town to the east and those ofAndré Masséna from the west, while JeanLannes and the cavalry of Joachim Muratled a frontal assault on Bassano itself.Würmser himself escaped, but the Frenchtook over 3,500 prisoners, plus 35 cannon,220 wagons and 2 pontoon bridge trains.On the following day Masséna occupiedVicenza and Augereau took Padua. TheAustrian survivors rallied in Mantua, whereWürmser assumed command of the de-fenses.

Related entries: Italian Campaigns

Suggestions for further reading:Ferrero, Guglielmo. 1961. The Gamble: Bonaparte

in Italy (1796–1797). London: G. Bell.Jackson, Sir William Godfrey Fothergill. 1953.

Attack in the West: Napoleon’s First CampaignRe-read Today. London: Eyre andSpottiswoode.

Batavian Republic

This “sister” republic of the FrenchRepublic was proclaimed in 1795

following the conquest of the Netherlands,initially with considerable popular enthusi-asm.Various political structures, centralized

and employing universal male suffrage, weretried before Napoleon’s seizure of power,but as first consul he wanted a compliantand less democratic regime.The legislaturerefused to bow to his pressure, and only inSeptember 1801, after a purge of the exec-utive and closure of the legislature, was anew constitution adopted.

The new Batavian Commonwealth pos-sessed a weak one-house legislature and atwelve-man executive, with considerablepowers returned to the traditional ancientprovinces of the Netherlands. In 1805 an-other constitution was imposed, with aregime headed by Councillor PensionaryRutger Jan Schimmelpennink, but this onlylasted until May 1806, when Napoleonmade his brother Louis Bonaparte monarchof the new Kingdom of Holland.

The Republic had been a notable dem-ocratic experiment: equality before the lawhad been established, church and state sepa-rated, and the once mighty East IndiaCompany dissolved, with its possessionsgoing to the nation.

Related entries: Netherlands

Suggestions for further reading:Kossman, E. H. 1978. The Low Countries,

1780–1940. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Schama, Simon. 1977. Patriots and Liberators:

Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813.New York: Knopf.

Bautzen, Battle of (20–21 May 1813)

A fter checking the Russo-Prussian in-vasion of Germany at the battle of

Lützen on 2 May 1813, Napoleon attemptedto take the walled cathedral city of Bautzenin Saxony. His newly formed Army of theElbe sought to engage the Russian and Prus-sian defenders of Bautzen in the marshes andwoodland on the banks of the river Spree.Bautzen was then to be surrounded by forces

Bautzen, Battle of 17

under Michel Ney and Nicolas Oudinot.However, delays in deploying the Frenchforces and their lack of cavalry allowed thedefenders to slip out and retreat southwardtoward Silesia, and the French were unable topursue them effectively.A brief armistice, se-cured by Austrian mediation, ensued be-tween 2 June and 17 August.

Related entries: Germany, Campaigns in

Suggestions for further reading:Petre, F. Loraine. 1974. Napoleon’s Last Campaign

in Germany, 1813. London:Arms andArmour.

Bavaria, Kingdom of

Throughout the Napoleonic periodthe large Catholic southern German

state of Bavaria, traditionally under the Wit-telsbach dynasty an ally of France in Ger-many, was ruled by Maximilian Joseph, firstas Elector and after December 1805 as KingMaximilian I. Bavarian troops had foughtagainst the French in 1799–1800, but afterthe decisive battle of Hohenlinden Maxi-milian struck a lasting bargain with Napo-leon. Bavaria hoped thereby to strengthenits own position at the expense of Austria.ABavarian force of some 25,000 men foughtwith the French at Austerlitz, and as a re-ward Bavaria received, by the Treaty ofPressburg, the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, andsome ecclesiastical lands.

In 1806 Bavaria joined the Confedera-tion of the Rhine, and the Franco-Bavarianalliance was strengthened further by themarriage of Maximilian’s daughter Augustato Eugène de Beauharnais. During the Wa-gram campaign of 1809 the Bavarians de-feated the Austrians on the river Inn on19–20 April, but thereafter were fully occu-pied with the revolt of Andreas Hofer inthe Tyrol. By the Treaty of SchönbrunnBavaria received Salzburg, Berchtesgarden,and further lands along the Inn.

Bavarian troops made up the bulk of theSixth Corps of the Grande Armée in 1812,and fourteen squadrons of Bavarian cavalryfought under Eugène de Beauharnais atBorodino. Following Napoleon’s defeat inRussia, however, Bavaria sought reconcilia-tion with Austria, and by the Treaty of Riedof October 1813 Maximilian, in return forrecognition of his royal title, withdrew fromthe Confederation of the Rhine. Bavariantroops now participated in the invasion ofFrance in 1814. At the Congress of ViennaBavaria was forced to give up Salzburg, theTyrol, and the Vorarlberg to Austria, butMaximilian consolidated his kingdom’s po-sition in southern Germany as a Catholiccounterweight to Prussia within the newGerman Confederation.

The Napoleonic years had been a periodof important internal reform in Bavaria. Asingle chamber legislature was set up in 1808and a legal code based on the Napoleonicmodel introduced in 1810. Serfdom wasabolished by stages between 1802 and 1808,the activities of religious orders curbed in1804, and the privileged influence of theChurch over education reduced in 1809. In1815 Bavaria had been transformed into amodernized kingdom capable of playing aconsiderable role in German affairs.

Related entries: Austria; Confederation of theRhine; Pressburg,Treaty of; Schönbrunn,Treatyof;Tyrol, Revolts in

Suggestions for further reading:Klang, Daniel. 1965.“Bavaria and the War of

Liberation, 1813–1814,” French HistoricalStudies 4, pp. 22–41.

Sheehan, James J. 1989. German History,1770–1866. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Beauharnais, Eugène Rose de(1781–1824)

E ugène, the son of Joséphine deBeauharnais by her first marriage to

18 Bavaria, Kingdom of

vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais, beganhis military career at the age of fourteen asorderly to General Hoche against the rebelsof the Vendée. When his mother marriedNapoleon Eugène became a loyal supporterof his stepfather: he was his aide-de-campduring the Egyptian campaign and servedas a cavalry captain at the battle of Ma-rengo. Given the title of prince in 1804, heserved as colonel-general of the guard atNapoleon’s coronation. In 1805 he wasnamed viceroy of Italy and in 1806 marriedAugusta of Bavaria.

While he genuinely did his best to pro-vide his kingdom in northern Italy withefficient and enlightened government,Eugène’s principal service to Napoleonwas on the battlefield. On the renewal ofwar in 1805, together with AndréMasséna, he kept the Austrians occupiedin Italy while Napoleon overran Ger-many. In 1809 he played a crucial role inNapoleon’s victory at Wagram, firstly bypreventing the juncture of the Austrianarmies of the Archduke John and theArchduke Charles and then as a cavalrycommander in the battle itself. But Eu-gène distinguished himself primarily be-tween 1812 and 1814. The opinions ofhistorians may be divided about his ca-pacities as a commander, but he learnedmuch during the Russian campaign of1812, putting the lessons to use in the de-fense of Italy in 1813–1814.

During Napoleon’s retreat from Mos-cow Eugène and his Italian Royal Guardwon the battle of Maloyaroslavets (25October 1812), and he rescued MarshalMichel Ney and the French rearguard atSmolensk. Assuming command of thearmy after Joachim Murat abandoned hispost and returned to his kingdom ofNaples, Eugène succeeded in effecting abrilliant retreat across eastern Germany tothe river Elbe, where he held the lineuntil Napoleon appeared with a newarmy in April 1813. He then left for Italywhere, with Napoleon occupied in Ger-

many and France, he held the kingdomagainst the attacks of the Austrians andMurat, king of Naples. Eugène was stillfighting when, on 16 April 1814, heheard of Napoleon’s abdication and con-cluded an armistice with the Austrians,rejecting their tentative offer to retain hiskingdom.

Eugène retired to Bavaria at the invita-tion of his wife’s father, King Maximilian,and did not rally to Napoleon in 1815 be-cause it would have placed his family indanger. He lived out the remainder of hislife as duke of Leuchtenberg and prince ofEichstädt, though in 1818 he did appeal toTsar Alexander I to improve Napoleon’sconditions of confinement on Saint He-lena. Eugène died at Munich at the age offorty-one, but his five children all marriedinto European royal families. His eldestdaughter, Joséphine, married Oscar, son ofJean-Baptiste Bernadotte, and was QueenConsort of Sweden from 1844 to 1859.

Related entries: Beauharnais, Marie RoseJoséphine de; Beauharnais, Eugénie-HortenseCecile de; Italy, Kingdom of; Russian Campaign;Wagram, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Connelly, Owen. 1965. Napoleon’s Satellite

Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Oman, Carola. 1966. Napoleon’s Viceroy: Eugène de

Beauharnais. London: Collins.

Beauharnais, Eugénie-HortenseCecile de (1783–1837)

D aughter of Joséphine de Beauharnaisby her first husband, Alexandre de

Beauharnais, and sister of Eugène, theyoung Hortense was a favorite of her step-father Napoleon. Naturally charming andtalented, she sketched, painted, and com-posed music, including the marching song“Partant pour la Syrie,” which was to be-come the national anthem of the Second

Beauharnais, Eugénie-Hortense Cecile de 19

Empire under her son, Napoleon III, be-tween 1852 and 1870.

In 1802 Hortense dutifully marriedLouis Bonaparte, becoming queen of Hol-land in 1806.Their marriage was not happy,though it did produce three children. Hor-tense only spent a few months in Holland,and even at the palace of The Hague theking and queen kept separate apartments.She returned to the Netherlands in April1810, less than three months before herhusband’s abdication, and after Louis’s de-parture from Holland the couple never saweach other again.

Hortense settled at Aix-les-Bains, whereshe became the mistress of the comte Charlesde Flahaut, the natural son of Charles-Mau-rice de Talleyrand.The couple had an illegiti-mate son who, as the duke of Morny, was tohold influential posts under the Second Em-pire. She was with her mother at Malmaisonduring Joséphine’s final illness in 1814, andduring the Allied occupation of Paris becamea favorite of Tsar Alexander I, who persuadedLouis XVIII to make her duchess of Saint-Leu on 30 May 1814. During the HundredDays, however, she acted as First Lady ofFrance and provided a refuge for Napoleonat Malmaison for five days after his defeat atWaterloo. This fidelity to her stepfatherforced her into exile, and she settled at Are-nenberg in Switzerland. She traveled widelyin the company of her son Charles Louis, thefuture Napoleon III, with whom she visitedLondon in 1831. She died at Arenenberg in1837. Her fascinating memoirs, written be-tween 1816 and 1820, were published in1927.

Related entries: Beauharnais, Eugène Rose de;Beauharnais, Marie Rose Joséphine de;Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland

Suggestions for further reading:Beauharnais, Hortense de. 1927. Memoirs of

Queen Hortense. 2 vols. New York:Cosmopolitan.

Wright, Constance Choate. 1962. Daughter toNapoleon:A Biography of Hortense, Queen ofHolland. London:Alvin Redman.

Beauharnais, Marie Rose Joséphine de (1763–1814),

Empress Joséphine

N apoleon’s first empress was bornMarie-Josèphe-Rose Tascher de la

Pagerie to a family of minor nobility estab-lished as planters in Martinique. In 1779 atthe age of fifteen she was married to themuch older vicomte Alexandre deBeauharnais, an army officer, diplomat, andman of affairs whose constant travelingprovided the occasion for real or allegedinfidelities on his wife’s part.Their son Eu-gène was born in 1781 and daughter Hor-tense in 1783. But the vicomte denied pa-ternity of Hortense, and the couple werelegally separated.

At the outbreak of the Revolution in1789 Joséphine was in Martinique. ButAlexandre supported the Revolution as amember of the Constituent Assembly andthen as commander of the Army of theRhine in 1793. In 1794, however, he wasaccused of treason, arrested, and sent to theguillotine. Joséphine was saved from thescaffold through the influence of Jean Tal-lien and his wife, a salon socialite known as“Our Lady of Thermidor.” It was probablyat Mme. Tallien’s salon that Joséphine metNapoleon in the autumn of 1795, when theyoung general was the toast of respectableParis after suppressing the rising ofVendémiaire. They were married on 9March 1796 against the objections of theBonaparte family, who consideredJoséphine, then known as Rose, a dissolutewoman. It was also thought that at the ageof thirty-two she would be incapable ofbearing more children.

Napoleon departed almost immediatelyto command the Army of Italy, andJoséphine returned to the fashionable life ofParis, only finally being persuaded to joinher husband in July 1796.They were soonseparated again by Napoleon’s Egyptiancampaign of 1798–1799, and this time

20 Beauharnais, Marie Rose Joséphine de, Empress Joséphine

Joséphine’s affair with a certain CaptainHippolyte Charles was too public to be de-nied.When Napoleon returned to Paris hewas determined to divorce her, but Hor-tense and Eugène brought about a reconcil-iation just before the coup of 18 Brumaire.

From now on Joséphine devoted herselffaithfully to her marriage, and in 1802–1803 accompanied First Consul Napoleonon lengthy inspection tours in France andthe Netherlands. Just before Napoleon’scoronation in 1804 he forced Pope Pius VIIto marry the imperial couple in a religiousceremony, and Joséphine was crowned em-press by Napoleon himself. She presidedover the imperial court in impeccable style,but was never crowned queen of Italy evenwhen Eugène was made viceroy. In 1809,however, Napoleon decided to marryMarie-Louise of Austria in order to pro-duce a direct heir to the dynasty.The civilmarriage of Napoleon and Joséphine wasdissolved “by mutual consent” in December1809 and Cardinal Fesch secured an eccle-siastical annulment in January 1810. Thesettlement was generous: Joséphine kept thechâteau of Malmaison and received an an-nual income worthy of an empress.

Joséphine lived at Malmaison for the fewremaining years of her life. In 1814 duringthe Allied occupation of Paris Tsar Alexan-der I paid a call on her and she entertainedthe cream of Russian military society.Joséphine died suddenly on 29 May 1814.After his defeat at Waterloo Napoleon vis-ited Malmaison and walked sadly throughthe apartments where Joséphine had spenther last years.

Related entries: Beauharnais, Eugène Rose de;Beauharnais, Eugénie-Hortense Cecile de;Coronation; Fesch, Joseph

Suggestions for further reading:Bruce, Evangeline. 1995. Napoleon and Josephine:

An Improbable Marriage. New York: Scribner.Cole, Hubert. 1963. Josephine. New York:Viking

Press.Epton, Nina. 1975. Josephine:The Empress and her

Children. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Knapton, Ernest J. 1964. Joséphine. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.

Belgium

B efore the French Revolution theterritory of modern Belgium had

been ruled by the Habsburgs as the Aus-trian Netherlands. Conquered and an-nexed in 1794, it remained part of Francethroughout the Napoleonic period until1814.The rule of the Directory had beenharsh and unpopular, marked by heavytaxation and religious persecution of thedominant Catholic Church. The popula-tion had remained largely docile until1798, when resistance to conscriptionsparked off the so-called Peasants’ War,which was brutally repressed by theFrench.At the time of Napoleon’s coup of18 Brumaire, therefore, Belgium wasemerging from a period of poverty, re-pression, and economic stagnation, andthe long-suffering people greeted thechange of regime with indifference.

The government of the consulate en-deavored to restore order and to reorganizethe administration using more diplomacyand understanding than had its predeces-sors. As in all occupied territories the pre-fects of the nine Belgian departments wereall foreigners, but they chose their officialsfrom among the former opposition as wellas from supporters of the French. Public se-curity and peace were gradually restored,and following the Concordat of 1801,Catholic worship was restored in 1802.Bishops appointed by Napoleon becamefervent supporters of his rule, though a dis-sident group known as la petite église op-posed the adoration of the emperor after1804.

Under the empire Belgium was treatedon an equal footing with other parts ofFrance.The majority of former nobles con-tinued to participate in public life, and Na-

Belgium 21

poleon attained a peak of popularity thatlasted until 1809. Annexation to the largeFrench market and the ending of Britishcompetition by the Continental System al-lowed a degree of prosperity in the textileand metallurgical industries. The region ofVerviers, for example, achieved “a preco-cious, fast, and perfect Industrial Revolu-tion” (Crouzet 1964, p. 584) under Napo-leon’s rule. The downside of equality ofrights with France, however, was an equalobligation to provide soldiers for Napo-leon’s armies, and the heavy burden of con-scription created a seething hostility, whichbegan to grow more serious in the lateryears of the empire.

In 1809 the French under Jean-Bap-tiste Bernadotte repulsed the Britishforces of the Walcheren expedition, andthe construction of new defensive worksin Antwerp provided another stimulus forthe economy. But the breach betweenNapoleon and Pope Pius VII, resulting inthe annexation of the Papal States, re-vived Catholic opposition to French rule.The fall of Napoleon in 1814 was greetedwith rejoicing in Belgium, but the Treatyof Paris (30 May 1814) stipulated thatBelgium was to be annexed to Hollandunder Prince William I of Orange-Nas-sau.After the battle of Waterloo, the liber-ation of Belgium from France was com-plete, only for it to become part of theenlarged Netherlands, designed as abuffer state against future French aggres-sion. Belgium did not gain its indepen-dence until 1830.

Related entries: Austria; Continental System

Suggestions for further reading:Craeybeckx, J. 1970.“The Beginnings of the

Industrial Revolution in Belgium,” in R. E.Cameron, ed., Essays in French EconomicHistory. Homewood, IL: Irwin.

Crouzet, François. 1964.“Wars, Blockades andEconomic Change in Europe, 1792–1815,”Journal of Economic History 24, pp. 567–588.

Kossman, E. H. 1978. The Low Countries,1780–1940. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Berg, Grand Duchy of

E stablished in 1806 from Prussian andBavarian possessions in the Rhine-

land, the Duchy of Berg formed part ofNapoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine,and was made a Grand Duchy in 1807. In1806 Napoleon gave the new duchy toJoachim Murat, and by the Treaty of Tilsitadded the territories of Nassau and Mün-ster. In 1808 Napoleon raised Murat to theKingdom of Naples and ruled Berg himselfuntil March 1809, installing his four-year-old nephew Louis Napoleon as nominalruler. Berg lost about one-fourth of its ter-ritory in 1810 when Holland and NorthGerman lands were annexed to France.

Düsseldorf was made capital of theGrand Duchy, and the imperial commis-sioners, first Claude Beugnot and thenPierre-Louis Roederer, appointed Germansin the administration and created modernfinancial and legal structures. Economically,however, French rule was a disaster forBerg. The Continental System broughttrade to a virtual halt, and when a plea foreconomic integration with France was re-jected, manufacturing enterprises relocatedto the French left bank of the Rhine,adding to unemployment and the misery ofthe population. Economic destitution, con-scription, and the hated tobacco and salttaxes caused the people of Berg to riseagainst French rule in 1813, when news ofNapoleon’s defeat in Russia filteredthrough. The rising was repressed withoutpity, but the end was near for the artificiallycreated Grand Duchy.The territory was oc-cupied by Prussian and Russian troops in1813–1814 and the area annexed to Prussiain 1815.

Related entries: Confederation of the Rhine;Continental System; Murat, Joachim; Roederer,Pierre Louis

Suggestions for further reading:Sheehan, James J. 1989. German History,

1770–1866. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

22 Berg, Grand Duchy of

Berlin Decrees

These edicts of December 1806 markthe creation of Napoleon’s Conti-

nental System. Following the French defeatat the battle of Trafalgar, it was clear thatNapoleon could not challenge British navaldominance, and the Berlin Decrees recog-nized this by switching the struggle againstBritain into the economic field. They de-clared Britain to be in a state of blockadeby France and its allies and satellites, offi-cially ending all trading contacts betweenthem and the British. The British re-sponded with the Orders in Council ofJanuary and November 1807, whichobliged neutral ships to get British permis-sion to trade with enemy ports.This actionin turn forced Napoleon to respond withthe Milan Decrees of November and De-cember 1807 extending the ContinentalSystem to neutral shipping.

Related entries: Continental System



Hecksher, E. F. 1922. The Continental System:AnEconomic Interpretation. Oxford: Publicationsof the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace.

Bernadotte, Jean-Baptiste Jules(1763–1844)

G iven by Napoleon the titles of marshalof France, and prince of Ponte Corvo,and king of Sweden after 1818,

Bernadotte was the son of a lawyer fromPau in Gascony. He joined the army in1780 but was not commissioned until afterthe Revolution, rising from lieutenant in1791 to general of division in 1794. In1797 he was sent to reinforce Bonaparte inItaly and took part in the last phases of the

Italian campaign. He was briefly and reluc-tantly ambassador to Vienna in 1798, and inthe same year married Désirée Clary, so be-coming Napoleon’s brother-in-law.

Bernadotte was the Directory’s ministerof war between July and September 1799and at first refused to support Napoleon’scoup of 18 Brumaire. Nevertheless Napo-leon made him a councillor of state and in1800 gave him command of the Army of theWest in preparation for the subsequentlyabandoned invasion of England. In 1804 hewas appointed governor of Hanover andmarshal of the empire. Bernadotte com-manded the First Corps at Austerlitz in1805, but in 1806 was blamed by Napoleonfor his failure to reach the battlefield of Jena.Napoleon made him governor of theHanseatic towns in 1807, but he returned tocommand of the First Corps in 1809.Whenhis conduct at the battle of Wagram led to anew quarrel with the emperor Bernadotteresigned his command and returned to Paris.

With Napoleon’s approval Bernadottewas elected crown prince of Sweden inOctober 1810, changing his name toCharles-John. But as effective ruler of thecountry he supported Sweden’s reluctanceto join the Continental System and signed atreaty with Great Britain in December1812.As commander of the Allied Army ofthe North in August and September 1813he defeated Nicolas Oudinot at GrossBeeren and Michel Ney at Dennewitz, be-fore taking part in the Battle of the Nationsat Leipzig in October, where he was againcriticized for arriving late.

Bernadotte gained control of Norway forSweden by the Treaty of Kiel in January 1814and continued in the coalition against Napo-leon until the emperor’s abdication. He as-pired to succeed Napoleon, but was regardedas a traitor by most French people, and the al-lies preferred Louis XVIII. His hopes inFrance thus dashed, Bernadotte now devotedhimself to Swedish affairs, principally the oc-cupation of Norway, and refused to join thenew coalition of 1815 against Napoleon.

Bernadotte, Jean-Baptiste Jules 23

Bernadotte succeeded to the thrones ofSweden and Norway in 1818 as King CarlXIV and ruled as a cautious but capable andmostly popular monarch. He died in Stock-holm in his eightieth year.

Bernadotte’s fiery Gascon temperamentwas responsible for his constantly difficultrelations with Napoleon, who frequentlyreferred to him as too hotheaded or evenmad. He cut a dashing figure on the battle-field, and his personal bravery was never indoubt, but his reluctance to commit histroops to the field until he thought thetime was right caused extreme exasperationamong his allies, whether he was fightingfor or against Napoleon, and accusations ofcowardice. He was a difficult subordinate.In supporting Bernadotte’s aspirations inSweden Napoleon had hoped to securecontrol of the Baltic to the exclusion of theBritish, but once installed in his adoptedcountry Bernadotte pursued Swedish na-tional aspirations, which meant conflictwith Denmark over control of Norway, andhis personal ambitions, which brought himinto conflict with his brother-in-law.

Related entries: Austerlitz, Battle of; Clary,Bernadine Eugénie Désirée; Coalitions; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of; Leipzig, Battle of;Wagram,Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Heathcote,T.A. 1987.“Bernadotte,” in David G.


Palmer,Alan. 1990. Bernadotte: Napoleon’s Marshal,Sweden’s King. London: John Murray.

Scott, Franklin Daniel. 1933.“Bernadotte and theThrone of France, 1814,” Journal of ModernHistory 5, pp. 465–478.

Scott, Franklin Daniel. 1935. Bernadotte and theFall of Napoleon. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.

Bernier, Abbé Etienne(1762–1806)

T he versatile abbé Bernier wentfrom being one of the inspirational

leaders of the Vendée revolt to Napoleon’schief negotiator with Pius VII over theConcordat of 1801. As pastor of the parishof St. Laud in Angers in 1790 he refused tosubscribe to the Civil Constitution of theClergy; he then showed considerable abilityand heroism as head of the supreme councildirecting the Vendée insurrection, earningthe title of Apostle of the Vendée. By 1794,however, his independent attitude led to hislosing the confidence of the other leadersof the revolt. But even as things went badlyfor the rebels Bernier remained as LouisXVIII’s official agent in the Catholic androyalist armies. By 1799 he had come to re-alize the futility of the royalist cause, refusedto join in the final uprising of that year, andafter Napoleon’s coup of 18 Brumaireswitched his loyalties.

In January 1800 Bernier concluded thePeace of Montfaucon, securing religiousliberty for the Vendéans, and went to Pariswhere he preached sermons and was re-ceived cordially by Napoleon. His talent forintrigue was of great use to Napoleon innegotiating the Concordat, but Bernier wasplaying a double game. He used all hisdiplomatic skill as intermediary betweenNapoleon’s minister, Jean Portalis, and thepapal legate, Cardinal Giovanni Caprara, allthe time doing his best to defend the pope’sinterests. Bernier drafted the notes and re-sponses for both sides until the treaty wasfinally signed on 16 July 1801, but his slip-pery behavior was viewed badly by Napo-leon. Having been promised the bishopricof Paris as a reward for his diplomacy, hewas assigned to the lesser see of Orléans.

Bernier was now used by Charles-Mau-rice de Talleyrand for a series of delicatemissions with the Church: the Italian andGerman Concordats and Napoleon’s coro-nation. Most notably he succeeded in get-ting Pius VII’s acquiescence in the matter ofNapoleon’s crowning himself. Again frus-trated in his ambition to be named papalnuncio to Germany, Bernier had to be con-tent with running his diocese of Orléans

24 Bernier, abbé Etienne

until his death at the age of forty-four.Thecrafty cleric had received scant reward forhis valuable services after abandoning theroyalist cause.

Related entries: Concordat; Coronation; PiusVII, Pope;Vendée Revolt

Suggestions for further reading:Hales, Edward Elton Young. 1962. Napoleon and

the Pope. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.Tilly, Charles. 1976. The Vendée. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press.Walsh, Henry Horace. 1933. The Concordat of

1801:A Study of the Problems of Church andState. New York: Columbia University Press.

Berthier, Louis Alexandre(1753–1815)

N apoleon’s invaluable chief of staffwas born at Versailles, son of an of-

ficer in the topographical engineers, andjoined the same service himself at the ageof thirteen in 1766. His rise in the rankswas rapid during the last years of the ancienrégime and the early days of the Revolu-tion, from lieutenant of infantry in 1770 tobrigadier general in 1792. He was Napo-leon’s chief of staff for eighteen years, fromthe first Italian campaign in 1796 to thefirst abdication in 1814. He also served asminister of war between November 1799and April 1800 and again from October1800 until September 1807.

Berthier was a professional of the highestorder, whose loyalty and efficiency gaveNapoleon an immediate advantage at atime when Prussia, Austria, and Russia hadno general staffs. A workaholic who couldgrasp the essentials of any situation, his cre-ation of a disciplined staff providing up-to-the-minute information allowed the em-peror’s commands to be translated intoprecise and detailed orders for specific armyunits. Berthier never criticized Napoleon,though as their personal relations deterio-rated he could indulge in self-pity. Napo-

leon’s judgments on Berthier varied widely,revealing one of the worst sides of his char-acter. At one moment he could praiseBerthier, saying that “as chief of staff,Berthier has no equal” (Connelly 1985, p.65), at another call him “a gosling trans-muted by me into some kind of eagle”(Raeuber 1987, p. 50). During their years offriendship Napoleon showered Berthierwith honors: first marshal of France in1804; senator and Grand Master of thePalace in the same year; sovereign prince ofNeuchâtel in 1806; vice-constable of theempire in 1807; prince of Wagram in 1809.But Berthier’s loyalty was sorely tried. Na-poleon tricked him into marrying PrincessElizabeth-Marie, niece of King Maximilianof Bavaria, and abandoning his belovedMadame Giuseppina Visconti. And in 1809he forced Berthier to take the blame for hisown initial error in dividing his forces atthe beginning of the Wagram campaign,knowing that he could be relied upon topreserve the imperial image of infallibility.

Berthier never visited his principality ofNeuchâtel in Switzerland. But he did man-age to oversee some beneficial reforms infiscal, forest, postal, and police administra-tion, while creaming off substantial rev-enues for himself. He was, however, unableto prevent the conscription of his subjectsfor Napoleon’s armies (nearly a thousandwere killed in Spain and Russia) or the ruinof Neuchâtel’s industries by the Continen-tal System.

Despite the deterioration in his relationswith the emperor and Napoleon’s ill-tem-pered outbursts during the Russian cam-paign, Berthier faithfully fulfilled his dutiesto the end. After the first abdication he ledthe marshals to meet Louis XVIII at Com-piègne. Regarded with suspicion by bothsides, he rejected Napoleon’s appeal to joinhim during the Hundred Days. He wasgiven protection by his father-in-law, theking of Bavaria, but died at Bamberg on 1June 1815, following a fall from a windowwhile watching a parade of troops.

Berthier, Louis Alexandre 25

Related entries: Army; Switzerland

Suggestions for further reading:Connelly, Owen, ed. 1985. Historical Dictionary of

Napoleonic France, 1799–1815. Westport, CT:Greenwood.

Raeuber, Charles. 1987.“Berthier,” in David G.Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Watson, Sidney John. 1957. By Command of theEmperor:A Life of Marshal Berthier. London:Bodley Head.

Biens Nationaux

N ame given to properties confiscatedfrom the crown, the Church, émi-

grés, and political suspects and subsequentlyoffered for sale by Revolutionary govern-ment, starting in 1790. Speculation in biensnationaux reached extravagant proportionsunder the Directory, but the state neverbenefited from sales to the extent it shouldhave done. Sales continued under the con-sulate and empire, but on a greatly reducedscale, while the Concordat of 1801 guaran-teed the Revolution’s confiscation ofChurch property. Buyers who defaulted onpayments, as many had done under previ-ous regimes, were now pursued withNapoleonic vigor. All sales of biens na-tionaux were maintained at the Restoration,confirming the economic gains of manybourgeois and peasants.

Related entries: Economy; Peasants

Suggestions for further reading:Bergeron, Louis. 1981. France under Napoleon.

Princeton: Princeton University. Press.Sutherland, D. M. G. 1985. France, 1789–1815:

Revolution and Counter-Revolution. London:Fontana.

Bignon, Louis Pierre Edouard(1771–1841)

B orn at La Meilleraye, Bignon enteredthe diplomatic service in 1797, serv-

ing in minor posts until 1805, when Napo-leon appointed him minister to Hesse-Cas-sel and then to Baden in 1808. He wasmade resident in Warsaw in 1810 and,though removed during Napoleon’s Rus-sian campaign, he returned after the disas-ter, remaining until the withdrawal ofFrench troops was complete. Continuing inNapoleon’s service, during the HundredDays Bignon served as undersecretary forforeign affairs. After the Restoration Big-non was elected to the Chamber of De-puties, served as interim minister of foreignaffairs after the Revolution of 1830, andwas reelected in 1831 and 1834.

In his will Napoleon had commissionedBignon to write “the history of Frenchdiplomacy from 1792 to 1815,” a workwhich became the first extended history ofthe Napoleonic period, appearing as theHistory of France since the 18 Brumaire in atotal of fourteen volumes, including fourpublished posthumously, between 1828 and1850. From 1829 onward Bignon was givenaccess to the archives and to Napoleon’scorrespondence, thereby being able tocombine personal recollection and pioneerresearch. He was not uncritical of Napo-leon, especially over Spain and the creationof the Imperial nobility.

Related entries: Diplomatic Service

Suggestions for further reading:Whitcomb, Edward A. 1979. Napoleon’s Diplomatic

Service. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von(1742–1819)

B orn near Rostock on the Baltic coast,Blücher enlisted in the Swedish army

in 1756 at the age of fourteen and fouryears later transferred to the Prussian armyof Frederick the Great. Frustrated at lack ofpromotion and with a reputation for insub-

26 Biens Nationaux

ordination he quit the service in 1773,causing King Frederick to remark:“Captainvon Blücher may go to the devil as soon ashe pleases” (Palmer 1984, p. 44). Reinstatedin 1778, he fought against the French revo-lutionary armies in 1793–1794 and waspromoted to brigadier general, a remark-able achievement for a nonnoble.

Irritated by the lack of military actionafter 1795 and convinced that a clash withNapoleon was inevitable, Blücher called foruniversal conscription in Prussia and be-came one of the leaders of the war party in1805.At the disastrous battles of Jena-Auer-städt he retreated in good order and surren-dered to Marshal Bernadotte at Ratkau, hisexemplary conduct being one of the fewbright spots in the Prussian performance.After the Treaty of Tilsit Blücher becamemilitary governor of Pomerania and astrong supporter of Prussian army reforms,but was afflicted by illness and depressionuntil news of Napoleon’s problems in Spainrevived his spirits.

In 1813 Blücher, at the age of seventy,was placed in command of the Silesianarmy, the most active Prussian force inthe field against Napoleon, fighting atLützen and Bautzen. But his greatest tri-umph was at the Battle of Leipzig, afterwhich he played a leading role in the in-vasion of France. After Napoleon’s abdi-cation he was given the title of prince ofWahlstadt and given a huge welcome andan honorary degree from the Universityof Oxford on a visit to England. Duringthe Hundred Days Blücher was givencommand of Prussian forces in Belgium.Defeated by Napoleon at the Battle ofLigny, he nevertheless arrived in the nickof time at Waterloo, saving the day for theAllies. After 1815 he retired to his estatesin Silesia.

Known to his men as “Marshal For-wards,” Blücher was a popular and re-spected commander, sharing the hardshipsof his men as well as the glory. He was oneof the few commanders who realized that

bold tactics were necessary to defeat Napo-leon and was consistently intransigent inseeing the necessity to oppose him by allpossible means.

Related entries: Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of;Leipzig, Battle of; Ligny, Battle of; Prussia;Waterloo, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Palmer,Alan. 1984. An Encyclopaedia of Napoleon’s

Europe. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Parkinson, Roger. 1975. The Hussar General:The

Life of Blücher, Man of Waterloo. London: PeterDavies.

Bonaparte, Carlo (1746–1785)

N apoleon’s father came from a line ofCorsican gentry who traced their

ancestry back to a Florentine noble of thetwelfth century. He married Maria Letiziain 1764 and together they fought with theCorsican patriots of Pasquale Paoli againstthe Genoese and the French in 1768–1769.Napoleon was born months after their es-cape from the defeat of the nationalists.Carlo accepted an amnesty from the victo-rious French, became friendly with theroyal governor, the comte de Marboeuf,and took the French title of comte himself,an essential move if his family was to pros-per. He put his legal training to use as aprosecutor in the royal courts, was a mem-ber of the Corsican delegation at the coro-nation of Louis XVI, and was elected to theCorsican estates.Although comfortably off,Carlo was also somewhat extravagant, buteven in straitened times he ensured the ed-ucation of four of his children—Napoleon,Joseph, Lucien, and Elisa—in France. Afterseeing Napoleon successfully through theacademy of Brienne, he died at Montpel-lier, probably of stomach cancer, at the pre-mature age of thirty-nine.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Maria Letizia;Corsica

Bonaparte, Carlo 27

Suggestions for further reading:Carrington, Dorothy. 1988. Napoleon and his

Parents: On the Threshold of History. London:Viking.

Geer,Walter. 1928–1929. Napoleon and his Family:The Story of a Corsican Clan. 3 vols. London:George Allen and Unwin.

Markham, Felix. 1975. The Bonapartes. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Bonaparte, Caroline, Queen of Naples (1782–1839)

A ccording to Hortense de Beauhar-nais, her schoolmate, Napoleon’s

youngest sister, originally known as MariaAnnunziata, possessed “an art of attractingand charming, with a grace that had some-thing of an Eastern slave girl’s seduction init” (Seward 1986, p. 92). Universally recog-nized as ambitious, amoral, and intelligent,she was also, says Hortense, “courageous,determined and emotional: the charmwhich made one long to serve her couldnot hide her lust for total domination andher envy of everyone else’s success” (Sew-ard 1986, p. 93). Among the many menshe charmed in her youth was JoachimMurat, whom she married at Morte-fontaine in 1800. From then on her ambi-tion was tied to Murat and her plans fortheir four children.

When Murat was made king of Naplesin 1808, Caroline ensured that Napoleonmade her joint ruler, so that she could suc-ceed to the throne if her husband was killedin battle. As queen she encouraged Muratto be independent and to try and exploitItalian nationalist feeling, while pretendingto Napoleon that she was acting only in hisinterest. She was responsible for raising thesocial style of court life in Naples, presidingover the brilliant palaces of Portici, “theNeapolitan Fontainebleau,” and Caserta,but her scheming continued, as she com-plained about Murat to Napoleon and viceversa. In the interests of her sons, in 1809

she tried unsuccessfully to have Muratnamed as Napoleon’s successor should theemperor be killed fighting in Spain, and in1810 opposed Napoleon’s marriage toMarie-Louise, preferring that the emperorshould have no direct legitimate heir. Sentto escort the future empress from Munichto Paris, Caroline made an immediate andlasting enemy of her.

In 1813–1814, as Napoleon’s empirecrumbled, Caroline encouraged Murat inhis efforts to preserve his crown, giving himfull support in his efforts to reach an ac-commodation with the Allies. She appearsto have had fewer scruples about betrayingNapoleon than did her husband. Duringthe Hundred Days, however, Murat ignoredher advice, attacked the Allies, calling uponthe Italians to rise against Austrian rule, andthereby lost their kingdom. When he re-turned to Naples on 21 May 1815 he wasfaced by popular revolt, tried, and shot,while Caroline took refuge on a Britishwarship before being taken to Vienna.Styling herself the Contessa di Lipona (ananagram of Napoli), she lived under sur-veillance in Austria until 1824, when shemoved to Trieste. She may, much to Napo-leon’s disgust, have secretly married hernew companion, General Francesco Mac-donald, a soldier of Scottish origin formerlyin Neapolitan service, who remained withher for the rest of her life. Caroline lived inTrieste until 1831, when she moved to Flo-rence, living there in some style until herdeath in 1839. Of the children she had suchgreat plans for, her two sons emigrated tothe United States, and her daughters mar-ried into the Italian nobility.

Extravagant and ambitious, Caroline wasundoubtedly also very charming, with a lik-ing for music and a remarkable memory fornames and faces. Metternich, who detestedthe upstart Bonapartes, nevertheless ob-served that she possessed “quite extraordi-nary social tact.” On the other hand, herambition was more personal than familial.Her mother, Maria Letizia, told her: “Only

28 Bonaparte, Caroline, Queen of Naples

over your dead body should your husbandhave been allowed to strike at your brother,your benefactor and your master!” Tal-leyrand, possibly recognizing a kindred

spirit, says that Caroline “had the mind of aCromwell in the body of a pretty woman.Born with a forceful character, graceful,charming, inexpressibly attractive, she lacked

Bonaparte, Caroline, Queen of Naples 29

Caroline, Queen of Naples, and her Children by François Gérard. For all her ambition and politicalacumen, Caroline Bonaparte was a devoted mother, and during their residence in Naples she and her husband,Joachim Murat, spent as much time as possible with their children. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

only the gift of knowing how to concealher love of power” (Seward 1986, p. 93).

Related entries: Murat, Joachim; Naples,Kingdom of

Suggestions for further reading:Bear, Joan. 1972. Caroline Murat:A Biography.

London: Collins.Cole, Hubert. 1972. The Betrayers: Joachim and

Caroline Murat. London: Eyre Methuen.Seward, Desmond. 1986. Napoleon’s Family.

London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Weiner, Margery. 1964. The Parvenu Princesses:

Elisa, Pauline and Caroline Bonaparte. London:John Murray.

Bonaparte, Elisa, Grand Duchess of Tuscany

(1777–1820)

S ometimes called the most Napoleonicof the Bonaparte sisters, Elisa (Maria

Anna) was probably the most intelligentand capable of all Napoleon’s siblings. Theeldest surviving daughter of Carlo andMaria Letizia Bonaparte, she was sent toSaint-Cyr, the most exclusive girls’ schoolof the ancien régime, at the age of seven,remaining out of touch with her familyuntil she was fifteen. In May 1797, whenNapoleon was no more than a rising gen-eral, she married her fellow Corsican, FelixBacciochi, of whom Metternich remarked:“Napoleon would have preferred abrother-in-law not quite so destitute of in-tellect” (Seward 1986, p. 36). Lucien Bona-parte complained that Bacciochi did “noth-ing but scrape his violin” (Seward 1986, p.36). Elisa’s achievements were hers alone,owing nothing to her good-looking butvapid husband.

Napoleon created Elisa Princess of Pi-ombino in 1805 and Duchess of Lucca in1806. Lucca prospered under her rule. Silkproduction doubled in three years, marsheswere drained, and the alum deposits of Pi-

ombino developed profitably. Her greatestachievement was in reviving the famousbut moribund marble quarries of Carrara,which she financed through a special statebank. The artists and sculptors of Carrarasupplied all official busts of dignitariesthroughout the empire, including 500 ofNapoleon in the single month of Septem-ber 1808. Lucca also became a significantcultural center as Elisa established libraries,university chairs, a medical college, aNapoleonic Institute modeled on the Insti-tut Français, and the Istituto Elisa, a schoolfor girls of noble birth inspired by Saint-Cyr. Elisa governed her state like an eigh-teenth-century enlightened despot and es-tablished a court of which the principaladornment was the outstanding violinistand composer Niccolo Paganini.

Her success as a ruler led Napoleon tocreate her grand duchess of Tuscany in1809, but since Tuscany was annexed di-rectly to the French Empire she was effec-tively Napoleon’s viceroy and enjoyed lessfreedom of action than at Lucca. Elisa heldcourt at the Pitti Palace in Florence, whichshe restored and refurbished in competitionwith her sister Caroline’s court in Naples.The intellectual elite of Italy gravitated to-ward Florence, and the Academy La Cruscaproduced a Tuscan dictionary that waswidely used to standardize the Italian lan-guage.

In 1813–1814 as the empire fell, theturncoat Joachim Murat occupied Elisa’sstates, but he could not save her position.Assuming the title of countess of Compig-nano, she spent the last five years of her lifenear Trieste, obtaining an annual pensionfrom the Austrians and continuing to pa-tronize artists and the theater. She died of afever nine months before Napoleon’s death.Elisa’s abilities, as well as her arrogant man-ner and sharp tongue, probably made hertoo much like Napoleon for his own com-fort, and as brother and sister they werenever close. He said of her that she “had themind and strength of a man,” which he may

30 Bonaparte, Elisa, Grand Duchess of Tuscany

not have meant entirely as a compliment,and which probably indicates his own un-ease with her talents.

Related entries: Tuscany, Grand Duchy of

Suggestions for further reading:Geer,Walter. 1928–1929. Napoleon and his Family:

The Story of a Corsican Clan. 3 vols. London:George Allen and Unwin.


Seward, Desmond. 1986. Napoleon’s Family.London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Weiner, Margery. 1964. The Parvenu Princesses:Elisa, Pauline and Caroline Bonaparte. London:John Murray.

Bonaparte, Jérôme, King of Westphalia

(1784–1860)

N apoleon’s youngest brother couldnever live down a reputation for ir-

responsibility and wild living, but redeemedhimself in the last years of the empire andgained distinction in old age during thereign of his nephew, Napoleon III. Napo-leon sent Jérôme to sea in 1800, intendinghim to become a naval commander, and hesaw some action in the Caribbean beforedeciding that life before the mast was notfor him. In July 1803, without leave, he vis-ited the United States, and on ChristmasEve married Elizabeth Patterson, much-ad-mired southern belle and daughter of a Bal-timore millionaire.Their union caused con-sternation and anger among the Bonapartefamily. Napoleon had the marriage an-nulled, and when the couple returned toEurope refused to allow “Miss Patterson” toenter territory under French control. Eliza-beth found her way to London, where inMay 1805 she gave birth to a son, JeromeNapoleon.

Jérôme reestablished himself in hisbrother’s favor by commanding a Bavarian

division in the Prussian campaign of 1806,and in 1807 Napoleon made him king ofWestphalia and arranged his marriage toPrincess Catherine of Württemberg, a firstcousin of Alexander I. Despite his frivolousreputation and the notorious wild partiesat his court, Jérôme proved a surprisinglyable ruler of his kingdom between 1807and 1813. Napoleon imposed a constitu-tion and his handpicked officials on Jérômeand Catherine. German ministers, officials,and judges presided over the introductionof a version of the Civil Code, the aboli-tion of feudalism and serfdom, reorganiza-tion of the administration, and beneficialreforms in education.The Westphalian Par-liament played a real role in affairs until1810, when resistance to Napoleon’s evergrowing financial demands robbed Jérômeof what popularity he had succeeded ingaining.

Jérôme remained unpredictable and alltoo conscious of his status. He took greatpride in his army, which drew on Hessianmilitary tradition, fought well, and helpedbreak down provincialism and religious prej-udices. Jérôme commanded the Tenth Corpsin the Wagram campaign, and his dedicationto Napoleon was never in doubt. In theRussian campaign of 1812, however, he wassent home by Napoleon after refusing toserve under Louis Nicolas Davout. Jérômeand Catherine were forced to abandon theirkingdom in October 1813 and when theempire collapsed found refuge in Switzer-land. Rallying to Napoleon during theHundred Days, Jérôme distinguished himselfat Waterloo, where, though wounded, he wasone of the last to leave the field.

After the definitive end of the empire,Jérôme lived mostly in Italy, where Cather-ine bore him two sons and a daughter.AfterCatherine’s death in 1835 he secretly mar-ried a Florentine widow, Giustina Pecori.He was allowed to return to Paris in 1847and was appointed governor of the In-valides in 1849 and, under Napoleon III, asenator and marshal of France. He lived in

Bonaparte, Jérôme, King of Westphalia 31

the Palais Royal, where in 1855 he receivedQueen Victoria, who found him an “oddold man, rather tall and very civil.” Whenhe died in 1860 he was buried near Napo-leon in Les Invalides.

Jérôme may have been the most frivo-lous of Napoleon’s brothers, showing a flairfor parading in extravagant uniforms re-markable even by the standards of theBonaparte family, but he founded two dis-tinguished lineages. Elizabeth PattersonBonaparte’s grandson, Charles JosephBonaparte, was secretary of the navy and at-torney general under President TheodoreRoosevelt between 1905 and 1909. Napo-leon Joseph, Jérôme’s second son byCatherine of Württemberg, became theBonaparte pretender in 1879 on the deathof the son of Napoleon III. Jérôme’s great-grandson, Prince Napoleon, a successful in-ternational businessman, hero of the Resis-tance, and pretender to the throne, died in1997.

Related entries: Danube Campaigns;Waterloo,Battle of;Westphalia, Kingdom of


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Kircheisen, Friedrich Max. 1932. Jovial King:

Napoleon’s Youngest Brother. London:E. Mathews and Marrot.


Bonaparte, Joseph, King of Naples, King of Spain

(1768–1844)

N apoleon’s elder brother possessedsocial charm and a fair degree of

political skill, but failed as a military com-mander. Napoleon judged him “too goodto be a king” (Connelly 1985, pp. 80-81).Originally intended for the priesthood, hebecame a lawyer instead and was a rising

star in Corsican politics before the revolt ofPasquale Paoli in 1793 forced the Bona-partes to flee to France. In 1794 Josephmarried Julie Clary, sister of Désirée, andadding to her considerable dowry by wiseinvestments, built up a considerable fortuneduring the period of his brother’s rise andascendancy.

Between 1796 and 1799 under the Di-rectory Joseph acted as a legislator, as amember of the Council of Five Hundred,and as a diplomat on missions to Parma andRome. He put his reconciliatory talents touse during the coup of 18 Brumaire andunder the consulate acted as Napoleon’spersonal envoy, deeply involved in the ne-gotiations of the Treaties of Lunéville and

32 Bonaparte, Joseph, King of Naples, King of Spain

François Gérard’s Joseph Bonaparte portraysJoseph as king of Spain standing in front of histhrone, bedecked in ermine and blue velvet robes. Hisleft hand rests on the scepter while he holds his hatcasually in his right hand.The whole portraitcombines magnificence with a hopeful “popular”touch. (Lauros-Giraudon/Art Resource)

Amiens and the Concordat of 1801. Josephinitially opposed the creation of the empire,but in 1806 Napoleon made him king ofNaples. Here he promulgated a constitu-tion, attempted to abolish feudalism and re-form the administration, and managed toreconcile the Catholic Church by consci-entious observance of his religious duties.This latter success probably induced Napo-leon to persuade a reluctant Joseph that hewould make an acceptable king of Spain, adelusion the failure of which cannot beblamed on Joseph.

As king of Spain between 1808 and1813 Joseph tried to woo Spanish liberals,but faced massive popular rebellion, whichforced him to abandon Madrid only eightdays after arriving there. He attempted torule according to the Constitution of Bay-onne, but his efforts were impractical andled him to neglecting military affairs, muchto Napoleon’s annoyance. Never acceptedas ruler by the Spanish people, Josephwanted to be an enlightened monarch butwas forced to be a soldier king, a role forwhich he was totally unsuited. When theduke of Wellington’s decisive victory at Vi-toria on 21 June 1813 brought an end tothe Peninsular War, Joseph had to flee igno-miniously back to his estate of Morte-fontaine, near Paris. He formally abdicatedon 11 December 1813. During the Alliedinvasion of France in 1814 Joseph was headof government in Paris while Napoleonheaded the army. He escaped to Switzer-land, returned to serve during the HundredDays, and accompanied Napoleon toRochefort after the defeat at Waterloo.While Napoleon was being sent into per-manent exile, Joseph slipped onto an Amer-ican ship and arrived in New York at theend of July 1815.

Joseph brought an estate at Bordentown,New Jersey, and between 1815 and 1832 hemade friends in high places, was received byPresident Andrew Jackson, and was electedto the American Philosophical Society. In1832 he left for Europe to support the

cause of Napoleon II, but the prince diedbefore he arrived. Banned from France, hefirst settled in England and then in 1841joined his much neglected wife in Italy. Hedied in Florence on 28 July 1844, and Juliesurvived him for only eight months. In1862 Napoleon III had Joseph’s remains re-moved to the Invalides to rest near those ofNapoleon. Characterized as “the gentleBonaparte,” Joseph’s considerable talentswere well employed in times of peace, butunsuited to the times of war his brother in-flicted on Spain and Europe.

Related entries: Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII;Hundred Days; Naples, Kingdom of; PeninsularWar; Spain

Suggestions for further reading:Connelly, Owen. 1968. The Gentle Bonaparte:A

Biography of Joseph, Napoleon’s Elder Brother.New York: Macmillan.

Connelly, Owen, ed. 1985. Historical Dictionary ofNapoleonic France, 1799–1815. Westport, CT:Greenwood.

Glover, Michael. 1971. Legacy of Glory:TheBonaparte Kingdom of Spain, 1808–1813. NewYork: Scribner.

Lovett, Gabriel H. 1965. Napoleon and the Birth ofModern Spain. 2 vols. New York: New YorkUniversity Press.

Ross, Michael. 1976. The Reluctant King: JosephBonaparte, King of the Two Sicilies and Spain.London: Sidgwick and Jackson.

Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland (1778–1846)

N apoleon’s third brother, born atAjaccio, Louis started his career as a

soldier. Commissioned in the artillery in1795, he served as Napoleon’s aide-de-camp in the first Italian and Egyptian cam-paigns between 1796 and 1799. He trans-ferred to the cavalry in 1799 but retiredalmost immediately through ill health. On4 January 1802 Louis married Hortense deBeauharnais, with whom he had three sons,two of whom died in infancy, but the third,Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, lived to

Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland 33

become Napoleon III in 1850. Louis’s poorrelations with Hortense, however, were tobecome one cause of friction with hisbrother the emperor.

With the creation of the empire in 1804Louis became grand constable, adding thetitle of commander of reserves in 1805, andbriefly governor general of the depart-ments beyond the Alps. In June 1806 Na-poleon made Louis king of Holland, butduring his reign as Lodewijk I he enragedNapoleon by his pro-Dutch and nationalistpolicies, refusing to accept that the onlyrole for his kingdom was to be exploitedfor the greater glory of his brother. Thehistorian Jean Tulard describes Louis as “anexcellent sovereign” who “‘took to heartthe interests of his state,” adding, “fromthence onwards a conflict with his brotherwas inevitable.” He learned Dutch, formeda Dutch ministry and governed with a Par-liament, maintained traditional rights andreligious freedom, and introduced educa-tional reforms, a flood control program,and the foundations of a national healthservice. Even more serious from Napo-leon’s point of view, Louis refused to orga-nize military conscription, rejected theNapoleonic law codes as “un-Dutch,” andrefused to enforce the Continental System,which he called “immoral” (Connelly1985, pp. 80–81).

In 1810, therefore, Napoleon forcedLouis to abdicate and annexed Holland toFrance. Louis took the title of Count ofSaint-Leu and found asylum in Austria, set-tling at Graz before moving to Switzerlandin 1813. In January 1814 he offered his ser-vices to Napoleon as “a Frenchman wishingto share the dangers of the moment,” butwas ignored.Taking refuge in Lausanne andthen in Italy, Louis refused Napoleon’s invi-tation to return during the Hundred Days,observing his brother’s final downfall froma distance in Rome. Thereafter he spentmost of his remaining years in Florence,moving to Livorno shortly before his deathin July 1846.

Louis was the author of several books ofpoetry and history, a novel, Marie ou lespeines d’amour (1812), and most notablythree volumes of Historical Documents andReflections on the Government of Holland,which when published in 1820 further en-raged the exiled and dying Napoleonagainst his independent-minded brother.Although liable to fits of paranoia and a badhusband to a talented wife who deservedmuch better, Louis as king of Hollandshowed talent and a sympathy for his sub-jects that proved stronger than family feel-ing or the glories of the empire.

Related entries: Beauharnais, Eugénie-Hortense Cecile de; Continental System;Holland, Kingdom of; Netherlands


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Connelly, Owen, ed. 1985. Historical Dictionary of

Napoleonic Frace, 1799–1815. Westport, CT:Greenwood.


Schama, Simon. 1977. Patriots and Liberators:Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813.New York: Knopf.

Bonaparte, Lucien, Prince of Canino (1775–1840)

N apoleon owed much to his fieryyounger brother but could never

control him, and Lucien was the onlymember of the Bonaparte clan to receiveno title under the empire. Born at Ajaccio,Lucien was educated in France at the Col-lège d’Autun, but returned to Corsica onthe outbreak of the Revolution. He be-came a fervent Jacobin, and his denuncia-tion of Pasquale Paoli in Jacobin clubs ledto the Bonaparte family’s flight from Cor-sica in 1793. In revolutionary Paris Luciendeveloped his skills as a politician and radi-cal orator. An ardent supporter of Robes-

34 Bonaparte, Lucien, Prince of Canino

pierre during the Terror, he was impris-oned briefly in 1794, but soon made acomeback under the Directory. Also in1794 he defied his family and marriedChristine Boyer, an innkeeper’s daughter.Elected to the Council of Five Hundred in1798, Lucien was its president in 1799when Napoleon returned from Egypt. Inthis capacity he became the hero of thecoup of 18 Brumaire, rallying the troops tosupport Napoleon and propelling hisbrother to power. Lucien had acted to savethe Republic, and the slow realization thathe had helped to kill it troubled him forthe rest of his life.

As minister of the interior in 1799 Lu-cien began the systematic collection of sta-tistics and drew up the first list of prefects,but as ambassador to Spain in 1800 heclashed with the increasingly imperiousNapoleon and left his brother’s service. Awidower since May 1800, in May 1803 hemarried Alexandrine Jouberthon, a stock-broker’s widow of dubious reputation, oncemore defying the wishes of his family. Na-poleon demanded he renounce his newwife, but instead Lucien went to Romewith Alexandrine, their child, and boththeir children by previous marriages. HerePope Pius VII befriended the family. Napo-leon offered Lucien the crown of Italy in1805 and possibly that of Spain in 1807 ifhe would divorce Mme. Jouberthon, but herefused, choosing instead to live on an es-tate near Rome with the papal title ofprince of Canino.

When Napoleon’s troops entered Romein 1808, Lucien found his brother’s rule op-pressive and planned to emigrate with hisfamily to the United States. However, theywere captured at sea by the Royal Navyand taken to England, where Lucien livedthe life of a country gentleman, first atLudlow Castle in Shropshire, then atThorngrove in Worcestershire, until 1814.His years in England were undisturbed, butthe suggestion in British propaganda thathe was there voluntarily disturbed him, and

eventually the family returned to a Romenow free from Napoleonic rule.

Despite all their personal and politicaldifferences, Lucien rallied to Napoleonduring the Hundred Days and attempted torevive his inspirational oratorical skills in hisbrother’s service. He rushed to Paris andafter Waterloo tried in vain to rally supportin the Senate for Napoleon’s son, the kingof Rome. Saved from reprisals by Pius VII,Lucien spent the rest of his life with his sec-ond wife and their ten children in Italy, de-voting himself to the study of the ancientEtruscans and the composition of manywritings, including his unfinished Memoirsand a book on the Hundred Days. He diedat Viterbo in 1840. Lucien’s independenceand uncommonly principled behavior, es-pecially in the 1800s, caused Sir WalterScott to comment: “A Frenchman refusinga crown and declining to part with his wifeis indeed one of the most uncommon exhi-bitions in an age fertile in novelties.”

Related entries: Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII;Corsica; Hundred Days; Pius VII, Pope; Prefects;Statistics

Suggestions for further reading:Atteridge,Andrew Hilliard. 1909. Napoleon’s

Brothers. London: Methuen.Goodspeed, Donald James. 1965. Bayonets at St.

Cloud:The Story of the 18th Brumaire. London:Rupert Hart-Davis.


Bonaparte, Maria Letizia(1750–1836)

N apoleon’s mother was born MariaLetizia Ramolino at Ajaccio, mar-

ried Carlo Bonaparte on 2 June 1764, andbore him twelve children, six sons and sixdaughters, of whom Napoleon was the sec-ond of the eight who survived infancy. Sheparticipated with her husband in PasqualePaoli’s revolt of 1768–1769, but her princi-

Bonaparte, Maria Letizia 35

pal concern as a young wife was to takecare of Carlo’s often disordered finances, anecessity that instilled the habits of frugalityand basic common sense that she retainedeven at the height of her son’s glory. Forcedto flee Corsica in 1793, she moved the fam-ily home first to Toulon, then to Marseille,but spent most of the years of Napoleon’sprimacy in Paris, with the official title of“Madame, Mère de l’Empereur,” generallyknown as “Madame Mère.”

Under the empire Madame Mère re-tained her frugal habits, an intense religiousdevotion, and a down-to-earth sense of re-alism. Her laconic “If only it lasts . . .” be-came famous. She encouraged Napoleon toseek reconciliation with the Church—herhalf-brother Joseph Fesch became cardinal-archbishop of Lyon—but otherwise took

little interest in politics. According to Met-ternich Letizia cared only for money andnothing for social elevation: “She had animmense income but without her son’s ex-plicit instructions would have done nothingbut invest it.” In fact this focus on invest-ment was very wise: her great wealth, ac-quired from jewelry and shrewd invest-ment, allowed her to live comfortably forover twenty years after the fall of the em-pire. Otherwise in the years of dominanceshe tried to employ her resolve and com-mon sense in the interests of her children,but was more often ignored than heeded.

In 1814 she joined Napoleon briefly onElba and returned to Paris during the Hun-dred Days, finally saying farewell to her sonat Malmaison on 29 June 1815. LeavingParis with Fesch, she made her way throughSwitzerland to Rome, where she was to livequietly for the rest of her life, outliving Na-poleon by fifteen years.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Carlo; Corsica;Fesch, Joseph

Suggestions for further reading:Carrington, Dorothy. 1988. Napoleon and his

Parents: On the Threshold of History. London:Viking.


Martineau, Gilbert. 1978. Madame Mère:Napoleon’s Mother. London: John Murray.

Stirling, Monica. 1961. A Pride of Lions:A Portraitof Napoleon’s Mother. London: Collins.

Bonaparte, Pauline, Duchess of Guastalla

(1780–1825)

N apoleon’s favorite and most beauti-ful sister seemed to revel in scandal.

She never showed any of the political capa-bilities or ambitions of Elisa or Caroline,being content to outdo them in wit andextravagance, but she showed more in the

36 Bonaparte, Pauline, Duchess of Guastalla

Even as the mother of the First Consul, Napoleon’smother continued to live in relative simplicity in herhouse in the Rue St. Dominique, Paris. (Alinari/ArtResource)

way of common humanity. Under the Di-rectory Pauline attracted and encouragedthe attentions of many of her brother’s fel-low officers, until in 1797 an embarrassedNapoleon forced her into marriage withGeneral Charles Victor Leclerc. For the firstyear of the consulate she was queen ofParisian society, but in 1802 Napoleon in-sisted that she accompany Leclerc to Haiti,where he was in command of the expedi-tion against the rising of Toussaint L’Ouver-ture. Leclerc contracted yellow fever, andPauline returned to France a widow with asickly four-year-old son.

Pauline lost no time in getting marriedagain to an Italian nobleman, PrinceCamillo Borghese, but conjugal life with afeeble husband among the aristocracy ofRome did not suit her. Her son died in1804, a tragedy which seems to have had atraumatic effect on her nervous health.Pauline’s extramarital affairs shockedRoman high society, but the single greatest

scandal, which she seems to have enjoyedparticularly, arose when she posed nude forAntonio Canova’s sculpture, Venus Reclin-ing, in 1808. In 1806 Napoleon granted herthe tiny duchy of Guastalla in northernItaly, which she described as “a single mis-erable village with a few beastly pigs,” andshe did not live there until 1810, after shehad clashed with the new empress, Marie-Louise. Unlike the other members of thefamily, Pauline had always enjoyed good re-lations with Joséphine.

Whatever the difficulties caused by herscandalous lifestyle, Pauline remained faith-ful to Napoleon. She was the only sister tovisit him on Elba in 1814, enlivening fourof his ten months there with balls and ama-teur theatricals. On Napoleon’s fall, PopePius VII, with whom she got on surpris-ingly well, secured a settlement with her es-tranged husband, granting her a sizableshare of the Borghese properties in Italy.She sold her principal home in the Rue

Bonaparte, Pauline, Duchess of Guastalla 37

Antonio Canova’s Venus Reclining (1804–1808) plays upon Pauline Bonaparte’s beauty and scandalousreputation. She is posing as Venus, the Goddess of Love, while her brother posed as Mars, the God of War.(Alinari/Art Resource)

Saint-Honoré in Paris to the British gov-ernment, and it remains the British embassyto this day. Pauline had amassed a huge per-sonal fortune, but her precarious health de-teriorated rapidly in 1823–1824. She diedin Florence, probably, like Napoleon, fromcancer of the stomach, on 9 June 1825.Thewarmhearted side of Pauline’s character, in-separable from her wild and promiscuousside, was shown near the end when she per-suaded her mother to receive her Americannephew, Jerome Bonaparte, son of herbrother Jérôme and Elizabeth Patterson.

Related entries: Elba; Empire Style; Leclerc,Charles Victor Emmanuel

Suggestions for further reading:Dixon, Pierson. 1966. Pauline: Napoleon’s Favourite

Sister. New York: D. McKay.Markham, Felix. 1975. The Bonapartes. London:

Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Ortzen, Len. 1974. Imperial Venus:The Story of

Pauline Bonaparte-Borghese. New York: Steinand Day.

Weiner, Margery. 1964. The Parvenu Princesses:Elisa, Pauline and Caroline Bonaparte. London:John Murray.

Bonapartism

N apoleon’s nephew Louis Napoleon,elected president of the Second

Republic in 1849, declared that “the nameof Napoleon is in itself a political pro-gramme.”Yet Napoleon’s legacy was so am-biguous and open to conflicting interpreta-tions that Bonapartism as a political forcecould be left-wing or right-wing, authori-tarian or democratic, or simply definedmostly by commitment to a strong stateand national unity as against the divisivenessof party politics.

Louis Napoleon, who became the Em-peror Napoleon III in 1851, defined Bona-partism as “internally: order, authority, reli-gion and the well-being of the people;externally: national dignity.”The legend ofNapoleon as revolutionary emperor and

savior of the nation was kept alive between1815 and 1848 by opponents of, first, therestored Bourbons and then the Orleanistmonarchy after 1830. Louis Napoleon’selection by universal male suffrage in 1849showed the strength of popular Bona-partism among the peasant masses, and asNapoleon III he never lost that support.However, defeat in the Franco-PrussianWar of 1870 led to the accusation that theBonapartes had led France to disastertwice, first at Waterloo, then at Sedan.Bonapartism continued for a while as a sig-nificant political force under the Third Re-public, but it split into left-wing and right-wing factions and became merely onemeans among several of expressing dissatis-faction with the real and imagined short-comings of the “regime of the parties.”

The death of the dashing Prince Imper-ial fighting the Zulus in South Africa in1879 marked the end of serious Bonapartistpretensions to a restored throne, and thefamily was banned from living on Frenchsoil in 1886. But the fear of a “plebiscitary”authoritarian form of democracy, bypassingparliamentary institutions, has continued tohaunt French politics throughout the twen-tieth century. Both Marshal Pétain andGeneral de Gaulle were accused by theirenemies of Bonapartism, but such connec-tions are vague at best and based on verysimplistic readings of French history. Thelast Bonapartist pretender, Prince Napo-leon, a successful international businessmanand Resistance hero, died in 1997.

Related entries: Napoleonic Legend

Suggestions for further reading:Alexander, R. S. 1991. Bonapartism and the

Revolutionary Tradition in France:The Fédérés of1815. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Furet, François. 1992. Revolutionary France,1770–1880. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gildea, Robert. 1994. The Past in French History.New Haven:Yale University Press.

Rothney, John. 1969. Bonapartism after Sedan.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

38 Bonapartism

Tulard, Jean. 1985. Napoleon:The Myth of theSaviour. London: Methuen.

Borodino, Battle of (7 September 1812)

The climactic battle of Napoleon’sRussian campaign took place at the

village of Borodino, some seventy mileswest of Moscow, when the Russian armyunder Mikhail Kutuzov halted in its retreattoward the ancient capital and turned tofight, taking up position along a line ofhigh ground broken by ravines. Napoleon’sforces had been worn down in the longpursuit of the Russians and now numberedsome 130,000 men and 590 guns facing120,000 Russians with 640 guns along afour-mile front. The Russian fortifications,designed by Prince Bagration, could with-stand wave after wave of French attacks andallow an orderly retreat if necessary.

Napoleon’s attack began with an ar-tillery barrage at dawn, and Eugène deBeauharnais, commanding the French left,soon captured the village of Borodino. Butthe battle turned into a bludgeoningmatch, resulting in bloody stalemate. TheFrench corps under Marshals Jozef Ponia-towski, Michel Ney, and Louis Davoutslowly pushed the Russians back, aided byJoachim Murat’s cavalry, assaulting theRussian center and left again and again. Bymidafternoon the Russians had with-drawn, but only about a mile to anotherdefensive position on another line of hills.They had only seriously wavered whenBagration was mortally wounded, andthen only briefly. Napoleon, who was notin the best of health all day, ignoredMurat’s pleas to commit the ImperialGuard to the battle, decided not to gam-ble, and the battle died away inconclu-sively. The Prussian military theorist andreformer, Carl von Clausewitz, who was in

Russian service at the time, wrote: “In thewhole of the battle there was not a trace ofsuperior skill or intelligence: it was simplya test of strength, and in this the twoarmies were almost equal.What ensued inthe end was merely a slight tipping of thebalance in favour of the side that was ledwith greater vigour and was more familiarwith war.”

During the night Kutuzov withdrew to-ward Moscow, allowing the French to claima victory. But Napoleon had failed to de-stroy the Russian army as he had hoped,and French casualties were about 30,000, orone in four, including ten generals killed.Russian losses were also enormous, but Ku-tuzov had plenty of reserves to call uponand could afford not to care if Napoleonproclaimed himself victorious. He hadstretched and depleted the French forcesand preserved the Russian army. Napoleoncalled Borodino “the most terrible of all mybattles. . . . The French showed themselvesworthy of victory and the Russians ofbeing invincible.” The Russian retreatopened up the road to Moscow, Napoleon’sprincipal objective, but as Clausewitzpointed out, “a total victory would havecost him more than he was able to pay.”Russia could not be conquered like othercountries by the decisive engagement Na-poleon always sought.

Related entries: Bagration, Pyotr Ivanovich,Prince; Beauharnais, Eugène Rose de; Kutuzov,Mikhail Ilarionovich; Lannes, Jean; Ney, Michel;Poniatowski, Jozef, Prince; Russian Campaign



———. 1994.“Borodino: 1812,” in his On theNapoleonic Wars: Collected Essays. London:Greenhill.

Duffy, Christopher. 1972. Borodino and the War of1812. London: Seeley.

Holmes, Edward Richard. 1971. Borodino 1812.London: Batsford.

Lee, Nigel de. 1987.“Poniatowski,” in David G.Chandler, ed. Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Borodino, Battle of 39

Bourrienne, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de (1769–1834)

N apoleon’s first military secretary wasborn at Sens and studied with Na-

poleon at the academy of Brienne. Heplanned to become a diplomat, but leftFrance during the Revolution, only return-ing in 1797 when he was appointed mili-tary secretary to Napoleon, serving him inItaly, Egypt, and Syria. Bourrienne wascompetent in his post, but also proved to bean embezzler on a grand scale. Napoleonsacked him in 1804 and sent him to Ham-burg where he continued in his embezzlingways: he sold passports illicitly and profitedfrom the black market in goods made scarceunder the Continental System.

In 1810 a commission of inquiry foundthat Bourrienne had embezzled some 2million livres while in Hamburg, and Napo-leon ordered him to repay it. But he hadstill not complied in 1814. At the Restora-tion in 1815 Talleyrand secured his ap-pointment as minister of posts, but histenure of office was short-lived. To escapehis creditors he settled near Charleroi inBelgium, where he dictated ten volumes ofmemoirs of dubious accuracy. Bourrienne’smind began to go in the 1820s, and he diedin 1834 in an insane asylum near Caen.

Related entries: Army


Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brienne, Military Academy

The military school at Brienne LeChâteau was founded in 1777, one

of twelve such academies established duringthe eighteenth century to augment theÉcole Militaire in Paris. Pupils were educatedfor the army at the expense of the state,

with the most gifted finishing their educa-tion at the prestigious Paris academy. Napo-leon entered Brienne on 13 May 1779, atthe age of nine, and remained until 30 Oc-tober 1784, when he duly progressed to theÉcole Militaire. The Brienne academy wasclosed in 1790.

Related entries: École Militaire

Suggestions for further reading:Ratcliffe, Bertram. 1981. Prelude to Fame:An

Account of the Early Life of Napoleon up to theBattle of Montenotte. London:Warne.

Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII

The almost bloodless coup whichoverthrew the Directory on 9–10

November 1799 (18–19 Brumaire,Year VIIIin the Revolutionary calendar) allowedNapoleon to assume unchallengeable polit-ical control of France, making possible thefour years of authoritarian rule under theconsulate. The chief plotters, Paul Barras,Joseph Fouché, Charles-Maurice de Tal-leyrand, and especially Emmanuel Sieyès,were seeking to replace the Directory witha stronger executive and saw Napoleon as a“safe” general, free from royalist sympathies,who would allow them to carry throughtheir plans.

The conspiracy involved calling anemergency meeting of the two legislativechambers of the Directory, the Council ofAncients and the Council of Five Hundred,under the pretext of a Jacobin plot. Napo-leon was to be appointed commander of thetroops in Paris, the two councils transferredout of Paris to Saint-Cloud, and the five Di-rectors forced to resign, making way forthree consuls. With the help of LucienBonaparte, who had been made president ofthe Council of Five Hundred, the relevantdecrees were passed, while Napoleon ad-dressed the Council of Ancients at the Tui-leries.The three directors who were in the

40 Bourrienne, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de

plot—Sieyès, Roger Ducos, and Barras—submitted their resignations, and the twoothers were held under guard in the Lux-embourg palace.

The chambers met at Saint-Cloud sur-rounded by large bodies of troops assem-bled in the courtyard outside the palace.Napoleon addressed the Council of An-cients, but for once his eloquence desertedhim. He declared that the Directory was inthe pay of the British and that there was aplot against the Republic. But he met hos-tility from some members and had to bepersuaded to leave. At the Council of FiveHundred he met violent opposition fromJacobin deputies and was dragged from thehall by his soldiers. Lucien adjourned thesession, joined his brother, and Napoleonordered grenadiers with fixed bayonets toclear the hall.

In the evening around sixty of the scat-tered Five Hundred were rounded up andvoted to accept Napoleon, Sieyès, andDucos as provisional consuls with authorityto revise the constitution.After the Councilof Ancients, still in session, had been forcedto go along, the legislature was adjournedfor six weeks and Jacobin members ex-cluded. The new constitution was com-pleted in six weeks, proclaimed on 25 De-cember 1799, and accepted by plebiscite inFebruary 1800.

The coup of Brumaire was a close-runthing, but it laid the basis for the consulate.Many of Sieyès’s complex constitutionalideas survived alongside Napoleon’s moredirect and authoritarian approach. As firstconsul Napoleon was to have far greaterpowers than his colleagues, directly influ-encing appointments to the Senate and

Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII 41

F.Vieira’s The Sitting of the Council of Five Hundred at St. Cloud is a dramatic rendering ofNapoleon’s appearance to harangue the Council of Five Hundred. It shows an imaginary assassination attempt,which nevertheless became part of the Napoleonic legend. (Corbis/Gianni Dagli Orti))

other legislative bodies, and directly choos-ing and removing all high officials. Skilfulpropaganda in newspapers, pamphlets, andposters justified the coup. But it was a myththat Napoleon was the sole victor, replacingthe weak rule of the Directory with thestrong government that France required.Nor was the Republic threatened with mil-itary disaster: other generals had alreadyturned the tide. Many members of thechambers of the Directory continued to sitin the legislature of the consulate. But thecoup did open the way for Napoleon’s ruleunder the consulate and then the empireafter 1804.

Related entries: Barras, Paul François JeanNicolas,Vicomte de; Bonaparte, Lucien, Princeof Canino; Consulate; Directory; Ducos, PierreRoger; Fouché, Joseph; Murat, Joachim; Sieyès,Emmanuel Joseph;Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de



Goodspeed, Donald James. 1965. Bayonets at St.Cloud:The Story of the 18th Brumaire. London:Rupert Hart-Davis.

Lefebvre, Georges. 1965. The Directory. London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.


Morton, John B. 1948. Brumaire:The Rise ofBonaparte. London:T.Werner Levine.

Thompson, J. M. 1952. Napoleon Bonaparte, HisRise and Fall. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Brune, Guillaume Marie Anne(1763–1815)

B orn at Brive-la-Gaillarde in centralFrance, Brune moved to Paris as a

printer’s apprentice and after 1789 an en-thusiastic revolutionary journalist and sup-porter of Georges Danton. He passed fromservice in the Parisian National Guard toenlistment in the army in 1792, and in 1793fought against the Counter-Revolution in

Normandy and at Bordeaux, where he dis-tinguished himself by his ruthlessness. Re-turning to Paris in 1795 he first met Napo-leon when taking part in the suppression ofthe rising of Vendémiaire.

In September 1796 Brune was surpris-ingly given a command under AndréMasséna in the Army of Italy. Here heshowed his personal bravery, if not out-standing military expertise, and fought atthe battles of Arcola and Rivoli, earning therank of divisional general in 1797.The year1798 saw Brune in Switzerland, chargedwith laying hands on the Swiss nationaltreasury and crushing resistance to theFrench, both of which he did in his usualremorseless manner. He then performed asimilar role in Holland as commander of allFrench troops in the Batavian Republic, re-pulsing the attempted Allied invasion of1799.

Despite his valuable services Napoleonremained suspicious of the republican con-victions of this revolutionary turned sol-dier. Brune briefly succeeded Masséna ascommander in chief in Italy and wasequally fleetingly president of the War De-partment of the Council of State beforeNapoleon dispatched him to Constantino-ple as ambassador to Turkey. Here he spenttwo frustrating years between 1802 and1804, being outmaneuvered by the Rus-sians on the diplomatic front. Brune wasmollified with the title of marshal, but hisappointment in 1805 as governor general ofthe Hanseatic towns was a form of exile.When he signed a treaty with Sweden in a“republican” form disapproved of by Napo-leon, he was recalled in disgrace in October1807 and remained unemployed for sevenyears. He rallied to the Bourbons in 1814,but during the Hundred Days transferredhis allegiance back to Napoleon, who for-got former differences by making him gov-ernor of Provence. Forced to retreat, hemade for Paris but was assassinated by royal-ist fanatics in Avignon on 2 August 1815and his body thrown into the river Rhône.

42 Brune, Guillaume Marie Anne

Related entries: Batavian Republic; ItalianCampaigns; Masséna,André; Ottoman Empire

Suggestions for further reading:Shepperd,Alan. 1987.“Brune” in David G.


Bussaco, Battle of (27 September 1810)

The battle of Bussaco was fought dur-ing the Peninsular War between the

French Army of Portugal commanded byAndré Masséna and Anglo-Portugueseforces under Arthur Wellesley, duke ofWellington. The fighting centered on theSierra de Bussaco, north of Coimbra, whereWellington succeeded in turning Masséna’s

attack and diverting the French from Es-tremadura. In bitter hand-to-hand fightingthe French suffered 4,480 casualties, whilethe Allies lost 626 men. Bussaco was not adecisive battle, and Wellington was forcedto resume his retreat toward Lisbon, but itdealt a grave blow to French morale, at thesame time demonstrating to the British theworth of the newly formed Portuguesearmy.

Related entries: Masséna,André; PeninsularWar;Wellington, Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Chambers, George L. 1910. Bussaco. London:

Sonnenschein.Glover, Michael. 1963. Wellington’s Peninsular

Victories: Busaco, Salamanca,Victoria, Nivelle.London: Batsford.

Horward, Donald David. 1965. The Battle ofBussaco: Massena vs Wellington. Tallahassee:Florida State University.

Bussaco, Battle of 43

CCadoudal, Georges (1771–1804)

A determined opponent of the Revo-lution since 1793, this Breton

farmer’s son was involved in the two mostserious attempts to assassinate Napoleon.Cadoudal had joined the rebellion in theVendée in 1793 and proved himself as aleader of chouannerie, one of the best-known leaders of the Counter-Revolution.In March 1800 Napoleon as first consul of-fered Cadoudal a general’s commission or agenerous annual income if he would aban-don political activity, but Cadoudal refusedand fled to England, setting up a trainingcamp for anti-Bonapartist terrorists inHampshire. Meanwhile, however, Napo-leon’s signing of the Concordat of 1801 putan end to serious guerrilla activity in France.

The first royalist attempt to kill Napo-leon, the Opera Plot of December 1800,was found to be the work of two ofCadoudal’s agents, though he himself al-ways denied knowledge of it. In August1803 Cadoudal returned secretly to Paris,and another conspiracy was hatched, thistime involving Generals Jean-CharlesPichegru and Jean-Victor Moreau. Theplan was to kidnap and kill Napoleon, openthe frontiers to royalist and Allied invaders,and install Louis XVIII as king. But JosephFouché’s police had infiltrated the royalistnetwork, and the conspirators were easilyapprehended. Cadoudal was arrested on 13

February 1804 and guillotined on 25 June.Napoleonic legend credited him with thefamous last words: “I came to make a kingand instead I have made an emperor.”

Related entries: Chouannerie; Counter-Revolution; Imperial Police; Moreau, Jean-Victor; Opera Plot; Pichegru, Jean-Charles;Royalists;Vendée Revolt

Suggestions for further reading:Godechot, Jacques. 1981. The Counter-Revolution:

Doctrine and Action, 1789–1804. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Calabria, Revolt in(1806–1811)

The province of Calabria, part of theKingdom of Naples, was described

by one French officer as “a paradise . . . in-habited by devils.” Already the scene of ananti-French revolt in 1799, Calabria saw re-volt break out again shortly after JosephBonaparte’s entry into Naples in 1806.Peasant resistance, building on the brig-andage inherent to the region, was sparkedoff by the requisitions of the French army,commanded by Jean Reynier, and spurredon by the British admiral, Sir Sidney Smith.In July 1806 British troops landed and de-feated the French at Maida, thereby en-couraging partisans to attack and wipe out

Calabria, Revolt in 45

C

the small French garrisons scatteredthrough the countryside, and soon theFrench were just barely holding on in thetowns. But the partisan leaders were indi-vidualists in the brigand tradition. TheBritish commander in Sicily, Sir John Stu-art, found them barbarous and, to Smith’sfury, evacuated his fever-ridden troops.

The arrival of a relief army underAndré Masséna swung things in favor ofthe French. They now built roads andbridges to facilitate communications, usedflying columns to pursue partisan bands,and recruited native Calabrian troops. Butthe French could never wipe out the par-tisans, who would reappear as soon as theFrench columns left any particular area.The introduction of conscription in1809–1810 caused revolt to flare up again,more widespread than ever. Only theruthless policy of the military governor,Jean-Baptiste Manhès, including thewholesale massacre of villages supportingthe rebels and the starving out of the par-tisan bands, could put down the revolt.The last leader was captured and executedin November 1811.

The insurrection in Calabria cost theFrench 20,000 casualties and was markedby atrocities on both sides. It was essentiallya peasant insurrection, directed against thepro-French townspeople as much as the in-vaders. It prefigured the guerrilla warfare ofthe Peninsular War and thus the partisanwars of the twentieth century.

Related entries: Guerrilla Warfare; Masséna,André; Naples, Kingdom of

Suggestions for further reading:Davis, John A. 1990.“The Impact of French

Rule on the Kingdom of Naples,1806–1815,” Ricerche Storiche 20, pp.367–405.

Finley, Milton. 1989.“The Most Monstrous ofWars: Suppression of Calabrian Brigandage,1806–1811,” Consortium on RevolutionaryEurope: Proceedings 18, pp. 251–266.

Grab,Alexander. 1995.“State Power, Brigandageand Rural Resistance in Napoleonic Italy,”European History Quarterly 25, pp. 39–70.

Cambacérès, Jean-Jacques Régis de (1753–1824)

A survivor of revolutionary politics,Cambacérès became second consul

during the consulate and arch-chancellorduring the empire, typifying the analyticalfinesse and enormous capacity for work ofthe ideal Napoleonic administrator. Borninto a family of lawyers at Montpellier, hetoo followed a legal career, and entered pol-itics as a member of the Convention anddeputy for the department of the Hérault.In 1793 during the Terror Cambacérès kepthis head and worked on the first abortiveattempt at a codification of French civillaw, anticipating his work on Napoleon’sCivil Code. Under the Directory he waselected to the Council of Ancients andserved briefly as minister of justice. Heowed his position as second consul after thecoup of 18 Brumaire to his ability to advisethe still inexperienced Napoleon on the in-tricacies of politics and the law.

Cambacérès was for practical purposeshead of the administration of justice be-tween 1799 and 1814, the titular ministersof justice being subordinated to his author-ity.The new court system was in his hands;he approved all judicial appointments; andhe dealt with much of the ministry’s busi-ness personally. In Napoleon’s absenceCambacérès presided over the majority ofmeetings of the Council of State and alsoover the Senate, acquiring great influenceand patronage. Napoleon while on cam-paign still ruled France, but his orderspassed through Cambacérès, who kept theroutine of administration working and in-formed the emperor about the state of pub-lic opinion. But his most lasting contribu-tion was in the formal formulation of theCivil Code, and next to Napoleon himselfhe was chiefly responsible for its comple-tion and implementation.

More than any other individual, Napo-leon could rely on Cambacérès for prudent

46 Cambacérès, Jean-Jacques Régis de

advice and intelligent execution of his or-ders. The arch-chancellor’s natural cautioncaused him to oppose the abduction of theduke of Enghien, the establishment of theempire, the involvement in Spain, Napo-leon’s marriage to Marie-Louise, and the in-vasion of Russia.These stands took courageon his part, but he had always avoided clear-cut political decisions, and his prudence andefficiency were invaluable to Napoleon.Cambacérès applied the same care and con-sideration to his own financial affairs, amass-ing a substantial personal fortune by soundinvestments and the acquisition of consider-able estates.Though exiled in Brussels from1815 to 1818, he spent his last years in com-fortable retirement on his lands.

Related entries: Civil Code; Consulate;Council of State; Directory; Senate


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Church, Clive H. 1981. Revolution and Red Tape:

The French Ministerial Bureaucracy 1770–1850.Oxford: Clarendon Press.


Campo Formio, Treaty of (October 1797)

The Treaty of Campo Formio estab-lished the peace that ended Napo-

leon’s Italian campaign. By the end ofMarch 1797 Napoleon was at Klagenfurt,threatening Vienna, but far from his basesand with an unstable situation in Italy at hisback.The Austrians sued for peace, but thepreliminary agreement signed at Leoben on18 April revealed the differences betweenNapoleon, who had committed himself tothe pro-French parties in Italy, and the Di-rectory, who wanted to secure Belgium andthe Rhineland for France and were willingto give up Napoleon’s Italian conquests in

return. By the terms of Leoben Austriaceded Belgium to France and recognizedthe French satellite states in Italy. TheRhineland was not mentioned.The Direc-tory was unhappy, but facing war-wearinessand royalist agitation in France agreed toNapoleon’s terms.

Napoleon now transformed Genoa intothe Ligurian Republic and created theCisalpine Republic in northern Italy.At thefinal peace concluded at Campo FormioAustria recognized the Cisalpine Republicand the French annexation of Belgium andpromised to support French claims to theRhineland at a future conference, which inthe event was never held. In return Venicewas divided between Austria, the CisalpineRepublic, and France. Austria gained most:the city of Venice itself, Dalmatia, Istria, andmost of the mainland territories. TheCisalpine Republic gained a strip of themainland, and France received the IonianIslands, seen by Napoleon as vital for navaloperations in the Mediterranean.

The treaty was accepted by the Direc-tory and brought temporary peace betweenFrance and Austria. However, it was littlemore than an armed truce. Austria did notgenuinely accept the French gains, and theresumption of hostilities only awaited asuitable occasion.

Related entries: Austria; Cisalpine Republic;Italian Campaigns




Canning, George (1770–1827)

The witty and resolutely Tory Can-ning was an ardent supporter of

Canning, George 47

William Pitt and influential in the forma-tion of British policy against Napoleon.Having been secretary of the navy underPitt in 1804, Canning was appointed for-eign secretary by the duke of Portland inMarch 1807. He encouraged the expedi-tion of September 1807 against Copen-hagen, which resulted in the destruction ofthe Danish fleet, and urged vigorous sup-port for the Spanish rebellion againstNapoleonic rule. However, in this heclashed with his colleague ViscountCastlereagh, who would have preferred amore active British policy in the LowCountries. Their personal antagonism ledto Canning’s resignation in September1809 and a duel on Putney Heath in whichCanning was slightly injured. He now de-voted his time to encouraging vigorouspursuance of the Peninsular War and servedas ambassador to Lisbon between 1814 and1816. Canning was to return to the ForeignOffice after Castlereagh’s suicide in 1822and finally became prime minister just fivemonths before his death.

Related entries: Castlereagh, Robert Stewart,Viscount; Great Britain

Suggestions for further reading:Dixon, Peter. 1976. Canning: Politician and

Statesman. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Hinde,Wendy. 1989. George Canning. Oxford:

Basil Blackwell.Rolo, Paul Jacques Victor. 1965. George Canning:

Three Biographical Studies. London: Macmillan.

Carl August, Duke of Weimar(1757–1828)

The duke who had turned Weimarinto the cultural center of Germany

was a nominal ally of Napoleon between1806 and 1813, but only through expedi-ency. On taking control of his small princi-pality from his widowed mother in 1775Carl August brought such intellectual giants

as Goethe, Herder, and Schiller into gov-ernment and transformed the University ofJena into a leading cultural force. He hadfought against France as a Prussian generalin 1792–1793 and did the same in the warof 1806, which resulted in catastrophic de-feat for Prussia. Napoleon was persuaded tolet his state survive, but Carl August wascompelled to join the Confederation of theRhine and profess loyalty to the emperor.Nevertheless his liberalism made him a nat-ural opponent of Napoleon, who calledhim Europe’s “most troublesome prince.”Carl August joined the Allies in 1813 andwas rewarded at the Congress of Viennawith an expansion of his territory and thenew title of grand duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach.The constitution of his new statein 1816 was the first in Germany andgranted complete freedom of the press.

Related entries: Confederation of the Rhine



Carnot, Lazare Nicolas(1753–1823)

K nown as the “organizer of victory”in the revolutionary wars, Carnot

gained equal distinction as a scientist, sol-dier, and politician, was important in pro-moting Napoleon’s early career, and servedhim so far as was compatible with his strictrepublican principles. Born in Nolay inBurgundy and educated at the army engi-neering school at Mézières, before theRevolution Carnot had already acquired areputation as a military engineer and withhis studies on the operation of machines.He entered politics in 1791; as a member ofthe Convention voted for the death ofLouis XVI; and was effectively minister ofwar in successive regimes between 1793

48 Carl August, Duke of Weimar

and 1797. As such he organized fourteenFrench armies to repel invading forces andthen occupy Belgium, Switzerland, and theRhineland.

Carnot’s brilliant staff work involved theadvancement of many young officers, and itwas he who promoted Napoleon from cap-tain to general after the siege of Toulon.And as part of Carnot’s strategic plan for athree-pronged attack on Austria in 1796 hemade Napoleon commander in chief of theArmy of Italy. After the coup of 18 Bru-maire Napoleon named Carnot as ministerof war in April 1800, but he found that hisauthority was weakened by the indepen-dent actions of the generals and by all cru-cial matters being referred to Napoleon asfirst consul.

Carnot never made a secret of his re-publican beliefs, resigned as minister afterthe Marengo campaign, and opposed all themeasures transforming the consulate intothe empire. With the abolition of the Tri-bunate in 1807 he retired from politics.However, when France was in danger in1814 Carnot was recalled, promoted togeneral, and appointed as governor ofAntwerp, which he defended with skillagainst Bernadotte’s Swedish forces, onlysurrendering after the armistice had beensigned. In 1815, during the Hundred Days,he served as minister of the interior, andurged Napoleon not to abdicate after Wa-terloo. As a regicide and implacable oppo-nent of the Bourbons, Carnot was exiled atthe Restoration, first in Poland and from1816 to his death in Magdeburg.

During his periods out of politics and inhis exiled final years Carnot pursued hismathematical and scientific research. Hiswork on machine motion had significantpractical applications, and his works on de-fensive fortification drew on his distin-guished contribution to the physics of workand energy in engineering mechanics. Healso applied himself to related problems ingeometry and to the foundations of calcu-lus. Carnot’s eldest son, Sadi, was to become

famous in the field of thermodynamics, anda grandson, also called Sadi, was president ofthe French Republic from 1887 until hisassassination in 1894.

Related entries: Hundred Days; RevolutionaryWars;Toulon, Siege of

Suggestions for further reading:Gillispie, Charles C. 1971.“Carnot, Lazare-

Nicolas-Marguerite,” in Charles CoulstonGillispie, ed., Dictionary of Scientific Biography,vol. 3. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.


Watson, Sidney John. 1954. Carnot. London:Bodley Head.

Castiglione, Battle of (5 August 1796)

A lthough not a major Napoleonicvictory, the battle of Castiglione

was nevertheless significant in the success ofNapoleon’s first Italian campaign. In lateJuly 1796, as two Austrian armies advancedon either side of Lake Garda, Napoleon wasforced to break off the siege of Mantua andface the more serious threat of the army ofDagobert von Würmser, which was ad-vancing across the rivers Adige and Mincio.In the action at Castiglione, CharlesAugereau and André Masséna sought tolure Würmser forward so that the Frenchcavalry could attack his flank. The maneu-ver failed, but the Austrians were forcedback to Peschiera.A month later Napoleongained a more decisive success in the battleof Bassano.





Castiglione, Battle of 49

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart,Viscount (1769–1822)

A s British foreign secretary after1812, Castlereagh was the prime

mover in the building of the final coali-tion against Napoleon. An Ulster Protes-tant, he had been chief secretary for Ire-land from 1798 to 1801, working withWilliam Pitt for the union with GreatBritain while also favoring CatholicEmancipation. He became a cabinet min-ister in 1802 as president of the Board ofControl, dealing with Indian affairs, andthen in 1805–1806 as secretary for warand the colonies, when his plans for aBritish land force for use in Europe wasabandoned for financial reasons. Castle-reagh became war minister again betweenApril 1807 and September 1809, a periodthat saw the beginning of the PeninsularWar and the disaster of the Walcheren ex-pedition. Criticism of Castlereagh’s han-dling of the Walcheren affair by GeorgeCanning led to a duel between the twomen in September 1809.

Castlereagh returned to office as foreignsecretary in February 1812. During 1813and 1814 he spent much time on the Con-tinent (a new departure for a British for-eign secretary), keeping the anti-Napoleoncoalition together. He remained abroadafter the signing of the Treaty of Paris inMay 1814 and played a leading role in theCongress of Vienna, so becoming one ofthe principal architects of the post-Napoleonic settlement in Europe.With theduke of Wellington, he chose Saint Helenaas a suitable place of exile for the fallenNapoleon.

After 1815 Castlereagh became identi-fied in the public mind with the repressivedomestic policies of Lord Liverpool’s gov-ernment. His austere manner and disdainfor criticism made him unpopular. Whenhe committed suicide in 1822 as a result ofgrowing depression and unwitting involve-

ment in a homosexual scandal he waswidely hated. Crowds cheered as he wasburied in Westminster Abbey. His friendLord Cornwallis found him “so cold thatnothing can warm him,” while Louis deCaulaincourt thought him “just and pas-sionless” (Dictionary of National Biography1909, p. 1244). But for all that his had beenone of the major contributions to the con-struction of a Europe after Napoleon.

Related entries: Canning, George; GreatBritain;Vienna, Congress of;WalcherenExpedition

Suggestions for further reading:Derry, John W. 1976. Castlereagh. London:Allen

Lane.Dictionary of National Biography. 1909.Vol. 18:

1233–1245.Hinde,Wendy. 1981. Castlereagh. London:

Collins.Webster, Charles K. 1950. The Foreign Policy of

Castlereagh. London: G. Bell.

Catholic Church

The religious question was one ofthe most serious facing Napoleon

when he became first consul in 1799.During the Revolution the CatholicChurch had lost its property (convertedinto biens nationaux), been subjected tothe Civil Constitution of the Clergy, andfaced official attempts to replace Catholi-cism with new “civic” religions, such asthe Cult of the Supreme Being. But themajor conflict arose from the division ofthe clergy into the constitutional, who ac-cepted the Civil Constitution, and the re-fractory, who refused it and became effec-tively outlaws. This split was a majorfactor in the rising in the Vendée, whichkept many French troops tied down inwestern France.

After his victory at Marengo in July1800 Napoleon opened negotiations withPope Pius VII.The result was the Concor-

50 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart,Viscount

dat of 1801, which put an end to theschism in the clergy and brought religiouspeace to France. Napoleon could takecredit for the reconciliation of church andstate. Pius VII came to Paris, albeit underduress, for Napoleon’s coronation in De-cember 1804, but pope and emperor werebound to clash over Italian affairs. Politicsthreatened to disrupt the religious agree-ment. When Napoleon annexed the PapalStates in 1808–1809 Pius excommunicatedhim. He had the pope seized and impris-oned at Fontainebleau.This humiliation ofthe pontiff served to revive religious pas-sions at the time when the empire had toface its greatest and eventually fatal crisisand contributed strongly to opposition toNapoleon in France and among Catholicseverywhere.

Napoleon had succeeded early in recon-ciling Catholics, especially the conservativeFrench peasantry, to his rule, without antag-onizing the influential anticlerical elementsin France. But by an ironic turn of eventshis thirst for domination of Italy and Eu-rope and harassment of the head of theChurch contributed to his loss of popular-ity and his downfall.

Related entries: Concordat; Papacy; Pius VII,Pope

Suggestions for further reading:Dansette,Adrien. 1961. Religious History of

Modern France. 2 vols. London: Nelson.Gibson, Ralph. 1989. A Social History of French

Catholicism 1789–1914. London: Routledge.Hales, Edward Elton Young. 1960. Revolution and

Papacy, 1769–1846. London: Eyre andSpottiswoode.

———. 1962. Napoleon and the Pope. London:Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Hufton, Olwen. 1983.“The Reconstruction of aChurch, 1796–1801,” in Gwynne Lewis andColin Lucas, eds., Beyond the Terror: Essays inFrench Regional and Social History. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp. 21–52.

Jedin, Hubert, ed. 1981. History of the Church,Vol.VII:The Church between Revolution andRestoration. London: Burns and Oates.

MacManners, John. 1969. The French Revolutionand the Church. London: Society for thePromotion of Christian Knowledge.

Caulaincourt, Armand Augustin Louis de, Marquis de

(1773–1827)

B orn into a noble family with a longmilitary tradition, under Napoleon

Caulaincourt became a skilful diplomat andwas foreign minister at the time of the em-peror’s downfall. Despite his origins, hefought with distinction in the armies of theRepublic in the Vendée and in Germany,and by 1799 had risen from trooper tocolonel. Napoleon, probably on the adviceof Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, sentCaulaincourt on a diplomatic mission toSaint Petersburg in 1801 and appointedhim an aide-de-camp in 1802. As such hewas involved in the kidnapping of the dukeof Enghien in 1803, while as grand masterof the horse in 1804 he supervised the effi-cient movement of the emperor through-out his territories and was responsible forhis personal security.

Caulaincourt became a general in 1805and was with Napoleon at the Battles ofAusterlitz, Jena, and Friedland. Between1807 and 1811 he was ambassador to Rus-sia, where he tried to promote moderationand peace and established cordial personalrelations with Tsar Alexander I. Caulain-court advised Napoleon against the inva-sion of Russia in 1812, but was in regularattendance throughout the campaign andafter the retreat from Moscow accompaniedNapoleon on his journey to Paris. Unlikethe perpetually devious Talleyrand,Caulaincourt always spoke his mind di-rectly to Napoleon and never intrigued be-hind his back.

In November 1813 Napoleon appointedCaulaincourt foreign minister in successionto Hugues Bernard Maret. Caulaincourtmade use of his good relations with Alexan-der I to try to secure honorable peace termsfor France, but Napoleon rejected all his ef-forts. Acting as intermediary with the tsar,

Caulaincourt,Armand Augustin Louis de, Marquis de 51

Caulaincourt settled the terms of Napo-leon’s first abdication. He again served asforeign minister during the Hundred Days,and after the Restoration was allowed tolive in retirement on his estates. In1822–1823 he compiled valuable memoirsusing notes he had made during his career.The authentic version was eventually pub-lished in 1933, and two volumes appeared inEnglish: With Napoleon in Russia (New York,1935) and No Peace with Napoleon (1936).

Related entries: Abdication, First;Alexander I,Tsar of Russia; Diplomatic Service; HundredDays

Suggestions for further reading:Caulaincourt,Armand Augustin Louis de. 1930.

Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke ofVicenza, ed. Jean Hanoteau. 3 vols. London:Cassell.

Caulaincourt,Armand Augustin Louis de. 1935.With Napoleon in Russia, ed. George Libaire.New York:William Morrow.

Whitcomb, Edward A. 1979. Napoleon’s DiplomaticService. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Censorship

N apoleon as first consul and emperorimposed ever increasing restrictions

on freedom of expression in France, withprovisions that were then extended through-out his conquered domains. Freedom of thepress had been declared by the Revolutionin 1789, but censorship of the stage wasreimposed in 1794, and under the Directoryagitation for the overthrow of the govern-ment was made a criminal offence. But cen-sorship was made much more rigorousunder the consulate. From September 1800all new books were examined by the policebefore publication, while five dramatic cen-sors reported on the moral and political con-tent of new plays to the minister of the inte-rior, whose authorization was necessary fortheir staging. Similarly sixty of the seventy-three newspapers published in Paris werebanned, and the contents of the thirteen sur-

vivors strictly supervised by the Press Bu-reau. Outside Paris the only newspapers al-lowed were those authorized by the prefects.

Censorship became most stringent in1810.The newly created imperial censor orDirecteur Général de l’imprimerie et de la librairiesupervised all newspapers, and in 1811 thenumber of Paris papers was reduced to four,while each department was to have onlyone.The censor also read all manuscripts be-fore publication, with orders to reject allcontent deemed harmful to the dignity ofthe throne or the interests of the empire.Atthe same time the minister of police vettedall stage plays, and theaters could only beopened by order of Napoleon himself.

Despite all the restrictions critical au-thors such as Benjamin Constant, René deChateaubriand, and Mme. de Staël did findways of making their views known, and inthe Acte Additionnel during the HundredDays of 1815 freedom of publication wasguaranteed for almost all publications.Thisbelated liberalism on Napoleon’s part, how-ever, was to no avail. Not only in Francebut throughout his empire severe measureshad been taken in a vain attempt to silenceNapoleon’s critics.

Related entries: Press

Suggestions for further reading:Arnold, Eric A. 1979. Fouché, Napoleon and the

General Police. Washington: University Press ofAmerica.

———. 1994. A Documentary Survey of NapoleonicFrance. Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmerica, pp. 37–38, 297–305.

———. 1996. A Documentary Survey of NapoleonicFrance:A Supplement. Lanham, MD:University Press of America, pp. 64–70.

Holtman, Robert B. 1950. Napoleonic Propaganda.Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UniversityPress.

Centralization

N apoleon was the true heir of theRevolution in increasing the

52 Censorship

power of central government in France,imposing a uniformity of institutionsthroughout the country, and removingany intermediaries between the individualand the state. His reforms in local govern-ment, appointment of prefects, codifica-tion of law, education, the collection ofstatistics, and taxation all aimed at central-ization and control. Delpierre, a memberof the Tribunate under the consulate, ex-pressed what became the Napoleonicideal: “the chain of command descendswithout interruption from the minister tothe citizen and transmits the law and theorders of the government into every cor-ner of society with the speed of an elec-tric current.” Excessive centralization,usually identified with Jacobinism butmore properly Napoleonic, was long seenas making French government too remoteand bureaucratic, but the trend was onlyreversed with the decentralizing reformsof the 1980s.

Related entries: Education; Law, Codificationof; Local Government; Prefects; Statistics;Taxation




Champagny, Jean-Baptiste deNompère de (1756–1834)

The son of a cavalry officer, Cham-pagny became a hardworking and

faithful diplomat and minister for Napo-leon, but he lacked initiative and the flairof his more flamboyant cohorts. He hadbeen active in political life in the earlyyears of the Revolution, but was impris-oned during the Terror. His political careerwas revived by Napoleon after the coup of

18 Brumaire with his appointment to theCouncil of State, specializing in naval mat-ters. Champagny served as ambassador toVienna between 1801 and 1804, owing hisadvance to the patronage of Charles-Mau-rice de Talleyrand.

On his return to France he succeededJean-Antoine Chaptal as minister of the in-terior, where he showed himself to be acompetent administrator but too docileeven for Napoleon, who was dismissiveabout his lack of initiative. As minister offoreign affairs between August 1807 andApril 1811, he consulted his predecessor,Talleyrand, rather more than Napoleonknew or would have appreciated. Cham-pagny’s relations with Klemens von Metter-nich, then Austrian ambassador, were espe-cially cool. Metternich despised what hesaw as Champagny’s sycophancy towardNapoleon. However, the two men did col-laborate in negotiating Napoleon’s mar-riage to Marie-Louise.

Champagny’s docility did have its limits.When he warned Napoleon against the in-vasion of Russia in 1811 he was demotedto the post of intendant of the Domains ofthe Crown and replaced by Hugues-Bernard Maret. During the Russian cam-paign Champagny was Marie-Louise’s sec-retary of state and acted as the chiefintermediary between the court in Parisand the army in the field. He rallied to Na-poleon during the Hundred Days and wassubsequently in disgrace after the Restora-tion. Throughout his career Champagnyprided himself on making the bureaucraticmachines under his control run moresmoothly and efficiently. But this valuable ifunspectacular work led to his being over-shadowed by such outstanding figures asChaptal and Talleyrand.

Related entries: Centralization

Suggestions for further reading:Church, Clive H. 1981. Revolution and Red Tape:


Champagny, Jean-Baptiste de Nompère de 53

Chaptal, Jean Antoine(1756–1832)

O ne of the most remarkable figures ofhis age, Chaptal gained renown as

industrial chemist, entrepreneur, and Napo-leon’s minister of the interior between1800 and 1804. Born into a family of smalllandowners in the Cévennes, before theRevolution Chaptal had founded a chemi-cal factory at Montpellier where he had ap-plied the new theoretical chemistry of An-toine Lavoisier to industrial processes withgreat success. A supporter of the Revolu-tion, he became active in politics, but fellfoul of the Terror. Chaptal was saved fromthe guillotine by Lazare Carnot and placedin charge of the gunpowder factory atGrenelle, where he speeded up the manu-facturing process, allowing the insatiableneeds of the Revolutionary armies to bemet successfully.

Under the consulate Napoleon ap-pointed Chaptal to the Council of State,where he drafted the law of February1800 which provided France with its en-during structure of prefects and local gov-ernment. Promoted to minister of the in-terior in November 1800, Chaptal notonly showed himself to be an extremelyefficient administrator but also took far-reaching initiatives that proved of lastingsignificance. During Chaptal’s tenure ofoffice channels of command and commu-nication with the prefects were improved;standards of cleanliness and care in hospi-tals and prisons in Paris were improved;and new construction of canals, roads, andpublic buildings was begun. Most origi-nally, the École des Mines and Conservatoiredes Arts et Métiers were established, provid-ing technical education combining theoryand practical application in the mannerthat Chaptal himself practiced in his ownfactories.With the help of a team of like-minded administrators he provided official

encouragement for new industrial initia-tives, but with mixed success.

Chaptal resigned as minister in July1804, allegedly in a fit of pique when hethought (probably wrongly) that Napoleonwas having an affair with his mistress, theactress Thérèse Bourgoin. He remained amember of the Senate, of which he becametreasurer, but devoted most of his time tohis chemical factories, especially a largeplant at Neuilly, near Paris. He also turnedhis property at Chanteloup into a modelfarm, experimenting with the cultivation ofsugar beets. His support for Napoleon dur-ing the Hundred Days lost him favor for awhile, but from 1818 onward his advice wasvalued by governments concerned withFrance’s expanding factory system and thewine industry. Chaptal wrote several books,including popularizing works on chemistryand a major study of French industry, pub-lished in 1819.

Related entries: Education; Industry; LocalGovernment




Crosland, Maurice Pierre. 1967. The Society ofArcueil:A View of French Science at the Time ofNapoleon. London: Heinemann.

Lyons, Martyn. 1994. Napoleon Bonaparte and theLegacy of the French Revolution. London:Macmillan.

Charles, Archduke of Austria(Karl von Habsburg)

(1771–1847)

The brother of Francis I and London’sfavorite Austrian general, Charles

was one of Napoleon’s most able militaryopponents, but constantly hampered by the

54 Chaptal, Jean-Antoine

inadequacies of the Austrian military ma-chine. He had entered the army in 1790and attained some famous successes duringthe revolutionary wars, notably in 1796when his defeat of the armies of JeanMoreau and Jean-Baptiste Jourdan forcedthe French to abandon the right bank ofthe Rhine and earned Charles acclaim asthe savior of Germany. But he was denied apolitical role by court intrigue, and by thetime he was sent to Italy to revitalize theAustrian army against Napoleon it was toolate. In 1799 Charles again inflicted defeatson the French in Germany before beingforced to resign his command. However, re-newed Austrian defeat in 1800 led to thedownfall of his principal rival, Baron Franzvon Thugut, and in 1801 Charles wasnamed field marshal, president of the Impe-rial War Council, and minister of war.

An epileptic and of a sensitive nature, acombination that left him prone to debili-tating crises of self-doubt, Charles nowfaced a long battle for military reform in ahighly conservative society. He succeededin streamlining the military administrationand abolished lifelong service for con-scripts. But his efforts were hampered byopposition from the nobility and financialconstraints, and he was aware that Austriawas in no condition to renew the fightagainst Napoleon. However, his advicewas ignored, and he lost all his officeswhen Austria renewed the war in 1805.Sent to Italy, he achieved Austria’s onlyreal success of the war, defeating AndréMasséna at Caligiero. The disaster ofAusterlitz proved that Charles had beenright in his view of Austrian unprepared-ness for war.

Recalled again after the defeat, Charleswas named Generalissimus, with commandof all forces in wartime and a supervisoryrole in peace. Resuming his attempts at re-form, he created a military reserve and re-organized the general staff. But he stillfaced interference and criticism from ene-

mies at court and was reduced to treatingthe symptoms of problems, not their causes,in an outdated, class-ridden system moresuitable to the age of Frederick the Greatthan that of Napoleon. Reluctantly givingin to pressure for a new war in 1809, he wascounting on a general uprising of the Ger-man people against Napoleon, which nevercame. While he checked Napoleon atEssling, his defeat at Wagram led to Napo-leon’s occupation of Vienna and Charles’sfinal downfall. While still acting as adviserto his brother, he devoted the rest of his lifeessentially to his family and to writings onmilitary affairs, of which the Principles ofStrategy (1813) was widely acclaimed andtranslated into several languages.

Charles is remembered as a courageoussoldier, but his weakness against Napoleonwas that, aware of Austrian deficiencies, hewas unwilling to risk his army to gain totalvictory. “The first lost battle,” he wrote in1809 before the Wagram campaign, “is thedeath sentence of the monarchy and thepresent dynasty” (Gates 1997, p. 121). Thisperception, combined with his sensitivecharacter, meant that he would never be arenowned leader of men like Napoleon orWellington.

Related entries: Austria; Danube Campaigns;Essling, Battle of; Francis I, Emperor of Austria;Wagram, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Brauer, Kinley, and William E.Wright, eds. 1990.

Austria in the Age of the French Revolution,1789–1815. Minneapolis: Center forAustrian Studies, University of Minnesota.


Rodger,A. B. 1964. The War of the SecondCoalition, 1798–1801. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1982. Napoleon’s GreatAdversaries:The Archduke Charles and theAustrian Army, 1792–1813. London:Batsford.

———. 1982.“The Archduke Charles and theQuestion of Popular Participation in War,” inConsortium on Revolutionary Europe: Proceedings1982, pp. 214–224.

Charles,Archduke of Austria 55

Charles IV, King of Spain(1742–1819)

O f decidedly mediocre character andabilities, and unprepared for rule,

Charles succeeded to the throne of Spain in1788, but throughout his reign was domi-nated by his wife, Maria Luisa of Parma,and her lover, Manuel Godoy. Between1801 and 1808 he supported Napoleon’spolitical and economic policies, whileGodoy became ever more unpopular. On17 March 1808 a rising known as the Tu-mult of Aranjuez forced Charles to dismissGodoy, and two days later he was forced toabdicate in favor of his son, Ferdinand VII.He appealed to Napoleon, hoping to be re-stored, but in the fateful meeting at Bay-onne both he and Ferdinand were forced torenounce the throne in favor of JosephBonaparte. Charles spent his remainingyears in exile, at first at Compiègne andMarseille, before in 1812 settling in Rome,where he died on 20 January 1819, justthree weeks after his formidable wife.

Related entries: Ferdinand VII, King of Spain;Godoy, Manuel; Spain

Suggestions for further reading:Hilt, Douglas. 1987. The Troubled Trinity: Godoy

and the Spanish Monarchs. Tuscaloosa:University of Alabama Press.


Lynch, John. 1989. Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Chateaubriand, François Auguste René, Vicomte de

(1768–1848)

O ne of the first great French Roman-tic writers, by 1800 Chateaubriand,

the son of a minor Breton nobleman, hadalready traveled in the American wilderness,

fought in the émigré armies against the Rev-olution, and almost starved to death in exilein London. But the publication of his Atala(1801) and especially Le Génie du Christian-isme (The Spirit of Christianity, 1802) wonhim the approval of Napoleon at a timewhen the first consul was seeking reconcili-ation with Catholicism. Chateaubriand wasappointed as secretary to the French em-bassy in Rome, but he resigned after the as-sassination of the duke of Enghien. Back inFrance in 1807, Chateaubriand’s literaryfame grew. Napoleon tried to win back hissupport by securing his election to theAcadémie Française in 1811, but secure inthe protection of society hostesses such asMadame Récamier, Chateaubriand wasnever reconciled. After the Restoration heresumed his diplomatic career, but his rela-tionship with all governments remained dif-ficult. In his partly fictional autobiography,the Mémoires d’outre-tombe, Chateaubriandexaggerated his role in events. He said ofNapoleon: “He threw himself on the uni-verse and shook it” (Furet 1992, p. 222).

Related entries: Romanticism

Suggestions for further reading:Chateaubriand, François Auguste René de. 1965.

The Memoirs of Chateaubriand, ed. RobertBaldick. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.

Furet, François. 1992. Revolutionary France,1770–1880. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Sieburg, Friedrich. 1961. Chateaubriand. London:George Allen and Unwin.

Cherasco, Treaty of (28 April 1796)

The agreement that ended the open-ing phase of Napoleon’s first Italian

campaign compelled King Victor Amadeusof Piedmont to withdraw from the war. Hegranted the French free passage over theriver Po and garrisons in the towns ofCuneo, Ceva, and Tortona. Of little signifi-

56 Charles IV, King of Spain

cance in itself, Cherasco played an impor-tant part in building up Napoleon’s militaryreputation and international fame.





Chouannerie

The violent opposition to the Repub-lic in the inland rural areas of west-

ern France, which had started in 1792, con-tinued to be a thorn in the side ofNapoleonic government, especially in itsearly years. Conscription, royalist agitation,and British support led to a rising in Brit-tany, Anjou, Maine, and lower Normandyin the autumn of 1799 that briefly appearedthreatening to the consulate. The Britishlanded supplies in Brittany, and in Octoberchouans (peasants), among whose leaderswas Georges Cadoudal, momentarily seizedthe important towns of Le Mans, Nantes,and La Roche-Bernard. Napoleon em-ployed a typical mixture of ruthlessness andconciliation in dealing with chouannerie.Military action and the murder of severalchouan leaders in 1800 were followed by anamnesty, while the Concordat of 1801helped calm Catholic opposition. But aform of politicized banditry persisted in thewest, and there was always a chance thatwith good leadership and British support itcould turn once again into insurrection.After 1805, however, with Cadoudal andthe other principal leaders dead, the secu-rity forces were in control of all but themost isolated and impenetrable areas. Butsupporters of the regime still lived precari-ous lives, and in 1815 new leaders arose to

call “Whites” to arms against Napoleon in aform akin to the White Terror. Royalistleaders, however, had never been enthusias-tic about chouannerie and its chiefs, givingmore support to the more organized andcontrollable resistance of the Vendée.

Related entries: Cadoudal, Georges;Conscription



Hutt, Maurice. 1983. Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution. 2 vols. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Sutherland, Donald. 1982. The Chouans: the SocialOrigins of Popular Counter-Revolution in UpperBrittany, 1770–1796. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1976. The Vendée. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.

Cisalpine Republic

C reated by Napoleon in 1797 with thesupport of Italian revolutionaries, the

Cisalpine Republic was the principal “sis-ter” republic in Italy during the period ofFrench control. After defeating the Austri-ans during his first Italian campaign, Napo-leon organized the Duchy of Milan andother conquered territories as the LombardRepublic, intending to use it as a personalpolitical power base. The Directory had toaccept Napoleon’s policy, and he encour-aged revolutionaries in the Duchy of Mo-dena and the papal states of Ferrara andBologna, south of the river Po, to proclaimthe Cispadane Republic. In 1797 Napoleonjoined the Cispadane with the Austrianpossessions of Milan and Mantua, the Val-telline, and western Venetia to form theCisalpine Republic, with Milan as its capi-tal. Swept away by the armies of the SecondCoalition in 1799, it was revived by theFrench in 1800, renamed the Republic ofItaly in 1801, with Napoleon as president,

Cisalpine Republic 57

before being transformed into the King-dom of Italy in 1805, with Napoleon asking and Eugène de Beauharnais as viceroy.

The republic was independent in nameonly: the two constitutions imposed by Na-poleon in 1797 and 1798 effectively re-stricted democratic participation, and a se-ries of purges removed the radicalrevolutionaries from government. TheCisalpine had to maintain an army underFrench command, subsidize a French armyon its soil, and exclude British imports.Nevertheless middle-class revolutionarieswelcomed the partial export of the princi-ples of the Revolution to Italy.

The country was divided into depart-ments, allowing the uniform application ofthe law; a wide measure of press freedomwas enjoyed; torture was abolished; andeconomic reforms stimulated the circula-tion of goods within the newly unifiedterritory. Church lands were confiscated,religious orders suppressed, and civil mar-riage introduced; state-supported schoolsreplaced church schools, and religious tol-eration was proclaimed.The ordinary peo-ple, suffering from land shortage, taxation,and conscription, gained little by thesechanges, but the memory of the CisalpineRepublic did serve to stimulate Italian na-tionalist ideas in the nineteenth century.Neither the Directory nor Napoleon wasinterested in the unification of the wholeof Italy, but by joining together a series ofstates, partially overcoming the spirit ofparticularism, and forcing people from dif-ferent regions to work together, theCisalpine had helped to strengthen the be-lief that unity was more than an impracti-cal dream.


Suggestions for further reading:Hearder, Harry. 1983. Italy in the Age of the

Risorgimento, 1790–1870. London and NewYork: Longman.

Woolf, Stuart J. 1991. A History of Italy,1700–1860:The Social Constraints on PoliticalChange. London: Routledge.

Ciudad Rodrigo, Siege of ( January 1812)

The taking of the fortress of CiudadRodrigo on the river Agueda by the

duke of Wellington was crucial in destroy-ing the French hold on northern Spainduring the Peninsular War. Ciudad Ro-drigo, commanding the Spanish side of the“northern corridor” between Spain andPortugal, had been blockaded and taken byMichel Ney and André Masséna in 1810.But Wellington ousted the French afterheavy fighting in bitter weather during aneleven-day siege starting on 19 January1812.This allowed the British commanderto advance to the key city of Salamanca inJune.

Related entries: Peninsular War;Wellington,Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Gates, David. 1986. The Spanish Ulcer:A History of

the Peninsular War. London:Allen and Unwin.Glover, Michael. 1974. The Peninsular War,

1807–14. Hampden, CT:Archon Books.

Civil Code

Toward the end of his life Napoleondeclared that he had counted for his

survival as much on his Civil Code of 1804as on his military victories.The work of acommission on which Jean Portalis was thedominant figure, the Code Napoléon (as itcame to be called) placed the new systemof law created by the Revolution on asound footing and fulfilled the unifyingambitions of different currents of eigh-teenth-century thought, including En-lightenment thinkers and reformist minis-ters of the ancien régime.

The preamble to the Code declared:“Roman laws, decrees, general or particularcustoms, statutes and regulations cease tohave the force of general or special law in

58 Ciudad Rodrigo, Siege of

matters which are the subject of the lawscontained in the present Code.”The privi-leges and inequalities embodied in the in-numerable codes and customs of the ancienrégime were definitively abolished. Theideas of personal liberty, freedom of con-science, and equality before the law wereconsecrated in the Code. But the aspectsconcerned with property were equally sig-nificant in reassuring property owners,above all the purchasers of biens nationaux,that their position was safe underNapoleonic rule. Property rights weremade as absolute as possible, and while theCode urged makers of wills not to divideproperty overmuch, by granting provisionsfor divisions of estates it helped to conse-crate small as well as large property.

The Code also introduced the notion ofbonnes moeurs, bringing the law to bearagainst behavior seen as offensive to publicmorality, while the section on the familyreinforced the patriarchal power of the hus-band as head of the household, relegatingwomen to a position of inferiority. If peas-ants and bourgeois property owners gainedmost from the Code, women were themain losers. The equality of the sexes pro-claimed by the Revolution was denied byNapoleon, the “Mediterranean” patriarch.

The Code was introduced in those re-gions of Napoleon’s empire where theFrench succeeded in establishing stablerule, principally in western Germany, theLow Countries, and northern Italy. Heremany of its provisions were retained by the

Civil Code 59

The Napoleonic Code Crowned by Time by Jean Baptiste Mauzaisse portrays the significance of theNapoleonic Code and its lasting influence in every part of Europe that came under Napoleon’s control. In thisextravagant portrayal,Time blesses Napoleon as he writes the inspired code. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

restored regimes after 1815. It is still thebasis of French law and that of more thantwenty other countries worldwide today.

Related entries: Law, Codification of; Portalis,Jean Etienne Marie



Goy, Joseph. 1989.“Civil Code,” in FrançoisFuret and Mona Ozouf, eds., CriticalDictionary of the French Revolution.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Schwarz, Bernard, ed. 1956. The Code Napoleonand the Common Law World. New York: NewYork University Press.

Clary, Bernadine EugénieDésirée (1779–1860)

D ésirée, as she was known, daughterof a prosperous Marseille silk mer-

chant, was reputedly the big love of theyoung Napoleon’s life, but it is difficult todistinguish romantic legend from fact. TheClary and Bonaparte families first met in1794 when Joseph Bonaparte as secretaryof the Committee of Public Safety was ap-parently instrumental in obtaining the re-lease of Désirée’s brother, Etienne, fromprison. Joseph married Désirée’s sister, JulieClary, on 1 August 1794. Napoleon becameinfatuated with the vivacious Désirée, butshe was only fourteen years old, and afterhe returned to Paris she responded hardlyat all to Napoleon’s correspondence. In themeantime he fell in love with and marriedJoséphine de Beauharnais.

The desirable Désirée had several suitorsand was set to marry General LeonardDuphot, but he was assassinated before theycould tie the knot. She eventually marriedJean-Baptiste Bernadotte on 17 August1798. A son, Oscar, was born on 4 July1799, and Napoleon became his godfather.

When Bernadotte was elected crown princeof Sweden in 1810 Désirée reputedly had toconsult a map to find out where it was.Aftera brief visit to the Nordic kingdom she re-turned to live in Paris, ignoring Bernadotte’sadherence to the coalition against Napo-leon. Bernadotte became King Charles XIVof Sweden in 1818, but Désirée remained inParis until 1823, when Oscar marriedJoséphine, daughter of Eugène de Beauhar-nais.As Queen Desideria she finally becamewell respected in Sweden, as consort toBernadotte and after 1844 Queen Motherto Oscar. She died in Stockholm on 17 De-cember 1860.

Related entries: Bernadotte, Jean-Baptiste Jules

Suggestions for further reading:Palmer,Alan. 1990. Bernadotte: Napoleon’s Marshal,

Sweden’s King. London: John Murray.Ratcliffe, Bertram. 1981. Prelude to Fame:An


Coalitions

F irst Coalition: formed in 1792 againstRevolutionary France, by 1794 it

comprised Prussia, Austria, most of theGerman states, Piedmont-Sardinia, Naples,other minor Italian states, Spain, GreatBritain, and the United Provinces of theNetherlands. Prussia and Spain made peacewith France in 1795. Napoleon’s defeat ofAustria in his first Italian campaign left onlyBritain still at war.

Second Coalition: formed in late 1798following Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign, itcomprised Britain, the Ottoman Empire,Austria, Russia, and some minor Europeanstates. The coalition fell apart after Napo-leon’s second Italian campaign and Frenchvictories in Germany. Britain made peaceby the Peace of Amiens.

Third Coalition: formed in 1805 after theestablishment of the Kingdom of Italy and

60 Clary, Bernadine Eugénie Désirée

Napoleon’s annexation of Piedmont, Elba,and Genoa. The major participants wereAustria, Russia, and Britain, but it was short-lived and disintegrated after Napoleon’s vic-tory at Austerlitz (2 December 1805).

Fourth Coalition: formed by Britain,Prussia, and Russia after Napoleon’s cre-ation of the Confederation of the Rhineand his bullying treatment of neutral Prus-sia. It dissolved after the battles of Jena-Auerstädt and Friedland. Britain, however,remained at war and would be so continu-ously until Napoleon’s defeat.

Fifth Coalition: alliance in 1808–1809between Austria and Britain, with supportfrom rebellious Spain.The Austrians hopedfor a national rising in Germany againstNapoleon, but were defeated decisively atWagram.

Sixth Coalition: alliance formed by Rus-sia and Sweden after Tsar Alexander I with-drew from Napoleon’s Continental System.It was followed by Napoleon’s invasion ofRussia and subsequent disastrous retreat.

Seventh Coalition: formed in 1813 byRussia, Sweden, and Prussia, with backingfrom Britain, it was joined by Austria andother German states as Napoleon’s armiesretreated across Germany. Naples underJoachim Murat joined in January 1814.Thiswas the alliance which, by opening up asecond front from Spain, finally defeatedNapoleon and forced his first abdication inApril 1814.

Eighth Coalition: formed to oppose Na-poleon during the Hundred Days, it com-prised the same countries as the SeventhCoalition, plus the new Kingdom of theNetherlands.This was the alliance that de-feated Napoleon at Waterloo on 18 June1815.

Suggestions for further reading:Blanning,T. C.W. 1995. The Napoleonic Wars

1803–1815. London: Edward Arnold.Craig, Gordon A. 1966.“Problems of Coalition

Warfare:The Military Alliance againstNapoleon,” in his War, Politics and Diplomacy.London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.


Esdaile, Charles J. 1995. The Wars of Napoleon.London and New York: Longman.

Muir, Rory. 1996. Britain and the Defeat ofNapoleon. New Haven:Yale University Press.


Schroeder, Paul. 1987.“The Collapse of theSecond Coalition,” Journal of Modern History59, pp. 244–290.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1994. The Transformation ofEuropean Politics 1763–1848. New York:Oxford University Press.

Code of Criminal Procedure

P romulgated in 1808, this Code com-pleted the organization of the justice

system decreed by Napoleon as first consulby the Law of 27 Ventôse Year VIII (18March 1800). This law had abolished theRevolutionary principle of the election ofjudges and allowed the first consul to ap-point almost all legal officials, thoughjudges were given tenure for life as a guar-antee of their independence. The newCode authorized the appointment ofjudges by prefects and the quashing of ajury’s verdict by the Senate if it was held tobe against the interests of the state. Theoverall effect of the Code of Criminal Pro-cedure was to favor the prosecution overthe defendant and to strengthen Napoleon’sauthoritarian government.

Related entries: Law, Codification of

Suggestions for further reading:Holtman, Robert B. 1967. The Napoleonic

Revolution. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Commercial Code

This Code of 1807 was intended toregularize conformity in business

transactions, but it was the least compre-

Commercial Code 61

hensive of the Napoleonic Codes and of-fered little that was new. It established prin-ciples for the responsibilities of shareholdersin joint stock companies, but left manyanomalies and took little account of theconsiderable development of commercialtechniques during the eighteenth century.Thus, although it provided a blueprint forcompany law in the nineteenth century, itneeded constant updating. The provisionsof the Code reflect Napoleon’s prejudicesagainst the mortgaging of real property andagainst money lending at interest.

Related entries: Economy; Law, Codification of



Concordat

N apoleon as first consul in 1800sought reconciliation with the

Catholic Church for several reasons: to helpend the rebellion in the Vendée; to improvethe international standing of the consulate;and to make use of the clergy as representa-tives of the established political order in thedioceses and villages of France and in con-quered Catholic territories. Following hisvictory at Marengo Napoleon could nego-tiate with the new pope, Pius VII, from aposition of strength. Long, tortuous, and se-cret negotiations with the papal representa-tives culminated in the journey to Paris ofthe papal secretary of state, Cardinal ErcoleConsalvi. The finished document wassigned by the pope in July 1801 but notpublished until Easter 1802.

The Concordat overturned the Revolu-tionary principle of the separation ofchurch and state and restored Catholicismto a privileged position as the “religion ofthe majority of the French people.” It pro-vided for the establishment of a new epis-copate with bishops nominated by the state

and consecrated by the pope. The bishopschose their own lower clergy, and all cleri-cal salaries were paid by the state. Churchproperty sold as biens nationaux remained inthe hands of its purchasers. The OrganicArticles, added unilaterally by Napoleon,were never accepted by the pope. Freedomof religion was later guaranteed by Napo-leon’s Civil Code. Sources of conflict re-mained over investiture and marriage laws,especially divorce, but Napoleon’s attemptin 1813 to impose a second “Concordat ofFontainebleau’” giving greater powers toFrench bishops at Rome’s expense, was re-pudiated by Pius VII and never became op-erative.

Napoleon achieved his political aim ofreuniting the French clergy and rejectedcriticism from anticlerical ex-revolutionar-ies in the government and the professions.“They will say I am a papist,” he said,“but Iam nothing at all. In Egypt I was aMuhammedan; here I will be a Catholic,for the good of the people.” In 1817 PiusVII, despite all the personal indignities hehad suffered at Napoleon’s hands, called theConcordat “the saving act of a Christianand a hero,” because it had restoredCatholicism in France. It remained in oper-ation until the separation of church andstate in 1905.

Related entries: Bernier,Abbé Etienne;Catholic Church; Organic Articles; Pius VII, Pope



Dansette,Adrien. 1961. Religious History ofModern France. 2 vols. London: Nelson.

Hales, Edward Elton Young. 1962. Napoleon andthe Pope. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Jedin, Hubert, ed. 1981. History of the Church,Vol.7:The Church between Revolution andRestoration. London: Burns and Oates.

Kafker, Frank A., and Laux, James M., eds. 1989.Napoleon and His Times: Selected Interpretations.Malibar, FL: Krieger.

Walsh, Henry Horace. 1933. The Concordat of1801:A Study of the Problems of Church andState. New York: Columbia University Press.

62 Concordat

Confederation of the Rhine

F ollowing his victory at Austerlitz Na-poleon was able, on 12 July 1806, to

establish the Confederation of the Rhine orRheinbund as a league of sixteen Germanstates, linked into close alliance with Franceand intended as a buffer between himselfand his potential enemies to the east. Afterthe defeat of Prussia in 1806 and Russia in1807 twenty-three other states joined theConfederation, which eventually encom-passed the whole of the old German Reichapart from Austria, Prussia, and lands be-longing to Denmark and Sweden. As a re-sult the Holy Roman Empire was abol-ished, and in return for loyalty and militaryassistance to France the medium-sized andrelatively well-integrated states of the Con-federation retained full sovereignty overtheir territories.

Napoleon and his chief supporter in Ger-many, Karl von Dalberg, Archbishop of Re-gensburg-Aschaffenburg, who was namedPrince Primate of the Confederation, triedto promote the creation of a central govern-ment with a representative Diet, but were fa-tally hampered by the determination of thestates to retain their sovereignty. Collectiveinstitutions were never formed, and after hisintervention in Spain in 1808 Napoleon wascontent with mobilizing the resources of theConfederation to feed the French war ma-chine. In 1813 the Confederation fell apart,as its members scrambled to join the Allies.Nevertheless, the events of 1806 and the es-tablishment of the Rheinbund represent a his-toric turning point in German history: thetraditional political order was permanentlyoverturned and the foundations were laid forreform of state and society in those westernand southern German states, includingBavaria and the Kingdom of Westphalia,where territorial transformations profoundlychanged the political landscape.

Related entries: Bavaria, Kingdom of; Berg,Grand Duchy of; Carl August, Duke of Weimar;

Frankfurt, Grand Duchy of; Saxony;Westphalia,Kingdom of

Suggestions for further reading:Schmitt, H.A. 1983.“Germany without Prussia:

A Closer Look at the Confederation of theRhine,” German Studies Review 6, pp. 9–39.

Shanahan,William O. 1981.“A Neglected Sourceof German Nationalism:The Confederationof the Rhine, 1806–13,” in Michael Palumboand William O. Shanahan, eds., Nationalism:Essays in Honor of Louis L. Snyder. Westport,CT.: Greenwood Press. pp. 106–132.


Conscription

The draft system, first introduced bythe Jourdan Law of September 1798

and widened in 1799, 1800, 1802, and1806, successfully ensured adequate man-power for Napoleon’s armies, but evasionand desertion created a serious and growingpolice problem for his regime. The law,under which all single men who reachedthe age of twenty in a given year formedthe class of that year and were liable to call-up until age twenty-five, fell most heavilyon the poorer classes, as wealthier menwere allowed to send substitutes in theirplace. Estimates of the total number mobi-lized by conscription vary from 1.6 millionto 3.6 million, but possibly up to half a mil-lion either evaded the draft entirely or de-serted and returned to their villages, oftenat harvest time. Many joined bands of brig-ands or royalists. The worst crisis arose in1812–1813, when entire companies of theretreating French armies melted away asthey reached the frontiers.

For the peasantry, conscription was seenas a kind of tax that took people rather thanmoney or goods.To remove men from theland was to condemn the land to death.Thehistorian Alan Forrest states: “Over con-scription, as over no other single issue, theinterests of the state and the local commu-nity were seen to come into open conflict,

Conscription 63

and the state had no other recourse but torepression” (Forrest 1989, p. viii). Whendraft time approached young men got mar-ried in suspiciously large numbers, recordsof birth dates vanished, and, especially in re-mote or mountainous regions, men simplydisappeared. A sizable number even re-sorted to self-mutilation so as to be unfitfor service.

Pursuit of refractory conscripts by thegendarmerie brought country people face toface with the law as never before, tied uppolice manpower, and became the mainpoint of friction between the village andthe state. Nevertheless, by the end of theNapoleonic period the idea of nationalmilitary service had come to be seen as anormal, if unpopular and resented, featureof life for young French males, whateverthe regime in power.

Related entries: Army; Chouannerie;Gendarmerie; Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste

Suggestions for further reading:Arnold, Eric A. 1966.“Some Observations on the

French Opposition to NapoleonicConscription, 1804–1806,” French HistoricalStudies 4, pp. 452–462.

———, ed. 1994. A Documentary Survey ofNapoleonic France. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America. pp. 3–14.

Forrest,Alan. 1989. Conscripts and Deserters:TheArmy and French Society during the Revolution andEmpire. New York: Oxford University Press.


Woloch, Isser. 1986.“Napoleonic Conscription:State Power and Civil Society,” Past & Present,no. 111 (May 1986), pp. 101–129.

Constant, Benjamin(1767–1830)

The Swiss-born writer gained hisgreatest literary and political fame

after 1815, but his relationship with Napo-leon illustrates the ambivalent attitudes ofmany liberals. Constant was appointed to

the Tribunate in 1799 thanks to the influ-ence of his mistress, Mme. de Staël, withwhom he enjoyed a stormy relationship be-tween 1794 and 1811. But he strongly ad-vocated giving the Tribunate real powerand as a consequence was purged in 1802.Constant went into exile and in 1814 sup-ported Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte for theFrench throne. When Napoleon landed inFrance at the beginning of the HundredDays, Constant wrote a violent newspaperdiatribe against the modern “Attila” and“Genghis Khan.” But within three weekshe joined the Council of State and was pri-marily responsible for drawing up the ActeAdditionnel, known as la benjamine by con-temporaries, which created, very briefly, aliberal empire. In his political writingsConstant showed himself equally opposedto despotism and to democracy, which heidentified with the tyranny of the majority.

Related entries: Acte Additionnel; Staël,Germaine de

Suggestions for further reading:Constant, Benjamin. 1988. Political Writings, trans.

and ed. Biancamaria Fontana. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Wood, Dennis. 1993. Benjamin Constant. Londonand New York: Routledge.

Constitutions

F rance under Napoleon had fourconstitutions: that of the Year VIII

(13 December 1799), which created theconsulate; that of the Year X (2–4 August1802), which created the Consulate forLife; that of the Year XII (18 May 1804),which created the empire; and finally theActe Additionnel of 22 April 1815 during theHundred Days.

The Constitution of the Year VIII wasthe work of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, re-vised by Napoleon. It was, in accordancewith Sieyès’s principles, “short and ob-scure.” The first consul, chief of state, was

64 Constant, Benjamin

named for ten years and the post given toNapoleon by name.The two other consulshad only a consultative role. In a compli-cated electoral system citizens elected com-munal notables, who in turn elected de-partmental notables, who in turn chosenational notables.The Senate, composed ofeighty members named for life, in theorychose the consuls and the members of thelegislative bodies, the Legislative Body (corpslégislatif ) and Tribunate. The latter was todiscuss laws; the former, an “assembly ofmutes,” merely to vote on them.A Councilof State, named by the first consul, was todraft new laws and judge administrative dis-putes. The Senate had the responsibility ofsafeguarding the constitution, but couldmodify it by a senatus consultum as proposedby the consuls.The main effect of the Con-stitution of the Year VIII was to provide Na-poleon with quasi-dictatorial powers.

The Constitution of the Year X, promul-gated through senatus consulta, furtherstrengthened the Napoleonic dictatorship.Napoleon’s appointment as consul for lifewas approved by plebiscite.The first consulwas provided with a Privy Council, andSieyès’s complex and impractical electoralsystem replaced. Electoral colleges in eachdepartment, elected by universal manhoodsuffrage from among its richest notables,nominated two persons for each opening inthe Tribunate or Legislative Body. At thesame time, the Tribunate, which had shownsome mild opposition to Napoleon, was re-duced from one hundred to fifty members.

The creation of the empire by the Con-stitution of the Year XII transformed thelife consulship into a hereditary monarchy.The Constitution regulated succession tothe throne, provided the emperor with asalary or “civil list” (equal to that of LouisXVI in 1790), and systematized the forma-tion of a court.The Tribunate was retained,but would be abolished in 1807.Two sena-torial commissions were established to safe-guard individual liberty and freedom of thepress, but were ineffectual.

The final constitution, the Acte Addition-nel, drafted by Benjamin Constant duringthe Hundred Days, attempted to reestablishthe empire on more liberal lines. It wasconfirmed by a referendum, which was ig-nored by the vast majority of the popula-tion, and only operated for two monthsuntil the defeat at Waterloo on 18 June1815.

Related entries: Acte Additionnel; Consulate;Council of State; Empire; Legislative Body;Plebiscites; Senate; Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph;Tribunate


of Napoleonic France. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, pp. 22–35, 180–204,348–56.


Collins, Irene. 1979. Napoleon and his Parliaments.London: Edward Arnold.


Consulate

The consulate, the regime establishedafter the coup of 18 Brumaire, was

consolidated by the Constitution of theYear VIII and modified in 1802 by theConstitution of the Year X. The idea ofconsulship was inspired, as were many ofthe institutions and symbols of the Revolu-tion, by the Roman Republic and fitted inwith the prevalent neoclassicism. Napoleonwas first consul, but the original second andthird consuls, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès andRoger Ducos, were soon replaced by Jean-Jacques de Cambacérès and CharlesFrançois Lebrun, who were more inclinedto accept Napoleon’s thinly veiled dictator-ship. Napoleon was made consul for life,with power to nominate his successor, bythe new Constitution of 1802. The con-sulate ended with the senatus consultum of18 May 1804, which created the empire

Consulate 65

and proclaimed Napoleon emperor of theFrench.

Related entries: Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII;Cambacérès, Jean-Jacques Régis de;Constitutions; Ducos, Roger; Lebrun, CharlesFrançois; Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph


of Napoleonic France. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America. pp. 16–19, 22–35, 135–138.

Sydenham, M. J. 1974. The First French Republic,1792–1804. London: Batsford.

Continental System

N apoleon by the end of 1806 had de-feated Austria, Prussia, and Russia,

but could not defeat Great Britain as longas it controlled the seas. The ContinentalSystem, closing continental Europe toBritish goods, was his attempt “to vanquishthe sea by the power of the land.” TheBerlin Decrees of 21 November 1806, de-claring Britain to be in a state of blockade,were complemented by the Milan Decreesof 23 November and 17 December. Napo-leon believed that through this economicwarfare the British economy would be dis-rupted, causing social and political instabil-ity, which would force Britain to give upthe fight against him.

The system was imposed on Napoleon’ssubject states in Europe during 1807 andadopted by Russia after the Treaties of Tilsitin July 1807.The occupation or annexationof Spain and Portugal in 1807–1808, thePapal States in 1809, Holland in 1810, andthe Hanseatic towns and Duchy of Olden-burg in 1810–1811 all in theory extendedthe system. Measures loosening it some-what through licenses for trade were re-versed by the Fontainebleau decree of 18October 1810. Maintaining the blockadewith any effectiveness was obviously de-pendent on French military dominance,and as this collapsed in 1813–1814, so didthe Continental System.

Historians are divided about the efficacyof the Continental System, but it manifestlyfailed to force Britain to sue for peace.Britain’s command of the seas allowed it totrade with the New World, and only whenits relations with the United States were badbetween 1810 and 1812 was severe disrup-tion caused to British commerce. Smugglingwas ignored or even encouraged by govern-ments reluctantly forced into applying theblockade, and this in turn tempted customsofficers into corruption.The maritime portsof continental Europe, including the Atlanticseaboard of France, suffered greatly, and thissuffering indirectly served to confirm Britishnaval and commercial power. And althoughBritain was hit by social unrest during theeconomic crisis of 1810–1811, the political

66 Continental System

The characteristic pose and stance affected byNapoleon are already apparent in this portrait of thefirst consul wearing the uniform of the Chasseurs ofthe Guard. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

system was not seriously threatened, govern-ment credit remained good, and industrialproduction continued to expand. Theprogress of the industrial revolution wasbarely hindered, if at all.

Some areas of the continental interior didbenefit from the lack of competition fromBritain. In Belgium and the Rhineland tradewas reoriented toward continental markets,boosting manufacture of textiles, metals, andwine, especially between 1807 and 1810.The cotton and chemical industries inFrance itself received a similar fillip.As a re-sult the blockade speeded up the shift offocus of the French economy away from theAtlantic coast toward the interior. However,the mainly agricultural regions of Napo-leon’s empire suffered, increasing the unpop-ularity of French rule.

Given French naval weakness and aneconomy geared to war, the ContinentalSystem seemed a logical way of striking atBritain. But it is clear that Napoleon neverunderstood the strength of the British econ-omy, especially the system of government fi-nance. His intervention in Spain in 1808and the subsequent popular uprising blewan enormous hole in the blockade, whichmerchants and smugglers everywhere inEurope were eager to exploit. It has beenargued that had Napoleon not invadedRussia in 1812 the pressure on Britaincould have been maintained. It is difficult todeny, however, that Spain and Russia fatallyweakened the Continental System for al-most the whole of its period of operation,and that in 1815 Britain’s economic ad-vance over its continental rivals was muchgreater than it would otherwise have been.

Related entries: Berlin Decrees; Economy;Fontainebleau Decree; Great Britain; MilanDecrees


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Crouzet, François. 1964.“Wars, Blockades and

Economic Change in Europe, 1792–1815,”Journal of Economic History 24, pp. 567–588.

Crouzet, François. 1989.“A Serious Cause ofSocial and Economic Dislocation,” in FrankA. Kafker and James L. Laux, eds., Napoleonand his Times: Selected Interpretations. Malibar,FL: Krieger, pp. 179–191.

Ellis, Geoffrey. 1981. Napoleon’s ContinentalBlockade:The Case of Alsace. Oxford:Clarendon Press.


Copenhagen, Battle of (2 April 1801)

This action by the British fleet underAdmiral Sir Hyde Parker was,

together with the death of Tsar Paul I, in-strumental in destroying the armed neutral-ity of the North.Twenty-six British ships ofthe line, backed by thirty support vessels,bombarded the Danish fleet and the shorebatteries of Copenhagen intermittently forfive and a half hours, with heavy casualtieson both sides. It was on this occasion thatVice-Admiral Horatio Nelson, command-ing the British vanguard, famously put histelescope to his blind eye so as not to seeHyde Parker’s signals ordering him to stopthe engagement with the shore batteries.The action at Copenhagen helped secureBritish control of the seas and boosted Nel-son’s reputation as a naval hero.

Related entries: Armed Neutrality; Denmark;Nelson, Horatio, Lord

Coronation

B y crowning himself emperor on 2December 1804 Napoleon, in the

words of the historian François Furet, “dis-tanced himself from the Revolution with-out drawing any nearer to the kings” (Furet1992, p. 239) of Europe. Using insignia rep-

Coronation 67

resenting the “honors of Charlemagne,”thereby eliminating the whole Capetianline of kings of France and claiming directpolitical descent from the great Emperor ofthe West, Napoleon crowned himself andJoséphine during a three-hour ceremony inthe cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris.

The “Carolingian kitsch” ceremonial wasconducted on a grand scale, designed to im-press the people with the majesty of the newempire, and consecrated by the presence ofPope Pius VII. The pope enthroned Napo-leon at the cathedral entrance, thereby addinghis blessing to the emperor’s elevation. TheBonaparte family and the new grand digni-taries of the empire attended in all theirglory, creating petty disputes over precedenceworthy of the court of Louis XIV. Carefullyorchestrated acclamations and artillery salvoesaccompanied the processions of emperor andpope through the streets of Paris.

Napoleon by his oath swore to upholdthe principles of the Revolution and “togovern with the sole aim of the interests,

happiness and glory of the French people.”But the coronation was also a spectacularconfirmation that the Revolution was nowover. Napoleon was no longer leader of theFrench Republic, but hereditary absolutesovereign, surrounded by a court and soonby a new aristocracy.Among the crowd, thesix-year-old Jules Michelet, writing fiftyyears later, recalled only “a mournful anddismal silence” (Furet 1992, p. 248).

Related entries: Beauharnais, Marie RoseJoséphine de; David, Jacques-Louis; Empire; PiusVII, Pope

Suggestions for further reading:Furet, François. 1992. Revolutionary France,

1770–1880. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Holtman, Robert B. 1950. Napoleonic Propaganda.

Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Corsica

N apoleon’s native island lies about ahundred miles southeast of the

68 Corsica

Coronation of Napoleon I (1806–1807) by Jacques-Louis David.A gorgeous if inaccurate portrayal ofNapoleon’s coronation, David’s work contains nearly a hundred portraits, including members of the imperialfamily, the dignitaries of the Empire, Pope Pius VII, and David himself. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

Mediterranean coast of France. It belongedto the Republic of Genoa until 1768, whenit was ceded to France, but between 1729and 1768 the island had been in a state ofrevolt for independence under the leader-ship of Pasquale Paoli, and the struggle hadaroused widespread interest and sympathyin Europe. Napoleon was born in the capi-tal,Ajaccio, on 15 August 1769, and he andhis brothers remained embroiled in Corsi-can politics until 1793. Thereafter he onlyvisited it briefly for three days in 1799.Corsica was occupied by the British fromFebruary 1794 to November 1796, butfrom then on remained in French hands,despite ambitious schemes by Britain andRussia to use it as a naval base.

Related entries: Paoli, Pasquale

Suggestions for further reading:Carrington, Dorothy. 1971. Granite Island:A

Portrait of Corsica. London: Longman.

Corunna, Battle of (16 January 1809)

L a Coruña, the provincial capital ofGalicia in northwestern Spain, was

first used as a British base during thePeninsular War in 1808. When the Britishcommander, Sir John Moore, then in Sala-manca, heard that the main French forceunder Napoleon and Nicolas Jean Soultwas at Leon, he decided to fall back onCorunna. The retreat over the CantabrianMountains cost the British some 5,000men, but 28,000 arrived safely, and on 14January 1809 a British convoy appeared toevacuate them. Soult’s pursuing force ap-proached the town as cavalry and guns werebeing loaded. On the afternoon of 16 Janu-ary Soult attacked the British lines, seekingto cut off the harbor, but faced fierce resis-tance. After three hours of violent combat

Corunna, Battle of 69

Napleon’s birthplace, the Casa Buonaparte in Ajaccio, in a nineteenth-century print.Today it houses a museumdedicated to him. (Alinari/Art Resource).

in rocky terrain Soult gave up the attack.Moore had been fatally wounded and wasburied the following morning as the em-barkation resumed. Some 27,000 meneventually reached England safely.

Related entries: Moore, Sir John; PeninsularWar; Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu

Suggestions for further reading:Hibbert, Christopher. 1961. Corunna. London:

Batsford.

Council of State

E stablished in December 1799, theCouncil of State was Napoleon’s

principal advisory body under both con-sulate and empire. It was meant to be abody of experts, chosen entirely by Napo-leon, with purely consultative functions andtherefore allowed greater freedom for dis-sent than the Senate,Tribunate, or Legisla-tive Body. Of the twenty-nine first mem-bers, ten were lawyers, nine wereeducational or scientific specialists, and fourwere military men.The majority of Coun-cil members held office for more than fiveyears, providing valuable continuity in theadministration.They were paid a stipend of25,000 francs a year, but slackness couldlead to instant dismissal.

The Council was initially divided intofive sections—War, Navy, Finance, Law,and Internal Affairs—soon joined by an-other on foreign relations, and it only metoccasionally as a general meeting, nor-mally under Napoleon’s presidency. Thecouncillors are known to have discussedover 60,000 questions, including such im-portant matters as the codification of lawand the Concordat. The Council was as-sisted by a special secretariat, while high-flying young civil servants could be at-tached to sections of the Council assupplementary advisers or auditeurs. The

Council of State has survived to this dayin France in the form of a supreme judi-cial advisory body and guardian of theconstitution.

Related entries: Constitutions


of Napoleonic France:A Supplement. Lanham,MD: University Press of America. pp. 18–22.

Church, Clive H. 1981. Revolution and Red Tape:The French Ministerial Bureaucracy 1770–1850.Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Freedeman, Charles E. 1961. The Conseil d’Etat inModern France. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Counter-Revolution

O pposition to the Revolution was asold as the Revolution itself, but had

never constituted a united movement.Theterm “Counter-Revolution,” therefore, canbe extended to include the very differentpolitical theories of Edmund Burke andJoseph de Maistre, military forces led fromabroad by émigrés, the rising in the Vendée,and the federalist revolt of 1793 against theoverriding authority of Paris. The youngNapoleon’s actions during the siege ofToulon in December 1793 helped put anend to the greatest threat to the Revolu-tion since 1789. His popularity and heroicimage, however, were probably enhancedby the fact that, unlike other generals, hismilitary reputation was made abroadrather than in killing French people athome.The coup of 18 Brumaire, followedby Napoleon’s victories in Italy in 1800and the advent of peace, helped to extin-guish serious counterrevolutionary activ-ity. Under Napoleonic rule active royalismtook the form of plots to kill him, dis-guised and secret organizations, and theactive chouannerie, often indistinguishablefrom mere banditry.

70 Council of State

Related entries: Cadoudal, Georges;Chouannerie; Émigrés; Royalists;Vendée Revolt



Lewis, Gwynne. 1978. The Second Vendée: theContinuity of Counter-Revolution in theDepartment of the Gard, 1789–1815. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Sutherland, D. M. G. 1985. France, 1789–1815:Revolution and Counter-Revolution. London:Fontana.

Counter-Revolution 71

DDanube Campaigns

The campaign of 1805, which becameknown as the Austerlitz campaign,

the Jena-Auerstädt-Friedland campaign of1806–1807, and the Wagram campaign of1809 all show Napoleon at the height of hismilitary powers and provide the best illus-trations of his methods of waging war. Be-tween August and December 1805 he wonswift and decisive victories over the Aus-trian and Russian armies, and between Sep-tember 1806 and June 1807 struck northfrom the Danube to defeat Prussia and in-flict a second defeat on the Russians.

When the Third Coalition went to warin 1805 it hoped that Italy would be themain theater of operations, but Napoleon,transforming his Army of England into thefirst Grande Armée, marched seven corpsfrom the Channel coast to the upperDanube in less than six weeks.The Frenchhad reached the Danube between Ulm andRegensberg by 7 October, outmaneuveringthe Austrian general Karl Mack, who wastrapped in Ulm.The battle of Ulm (15–20October 1805) marked the end of Austrianresistance and opened up the road to Vi-enna. The Austro-Russian forces com-manded by Mikhail Kutuzov proved moredifficult to corner. Ignoring Austrian de-mands to fall back on Vienna, the wily Rus-sian veteran crossed the Danube to its northbank on 8–9 November, attacked and

nearly defeated the corps of Marshal JosephMortier, and linked up with further Aus-trian forces to form an army of 86,000men. Napoleon, however, faced with Alliedforces converging from the west and south,lured the main Russian force, now com-manded by Tsar Alexander I, into attackinghim at Austerlitz (2 December 1805). Thiscrushing defeat forced the Austrians to suefor peace and ended the Third Coalition.

After the Treaty of Pressburg (26 De-cember 1805) Napoleon kept six corpsstationed in the Danube valley. And whenwar threatened with Prussia in September1806 he was able to move them north-ward, cut the advancing Prussian lines ofcommunication, and force them into thedecisive battles of Jena-Auerstädt on 14October. The remainder of the campaign,culminating in the battle of Friedland (14June 1807), was therefore fought on Prus-sian soil.

By the time of the Wagram campaign in1809 the Austrian army had been reorgan-ized by the Archduke Charles, many of Na-poleon’s best troops were pinned down inSpain, and the French forces were dividedand spread over a line seventy-five mileslong. Napoleon arrived to take command atDonauwörth on 17 April 1809. He imme-diately showed his ability to maneuver indi-vidual corps swiftly, and between 19 and 23April inflicted five defeats on the compara-tively cumbersome Austrians at Tengen,

Danube Campaigns 73

D

Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Re-gensberg. While Charles, bloodied but notdestroyed, withdrew in orderly fashionalong the north of the Danube, Napoleonmoved along the southern bank to Vienna,which surrendered on 13 May. Napoleontried to move his army across the Danubebelow Vienna, but was checked at the battleof Essling (21–22 May 1809). Within sixweeks, however, he had succeeded in trans-ferring his army to the north bank and de-feated Charles at the battle of Wagram (5–6July). The archduke sued for an armistice,which was signed on 12 July.

Related entries: Austerlitz, Battle of; Eckmühl,Battle of; Essling, Battle of; Friedland, Battle of;Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of; Ulm, Battle of;Wagram, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Arnold, James R. 1991. Crisis on the Danube:

Napoleon’s Austrian Campaign of 1809.London:Arms and Armour.

Chandler, David G. 1974. The Campaigns ofNapoleon:The Mind and Method of History’sGreatest Soldier. New York: Macmillan.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1982. Napoleon’s GreatAdversaries:The Archduke Charles and theAustrian Army, 1792–1814. London: Batsford.

Danubian Principalities

The Ottoman provinces of Moldaviaand Wallachia, populated mostly by

Romanians with a Greek ruling class, servedNapoleon’s purpose in embroiling Turkey inwar with Russia in 1806. His special ambas-sador in Constantinople, General HoraceSébastiani, warned Sultan Selim II aboutRussian interference in the principalitiesand promised French support. The allianceamounted to a declaration of war and Rus-sia invaded. However, although the Roma-nians may have placed their hopes in Russiato gain independence, the principalities re-mained under Ottoman rule in 1815.

Related entries: Ottoman Empire

Suggestions for further reading:Jewsbury, George F. 1976. The Russian Annexation

of Bessarabia, 1774–1828:A Study of ImperialExpansion. Boulder, CO: East EuropeanQuarterly.

———. 1979.“Nationalism in the DanubianPrincipalities, 1800–1825:AReconsideration,” East European Quarterly13, pp. 287–296.

Daru, Pierre Antoine NoëlBruno (1767–1829)

N apoleon’s invaluable intendant gen-eral, who kept his armies fed,

clothed, paid, and otherwise supplied, wasalso a historian and translator of Latin po-etry. Born in Montpellier, Daru first joinedthe quartermaster corps in 1784, rosethrough the ranks rapidly during the revo-lutionary wars, and in 1799 became chiefquartermaster of the Army of Switzerlandunder André Masséna. But he really pros-pered under the consulate and empire, be-came secretary general of the Ministry ofWar, and was appointed to the Tribunate in1802 and as intendant of the imperialhousehold in 1805.

Although Daru retained liberal sympa-thies, he clearly did not express them tooloudly, and in any case during the wars of1805–1807 became indispensable to themilitary administration. He was named in-tendant general of the Grande Armée in Au-gust 1805 and also served as commissionercharged with the execution of the Treaty ofPressburg in 1806 and that of Tilsit in 1807.He was responsible for the food, clothing,transport, and medical services of the army,while as intendant of the conquered terri-tories he levied the contributions that paidfor the army’s supplies and returned a sur-plus to Napoleon’s treasury.When war withAustria resumed in 1809 Daru took up hispost once again. His voluminous reports ofhis receipts and expenses show a thorough-ness and attention to detail that enabled

74 Danubian Principalities

him to keep the army supplied largely oncontributions levied in the occupied terri-tories. In April 1811 he succeeded HuguesMaret as secretary of state. In this capacityhe accompanied Napoleon on the Russiancampaign of 1812–1813 and aided the newintendant general of the Grande Armée,Mathieu Dumas. Daru held the post ofminister of the administration of war in1813 and again during the Hundred Days.Despite this fidelity to Napoleon he was al-lowed to devote himself to historical re-search after the Restoration and was giventhe title of count by Louis XVIII in 1819.

Daru could be outspoken. He opposedNapoleon’s marriage to Marie-Louise, pre-ferring that he should marry a French-woman, warned against the invasion ofRussia, and favored acceptance of the Aus-trian peace terms in 1813. But he carriedout the emperor’s orders impeccably: Na-poleon found him the ablest of all his ad-ministrators, with “judgement, spirit, a greatcapacity for work, and a soul and body ofiron” (Connelly 1985, p. 143).

As a scholar, Daru’s massive eight-vol-ume History of the Venetian Republic showeda mastery of vast amounts of documenta-tion and a critical spirit, similar qualities tothose he showed as an administrator, cou-pled with a dry, matter-of-fact irony. It isnot surprising that such virtues would bemore appreciated by Napoleon than byDaru’s young cousin, Stendhal, who was fora while in love with his wife and found himdogged but unimaginative and passionless.

Related entries: Army; Grande Armée






Daunou, Pierre Claude François(1761–1840)

B orn in Boulogne, Daunou, a leadinglegislator and historian, had been an

Oratorian priest before being defrockedduring the Terror. His troubled political ca-reer during the Revolution, which in-cluded a spell of imprisonment, peakedunder the Directory when as a prominentmember of the Council of Five Hundredhe was involved in educational reform andacted as commissioner for organizing theRoman Republic. Daunou disapproved ofthe coup of 18 Brumaire and refused to be-come a councillor of state, but he did takethe position of president of the Tribunatebetween 1800 and 1802, when he waspurged along with nineteen other idéo-logues. Napoleon, however, had come to ap-preciate Daunou’s integrity and in 1804 ap-pointed him director of the NationalArchives, which he reorganized thoroughly.He was also useful to Napoleon in 1809when at the emperor’s request he wrote hisHistorical Essay on the Temporal Power of thePapacy, which aided Napoleon in his con-flict with Pius VII. Daunou was to remainan outspoken liberal for the rest of his life;he served as a deputy, edited the influentialJournal des Savants, and wrote or editedscores of books and hundreds of articles onhistory, literature, and politics.

Related entries: Idéologues; Tribunate

Suggestions for further reading:Collins, Irene. 1979. Napoleon and his Parliaments.

London: Edward Arnold.

David, Jacques-Louis(1748–1825)

U nder the Revolution and the em-pire David came to embody the

artist as a public figure and made a great

David, Jacques-Louis 75

contribution to the glorification of Napo-leon through portraits of the emperor andmonumental paintings glamorizing hisachievements and the imperial figure.

As a young artist David won the presti-gious Prix de Rome in 1775 and studied inthe papal capital for six years, adopting thestyle of neoclassicism. His Oath of the Ho-

76 David, Jacques-Louis

Napoleon Crossing the Great St. Bernard (1801–1802) by Jacques-Louis David. David abandons theaustere classicism of his Revolutionary paintings for a romantic fantasy of Napoleon on a rearing white chargerpointing the way to conquest and glory in Italy. In reality Napoleon, who was an indifferent horseman, crossedthe Alps on a mule. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

ratii, painted in 1784, came to embody thestoic virtues and classical values adopted bythe revolutionaries, and David followed itwith other paintings in the same simple, se-vere, and uncompromising style. Under theRevolution David became a fervent Ja-cobin and a deputy to the National Assem-bly, where he voted for the death of LouisXVI. He became for a while the virtual“dictator of the arts” for the Jacobinregime, organizing festivities such as the“Feast of Reason,” and helping to found anew Institute to replace the old RoyalAcademy of the Arts. David also paintedmemorials to the fallen heroes of the Rev-olution, most famously the celebratedDeath of Marat, which has remained one ofhis most renowned works and which stillretained the neoclassical style. He was im-prisoned after the fall of Robespierre, butreleased through the efforts of his wife andpupils; in 1798 he met Napoleon and im-mediately became a devout Bonapartist,dedicated henceforth to the cult of theconsul and emperor.

Napoleon realized the value of David asa painter of propaganda pictures and gavehim the title of “first painter of the empire”and the most important official commis-sions. He produced Napoleon Crossing theAlps in 1801, using the new Romanticidiom, and worked for over two years onthe massive Coronation of the Emperor Napo-leon, which included over a hundred por-traits and showed Napoleon (unhistorically)placing the crown on his own head. Thiswas followed in 1810 by The Emperor Dis-tributing Eagles, which consolidated the dualimage of Napoleon as emperor and soldier.

After Napoleon’s defeat David rejectedany compromise with the restored Bour-bons and fled into exile, first to Switzer-land and then to Brussels, where he died.He continued painting up to the end, butwith a notable falling off of the powers thathad been best shown in exalting the valuesof the Revolution and in helping to createthe immortal image of Napoleon as glori-

ous soldier and hardworking emperor.David declared of Napoleon, “there is aman to whom altars would have beenraised in ancient times” (Lyons 1994, p.191), and his paintings can be seen as cele-brating a quasi-religious cult around theemperor. He also painted many portraits,including a refined classical Mme. Ré-camier and an acute portrayal of Pius VII,which deserves to be ranked among themasterpieces of portraiture.

Related entries: Empire Style; Propaganda

Suggestions for further reading:Brookner,Anita. 1980. Jacques-Louis David.

London: Chatto and Windus.Friedlaender,Walter. 1952. David to Delacroix.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Lyons, Martyn. 1994. Napoleon Bonaparte and the

Legacy of the French Revolution. London:Macmillan.

Nanteuil, Luc de. 1990. Jacques-Louis David.London:Thames and Hudson.

Roberts,Warren. 1989. Jacques-Louis David:Revolutionary Artist. Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press.

Davout, Louis Nicolas(1770–1823)

D avout, who eventually became dukeof Auerstädt, prince of Eckmühl, and

marshal of the empire, was born in Annoux,Burgundy, of an old noble family. He was ed-ucated at the military school of Auxerre andthe École Militaire, Paris, commissioned intothe Royal Champagne Cavalry in 1788, andserved in the royal army until 1791, when hewas dismissed for revolutionary activities.Vol-unteering for the revolutionary army, hereached the rank of brigadier general, servingin the armies of northern France and theRhine until 1797. He met General Bona-parte in 1798, served with distinction in theEgyptian campaign, and was promoted togeneral of division in 1800. Davout’s nomi-nation among the first marshals of the empire

Davout, Louis Nicolas 77

in 1804 caused surprise and some criticism,but as commander of the Third Corps of theGrande Armée he contributed to the victoryof Austerlitz in 1805 and in 1806 won a bril-liant victory over the Prussians at Auerstädt,in recognition of which he was created dukeof Auerstädt in 1808.

Davout commanded the Third Corpsand was wounded at Eylau in 1807, and inthe same year he was appointed governorgeneral of the Duchy of Warsaw; then in1809 he led the same corps at Eckmühl andWagram and was created prince of Eck-mühl. He commanded the First Corps dur-ing the invasion of Russia in 1812, was seri-ously wounded at the battle of Borodino,and commanded the rear guard during theretreat from Moscow. In 1813 he heldDresden and the lower Elbe, but after thedefeat of Leipzig he was given command ofthe Hamburg region, where he was be-sieged for seven months. Following Napo-leon’s first abdication, Davout evacuatedHamburg in May 1814 on the orders ofLouis XVIII and was exiled by the restoredBourbon to his estate at Savigny-sur-Orge.

Following Napoleon’s return during theHundred Days, the emperor appointedDavout minister of war on 20 March 1815,a post he held until 8 July. But as militarygovernor of Paris he remained in the capitalduring the Waterloo campaign beforebriefly assuming command of the Army ofthe Loire as the allies entered Paris. He re-submitted to Louis XVIII on 14 July andwas exiled once more to his estates. Davout’sstand in defense of Marshal Michel Neykept him out of favor at the court until1817, when he was restored to the dignityof marshal before being readmitted to thepeerage in 1819. He subsequently spentmost of his time at Savigny-sur-Orge anddied of consumption in Paris in 1823.

Widely regarded as one of Napoleon’smost effective commanders, Davout wasknown as the “iron marshal.” Severe, ambi-tious, and a strict disciplinarian, Davout wasalso incorruptible and universally respected

even when not liked. Unlike most of theother marshals, he made no personal profitsfrom plundering occupied territories andrestrained the predatory instincts of histroops. His relations with other marshals,especially Joachim Murat and Jean-BaptisteBernadotte, were frequently hostile, leadingon occasions to violent arguments. Butnone of the other marshals showed his con-cern for the well-being of the rank-and-filetroops, making him a popular commanderdespite his strict disciplinary code. Napo-leon in exile on Saint Helena describedDavout as “one of the purest glories ofFrance” (Chandler 1987, p. 110).

Related entries: Austerlitz, Battle of; Borodino,Battle of; Eckmühl, Battle of; Eylau, Battle of;Hundred Days; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of;Wagram, Battle of;Warsaw, Duchy of

Suggestions for further reading:Chandler, David G. 1987.“Davout,” in David G.


Gallagher, John G. 1976. The Iron Marshal:ABiography of Louis N. Davout. Carbondale:Southern Illinois University Press.

Decrès, Denis (1761–1820)

A s Napoleon’s minister of the navybetween 1801 and 1814, Decrès

made strenuous efforts to improve theFrench navy, but was hindered by lack ofmoney, the inferior design of French ships,and the lack of an experienced officercorps. Decrès had a distinguished record innaval warfare, from the American Revolu-tion to Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign, andas a minister drove himself and his subordi-nates hard, showing himself to be a compe-tent but unpopular administrator. He man-aged to accomplish Napoleon’s strategy ofrebuilding the fleet after the defeat ofTrafalgar in 1805, but his efforts came toolate. After serving in his old post brieflyduring the Hundred Days, Decrès retiredfrom public life after 1815.

78 Decrès, Denis

Related entries: Navy, French

Suggestions for further reading:Glover, Richard. 1967.“The French Fleet,

1807–1814: Britain’s Problem and Madison’sOpportunity,” Journal of Modern History 39,pp. 233–252.

Denmark

The Kingdom of Denmark, under theregency of Frederick VI, joined the

League of Armed Neutrality in 1800, as aresult of which the Danish fleet was de-stroyed by the British at the battle ofCopenhagen. After the assassination of TsarPaul I in 1801 put an end to the League ofArmed Neutrality, Frederick allied himselfbriefly with Britain.With the proclamationof Napoleon’s Continental System in 1807,however, the British feared that Denmarkwould close the Baltic and again bom-barded Copenhagen. In reaction Fredericksigned an alliance with Napoleon in Octo-ber 1807, but proved himself a largely inac-tive ally, useful mainly in not opposing theemperor. Despite his virtual neutrality, afterNapoleon’s defeat in 1814 Frederick wasforced to cede Norway to Sweden.

Related entries: Armed Neutrality;Copenhagen, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Oakey, Stewart P. 1972. A Short History of

Denmark. New York: Praeger.Ruppenthal, Roland. 1943.“Denmark and the

Continental System,” Journal of Modern History15, pp. 7–23.

Denon, Dominique Vivant(1747–1825)

N apoleon’s director-general of muse-ums between 1802 and 1815,

Denon has been described as the most

powerful museum curator there has everbeen. He already had a long career as diplo-mat, artist, and traveler behind him when, atthe age of fifty-one, he joined Napoleon’sEgyptian campaign, during which, even inthe midst of battle, he surveyed and madedrawings of the pyramids and other Egypt-ian monuments. The results of his laborsnot only laid the basis for the science ofEgyptology but also served to popularizethe Egyptian style in France.

Art treasures looted from conqueredlands were stored in the Louvre in Paris,and Denon suggested that the new artgallery be called the Musée Napoléon. Hewas named as director-general of museumsin November 1802, charged with oversee-ing the Louvre, minting medals, hiringpainters, erecting monuments, and admin-istering ceramic and tapestry works. Thus,though no great artist himself, Denoncould be said to be one of the main cre-ators of the Empire style. He personally su-pervised the looting of artworks, followingthe victorious French armies to Italy, Ger-many, and Austria. His final and most suc-cessful mission, however, in Italy in1811–1812, was undertaken in a time ofpeace, when Denon used his diplomaticskills to acquire an array of Renaissancemasterpieces, which went on display in theLouvre in July 1814. Denon’s collectionwas admired even by visiting British artistsand connoisseurs, but he could not preventits dismantling in 1815, when the victori-ous allies demanded the restitution of theirproperty. Having presided with dignityover the ending of his work for Napoleon,Denon spent his last decade in retirement,arranging his private collection and prepar-ing publications.

Related entries: Description de l’Égypte; EmpireStyle; Musée Napoléon

Suggestions for further reading:Gould, Cecil H. M. 1965. Trophy of Conquest:The

Musée Napoléon and the Creation of the Louvre.London: Faber & Faber.

Denon, Dominique Vivant 79

Description de l’Égypte

A fter capturing Cairo in July 1798during his Egyptian campaign, Na-

poleon set his scientists to work in the In-stitute of Egypt, modeled on the InstitutNational. Field teams were assigned to sur-veying the Isthmus of Suez, compiling de-tailed maps of Egypt, and exploring itsruins and antiquities. The monumentalcompilation of their findings, the Descriptionde l’Égypte, was published in ten volumes oftext and fourteen sumptuous volumes ofplates between 1809 and 1828.The unreli-able accounts of previous travelers were re-placed by detailed archaeological descrip-tions, and Napoleon’s imperialist venturehad provided the impetus for the creationof the new science of Egyptology.

Related entries: Denon, Dominique Vivant;Egyptian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Herold, J. Christopher. 1962. Bonaparte in Egypt.

New York: Harper and Row.

Diplomatic Service

N apoleon never underestimated theimportance of the diplomatic ser-

vice in the conduct of international rela-tions, maintaining an average of 130 diplo-mats in the field, with a further 250 in theconsular service, not only in Europe, but inthe Levant, the United States, and fartherafield. Representation fluctuated accordingto the state of peace and the extension ofthe empire, but the traditional pattern wasmaintained. For example, ten embassieswere preserved in Germany and a furthereleven accredited to the Confederation ofthe Rhine.

Appointments were strongly influencedby family patronage and recommendation.There was no bureaucratic development ofprofessionalism: Napoleon preferred to rely

on experience and local knowledge. But hischoices were not always suitable, as thenomination of François René deChateaubriand to be secretary of the lega-tion at Rome showed. He often chose menwithout any previous diplomatic experi-ence, especially in his early years in power,when his preference went to the military.During the brief spell of peace in1801–1802 almost all the ambassadors andplenipotentiaries were generals. Militarydiplomats were used to impress the courtsto which they were sent, and although theywere well qualified to report on potentialenemy forces, were mostly unsuitable inother respects. With the return of émigréfamilies, especially after 1810, aristocrats re-sumed their traditional role in diplomacy.By 1812–1813, 60 percent of heads of mis-sions were nobles.

Diplomatic reports were Napoleon’smain and most regular source of informa-tion about foreign countries. The highestpriority was given to military information,but representatives were told that theyshould “neglect no detail, however small, ifit can shed light on the state of the country,the spirit of the court, the character and at-titudes of influential persons” (Woolf 1991,p. 67).They were also to act as instrumentsof propaganda, receiving regular circularsstressing military victories, the solidity ofthe regime, Napoleon’s personal popularity,and the “lies” of Allied propaganda. In Alliedand satellite states they played a leading rolein internal affairs, taking or sharing respon-sibility for the raising of troops, enforcementof the economic blockade, and the paymentof subsidies. Given Napoleon’s personal di-rection of foreign affairs, diplomats enjoyedvirtually no autonomy: they were pawns inthe game of war and peace and in the occu-pied territories above all tools of conquest.

Related entries: Nobility

Suggestions for further reading:Mowat, R. B. 1924. The Diplomacy of Napoleon.


80 Description de l’Égypte



Woolf, Stuart. 1991. Napoloeon’s Integration ofEurope. London and New York: Routledge.

Directory

The regime that ruled France between1795 and 1799 was systematically

denigrated by official propaganda underNapoleon, being presented as a weak gov-ernment, under which anarchy reigned andthe Republic yearned for a savior. Namedafter its five-man executive known as Direc-tors, it established a liberal economic policyand a theoretically liberal political system,but used illiberal measures to ensure majori-ties in elections and against coup attempts.But the Directory never succeeded in creat-ing a “center” party between the extremesof Jacobinism and royalism and by 1799 wasfacing mass political apathy.

However, the Directory’s fiscal and ad-ministrative reforms laid the basis for thework of the consulate. The tax system wassimplified, the financial chaos of the Jacobinera ended by a return to metallic currency,and the Counter-Revolution combated ef-fectively. But the Directors lost control overtheir generals: Napoleon in Italy ignoredorders from Paris and followed a personalpolicy.The regime’s popularity was at a lowebb in 1799, with rampant inflation causedby the abandonment of Jacobin controls, aswell as widespread apathy, and discontentcaused by the Directory’s scant respect forpolitical freedom. But Napoleon’s dictator-ship, established by the coup of 18 Bru-maire, was not the inevitable outcome: heneeded the support of disgruntled militarymen and constitutional revisionists to estab-lish the consulate.

Related entries: Barras, Paul François JeanNicolas,Vicomte de; Bonaparte, Lucien, Princeof Canino; Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII;

Egyptian Campaign; Italian Campaigns;Jacobinism; Propaganda; Revolutionary Wars;Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph;Talleyrand-Périgord,Charles-Maurice de

Suggestions for further reading:Church, Clive H. 1973.“In Search of the

Directory,” in J. F. Bosher, ed., FrenchGovernment and Society, 1500–1850: Essays inMemory of Alfred Cobban. London:AthlonePress.

Hunt, Lynn, et al. 1979.“The Failure of theLiberal Republic in France, 1795–1799:TheRoad to Brumaire,” Journal of Modern History51, pp. 734–759.




Woronoff, Denis. 1984. The Thermidorian Regimeand the Directory, 1794–1799. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Dresden

The capital of Saxony, situated strate-gically on the river Elbe, became in

1813 the site of Napoleon’s last victory ofany consequence. He had already stayedthere in 1807 after signing the Treaty ofTilsit and in May 1812 on the eve of theRussian campaign, when he had stagedspectacular ceremonies to impress the rulersof Austria, Prussia, and most other Germanstates. However, on 27 March 1813 theArmy of Silesia under Gebhard vonBlücher occupied Dresden. It was recov-ered by Napoleon after the battle of Lützen(2 May) and he made the city his advancedheadquarters, even if he was rarely therehimself. He did, however, receive Klemensvon Metternich for two important conver-sations on 26 June and 30 June.

When hostilities renewed on 17 August1813 Napoleon was absent from Dresden,and the Austro-Russian Army of Bohemia,commanded by Karl, Prince von Schwar-zenberg, advanced on the city.This broughtNapoleon hurrying back. On 26 August

Dresden 81

Tsar Alexander I, against Austrian advice,insisted that Schwarzenberg should make afrontal assault on Dresden, but Napoleoncounterattacked and recovered almost allthe lost ground. On the following morningNapoleon took the initiative, coordinatingattacks led by Joseph Mortier on the Alliedleft and Joachim Murat on their right.These attacks forced Schwarzenberg to re-tire hurriedly across the Austrian border towithin a few miles of the Austro-Russianheadquarters at Teplitz. Marshal LaurentGouvion Saint-Cyr was left in command ofDresden while Napoleon rode to defeat atthe battle of Leipzig. Saint-Cyr held out forthree weeks against a Russian siege beforesurrendering on 31 October.

Related entries: Germany, Campaigns in;Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Laurent; Saxony




Ducos, Pierre Roger(1747–1816)

Though generally considered a sec-ond-rank politician, always trailing

in the wake of stronger-minded personali-ties, Ducos did play an important role inbringing Napoleon to power in 1799. Alawyer before the Revolution, Ducos repre-sented his native department of the Landesin the Convention, where he voted for thedeath of Louis XVI. He gained a reputationas a staunch antiroyalist under the Direc-tory, and joined his friend Paul Barras as aDirector in June 1799. Switching his sup-port to Emmanuel Sieyès, Ducos joined inthe conspiracy to overthrow the Directoryin the coup of 18 Brumaire and helpedSieyès draw up the plans for the consulate.

He was named third consul, but quickly re-alized that Napoleon was now the real mas-ter and only remained in office for amonth. Ducos later served discreetly asvice-president of the Senate and was re-warded for his past services with the title ofcount of the empire and the Legion of Ho-nour. At the Restoration he was first madea peer of France, until it was rememberedthat he was a regicide and he was expelledfrom the country. Ducos was killed in a car-riage accident near Ulm in March 1816.

Related entries: Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII;Consulate; Directory

Suggestions for further reading:Morton, John B. 1948. Brumaire:The Rise of

Bonaparte. London:T.Werner Levine.

Duroc, Géraud ChristopheMichel (1772–1813)

N apoleon’s grand marshal of thepalace was one of his most loyal ser-

vants and could even be described as a closefriend. Born into a poor aristocratic familyin Lorraine, Duroc joined the army of theRevolution in 1792. As an artillery lieu-tenant he served at the siege of Toulon in1793, where he first met Napoleon. Thenewly famous General Bonaparte appointedDuroc one of his aides-de-camp in the Ital-ian and Egyptian campaigns, after whichDuroc returned to Paris with Napoleon andtook part in the coup of 18 Brumaire. Hewas promoted to general of brigade in 1800and general of division in 1803.

Appointed grand marshal of the palacein 1804, Duroc carried out his functions ef-ficiently and economically and was in dailycontact with Napoleon. He also acted asthe emperor’s personal envoy on diplomaticmissions to Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg,and Copenhagen. Marriage to the daughterof a Spanish banker allowed him to amass a

82 Ducos, Pierre Roger

considerable personal fortune. His diplo-matic finesse was often valuable in offset-ting Napoleon’s fits of temper, and inrecognition of his tactful handling ofCharles IV of Spain in 1808 he was createdDuke of Frioul. Duroc was present at mostof Napoleon’s battles, and, although likemost of the emperor’s advisers he warnedagainst the invasion of Russia in 1812, healways obeyed loyally. He was woundedwhile escorting Napoleon on the day afterthe battle of Bautzen, 22 May 1813, and

died the next morning. Napoleon was foronce genuinely moved by the death of oneof his most valued confidants and friends.

Related entries: Bautzen, Battle of; EgyptianCampaign; Generals; Grand Dignitaries of theEmpire; Italian Campaigns;Toulon, Siege of

Suggestions for further reading:Mansel, Philip. 1987. The Eagle in Splendour:

Napoleon I and His Court. London: GeorgePhilip.


Duroc, Géraud Christophe Michel 83

EEblé, Jean-Baptiste

(1758–1812)

The hero of Napoleon’s crossing ofthe Berezina River during the re-

treat from Moscow in November 1812,Eblé was the son of an artillery sergeant andhad risen to the rank of major general inthe armies of the Revolution. He came toNapoleon’s notice as artillery commanderof the First Corps of the Grande Armée dur-ing the Austerlitz campaign, and between1808 and 1811 served as minister of war inJérôme Bonaparte’s kingdom of Westphalia.He also served with distinction in thePeninsular War in 1811–1812. Eblé’s engi-neers in the Grande Armée during the Rus-sian campaign allowed Napoleon to ad-vance swiftly across the rivers Niemen andDnieper, and his bridging of the Berezinaon 24–25 November 1812 facilitated thesurvival and escape of most of the remnantsof the invading forces. Eblé collapsed anddied in Königsberg as a result of debilitationfrom cold and exposure on New Year’s Eve.

Related entries: Russian Campaign;Westphalia,Kingdom of

Suggestions for further reading:Chandler, David G. 1994.“Retreat from

Moscow,” in his On the Napoleonic Wars:Collected Essays. London: Greenhill.

Eckmühl, Battle of (22 April 1809)

O ne of a series of victories over theAustrians during the early days of

the Wagram campaign, Eckmühl inflicted aheavy though far from mortal blow on thearmy of the Archduke Charles. An Aus-trian attack on the French Third Corpsunder Louis Davout at the village of Eck-mühl, some eleven miles south of Regens-berg, was countered by an envelopingmovement by Napoleon, employingBavarian and Würtemberger troops com-manded by Dominique Vandamme.Charles lost about a third of his men,killed, wounded, or captured, and wasforced to abandon the town of Regens-berg itself. But the bulk of Napoleon’sforces was too tired by six days of fightingand marching to pursue the Austrianforces farther.

Related entries: Charles,Archduke of Austria;Danube Campaigns; Davout, Louis Nicolas



Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1982. Napoleon’s GreatAdversaries:The Archduke Charles and theAustrian Army, 1792–1814. London:Batsford.

Eckmühl, Battle of 85

E

École Militaire

N apoleon graduated from the centralmilitary school of the ancien

régime in 1785 at the age of sixteen. It hadbeen founded in 1751 in Paris, where itsbuildings may still be seen on the Left Bankof the Seine. It was replaced by Napoleon’snew military school at St. Cyr in 1802.

Suggestions for further reading:Ratcliffe, Bertram. 1981. Prelude to Fame:An


École Normale

N apoleon’s law of 17 May 1808 cre-ating regional normal schools (écoles

normales), attached to lycées, for the trainingof teachers was never implemented, and the whole subject was curiously neglected.The first French normal school, based onthe German model, was established inStrasbourg in 1810 on local initiative, butits success did not spread the idea elsewherein France. Most educators, including theChristian brothers, who returned to Franceunder Napoleon, preferred training throughapprenticeship. However, Napoleon’s foun-dation of the École Normale Supérieure inParis in 1810 had momentous conse-quences, as it has gone on to produce manymembers of the French political and intel-lectual elite up to the present day.

Related entries: Education; Lycées



École Polytechnique

The central institution in the newsystem of French higher education

was founded in 1794 under the leadershipof Lazare Carnot and Gaspard Monge; Na-poleon changed it from a scientific estab-lishment into a military school. Originallythe “Central School of Public Works,” in1802 it absorbed the state artillery school,and in 1811 it was decided that its best stu-dents should henceforth become militaryengineers. Between 1811 and 1813 over200 Polytechnique graduates were channeledinto the artillery.

Related entries: Artillery; Education; Monge,Gaspard

Suggestions for further reading:Williams, L. Pearce. 1956.“Science, Education

and Napoleon I,” Isis 47, pp. 369–382.

Écoles Centrales

C reated in 1795 as supersecondaryschools, one for every 300,000 in-

habitants, between ninety and one hundredécoles centrales were founded in succeedingyears. However, they did not suit Napo-leon’s educational plans, as courses lackedthe kind of national uniformity he wantedto impose. Students effectively chose theirown courses, too many of which were onlyvaguely defined. Napoleon abolished theécoles centrales in 1802, replacing them withlycées and the less elitist écoles secondaires.




Economy

The development of the French econ-omy under Napoleon was domi-

nated by the almost continuous militaryand economic warfare. The Commercial

86 École Militaire

Code helped to create modern forms ofbusiness organization, while the École Poly-technique and other technical schools helpedprepare the way for French predominancein engineering. But this was for the future.Under Napoleonic rule the economic warwith Britain and an exaggerated protec-tionism inflicted great damage on somesectors of the economy, while limitingprogress in others.

A lack of radical innovation dominatesthe economic history of the period. Thesystem of landholding had been pro-foundly changed by the Revolution, butagrarian France was still not on the movein any noticeable fashion. And the eco-nomic war exacerbated the effects of badharvests and subsistence crises between1798 and 1801 and again in 1803, 1805–1807, and 1811–1812. The imperial econ-omy never recovered from the combinedindustrial and agricultural crises of1810–1812. Equally seriously, the loss ofoverseas territories, the British blockade,and the Continental System ruined thehitherto flourishing commerce of the portsof France’s Atlantic coast, most notablyBordeaux and Nantes. This loss was onlypartly offset by the opening up of vast con-tinental markets to French goods, since theFrench market was itself open to goodsfrom the economically advanced areas ofBelgium and the Rhineland.

A shift in the economic geography isdiscernible under Napoleon, with easternregions such as Alsace and Marseille on theMediterranean coast as the principal bene-ficiaries. Progress in the cotton industry wasalso localized, but it did provide domesticpiecework for peasants in Alsace, Picardy,Flanders, Normandy, and the Paris region,where agriculture did not guarantee ade-quate work or income. Overall, however,while French industrial output grew mod-erately, Britain widened its lead over thecontinent in both quantitative and qualita-tive terms.A certain optimism and belief ineconomic progress may be seen in France

in 1815, and the path to the future lay inindustrial revolution. But France under Na-poleon had done little to gain back the leadestablished by the British in most areas ofthe economy.

Related entries: Bank of France; BerlinDecrees; Biens Nationaux; Chaptal, Jean Antoine;Commercial Code; Continental System; Finance;Industry; Milan Decrees; Ouvrard, Gabriel Julien;Peasants; Population; Rural Code; Statistics;Taxation


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Forrest,Alan, and Peter Jones, eds. 1991.

Reshaping France:Town, Country and Regionduring the French Revolution. Manchester:Manchester University Press.


Education

N apoleon gave a considerable amountof personal attention to educational

matters, and his reforms were to have last-ing and profound effects in France. His pur-pose, however, was to create future leadersand administrators, and his approach waseminently political. “There will be no set-tled political state,” he declared in 1805,“solong as there is not a teaching body withsettled principles. So long as one does notlearn from childhood whether to be repub-lican or monarchist, Catholic or non-reli-gious, etc., the State will not form a nation”(Bergeron 1981, pp. 32–33). The Napo-leonic system, centralized through the Im-perial University, was to teach pupils whatto think more than how to think, but prac-tice was not as simple or efficient as theory.

The creation of lycées was to be of lastingsignificance, but primary education was cu-riously neglected, and Napoleon’s conser-vative view of the position of womenmeant that any progress in female educa-

Education 87

tion had to happen despite him, not be-cause of him. In the memorandum he pre-pared for the model girls’ school at Ecouenhe opined that “the best education is thatwhich a mother can give her daughters.”Although he wished to see girls educated inregular establishments, the stress would beon religion and the practical activities of adutiful wife. Primary education was the re-sponsibility of the communes. Napoleon’sreconciliation with the Catholic Church al-lowed church schools to be reestablished,and the communes were forced to relyheavily on the Brethren of the ChristianSchools.Although Napoleon prevented theChurch from regaining its pre-Revolution-ary dominant position in French education,the rivalry between state and religiousschools was to create incessant and bitterconflicts during the nineteenth century.

Related entries: Centralization; École Normale;École Polytechnique; Écoles Centrales; ImperialUniversity; Local Government; Lycées



Barnard, Howard C. 1969. Education and theFrench Revolution. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.



Palmer, R. R. 1985. The Improvement of Humanity:Education and the French Revolution. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Egyptian Campaign

The French expedition of conquest inEgypt and Syria between 1798 and

1801 was meant to challenge British navalsupremacy in the Mediterranean and to se-cure Egypt for further operations againstthe British in India.The British secretary ofstate for war, Henry Dundas, called the oc-cupation of Egypt “the master key to all the

commerce of the world” (Ehrman 1996, p.142), an unusually farsighted view withwhich Napoleon would have been one ofthe few to agree. His political masters in theDirectory were probably more interested inremoving the dangerous general far fromParis.

The expedition under Napoleon’s com-mand sailed from Toulon on 19 May 1798,carrying in all 35,000 officers and men and167 scholars. It captured Malta on 11–12June, intending to use it as a naval base inthe central Mediterranean, then sailed tothe east, arriving off Alexandria on 30 June.Having encountered little resistance in tak-ing the city, Napoleon moved south, de-feated the army of the Mameluke rulers ofEgypt in the battle of the Pyramids, and en-tered Cairo on 22 July. Napoleon was nowin control of the lower Nile, and a Frencharmy pursued the fleeing Mamelukes to thesouth. Although the whole of Egypt wasdeclared to be under French control, inUpper Egypt they only effectively con-trolled the major towns along the Nile.

Napoleon set about reordering the con-quered country. Taxes were levied to sup-port the new government, a mint was es-tablished to coin money, a postal servicewas created along with a health depart-ment, and the first printing presses in Egyptwere put into operation.The Egyptian In-stitute was set up to research the countryand introduce the ideas of the Enlighten-ment. These were the first Europeans tostudy the wonders of ancient Egypt, layingthe foundations of modern Egyptology.Theresults were eventually published in themassive Description de l’Égypte.

The French position suffered a majorblow on 1–2 August when the Britishunder Horatio Nelson destroyed the entireFrench fleet in the battle of the Nile. Thisconfirmed British control of the Mediter-ranean and made communication withFrance extremely difficult.Then the forma-tion of the Second Coalition brought Aus-tria and Russia back into the war on the

88 Egyptian Campaign

British side and persuaded the OttomanEmpire, nominal ruler of Egypt, to declarewar on France. On 10 February 1799, withaffairs in good order in Egypt, Napoleonmarched from Cairo with 10,000 men todefeat the Turkish army in Syria. After along march through the desert he reachedAcre on 20 March and laid siege to the city.However, despite Napoleon’s victory overthe Turks at Mount Tabor on 16 April,Acrewith British help held out for two months.Lack of siege equipment, illness in theFrench army, plague in Acre, and news ofallied victories in Europe, all decided Na-poleon to return to Egypt. Almost half themen who took part in the Syrian expedi-tion did not return.

On his return to Cairo, Napoleonlearned that a Turkish army of some 15,000men had landed at Aboukir.With a force of10,000, he rushed to the coast and defeatedthe Turks, thereby securing the French mil-itary position for the moment. On 23 Au-gust Napoleon turned over command inEgypt to General Jean-Baptiste Kléber andreturned to France. Kléber immediatelyopened negotiations with the Turks andBritish to secure a French evacuation ofEgypt, which he had long favored. Agree-ment was reached in January 1800, butKléber was assassinated on 14 June beforethe terms of the evacuation could be car-ried out, and command of the Frenchforces passed to Jean-François Menou. 1801saw the end of the Egyptian expedition, asBritish and Turkish armies landed and be-sieged Cairo and Alexandria. Menou heldout in Alexandria until September, whenthe final French troops were evacuatedhome aboard British ships.

Related entries: Coalitions; Description del’Égypte; Directory; Kléber, Jean-Baptiste; Malta;Nelson, Horatio, Lord; Nile, Battle of the;Ottoman Empire; Pyramids, Battle of the

Suggestions for further reading:Barthorp, Michael. 1978. Napoleon’s Egyptian

Campaigns, 1798–1801. London: Osprey.


Charles-Roux, François. 1937. Bonaparte:Governor of Egypt. London: Methuen.

Ehrman, John. 1996. The Younger Pitt:TheConsuming Struggle. London: Constable.

Herold, J. Christopher. 1962. Bonaparte in Egypt.New York: Harper and Row.

Elba

N apoleon’s first place of exile in1814–1815 is a Mediterranean is-

land situated between the west coast ofItaly and Corsica, approximately 86 squaremiles in area and in 1814 with a popula-tion of about 12,000. It had been annexedto France in 1802 and in 1814 made aprincipality with the exiled Napoleon asits sovereign.

The emperor set about governing histiny domain with enthusiasm. Mule trackswere turned into a road system, wells anddrains dug, and Napoleon encouraged thegrowing of vegetables and planted vines,chestnut and olive trees from Corsica, andmulberry trees from Tuscany. Money waspoured into improving mining and fishing.As a result, the initially hostile populationwas won over, comforted by the new pros-perity and the spending of curious foreignvisitors.

Napoleon chose the Villa dei Mulini ashis palace, and the Villa San Martino assummer residence, with a court, an army of1,600, and a navy of five small ships. His sis-ter Pauline acted as hostess on formal occa-sions, but the Allies prevented the EmpressMarie-Louise and his son from joininghim. His anger and frustration were in-creased when the two million francs peryear supposed to be sent him by LouisXVIII refused to materialize, forcing him towater down some of his schemes.This, plusthe news of Louis’s unpopularity in France,decided Napoleon to plot his escape. On 25February 1815, while his English watch-

Elba 89

dog, Sir Neil Campbell, was away in Flo-rence, Pauline announced that she wasplanning a grand ball, and the next day Na-poleon, along with 500 men, secretly fledthe island on board the brig Inconstant, dis-guised as a British warship. The famous“flight of the eagle” on 1 March led to theHundred Days and the Waterloo campaign.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Pauline, Duchess ofGuastalla; Hundred Days

Suggestions for further reading:Hamilton-Williams, David. 1994. The Fall of

Napoleon:The Final Betrayal. London: JohnWiley.


Elections

U niversal male suffrage existed theo-retically in Napoleonic France, but

was never practiced in any form recogniza-ble to modern democracy.When Napoleonwished to lay claim to a popular mandate hedid it by plebiscite. Under the Constitutionof the Year VIII, citizens elected communalnotables, who in turn chose departmentalnotables, who in turn chose national nota-bles.The Senate then chose the members ofthe Legislative Body and Tribunate from thenational lists. This cumbersome system wasreplaced in the Constitution of the Year X(1802) by electoral colleges in each districtand department, elected by universal man-hood suffrage from among the richest citi-zens, which nominated two persons for eachopening in the Legislature or Tribunate.Electoral colleges were formed for life andreceived no new members until a third ofthe places were vacant. There was in factonly one renewal. The membership of thedepartmental colleges, chosen from amongthe 600 largest taxpayers in the Department,made up the notables who Napoleon saw as“the true people of France.”

90 Elections

A stirring engraving by Gaitte depicts Napoleon returning from his exile in Elba to be enthusiastically greeted bythe men who will soon die for him in the Hundred Days War. (Mary Evans Picture Library)

Related entries: Constitutions; Consulate;Legislative Body; Local Government; Notables;Plebiscites; Senate;Tribunate


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Collins, Irene. 1979. Napoleon and his Parliaments.


Émigrés

The precise number of people whoemigrated from France to flee the

Revolution is impossible to calculate, butwas probably around 100,000, of whom aquarter were clergy and about 17 percentnobles. The various Revolutionary regimeshad passed harsh laws against émigrés, al-though some had returned under the Direc-tory after being struck from the notoriouslyinaccurate official lists. Napoleon as firstconsul declared that he wished to “reconcileall the French,” but the Constitution of theYear VIII maintained the exclusion of allémigrés not included on a list of exceptions.

Napoleon clearly wanted émigrés to re-turn, and decrees of 2 March 1800 and 26April 1802 turned the policy around, de-claring an amnesty for all those not on aproscribed list. Those still banned includedchiefly those who had commanded armiesagainst the Republic or held commissionsin enemy armies and archbishops and bish-ops who refused to accept the Concordatof 1801 with the pope. The new policyprovoked a rush to return. Between 40,000and 50,000 émigrés returned in all, many tolive quietly on what remained of their es-tates, but others to serve the new regime asdiplomats or in the Senate, Council ofState, or at court.A small number of the re-turnees left France again, but the remainingémigrés were mostly those excluded fromthe amnesty, joined by a small band of dissi-dents such as Mme. de Staël. The truly ir-reconcilable among the old émigrés re-

mained in British service and returned withWellington’s army in 1814.

Related entries: Catholic Church; Counter-Revolution; Nobility; Royalists


of Napoleonic France:A Supplement. Lanham,MD: University Press of America, pp. 34–41,48–51.

Godechot, Jacques. 1981. The Counter-Revolution:Doctrine and Action, 1789–1804. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Greer, Donald M. 1951. The Incidence ofEmigration during the French Revolution.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weiner, Margery. 1960. The French Exiles,1789–1815. London: John Murray.

Empire

The senatus consultum of 18 May 1804that created the empire decreed that

“the government of the Republic be en-trusted to an Emperor,” that NapoleonBonaparte was henceforth “Emperor of theFrench,” and that the imperial dignity wasto be hereditary. Napoleon was declaredemperor “by the grace of God and the con-stitution of the Republic.” His coronationon 2 December 1804 consecrated the newregime on classical and Carolingian prece-dents, implying sovereignty over landsgreater in extent than the traditionalboundaries of the kingdom of France.

At its height in 1812 the Empire of theFrench comprised 130 departments as op-posed to the 83 originally created in 1789.It included Belgian, Swiss, German, Pied-montese, and Italian departments annexedin 1809 or before, as well as the Hanseaticcities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeckand the territories of the Kingdom of Hol-land, all annexed in 1810.The provinces ofIllyria, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the GrandDuchies of Berg, Frankfurt, and Tuscany, al-though technically part of France, wereruled separately.

Empire 91

Related entries: Belgium; Berg, Grand Duchyof; Coronation; Frankfurt, Grand Duchy of;Grand Dignitaries of the Empire; Holland,Kingdom of; Illyria; Netherlands; Poland;Switzerland;Tuscany, Grand Duchy of;Warsaw,Duchy of




Empire Style

D espite the often ostentatious vulgar-ity of Napoleonic ceremonial and

the throne rooms and royal suites designedfor it, the prevailing style in art, architec-ture, decoration, and costume under Napo-leon was a monumental neoclassicismmeant to express the grandeur of the em-pire. Only the restless stirrings of Romanti-cism, through which artists could portraythe heroic actions of the young Bonaparte,saved it from mere authoritarian sterility.The war between reason and passion pro-duced the best art of the period, as exem-plified in the work of Jacques-Louis Davidand his pupils, including the “romantic clas-sicist” Antoine Jean Gros.The other partialcounterweight to strict classicism was pro-vided by the increase in knowledge ofEgyptian art brought back from Napoleon’sEgyptian campaign. A cult of Egyptomaniawas grafted onto classical models.

Napoleon as the central figure in theculture of the period believed that “what isbig is always beautiful” (Tulard 1985, p.224). The pure Empire style as an expres-sion of power is therefore best seen in ar-chitecture, where Napoleon’s activity wasconcentrated almost entirely in Paris. Hewanted to make the French capital “notonly the most beautiful city that has everexisted, but the most beautiful city imagi-nable” (Connelly 1985, p. 19). Paris would

express Napoleon’s revival of the RomanEmpire and the ideals of antiquity. It wouldbe studded with such monuments “as thereused to be in Athens.” The results are stillthere for all to see: the Arc de Triomphe, theRue de Rivoli, the Vendôme column, theBourse, the Madeleine (originally built asthe Temple de la Gloire), the Arc du Car-rousel, and various public buildings andfountains.

The Empire style is shown in moremodest mode in sculpture and the decora-tive arts. Napoleon’s favorite sculptor,Anto-nio Canova, gained Europe-wide famewith his busts and statues of the Bonapartefamily. Probably his best known work, hissemi-nude portrayal of Pauline Bonaparteas Venus, completed in 1808, exemplifiesCanova’s brand of sensuous classicism.Neoclassical sculpture in general seems tosymbolize Napoleonic taste, despite Napo-leon’s personal aversion for public sculp-tures of himself. The same classical linesmay be seen in Empire furniture, albeitpartly hidden by carvings of imperial motifsand ornate drapery, in silverware, and evenin carpets.

Although male fashion followed Britishmodels, settling into an ensemble style thatwould become the modern suit, the Empirestyle for women followed discreet classicallines. Female fashion under the Directoryand Consulate, although supposedly in-spired by antiquity, had reached semicladextremes out of keeping with Napoleon’spuritanical sobriety in such matters. Underthe Empire waistlines were high and dressesand tunics straight: the female form wasoutlined but not emphasized. Sleeves wereshort and puffed. Mme. Récamier, thereigning beauty of the early empire, madewhite the fashionable color in the highestcircles. Hair, cut short in “antique” style,was adorned with jewels and ribbons, andhairstyles became more complicated in thelater days of the regime. Turbans, anotherEgyptian inspiration, were also in vogue.The Empire style of fashion, confined to a

92 Empire Style

small group of style-setting women, includ-ing Mme. Récamier and Pauline Bona-parte, complemented the pseudo-antiquegrandeur of its surroundings and of thegrandiose public world Napoleon was try-ing to create. “The style empire,” writes thehistorian Timothy Wilson-Smith, “was notinvented by Napoleon . . . but it looked asif it had been invented for Napoleon”(Wilson-Smith 1996, p. xxix).

Related entries: David, Jacques-Louis; Denon,Dominique Vivant; Gros,Antoine Jean;

Récamier, Jeanne Françoise Julie Adélaïde;Romanticism;Vernet, Émile Jean Horace

Suggestions for further reading:Boime,Albert. 1990. Art in an Age of Bonapartism,

1800–15. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress.


Gonzalez-Palacios,Alvar. 1970. The French EmpireStyle. London: Hamlyn.

Honour, Hugh. 1968. Neo-Classicism.Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.


Empire Style 93

François Gérard’s portrait Joséphine (1801) is more direct and intimate than later official portraits. She isshown relaxing at Malmaison, dressed in what became the Empire style. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

Wilson-Smith,Timothy. 1996. Napoleon and HisArtists. London: Constable.

Enghien, Louis Antoine Henri de Condé,

Duc d’ (1772–1804)

The kidnapping and execution,amounting to judicial murder, of the

duke of Enghien, last of the Condé Princesof the Blood, in 1804 put an end to royalistconspiracies against Napoleon at the cost ofenraging the crowned heads of Europe.Theseizure of Enghien, totally illegally, in neu-tral Baden, indicated Napoleon’s meddlingin the affairs of Germany and his desire tosend a warning to Louis XVIII and the émi-grés at his court.The duke was taken to Vin-cennes, tried for treason by a military court,and executed by firing squad on 20 March1804. He was to be remembered as youngand handsome and the last of a distin-guished military line stretching back manygenerations. Tsar Alexander I, who hadbeen deeply implicated in the murder of hisown father, was especially outraged, brokeoff diplomatic relations with France, andbegan to make overtures to London and Vi-enna for a new alliance. Joseph Fouché’scomment that the execution of Enghien“was worse than a crime, it was a mistake”has become proverbial.

Related entries: Royalism



Enlightenment

The question of Napoleon’s relation-ship to the eighteenth-century move-

ment of rational thought about society andpolitics permits of no easy answer. Thosewho see Napoleon as the heir to the Enlight-enment can point to his attempted rationali-zation of government and administration, thecodification of law, the preservation of civicequality and religious freedom. In this per-spective Napoleon has been described as thelast of the enlightened despots, the heir tosuch rulers as Frederick the Great of Prussiaor Catherine the Great of Russia. For others,however, Napoleon’s despotic government,with all power concentrated in the hands ofthe emperor, is a betrayal of both Enlightenedthought and the best ideals of the Revolu-tion. In the age of the American Revolutionand in light of British constitutionalism, Na-poleon’s authoritarianism seems little differ-ent from absolute monarchy.

If Napoleon was in any way a product ofthe Enlightenment, it was through his beliefin the triumph of merit, in careers open tothe talented, and in the superiority of thepresent over the monarchic past.The youngNapoleon was a great reader of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and later of Voltaire andMontesquieu. Their influence certainlyhelps to explain his early commitment toJacobinism. But once in power he distancedhimself from the boldest thought of theeighteenth century and his own youthfulidealism. Napoleon as emperor was aboveall a pragmatist, even in his preservation ofmany of the positive gains of the Revolu-tion. The only knowledge he valued waspractical knowledge. His attitude toward“nonuseful” knowledge is summed up inhis words to Alexander von Humboldt in1805: “You are interested in botany? So ismy wife.”

Related entries: Centralization; Education;Idéologues; Jacobinism; Law, Codification of

Suggestions for further reading:Cobban,Alfred. 1960. In Search of Humanity:The

Role of the Enlightenment in Modern History.New York: G. Braziller.

Hampson, Norman. 1968. The Enlightenment.Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.

94 Enghien, Louis Antoine Henri de Condé, Duc d’

Erfurt, Congress of (27 September–

14 October 1808)

The meeting between Napoleon andAlexander I at the small Thuringian

town of Erfurt, sixty-five miles southwestof Leipzig, was a spectacular if ultimatelyempty dramatization of Napoleon’s power.The congress was meant to strengthen theFranco-Russian alliance concluded by theTreaty of Tilsit in 1807, provide for cooper-ation against Austria, strengthen the Conti-nental System, and not least impress the tsarand the princes of Germany. Erfurt there-fore played host to two emperors and ahorde of kings, princes, and dukes repre-senting the whole of Germany exceptPrussia and Austria. The Comédie Françaisewith Joseph Talma in the lead performednine plays before a “pit full of kings,” whothen adjourned to a series of balls and ban-quets. But the diplomatic results were neg-ligible: the alliance between France andRussia was confirmed, but Alexanderavoided any further commitment againstAustria.The tsar was in a stronger positionthan a year earlier, and rifts between himand Napoleon would not be long delayed.

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Russia

Suggestions for further reading:Niven,Alexander C. 1978. Napoleon and

Alexander I. Washington: University Press ofAmerica.



Essling, Battle of (21–22 May 1809)

A lso known as the Battle of Aspern orAspern-Essling, this engagement on

the banks of the Danube was the only re-verse suffered by Napoleon during the Wa-gram campaign of 1809. Having capturedVienna, Napoleon needed a decisive vic-tory against the main Austrian army toforce the Austrian monarchy to the negoti-ating table. Having successfully bridged theDanube at Lobau Island Napoleon aimedto establish his troops on the north bank atthe villages of Aspern and Essling, but nowfaced a series of attacks by the ArchdukeCharles, the Austrian commander in chief.Although the villages were defensible, thedestruction of the Lobau pontoon bridgemeant that Napoleon could not bring upsufficient reinforcements to continue thefighting. Under continuous artillery barrageand infantry assaults the French fell back tothe bridgehead. Among the 20,000 to25,000 men killed or wounded on eachside was Marshal Jean Lannes.Although thebattle fizzled out and despite the fact thatthe French had been rebuffed rather thanrouted, the news of a defeat for Napoleonspread across Europe, giving his enemieshopes, which would, however, be shatteredby the battle of Wagram seven weeks later.

Related entries: Charles,Archduke of Austria;Danube Campaigns;Wagram, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Gates, David. 1997. The Napoleonic Wars,

1803–15. London: Edward Arnold.Horward, Donald D. 1987.“Lannes,” in David G.


Parker, Harold T. 1983. Three Napoleonic Battles.Durham, NC: Duke University Press.


Eylau, Battle of (7–8 February 1807)

This indecisive battle in Napoleon’sPolish campaign has been described

by the historian David Gates as “one of the

Eylau, Battle of 95

most gory and confused engagements inmilitary history” (Gates 1997, p. 71). Themain French army, under nagging attacksfrom Prince Bagration’s Russian rearguard,occupied the town of Preussisch-Eylau, justinside the East Prussian border, on 7 Febru-ary 1807, but the main Russian force underCount Levin Bennigsen was in position inthe plains to the north of Eylau.

On the morning of 8 February therolling terrain was buried under a meter ofsnow, and a raging blizzard obscured themovements of both armies. In the ensuingconfusion, the Russians laid an artillery bar-rage on Eylau, and Napoleon, who hadprobably not originally intended any majorinitiative, found his initial moves repulsed.The Russians penetrated Eylau and almostcaptured his headquarters. His position wassaved, however, by a remarkable chargeagainst the Russian batteries by the cavalry

of Joachim Murat and by the reinforcementof his center by the arrival of the corpscommanded by Michel Ney and LouisDavout. In the ensuing appalling hand-to-hand mêlée the Russians, despite the arrivalof Prussian reinforcements, were graduallydriven back. Bennigsen’s forces withdrewduring the night, having lost some 25,000casualties, with the exhausted French onlyable to mount a desultory pursuit.

French losses were on a similar horrificscale to those of the Allies, and Napoleon’scavalry, despite their outstanding braveryagainst the Russian guns, had been shat-tered. Napoleon had lost many experiencedtroops, and he immediately set about re-building the morale of his army. Ney, view-ing the carnage in the cold light of dawn,observed: “What a massacre! And with noresult!” Even Napoleon in the official bul-letin of the battle declared:“Such a sight as

96 Eylau, Battle of

Jean-Antoine Gros’s Napoleon at the Battle of Eylau (1808) is a subtle piece of propaganda showingNapoleon and his marshals surveying the horrors of the field of Eylau the day after battle. Grateful Poles andLithuanians kneel before their savior while a dying common soldier lifts his arms to salute the Christ-likeemperor. (Scala/Art Resource)

this should inspire rulers with love of peaceand hatred of war” (Gates 1997, pp. 73-75).The town of Eylau was renamed Bagra-tionovsk when the Red Army occupied theregion in 1945.

Related entries: Bagration, Pyotr Ivanovich,Prince; Murat, Joachim; Ney, Michel


1803–15. London: Edward Arnold.

Eylau, Battle of 97

FFederalism

The federalist revolt against the Ja-cobin government in 1793 engulfed

large areas of France and major cities in-cluding Lyon, Bordeaux, Marseille, andToulon.This major crisis of the Revolutiondid, however, provide opportunities for am-bitious soldiers. Napoleon first gained fameas artillery commander in the siege ofToulon against the federalists and theirBritish reinforcements between Septemberand December 1793.

Related entries: Toulon, Siege of

Suggestions for further reading:Sutherland, D. M. G. 1985. France, 1789–1815:

Revolution and Counter-Revolution. London:Fontana.

Sydenham, M. J. 1981.“The Republican Revoltof 1793,” French Historical Studies 12, pp.120–138.

Fédéré Movement

The latent support for Napoleon dur-ing the Hundred Days was shown in

the spontaneous formation in May 1815 ofunits of fédérés who sought to infiltrate theNational Guard and swore fidelity to theemperor and the empire. Dedicated to pre-venting a second Bourbon Restoration, thefédérés wanted Napoleon to become a revo-

lutionary emperor, fulfilling and consolidat-ing the work of the Revolution. In someparts of France the fédérés were predomi-nantly middle class, but the 14,000 fédéréstravailleurs of Paris were drawn from thepopular classes. Fearful of revolutionary vi-olence, Napoleon refused to arm theParisian fédérés, his most fervent supporters,or use them for a coup against the assem-blies, and abdicated instead. For all the em-peror’s distrust of them, the fédérés showedthe existence of a popular Bonapartism thatwas to persist throughout the nineteenthcentury.

Related entries: Bonapartism; Hundred Days



Ferdinand VII, King of Spain(1784–1833)

A s prince of Asturias and heir to theSpanish throne Ferdinand continu-

ally plotted against his father, Charles IV, hismother, Queen Maria Luisa, and their firstminister, Manuel Godoy. His opposition tothe universally unpopular Godoy gainedFerdinand a thoroughly undeserved popu-

Ferdinand VII, King of Spain 99

F

larity, even among Spanish liberals. In 1808,as the French army approached Madrid,Ferdinand overthrew his father and pro-claimed himself king, but Napoleon forcedboth claimants to abdicate. Ferdinand spentthe next five years in comfortable exile inthe château of Valençay, refusing British of-fers to help him to escape, while the Spanishpeople rose and sacrificed themselves on hisbehalf in the uprising against the French. Hereturned to Spain after Napoleon’s first ab-dication in 1814, immediately renouncedthe liberal Cadiz Constitution of 1812, andpersecuted his liberal opponents. Ferdinand’sbad faith plunged Spain backwards, dashingthe hopes of many who had supported himwhen he was in gilded exile, and his tyran-nical rule led to a new revolt in 1820.

Related entries: Charles IV, King of Spain;Godoy, Manuel; Peninsular War; Spain

Suggestions for further reading:Carr, Raymond. 1982. Spain: 1808–1975. 2nd

ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Lovett, Gabriel H. 1965. Napoleon and the Birth of

Modern Spain. 2 vols. New York: New YorkUniversity Press.


Fesch, Joseph (1763–1839)

N apoleon’s “Uncle Fesch,” a half-brother of Maria Letizia Bonaparte,

was ordained as a priest in 1785, but aban-doned his clerical state to work for hisnephew’s war commissariat in 1796. Thisbrought him considerable financial rewards,but in 1800 Napoleon as first consul re-called him to the Church. In 1802 he wasnamed archbishop of Lyon, the highest po-sition in the Gallican Church, and wasmade a cardinal in January 1803. Sent asambassador to the Vatican in 1804, he trans-mitted the demand that Pius VII attend atNapoleon’s coronation, but the demandwas rejected by the pope, forcing Napoleon

to write personally and more politely to in-duce Pius to travel to Paris for the great oc-casion. Fesch himself also attended and wasafterward named grand almoner of the im-perial household and accumulated variousother titles and incomes.

As churchman and imperial official Feschacted first and foremost in his nephew’s in-terests. In particular, he played an importantrole in securing the annulment of Napo-leon’s marriage to Joséphine de Beauharnais,at which he had officiated, opening the wayfor the new marriage to Marie-Louise. Buthe also used his position to restore the train-ing of the priesthood in the empire. Kle-mens von Metternich described him as “astrange compound of bigotry and ambition,”adding: “although sincerely devout, he wasnot far from believing Napoleon to be theinstrument of Heaven and an all but super-natural being” (Seward 1986, p. 122).

Fesch had always adopted a somewhatbullying attitude toward Pius VII, especiallywhen the pope was under French constraintbetween 1809 and 1813. On Napoleon’sfirst abdication Fesch escorted his sister,“Madame Mère,” to Rome. After returningto Lyon during the Hundred Days, he hur-riedly regained safety in Italy after the sec-ond abdication.The pope did not allow himto return to Lyon, and he spent the rest ofhis life amassing a fabulous art collection,which on his death was bequeathed to Lyonand his birthplace of Ajaccio.

Related entries: Catholic Church; Papacy; PiusVII, Pope


the Pope. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.Seward, Desmond. 1986. Napoleon’s Family.

London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Finance

N apoleon needed ever increasingamounts of money to finance his

100 Fesch, Joseph

government, his armed forces, and his em-pire.Though no expert in financial matters,his reorganization of the collection of taxa-tion put him on the way to a tight financialadministration. Expenses were rigorouslymonitored and a sinking fund established,chiefly to intervene on the stock marketand keep the price of government bondshigh. In the rare years of peace the budgetwas balanced, and in war years nearly keptin balance by quartering troops abroad andlevying contributions on allies and defeatedenemies. But the principle that “war shouldpay for war” depended on victory, and thedefeats of 1812–1813 hit the budget hard.

Napoleon consistently refused to resortto loans or to paper money, and on prob-lems of credit his ideas have been describedas primitive. The only alternative in thefinal years of crisis was an enormous in-crease in direct taxes, a significant elementin his rising unpopularity. Although hisideas on public credit put Napoleon at aconsiderable disadvantage compared withGreat Britain, he kept his regime going tothe end and founded structures in budget-ary control and banking that would endure.

Related entries: Bank of France; BiensNationaux; Centralization; Economy; Industry;Taxation


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Clough, Shepherd B. 1939. France:A History of

National Economics, 1789–1939. New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons.


Five Days, Battles of

This series of brilliant actions againstthe invading Allied armies in Febru-

ary 1814 constituted the high point of Na-poleon’s inspired but doomed defense ofFrance and restored his own and the French

army’s martial reputation. Leading paltryforces of veterans and green conscripts,manyof doubtful commitment, and amid generalpopular indifference, Napoleon personallyled his ragtag army to four victories in fivedays, at Champaubert (10 February), Mont-mirail (11 February), Château-Thierry (12February), and Vauchamps (14 February).

The immense difficulties he facedseemed to reinvigorate Napoleon.While themain Allied force under Prince Karl zuSchwarzenberg advanced toward Paris alongthe Seine valley, the Army of Silesia underGebhard von Blücher progressed along theMarne. Blücher, overanxious to get to Parisand assuming that Napoleon would be heldin the valley of the Seine by Schwarzen-berg’s vastly superior forces, badly overex-tended his forces, allowing Napoleon totake him by surprise. Striking north thenwest Napoleon overwhelmed a Russiancorps at Champaubert, then a combinedRusso-Prussian force at Montmirail, and on12 February he drove his opponents acrossthe Marne at Château-Thierry, capturingprisoners, guns, and baggage. Learning thenext day that a Prussian force commandedby Blücher himself was moving westwardtoward Montmirail, Napoleon led his wearytroops to meet it at Vauchamps on 14 Feb-ruary, forcing Blücher to withdraw towardChâlons.

Despite being “one of the most brilliantcampaigns in military annals ”(Gates 1997,p. 256), the Five Days battles could onlyslow down the inexorable Allied advancetoward Paris. Paradoxically, the ultimate re-sult of Napoleon’s startling victories was tojolt his squabbling enemies back into coop-eration. With stiffened resolve on 9 Marchthey signed the Treaties of Chaumont,which committed them not only to contin-uing the war but to maintaining their col-laboration for twenty years after any peacesettlement.

Related entries: Blücher, Gebhard Leberechtvon; Coalitions

Five Days, Battles of 101





Lawford, James P. 1977. Napoleon:The LastCampaigns. New York: Crown.

Fontainebleau Decree (18 October 1810)

This final attempt to make Napoleon’sContinental System effective was

made after other measures that had weak-ened it by widening the range of licensesfor trade.The new decree ordered the con-fiscation and sale by the state of interceptedunlicensed colonial goods, the destructionof prohibited manufactured goods, andstiffer penalties for smuggling. Its chiefvalue was in increasing revenue through itsfirst provision, and it remained in operationfor the next two years.

Related entries: Continental System

Suggestions for further reading:Hecksher, E. F. 1922. The Continental System:An

Economic Interpretation. Oxford: Publicationsof the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace.

Fouché, Joseph (1760–1820)

N apoleon’s feared but untrustworthyMinister of Police was one of the

great political survivors, usually to be reliedupon to be playing both ends against themiddle. Born at Nantes, the son of a mer-chant sea captain, Fouché received a full ed-ucation, intending to be a teacher, but wassoon caught up in Revolutionary politics.Azealous Jacobin, he was nevertheless close

to Paul Barras, and became Minister ofGeneral Police for the Directory shortlybefore the coup of 18 Brumaire, which hesupported by neglecting to inform the Di-rectors of the plot against them. Retainedin his post by the consulate, in May 1802Fouché was diplomatically absent from themeeting of the Council of State which cre-ated Napoleon consul for life, and fourmonths later was dismissed.

Reappointed as minister of police inJuly 1804 with greater powers than previ-ously, Fouché held the post until May 1810,when he was dismissed for making contactswith the British. Using every availabletechnique bequeathed by the ancienrégime and the Revolution, Fouché put inplace a network of informers to create thefirst modern political police. As the mostfeared and probably the best-informedmember of the government he was in a po-sition both to feather his nest and send hisown agents to London. But his intriguingreached its height in 1814–1815.After Na-poleon’s first abdication, Fouché warnedthe restored Bourbons that the exiled em-peror might land in southern France, whileat the same time plotting with Bonapartistofficers to proclaim a regency in the nameof Napoleon II. During the Hundred Dayshe was again minister of police, but afterWaterloo took the lead in making contactwith Louis XVIII and securing Napoleon’ssecond abdication.

Despite his regicide past, Fouché servedthe restored monarchy briefly as minister ofpolice between July and September 1815.During this time he drew up a list of thosewho had served Napoleon on his return,causing Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand,himself no mean intriguer, to comment sar-donically: “One must do M. Fouché thejustice to recognize that he has left outnone of his friends” (Horne 1996, p. 383).Though exiled as a regicide, he served as adiplomatic envoy in Saxony for a year be-fore retiring to Trieste to enjoy the fruits ofa lifetime of wheeler-dealing in peace.

102 Fontainebleau Decree

Related entries: Abdication, First;Abdication;Second; Barras, Paul François Jean Nicolas,Vicomte de; Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII;Censorship; Constitutions; Hundred Days;Imperial Police; Malet Conspiracy; Opera Plot;Opposition Movements



Cole, Hubert. 1971. Fouché:The UnprincipledPatriot. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Cubberley, R. E. 1969. The Role of Fouché duringthe Hundred Days. Madison:WisconsinUniversity Press.

Horne,Alistair. 1996 How Far from Austerlitz?Napoleon 1805–1815. London: Macmillan.

Francis I, Emperor of Austria

(1768–1835) (Holy Roman Emperor

as Francis II, 1792–1806; Emperor of Austria as Francis I, 1806–1835)

A lmost immediately on his successionto the throne of the Holy Roman

Empire in 1792 Francis II was at war withFrance.Thereafter he was a party in all thesuccessive coalitions against Revolutionaryand Napoleonic France, while blocking re-forms within Austria as leading onto theslippery slope toward revolution. As a suc-cession of treaties imposed by Napoleonfrom Campo Formio in 1797 to Schön-brunn in 1809 reduced the Habsburg do-mains to Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, andStyria, Francis was forced to dissolve theHoly Roman Empire in 1806, while con-sistently opposing the radical reform of thearmy proposed by the Archduke Charlesand any kind of internal political change.

Conscientious but ineffective and totallylacking in imagination, Francis was fortu-

nate in being served by the equally reac-tionary but skillful and realistic Klemensvon Metternich, who was appointed for-eign minister in 1809. It was Metternichrather than his master who managed tosteer a diplomatic course between Franceand Russia and accept the marriage be-tween Napoleon and Marie-Louise, Fran-cis’s eldest surviving daughter. Francis sawthe defeat of Napoleon as a victory over theRevolution and revolutionary ideas, nevermaking any distinction between Frenchradicalism and Napoleon’s armies. For therest of his reign after 1815 he left it largelyto Metternich to preserve the status quo inAustria and Europe.

Related entries: Austria; Charles,Archduke ofAustria; Coalitions; Marie-Louise von Habsburg,Empress; Metternich, Klemens Wenceslas Lothar,Fürst von

Suggestions for further reading:Bérenger, Jean. 1994. A History of the Habsburg

Empire. London and New York: Longman.Langsam,Walter C. 1930. The Napoleonic Wars and

German Nationalism in Austria. New York:Columbia University Press.

———. 1949. Francis the Good:The Education ofan Emperor, 1768–1792. New York:Macmillan.

Frankfurt, Grand Duchy of

N apoleon reorganized the territoryaround Frankfurt-am-Main as the

Grand Duchy of Frankfurt in 1810, essen-tially for the benefit of Eugène deBeauharnais, who was due eventually tolose the income from the Kingdom of Italyto the benefit of Napoleon’s son or sons.The first grand duke was Karl Theodorvon Dalberg, prince primate of the Con-federation of the Rhine, who was to besucceeded by Eugène.

The grand duchy, with its approximately300,000 inhabitants, was divided into fourdepartments—Frankfurt, Hanau,Aschaffen-burg, and Fulda—administered by prefects

Frankfurt, Grand Duchy of 103

assisted by appointed councils. The grandduke ruled with a state council and estateselected by departmental colleges. Local ad-ministration was based on the Frenchmodel, with departments divided into dis-tricts and municipalities governed by may-ors with elected municipal councils. TheNapoleonic legal codes were introduced in1811, serfdom abolished, and Jews emanci-pated. The emancipation edicts, however,were tied to high redemption payments, asNapoleon’s financial requirements limitedthe effectiveness of reforms. But the middleand lower levels of the administration wit-nessed a minor social revolution, as nobleswere replaced with bourgeois officials.

The grand duchy was dissolved after thebattle of Leipzig in October 1813, and Em-peror Francis I made a ceremonial entryinto Frankfurt on 6 November. At theCongress of Vienna Frankfurt regained itsformer status as a free city, which it re-mained until absorbed by Prussia in 1866.

Related entries: Confederation of the Rhine



Frederick William III, King of Prussia (1770–1840;

reigned 1797–1840)

F rederick William, great-nephew ofFrederick the Great, presided over

the near-liquidation of Prussia by Napo-leon and then over its reconstruction. Dur-ing his early years on the throne he wassympathetic to reform, accomplishing theliberation of peasants on crown lands, butbacked down in the face of the great land-owners and remained suspicious about anyform of representative government. Until1805 Frederick William’s foreign policyconsisted of neutrality coupled with slow

reaction to external events.When he finallyentered the war against Napoleon in 1806the result was the disastrous defeat of Jaen-Auerstädt. The survival of the Prussianmonarchy owed more to the decisiveness ofFrederick William’s wife, Louise of Meck-lenburg, and to the diplomacy of AlexanderI than it did to the king himself.

Although in effect a client king of Na-poleon until 1813, unable even to reside inBerlin between October 1806 and Christ-mas 1809, Frederick William did at lastgive support to the civil and military re-forms necessary for Prussian revival.Whenhe joined the fight against Napoleon in1813 Frederick William issued emotionalappeals to the German people to riseagainst the foreign invader, but any hopesfor radical political reform would bedashed after 1815.The king was present atthe battles of Bautzen, Dresden, andLeipzig and entered Paris behind Alexan-der I in 1814.At the Congress of Vienna hemanaged to cooperate with Russia andcompromise with Austria. After 1815 hemaintained the essential reforms of theNapoleonic period and pursued progres-sive economic and religious policies, sothat, despite the persecution of politicaldissidents, his fellow autocrats consideredhim less repressive than was desirable.

Related entries: Louise of Mecklenburg,Queen of Prussia; Prussia

Suggestions for further reading:Haffner, Sebastian. 1980. The Rise and Fall of

Prussia. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Ross, Steven T. 1981. European Diplomatic History,

1789–1815. Malabar, FL: Krieger.

Freemasonry

The Masonic lodges of France hadbeen persecuted during the Terror

but reemerged under the Directory. Napo-leon realized that freemasonry could be

104 Frederick William III, King of Prussia

useful to his regime as part of the establish-ment and reorganized it into a single rite,the Grand Orient, deist and rationalist inideology. Headed by Napoleon’s brothers,leading ministers like Jean-Jacques de Cam-bacérès, generals, prefects, administrators,and local notables, the Grand Orient ex-panded rapidly and by 1814 controlled 886lodges and 337 chapters in France. Themost rapid spread of masonry was in thearmy, which in 1805 had 132 lodges. Aquarter of all infantry officers were masons.

Freemasonry followed Napoleon’sarmies into Europe, contacting and absorb-ing indigenous lodges and creating newones. In all some 400 lodges were set up byarmy officers in conquered Europe. Theywere seen as a way of winning over localelites, with most success in Germany, Italy,and Switzerland. In the Rhineland, for ex-ample, there were seventeen lodges, with170 French and 345 local members. ButFrench-dominated masonry was weak inHolland and in the Duchy of Warsaw,where it was identified entirely withNapoleonic rule, sporting arms bearing theNapoleonic “N,” but opposed by the pow-erful Catholic clergy. It failed totally inSpain and Portugal, where local elites re-fused completely to join lodges dominatedby French army officers.

Suggestions for further reading:Roberts, J. M. 1972. The Mythology of the Secret

Societies. London: Secker and Warburg.Woolf, Stuart. 1991. Napoleon’s Integration of

Europe. London and New York: Routledge.

Friedland, Battle of (14 June 1807)

This decisive victory for Napoleon inthe spring campaign of 1807 effec-

tively forced Tsar Alexander I to negotiatethe Treaty of Tilsit in July of that year. Some50,000 Russians under Levin von Ben-

nigsen faced 80,000 of the Grande Armée,which had been wintering in Poland afterdefeating the Prussians in the campaigns of1806. Friedland shows to the full Napo-leon’s ability to size up a situation, suck anenemy into a major battle, and tailor histactics to take maximum advantage of theground and the enemy’s dispositions.

Napoleon had sent his five army corpsnorthwards along the left bank of the RiverAlle in East Prussia, hoping to reach theRussian base of Königsberg before theRussians. On 13 June a detachment of cav-alry from the French advance guard underJean Lannes encountered Russian cavalrynear Friedland, a small town on the leftbank of the Alle some thirty-five kilometersfrom Königsberg. During the night, Ben-nigsen moved his forces across the river tothe Friedland side, believing Napoleon andhis main force to be much farther awaythan they actually were. Lannes swiftlybrought up the rest of his corps, but whenfighting began in the early hours of 14 Junethe Russians enjoyed overwhelming nu-merical advantage. Despite a series of vigor-ous cavalry charges led by Emmanuel deGrouchy, Lannes sent desperately for helpfrom Napoleon, who was still at Eylau,twenty kilometers to the southwest.

Napoleon acted decisively, remindingthe messenger, Captain Marbot, that 14June was the anniversary of the battle ofMarengo. While Lannes’s corps continuedto resist the Russians, Napoleon stationedhimself on elevated land and saw that Ben-nigsen, counting neither on Lannes’s re-sistance nor Napoleon’s swift arrival, hadput himself in a dangerous position, with ariver to his rear and with every likelihoodof being outnumbered. The arrival of theImperial Guard, the corps commanded byMichel Ney and Joseph Mortier, andheavy cavalry gave the French the numeri-cal advantage when the battle properbegan in the late afternoon, after Napo-leon had given his men time for rest. Theplan was simple and worked perfectly.

Friedland, Battle of 105

Mortier and Lannes kept the Russian cen-ter and right occupied, while Ney’s corps,supported by cavalry charges and an ar-tillery barrage the likes of which the Rus-sian troops had never seen before, hit theRussian left wing from the front and flank,driving it back into Friedland and destroy-ing the bridges constructed by the Rus-sians in crossing the Alle, which were theironly avenue of retreat. Mortier and Lannesthen advanced against the Russian centerand right, starting a slaughter that lasted

until nightfall. Russian casualties were esti-mated at between 18,000 and 20,000 deador wounded, the French between 7,000and 8,000.


Suggestions for further reading:Lunt, James D. 1987.“Grouchy,” in David G.



106 Friedland, Battle of

GGaudin, Martin Michel Charles

(1756–1844)

N apoleon’s minister of finance be-tween 1799 and 1814 and again

during the Hundred Days in 1815 was anexperienced financial official who had en-tered the tax-collecting service of themonarchy in 1779 and continued to servethe various regimes of the Revolution.Under Napoleon Gaudin was responsiblefor the collection of taxes, a task he per-formed with honesty and method. He re-cruited a hierarchy of tax collectors andprepared the national cadastre, the survey ofland that served as the basis for local tax as-sessment. Gaudin taught Napoleon muchabout the basics of sound financial adminis-tration, and the emperor appreciated his“clear ideas and severe probity” (Connelly,1985, p. 203), giving him the title of dukeof Gaeta. After the Restoration Gaudinserved in the Chamber of Deputies and wasgovernor of the Bank of France from 1820to 1834.

Related entries: Finance; Statistics;Taxation


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Connelly, Owen, ed. Historical Dictionary of


Gendarmerie

The mounted gendarmerie was the onepolice force Napoleon kept out of

the hands of the untrustworthy JosephFouché, entrusting its command instead toMarshal Adrien de Moncey. A traditionalforce, primarily concerned with imposingorder in the countryside, under Napoleonthe gendarmerie in many areas expendedmuch effort on attempts to round up re-fractory conscripts and deserters. Thishelped to make gendarmes as unpopular asthey were too few in number, underfi-nanced, and corruptible.

Related entries: Conscription; Imperial Police



Generals

P romotion in the Napoleonic armieswas still based on the Revolutionary

principles of merit, talent, and elections, butNapoleon gradually suppressed the remain-ing elective element, and from 1805 on-ward personally nominated all his generals.Himself sometimes called “the most civilian

Generals 107

G

of generals,” Napoleon robbed his generalsof the powers of patronage and indepen-dence that had played such a role in hisown rise to prominence, powers that hadled to several prominent generals changingsides during the revolutionary wars.Though the idea that each Napoleonicgeneral “carried a marshal’s baton in hisknapsack” was a myth, Napoleon wantedand got generals who were both educatedin the theory of warfare and experiencedon the battlefield. As part of the new eliteof notables it was in the generals’ interest toserve Napoleon well, but he allowed themlittle initiative on campaign or in battle.Napoleon was the only master in his army.Generals were honored and an integral partof the ruling elite, but the Napoleonicregime cannot be called a military dictator-ship in the modern sense of the word.


Suggestions for further reading:Bertaud, Jean-Paul. 1986.“Napoleon’s Officers,”

Past & Present, no. 112 (August 1986), pp.91–111.


Genoa

The principal seaport in the westernMediterranean had been one of the

great Italian republics and ruler of Corsicauntil 1768. Jacobin feeling had developedstrongly in Genoa during the early 1790s,and when the city was captured during Na-poleon’s first Italian campaign in 1796 theLigurian Republic was established as asatellite “sister republic” of France. AndréMasséna was besieged there between Apriland June 1800, causing great suffering tothe people. The republic lasted until 1805,when Genoa was absorbed into France.Napoleon made a ceremonial entry on 30June 1805. After Napoleon’s defeat in

1814–1815 Genoa was incorporated intothe Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, a movewhich led to vigorous debate and condem-nation in the British parliament.

Related entries: Italian Campaigns; LigurianRepublic



Germany, Campaigns in

The Jena-Auerstädt-Friedland cam-paign in 1806–1807 assured Napo-

leon’s control of east-central Europe andforced Russia to sue for peace, and illus-trates his way of fighting a devastating warof maneuver.The campaign of 1813, how-ever, known in German history as the Warof Liberation, showed that following thedisaster in Russia he could no longer with-stand the Seventh Coalition, as the Germanstates backed by Russia finally unitedagainst him.

In 1806 he faced the still unreformedand poorly led Prussian army, of which Carlvon Clausewitz remarked that “behind thefine facade, all was mildewed” (Gates 1997,p. 52). While the Prussians advanced intothe Erfurt-Weimar region of central Ger-many, Napoleon performed one of his sur-prising manoeuvres sur les derrières, movingsix corps and the Imperial Guard throughthe rocky and twisting roads of mountain-ous Thuringia, thereby penetrating into thePrussians’ rear and cutting their communi-cations with Dresden, Leipzig, and Berlin.Throwing his net around the retreatingPrussians, he defeated them decisively at thebattle of Jena-Auerstädt (14 October 1806)and entered Berlin on 25 October.

The Prussians, however, despite the al-most complete collapse of the monarchy,could still fight on with Russian support.

108 Genoa

Napoleon’s army spent the winter in Prus-sian Poland, confronting the Russians in thebloody and pointless battle of Eylau (7–8February 1807). In the spring Napoleonmoved back onto the offensive, again usinghis cavalry to operate in the enemy’s rear.Atthe Battle of Friedland on 14 June 1807 heinflicted such a severe defeat on them thatAlexander I was forced to negotiate theTreaty of Tilsit.

In 1813 Napoleon was fighting withforces very different from the disciplinedand battle-hardened Grande Armée of1806–1807. The remnants of this forcewho had survived the Russian campaign,commanded by Eugène de Beauharnais,were concentrated in Saxony, while Napo-leon, heading an army made up largely ofinexperienced conscripts, crossed intoGermany in April 1813. He defeated theRusso-Prussian forces at the battles ofLützen (2 May) and Bautzen (20 May),forcing them to retire beyond the riverOder, but these were costly victories andNapoleon accepted an armistice, whichlasted from 4 June to 10 August, so as togain time to rebuild his army. When thearmistice ended he faced a coalition ofAustria, Great Britain, Spain, Russia, Prus-sia, and Sweden.

Eugène in Saxony faced an impossiblesituation, with Austrian, Prussian, andSwedish armies converging on him from alldirections.The Allies for once adopted thesensible strategy of only attacking isolatedFrench corps, inflicting a series of defeatson those commanded by Nicolas Oudinotat Gross-Beeren (23 August), Jacques Mac-donald on the Katzbach (26 August), Do-minique Vandamme at Kulm (29–30 Au-gust), and Michel Ney at Dennewitz (16September). Bavaria, France’s traditionalally in Germany, defected to the Allies on 8October. The three allied armies finallyconverged on Napoleon in the battle ofLeipzig (16–19 October), the defeat thatforced him to retire beyond the Rhine,leaving only a few besieged French gar-

risons to hold out briefly in Germany.Thecharacter of the war as a German nationaluprising against Napoleon has been exag-gerated by nationalist historians, but it wasdecisive in his collapse, creating negative ef-fects in Holland, Spain, and Italy.

Related entries: Austria; Bautzen, Battle of;Bavaria, Kingdom of; Coalitions; Confederationof the Rhine; Dresden; Eylau, Battle of; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of; Leipzig, Battle of; Lützen,Battle of; Prussia; Saxony



Connelly, Owen. 1987. Blundering to Glory:Napoleon’s Military Campaigns. Wilmington,DE: Scholarly Resources.

Esposito,Vincent J., and John R. Elting. 1964. AMilitary History and Atlas of the NapoleonicWars. New York: Praeger.


Gill, John H. 1992. With Eagles to Glory: Napoleonand His German Allies in the 1809 Campaign.Novato, CA: Presidio Press.

Petre, F. Loraine. 1972. Napoleon’s Conquest ofPrussia, 1806. London:Arms and Armour.

———. 1974. Napoleon’s Last Campaign inGermany, 1813. London:Arms and Armour.

Gneisenau, August WilhelmAnton Meithardt von

(1760–1831)

O ne of the leading figures in the driveto modernize the Prussian army

after the defeat of Jena in 1806, Gneisenauhad been commissioned into the infantryin 1786, fought at Jena as a major, and be-came celebrated for his defense of theBaltic port of Kolberg in 1807. As a mem-ber of the Military Reorganization Com-mission he assisted Gerhard von Scharn-horst in a reform of the army based on theexperience of facing Napoleon, seeking toopen up recruitment and the appointmentof officers to men of merit regardless of so-

Gneisenau,August Wilhelm Anton Meithardt von 109

cial origins. He was among the most radicalof the reformers, viewed in reactionary cir-cles as a dangerous revolutionary.

Gneisenau resigned his commission in1808, but was used in secret missions toBritain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden in1809 and 1810. Along with Gebhard vonBlücher he believed that peace could onlybe secured by the total defeat of Napoleon,and he argued in vain for war in 1811. Be-tween 1813 and 1815 he was Blücher’schief of staff, but his desire for an indepen-dent command was frustrated by court in-trigue. Gneisenau made a notable contribu-tion to the plan of operations in the battleof Leipzig, and during the Hundred Daysafter the defeat at Ligny he was responsiblefor the decision to move in the direction ofWaterloo, thereby ensuring Napoleon’s de-feat. Gneisenau retired in 1816 and wasmade a field marshal in 1825 on the tenthanniversary of Waterloo, a belated recogni-tion of the part his drive and initiative hadplayed in making the Prussian army a fitadversary for Napoleon.

Related entries: Prussia; Scharnhorst, GerhardJohann David von

Suggestions for further reading:Shanahan,William O. 1945. Prussian Military

Reforms, 1786–1813. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Godoy, Manuel (1767–1851)

The dominant figure in Spanish poli-tics during the reign of Charles IV,

Godoy served at various times as first min-ister, commandant of the army, grand admi-ral of the navy, and (reputedly) lover ofQueen Maria Luisa. He was responsible forthe alliance between Spain and France in1795, earning himself the purely honorifictitle of “Prince of Peace.”When Napoleonbecame emperor in 1804 Godoy collabo-rated with France in every way possible,

thereby causing economic difficulties inmany regions of Spain. The Treaty ofFontainebleau in October 1807 allowedFrench troops to cross Spain to invade Por-tugal, in effect an invasion of Spain itself.Godoy’s pro-French policies, his anticleri-calism, and his personal flamboyance madehim unpopular with the Spanish aristocracyand common people alike, and he hadmade a particular enemy of the heir to thethrone, the future Ferdinand VII. Napoleonfor his part despised Godoy. When Ferdi-nand overthrew his father in 1808 Godoybarely escaped with his life, but he waspresent at the meeting at Bayonne whenboth Charles and Ferdinand were deposed.He spent the rest of his life in exile, firstwith Charles and Maria Luisa in Rome,later in Paris. His memoirs, published in1836, have been described as a masterpieceof complacency.

Related entries: Charles IV, King of Spain;Ferdinand VII, King of Spain; Spain

Suggestions for further reading:Chastenet, Jacques. 1953. Godoy: Master of Spain.

London: Batchworth Press.Hilt, Douglas. 1987. The Troubled Trinity: Godoy

and the Spanish Monarchs. Tuscaloosa:University of Alabama Press.

Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Laurent(1764–1830)

B orn in Toul, the son of a tanner, Gou-vion left home and traveled to Italy

and Paris as an artist. Abandoned by hismother, he nevertheless took her name ofSaint-Cyr, preferring her memory to thatof his abusive father. In 1792 he volun-teered for the army, using the name Gou-vion Saint-Cyr, and through the 1790sserved in the Rhineland and his belovedItaly. Named commander of the Army ofRome in March 1798, he refused to serveunder André Masséna, whom he despised

110 Godoy, Manuel

for his greed and corruption, and was re-moved in July. As corps commander of theArmy of the Rhine, he received his saber ofhonor from Consul Bonaparte and won thesecond battle of Biberach, his greatest per-sonal success, on 9 May 1800.

Napoleon was always suspicious of Saint-Cyr’s attitude but valued his abilities highlyenough to send him to Spain as ambassadorto Madrid, where he was reasonably suc-cessful and negotiated the sale of Louisianato the United States. Back in Italy as head ofthe observation corps of the Kingdom ofNaples, he clashed violently with JoachimMurat, his complete opposite in tempera-ment and outlook. Saint-Cyr’s reluctance toadminister the oath of allegiance to the em-pire, on the grounds that the army shouldbe above politics, caused his recall to France,where he was effectively inactive between1804 and 1808, being recompensed some-what with a string of titles, including that ofcount of the empire in 1808.

Recalled as commander of the Army ofCatalonia in September 1808, Saint-Cyrwas soon in trouble with Napoleon again,and he was suspended from active service inNovember 1809 on unjust charges of de-serting his command.This injustice allowedhis successor, Charles Augereau, who haddelayed his arrival in Catalonia, to claim thecredit for military successes prepared bySaint-Cyr. The suspension lasted threeyears, until Napoleon’s Russian campaignof 1812, in which Saint-Cyr commandedthe Bavarian corps, one of the most activeand heroic sections of the Grande Armée.Under Saint-Cyr the Bavarians secured afamous victory in the battle of Polotsk on18 August 1812, and further distinguishedthemselves in the defense of Dresden in theautumn of 1813. These were the years ofSaint-Cyr’s reconciliation and good rela-tions with Napoleon, and he was created amarshal of the empire on 27 August 1812.Taken prisoner after the fall of Dresden,Saint-Cyr was only a distant spectator ofNapoleon’s fall.

During the Hundred Days Saint-Cyrtried to return to action, hoping to serveFrance rather than either side, but retired tohis estate near Boulogne in disgust. Al-though he was distrusted by the extremeroyalists or Ultras, Louis XVIII appointedhim minister of war in July 1815, but hisplans for reorganizing the French armywere opposed by Ultras who wished to re-store the order of the ancien régime, and heresigned in September. He became knownas a left-wing liberal in the House of Peersand as minister of war again in 1819 suc-ceeded in implementing major army re-forms, including the reintegration of manyNapoleonic veterans.

Stoic and restrained in character, insharp contrast to most of the otherNapoleonic marshals, Saint-Cyr was alsoscrupulously honest and maintained an ex-alted moral view of the role of the army.This attitude caused his problems with Na-poleon’s demands for personal loyalty tohimself. But the emperor could not ignoreSaint-Cyr’s capacities, especially as a defen-sive commander and in mapping terrain,where his talents as an artist proved invalu-able, first to the Revolutionary then theNapoleonic armies.

Related entries: Dresden; Naples, Kingdom of;Peninsular War; Russian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Coates-Wright, Philip. 1987.“Gouvion Saint-

Cyr,” in David G. Chandler, ed., Napoleon’sMarshals. New York: Macmillan.

Goya y Lucientes, Francisco de(1746–1828)

O ne of the greatest painters in Euro-pean history, Goya left an astonishing

record of the brutalities of the struggle of theSpanish people against Napoleonic occupa-tion as well as penetrating portraits of someof the leading figures of the age. He had be-

Goya y Lucientes, Francisco de 111

come official court painter to Charles IV in1799, but his liberal sympathies were madeobvious in his viciously satirical portrayals ofthe backwardness of Spanish society. In histwo great paintings, the Dos de Mayo and Tresde Mayo, Goya showed the fury of the upris-ing against the French in Madrid on 2–3May 1808, but these paintings were not seenuntil after Napoleon’s fall.

Goya accepted the patronage of JosephBonaparte when Napoleon’s brother be-came king of Spain, but his courtly work de-creased as he was torn between his liberalismand his patriotic abhorrence of foreign rule.The collection of engravings, The Disasters ofWar, published in 1814, records the viciouscruelties of guerilla warfare with unforget-table vividness.When asked why he depictedSpanish as well as French barbarism, Goyareplied:“To tell men forever that they shouldnot be barbarians” (Herold 1983, p. 205).The restored king Ferdinand VII pardonedGoya for his collaboration with Joseph, butthe painter was disgusted by the reactionarynature of Ferdinand’s regime and spent hisfinal years in France. Throughout his workone may see a commitment to the Enlight-enment values rejected by the Spanish andbetrayed by the French.

Related entries: Peninsular War; Spain

Suggestions for further reading:Gassier, Pierre. 1985. Goya:A Witness of his Times.

New York:Alpine Fine Arts Collection.Herold, J. Christopher. 1983. The Horizon Book of

the Age of Napoleon. New York:AmericanHeritage Publishing Co./Bonanza Books.

Myers, Bernard S. 1964. Goya. London: SpringBooks.

Williams, Gwyn A. 1976. Goya and the ImpossibleRevolution. London:Allen Lane.

Grand Dignitaries of the Empire

O n the creation of the empire in 1804Napoleon named a series of grand

dignitaries, designed to give his new impe-rial court a status equal to those of the oldmonarchies of Europe. The six appoint-ments were meant to reward public service,while also doubtless flattering the vanity ofthe recipients. Six grand dignitaries wereappointed: Jean-Jacques Cambacérès be-came arch-chancellor; Charles Lebrun,arch-treasurer; Joseph Bonaparte, grandelector; Louis Bonaparte, high constable;Eugène de Beauharnais, arch-chancellor ofstate, and Joachim Murat, grand admiral.The appointments indicate Napoleon’s de-sire to appeal to tradition and legitimacywhile showing that his new nobility wasnot dependent on “feudal” origins. It is no-table, however, that four of the six ap-pointees were members of or allied by mar-riage to the Bonaparte family.

Related entries: Empire; Nobility

Grande Armée

The name Grande Armée was firstused in 1805, but the force had its

origins in the Army of England, the troopsconcentrated along the Channel andNorth Sea coasts for the invasion of GreatBritain. Numbering some 350,000 men atits inception, the Grande Armée designatedthe principal body of French and alliedforces operating under Napoleon’s per-sonal command. Having received intensivetraining and practiced new tactics, it al-lowed Napoleon to boast that “surely thereis no finer army in Europe than minetoday” (Kafker and Laux 1989, p. 232).Theconcentration of the bulk of his troops inhis own hands gave Napoleon the advan-tage when it came to striking the decisiveblow against his opponents.The army did,however, rely on Napoleon being in per-sonal command, so that when he was ab-sent, as in Spain in 1808–1809, the conse-quences could be disastrous.

112 Grand Dignitaries of the Empire

The Grande Armée’s order of battle com-prised seven corps, with additional alliedcorps, backed up by cavalry and artillery re-serves and by the Imperial Guard. Com-mand and control was exercised by Napo-leon at Imperial Headquarters, which by1812 had come to look like a small army initself, but in battle he usually surroundedhimself with a small escort of trusted subor-dinates. Napoleon made his own decisions,and the General Staff, presided over byLouis Berthier, existed solely to carry outhis orders. This refusal to allow his corpscommanders to act independently was ini-tially one of Napoleon’s great strengths, butby 1813 had become a liability.The militaryhistorian J. F. C. Fuller commented on the1813 campaign: “Wherever Napoleon was,success was assured; wherever he was not, itwas disaster” (Kafker and Laux, p. 234).

The army of 1805 was the first GrandeArmée and fought at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena,and Friedland. A considerable part of itsforces were switched to Spain in 1808, butit was speedily reunited in 1809 and foughtat Essling and Wagram. The Grande Arméeassembled its greatest strength for the Rus-sian campaign of 1812, leading to its de-struction. A new Grande Armée was assem-bled for the war of 1813–1814, but whenNapoleon fought his last campaign in 1815the title was no longer used, and his forceswere known as the Army of the North.

Related entries: Army; Berthier, LouisAlexandre; Danube Campaigns; Germany,Campaigns in; Russian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Bowden, Scott. 1990. Napoleon’s Grande Armée of

1813. Chicago:The Emperor’s Press.Elting, John R. 1988. Swords around a Throne:

Napoleon’s Grande Armée. New York: FreePress.

Kafker, Frank A., and James M. Laux, eds. 1989.Napoleon and His Times: Selected Interpretations.Malibar, FL: Krieger.

Pivka, Otto von. 1977. Armies of 1812.Cambridge, England: Stephens.


Woloch, Isser. 1979. The French Veteran from theRevolution to the Restoration. Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press.

Great Britain

B y the late eighteenth century Britainwas the predominant commercial and

naval power in the world, and it became themost implacable enemy of Revolutionaryand Napoleonic France, at war between1793 and 1802 and again from 1803 to1814. The small British army played littlerole until 1808, British strategy being basedon naval power, with occasional attacks onthe periphery of Napoleon’s empire. TheBritish navy, having recovered from thebungling which had led to serious mutiniesin 1797, scored an unprecedented series ofnaval victories culminating at Trafalgar in1805, assured British control of the Chan-nel and the Mediterranean, and helped toextend Britain’s commercial empire in theWest Indies, the Indian Ocean, and theSouth Atlantic at the expense of France andits allies, especially the Dutch.

On the other hand, the British landingsin Calabria and Walcheren were at best in-effective, at worst disastrous. Britain’s reluc-tance to commit large numbers of troopsto continental warfare only ended with thePeninsular War from 1808 onward. Britishtroops now played a major role in Spain, inthe invasion of France in 1814, and at Wa-terloo in 1815. But standing armies weretraditionally unpopular in Britain, and, al-though threats of French invasion led tothe enthusiastic formation of local militiasand volunteer forces in 1797, 1801, and1803–1805, the main British contributionto land warfare against Napoleon lay insubsidies to Austria, Prussia, and Russia.Britain’s main strength, apart from thenavy, lay in its financial institutions. Lon-don was the center of the European moneymarket, and reforms in state finances over-

Great Britain 113

seen by William Pitt in the 1790s, espe-cially the establishment of a sinking fundfor government debts, helped Britishdiplomacy in cobbling together coalitionsagainst Napoleon.

Napoleon’s Continental System, there-fore, while it did considerable damage toBritish trade on the continent, could notfulfil its purpose of starving the countryinto submission. Only in 1811 did Britainface major financial and social crisis. Theworking classes suffered economic distressdue to attempts to protect agriculture andto unemployment caused by the introduc-tion of new machinery in the textile in-dustry, leading to the Luddite disturbancesin the North and Midlands. The Napo-leonic wars and accompanying patrioticenthusiasm also meant the postponementof much needed political reforms, stokingup problems for the years after 1815. Un-rest in Ireland, revolving around the termsof the Union with Britain in 1800 and thequestion of Catholic Emancipation, led tothe resignation of Pitt in 1801 and contin-ued to be a major headache for Britishgovernments.

But if on the domestic front all was farfrom well in 1815, diplomatically andcommercially Britain emerged from theNapoleonic wars in a position of renewedstrength. The Prussian general August vonGneisenau commented: “Great Britain hasno greater obligation to any mortal onearth than to this ruffian Napoleon. Forthrough the events which he has broughtabout, England’s greatness, prosperity, andwealth have risen high. She is the mistressof the sea and neither in this dominionnor in world trade has she now a singlerival to fear.”

Related entries: Castlereagh, Robert Stewart,Viscount; Coalitions; Continental System;Liverpool, Robert Banks Jenkinson, Earl of;Navy, British; Nelson, Horatio, Lord; PeninsularWar; Pitt,William the Younger;Trafalgar, Battleof;Walcheren Expedition;Wellington, Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Christie, Ian R. 1982. Wars and Revolutions:

Britain, 1760–1815. London: Edward Arnold.Cookson, J. E. 1997. The British Armed Nation

1793–1815. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Emsley, Clive. 1979. British Society and the French

Wars. New York: Macmillan.Glover, Richard. 1973. Britain at Bay: Defence

Against Bonaparte, 1803–14. New York:Barnes and Noble.

Guy,Alan J., ed. 1990. The Road to Waterloo:TheBritish Army and the Struggle againstRevolutionary and Napoleonic France. London:National Army Museum.

Hall, Christopher D. 1992. British Strategy in theNapoleonic Wars. Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press.


Sherwig, John M. 1969. Guineas and Gunpowder:British Foreign Aid in the War with France.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gros, Antoine Jean (1771–1835)

The favorite pupil of Jacques-LouisDavid, Gros also became a valued

propagandist of Napoleon through paint-ing, but portrayed the emperor’s heroicdeeds in a more human and individual andless monumental fashion. He first encoun-tered Napoleon during the Italian cam-paign in 1796.Visiting Genoa for the pur-pose of studying the paintings of Rubens,Gros was presented to Joséphine and ac-companied her to Milan, where she intro-duced him to her husband. His painting ofNapoleon, flag in hand and inspiring histroops at the battle of Arcola, so flattered itssubject that Gros was given the post of in-spector of revenues, following the cam-paign, observing military events at firsthand, and selecting art objects for trans-portation to France.

As a member of Napoleon’s entourageGros had the opportunity to develop histalents, especially in portraiture, and in 1801Napoleon expressed his wish that Grosshould paint for him exclusively. His Bona-

114 Gros,Antoine Jean

parte Visiting the Plague Victims at Jaffa (1804),an unhistorical representation of an episodeof the Egyptian campaign, portrayed Napo-leon as a kind of saint, bringing comfort toplague-stricken soldiers by his presence andhis “royal” touch. Conceived on a massivescale, it combined the influence of Italianbaroque painting with an incipient Ro-manticism and helped to create the myth ofNapoleon as a great leader, but also an ordi-nary soldier, the “little corporal,” imbuedwith a superhuman capacity for sympathywith the humble soldiers under his com-mand.This image reached its peak with hisportrayal of Napoleon after the battle ofEylau, where the emperor as magnanimousvictor, tired and pensive, seems to bless thedead on all sides and big-heartedly acceptsthe submission of a Lithuanian hussar andother Russian soldiers, one of whom seems

to be praying to him.The weary Napoleon,saddened by the spectacle of slaughter,grants absolution to his enemies.

In addition to the monumental paintingsglorifying Napoleon, Gros also executedmany portraits, his subjects includingJérôme Bonaparte and Christine Boyer, thelong-dead first wife of Lucien Bonaparte.In 1812 he was commissioned to decoratethe dome of the Pantheon, which he com-pleted in 1824, with Napoleon excludedfrom the ranks of the great Frenchmencommemorated within.

Gros adapted easily to the Restoration;his style, blending the classicism of Davidwith the new Romanticism, continued tobe popular for many years, and in 1824 hewas made a baron by King Charles X. Buthe fell out of favor with both the publicand the monarchy in the 1830s, and in

Gros,Antoine Jean 115

In all his depictions of Napoleon, Jean Antoine Gros detected a saintlike quality that escaped other observers.Bonaparte Visiting the Plague Victims at Jaffa (1804) is Gros’s version of an episode from Napoleon’sEgyptian campaign. Bonaparte touches a plague victim and becomes a royal, even superhuman, figure bringingcomfort and relief by his presence. (Alinari/Art Resource)

1835, after his painting of Hercules andDiomedes had been ridiculed, he committedsuicide by drowning himself in four feet ofwater in the forest of Meudon.

Related entries: Napoleonic Legend;Personality, Cult of; Propaganda

Suggestions for further reading:Wilson-Smith,Timothy. 1996. Napoleon and His

Artists. London: Constable.

Grouchy, Emmanuel, Marquis de (1766–1847)

A hereditary noble, cavalryman, andthe last to be given his baton,

Grouchy was in several ways the odd manout among Napoleon’s marshals. He wasalso blamed, not least by Napoleon himself,for the defeat at Waterloo, but few histori-ans today would go along entirely with thisscapegoating.

Intended for the military from birth,Grouchy entered the royal army at the age offourteen. Invalided out in 1787, he subse-quently supported the Revolution and re-turned to the colors in 1791, fighting againstthe royalist rebels of the Vendée and in Brit-tany. In 1798 he served under Jean Moreau inItaly and was wounded and captured at thebattle of Lodi. He commanded an infantrydivision at Hohenlinden (3 December 1800)and served Napoleon with great distinctionin the German campaigns of 1806–1807. Hecommanded the Second Dragoon Divisionin the pursuit of the Prussians after the battlesof Jena-Auerstädt, which has been describedas “the greatest sustained pursuit in history”(Lunt 1987, p. 142); commanded the dra-goons at Eylau (8 February 1807), where hewas wounded; and was a cavalry commanderat Friedland (14 June 1807), the battle thatended the Fourth Coalition.

As governor of Madrid in 1808,Grouchy was responsible for suppressing

the rising of 2 May, then back in Germanyserved with Louis Davout’s corps at Wa-gram (6 July 1809) and so impressed Napo-leon that he made him colonel-general ofchasseurs and thus a grand officer of the em-pire. Grouchy was on the semiactive list be-tween 1809 and 1811, returning for theRussian campaign of 1812. He commandedEugène de Beauharnais’s cavalry atBorodino and performed sterling serviceduring Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow.After retiring briefly as physically unfit in1813 he returned again as a cavalry com-mander during the Allied invasion ofFrance in 1814, fighting in all the majorengagements of the campaign.

When he rallied to Napoleon duringthe Hundred Days, Grouchy became thetwenty-sixth and last marshal of the em-pire. He put down the royalist rising led bythe Duke of Angoulême in the south ofFrance and commanded Napoleon’s rightwing at Ligny, defeating the Prussiansunder Blücher. Grouchy was sent in pur-suit of the Prussian army, while Napoleonand Michel Ney pursued Wellington’sAnglo-Dutch army toward Brussels.Grouchy lost contact with Blücher on 17June 1815.The next day his advance guardencountered a Prussian force at Wavre, un-aware that Blücher had reorganized andwas marching for Waterloo, nine milesaway, where Napoleon had engagedWellington. Having no specific orders toreinforce Napoleon, whose commands tohim were at best ambiguous, Grouchy andhis 33,000 troops heard the guns of Water-loo, but his essentially cautious nature pre-vented his moving. Had he marched toWaterloo, his presence would have evenedthe odds, which were swung against Napo-leon by the arrival of Blücher. By notmoving, however, he allowed Napoleon topin the blame on him for the defeat.

Grouchy’s retreat after Waterloo wasmasterly, but it did him no good.After Na-poleon’s second abdication he turned histroops over to Davout and, proscribed by

116 Grouchy, Emmanuel, Marquis de

the new Bourbon regime, emigrated to theUnited States. Amnestied in 1819, he re-turned to France in 1821, was placed onthe retired list, and restored to the rank ofmarshal of France in 1831. For the rest ofhis life after 1815, however, his main con-cern was the battle of print to clear hisname over the defeat of Waterloo. He ex-changed violent pamphlets and articleswith General Etienne Gérard, who hadserved under him in the campaign andclaimed to have begged him to “march tothe guns.” Grouchy’s memoirs, published byhis son in 1873–1874, were also directed atclearing his name, unsuccessfully at thetime. Historians today are inclined to bemore generous, acknowledging thatGrouchy may have been slow off the markbut considering that, in sticking too closelyto Napoleon’s orders, he was more sinnedagainst than sinning.

Related entries: Danube Campaigns; Germany,Campaigns in; Italian Campaigns;Waterloo, Battleof

Suggestions for further reading:Hamilton-Williams, David. 1993. Waterloo: New

Perspectives:The Great Battle Reappraised.London:Arms and Armour.

Hibbert, Christopher. 1998. Waterloo. London:Wordsworth Military Library.

Lunt, James D. 1987.“Grouchy,” in David G.Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.


Guerrilla Warfare

The guerrilla or “little war” had its ori-gins in the eighteenth century, when

it meant actions by small bodies of mobiletroops detached from the main armies andoperating on the wings or in the enemy’srear. But it was as a demonstration of popu-lar resistance to Napoleonic occupationthat it acquired its modern connotations asa war of liberation. In areas of preexisting

social and economic tensions and with apopular tradition of paramilitary activity orbrigandage, guerrilla insurrections couldharass or tie down large numbers of Napo-leon’s occupying troops.The distinction be-came blurred between brigandage and na-tional resistance. Thus guerrillas played anessential role in the revolt in Calabria andthe revolt in the Tyrol, and in 1810 Illyriasaw guerrilla outbreaks among the Serbsand Croats of the old military frontier be-tween the Austrian and Ottoman Empires.But it was in Spain during the PeninsularWar that the most celebrated guerrillabands and leaders acquired the image ofpopular heroes.

In Spain the “little war” was little inname only. Guerrilla bands made up mostlyof armed peasants were either molded intomore conventional units by professionalsoldiers or practised indiscriminate banditryagainst the French and their Spanish sup-porters. Spanish governments tried to im-pose their authority on the guerrillas, butwhile Napoleon’s troops occupied most ofthe country this proved impossible. Theircontinual shadowy presence caused Frenchcommanders to overestimate their effec-tiveness, but they did provide intelligencefor Allied commanders, force the French to

Guerrilla Warfare 117

Goya’s Disasters of War dramatically conveys thebrutality of the Spanish guerrilla struggle againstNapoleon’s forces. (The Trustees of the BritishMuseum, London)

maintain garrisons to protect convoys, andeven occasionally cooperate effectively withAllied forces.Their most forceful contribu-tion in purely military terms came whenthey reinforced the forces of the duke ofWellington in his campaign of 1812.

By 1812 between 35,000 and 50,000guerrillas were at large, often proving asbothersome for their allies as they were forthe French. Large areas of the countrysidewere in a state of virtual anarchy. By itselfguerrilla warfare could not defeat Napo-leon, and the existence of the partisanbands hampered attempts to create an ef-fective regular Spanish army. But they hadbeen left to carry the fight alone for longperiods in 1809 and 1810, and guerrillassuccessful in harrying the French gained areputation, however undeserved, as nationalheroes.Their example was to serve as an in-

spiration to Italian and Polish nationalists inthe nineteenth century.

Related entries: Calabria, Revolt in; PeninsularWar;Tyrol, Revolts in

Suggestions for further reading:Chandler, David G. 1994.“Wellington and the

Guerrillas,” in his On the Napoleonic Wars:Collected Essays. London: Greenhill.

Esdaile, Charles J. 1988.“Heroes or Villains? TheSpanish Guerrillas and the Peninsular War,”History Today 38 (April 1988), pp. 29–35.

———. 1991.“The Problem of the SpanishGuerrillas,” in Alice D. Berkeley, ed. NewLights on the Peninsular War. Lisbon: BritishHistorical Society of Portugal.

Eyck, F. Gunther. 1986. Loyal Rebels:AndreasHofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809.Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Finley, Milton. 1991.“Patriots or Brigands? TheCalabrian Partisans, 1806–1812,” Consortiumon Revolutionary Europe, Proceedings 1991, pp.161–170.

118 Guerrilla Warfare

HHaiti

The French colony of Saint-Domingue, making up the western

third of the island of Hispaniola, had seenthe black slave rebellion led by Toussaint-L’Ouverture successfully defy both Frenchand British attempts to secure control since1797. In December 1801, however, Napo-leon dispatched a French force commandedby his brother-in-law, General CharlesLeclerc, to reimpose French rule and re-store slavery. The French force landed inFebruary 1802, and in May Toussaint sur-rendered after receiving guarantees of con-tinued freedom for blacks. Leclerc, how-ever, following Napoleon’s instructions,began a pacification program designed torestore slavery and the plantation system.

In August 1802, with resistance increas-ing, an epidemic of yellow fever killedthousands of French soldiers. Insurrectionspread throughout the colony, and by lateOctober only the main towns remainedunder French control. Leclerc succumbedto the fever in early November, and his suc-cessor, General J. B. de Rochambeau,launched a counteroffensive. But with therenewal of war with Britain in May 1803the French suffered increasingly from lackof supplies and reinforcements, andRochambeau surrendered to the blockad-ing British navy on 30 November.

On 1 January 1804 the independence ofthe Republic of Haiti was proclaimed, andin October Jean-Jacques Dessalines, themost successful Haitian general, followedNapoleonic precedent by proclaiming him-self emperor. Dessalines was assassinated in1806, and after a power struggle the mu-latto leader, Alexandre Pétion, became thefirst president of independent Haiti.

Related entries: Leclerc, Charles VictorEmmanuel;Toussaint-L’Ouverture, FrançoisDominique

Suggestions for further reading:Bryan, Patrick E. 1984. The Haitian Revolution

and its Effects. London: Heinemann.James, C. L. R. 1938. The Black Jacobins:Toussaint

L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.London: Secker and Warburg.

Helvetic Republic

The French satellite republic inSwitzerland under the Directory

and consulate lasted with great difficultyfrom 1798 to 1803, but not even Napoleoncould overcome the centuries-long tradi-tions of autonomy within the Swiss Con-federation and impose a French-inspiredunity.With Napoleon’s victories in Italy in1796, the shortest route from Paris to Milanran through a Switzerland that had to be

Helvetic Republic 119

H

“democratized.” The French in collusionwith Swiss patriots declared that the con-federation should be transformed into aFrench-style “Republic, one and indivisi-ble”; Geneva and Mulhouse were to be an-nexed to France; and the complex politicalsystem simplified into a structure of freeand equal cantons.

The Swiss, however, did not readily ac-cept the changes.The cantons that rejectedthe new arrangement and the rebelliouspeasants of the Valais were defeated in May1798 and the new constitution put into ef-fect on the back of French arms. Switzer-land was divided into nineteen cantons,roughly equal in area, and the republicheaded by a directory of five members,aided by a legislative body and a senateelected by universal male suffrage. Eachcanton was administered by a prefect; feu-dalism was abolished, and numerous re-forms introduced. The regime only func-tioned with difficulty, and two directorsbelieved hostile to France were forced toresign in June 1798.

With the renewal of war in 1799Switzerland became a major theatre ofoperations, and when over half the terri-tory of the Helvetic Republic was occu-pied by Austrian and Russian forces, op-position to the centralist constitution of1798 was reinforced. Napoleon, in powerin France, was forced constantly to medi-ate between centralists and federalists,eventually giving way to federalism. By anact of 19 February 1803 the autonomy ofthe cantons was recognized in a new Hel-vetic Confederation, from which theValais was excluded, becoming an inde-pendent republic tightly controlled byFrance.The attempt to centralize Switzer-land on the model of the French Repub-lic had failed completely.

Related entries: Switzerland

Suggestions for further reading:Oechsli,Wilhelm. 1922. History of Switzerland.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hofer, Andreas (1767–1810)

A n innkeeper’s son from an Alpinevalley near Innsbruck, Hofer at-

tained legendary status as the leader of theTyrolean revolt against Napoleon. In 1796and 1805 he fought as a sharpshooteragainst the French in the Tyrol, rising to therank of captain in the Austrian army. In1805 the Tyrol was granted to Bavaria, Na-poleon’s ally, and in the spring of 1809Hofer led the Tyrolean militia to success,driving the Bavarians out of Innsbruck. Butthe Treaty of Schönbrunn (14 October1809) returned the Tyrol to Bavaria, andHofer led guerrilla action against theFrench army of Marshal François Lefebvre.Hofer was encouraged by false hopes ofAustrian help, but his hiding place was be-trayed to the French, and he was capturedon 27 January 1810. Taken in chains toMantua, Hofer was court-martialed, andwhen the court could not reach a decisionNapoleon personally ordered him to be ex-ecuted before the Austrians could presentany pleas for clemency. Hofer was executedon 18 February 1810, soon becoming thehero of Tyrolean songs, plays, and novels.

Related entries: Guerrilla Warfare;Tyrol,Revolts in

Suggestions for further reading:Eyck, F. Gunther. 1986. Loyal Rebels:Andreas

Hofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809.Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Hohenlinden, Battle of (3 December 1800)

The victory of General Jean Moreauover the young Austrian archduke

John at the Bavarian village of Hohenlin-den, some thirty miles east of Munich, fi-nally decided the Austrians to make peaceand break up the Second Coalition. Much

120 Hofer,Andreas

to Napoleon’s annoyance Moreau’s tri-umph was greeted in Paris as the equal ofhis own defeat of the Austrians at Marengosix months previously. It was thus Moreaurather than Bonaparte who finally forcedAustria to seek an armistice, resulting in theTreaty of Lunéville of 9 February 1801.

Related entries: Coalitions; Moreau, Jean-Victor

Holland, Kingdom of

W hen Napoleon transformed theBatavian Republic into the

Kingdom of Holland in May 1806, with hisbrother Louis as king, he hoped thereby tosee Holland governed in the interests ofFrance and the Bonaparte dynasty, but hewas to be severely disappointed. Louis notonly implemented and continued the re-forms in taxation and education introducedby the Republic, but proved to be his ownmaster, trying to protect the Dutch peoplefrom his brother’s excessive and constantdemands.

During Louis’s short reign a new crimi-nal code was introduced, measures taken toencourage agriculture, and the Royal Acad-emy of Sciences and the Royal Library es-tablished; Louis resisted Napoleon’s demandfor troops and was at best half-hearted inhis support for the Continental System.Despite his often erratic and extravagantbehavior, Louis’s policies made him popularwith the people, and he managed to deflectNapoleon’s complaints until 1810.

In November 1809 Louis was sum-moned to Paris, where he was forced toagree to cede territory to France and en-force the Continental System.When he re-turned to Holland in April 1810 he foundthat his power had been usurped by Frenchofficials. Louis abdicated on 1 July 1810,and the Kingdom of Holland was annexedto France.

Related entries: Batavian Republic; Bonaparte,Louis; Netherlands


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Ellis, Geoffrey. 1991. The Napoleonic Empire.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities PressInternational.

Schama, Simon. 1977. Patriots and Liberators:Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813.New York: Knopf.

Hundred Days

The phase “hundred days” was firstused by the comte de Chabrol, pre-

fect of the Seine, to describe the periodfrom Napoleon’s return to Paris on 20March 1815 to his second abdication on 22June.The attempted reestablishment of theempire was Napoleon’s most extraordinaryventure, but it was doomed to failure be-cause of the international context. Escapingfrom Elba, Napoleon landed on French soilwith a small band of loyal followers, and by6 March had secured control of Grenoble,the capital of Dauphiné. Contrary to Bona-partist legend, the emperor’s return was notgreeted with overwhelming enthusiasm,but it was accepted.The rule of the restoredBourbons was widely unpopular; Napoleonon his march to Paris avoided royaliststrongholds; and most importantly thearmy, reduced in numbers and neglected bythe Bourbons, was easily won over. LouisXVIII and his court fled ignominiously, fi-nally on 30 March arriving in Ghent in theLow Countries.

Napoleon formed a government thatincluded Louis Davout (war), JosephFouché (police), Lazare Carnot (interior),and Louis Caulaincourt (foreign affairs). Inan attempt to rally liberal support hegranted liberty of the press, and had Ben-jamin Constant draw up the Acte Addition-nel establishing a parliamentary regime.However, the victorious Allies put aside

Hundred Days 121

their differences, dashing Napoleon’s hopesthat either Austria or Russia might declarethemselves neutral, and war became hisonly hope for survival. By May he had as-sembled an army of 300,000, but most ofhis marshals had not returned. Only a rapidmovement into the Low Countries againstthe armies of Wellington and Blüchercould produce victory.

The defeat at Waterloo on 18 Junedoomed Napoleon’s new empire, bringingto an end a period that had always had anair of unreality about it. On his return toParis on 21 June he found Fouché the mas-ter of the situation and a legislative assem-bly demanding his abdication. Fouché andDavout signed an armistice with Wellingtonand Blücher, sent Napoleon’s army away tothe south, and arranged Napoleon’s depar-ture for Rochefort and thence into exile onSaint Helena. Louis XVIII returned toSaint-Denis on 3 July and received Fouché,presented to him by Talleyrand:“Vice lean-ing on the arm of crime,” commentedRené de Chateaubriand (Tulard 1985, p.

340).The old regicide and former ministerof police had smoothed the way for a sec-ond restoration of the Bourbons.

Related entries: Abdication, Second; ActeAdditionnel; Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von;Coalitions; Constant, Benjamin; Davout, LouisNicolas; Elba; Fédéré Movement; Fouché, Joseph;Ligny, Battle of; Louis XVIII;Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de;Waterloo, Battleof;Wellington, Duke of






Schom,Alan. 1992. One Hundred Days: Napoleon’sRoad to Waterloo. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.


122 Hundred Days

IIdéologues

The term idéologue was coined by Na-poleon in 1800 as a term of dispar-

agement for those republican intellectualswho turned against his regime. But, al-though he applied it very broadly, it is bet-ter applied to the small group of thinkerswho had supported the coup of 18 Bru-maire in the hope that basic liberties wouldbe maintained, but later became criticaloutsiders in Napoleon’s dictatorial regime.The idéologues shared a belief in human per-fectibility derived from the ideas of Etiennede Condillac, the eighteenth-centuryphilosopher and one of the founders ofmodern psychology, and the mathematicianAntoine Nicolas Condorcet. Their viewswere best expressed by comte AntoineDestutt de Tracy, who had invented theword idéologie, meaning the “science ofideas,” in 1796 in his Éléménts d’Idéologie(1801–1815), the fourth and final volumeof which he held back until after Napo-leon’s fall.As a member of the Senate Tracyproposed the deposition of Napoleon on 2April 1814.

Idéologues, including Benjamin Constantand Pierre Daunou, formed an oppositionto Napoleon within the Tribunate, untiltwenty of them were purged in 1802.Theythen largely retired from active politics, ac-cepting appointments from Napoleonwhile maintaining a kind of muffled oppo-

sition. Mme. de Staël was close to the idéo-logues without ever being one; EmmanuelSieyès was a close associate; but PierreLouis Roederer was the only true idéologueto fill significant office under Napoleon.Other prominent idéologues included theliberal economist Jean-Baptiste Say, thephysiologists Georges Cabanis and FrançoisBichat, and the psychologist Philippe Pinel,one of the first physicians to treat the men-tally ill as medical cases. Despite stickingadmirably to their principles, the idéologuesnever constituted a political party and wereunable or unwilling to appeal to a broaderpublic opinion. Napoleon’s attitude wassummed up by a statement he reputedlymade to Karl von Dalberg in 1806:“All youidéologues act according to ready-made the-ories; I am a practical man, I make the bestof what opportunity offers.”

Related entries: Constant, Benjamin; Daunou,Pierre Claude François; Roederer, Pierre Louis;Staël, Germaine de;Tribunate

Suggestions for further reading:Head, Brian. 1985. Ideology and Social Science:

Destutt de Tracy and French Liberalism.Dordrecht, Netherlands: Nijhoff.

Kaiser,Thomas E. 1980.“Politics and PoliticalEconomy in the Thought of the Ideologues,” History of Political Economy 12pp. 141–160.

Kennedy, Emmet. 1978. A Philosophe in the Age ofRevolution: Destutt de Tracy and the Origins ofIdeology. Philadelphia:American PhilosophicalSociety.

Idéologues 123

I

Staum, Martin S. 1980. Cabanis: Enlightenment andMedical Philosophy in the French Revolution.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Illyria

I n 1805 by the Treaty of Pressburg Na-poleon took control of the formerly

Austrian and Venetian lands on the Adriaticcoast, to which Ragusa (Dubrovnik) wasadded in 1808. Between 1806 and 1809these areas of present-day Slovenia, Croatiaand Bosnia, nominally part of the King-dom of Italy, were governed by MarshalAuguste Marmont, with civil administra-tion under Vincenzo Dandolo. In 1809 fur-ther territories ceded by Austria by theTreaty of Schönbrunn were added to cre-ate the Illyrian Provinces, which nowstretched from Trieste to Dubrovnik andincluded the cities of Fiume (Rijeka) andLjubljana. The military district of Croatiawas granted a special regime, which pre-served its traditional social order, but else-where the years of French rule introducedradical changes.

Under Marmont’s governorship educa-tion and communications were improved inDalmatia. The Civil Code was introducedin family law, succession, and inheritance.Convents were suppressed, church propertyconfiscated, and the ecclesiastical tithe abol-ished. Legal possession of peasant land wastransferred from the state to the peasantsthemselves, a land tax replaced the formerstate tithe, and the alienation of peasantownership made almost impossible.

Ljubljana became the capital of the Il-lyrian Provinces, and by a decree of 25 De-cember 1809 Marmont centralized thegovernment and effected uniformity in ad-ministrative and legislative practice in theten intendancies (reduced to six in 1811)of the new Illyria. In 1812, first underGeneral Henri Bernard and then underJean Andoche Junot, the Civil Code was

adopted in its entirety, and French taxeswere imposed. Conscription had been in-troduced in 1810.

The official abolition of feudalism in1811 made the regime popular for a whilewith the peasants, but turned the nobles to-ward support for Austria. The regime wassupported by radical intellectuals, but itgradually alienated other classes. Peasantdiscontent was aroused by the abolition ofcustomary rights, while the urban middleclasses, especially in Trieste, were hit hard bythe economic effects of war and the Conti-nental System. And while the parish clergyremained neutral, the Catholic religious or-ders, especially the Franciscans, fiercely op-posed French rule and whipped up popularunrest.

The Congress of Vienna returned the Il-lyrian Provinces to Austria, but the impres-sion left by Napoleonic rule in popular tra-dition was not as negative as in many areasof Europe. The French years had seen thebeginnings of a cultural awakening amongthe south Slavs, especially in Slovenia andCroatia. The area had experienced its firstmodern state administration and the firststirrings of national awareness. Even theemperor of Austria was forced to admit thatthe episode had not been totally negative,remarking to Metternich: “It is a great pitythat marshal Marmont was not two or threeyears longer in Dalmatia” (Chandler 1987,p. 259).

Related entries: Austria; Junot,Andoche;Marmont,Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de

Suggestions for further reading:Bjelovuc, Harriet. 1970. The Ragusan Republic:

Victim of Napoleon and its own Conservatism.Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Carter, Francis W. 1972. Dubrovnik (Ragusa):AClassic City-State. London: Seminar Press.

Chandler, David G. 1987. Napoleon’s Marshals.New York: Macmillan.

Ellis, Geoffrey. 1991. The Napoleonic Empire.Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities PressInternational.

Woolf, Stuart. 1991. Napoleon’s Integration ofEurope. London and New York: Routledge.

124 Illyria

Imperial Catechism

The new catechism devised by Napo-leon and abbé Etienne Bernier in

1806 shows the extent to which spiritualauthority of the Catholic Church followingthe Concordat of 1801 was to be sub-servient to the will of the emperor. Chil-dren were taught loyalty to Napoleon andthe Bonaparte dynasty and deference tothose in government over them.“NapoleonI, our Emperor” had restored religious wor-ship, preserved public order “by his pro-found and active wisdom,” and now de-fends the state with the strength of his arm.Napoleon’s young subjects owed him “love,respect, obedience, loyalty, military serviceand the taxes ordered for the preservationand defence of the Empire and his throne”(Arnold 1994, p. 222). Pope Pius VII refusedto recognize the imperial catechism, but thepliant French clergy accepted it.Along withthe introduction of the Festival of SaintNapoléon on 15 August, the papacy foundit one of the most discomfiting of Napo-leon’s innovations.

Related entries: Catholic Church; Concordat;Pius VII, Pope




Imperial Guard

N ot, as its name implies, a personalbodyguard for Napoleon, the Impe-

rial Guard was in fact a military elite withits own infantry, cavalry, artillery, and ser-vices. It was Napoleon’s ultimate reserve,made up of veterans and almost never com-mitted to battle. The Guard was multina-tional, with Egyptian, Italian, Polish, Ger-

man, Swiss, and other units as well asFrench. The Old Guard was formed be-tween 1800 and 1806, the Middle Guardbetween 1806 and 1809, and the YoungGuard thereafter, the whole growing innumbers from 8,000 in 1805 to 80,000 in1812. From the Guard, 60,000 marchedinto Russia in 1812, and the Old Guardbattalions were the last to be committedinto battle at Waterloo. When they werethrown back it was a sign that Napoleonhad lost the battle. In later years the Imper-ial Guard became the focus of heroic storiesand legends and was revered alike by oldsoldiers and Bonapartists.

Related entries: Army;Waterloo, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Lachouque, Henry. 1997. The Anatomy of Glory:

Napoleon and His Guard. London: Greenhill.

Imperial Police

C entralized in the Ministry of Gen-eral Police under Joseph Fouché and

then Anne Jean Savary, Napoleon’s policeforce played a vital part in maintaining theauthority of the imperial regime in Franceand may be seen as Europe’s first modernpolitical police. A law of 10 July 1804 es-tablished four regional councillors of statefor police affairs and a sophisticated sys-tem, by the standards of the time, for ob-taining, storing, and retrieving informa-tion. Under Savary after 1810 the policesystem became more heavy-handed andarbitrary than under Fouché, whom Na-poleon had (rightly) never completelytrusted.

Related entries: Fouché, Joseph; Savary,AnneJean Marie René



Imperial Police 125

Imperial University

N ot a university in the usual sense ofthe word, Napoleon’s Imperial

University, set up in 1808, was the tip of thepyramid of the new centralized educationsystem and constituted a teaching corpora-tion, theoretically made up of all those in-volved in the education of males in France.At its head stood a grand master, chosen byNapoleon, aided by a Council of Thirty.Napoleon’s choice for the top post, Louisde Fontanes, used his position to favorCatholics within the education system, buthis conservative ideas on education wereprobably not far removed from the em-peror’s own.

The university was an active body, witha chancellor, a treasurer, and up to thirty in-spectors general reporting to the council.Schools at all levels reported to one oftwenty-seven regional academies, headedby rectors appointed by the grand master,and the grand master himself was rector ofParis. In its six years of existence under Na-poleon the university, though not securingthe desired monopoly of teaching, enabledthe government to establish strict controlover schooling.The historian Geoffrey Bestnotes its essential nature:“Its perfectly hier-archical organization was in essence mili-tary, with the First Consul Emperor ascommander-in-chief ” (Best 1982, p. 118).Much of its organization and even more ofits spirit is still evident in French educationtoday.




Best, Geoffrey. 1982. War and Society inRevolutionary Europe, 1770–1870. London:Fontana.


Industry

F rance under Napoleon experiencedno industrial takeoff, but under the

shelter of Napoleon’s protectionist policies,did make progress in some key areas. Theeffects of economic blockade and warfareheld back progress in the iron industry,where manufacturers remained contentwith traditional preindustrial methods, andthe technological gap between France andBritain widened. Iron production remainedlargely limited to areas rich in both iron oreand forests to provide wood, and innova-tions were small-scale and local.The devel-opment of heavy industry based on coaland iron still lay in the future.

The most important industrial sector re-mained textiles.While older branches of thetextile industry continued to decline orstagnate, cotton, the new industry of theeighteenth century, took large steps alongthe road of mechanization under Napole-onic rule, at least until 1810. Mules, spin-ning jennies, and waterframes rapidly re-placed hand spinning, and the expandingcotton industry established itself not only inParis, but also in the cities and environs ofRouen, Lille, and Mulhouse, the new in-dustrial centers of Normandy, northernFrance, and Alsace. In the absence of Britishand Indian cloths, excluded by the Conti-nental System, a somewhat artificial cottonboom lasted until shortages of raw materialcaused bankruptcies after 1810.The returnof peace and British competition in 1815placed the cotton industry in a precariousposition, but it was still in a reasonable stateto face the future.

The other sector where progress contin-ued was the chemical industry, where inno-vation depended as much on science as onentrepreneurial initiative. Enterprises headedby chemists joined by personal links devel-oped the industry around its main centersin Paris and Marseille.The most celebratedchemist and industrialist, Jean Antoine

126 Imperial University

Chaptal, was also one of Napoleon’s mosteffective ministers; other examples includedthe Darcet family, engaged in the refiningof metal and the production of artificialsoda, and Auguste Jacquemart, brother of aprominent banker and himself a manufac-turer of soap.

Related entries: Chaptal, Jean Antoine;Continental System; Economy


of Napoleonic France. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America. pp. 169–173.


Crouzet, François. 1964.“Wars, Blockade andEconomic Change in Europe, 1792–1815,”Journal of Economic History 24, pp. 567–588.

Ellis, Geoffrey. 1981. Napoleon’s ContinentalBlockade:The Case of Alsace. Oxford:Clarendon Press.

Forrest,Alan, and Peter Jones, eds. 1991.Reshaping France:Town, Country and Regionduring the French Revolution. Manchester:Manchester University Press.

Institut National

The Institut National des Sciences et desArts was established in 1795 to re-

place the various scientific and culturalacademies of the ancien régime.As a rewardfor his victories in the first Italian cam-paign, Napoleon was elected to the FirstClass of the Institute, that of Physical andMathematical Sciences, on 25 December1797. He initially took his membership ofthis predominant section very seriously andtook scholars from the Institute to Egypt,where he created the Institute of Egypt inCairo.

As first consul Napoleon continued tofavor the scientific activities of the institutebut came to resent criticism of his authori-tarianism from idéologues in the Class ofMoral and Political Sciences.The politicallyinspired reorganization of 1803, therefore,

divided this section into harmless newclasses covering French Language and Lit-erature and History and Ancient Literature,with the sciences retaining their privilegedposition.

The government of the empire retainedits interest in the institute, now renamedthe Institut de France. Members were classi-fied as public servants and given generousstipends, and members of the First Classwere consulted by ministerial departmentsand the army on aspects of public utility.But any idea of collective scientific researchsoon disappeared, and the Institute’s chieffunction came to be the diffusion of privateresearch. Official consultations became re-stricted to minor technical matters. Despitehis growing mistrust, Napoleon kept theinstitute alive, and it survives to this day, stillhoused under the imposing CollègeMazarin on the Left Bank of the Seine op-posite the Louvre.

Related entries: Description de l’Égypte;Idéologues

Suggestions for further reading:Hahn, Roger. 1971. The Anatomy of a Scientific

Institution: the Paris Academy of Sciences,1666–1803. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Williams, L. Pearce. 1956.“Science, Educationand Napoleon I,” Isis 47, pp. 369–382.

Italian Campaigns

N apoleon’s first Italian campaign,1796–1797, made him the most fa-

mous and successful general of the FrenchRepublic, while his second campaign of1800 was vital in securing the rule of theconsulate on firm foundations. On bothoccasions his prestige and power were en-hanced enormously.

Napoleon took command of the Armyof Italy in March 1796 at the age oftwenty-six, with orders to prevent the Aus-

Italian Campaigns 127

trians and their allies from reinforcingHabsburg forces in Germany.The campaignwas meant to be a secondary action, butNapoleon’s outstanding victories allowedhim effectively to impose his own policyon the Directory in Paris. With only asmall, ill-equipped army at his disposal, Na-poleon waged a war of movement, strikingshrewd and stinging blows against isolatedelements of the numerically superior Aus-trian and Piedmontese armies. In the sum-mer of 1796, after defeating the Piedmon-tese at the battle of Mondovi he forcedthem out of the war, and turning on theAustrians he overcame them at Lodi andseized Milan. Moving east he surrounded alarge Austrian force at Mantua.

The Austrian attempts to relieve Man-tua were poorly coordinated, allowing Na-poleon to concentrate his forces and turnon their forces separately. In August 1796,following the battles of Lonato and Cas-

tiglione, he drove the remnants of Dago-bert von Wurmser’s forces into Mantua.Further victories at Arcola in November1796 and Rivoli in January 1797 forcedthe Mantua garrison to surrender and freedNapoleon to mount an offensive over theAlps towards Vienna. Already carefully cul-tivating his heroic image, Napoleon domi-nated the armistice negotiations at Leobenleading to the Treaty of Campo Formio.He was now the greatest military hero ofthe Republic, and the stage was set for hisfuture ambitions.

If the campaign of 1796–1797 madeNapoleon famous in France and Europe,that of 1800 ensured his political survivalafter the coup of 18 Brumaire. The war-weary French public demanded a speedyconclusion to the war against the SecondCoalition. In fact only Austria was still ac-tively engaged in the fighting, and Napo-leon’s aim, as the leading figure in the newconsulate regime, was to defeat themwithout allowing any other general to gainthe credit and popular acclaim. He de-cided to launch the campaign in Italy,downgrading the German theater to a sec-ondary role.

Napoleon placed André Masséna incommand of the garrison at Genoa, hopingto attract the main body of the Austrianforces in Italy toward the Ligurian port,while he himself led an army of 60,000men across the Alps into Lombardy, sceneof his earlier triumphs. By 1 June 1800 hewas again in Milan. But while Napoleonbusied himself against the scattered Austrianforces in Piedmont, the main Austrian forceunder General Michael Melas had takenGenoa. Napoleon thought that the Austri-ans were preparing to retreat rather thanfight, and he detached units to block poten-tial escape routes. He therefore faced theAustrians at Marengo on 14 June with un-necessarily depleted forces. The closelycontested battle was presented by Napo-leon as a major victory. His popularity inFrance received another boost, but the war

128 Italian Campaigns

David’s sketch shows General Bonaparte at the timeof his first Italian campaign in 1796–1797. (Libraryof Congress)

dragged on in Germany until December1800, when the French under Jean Moreauwon a decisive victory at Hohenlinden.Napoleon finally achieved his aim of peacewith Austria in 1801.

Related entries: Arcola, Battle of;Austria;Bassano, Battle of; Bussaco, Battle of; CampoFormio,Treaty of; Castiglione, Battle of;Coalitions; Consulate; Directory; Genoa; Mantua;Marengo, Battle of; Masséna,André; Mondovi,Battle of; Napoleonic Legend; Papal States;Personality, Cult of; Propaganda; RevolutionaryWars; Rivoli, Battle of;Venice

Suggestions for further reading:Burton, Reginald George. 1912. Napoleon’s

Campaigns in Italy, 1796–97 and 1800.London and New York: G.Allen.



Phipps, Ramsay Weston. 1926–1939. The Armiesof the First French Republic and the Rise of theMarshals of Napoleon I. 5 vols. London:Humphrey Milford.

Italy, Kingdom of

The Kingdom of Italy was formed in1805 from the former Cisalpine Re-

public, with Napoleon as king and Eugènede Beauharnais as viceroy. It incorporatedthe northern and eastern plains of Italy.Venice was added to the original Cisalpineterritories in 1806, followed by the PapalStates of Urbino, Macerata, Ancona, andCamerino in 1807, and the southern Tyrolin 1809. In all some 7 million subjects livedin Eugène’s kingdom, supporting an armyof 100,000 men.

Eugène was allowed little political ini-tiative, but succeeded in creating a sur-prisingly broad basis of support amonghis people for several years. The adminis-tration of the kingdom was reorganizedon French lines, with twenty-four de-

partments under prefects appointed bythe viceroy, who also nominated a senatefor the passage of legislation. TheNapoleonic Codes became the basis oflaw administered through courts on theFrench model. In the army and adminis-tration careers were open to the talented,with new nobles and educated common-ers employed in high office alongsidemembers of the old nobility. The wholewas overseen by a ministry formed en-tirely of Italians, dominated by FrancescoMelzi d’Eril as grand chancellor. Theminister of finance, Giuseppe Prina,miraculously kept the budget in balance,despite Napoleon’s demands for taxation,until 1813. Schools and universities werebrought under central control, and grantswere provided for scholars and scientistsand the arts encouraged through a royalacademy, a conservatory of music, and anacademy of fine arts.

The economy, however, presents a moreequivocal impression. Eugène protestedagainst Napoleon’s exorbitant demands formoney, and Prina succeeded in keepingtaxes lower than in France. But the Conti-nental System subordinated the needs ofItalian producers to a damaging tariff sys-tem. Enterprising farmers and manufactur-ers converted to the export of raw silk andfood, and even began growing cotton, sothat the System could be circumvented.

The Italian troops in Napoleon’s armiescontinued to fight well, with 20,000 lost inRussia in 1812. But by 1814 Eugène’s at-tempts to hold on to his kingdom by reach-ing agreement with the Allies were doomedto failure. Prina was killed by a mob inMilan, and other representatives of theNapoleonic order were threatened. TheAustrians moved back into control ofnorthern Italy.Within a few years, however,Italian patriots came to look back on theKingdom of Italy, with all its faults, as theprecursor of national unity. Its tricolor flagof red, white, and green was adopted as thebanner of united Italy.

Italy, Kingdom of 129

Related entries: Beauharnais, Eugène Rose de;Continental System; Melzi d’Eril, Francesco;Papal States


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Grab,Alexander. 1988.“The Kingdom of Italy

and Napoleon’s Continental Blockade,”Consortium on Revolutionary Europe,Proceedings, 1988, pp. 587–604.

Hearder, Harry. 1983. Italy in the Age of theRisorgimento, 1790–1870. London and NewYork: Longman.

Oman, Carola. 1966. Napoleon’s Viceroy: Eugène deBeauharnais. London: Collins.

Rath, Reuben J. 1941. The Fall of the NapoleonicKingdom of Italy, 1814. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Woolf, Stuart. 1991. Napoleon’s Integration ofEurope. London and New York:Routledge.

130 Italy, Kingdom of

Jacobinism

The term Jacobin, first used in 1790to describe members of the revolu-

tionary club, the Society of Friends of theConstitution, which met at the former Do-minican (Jacobin) convent in Paris, becameassociated with the Montagnard govern-ment of 1793–1794 led by MaximilienRobespierre. Napoleon and his brotherswere Jacobin supporters in the early 1790s,helping to organize clubs in Corsica, andNapoleon’s pamphlet Le Souper de Beaucairecan be read as pro-Jacobin. He owed hiscommand of the artillery during the siegeof Toulon to the Corsican Jacobin,AntonioCristoforo Saliceti, and Robespierre’s sister,who knew him in 1794, described him as aconvinced Montagnard. The sincerity ofNapoleon’s Jacobinism is, however, open todoubt in view of his overriding ambition.He later explained:“I was then very youngand my opinions were not yet settled.”

By the time of the Directory Jacobinismwas associated with the radical democraticopposition, and Napoleon was definitelyanti-Jacobin. The myth of a “Jacobin con-spiracy” was used to justify the coup of 18Brumaire, and during the consulate Napo-leon continued to play on moderate fears ofa Jacobin coup. The Opera Plot to assassi-nate Napoleon on 24 December 1800 wasblamed on “Jacobins.” Some 130 were ar-rested and deported to the Seychelles or

Guiana, where half were to die in exile, andnone were pardoned even when it hadbeen established that the plot was the workof royalists.Throughout Napoleon’s rule thepolice kept a watchful eye on all suspected“Jacobins” and “anarchists,” and displays ofovert republicanism were limited to thewords or actions of reckless individuals.

Italian Jacobinism was somewhat differentfrom the French original. Giacobini, drawnmostly from the ranks of the professionalmiddle classes, wanted an independent, uni-fied, and secular Italian republic. Many Italianexiles had played a role in the Revolution,and the Giacobini placed their faith in Frenchinvasion leading to mass insurrection againstthe Italian princes and the papacy. But theGiacobini lacked popular support, and Napo-leon colluded with more moderate Italian re-publicans in the formation of so-called “sisterrepublics” under French control. With thepassage of time the Giacobini came to be seenas the forerunners of Italian unification, butduring the Napoleonic era in Italy they weredistrusted by the French, and rejected by Ital-ians as being too closely associated with theinvader.

Related entries: Corsica; Directory; OperaPlot; Opposition Movements; Saliceti,AntonioCristoforo; Souper de Beaucaire, Le

Suggestions for further reading:Brinton, Crane. 1930. The Jacobins. New York:

Macmillan.

Jacobinism 131

JJ

Lefebvre, Georges. 1967. The French Revolutionfrom 1793 to 1799. London: Routledge andKegan Paul.

Woloch, Isser. 1970. Jacobin Legacy:The DemocraticMovement under the Directory. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of (14 October 1806)

The double victory of Napoleon andLouis Davout over the Prussians ex-

posed the incompetent leadership of thePrussian army and led to the collapse of thestate. Although neither side was ever fullyaware of what the other was doing, Napo-leon’s more decisive way of waging warproved superior to the hidebound Prussianapproach. When war between France andPrussia threatened in September 1806 thePrussian army of 171,000 troops movedinto the Weimar region of central Germany,but Napoleon moved his 180,000 men inthree columns to the Prussian rear, cuttingoff their lines of communication towardDresden, Leipzig, and Berlin. He was thusable to throw a net around the retreatingPrussians and engage them between Jenaand Auerstädt to the east of Weimar.

The Prussian forces were divided intothree armies. The main force under theduke of Brunswick, accompanied by KingFrederick William III, marched to thenortheast, while the other two armies, oneunder Prince von Hohenlohe and a smallerforce under Ernst von Rüchel, guarded theflank and rear around Jena. On the morn-ing of 14 October Napoleon’s main forceof 96,000 men (only 54,000 of which hehad to use) engaged Hohenlohe’s 53,000on the plains north of Jena. After fiercefighting, by midafternoon the Prussianswere in full retreat.

At the same time Davout’s Third Corpshad engaged Brunswick’s superior forces atAuerstädt, eleven miles to the north. Napo-

leon had to acknowledge that the ThirdCorps performed wonders. For two hoursthe leading division, commanded by Gen-eral Charles Gudin, fought off two Prussiandivisions, plus the cavalry under Gebhardvon Blücher.When the other French divi-sions arrived to support the vanguard,Brunswick was mortally wounded and theking took command, but was incapable ofmaking his numerical advantage count.ThePrussians were driven off in all directions,and a pursuit led by Joachim Murat’s cav-alry destroyed all semblance of Prussian dis-cipline and morale. While thousands ofmutinous and starving Prussian troops wererounded up, Frederick William fled toKönigsberg. Berlin, the Prussian capital, wasleft to its fate.

The Prussian soldiers had fought withconsiderable courage, but their command-ers had displayed not only tactical inflexi-bility but sheer incompetence. Napoleon’svictory was complete. Hermann vonBoyen, a young Prussian officer badlywounded in the battle, wrote: “The care-fully assembled and apparently unshakablemilitary structure of Prussia was suddenlyshattered to its very foundations” (Sheehan1989, p. 234). Napoleon had suffered fewerthan 7,000 casualties, while around 11,000Prussians were killed or injured and 15,000captured. Carl von Clausewitz observed:“Itwas not just a case of a style which had out-lived its usefulness but the most extremepoverty of imagination to which routinehas ever led” (Gates 1997, p. 64).

Related entries: Davout, Louis Nicolas;Germany, Campaigns in; Prussia



———. 1987.“Davout,” in David G. Chandler,ed. Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.


Sheehan, James J. 1989. German History1770–1866. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

132 Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of

Jews

N apoleon’s personal attitude towardthe Jewish people is difficult to de-

termine, with both friendly and hostilestatements being more or less reliablyrecorded. He certainly showed no more re-spect for Judaism as a religion than he didfor Christianity or Islam. Yet his memorywas long revered by Jews in Germany, as hisarmies continued the work of the revolu-tionary armies in imposing civil equality forJews in conquered territories. “Whereverhis victorious legions came,” writes theAmerican Jewish historian Abram LeonSacher,“the walls of the ghetto fell and theJews walked forth free and unafraid”(Sacher 1989, p. 296). Even the beginningsof Jewish emancipation in Prussia after thedefeats of 1806–1807 may be attributed in-directly to Napoleon, as Prussian reformistsperceived emancipation as economicallyand politically beneficial. The story that in1799 he appealed to the Jews of Asia andAfrica for support, promising them ahomeland in Palestine, is however a legend.

Napoleon sought to follow the traditionof the Revolution in pursuing the eco-nomic, social, and political assimilation ofFrench Jewry. He demanded their obedi-ence through a religious settlement parallelto that imposed on Catholics and Protes-tants. In 1806 he convened an Assembly ofJewish Notables from France, Italy, andGermany to redefine traditional Judaism inaccordance with Napoleonic ideas of patri-otism and social morality.This assembly wasfollowed in 1807 by the Grand Sanhedrinof European rabbis, supposed to adapt thelaws of Moses “to the customs and usages ofthe present.”Adding his own brand of prag-matism to revolutionary ideals, Napoleonwanted above all to obtain Jewish consentto civil marriage, taxation, conscription, andwhatever changes he may have wished tomake to commercial practices.

By an Imperial Edict of 18 March 1808Jewish worship in France and its annexed

territories was organized through a centralconsistory in Paris, with an approved syna-gogue in each department with a Jewishcommunity. Napoleon’s wishes with regardto the Jews were largely met within France,where he could be assured that they re-garded themselves as French citizens on apar with all others, and in areas under directFrench rule. But he made no attempt to ap-peal to Jewish sentiment in enemy coun-tries. Jews in Russia and Prussia supportedtheir own rulers against him, and the Roth-schilds, the biggest banking house in Eu-rope, proved of considerable help to theBritish and Austrians in providing funds fortroops and negotiating loans and subsidiesto anti-French rulers.


of Napoleonic France. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, pp. 224–226, 280–287.

Hyman, Paula E. 1991. The Emancipation of theJews of Alsace. New Haven:Yale UniversityPress.

Malino, Frances. 1978. The Sephardic Jews ofBordeaux:Assimilation and Emancipation inRevolutionary and Napoleonic France.University,Alabama: University of AlabamaPress.

Sacher,Abram Leon. 1989.“Napoleon and theJews,” in Frank A. Kafker and James M. Laux,eds., Napoleon and His Times: SelectedInterpretations. Malibar, FL: Krieger. pp.296–300.

Schwarzfuchs, Simon. 1979. Napoleon, the Jewsand the Sanhedrin. London: Routledge andKegan Paul.

Sorkin, David Jan. 1987. The Transformation ofGerman Jewry, 1780–1840. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste(1762–1833)

The son of a surgeon of Limoges,Jourdan first saw military action be-

tween 1779 and 1781, serving in the Amer-ican War of Independence and the West In-dies before being discharged in 1784.Elected as captain of the National Guard of

Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste 133

Limoges in 1789, he restarted a military ca-reer that saw him emerge as a hero of theRevolution.As commander of the Army ofthe Moselle, responsible for holding thefrontier with Luxemburg and southern Bel-gium, Jourdan led the French to victoryover the Austrians at Fleurus (26 June1794), a triumph which assured Frenchcontrol over Belgium for the next twentyyears. Jourdan resigned his command in1795, but became active in politics.As pres-ident of the Council of Five Hundredunder the Directory he was responsible forthe so-called Jourdan Law, which createdthe system of military conscription used byNapoleon. Rejoining the army in 1798 heperformed feebly in the fighting against theSecond Coalition in 1799.

True to his republican principles and de-spite his disillusionment with the Directory,Jourdan opposed the coup of 18 Brumaireand was briefly imprisoned. Napoleon,however, wanting republican heroes to le-gitimize his power, freed him in 1800, madehim inspector general of the infantry andthe cavalry, and in 1804 created him a mar-shal of the empire. But he was never givenpositions in accord with his rank. Jourdanreplaced the rapacious André Masséna aschief of staff to King Joseph Bonaparte inNaples in 1806 and, forming a lastingfriendship with Napoleon’s elder brother,followed him to Spain in 1808. As chief ofstaff of the Army of Spain in 1808–1809and again in 1812–1813 Jourdan faced animpossible task trying to coordinate the ef-forts of marshals who acted as laws untothemselves, but he was nevertheless forcedto accept ultimate responsibility. He thusbecame the scapegoat for the defeats at Ta-lavera (1809) and at the decisive battle ofVitoria (1813), which brought a final endto the Napoleonic kingdom of Spain.

Jourdan rallied to Napoleon during theHundred Days in 1815, but played little ac-tive part, and Louis XVIII restored his rankas marshal and created him a peer of France

in 1817. He was still serving in 1830, whenhe was made governor of Les Invalides, aposition he held until his death at the ageof seventy-one. Jourdan was a capable sol-dier rather than a great one, but Napoleon,looking back during his time on Saint He-lena, realized that he had behaved badly to-ward him. “Jourdan is a true patriot,” hesaid,“and that is the answer to many thingsthat have been said about him” (Glover1987, p. 168).

Related entries: Conscription; Peninsular War.

Suggestions for further reading:Glover, Michael. 1987.“Jourdan,” in David G.

Chandler, ed. Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Junot, Andoche (1771–1813)

A former law student and volunteer inthe revolutionary armies, Junot was a

sergeant at the siege of Toulon in 1793. Na-poleon, appreciating his coolness under fire,made Junot his secretary and secured himrapid promotion. He served his patron inItaly and Egypt, where he was wounded ina duel with an officer who had criticizedNapoleon. After a brief spell as ambassadorto Portugal Junot fought at Austerlitz and,in 1807, commanded the almost bloodlessconquest of Portugal, being rewarded withthe title of duke of Abrantès. However, Na-poleon never forgave him for being drivenout of Portugal by the duke of Wellingtonin the following year, and he never receivedthe marshal’s baton for which he seemeddestined.

Junot fought in the Wagram campaign of1809 and again in Spain in 1810. But whenhe commanded the Eighth Corps in theRussian campaign of 1812 his health wasfailing, and he returned a broken man. Na-

134 Junot,Andoche

poleon made Junot governor of the IllyrianProvinces in 1813, but by now it was clearthat he was going insane. Shipped back tohis father’s home near Dijon, he jumpedfrom a window to his death in July 1813.

Junot’s wife, Laure Permon, betterknown as the duchess of Abrantès, wrotegossipy memoirs of the Napoleonic era aswell as harrowing accounts of the horrorsof the Peninsular War, which she had wit-

nessed at first hand traveling with her hus-band’s troops.

Related entries: Illyria; Portugal


the Peninsular War. London:Allen and Unwin.Oman, Charles W. C. 1902–1930. A History of the

Peninsular War. 7 vols. Oxford: ClarendonPress.

Junot,Andoche 135

KKalisch, Treaty of

(28 February 1813)

The alliance between Prussia andRussia following Napoleon’s defeat

in the Russian campaign of 1812 commit-ted Russia to assist Prussia to regain the ter-ritory lost by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1806.Anaccompanying proclamation by FrederickWilliam III and Alexander I calling on theGerman princes to rise against Napoleonmet with little response among rulers andpeople anxious at seeing the Russians andPrussians advancing from the east.

Related entries: Coalitions; Prussia; Russia

Suggestions for further reading:Ross, Steven T. 1981. European Diplomatic History,


Kellermann, FrançoisChristophe (1735–1820)

A lready an experienced soldier withthe rank of major general in 1789,

Kellermann became one of the heroes ofthe Revolution by playing a crucial role inthe battle of Valmy (20 September 1792),which saved France from Prussian invasion.He was commander of the Army of Italy in

1796, replaced by Napoleon, and in Sep-tember 1797 retired from active duty. Al-though Kellermann did not support thecoup of 18 Brumaire, Napoleon was anx-ious to secure the support of this republicanhero. Kellermann was made a senator in1799 and later president of the Senate,while in 1804 he became the oldest of themarshals of France. During Napoleon’sgreat military campaigns Kellermann com-manded reserve troops, putting his organi-zational abilities to good use, but he nevertook the field. He refused to rally to Napo-leon during the Hundred Days, and as anoctogenarian participated in the reorgani-zation of the army under the Restoration.

Related entries: Revolutionary Wars; Senate

Suggestions for further reading:Hofschröer, Peter. 1987.“Kellermann,” in David

G. Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. NewYork: Macmillan.

Kléber, Jean-Baptiste(1753–1800)

O ne of the most competent generalsof the Republic, Kléber played a dis-

tinguished part in Napoleon’s Egyptiancampaign. Before 1798 he had alreadyserved in the Vendée (in 1793) and in Ger-

Kléber, Jean-Baptiste 137

K

many (between 1794 and 1796) and hadshown himself a first-rate tactician andcommander. However, disagreements withhis superiors led to his resignation in Feb-ruary 1797.Assigned to the Army of Egyptunder Napoleon, he was wounded in theattack on Alexandria on 2 July 1798, butstill served in all the principal battles inSyria. When Napoleon returned to Francein August 1799 Kléber was named com-mander in chief in Syria and Egypt. He ne-gotiated a treaty for the evacuation of theFrench with the British admiral Sir SydneySmith, only to have it rejected by the gov-ernment of William Pitt. Kléber crushedthe Turkish army at Heliopolis on 23March 1800 and put down the revolt inCairo in April. But he was assassinated by ayoung Muslim fanatic, Suleiman el Halepi,on 14 June 1800.

Related entries: Egyptian Campaign


Campaigns, 1798–1801. London: Osprey.Chandler, David G. 1974. The Campaigns of


Herold, J. Christopher. 1962. Bonaparte in Egypt.New York: Harper and Row.

Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich(1745–1813)

The wily old fox of the North, as Na-poleon called him, is remembered as

the chief instrument of the emperor’sdownfall in Russia. Kutuzov was an im-mensely experienced soldier and diplomatwho had lost his right eye in 1773 duringthe Russian war of 1770–1774 against theTurks. As well as distinguishing himself inthe armies of Count Rumyantsev andAlexander Suvorov, Kutuzov learned in theTurkish wars the valuable lesson, also ap-plied by Napoleon, that the object of war-

fare was not the occupation of territory butthe destruction of enemy forces. But, unlikeNapoleon, he saw that this destruction wasnot necessarily always best achieved in onedecisive battle.

In 1801 Kutuzov distanced himself fromthe plot against Tsar Paul I, thereby earningthe mistrust of Alexander I, who sent himinto virtual exile.With the formation of theThird Coalition in 1805, however, Alexan-der was compelled to recall one of his mostresourceful and intelligent commanders.Forced to act jointly with the Austrians,Kutuzov managed to preserve the Russianarmy intact after Napoleon’s victory in thebattle of Ulm. He proposed withdrawal toRussia but was overruled by Alexander,who took personal command and insistedon forcing Napoleon into a decisive en-gagement. The result was the disaster ofAusterlitz, after which Kutuzov withdrewthe remnants of the Russian army in goodorder to Poland. Alexander, peevishly andunjustly, blamed Kutuzov for Austerlitz. Forthe next six years he again occupied minorposts, until he was recalled in 1811 to pros-ecute the simmering war against Turkey inMoldavia. Within a few months he hadforced the Turks to sign the Treaty ofBucharest, thereby freeing Russia from theTurkish entanglement as war threatenedwith Napoleon.

When Napoleon’s Grande Armée invadedRussia in June 1812, the Russians retreated,and in August after the loss of SmolenskAlexander was compelled, with great reluc-tance, to replace Barclay de Tolly with Ku-tuzov as commander in chief.After the bat-tle of Borodino on 7 September, Kutuzovdecided to continue the retreat beyondMoscow. “Napoleon,” he said, “is a torrentwhich as yet we are unable to stem;Moscow will be the sponge to suck himdry” (Palmer 1984, p. 170). He summarilyrejected all armistice proposals from Napo-leon and waited for the French to retreat.Only then did he harry the retreatingGrande Armée all the way to the river Bere-

138 Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich

zina, disrupting the orderly progress of theretreat and inflicting heavy casualties.

When in the spring of 1813 the A l l i e sbegan their advance into Germ a ny, Ku t u-z ov commanded the main Russian army.But his health, which had long been un-c e rt a i n , g ave way, and he died at Bunzlauin Silesia on 28 A p ril 1813. Ku t u z ov doesnot deserve the sole credit for Napoleon’sdefeat in Russia; the strategy of re t re a thad already been pursued by Barc l ay deTo l l y. On the other hand, it is equallyw rong to criticize him for being lethargi cand unwilling to give battle. His prev i o u sc a reer proved that he could act swiftly andd e c i s ively when occasion demanded. T h eRussians pro b a bly had no option but to

adopt delaying tactics against the inva s i o n .Ku t u z ov carried them out with outstand-ing success.

Related entries: Austerlitz, Battle of; Borodino,Battle of; Danube Campaigns; RussianCampaign; Ulm, Battle of


1812. London: Seeley.Palmer,Alan. 1984. An Encyclopaedia of Napoleon’s

Europe. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.Parkinson, Roger. 1976. The Fox of the North:The

Life of Kutuzov, General of War and Peace.London: Peter Davies.

Riehn, Richard K. 1991. 1812: Napoleon’sRussian Campaign. New York: John Wiley.


Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich 139

LLa Plaigne, Léon Charles de

(1806–1881)

O ne of the two illegitimate sons ac-knowledged by Napoleon, the other

being the child of Marie Walewska, “lecomte Léon’s” contribution to history lay inhis existence, proof that Napoleon could fa-ther children. Napoleon’s affair with Léon’smother, Eléonore Deruelle de La Plaigne,was brief and meaningless, but he showeredincome and gifts upon the child who madehis divorce from Joséphine more feasible.Any hopes Napoleon may have had forLéon were unfulfilled. An inveterate gam-bler, he spent most of his life sponging offhis Bonaparte relatives and died in poverty.

Suggestions for further reading:Aronson,Theo. 1965. The Golden Bees:The Story

of the Bonapartes. London: Oldbourne.

Lacuée, Jean Gérard(1752–1841)

N apoleon called Lacuée, minister ofwar administration between 1810

and 1813, his most able administrator afterPierre Daru. Lacuée had been influential inthe reorganization of the army during theRevolution, and Napoleon called on his ex-perience in drafting legislation about con-

scription. Between 1806 and 1810 as direc-tor general of the combined bureau dealingwith conscription and payrolls Lacuée haddirect access to Napoleon.Appointed minis-ter of war administration on 3 January 1810,Lacuée oversaw the enormous task of orga-nizing the supply of both the Grande Arméefor the invasion of Russia and the new forcesraised for the campaign of 1813. Lacuée’scorrespondence showed that he stood up toNapoleon over details of the enforcement ofconscription and opposed the marriage toMarie-Louise and the Russian adventure.He resigned his office in November 1813when he could no longer support Napo-leon’s continuation of the war.

Related entries: Conscription; Grande Armée




Lafayette, Marie Paul Joseph Roch Gilbert du Motier,

Marquis de (1757–1832)

The hero of the American Revolutionand creator of the Paris National

Guard had been a prisoner of the Prussians

Lafayette, Marie Paul Joseph Roch Gilbert du Mottier, Marquis de 141

L

and then the Austrians since 1792 when aspecial provision of the Treaty of CampoFormio, negotiated by Napoleon, securedhis release in September 1797. He took upresidence first in Holstein then in Holland,but on hearing of the coup of 18 Brumairehurried to Paris under an assumed name.Lafayette’s name was stricken from the listof émigrés in May 1800, but he rejected of-fers of a seat in the Senate and the ambas-sadorship to the United States and inMarch 1802 requested his retirement fromthe army. He did not reenter politics untilafter Napoleon’s fall, when he became aleader of the liberal opposition under theRestoration.

Suggestions for further reading:Gottschalk, Louis R., and Margaret Maddox.

1969–1973. Lafayette in the French Revolution.2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lannes, Jean (1769–1809)

V olatile, courageous, impetuous, andtenacious, Lannes came to typify the

dash and bravery of the Napoleonic army,while also showing a personal attachmentto Napoleon not always shown by his othercommanders. A Gascon farmer’s son whofirst saw action in the Pyrenees in 1792, hefought with distinction in almost all thesignificant campaigns of the revolutionaryand Napoleonic wars until he became thefirst of Napoleon’s marshals to die in battle.

Lannes first served under Napoleon inItaly in 1796–1797, distinguishing himselfin the battles of Bassano, Arcola (where hewas wounded three times), Lodi, and Rivo-li. During the Egyptian campaign of1798–1799 he was wounded again at thesiege of Acre and at Aboukir. Returning toFrance with Napoleon, he supported butplayed no active role in the coup of 18 Bru-maire. In 1800, confirmed as a divisionalgeneral, he won Montebello, the prelimi-nary action to Marengo, and fought with

conspicuous bravery in the main battle,checking the Austrian attacks at the heightof the fighting. A diplomatic mission toPortugal in 1801 was less suited to his tal-ents, and he spent 1804 at Ambleteuse inpreparation for the abandoned invasion ofEngland. Napoleon, who regarded Lannesas a personal friend, made him a marshal in1804.

In 1805 Lannes fought at Ulm andAusterlitz, where his infantry halted PrinceBagration’s cavalry; he commanded thecenter of Napoleon’s army and launchedthe first attack at Jena (10 October 1806);he was wounded seriously again when de-feating a Russian force at Pultulsk (26 De-cember 1806); and in June 1807 he set thestage for Napoleon’s climactic victory atFriedland. Dispatched to Spain in 1808,Lannes commanded at the siege ofSaragossa, negotiating the city’s surrender inFebruary 1809. Back in Germany in April,he fought a string of battles, culminating atEssling, where on the second day of this ex-ceptionally bloody battle he was mortallywounded by a chance shot, dying nine dayslater on 31 May 1809.

Napoleon mourned Lannes’s deathdeeply. Lannes had served courageously andwith a deep sense of loyalty since their daystogether in Italy.As a leader Lannes was al-ways in the thick of the action, as shown byhis numerous wounds: a ball in the necksuffered at the siege of Acre nearly cost himhis life and left him with difficulties inspeaking and his head inclined permanentlyto one side. This impetuosity could causeproblems with other commanders—his re-lations with the equally hotheaded JoachimMurat were strained if not hostile—but alsomade him the epitome of the elan andpanache of the Napoleonic soldier.

Related entries: Arcola, Battle of;Austerlitz,Battle of; Bassano, Battle of; Danube Campaigns;Essling, Battle of; Italian Campaigns; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of; Lodi, Battle of; Marengo,Battle of; Peninsular War; Rivoli, Battle of; Ulm,Battle of

142 Lannes, Jean

Suggestions for further reading:Horward, Donald D. 1987.“Lannes,” in David G.



Larrey, Dominique Jean(1766–1842)

A lthough the medical care of soldiersin battle remained appallingly prim-

itive during the Napoleonic wars, Larrey’swork in ameliorating the suffering of thewounded and his skill at performing ampu-tations make him one of the greatest figuresin the history of military medicine. Larreybecame famous during the revolutionarywars when as a surgeon in the Army of theRhine he organized a system of mobilefield hospitals, allowing surgeons to followarmies and avoid delays in treating thewounded. Napoleon called upon him toorganize the ambulances in his first Italiancampaign and again in the Egyptian cam-paign, where his personal bravery and de-votion, helping to move the wounded tohospitals in the thick of battle, were out-standing. From then on Larrey was presentin all Napoleon’s major military campaigns.

In addition to receiving numerous hon-ors and posts, Larrey served as surgeon inchief of the Imperial Guard. He distin-guished himself in particular at the dreadfulBattle of Eylau (18 February 1807), movingthe wounded in extremely cold weather, atWagram (5–6 July 1809), and during theRussian campaign of 1812 as chief surgeonof the Grande Armée. His observations onthe effects of cold on the wounded gaverise to further research and writings. Larreywas also present at Waterloo, where he waswounded and taken prisoner. After theRestoration he pursued a distinguished ca-reer in medicine, receiving the highest hon-ors and publishing numerous works of last-ing value in his field.


Suggestions for further reading:Dible, James H. 1970. Napoleon’s Surgeon.

London:William Heinemann.Richardson, Robert G. 1974. Larrey: Surgeon to

Napoleon’s Imperial Guard. London: JohnMurray.

Vess, David M. 1975. Medical Revolution in France,1789–1796. Gainesville: University Presses ofFlorida.

Las Cases, Emmanuel Augustin,Comte de (1766–1842)

The man who wrote the Mémorial deSainte-Hélène and thereby became a

prime mover in the creation of theNapoleonic legend was, ironically, a noble-man who emigrated from France at the timeof the Revolution and fought in the émigréarmy of the Prince de Condé. He returnedto France in 1802, eventually rising at Napo-leon’s court to become chamberlain in 1810.After seeing Napoleon again during theHundred Days,he volunteered to accompanyhim in exile to Saint Helena. Las Cases’s mo-tives for creating the Mémorial, published in1823, are obscure: either he acted out of per-sonal devotion to Napoleon or he saw thechance to write a best-seller. He stayed onSaint Helena for eighteen months beforebeing expelled by the governor, Sir HudsonLowe, possibly as a result of a deliberate ma-neuver by Napoleon. Las Cases used consid-erable journalistic skill in presenting Napo-leon as a martyr for democracy, liberty, andpeace. Later in life he sat in the Chamber ofDeputies between 1830 and 1842 and ac-companied Napoleon’s remains on their re-turn from Saint Helena to Paris in 1840.

Related entries: Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène;Napoleonic Legend

Suggestions for further reading:Harvey,A. D. 1998.“Napoleon—the Myth,”

History Today 48 (January 1998), pp. 27–32.

Las Cases, Emmanuel Augustin, Comte de 143

Korngold, Ralph. 1960. The Last Years ofNapoleon: His Captivity at St. Helena.Princeton:Van Nostrand.

Law, Codification of

The various law codes promulgated byNapoleon between 1804 and 1810

may properly be considered his most lastingachievement, and the Civil Code has beencalled one of the few books that have influ-enced the whole world.The Revolution hadmade various attempts to replace the ap-proximately 400 codes used in France underthe ancien régime, but had made littleprogress until Napoleon took matters inhand.The Civil Code of 1804 was followedby the Code of Civil Procedure (1806), theCommercial Code (1807), the CriminalCode and Code of Criminal Procedure(1808), and the Penal Code (1810). TheRural Code was never put into effect. De-spite all their defects and authoritarian ten-dencies, taken together the NapoleonicCodes embodied for the first time in mod-ern history a system of unified law applicablewithout distinction to all classes of citizens.As such they made permanent the essentialachievements of the Revolution: nationalunity and civic equality.

Related entries: Civil Code; Code of CriminalProcedure; Commercial Code, Penal Code; RuralCode


Revolution. Philadelphia: Lippincott.Lyons, Martyn. 1994. Napoleon Bonaparte and the


Lebrun, Charles François(1739–1824)

E ssentially a competent administrator,Lebrun attained brief political pro-

minence as third consul after the coup of18 Brumaire. He had held various adminis-trative posts under the monarchy, been im-prisoned during the Terror, and been amember of the Council of Ancients underthe Directory. As consul until 1802 Lebruncontributed to the reorganization of justiceand finance. In 1804 Napoleon appointedhim arch treasurer of the empire and, afterforcing Louis Bonaparte to abdicate as kingof Holland in 1810, sent Lebrun to preparefor its integration with France. After theRestoration Lebrun lived out his final yearsin obscurity, but his exercise of patronageunder Napoleon, especially in the appoint-ment of prefects, had brought him consid-erable wealth and influence.

Related entries: Consulate; Netherlands





Leclerc, Charles Victor Emmanuel (1772–1802)

The son of a wealthy mill-owner fromPontoise, Leclerc had joined the

army as a volunteer in 1791 and first en-countered Napoleon at the siege of Toulon.His rise through the ranks continued inItaly in 1796, when Napoleon recom-mended his promotion to general ofbrigade, and he sealed his connection withthe Bonaparte family by marrying PaulineBonaparte in 1797.A general of division in1799, he took part in the coup of 18 Bru-maire and served in the Army of the Rhineunder Jean Moreau. However, Leclerc’spromising military career was destined foran ignominious end when in October 1801

144 Law, Codification of

Napoleon appointed him commander ofthe expedition to regain control of Haiti.After initial success, Leclerc was faced bygeneral insurrection by September 1802,and he succumbed to the yellow fever thathad decimated his forces.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Pauline, Duchess ofGuastalla; Haiti

Suggestions for further reading:James, C. L. R. 1938. The Black Jacobins:Toussaint

L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.London: Secker and Warburg.

Ortzen, Len. 1974. Imperial Venus:The Story ofPauline Bonaparte-Borghese. New York: Steinand Day.

Lefebvre, François Joseph(1755–1820)

E ventually to become duke of Danzigand marshal of France, Lefebvre was

the son of a former trooper turned millerfrom Rouffach in Alsace. He was the mostproletarian of Napoleon’s marshals and hasbeen dismissed by some historians as “thecomplete sergeant major.” He enlisted in thearmy in 1773 and under the Revolutiongained rapid promotion, becoming a majorgeneral in 1794. Between 1794 and 1799Lefebvre served in the Rhineland and Ger-many and therefore never with or under Na-poleon. Scrupulously honest himself, he haddeveloped a dislike for the venal politicians ofthe Directory and,when consulted by Napo-leon about the coup of 18 Brumaire, replied:“Yes, let us throw the lawyers into the river!”(Rothenberg 1987, p. 222). Lefebvre playedno active part in the coup; he was one of theimpeccably republican generals whom Na-poleon wanted to win over. He was made asenator in 1800 and a marshal in 1804.

Lefebvre’s talents were as a loyal andsteady troop commander: he had no capacityfor independent command and his few per-sonal initiatives, notably in Spain in 1808–1809, usually turned out badly. Whenever

called upon, however, he fought bravely, as atJena (1806), at the siege of Danzig (1807),and in Spain.He commanded the infantry ofthe Old Guard in the Russian campaign of1812, taking part in all the horrors of the re-treat from Moscow. In 1814, at the age ofsixty, he fought valiantly during the Alliedinvasion of France, but in April reluctantlyjoined the group of marshals urging Napo-leon to abdicate. Lefebvre was credited withpersuading the victorious Alexander I thatAlsace, his homeland, should remain French.His support for Napoleon during the Hun-dred Days led to temporary disgrace, but hewas restored to his rank and honors in 1819,a year before his death.

Bluff and unsophisticated, Lefebvre andhis wife, Catherine Hübscher, a formerwasherwoman who passed into legend as“Madame Sans-Gêne,” caused consternationat the imperial court by their lack of preten-sions and tendency to preface their remarkswith “when I was a sergeant” or “when Idid the washing.” Only two of their four-teen children survived infancy, and theironly surviving son was killed in the Russiancampaign. Honesty and truthfulness distin-guished both Lefebvres, who spent much oftheir fortune helping friends and supportingcharities. Lefebvre himself never took partin the squabbling that marked relations be-tween some of the other, more flamboyantmarshals. His straightforward bluntness maybe summed up by his famous address to thepeople of a newly “liberated” town in Fran-conia:“We have come to bring you Libertyand Equality, but don’t lose your headsabout it; the first one of you who moveswithout my permission will be shot”(Rothenberg 1987, p. 226).

Related entries: Abdication, First; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of; Peninsular War; RussianCampaign

Suggestions for further reading:Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1987.“Lefebvre,” in

David G. Chandler, ed. Napoleon’s Marshals.New York: Macmillan.

Lefebvre, François Joseph 145

Legion of Honor

The Légion d’honneur was instituted asa reward for loyal service to the na-

tion under the consulate in 1802, but thefirst crosses were not handed out until July1804. Originally the Legion was to havecomprised fifteen cohorts each with 250members, civilian and military, sworn to de-vote themselves to the service of the Re-public, oppose the restoration of feudalism,and maintain liberty and equality. Legion-naires were to be graded into five classes, beguaranteed special privileges, and receivestipends, though under the empire thesewere replaced by decorations attached to ared ribbon. Old republicans were unhappywith the introduction of the Legion, andindeed it did become associated with Na-poleon’s new nobility. By 1814 there weresome 32,000 members of the Legion, ofwhom over 30,000 were military men.As asymbol of meritocracy, however, the Legionsurvived Napoleon’s fall and is today one ofthe greatest honors the French Republiccan bestow.

Related entries: Nobility; Notables




Legislative Body

The Corps Législatif, established by theConstitution of the Year VIII (1799)

and little changed by the constitutions of1802 and 1804, voted on laws but wasmeant to represent the regime to the peo-ple rather than the other way around. The300 members of the legislature were se-lected by the Senate from a national listdrawn up by a complex process of indirect

election and scrutinized by Napoleon. In allslightly more than 700 men served between1800 and 1814. Every department had tohave at least one representative in the as-sembly, which normally met for fourmonths each year.

The Legislative Body had little power.Members listened to speeches by membersof the Council of State or the Tribunateand then voted for or against measureswithout debating them. Unsurprisingly,negative votes were seldom recorded. Thelegislators were selected to represent Napo-leon’s ideal elite of mature males with arecord of service to the state and strong tiesto the land. Over three-quarters held officeunder the empire, one-third held the Le-gion of Honor, and one-third became im-perial nobles. Over time survivors of therevolutionary assemblies became rare. InNapoleon’s eyes the notables were the truerepresentatives of France.

Related entries: Constitutions; Nobility;Notables

Suggestions for further reading:Beck,Thomas D. 1974. French Legislators,

1800–1834. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Collins, Irene. 1979. Napoleon and his Parliaments.London: Edward Arnold.

Leipzig, Battle of (16–19 October 1813)

The “Battle of the Nations,” foughtaround the city in Saxony where the

river Elster converges with several tributar-ies, lost Napoleon control of Germany dur-ing that country’s “war of liberation.” Na-poleon’s 442,000 troops were brought tobay around Leipzig and the small town ofLindenau by superior Austrian, Russian,Prussian, and Swedish forces. On 16 Octo-ber 1813 Napoleon launched an offensiveagainst the Army of Bohemia, commanded

146 Legion of Honor

by Karl zu Schwarzenberg, which was con-verging on Leipzig from the south, but theoffensive soon ran out of steam, and to thenorth of the city the Army of Silesia, underGebhard von Blücher, pinned down theFrench corps commanded by MarshalLouis Marmont, depriving Napoleon of theopportunity to unite his forces and win adecisive victory.

With the arrival the following day of theArmy of the North, Swedes and Prussianscommanded by Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte,the initiative passed to the Allies. Now ar-rayed in a huge semicircle to the north,south and east of Leipzig, on 18 Octoberthe Allied forces began a concerted assault,making their superior numbers tell andslowly pushing Napoleon’s forces backthrough the Leipzig suburbs. Seeing his po-sition to be untenable Napoleon ordered aphased retreat across the Elster to Lindenau.All proceeded according to plan until a

panic-stricken sapper corporal prematurelyblew up the bridge across which the troopswere to pass. The French rearguard, some30,000 men, were cut off and forced to sur-render. Others, including Marshal JosefPoniatowski, were drowned trying to swimthe Elster.

The Battle of the Nations was a costlyvictory for the Allies. They lost at least54,000 killed or wounded, and the Frenchprobably 38,000. Some 5,000 Saxon troopshad gone over to the Allies, the first of Na-poleon’s German troops to defect as the Al-lies advanced. Several thousand sick wereleft behind in the city’s overcrowded hospi-tals, churches, and schools. Disease, thehandmaiden of war, killed most of them,and typhus soon spread through the con-gested streets of Leipzig. Among the manycivilian victims was Friedrich Wagner, a citypoliceman, who left a wife and a six-year-old son named Richard.

Leipzig, Battle of 147

Pigeot’s The Retreat of the French portrays a disastrous defeat for Napoleon at the hands of the Austrian,Russian, Prussian, and Swedish forces when he attempted to take Leipzig in 1813.This defeat cost Napoleon hisdreams for Germany. (Mary Evans Picture Library)

Related entries: Germany, Campaigns in;Poniatowski, Josef, Prince




Petre, F. Loraine. 1974. Napoleon’s Last Campaignin Germany, 1813. London:Arms andArmour.

Ligny, Battle of (16 June 1815)

This preliminary action two days be-fore the battle of Waterloo may be

considered as Napoleon’s last victory, if nota very significant one.Three Prussian corpsunder Gebhard von Blücher were concen-trated in the village of Ligny, and when Na-poleon’s forces, with the Imperial Guard inthe van, fell upon them they scattered, andBlücher was nearly killed when he wasthrown from his horse. Napoleon, however,had also suffered heavy casualties and didnot have the resources to follow up the vic-tory, allowing August von Gneisenau to re-store order in the Prussian ranks.

Related entries: Blücher, Gebhard Leberechtvon; Gneisenau,August Wilhelm AntonNeidhardt von; Hundred Days;Waterloo, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Chandler, David G. 1980. Waterloo:The Hundred

Days. London: Osprey.

Ligurian Republic

This “sister” republic created out ofthe former republic of Genoa

lasted from 1797 to 1805. Genoese terri-tory had been violated by both theFrench and the Austrians in 1796, and fol-

lowing Napoleon’s victories in his firstItalian campaign pro-French Genoese pa-triots demanded a republic on the lines ofthe Cisalpine Republic, which had beenestablished in April 1797. Following fight-ing in Genoa between pro- and anti-French factions, the Ligurian Republicwas proclaimed on 6 June 1797, and aconstitution, drawn up by a commissionunder Napoleon’s supervision, was pro-claimed on 11 November and approvedby plebiscite on 2 December.

Legislative councils were chosen by asystem of indirect election and in turn ap-pointed a Directory. The feudal regime,which was of little importance in Genoa,was abolished; Catholicism was recognizedas the state religion; provision was made forpublic assistance and education; and a per-manent alliance with the French Republicwas declared. In August 1798 the councilswere purged by the French and the Gen-oese Jacobins, and the archbishop of Genoa,who was hostile to the French, was exiledto Novi.

When the French were forced to retreatfrom Italy in the spring of 1799, the Ligu-rian Republic alone escaped invasion byAustro-Russian forces. French troops com-manded by André Masséna shut themselvesup in Genoa, but, after running out of pro-visions and munitions, capitulated on 4June 1800, ten days after Napoleon’s vic-tory at Marengo. The Ligurian Republicwas reconstituted in 1802 with a new con-stitution drawn up by Antonio CristoforoSaliceti. After the annexation of Piedmontto France on 11 September 1802, however,it was evident that Genoa, which was sureto be a major naval base in future fightingin the Mediterranean, would not remainindependent for long. The Ligurian Re-public was annexed to the French Empireon 30 June 1805.

Related entries: Genoa; Italian Campaigns;Masséna,André; Saliceti,Antonio Cristoforo

148 Ligny, Battle of

Liverpool, Robert Banks Jenkinson, Earl of (1770–1828)

Though outshone in British politicsby stronger personalities such as

George Canning and Viscount Castlereagh,Lord Liverpool, who became prime minis-ter in May 1812, held together a govern-ment containing those conflicting charac-ters and steered Britain through the finalyears of the struggle against Napoleon.Holding government office almost contin-uously from 1793 to 1827, Liverpool be-came foreign secretary in February 1801and conducted the negotiations leading tothe Peace of Amiens in 1802.The assassina-tion of Spencer Percival led to his succeed-ing to the highest office in the land, and hewas to head the British government for al-most fifteen years.

Related entries: Amiens, Peace of; GreatBritain

Suggestions for further reading:Gash, Norman. 1984. Lord Liverpool:The Life and

Political Career of Robert Banks Jenkinson,Second Earl of Liverpool, 1770–1828. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Local Government

The Constituent Assembly of 1789–1791 had completely reorganized

local government in France, creating a uni-form and rational division of the countryinto department, districts, cantons, andcommunes under elective local officials.Napoleon accepted the principle of thenew arrangement but appointed his ownofficials to impose the will of central gov-ernment: prefects for departments, subpre-fects for enlarged districts called arrondisse-ments, and mayors for communes. Advisorycouncils for these officials were appointedand served for information and consulta-

tion. Napoleon thus established a structureof French local government capable of fu-ture democratization, which has endured tothe present day, the only radical modifica-tion being the creation of the regions in the1980s. Local officials communicated alongwell-defined channels with ministers inParis, who in turn reported to Napoleon.Although Napoleon himself was incapableof delegating authority, he nevertheless pro-vided stability and opportunities for pre-fects and others to create networks of pa-tronage around themselves.

Related entries: Prefects




Ellis, Geoffrey. 1983.“Rhine and Loire:Napoleonic Elites and Social Order,” inGwynne Lewis and Colin Lucas, eds., Beyondthe Terror: Essays in French Regional and SocialHistory, 1794–1815. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.


Whitcomb, Edward A. 1974.“Napoleon’sPrefects,” American Historical Review 79, pp.1089–1118.

Lodi , Battle of (10 May 1796)

This action of Napoleon’s first Italiancampaign, securing the crossing of

the river Adda at Lodi, eighteen milessoutheast of Milan, allowed the French tooccupy western Lombardy and Milan itself.An Austrian rearguard of 8,500 men and 14cannon defended the bridge at Lodi againstattacks led by André Masséna and LouisAlexandre Berthier. The Austrians lost2,000 men and their artillery, while theFrench lost 1,000. The Directory in Parispublicized Lodi as a great victory and in sodoing helped to create the Bonaparte leg-

Lodi, Battle of 149

end. The image of Napoleon as standard-bearer leading his men across the bridge ispurely imaginary, although he had shownpersonal bravery and gained the respect ofhis men by reconnoitering and personallydirecting the battle.

Related entries: Italian Campaigns; NapoleonicLegend

Suggestions for further reading:Jackson, Sir William Godfrey Fothergill. 1953.

Attack in the West: Napoleon’s First CampaignRe-read Today. London: Eyre andSpottiswoode.

Louis XVIII, King of France(1755–1824;

reigned 1814–1824)

The pretender to the throne of Francebetween 1795 and 1814 with the title

of count of Provence, Louis was the eldestsurviving brother of Louis XVI, executed in1793. He had fled France in 1791, and wasproclaimed king in June 1795 following thedeath in captivity of the ten-year-olddauphin, known as Louis XVII. In exileLouis busied himself with conspiracies andproclamations for the restoration of themonarchy and turned down various over-tures from Napoleon,who, in 1800 and againin 1803, promised indemnities and other re-wards if he would renounce his claims. Onthe creation of the empire in 1804 he de-nounced Napoleon’s “usurpation.”

In 1807 Louis went to England, wherehe was to spend the rest of his exile. How-ever, British plans for a future after Napo-leon did not necessarily mean restoration ofthe Bourbons, and they vetoed Louis’s plansto act as regent for the captive Bourbonking of Spain. Louis had to act carefully, atthe risk of alienating his more extreme sup-porters. In January 1814 he issued a procla-mation, which became the Charter of

1814, recognizing many of the changes andinstitutions resulting from the Revolution,and then negotiated the terms of his returnwith Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand.Aloof,unknown to his people, and grotesquely fat,Louis quickly lost much goodwill and fledto Ghent during the Hundred Days. Asking, however, he tried to follow a moder-ate policy, curbing the vengeful instincts ofthe ultraroyalists gathered around hisbrother, the count of Artois, the futureCharles X, who was to lose the legitimateBourbon line to the throne for good.

Related entries: Abdication, First; Émigrés;Hundred Days; Royalists

Suggestions for further reading:Mansel, Philip. 1981. Louis XVIII. London: Blond

and Briggs.

Louise of Mecklenburg, Queen of Prussia (1776–1810)

N apoleon paid the wife of FrederickWilliam III the backhanded com-

pliment of calling her “the only real man inPrussia.” Louise was indeed his most res-olute opponent at the Prussian court, call-ing him “this devilish being, sprung fromthe mire.” Favoring close ties with Russia,the queen, as resolute as she was attractive,became the center of the war party in theevents leading up to Prussia’s declaration ofwar on Napoleon in September 1806. Andin the subsequent campaign she accompa-nied the troops, only returning to Berlinjust before the battles of Jena-Auerstädt.

After these defeats Louise tried tocounter the defeatism of the court, assertingher influence over her less able husbandand gathering the reformers who wouldresurrect Prussia around her. She reluctantlyattended the negotiations leading to theTreaty of Tilsit in 1807, where she tried toinfluence both Napoleon and her great ad-

150 Louis XVIII, King of France

mirer, Tsar Alexander I. Louise must takemuch of the credit for Prussia’s survival asan independent kingdom. Her health beganto fail shortly after Tilsit, but she survivedlong enough to lose her illusions aboutAlexander during a visit to Saint Petersburgin 1809. Louise collapsed and died on 19July 1810. Although an autopsy revealedlung and heart problems, it was popularlysaid that Napoleon and Alexander hadmade her die of sorrow. Her tomb at Char-lottenburg became a place of pilgrimage forGerman nationalists, and in 1871 her sec-ond son,Wilhelm, became the first emperorof a Prussian-dominated Germany.

Related entries: Frederick William III, King ofPrussia; Prussia

Suggestions for further reading:Aretz, Gertrude. 1929. Queen Louise of Prussia.

New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.Sheehan, James J. 1989. German History,


Lowe, Sir Hudson (1769–1844)

A ppointed governor of Saint Helenain April 1816 with orders to enforce

new restrictions on the exiled Napoleon,Lowe’s career and character ensured thatonly very bad relations could result. Bornin Galway, the son of an army surgeon, thethen Captain Hudson Lowe had been in-volved in the siege of Corsica in 1793 andremained there on garrison duty for twoyears. In 1799 he organized the CorsicanRangers, made up mostly of royalist émigrés,and fought with them against the French inEgypt in 1800–1801. The reorganized andrenamed Royal Corsican Ranger Battalionunder Lowe garrisoned the island of Capribetween 1803 and 1808 before beingejected by the superior forces of JoachimMurat. In 1813–1814 Lowe was attached toGebhard von Blücher’s Prussian army as asenior liaison officer and participated in

thirteen major battles. As a result he wasknighted, promoted to major general, anddecorated by Prussia and Russia.

The antipathy between Lowe and Na-poleon was mutual, immediate, and perma-nent. Lowe had only five meetings with“General Bonaparte,” as he was ordered tocall him, before Napoleon refused to seehim again. Napoleon became a recluse,waging a petty campaign against his “jailer,”in which he was aided and abetted by hiscompanions, including his personal physi-cian, Dr. Barry O’Meara. Stories of Lowe’ssupposed pettiness reached England, lead-ing to a relaxation of some of the restric-tions on Napoleon, but Lowe, fearing an at-tempt to escape, would not ease security.

Throughout his period as Napoleon’s“jailer” Lowe showed himself to beunimaginative and pedantic in carrying outhis orders to the letter, but he was far fromthe monster of cruelty depicted inO’Meara’s Napoleon in Exile: A Voice fromSaint Helena, published in 1823. Publicopinion turned against Lowe, who did nothelp his cause by threatening to sueO’Meara, then backing down. After sixyears in the colonial service in Ceylon be-tween 1825 and 1831, Lowe returned toEngland and spent his last years trying tojustify his actions on Saint Helena. He diedin poverty in London in January 1844.

Related entries: Saint Helena

Suggestions for further reading:Korngold, Ralph. 1960. The Last Years of

Napoleon: His Captivity at St. Helena. London:Victor Gollancz.

Martineau, Gilbert. 1968. Napoleon’s St. Helena.London: John Murray.

Lunéville, Treaty of (9 February 1801)

N egotiated largely by Joseph Bona-parte, this peace between Austria and

Lunéville,Treaty of 151

France effectively ended the Second Coali-tion and drove the Habsburgs out of all Italyexcept Venice; Austria reaffirmed all theconcessions made by the Treaty of CampoFormio and ceded the Grand Duchy of Tus-cany to the duke of Parma, whose lands nowformed part of the Cisalpine Republic.Theleft bank of the Rhine was incorporated intoFrance, with its dispossessed rulers to becompensated elsewhere in Germany.

Related entries: Austria; Coalitions




Ragsdale, Hugh. 1968.“Russian Influence atLunéville,” French Historical Studies 5, pp.274–284.


Lützen, Battle of (2 May 1813)

The first major engagement of Napo-leon’s 1813 campaign in Germany

was fought around a group of five villagestwelve miles southwest of Leipzig and fourmiles south of the small town of Lützen.Having concentrated a force of 69,000men, the Russians and Prussians underPrince Wittgenstein attacked what theythought was merely the flank guard ofMichel Ney’s Third Corps. However, Ney’sentire corps was digging in, and althoughtaken by surprise and outnumbered thenew conscripts fought back vigorously. Asthe rest of the French army rushed to Ney’ssupport, Napoleon himself galloped overfrom Leipzig and plunged into the fray, as aferocious struggle developed during whichthe villages of Klein Görschen and Rahnachanged hands several times. Among thewounded was Gerhard von Scharnhorst,who died of his wounds several weeks later.

As dusk fell and 140,000 of Napoleon’stroops converged on the battlefield theRusso-Prussian army was forced onto thedefensive.The Eleventh Corps under JacquesMacdonald and the Sixth Corps under LouisMarmont severely mauled the Russian rein-forcements, which had been slow in arriv-ing.The Allies abandoned the field, but mostescaped in the darkness. Napoleon’s shortageof cavalry prevented him from mounting aneffective pursuit, and though he had won avictory his losses were probably greater thanthose of the Allies, with at least 18,000killed, wounded, or captured.

The battle of Lützen enabled Napoleonto occupy Dresden five days later, but forhis exhausted troops it was a Pyrrhic vic-tory. Nevertheless it was one of those bat-tles in which Napoleon’s swift thinking andpersonal engagement had played a decisiverole. “Of all his career,” recalled Marmont,“this is probably the day on which Napo-leon incurred the most personal danger onthe battlefield. He exposed himself con-stantly, leading back to the charge the de-feated troops of the Third Corps” (Gates1997, p. 236). For the first time, however, aweakness in his army, the shortage of cav-alry horses, prevented him from turning avictory into a decisive rout.





Petre, F. Loraine. 1974. Napoleon’s Last Campaignin Germany, 1813. London:Arms andArmour.

Lycées

N ew secondary schools providing athorough education (especially for

the sons of officers), the lycées, created in

152 Lützen, Battle of

1802, were meant to be the cornerstone ofthe new French educational system. Eachcourt of appeal area was to have at least onelycée, while the principle of equality of op-portunity was honored by the provision ofscholarships. A common curriculum wasimposed in 1809, together with the bac-calaureate examination that is still a prereq-uisite for entry into higher education inFrance today. Under Napoleon the lycéeswere not as successful as was hoped. Thestrict discipline and centralized regulationswere unpopular, and the relatively fewpupils drawn almost entirely from the mid-

dle and upper classes.The emphasis was onteaching the humanities, with the sciencesrelegated to a limited number of classes,generally poorly attended. Nevertheless, thefirst foundations had been laid for a systemof elite secondary schools, essentially toprovide future state functionaries.

Related entries: Education; Imperial University


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Holtman, Robert B. 1967. The Napoleonic


Lycées 153

MMacdonald, Jacques Étienne

Joseph Alexandre (1765–1840)

D uke of Taranto, marshal of France,Macdonald was born at Sedan to a

Jacobite father distantly related to the ro-mantic Flora Macdonald. He was a solidprofessional soldier with no interest in po-litical intrigue who served the Bourbons,the Republic, Napoleon, and the Bourbonsagain, with the same steady resolve. He hadgained rapid promotion during the revolu-tionary wars without coming into sustainedcontact with Napoleon, being morefriendly with Jean-Victor Moreau, whosemilitary capacities he much admired. Hislack of contact with Napoleon was unfor-tunate for Macdonald because it meant thatNapoleon never entirely trusted him, onlyrecognizing his qualities late in the day.

Although he supported the coup of 18Brumaire, Macdonald’s friendship withMoreau made Napoleon suspicious of him,and in 1804, after Macdonald had publiclydefended Moreau against charges of trea-son, he was exiled to his estate nearBourges.The recall to arms came in March1809, as a result of Napoleon’s seriousshortage of experienced commanders. Sentto the Army of Italy, Macdonald supportedand became friends with Eugène deBeauharnais, and then won back the em-peror’s favor by leading the vital charge on

the second day of the Battle of Wagram,where he became the only Napoleonicmarshal to be awarded his baton in thefield. After a short period of unhappy andreluctant service in Spain, Macdonald spentthe Russian campaign of 1812 mostly inthe Baltic provinces. He fought in all thebattles of Napoleon’s German campaign of1813, showing great courage at Leipzig,where he only escaped by swimming theriver Elster.

In March 1814 Macdonald joinedMichel Ney and other marshals in demand-ing Napoleon’s first abdication. His palpa-ble honesty impressed Tsar Alexander Iduring the negotiation of the abdicationterms, and Napoleon now acknowledgedthat “only during these recent circum-stances have I brought myself to appreciatethe full nobility of his character.” Macdon-ald refused to support Napoleon during theHundred Days, and under the Restorationretained his rank, served as minister of state,and became grand chancellor of the Legionof Honor. His open disapproval of many ofthe actions of the restored monarchyearned him the nickname “His Outspoken-ness,” of which he was very proud, but hecontinued to fulfil his duties until the endof his life.

Macdonald’s Recollections, belatedly pub-lished in 1892, reveal a serious, conscien-tious, and considerate man, with little sub-tlety or sense of humor. But his claim that

Macdonald, Jacques Étienne Joseph Alexandre 155

M

his guides in life were honor, fidelity, andimpartiality was no sham. A professionalsoldier, as he saw it his first duty was toFrance, his second to whoever happened tobe ruling France. More subtle minds likeNapoleon’s were bound to be suspicious.He was however the subject of a rareNapoleonic joke: noting that Macdonaldhad never fought the British, Napoleon de-clared that he dared not let him within thesound of the bagpipes.

Related entries: Abdication, First; Germany,Campaigns in;Wagram, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Hankinson,Alan. 1987.“Macdonald,” in David


Macdonald, Jacques. 1893. Recollections of MarshalMacdonald, ed. Camille Rousset, trans. S. L.Simeon. 2 vols. London: Bentley and Sons.

Malet, Claude François de(1754–1812)

The leading figure in the Malet con-spiracy of 1812 was described by

the writer Charles Nodier, who knew himpersonally, as formed by nature “to keeptyrants from sleeping soundly,” but a lesscharitable view would portray him asbizarre if not completely mad. Though ofminor noble origin, Malet was undoubt-edly a firm and consistent republican, whoby 1799 had risen to the rank of brigadiergeneral in the army of the Revolution. Ascommanding officer in the Charente de-partment he loudly opposed Napoleon’selevation to the life consulate and later thecreation of the empire. Malet’s visceralaversion to Napoleon got him cashiered in1807. He immediately tried to organize aplot against Napoleon, was imprisoned,and in 1810 was transferred to a mental in-stitution just outside Paris. It was from herethat he emerged in October 1812 to an-

nounce that Napoleon was dead in Russiaand launch his conspiracy. Malet was exe-cuted along with his principal accompliceson 29 October 1812.

Related entries: Malet Conspiracy

Suggestions for further reading:Artom, Guido. 1970. Napoleon is Dead in Russia:

The Extraordinary Story of One of History’sStrangest Conspiracies. London:Allen andUnwin.

Malet Conspiracy

The strange conspiracy staged byClaude de Malet was the reason for

Napoleon’s return to Paris, leaving his re-treating army, in December 1812. WhenMalet escaped from the asylum where hewas detained on 23 October there had beenno news from Napoleon for several weeks.Malet and his fellow plotters, including aroyalist priest and two generals, producedforged documents, convincing the prefect ofthe Seine department that Napoleon hadbeen killed in Russia and that a new repub-lican government had been formed. Theconspirators persuaded most of the garrisoncommanders in Paris that their story wastrue, and even held Anne Jean Marie RenéSavary, the minister of police, in custody.However, Malet’s behavior became evermore bizarre, and when he shot dead a gen-eral who asked for his credentials, troopswere marched into Paris from Saint-Cloud,Savary released, Malet and his followers cap-tured, and order restored by GeneralLaborde and Jean-Jacques Régis de Cam-bacérès. Malet and fifteen accomplices weretried during the night and shot the next day.

The affair convinced Napoleon that if anapparent lunatic could succeed as well asMalet had, then seasoned and deviouspoliticians like Joseph Fouché or Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand could easily seize thereins of government in his absence. “My

156 Malet, Claude François de

presence in Paris is essential for France,” hedeclared, and he was back in his capital on19 December 1812. Malet may not havebeen so mad when, asked by the presidingjudge at his trial to name his accomplices,he replied: “All of France and even you if Ihad succeeded.”

Related entries: Malet, Claude François de


of Napoleonic France:A Supplement. Lanham,MD: University Press of America.

Artom, Guido. 1970. Napoleon is Dead in Russia:The Extraordinary Story of One of History’sStrangest Conspiracies. London:Allen andUnwin.

Malta

N apoleon seized the island of Maltafrom the Knights of St. John in June

1798 while en route for Egypt.Two monthslater Horatio Nelson commenced a navalblockade, but the French garrison com-manded by General Vaubois held out untilSeptember 1800. The British now tookcontrol of Malta. Meanwhile, Tsar Paul I,who had been offered the Grand Master-ship of the Knights, made the proposedcapture of Malta one of his reasons for join-ing the Second Coalition. Paul and his suc-cessor Alexander I continued to support theclaims of the Knights against both Franceand Britain. The British undertook to re-store Malta to the Knights in the Peace ofAmiens, but it was too valuable to them as abase in the Mediterranean.The first Treatyof Paris in 1814 recognized the annexationof Malta by Britain.

Related entries: Egyptian Campaign; Nelson,Horatio, Lord

Suggestions for further reading:Gregory, Desmond. 1996. Malta, Britain and the

European Powers, 1793–1815. Madison, NJ:Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Saul, Norman E. 1970. Russian and theMediterranean, 1797–1807. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.

Mantua

The possession of this key fortress inLombardy, set among the lakes and

marshes of the river Mincio, was of crucialimportance in Napoleon’s first Italian cam-paign. Between June 1796 and February1797 an Austrian garrison held out against aFrench blockade. But their position meantthat they were unable to take advantage ofany movement by Napoleon’s forces. Some14,000 Austrians perished from disease dur-ing the siege, although 16,000 survived.Thefall of Mantua allowed Napoleon to con-centrate his forces against those of theArchduke Charles.





Marengo, Battle of (14 June 1800)

The royalist agent Jean GuillaumeHyde de Neuville dubbed this vic-

tory in the second Italian campaign the“baptism of Napoleon’s personal power.”The Austrian commander, Friedrich vonMelas, supposedly marching to the defenseof Turin but in fact unfindable, was en-camped in Alessandria, while Napoleon un-characteristically divided his forces in thesearch for him. On the morning of 14 June1800 Melas’s troops pounced on the French

Marengo, Battle of 157

forces commanded by Claude Victor andforced them back to the village ofMarengo.At the same time an Austrian en-veloping movement threatened Napoleon’sown position, and by three o’clock in theafternoon a French defeat seemed certain.Napoleon was saved by the arrival of thecorps commanded by General Louis De-saix, who had been alerted by the sound ofgunfire during his own search for Melas.“The battle has been lost,” remarked De-saix,“there is time to win another.”

Desaix, leading fresh troops and sup-ported by the cavalry of François Keller-mann, personally led the attack, while theentire French artillery opened up on theunsuspecting Austrians. Before sunset the Austrians were routed, but Desaix hadbeen killed by a bullet through the heart.Melas pulled back to Alessandria and thefollowing day agreed to an armistice. Na-poleon’s victory bulletins turned a narrowescape into a predetermined victory, all partof the first consul’s brilliant strategy. Hewrote to Emperor Francis I “from the bat-tlefield of Marengo, in the midst of suffer-ing and surrounded by fifteen thousandcorpses” (Herold 1983, pp. 114–115), im-ploring him to make peace, but the Austri-ans did not see Marengo as a crushing de-feat. It was only after further French successin Italy and Germany, especially JeanMoreau’s victory at Hohenlinden, that theywere forced to accept Napoleon’s terms forpeace in the Treaty of Lunéville, signed on9 February 1801.

Related entries: Italian Campaigns; Propaganda



Arnold, James R. 1987.“Victor,” in David G.Chandler, ed. Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Chandler, David G. 1994.“Adjusting the Record:Napoleon and Marengo,” in his On theNapoleonic Wars: Collected Essays. London:Greenhill.

Herold, J. Christopher. 1983. The Horizon Book ofthe Age of Napoleon. New York:AmericanHeritage Publishing Co./Bonanza Books.

Maret, Hugues Bernard(1763–1839)

A lawyer turned diplomat during theRevolution, Maret had been im-

prisoned by the Austrians in Milan whenhe was freed by Napoleon’s army in May1796, and he became one of his rescuer’smost diligent and discreet servants. As sec-retary-general under the consulate and sec-retary of state under the empire, he was theessential middleman between Napoleonand his ministers, using his position to in-fluence appointments and moderate thetone of Napoleon’s decisions. OnlyCharles-Maurice de Talleyrand insisted oncircumventing him by conferring withNapoleon directly. From 1800 onwardMaret selected the stories to be publishedin the Moniteur, the official governmentnewspaper.

Maret replaced Champagny as foreignminister in April 1811, largely becauseNapoleon could rely on him to developthe new policy leading to the invasion ofRussia. But he returned to the secretariatin November 1813, when Napoleonwanted to pursue a peace policy. Maret re-mained in his old post during the lastmonths of the regime, kept Napoleon in-formed about public opinion during theexile on Elba, and served again in the statesecretariat during the Hundred Days. Hewent into exile for five years after theRestoration before retiring to his nativeBurgundy.

Related entries: Press


The French Ministerial Bureaucracy, 1770–1850.Oxford: Clarendon Press.

158 Maret, Hugues Bernard

Marie-Louise von Habsburg,Empress (1791–1847)

N apoleon’s second empress never at-tained the popularity of Joséphine

de Beauharnais, but criticism of her ignoresthe fact that in her world women weretrained to obey their husbands and fathers.The marriage of Napoleon and Marie-Louise in 1810 was the result of Napoleon’sdesire for a son and heir and for a dynasticmarriage that would confirm the place ofthe Bonaparte dynasty in Europe. Afterbeing rebuffed by Russia, he turned to Aus-tria, where Klemens von Metternich nego-tiated the union with the eighteen-year-oldMarie-Louise, eldest surviving daughter ofFrancis I.The fact that she was the niece ofMarie-Antoinette allowed Napoleon torefer casually to “my uncle, Louis XVI.” Fortheir part, Francis and Metternich hopedthat the marriage would provide securityfor Austria through an alliance with a Na-poleon at the height of his power.

Marie-Louise married Napoleon byproxy in Vienna on 11 March 1810; thecouple first met at Courcelles, east of Sois-sons, on 27 March; and the religious mar-riage took place in the Louvre on 2 April.The new empress adapted quickly toNapoleonic court life, was treated with lav-ish affection by Napoleon, and on 20March 1811 gave birth to a son, the futureNapoleon II. After Napoleon embarked onhis Russian adventure in 1812, Marie-Louise saw little of her husband, but re-mained loyal to him until the first abdica-tion. When Napoleon was sent into exileon Elba Marie-Louise was taken into herfather’s protection and prevented fromcommunicating with her husband. Duringthe Hundred Days she remained in Austriaand showed no desire to return to Napo-leon or to see him succeed.

Marie-Louise survived Napoleon andtheir son, having two more marriages andfour more children.When she died Metter-

nich, who had shaped her adult life, was stillAustrian foreign minister. Some fancifulolder historians attributed Napoleon’sdownfall to his second marriage, andMarie-Louise has been seen as the avengerof Marie-Antoinette and a traitor whoabandoned her husband and son for herown security. But this verdict is grossly un-fair. Forced into an arranged diplomaticmarriage, she nevertheless tried to do Na-poleon’s bidding as far as possible. Butevents were always far beyond her control,and her father won the battle for control ofmother and son.

Related entries: Austria; Francis I, Emperor ofAustria; Metternich, Klemens Wenceslas Lothar,Fürst von; Napoleon II, King of Rome

Suggestions for further reading:Mansel, Philip. 1987. The Eagle in Splendour:

Napoleon I and His Court. London: GeorgePhilip.

Oddie, E. M. 1931. Marie Louise, Empress ofFrance, Duchess of Parma. London: E. Mathewsand Marrot.

Stoeckl,Agnes de. 1962. Four Years an Empress:Marie Louise, Second Wife of Napoleon.London: John Murray.

Turnbull, Patrick. 1971. Napoleon’s SecondEmpress. London: Joseph.

Marmont, Auguste FrédéricLouis Viesse de (1774–1852)

M armont was a resourceful soldierin his younger days, and he be-

came a remarkable administrator of Illyria,but his name will nevertheless always be as-sociated with defeat and betrayal of Napo-leon. Born into a family of minor nobilityat Châtillon-sur-Seine in Burgundy, Mar-mont joined the army at the age of sixteenand was first noticed by Napoleon at thesiege of Toulon in November 1793. He be-came Napoleon’s aide-de-camp in 1796and fought in all the major encounters ofthe Italian campaign of 1796–1797. Now amember of Napoleon’s inner circle, Mar-

Marmot,Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de 159

160

François Gérard’s The Empress Marie-Louise and the King of Rome portrays Napoleon’s second empressand their son, who represents the future of the dynasty. (Alinari/Art Resource)

mont fought as a general in the Egyptiancampaign of 1798–1799, participated in thecoup of 18 Brumaire, and showed particularresourcefulness as commander of the ar-tillery at Marengo (14 June 1800).This spe-cialty led to his appointment as comman-dant in chief of the artillery in 1803,charged with modernizing French gunnery.

Marmont was bitterly disappointed atnot being named among the first of theNapoleonic marshals in 1804, but contin-ued to serve in the Grande Armée and theArmy of Italy, before being surprisinglynamed as governor-general of Dalmatia,later Illyria, in 1806. After seizing Ragusafrom the Russians in 1807, Marmontproved himself a remarkable governor. Ithas been said that he built the only decentroads around Dubrovnik between the Ro-mans and Tito. Marmont finally receivedhis marshal’s baton in 1809 after the Wa-gram campaign and in March 1811 suc-ceeded André Masséna as commander ofthe Army of Portugal.

It was in Iberia that Marmont’s problemswith Napoleon began. Defeated by theduke of Wellington and badly wounded atthe Battle of Salamanca (22 July 1812), de-spite having initially outmaneuvered theBritish commander, he took a year to re-cover, returning to fight in Germany in1813 and in the defense of France in Feb-ruary and March 1814. On 5 April he sur-rendered his corps, prematurely in Napo-leon’s opinion, to the Allies, and this“treason” was to haunt him for the rest ofhis life. “That Marmont should do such athing,” Napoleon is said to have exclaimed,“a man with whom I have shared mybread.” Marmont was struck from the list ofmarshals, refused to support Napoleon dur-ing the Hundred Days, and sat as one of thejudges who condemned Marshal MichelNey to death.

Covered with honors by the restoredBourbons, Marmont was vilified by Bona-partist writers and never again commandedtroops in the field. In 1830 as governor of

the first military district of Paris he failed toput down the revolutionaries seeking tooverthrow King Charles X and was forcedinto exile, never to set foot in France again.His posthumously published Memoirs(1856–1857) devoted much space to de-fending his actions in 1814, but his death inVenice on 3 March 1852 went unmournedin Napoleon III’s France.

Related entries: Artillery; Illyria; Marengo,Battle of; Ney, Michel; Peninsular War;Salamanca, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Marmont, Louis Viesse de. 1974. The Spirit of

Military Institutions. Westport, CT: Greenhill.Pimlott, John L. 1987.“Marmont,” in David G.


Marshals

N apoleon revived the ancien régimedignity of marshal as the highest

position in the army in 1804, creatingeighteen marshals of the empire. This firstpromotion was made up of heroes of therepublic and officers who had served Na-poleon, comprising, in order of precedence,Louis Berthier, Joachim Murat, Bon AdrienJeannot de Moncey, Jean-Baptiste Jourdan,André Masséna, Charles Augereau, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, Nicolas Soult, Guil-laume Brune, Jean Lannes, Joseph Mortier,Michel Ney, Louis Davout, Jean-BaptisteBessières, François Kellermann, FrançoisLefebvre, Dominique-Catherine Pérignon,and Philibert Sérurier.

Later promotions were Claude Victor in1807, and Alexandre Macdonald, the heroof Wagram,Auguste Marmont, and NicolasOudinot in 1808. Louis Suchet was ele-vated in 1811 for services in Spain, andLaurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr during theRussian campaign of 1812. Jozef Ponia-towski became the only non-Frenchmanamong the marshals in 1813, and Em-

Marshals 161

manuel Grouchy was promoted during theHundred Days in 1815.

The marshals came from all social back-grounds and were greatly varied in theirtemperaments, characters, and ultimately intheir attitudes toward Napoleon.As a groupthey were all personally courageous com-manders, but prone to feuding amongthemselves, sometimes going as far as insub-ordination.They brought a great variety ofmilitary and civil experience to the leader-ship of the army and socially formed an im-portant part of the hierarchy around theimperial throne.

Related entries: Augereau, Pierre FrançoisCharles; Bernadotte, Jean-Baptiste Jules; Berthier,Louis Alexandre; Brune, Guillaume Marie Anne;Davout, Louis Nicolas; Gouvion Saint-Cyr,Laurent; Grouchy, Emmanuel; Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste; Kellermann, François Christophe;Lannes, Jean; Lefebvre, François Joseph;Macdonald, Jacques Étienne Joseph Alexandre;Marmont,Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de;Masséna,André; Moncey, Bon Adrien Jeannot de;Murat, Joachim; Ney, Michel; Oudinot, NicolasCharles; Poniatowski, Jozef; Soult, Nicolas Jean deDieu;Victor, Claude

Suggestions for further reading:Chandler, David G., ed. 1987. Napoleon’s Marshals.

New York: Macmillan.———. 1994.“The Napoleonic Marshalate,” in

On the Napoleonic Wars: Collected Essays.London: Greenhill.

Macdonell,A. G. 1934. Napoleon and His Marshals.London: Macmillan.


Masséna, André (1758–1817)

D uke of Rivoli, prince of Essling,marshal of France, Masséna was a

natural fighter, unsophisticated and unre-fined. He won victories in Italy andSwitzerland that have earned him a placeamong the great soldiers of France, but histroubled career after 1800 shows a declinein his capacities. Born near Nice of ple-

beian origins, he owed his military career tothe Revolution, progressing rapidlythrough the ranks to general of brigade in1793. On assuming command of the Armyof Italy in 1796, Napoleon appointedMasséna, who had already fought in Italy,commander of the advance guard. Hisvaliant role in the first Italian campaigncaused Napoleon to dub him the “dearestchild of victory.” But the most importantassignment of his career was to take com-mand of the Army of Switzerland in De-cember 1798, when France faced imminentinvasion from Austrian and Russian forces.In a brilliant maneuver Masséna destroyedthe Austro-Russian forces at the battle ofZurich (25–28 September 1799) thenturned on and defeated a Russian reliefarmy. His victories in Switzerland savedFrance from invasion and had a decisiveimpact on the disintegration of the SecondCoalition.

Following the coup of 18 Brumaire, inwhich he played no part, Masséna returnedto Italy to command the French forcesblockaded in Genoa. He held the city foralmost three months under conditionsdreadful for both the population and theoccupying forces, evacuating with the hon-ors of war only when his army was starv-ing. His resistance allowed Napoleon timeto cross the Alps and win the decisive vic-tory of Marengo (14 June 1800). ButMasséna’s health was permanently dam-aged, and he was inactive for five years, re-turning to the colors in Italy and Polandbetween 1805 and 1807. In 1809 he foughtat the battles of Essling and Wagram, butwas wounded, further impairing his healthand apparently also his spirit.

In April 1810 Napoleon appointedMasséna commander of the Army of Portu-gal, with orders to drive the forces of theduke of Wellington into the sea. Thoughdefeated by Wellington at the battle of Bus-saco (27 September 1810), he continuedthe invasion of Portugal, only retreatingwhen forced to by lack of reinforcements

162 Masséna,André

and supplies. After an unsuccessful attackagainst Fuentes de Onoro in May 1811,Masséna was relieved of his command andreturned to France in disgrace. Officerswho had known him in Switzerland andmet him again in Spain found him a differ-ent man, weary and broken in health. Andthe presence of his mistress, HenrietteLeberton, disguised as a dragoon, as aide-de-camp caused dissension among his sub-ordinates, especially Michel Ney and An-doche Junot. Blamed by Napoleon fordefeat, Masséna was now a broken man andnever again commanded an army in thefield.

Made a peer by Louis XVIII at theRestoration, Masséna nevertheless some-what wearily acknowledged Napoleon’sgovernment during the Hundred Days.This act of loyalty caused his final disgrace,and he retired to Nice, where he died on 4April 1817.

Related entries: Bussaco, Battle of; Genoa;Italian Campaigns; Peninsular War; Switzerland

Suggestions for further reading:Horward, Donald D. 1965. The Battle of Bussaco:

Masséna vs Wellington. Tallahassee: FloridaState University.

Marshall-Cornwall, Sir James. 1965. MarshalMassena. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1987.“Massena,” in David G. Chandler,ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Melzi d’Eril, Francesco(1753–1816)

A minor Milanese nobleman by birth,Melzi played a leading role in the

creation of the Cisalpine Republic in 1797,and became vice-president of the ItalianRepublic, effectively the head of state, on itscreation in 1802.Very soon, however, Na-poleon came to suspect that Melzi wasseeking independence and recognitionfrom Austria. When he created the King-

dom of Italy in 1804, therefore, Napoleonignored Melzi’s constitutional proposals andappointed Eugène de Beauharnais asviceroy. As grand chancellor of the king-dom Melzi deputized for Eugène duringhis absence at the wars in 1809 and1812–13, but in 1814 as Napoleon’s powercrumbled he behaved deviously, contractingdiplomatic illnesses, and he did not longsurvive the restoration of Austrian rule.

Related entries: Cisalpine Republic; Italy,Kingdom of


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.

Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène

B y means of the memoirs of Saint He-lena,” writes the historian Annie Jour-

dan, “the Emperor engaged his final battleand set about his final conquest, that of his-tory itself.” The Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène,written by the comte de Las Cases and pub-lished in 1823, became a prime source ofthe Napoleonic legend. Las Cases recountsNapoleon’s “martyrdom” on Saint Helena,interspersed with lengthy quotes and para-phrases of Napoleon’s conversations inwhich he seeks to justify his life and actions.Napoleon had, according to himself, im-posed order on anarchy,“cleansed the Rev-olution, ennobled the common people, andrestored the authority of kings.” Dictator-ship and restrictions on freedom were nec-essary to combat disorder; his wars had allbeen waged for defensive reasons; and theuniversal monarchy was “the fortuitous re-sult of circumstances. . . . I was led to it stepby step by our enemies themselves.” Hisonly sin, apparently, was ambition: “a greatdeal of it—but the grandest and noblest,perhaps, that ever was: the ambition of es-tablishing and consecrating at last the king-dom of reason and the full exercise, the

Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène 163

complete enjoyment, of all human capabili-ties!” (Herold 1983, p. 397).

The publication of the Mémorial notonly stirred the souls of his old soldiers andofficers retired on half pay but appealed topeasants alarmed by the return of the oldaristocracy.The image of the soulful martyron his rock appealed also to the Romanticsensibility, previously more inclined towardanti-Enlightenment soul-searching and po-litical royalism.Victor Hugo and AlexandreDumas remembered that they were thesons of Napoleonic generals; Stendhalbegan his own tales of youth inspired by theNapoleonic epic; and Honoré de Balzacdeclared: “What Napoleon began with thesword, I finish with the pen.”

Related entries: Las Cases, Emmanuel-Augustin, Comte de; Napoleonic Legend

Suggestions for further reading:De Chair, Somerset, ed. 1992. Napoleon on

Napoleon. London: Cassell.Harvey,A. D. 1998.“Napoleon—the Myth,”

History Today 48 (January 1998), pp. 27–32.Herold, J. Christopher. 1983. The Horizon Book of


Jones, R. Ben. 1977. Napoleon, Man and Myth.London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Metternich, Klemens Wenceslas Lothar,

Fürst von (1773–1859)

A lthough in his later years as Austrianforeign minister Metternich de-

scribed himself as a “rock of order” in Euro-pean politics, during the Napoleonic pe-

164 Metternich, Klemens Wenceslas Lothar, Fürst von

This illustration from the Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène shows Napoleon’s indulgence in gardening.An imagelike this was especially suited to appeal to the peasantry, who could see Napoleon as a simple man of the peoplewho would look after their interests. (Mary Evans Picture Library, London)

riod, which he saw as the climax of his life,he pursued a pragmatic policy that includeda period of alliance with Napoleon. Born inKoblenz into a family of high nobility, hewitnessed the early violence of the Revolu-tion as a student in Strasbourg, and in 1794the Metternich family were driven fromtheir estates by invading French armies.Thisinstilled in the young Metternich a lifelongbelief in political order and stability that be-came a determined opposition to liberalismand a commitment to the preservation ofAustrian predominance in central Europe.

Metternich joined the Austrian diplo-matic service in 1801, holding posts in Dres-den and Berlin before becoming ambassadorto Paris in 1806. Here he established closerelations with Charles-Maurice de Tal-leyrand and could observe Napoleon at closequarters, admiring the efficiency of his ad-ministration but urging Vienna to adopt anaggressive response to his expansionism.Theresulting war of 1809 was a disaster for Aus-tria, but secured Metternich’s appointmentto the Foreign Ministry (where he was to re-main until 1848), after he had negotiated theTreaty of Schönbrunn (14 October 1809).

In his new position of power Metternichpursued a realistic if unheroic policy towardNapoleon, which might be described as “al-liance but with minimal support.” He per-sonally negotiated the marriage betweenNapoleon and Marie-Louise and showedgreat ingenuity in extricating Austria fromany commitment to support Napoleon’sRussian campaign of 1812. For Metternichat this time, Austria’s interest lay in preserv-ing Napoleonic France and its German alliesas a counterweight to Prussia and Russia, es-pecially the latter. As a result his relationswith Alexander I were often strained, but hefound a more congenial partner in LordCastlereagh. His views prevailed in theTreaties of Paris of 1814 and 1815, where hemanaged to limit Prussian ambitions in Ger-many and preserve a reasonably strongFrance, without Napoleon but with manyNapoleonic institutions intact.

The Congress of Vienna and peace settle-ment of 1815 saw Metternich at the heightof his powers. The rift between Austria andRussia, especially over Poland and Saxony,was obvious, but Metternich and Talleyrandsucceeded in restoring France as an essentialcomponent of the new conservative order inEurope. Metternich also reestablished Habs-burg power and influence in Italy and in the new German Confederation. Austriaemerged stronger and more influential thanever before. Metternich became the symbolof the system established in 1815, and like hissystem he lasted in office until finally drivenout by the revolutions of 1848.

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Austria; Coalitions; Danube Campaigns; FrancisI, Emperor of Austria; Marie-Louise vonHabsburg, Empress; Nationalism; Paris,Treatiesof; Schönbrunn,Treaty of;Talleyrand-Périgord,Charles-Maurice de;Vienna, Congress of

Suggestions for further reading:Kraehe, Enno Edward. 1963. Metternich’s German

Policy,Vol. 1:The Contest with Napoleon,1799–1814. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.

Palmer,Alan. 1972. Metternich. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Stearns, Josephine B. 1948. The Role of Metternichin Undermining Napoleon. Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press.

Milan Decrees

Together with the earlier Berlin De-crees, the Milan Decrees of Novem-

ber and December 1807 formed the basis ofNapoleon’s Continental System. Respond-ing to the British Orders in Council of Jan-uary and November 1807, which forcedneutral ships to get British permission totrade with enemy ports, these new measuresextended the ban on the import of Britishgoods to the Continent to British goodscarried by neutrals. The Berlin and MilanDecrees laid down the form of the Conti-nental System between 1807 and 1810.

Milan Decrees 165

Related entries: Berlin Decrees; ContinentalSystem




Mollien, François Nicolas(1758–1850)

A s minister of the treasury between1806 and 1814 and again during the

Hundred Days, Mollien, like MartinGaudin, helped provide financial stabilityfor Napoleon’s regime on time-honoredprinciples.Already an experienced financialadministrator under the ancien régime,Mollien was appointed director of theSinking Fund by Napoleon in 1800, wherehe introduced the double-entry bookkeep-ing he later extended throughout the trea-sury. Mollien’s cautious approach could betaken too far, as when he opposed Napo-leon’s plans to establish branches of theBank of France in all major cities, but heoften recalled Napoleon to financial recti-tude, for example over the prompt paymentof army and navy contractors. After Napo-leon’s downfall Mollien turned down op-portunities to serve other French govern-ments as minister of finance, but as amember of the Chamber of Peers he of-fered sound advice to the governments ofthe Restoration and the July Monarchy.

Related entries: Finance



Clough, Shepherd B. 1939. France:A History ofNational Economics, 1789–1939. New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Moncey, Bon Adrien Jeannot de (1754–1842)

E ventually to become duke of Co-negliano and marshal of France,

Moncey was born at Palise near Besançon,the son of a lawyer; he left school to jointhe army at the age of fifteen but enjoyed acheckered career until the Revolution,when he rose rapidly to the rank of majorgeneral by 1794. Between 1793 and 1795,the most successful period of his militarycareer, Moncey distinguished himself infighting in the Pyrenees. However, his asso-ciation with known royalists and his openopposition to the war in the Vendée seemedto have brought his active career to an endby 1797.

Napoleon recalled Moncey to the colorsin 1800, giving him commands in Switzer-land and Italy. Even so, his nominationamong the first marshals of the empire in1804 was considered a surprise, being prob-ably due to Napoleon’s desire to associateold republican generals with his imperialregime. Moncey was back in Spain in1808–1809, but with less success than inthe 1790s, and for the rest of Napoleon’sreign he only had command of reservetroops. In 1814, as commander of theParisian National Guard, Moncey acquittedhimself valiantly in the defense of theClichy gate against the Allies, and he wasone of the marshals who forced Napoleon’sfirst abdication.

Moncey supported Napoleon duringthe Hundred Days, but played no activerole in the emperor’s last campaign. Withthe Bourbons restored, Moncey refused tohead the court-martial of Michel Ney, de-claring that he could not condemn a manwho had served France and saved count-less lives during the Russian campaign of1812, an adventure Moncey himself hadopposed. His honesty earned Moncey abrief term of imprisonment, but he re-turned to serve his country into extreme

166 Mollien, François Nicolas

old age.As governor of the Invalides he re-ceived Napoleon’s remains when theywere brought back from Saint Helena inDecember 1840.

Moncey was not a great general, but asensitive man of decency and honor whorefused to wage war as ruthlessly as most ofhis contemporaries. His character earnedhim the respect even of France’s most de-termined enemies in Spain. Napoleon con-sidered his behavior frank and correct, call-ing him simply an honest man. In refusingto condemn Ney, Moncey wrote to LouisXVIII:“No Sire, if I am not allowed to savemy country, nor my own life, then at least Iwill save my honour” (Beckett 1987, p.306). His honorable nature and honesty un-doubtedly hindered his career, though hislongevity in service shows that both Napo-leon and the Bourbons were capable of ap-preciating his qualities.

Related entries: Abdication, First; Ney, Michel;Peninsular War; Revolutionary Wars

Suggestions for further reading:Beckett, Ian F.W. 1987.“Moncey,” in David G.


Mondovi , Battle of (21 April 1796)

This victory in Napoleon’s first Ital-ian campaign forced Piedmont-

Sardinia to withdraw from the war, leavingthe Austrians to face the French withoutsignificant Italian allies. Having fought aseries of engagements against separate al-lied armies, Napoleon finally turned hisfull force against the Piedmontese underGeneral Michael von Colli and crushedthem at Mondovi. A week later Piedmontwithdrew from the war by the Treaty ofCherasco.


Suggestions for further reading:Rooney, David D. 1987.“Sérurier,” in David G.


Monge, Gaspard (1746–1818)

The leading French scientist of theage both benefited greatly and ulti-

mately suffered from close association withNapoleon. Already before the RevolutionMonge’s work on problems of mathemati-cal theory and the application of geometryto military questions had earned him thetitle of Royal Professor of mathematics andphysics; he also conducted experiments inchemistry and between 1784 and 1792 wasexaminer of naval cadets, entailing tours ofinspection of naval schools. After the fall ofthe monarchy Monge was unexpectedlynamed minister of the navy, and in1792–1793 worked hard to reorganize theFrench fleet and expand arms and muni-tions production. After resigning in April1793, Monge threw himself into the revo-lutionary war effort, improving manufac-ture of steel and gunpowder. He was in-volved in the new Central School forPublic Works, predecessor of the ÉcolePolytechnique, and in the foundation of theInstitut National in 1795–1796.

Monge became friendly with Napoleonin 1796, when he was sent to Italy to in-spect and preserve the artistic and scientificobjects captured by the French army andwas charged with transmitting the terms ofthe Treaty of Campo Formio to the Direc-tory. In 1797 he returned to France as di-rector of the École Polytechnique, but afteronly three months was sent as politicalcommissioner to Rome, where he helpedto establish the “sister” Roman Republic.Approached by Napoleon in Italy, he nowhelped to organize the Egyptian campaignby selecting maps and other necessary in-formation, and eventually gave in to Napo-

Monge, Gaspard 167

leon’s request to take part. He participatedin the taking of Alexandria in July 1798;after the capture of Cairo Napoleoncharged him with the establishment of aprinting press in the Egyptian capital, thecreation of the Institute of Egypt, the ad-ministrative reorganization of the country,and tracing the course of the ancientRoman canal between the Nile and theRed Sea. Despite suffering severely fromdysentery, he accompanied Napoleon toPalestine and Syria between February andJune 1799.

Returning to France with Napoleon,Monge was relieved to be back in Paris, re-suming the directorship of the École Poly-technique. After the coup of 18 BrumaireNapoleon rewarded Monge with a place inthe Senate. Now a confirmed Bonaparteloyalist, he was elevated to the Legion ofHonor in 1804, became president of theSenate in 1806, and was created count ofPélouse in 1808.All this time he continuedhis scientific work, publishing various trea-tises on mathematics.

In declining health during the lastyears of the empire, Monge did not sufferpolitically after the first abdication, con-tinuing his work at the Institut National,but he made the mistake of renewing hisfriendship with Napoleon during theHundred Days, when he accepted a peer-age from the restored emperor. Fearingreprisals after Napoleon’s defeat, the bynow elderly Monge fled to the Nether-lands in October 1815. Returning to Parisafter five months he was expelled fromboth the Institut and the École Polytech-nique. He died, exhausted and disillu-sioned, in October 1818.

Related entries: École Polytechnique; EgyptianCampaign; Industry; Institut National

Suggestions for further reading:Taton, René. 1974.“Monge, Gaspard,” in Charles

Coulston Gillispie, ed., Dictionary of ScientificBiography, vol. 9. New York: Charles Scribner’sSons.

Montalivet, Jean-PierreBachasson, Comte de

(1766–1823)

A s minister of the interior between1809 and 1814, Montalivet compe-

tently enforced Napoleon’s policy of cen-tralization. He had first encountered Na-poleon as early as 1789, when he had beenmayor of Valence, and under the consulatehe was made prefect, first of the Manche,then of Seine-et-Oise, before advancingfurther under the empire as director ofbridges and highways. At the Ministry ofthe Interior Montalivet endeavored to im-prove the quality of prefects and super-vised the public works program, which in-cluded the building of canals, roads andbridges, the redevelopment of the ports ofCherbourg, Antwerp, and Ostend, and theconstruction of monuments and publicbuildings in Paris. He also made a valianteffort to organize relief during the eco-nomic depression of 1810–1811. Most im-portant, though, Montalivet used his volu-minous correspondence with prefects andtheir subordinates to present comprehen-sive reports on the state of the empire in1809 and 1813.

Related entries: Centralization; LocalGovernment; Prefects


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Perrot, Jean-Claude, and Stuart Woolf. 1984. State

and Statistics in France, 1789–1815. London:Harwood Academic.

Moore, Sir John (1761–1809)

B orn in Glasgow, Moore nearlycrossed Napoleon’s path when he

served as a colonel attached to PasqualePaoli in Corsica in 1794–1795, and again in

168 Montalivet, Jean-Pierre Bachasson, Comte de

1801 when he commanded the landing ofthe British forces at Aboukir in Egypt, acampaign in which he was wounded. In1808 Moore was sent to Portugal with30,000 men to help Spanish resistance toNapoleon’s invasion. By the middle of De-cember he was at Salamanca, threateningthe French communications between Bay-onne and Madrid, but on hearing that Na-poleon was turning to deal with the threatMoore led a brilliant retreat through themountains to Corunna. Here he defied theefforts of the French under Nicolas Soult toprevent the British evacuation, but wasmortally wounded in the fighting. Buriedat Corunna, Moore was, in the words ofCharles Wolfe, “left alone in his glory”(Horne 1996, p. 255), but his heroic deathdid not prevent him being blamed for thefailure of the campaign.

Related entries: Corsica; Corunna, Battle of;Egyptian Campaign; Peninsular War; Soult,Nicolas Jean de Dieu

Suggestions for further reading:Davies, David William. 1974. Sir John Moore’s

Peninsular Campaign, 1808–1809. The Hague:Nijhoff.

Horne,Alistair. 1996. How Far from Austerlitz?Napoleon 1805–1815. London: Macmillan.

Oman, Carola. 1953. Sir John Moore. London:Hodder and Stoughton.

Parkinson, Roger. 1976. Moore of Corunna.London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon.

Moreau, Jean-Victor(1763–1813)

M oreau was one of the most bril-liant generals of the revolution-

ary armies, being largely responsible for theconquest of Holland in 1795 and com-mander of the Army of the North and thenthe Army of the Rhine and Moselle in1796. But he was never an ardent republi-can—his father had been guillotined duringthe Terror—and in 1797 he was placed on

the inactive list, before being recalled in1798 and fighting in Italy. He met Napo-leon on the latter’s return from Egypt andjoined in the coup of 18 Brumaire, leadingto a new rise in his fortunes.

Moreau assumed command of the Armyof the Rhine in November 1799 and dur-ing the victorious campaigns in Germanyin 1800 defeated the Austrians at the Battleof Hohenlinden. He retired from activeduty in September 1801, but his persistentroyalist sympathies caused him to joinCharles Pichegru’s conspiracy against Na-poleon. He was arrested, imprisoned, andremoved from the army. Moreau spent theyears 1804–1813 in voluntary exile in theUnited States, but was summoned byAlexander I as an adviser to the Alliesagainst Napoleon. In this capacity he wasfatally wounded by French fire at Dresdenin August 1813.

Related entries: Dresden; Hohenlinden, Battleof; Pichegru, Jean-Charles; Revolutionary Wars

Suggestions for further reading:Bertaud, Jean-Paul. 1988. The Army of the French

Revolution. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.


Mortier, Edouard AdolpheCasimir Joseph (1768–1835)

D uke of Treviso, marshal of France,Mortier was the most loyal of Na-

poleon’s marshals (he even named his eldestson Napoleon), and he was also the bestliked, the most modest, and the only onewho spoke English. Born at Câteau-Cam-brésis in northwestern France, the son of awealthy cloth merchant and his Englishwife, Mortier entered the army through theNational Guard of Dunkirk in 1798 anddistinguished himself in some of the major

Mortier, Edouard Adolphe Casimir Joseph 169

campaigns and battles of the revolutionarywars, but never served under Napoleon. Hesupported the coup of 18 Brumaire, waspromoted to divisional general during theSwiss campaign on 1799, and was ap-pointed to command the military divisionof Paris in April 1800.

In 1803 Napoleon selected Mortier tolead the conquest and occupation ofHanover, Britain’s only possession in conti-nental Europe, and created him one of hisoriginal marshals of the empire in 1804. Insubsequent campaigns in Germany be-tween 1805 and 1807, Spain in 1810, andRussia in 1812, Mortier was seldom givenindependent command, but he alwaysachieved results with small forces and suc-cessfully administered conquered territo-ries. His calm under pressure at the battle ofFriedland (1807) won Napoleon’s particu-lar admiration, and he was unique amongFrench commanders in Spain in sufferingno major setbacks or defeats. During theRussian campaign he commanded theYoung Guard at the battle of Borodino andwas made governor of Moscow, only par-tially carrying out Napoleon’s order to de-stroy the city. Mortier was in every majorbattle in 1813–1814, commanding theYoung Guard in Germany and the OldGuard during the campaign of France. Hesupported Napoleon during the HundredDays, but was prevented by illness fromjoining the emperor at Waterloo.

Mortier continued to serve his countryin various political and military appoint-ments until 1835. He had known KingLouis Philippe, brought to power by theRevolution of 1830, since the campaigns of1792–1793, and served him as ambassadorto Russia and briefly as minister of war in1834–1835. But peaceful retirement in1835 at the age of sixty-seven with a grow-ing number of grandchildren was not to behis. On 28 July during a National Guardparade he was one of those killed by an “in-fernal machine” meant for Louis Philippe.Although not the most flamboyant of Na-

poleon’s marshals, nor the greatest soldier,Mortier was ahead of his time as a trainer ofthe Young Guard and particularly in thecare of army horses. The historian RandalGray says that “as an honest and modesthuman being” Mortier surpassed all his col-leagues (Gray 1987).

Related entries: Borodino, Battle of; Friedland,Battle of; Imperial Guard; Moscow

Suggestions for further reading:Gray, Randal. 1987.“Mortier,” in David G.


Moscow

B arbarous peoples are superstitiousand have simple ideas,” said Napo-

leon on the eve of his Russian campaign of1812. “A terrible blow against the heart ofthe Empire, on Moscow the Great,Moscow the Holy, will deliver this blindand spiritless mass to me with one blow”(Tulard 1985, p. 61). Moscow had beencapital of Russia until 1703 and was stillthe spiritual center of Orthodox Christian-ity. Taking the city, Napoleon was con-vinced, would force Tsar Alexander I to suefor peace.

The decision not to defend Moscow wastaken by Mikhail Kutuzov, who believedthat the occupation of the city would over-strain Napoleon’s resources. The governorof Moscow, Count Fedor Rostopchin, al-though he disagreed with Kutuzov, orderedthe evacuation of the city. Napoleon tookup residence in the Kremlin on 15 Septem-ber 1812, but was soon forced to takerefuge in the Petrovsky Palace. Fires, theorigin of which remains obscure, ragedthrough Moscow. In four days three-quar-ters of the old, wood-built city was de-stroyed, while carousing and looting by Na-poleon’s drunken troops added to thedestruction wrought by the fires.

170 Moscow

Disappointed in his hope that the cap-ture of the ancient capital would bringpeace, Napoleon evacuated Moscow on 19October. Joseph Mortier was left behindwith orders to destroy what remained ofthe city, but ignored Napoleon’s commandsand withdrew his forces four days later.Theterrible retreat from Moscow had begun.Asthe inhabitants returned to their homesduring the following three months, infec-tious diseases ran rampant, decimating thepopulation. But rebuilding began soon af-terward and by 1816 had advanced suffi-ciently for the tsar to be received in state inthe Kremlin.

Related entries: Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich;Mortier, Joseph; Russian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Brett James,Antony. 1966. 1812: Eyewitness

Accounts of Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. NewYork: Macmillan.

Cate, Curtis. 1985. The War of the Two Emperors:The Duel between Napoleon and Alexander,Russia, 1812. New York: Random House.

Chandler, David G. 1994.“Retreat fromMoscow,” in his On the Napoleonic Wars:Collected Essays. London: Greenhill.



Tulard, Jean. 1985. Napoleon: the Myth of theSaviour. London: Methuen.

Murat, Caroline

See Bonaparte, Caroline, Queen of Naples

Murat, Joachim (1767–1815)

G rand duke of Berg, king of Naples,marshal of France,“The First Horse-man of Europe,” and Napoleon’s

finest cavalry commander, the daring andimpetuous Murat came to embody theextravagance and dash of the Napoleonic

armies. The youngest of twelve childrenof a prosperous innkeeper from Guyenne,he was originally intended for the Churchbut instead joined the army in 1787. Inthe early years of the Revolution Muratsaw action on the Rhine and was com-missioned as a sub-lieutenant of cavalry in1792.

Murat’s destiny became entangled withthat of Napoleon in October 1795 whenhe secured the cannon used for Bona-parte’s “whiff of grapeshot” of 13Vendémiaire. He became Napoleon’s chiefaide in the Italian campaign of 1796–1797, showing for the first time his con-spicuous though often foolhardy couragein leading cavalry charges, a quality hecontinued to show in the Egyptian cam-paign, where at Aboukir he engaged insingle combat with the Turkish com-mander, Saïd Mustapha Pasha. Murat re-turned with Napoleon from Egypt withthe rank of general of division, providedvaluable support in the coup of 18 Bru-maire, and in January 1800 married thenew first consul’s sister, Caroline Bona-parte. She was sixteen years old, he wasthirty.

In Napoleon’s second Italian campaignMurat again fought with manifest courageat Marengo (14 June 1800), remaining inItaly until 1804, when he was created amarshal of the empire and began to accu-mulate the innumerable orders, titles, andhonors of which he was inordinately fond.Although Napoleon continued to criticizehis rashness, the new Prince Murat’s cavalryscreen at Austerlitz secured the French vic-tory, and he was the first to occupy Viennain November 1805. Now grand duke ofBerg and Cleves, Murat was accepted as thefinest cavalry commander in Europe, serv-ing at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806 and evenmaintaining his dashing presence duringthe brutal battle of Eylau.

When Napoleon made his fateful deci-sion to intervene in Spain in 1808 Muratbecame his deputy in Madrid, responsible

Murat, Joachim 171

172

Joachim Murat came to embody the extravagance and dash characteristic of the Napoleonic armies.AlthoughThéodore Géricault’s Charging Chasseur (1812) features an unnamed rider in an unknown battle, it displaysall the panache of the ideal horseman as set forth by Murat. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

for the savage repression of the rebellion of2 May, before succeeding Joseph Bonaparteas king of Naples. He resided in his king-dom until 1812, mounting a failed attackon Sicily in 1809, but showing the firstsigns of independence from Napoleon byturning a blind eye to breaches of the Con-tinental System and spending as much timeas possible with his four children. Murathad to be cajoled by Napoleon into com-manding the cavalry and the advance guardin the invasion of Russia in 1812, but heperformed with his usual spirit at Smolenskand Borodino and was the first to enterMoscow as he had been at Vienna. Duringthe retreat from Moscow he was givencommand of the army when Napoleon leftfor Paris, but once the survivors reachedPrussia he passed command to the moresuitable hands of Eugène de Beauharnaisand departed, without authority, for Naples.

Murat fought beside Napoleon again atLeipzig (17–18 October 1813), but the de-feat convinced him that the Napoleonicempire in Europe was doomed. In 1814 heand Caroline came to an agreement withthe Austrians and the more reluctant Britishand so preserved their kingdom after Na-poleon’s first abdication. When Napoleonescaped from Elba in 1815, however, Muratattacked the Austrians in Italy. Distrustingthe British and believing that Napoleoncould regain power in France, he called onthe Italian people to fight behind him for aunited Italy, but his naive crusade ended indefeat. Fleeing to France Murat offered hisservices to Napoleon for what became theWaterloo campaign, but the emperor ig-nored him. In a desperate last adventure hetried to recapture Naples from the restoredBourbon rulers with a tiny expeditionaryforce; he was captured in the village ofPizzo, tried by court-martial, and executedby firing squad on 13 October 1815.

With his extravagant uniforms, be-decked with feathers and medals, Muratepitomizes the romantic side of theNapoleonic legend. Idolized by his troops,

whom he had helped to make the best cav-alry in Europe, and feared by his enemies,his military skills and personal bravery werenever in question. But in politics he seemedto be from another age. He could not com-mand an army in retreat and showed greatnaïveté in Italy; his wife Caroline was thebetter administrator and negotiator. Theirnumerous descendants included severalwho played prominent roles in the raisingto power of Napoleon’s nephew as Napo-leon III.

Related entries: Austerlitz, Battle of; Berg,Grand Duchy of; Bonaparte, Caroline, Queen ofNaples; Borodino, Battle of; Brumaire, Coup ofYear VIII; Danube Campaigns; EgyptianCampaign; Eylau, Battle of; Hundred Days;Italian Campaigns; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of;Leipzig, Battle of; Marengo, Battle of; Naples,Kingdom of; Russian Campaign; Spain;Vendémiaire, Rising of Year IV

Suggestions for further reading:Atteridge,Andrew Hilliard. 1918. Joachim Murat,

Marshal of France and King of Naples. London:T. Nelson and Sons.

Cole, Hubert. 1972. The Betrayers: Joachim andCaroline Murat. London: Eyre Methuen.

Connelly, Owen. 1965. Napoleon’s SatelliteKingdoms. New York: Free Press.

Pickles,Tim. 1987.“Murat,” in David G.Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Musée Napoléon

The old royal palace of the Louvrewas transformed into a museum

during the Revolution, and the culturaltreasures seized by Napoleon during hisItalian campaigns and Egyptian campaignmade a major contribution to the new col-lections. In 1802 Dominique Vivant Denonsuggested that the new art gallery be re-named the Musée Napoléon, which nowserved as the central depot for works of artlooted from occupied Europe.Architecturalmodifications to the Louvre caused themuseum to be closed between 1808 and

Musée Napoléon 173

1810, but it was reopened with a grand cer-emony coinciding with Napoleon’s reli-gious marriage to Marie-Louise. Thewidely admired collection was dismantledon Napoleon’s fall, despite Denon’s best ef-forts to keep it all together.

Related entries: Denon, Dominique-Vivant

Suggestions for further reading:Gould, Cecil H. M. 1965. Trophy of Conquest:The

Musée Napoléon and the Creation of the Louvre.London: Faber & Faber.

174 Musée Napoléon

NNaples, Kingdom of

F rench armies had first enteredNaples and expelled the ruling

branch of the Bourbon dynasty in 1799,but King Ferdinand IV was restored by theBritish and ruled until 1806, when he wasbanished again and Napoleon created theKingdom of Naples, with Joseph Bona-parte as king. Having put together a min-istry made up of Frenchmen, includingPierre Louis Roederer, and reformistNeapolitans, Joseph introduced radical so-cial and economic reforms, but delayedthe introduction of a constitution. Feudalrights and dues were abolished; new crops,including cotton and sugar, were intro-duced to replace those excluded by theContinental System; French-style adminis-tration and courts were set up; and theschool and university system considerablyimproved.

When Napoleon made Joseph king ofSpain in 1808, he was replaced on thethrone of Naples by Joachim Murat, andthe new kingdom eventually succumbed toMurat’s desire to become independent ofNapoleon. He continued many of Joseph’sreforms, but refused to implement his pre-decessor’s constitution. Together with hisright-hand man, Antonio Marghella, policeprefect of Naples and an ardent Italian na-tionalist, Murat began creating his own

army, which by 1812 numbered some80,000 men. However, when he was per-suaded by Napoleon to take part in theRussian campaign of 1812 any chanceMurat may have had of saving his thronebecame extremely remote.

Although Murat negotiated with theAustrians in 1814, the British stood by theircommitments to Ferdinand IV, who hadspent the years since his overthrow undertheir protection in Sicily. Murat’s conductin 1815 mixed miscalculation with naïvetéand cost him his throne and his life. WithNapoleon’s final overthrow Ferdinand re-turned to Naples, where he ruled until1825. Naples and Sicily became part of aunited Italy in 1860.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Caroline, Queen ofNaples; Bonaparte, Joseph, King of Naples, Kingof Spain; Calabria, Revolt in; Murat, Joachim;Roederer, Pierre Louis


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Davis, John A. 1990.“The Impact of French

Rule on the Kingdom of Naples,1806–1815,” Ricerche Storiche 20, pp.367–405.

Noether, Emiliana. 1988.“Change andContinuity in the Kingdom of Naples,1806–1815,” Consortium on RevolutionaryEurope 1988, pp. 605–618.

Woolf, Stuart. 1979. A History of Italy,1700–1860:The Social Constraints of PoliticalChange. London: Methuen.

Naples, Kingdom of 175

N

Napoleon II, King of Rome(1811–1832)

B orn in the Tuileries, NapoleonFrançois Charles Joseph, the only son

of Napoleon and Marie-Louise, was adu-lated from birth by his father and given thetitle of King of Rome, a city he never vis-ited during his short life. In 1813 Napoleonbegan preparations for his coronation bythe pope, a ceremony which never tookplace. Napoleon tried to abdicate in hisfavor in 1814 and again in 1815, but with-out serious support. The emperor saw hisson for the last time on 24 January 1814 ata military parade outside the Tuileries.

The three-year-old prince was taken toVienna by his doting grandfather, Francis I,and given the new title of duke of Reich-stadt. He matured into a handsome andcharming young man, fully aware of his in-heritance.He could be used as a threat by theAustrians against the post-Napoleonicregimes in France, but after Napoleon’s deathBonapartist propaganda portrayed the aiglon,the “little eagle,” as the “prisoner of Vienna,”and his picture could be found adorning thehomes of the peasantry. Napoleon’s letters tohim, presenting Bonapartism in an idealizedform,became part of the Napoleonic legend.However, Napoleon II died of tuberculosis atthe age of twenty-one, after participating tooenthusiastically in Austrian army maneuvers.It was his cousin, Napoleon III, swept topower in 1848, who was to benefit from thelegend of the aiglon. His remains werebrought back to lie with those of his father inthe Invalides in December 1940 on the per-sonal orders of Adolf Hitler and interred in alavish ceremony that was highly embarrassingfor the government of Marshal Pétain.

Related entries: Bonapartism; Marie-Louisevon Habsburg, Empress; Napoleonic Legend



Castelot,André. 1960. Napoleon’s Son:The King ofRome. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Napoleonic Legend

L iving he lost the world, dead he con-quers it,” wrote François René de

Chateaubriand (Connelly 1985, p. 298). Butthe legend of Napoleon, described by thedistinguished historian, Jean Tulard, as “thefirst of the modern myths,” was originallydeliberately created during Napoleon’s life.The legend was forged during the first Ital-ian campaign by newspapers designed topraise the army and its leader, who “flieslike lightning and strikes like a thunderbolt.He is everywhere and sees everything.”Theyoung Bonaparte marched “accompaniedby the god of War and the god of Fortune.”Under the empire the figure of the em-

176 Napoleon II, King of Rome

In the Cradle of the King of Rome the infant liesunder the Roman olive leaves of victory, while aNapoleonic eagle, his father’s emblem, protectivelywatches over his sleep. (Erich Lessing/Art Resource)

177

Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres created an almost godlike image of Napoleon seated like Jupiter on his thronewith the sword of Charlemagne by his side.A cold and distant portrayal of the emperor in all his majesty, ithangs today in Les Invalides, a suitable companion piece for Napoleon’s tomb.(Giraudon/Art Resource)

peror was central to imperial propaganda,exalted in army bulletins, prints, medals,and paintings. This early image was to de-velop after his downfall and death into alegend that persists to this day.

Under the Bourbon Restoration be-tween 1815 and 1830 admiration for Na-poleon was a way of expressing opposi-tion to the restored regime. The regimeattempted to eradicate all reference toNapoleon, but popular opinion came tolook upon him more favorably as theBourbons grew more unpopular, and lib-erals portrayed him as a martyr who haddied for the egalitarian principles of theRevolution. The publication in 1823 ofthe Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène consolidatedthe image of the martyr dying on hislonely rock. Romantic writers like VictorHugo, Alexandre Dumas, and Stendhalpraised the Napoleonic epic, while on amore mundane level old officers retiredon half pay, peasants alarmed by the returnof old landowners, and officials excludedfrom offices by the restored regime alllooked back with nostalgia on the days ofglory.

After 1830, under the July Monarchy ofLouis Philippe, dramatic renditions of Na-poleon’s life and career flooded the Parisianstage, while popular prints portrayed him asthe “little corporal” in greatcoat, boots, andcocked hat, the image which is still familiartoday. Napoleon became not so much aruler, conqueror, and legislator, as a soldiercaring for his men, going back to the imageforged in Italy and Egypt.The Napoleonicwar veteran or grognard became a stock fig-ure in novels and plays.The “little corporal”and his men were not only participants in aglorious epic, but also part of a heroic andromanticized French people. Louis Philippetried to appropriate the legend, bringingNapoleon’s remains back to France, andNapoleon came to represent militaryprowess and the militant defense of libertyfor all shades of political opinion, not onlyBonapartist.

The Napoleonic legend played a part inenabling his nephew, Napoleon III, to be-come president of the Second Republic in1848 and then to proclaim the Third Em-pire in 1852, using Napoleon’s favorite de-vice of a plebiscite to legitimize his positionas emperor. Even Napoleon III’s defeat inthe Franco-Prussian War of 1870 did noharm to the legend of his uncle. Napoleon,who had beaten the Prussians at Jena, nowbecame a powerful symbol for the move-ment of “revenge,” expressed in popularnovels and by nationalist writers such asMaurice Barrès.

In the twentieth century the legend hasbeen conveyed most effectively in film. Na-poleon made his first appearance on screenas early as 1897–1898 in Bonaparte au Pontd’Arcole, directed by Alice Guy. Since thenhe has been portrayed by, among others,Marlon Brando, Rod Steiger, Charles Boyer,and Sacha Guitry, though in most cases withmore attention to his love life than to hisconquest of Europe. The greatest and mostself-consciously heroic depiction is in AbelGance’s ideologically dubious masterpieceNapoléon vu par Abel Gance (1925), with Al-bert Dieudonné as a young Bonaparte whotruly “is everywhere and sees everything.”Napoleon’s tomb in the Invalides is nolonger, as it once was, the most visited mon-ument in Paris, but it is still an obligatorystop on the tourist trail, taken in by manythousands of people every year.

Related entries: Bonapartism; Mémorial deSainte-Hélène; Personality, Cult of; Propaganda

Suggestions for further reading:Connelly, Owen, ed. 1985. Historical Dictionary of


Harvey,A. D. 1998.“Napoleon—the Myth,”History Today 48 (January 1998), pp. 27–32.




178 Napoleonic Legend

Nationalism

The relationship between Napoleon,his empire, and emergent national-

ism in Europe is complex and inevitablycontroversial. It is tempting but arguablytoo easy to hold him responsible for theemergence or strengthening of movementsand ideas that only reached maturity laterin the nineteenth century. For example, thepart played by resistance to Napoleon inthe development of nationalism in Ger-many has been exaggerated both by Ger-man nationalist historians and by anti-Napoleon historians who hold himresponsible for Prussian militaristic domi-nance of united Germany.The situation ineach country was unique. The nineteenth-century British historian Lord Acton wrotethat “Napoleon called a new power intoexistence by attacking nationality in Russia,by delivering it in Italy, by governing in de-fiance of it in Germany and Spain.” Poland,Switzerland, Illyria, Belgium, and evenGreat Britain may be added to Acton’s for-mula to create even greater complication.

Napoleon himself had abandoned hisyouthful Corsican nationalism for commit-ment to the universal ideals of the Revolu-tion. But once he was in power his policiescombined pragmatism and opportunismwith his obsession with the supranationalempire of Charlemagne. Napoleon’s basiclack of belief in “natural” nations is shownby the way he made and unmade new statesin Germany, Italy, and eastern Europe with-out regard to incipient national feelings. InFrance itself nationalistic feeling under Na-poleon was dependent on victory and gloryand by 1812 had been worn down, al-though revived briefly during the Allied in-vasion of 1814. In Italy and Poland Napo-leon encouraged nationalist feeling, but waswilling to betray it when it clashed with hisown interests. Opposition to Napoleonicrule in Spain and Germany took on a na-tionalistic tinge, but was more tied to thepast than looking to the future: those who

believed in revolution against Napoleonrule were a minority compared to thosewho saw the goal as restoration.

Only in the Mémorial de Sainte-Hélènedid Napoleon claim that he had wished topreside over a “Europe of the nations.”Thispretence became part of the Napoleoniclegend and was to inspire his nephew, Na-poleon III. And it is true that Napoleonicrule had breathed life into moribund statestructures while at the same time arousingopposition which would pass into national-istic myth. In the words of Hans Kohn, “atthe beginning of the age of nationalismstands its denial in Napoleon’s universalempire” (Kohn 1950, p. 26), but the experi-ence of the Napoleonic Wars and empire inEurope helped to provide some of themyths and nostalgia necessary for the cre-ation of authentic nationalism.

Related entries: Belgium; Bonapartism;Confederation of the Rhine; Corsica; Germany,Campaigns in; Great Britain; Holland, Kingdom of;Illyria; Italy, Kingdom of; Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène;Napoleonic Legend; Poland; Prussia; Romanticism;Spain; Switzerland;Warsaw, Duchy of

Suggestions for further reading:Anderson, Eugene N. 1939. Nationalism and the

Cultural Crisis in Prussia, 1806–1815. NewYork: Farrar and Rinehart.

Dann, Otto, and John Dinwiddy, eds. 1988.Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution.London: Hambledon.

Davies, Norman. 1981. God’s Playground:AHistory of Poland. 2 vols. Oxford: ClarendonPress.

Kohn, Hans. 1950.“Napoleon and the Age ofNationalism,” Journal of Modern History 22, pp.21–37.

Kohn, Hans. 1967. Prelude to Nation States:TheFrench and German Experience, 1789–1815.Princeton:Van Nostrand.

Langsam,Walter C. 1930. The Napoleonic Wars andGerman Nationalism in Austria. New York:Columbia University Press.

Schulze, Hagen. 1991. The Course of GermanNationalism: from Fichte to Bismarck,1763–1867. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.


Snyder, Louis L. 1978. Roots of GermanNationalism. Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress.

Nationalism 179

Woolf, Stuart. 1989.“French Civilization andEthnicity in the Napoleonic Empire,” Past &Present, no. 124 (August 1989), pp. 96–120.

———. 1991. A History of Italy, 1700–1860: theSocial Constraints of Political Change. London:Routledge.

Naval Warfare

The inescapable facts of geographydictated that the struggle between

Napoleon’s France and Britain would takeplace more at sea than on land. However,British naval superiority had already beenestablished in the 1790s, and as long as theRoyal Navy adopted a basically defensiveposture the French could never challengeits dominance of the seas. The battle ofTrafalgar, though one of the most cele-brated sea battles in history, was the onlymajor sea battle of the Napoleonic Wars.Thereafter minor engagements between in-dividual squadrons took the place of epicclashes between the rival fleets. France’smain strength lay in attacking British mar-itime trade through the privateer war.

Napoleon apparently never appreciatedthe difficulties of naval warfare and howmuch it was governed by the elements: theweather and the sea itself. Far more sailorsperished from disease and the perils of thesea than through enemy action.Winds andtides plunged the best-planned naval cam-paigns into chaos, which worked to Napo-leon’s advantage to the extent that Britishamphibious operations against the Conti-nent were rendered almost impossible.Ships had to be virtually self-sufficient inwater and supplies, and ship-to-ship com-munications were effectively limited to therange of the human eye. Warships doubledas transport vessels for men and horses, sovoyages had to be kept as short as possible.

British ships spent longer times at seathan their French or Spanish opponents,losing many ships in the process. But theSpanish fleet had been destroyed at Trafal-

gar, and Napoleon’s plans to rebuild a for-midable French fleet remained perpetuallyin the future. Despite his confident asser-tion in 1811 that within five years hewould have a navy capable of challengingthe British and invading England, the ulti-mate result of the Napoleonic Wars was toconfirm British naval supremacy for a cen-tury thereafter.

Related entries: Navy, British; Navy, French;Privateer War

Suggestions for further reading:Lloyd, Christopher. 1965.“Navies,” in C.W.

Crawley, ed., New Cambridge Modern History.Vol. 9:War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval,1793–1830. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Mahan,Alfred Thayer. 1892. The Influence ofSeapower upon the French Revolution andEmpire, 1793–1812. 2 vols. London andCambridge, MA: Sampson Low.

Navy, British

D uring the eighteenth century theBritish or Royal Navy had gained

dominance of the seas, and Napoleon wasnever able to challenge this superiority.Whereas the great French heroes of theNapoleonic Wars were army commanders,the British heroes, principally Horatio Nel-son, were seamen. Nevertheless, the strug-gle against Napoleon did place great strainson British sea power as the fleet was en-larged and its tasks increased. At the heightof Napoleon’s power between 1805 and1809 the Royal Navy not only maintaineda constant vigil over enemy naval basesthroughout Europe, but also patrolled theBaltic, Mediterranean, and Atlantic,mounted colonial expeditions, and escortedconvoys under threat from French priva-teers. British ships therefore spent toomuch time at sea: of 317 ships lost duringthe wars, no fewer than 223 were wreckedor foundered rather than being destroyedby enemy action.

180 Naval Warfare

British naval superiority was confirmedat the battle of the Nile in 1798 and conse-crated at Trafalgar in 1805, where Nelsoncrippled the French and Spanish fleets.Thesuperior maneuverability, gunnery, andtraining of the British ships was backed upby the greater daring and initiative shownby British naval commanders such as Admi-rals Cornwallis, Collingwood, and Keith aswell as Nelson. While its successes werecounterbalanced by Napoleon’s victories onland, the Royal Navy contained any Frenchnaval threat to Britain and its colonies.

But the cost of maintaining and repair-ing the fleet and obtaining naval supplies,threatened by Napoleon’s Continental Sys-tem, stretched the naval budget to over 20million by 1813. In addition, as the warsdragged on Britain faced a constant short-age of manpower. While the theoreticalstrength of the Royal Navy reached145,000 by 1810, the service faced a per-petual shortfall of between 3,000 and16,000 personnel. The brutal discipline,boredom, low pay, and poor rations of lifeat sea had sparked off mutinies in 1797, anddesertion and disease remained seriousproblems. The government was forced torely ever more on the callous practice ofimpressing throughout the British Isles(about one-quarter of lower-deck seamenat Trafalgar were Irish) and recruitment offoreigners. Even for practiced seafarers ser-vice in the privateer war or in the merchantfleet was better paid and less dangerous.Thedebt owed by the British people to theseprisoners within the “wooden walls” of theRoyal Navy was immeasurable, and theNapoleonic Wars confirmed British navalsuperiority for the next century.

Related entries: Continental System;Copenhagen, Battle of; Naval Warfare; Navy,French; Nelson, Horatio, Lord; Nile, Battle ofthe; Privateer War;Trafalgar, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Horward, Donald D. 1978.“The Influence of

British Seapower upon the Peninsular War,

1808–1814,” Naval War College Review 31, pp.54–71.

Kennedy, Paul. 1991. The Rise and Fall of BritishNaval Mastery. 3rd ed. London: Fontana.

Pope, Dudley. 1991. Life in Nelson’s Navy.London:Allen and Unwin.

Navy, French

N apoleon inherited a navy that hadbeen shorn of its officer corps by

the Revolution and was no match for itsBritish counterpart. And although he gavemore attention to the war at sea than he issometimes given credit for, he could nevermake up for crucial defects in personneland infrastructure or restore the moraleweakened by British victories. The Frenchnavy under Napoleon remained perma-nently on the brink of major improvement.In 1811 Napoleon predicted that in fiveyears he would have a fleet capable of tak-ing on the British and that “before ten yearsare passed, I shall have conquered England.”Time was to provide no opportunity toprove whether his optimism was justified.

When hostilities resumed with Britainin 1803 the French navy, dispersed in itsprincipal bases at Rochefort, Brest, Lori-ent, and Toulon, was unready for action.Appreciating Horatio Nelson’s maxim that“only numbers can annihilate,” Napoleonand his minister of the marine, Denis De-crès, commissioned new warships, somesuperior in design and construction totheir British opposite numbers, and im-proved training and discipline. Despite thedisaster of Trafalgar, by 1813 he had eightybattleships ready for the sea and thirty-fiveunder construction. But only the Toulonflotilla posed any serious threat to Britishcontrol of the Mediterranean. The rebirthof French sea power remained more athreat than a reality.

French naval doctrine, inherited fromthe eighteenth century, suppressed initiativeand emphasized the husbanding of re-

Navy, French 181

sources rather than seeking decisive attackson the opponent’s fleet. The demoralizedofficer corps was in a slow process of regen-eration, and basic training in gunnery wasmarkedly inferior to the British.The prob-lem was that the French were denied theopportunity to improve their seamanship oremulate superior British tactics.The condi-tions of blockade, meaning that the fleetspent most of its time bottled up in port,deprived commanders and men of essentialexperience at sea. The quality of ships anddockyards improved through Napoleon’sand Decrès’s efforts, but French command-ers could never match the professionalismand discipline of the British. Without thisexperience they could never confront theBritish in another full-scale battle afterTrafalgar. British maritime supremacy re-mained unchallenged.

Related entries: Decrés, Denis; Naval Warfare;Navy, British; Nile, Battle of the; Privateer War;Trafalgar, Battle of;Villeneuve, Pierre de

Suggestions for further reading:Glover, Richard. 1967.“The French Fleet,

1807–1814: Britain’s Problem and Madison’sOpportunity,” Journal of Modern History 39,pp. 233–252.

Rose, J. H. 1924.“Napoleon and Seapower,”Cambridge Historical Journal 1, pp. 138–157.

Nelson, Horatio, Lord(1758–1805)

O f all the figures of the Napoleonicage, Nelson is the only male to have

exerted a fascination equal to that of Napo-leon himself. His victories, turbulent pri-vate life, and heroic death ensure him a se-cure place in both history and romanticlegend.

The son of a village rector from Nor-folk, Nelson went to sea at the age oftwelve and served (mainly in the West In-dies, where he met and married FrancesNisbet, the young widow of a doctor) until

1787, when he retired from active servicefor five years. When war broke out withrevolutionary France in 1793, Nelson wassent to convey reinforcements from Naplesfor British forces in the siege of Toulon,and made the acquaintance of Sir WilliamHamilton, British minister to Naples, andhis wife Emma. He also took part in theBritish capture of Corsica in 1794, wherehe lost his right eye at the siege of Calvi.Nelson was promoted to rear admiral andknighted after winning the battle of CapeSt. Vincent in February 1797 and lost hisright arm during a raid on Santa Cruz inthe Canary Isles in July of the same year.

Between 1798 and 1800 Nelson com-manded HMS Vanguard in the Mediter-ranean. He was unable to prevent the shipsof Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign fromreaching their destination, but he destroyedthe French fleet in the battle of the Nile.When the British fleet put into Naples forrepairs Nelson renewed acquaintance withLady Hamilton, who nursed him during hisrecovery from a wound received in Egypt,and became embroiled in Neapolitan poli-tics. The Admiralty in London grew in-creasingly impatient with Nelson and or-dered him home. He returned with theHamiltons, acclaimed as a popular hero, butshunned by polite society. In 1801 EmmaHamilton gave birth to his daughter Hora-tia. His next naval duty was as second incommand at the battle of Copenhagen,after which he was ennobled as a viscount.Then the peace of Amiens gave him arespite from command, which he spentwith Emma at their new country house,Merton Place.

When the war broke out anew Nelsoncommanded the blockade of Toulon foreighteen months, and when the Frenchfleet under Pierre de Villeneuve broke outhe pursued it across the Atlantic to the WestIndies and back again to the Bay of Biscay.He eventually succeeded in bringing thecombined Franco-Spanish fleet to battle atTrafalgar on 21 October 1805. Nelson

182 Nelson, Horatio, Lord

hoisted his famous signal, “England expectsthat every man will do his duty,” and inconjunction with Admiral Collingwoodbrought off a famous victory. But Nelsonwas wounded by a musket shot and spentthree hours below decks giving his com-mands until he died at 4:30 in the after-noon with the last words:“Now I am satis-fied, I have done my duty.” Having securedthe supremacy of the British navy for theduration of the Napoleonic Wars, Nelsonwas buried in Saint Paul’s Cathedral, Lon-don, on 9 January 1806.

Related entries: Copenhagen, Battle of;Corsica; Egyptian Campaign; Navy, British; Nile,Battle of the; Revolutionary Wars;Toulon, Siegeof;Trafalgar, Battle of;Villeneuve, Pierre de

Suggestions for further reading:Bennett, Geoffrey M. 1972. Nelson, the

Commander. New York: Charles Scribner’sSons.

Howarth, David Armine. 1969. Trafalgar:TheNelson Touch. London: Collins.

Oman, Carola. 1954. Lord Nelson. London:Collins.

Waller, David. 1978. Nelson. London: Hamilton.White, Colin. 1996. The Nelson Companion.

Gloucester:Alan Sutton.

Netherlands

The arrival of French troops in theUnited Provinces of the Nether-

lands in 1795 brought to power the Patriotparty, united only by their opposition to thepolitical ambitions of the House of Orange.During the period of the French “sister”Batavian Republic between 1795 and 1806Patriot burghers attempted to impose aunitary structure on the traditionally de-centralized Dutch state, abolishing the es-tates, which had previously wielded effec-tive political power, and sponsored socialand economic reform. But reforms came toan end after 1801, and the aristocracy re-captured political power with the help ofNapoleon. The Napoleonic regimes in the

Netherlands created no new group of nota-bles such as emerged in France.

The Netherlands continued to flourishas a world financial center, as it had beensince the seventeenth century. The UnitedStates borrowed money from the Dutchfirm of Hope & Co. to help finance theLouisiana Purchase in 1803. But under theKingdom of Holland, despite the efforts ofKing Louis Bonaparte to protect Dutch in-terests, the trading economy on which thepower of the United Provinces had beenbuilt was hit hard by Napoleon’s Continen-tal System. Agriculture, however, on whichhalf the population depended for theirlivelihoods, prospered and was even stimu-lated by the blockade.

Any move toward greater social equalityand support for French ideas was broughtto an end when Napoleon deposed Louisand incorporated the Netherlands intoFrance in 1810. In 1815 the Netherlandsbecame a monarchy under the house ofOrange and expanded to rule Belgiumuntil 1830.

Related entries: Batavian Republic; Belgium;Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland; ContinentalSystem; Holland, Kingdom of


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Kossmann, E. H. 1978. The Low Countries

1780–1940. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Schama, Simon. 1977. Patriots and Liberators:

Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813.New York: Knopf.

Ney, Michel (1769–1815)

E ventually to become prince ofMoscow, duke of Elchingen, and mar-

shal of France, Ney was born at Sarrelouis inLorraine, the son of a cooper. He joined thearmy in 1787, was commissioned in 1792,and was promoted rapidly during the revo-lutionary wars, when he fought with the

Ney, Michel 183

Army of the North in the Rhineland. In1799–1800 he served as a light cavalry com-mander in Switzerland under Jean Moreau,helping to win the vital battle of Hohenlin-den, and was minister plenipotentiary inSwitzerland in 1802–1803.When Napoleonnamed him among the first marshals of theempire in 1804, therefore, they had neverworked together in the field, and Ney alwayssmarted at serving under veterans of the Ital-ian campaigns such as André Masséna orJoachim Murat.

Ney displayed his tactical prowess in1805 when he won the victory of Elchin-gen over the Austrians, which earned himhis ducal title in 1808. His corps played avital role in Napoleon’s victory at Ulm in1805, and though he had to be rescued byJean Lannes at Jena, he distinguished him-self at both Eylau and Friedland in 1807.But when he was dispatched to Spain in1808 and posted to the Army of Portugalhis bad relations with Masséna contributedto the disastrous outcome of the invasion ofPortugal. Despite performing well in a dif-ficult campaign, Ney was dismissed for in-subordination by Masséna in March 1811.

Ney’s finest hour was the retreat fromRussia in 1812. He had been in the thick ofthe fighting as commander of the ThirdCorps at Borodino, but as commander ofthe rear guard he became a legend. Cut offduring the retreat, he held his troopstogether, leading by example. Reputedlythe last French soldier to leave Russian soil,he was hailed by Napoleon as “the bravestof the brave” and named prince of Moscow.During Napoleon’s last campaign in Ger-many Ney commanded the left wing atBautzen and was wounded twice at Lützenand at Leipzig. But by now he had becomedeeply critical of Napoleon.

Ney led the group of marshals who se-cured Napoleon’s first abdication in April1814 and as a reward was given commandof the cavalry by Louis XVIII. During theHundred Days, however, after promisingLouis to bring Napoleon back to Paris in

an iron cage, he defected to Napoleon. Heengaged Wellington in the battle of QuatreBras and was given overall battle commandat Waterloo, a role for which he was proba-bly not suited. He nevertheless fought withinsane bravery, and he was surprised to bearrested by the restored Bourbons. Chargedwith treachery, he was tried by a Court ofPeers and executed by firing squad on 7December 1815.

Temperamental, quarrelsome, proud, andtouchy, Ney showed energy and greatcourage on the battlefield, but off it was li-able to be led by other people’s opinions.During the Hundred Days Napoleon, whoclearly did not trust him, only employedhim at the last moment. Ney had spent hiscareer mostly disagreeing with everyone, es-pecially his fellow marshals. But he showedtypical courage at his execution, himselfgiving the command to fire and orderingthe soldiers to fire straight at the heart.

Related entries: Abdication, First; Bautzen,Battle of; Borodino, Battle of; Eylau, Battle of;Friedland, Battle of; Germany, Campaigns in;Hohenlinden, Battle of; Hundred Days; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of; Leipzig, Battle of; Lützen,Battle of; Masséna,André; Peninsular War;Portugal; Quatre Bras, Battle of; RevolutionaryWars; Russian Campaign; Switzerland; Ulm,Battle of;Waterloo, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Compton, Piers. 1937. Marshal Ney. London:

Methuen.Horricks, Raymond. 1982. Marshal Ney, the

Romance and the Real. Tunbridge Wells,England: Midas.

Kurtz, Harold. 1957. The Trial of Marshal Ney.London: Hamish Hamilton.

Young, Peter. 1987.“Ney,” in David G. Chandler,ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Nile, Battle of the (1 August 1798)

The destruction of the French fleet atAboukir Bay by the British fleet

184 Nile, Battle of the

under Horatio Nelson cut off Napoleon’sEgyptian expedition, contributing deci-sively to its ultimate failure. When newsreached London of Napoleon’s sailing fromToulon the British Admiralty had no defi-nite idea of his destination. Nelson, how-ever, guessed that Napoleon intended tostrike at India by way of Egypt. He firstreached Alexandria before the French, butnot finding them there, sailed north. Re-turning to Egypt at the end of 1798, hefound Napoleon’s fleet anchored atAboukir Bay. As he was later to do in thebattle of Copenhagen, Nelson exploited su-perior British seamanship and lighter ves-sels by sailing some of his ships of the lineon the landward side, taking the French bysurprise. Only two of thirteen French shipsof the line avoided capture or destruction,and while the French lost over 8,900 menthe British suffered less than 900 casualties.Napoleon’s Army of the East was strandedin Egypt, and Nelson’s victory helped toencourage other powers, starting with theOttoman Empire, to declare war on France.

Related entries: Egyptian Campaign; Nelson,Horatio, Lord

Suggestions for further reading:Lloyd, Charles C. 1973. The Nile Campaign:

Nelson and Napoleon in Egypt. Newton Abbot,England: David & Charles.

Warner, Oliver. 1960. The Battle of the Nile.London: Batsford.

Nobility

The Revolution had sought to destroythe power of the French nobility by

removing their titles and privileges andconfiscating the property of those who em-igrated. Many émigrés, however, had kepttheir land by various devices such as usingfront men to purchase their own property,and when most returned under Napoleonthey repossessed unsold land and repur-chased much of what had been sold. In

many instances the wealthiest noble fami-lies once again came to dominate “their”countryside. While some refused to recog-nize the new political order and lived se-cluded in their châteaux, others collabo-rated willingly with the Napoleonicregime, holding office at the local and na-tional level, in the armed forces, and in thediplomatic corps. Many families broke withthe old caste mentality and intermarriedwith the bourgeoisie or Napoleon’s newimperial nobility.

The new nobility was created step bystep from 1802 onward.The creation of theLegion of Honor was followed in 1804 bythat of an imperial court, with the GrandDignitaries of the Empire and civil officersof the imperial household. The militaryconquests of 1806–1807 allowed the cre-ation of hereditary fiefs, which were mostlygranted to marshals and generals, in theconquered lands. Finally a series of decreesin 1808 created a new noble hierarchy ofprinces, dukes, counts, barons, and cheva-liers. Titles were granted for service in of-fice or by letters patent issued by Napo-leon. Between 1808 and 1814, according tothe researches of Louis Bergeron, some3,600 personal titles were conferred by let-ters patent, and about 200 heads of familyreceived hereditary titles.

But Napoleon’s new nobility was notthe old nobility in new guise.They had nolegal privileges, nor were they imbued witha specifically aristocratic mentality or codeof honor. As the regime consolidated, thechances for ambitious young men of thelower or middle classes to achieve a nobletitle diminished. The top positions in thearmy had been filled early in the empire,and after his marriage to Marie-Louise Na-poleon increasingly gave appointments andhonors to members of the old nobility.Thisbias caused resentment against an ever morerigid social order and frictions within noblefamilies. When the regime collapsed in1814 neither the new nor the old nobilityhad any reason to rush to save it.

Nobility 185

Related entries: Diplomatic Service; Émigrés;Grand Dignitaries of the Empire; Legion ofHonor


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Forster, Robert. 1967.“The Survival of the

Nobility during the French Revolution,” Past& Present, no. 37 (July 1967), pp. 71–86.

Notables

The 100,000 notables made up the“masses of granite”’ on whom Na-

poleon based his regime and from whosenumbers he drew his governing elite. In hisphilosophy the rich who had a stake in so-ciety should form the backbone of thestate. As he expressed it: “I have made thefortunes of those who have worked withme to found the Empire. I will do the samefor their children, it is my duty; and afterthat I will employ only people who havefifty thousand livres a year in landed rents. Iam not rich enough to pay everybody, andthose who have the most interest in sup-porting the state should do so for nothing”(Bergeron 1981, p. 152).

In 1802 Napoleon instructed the prefectsto compile lists of men of wealth, fame, andlocal influence, who could mold opinion inthe departments and be recruited for theadministration. By 1810 these lists of nota-bles provided detailed information on thewealth and lives of the approximately100,000 men designated to be the leadingcitizens in the 130 departments of the em-pire in France and the annexed territories.The honor of being so selected was sup-

posed to imbue the notables with a sense ofidentity and public service apart from class,family, or ancestry. They were mostlylandowners and professional men, an amal-gam of old and new landlords, noble andnonnoble, bound together by common out-look and habits, a new elite united in theservice of the country and the state.

Essentially the rule of the notablesmeant the substitution of wealth for birth asthe basis of power: what the nineteenth-century writer Hippolyte Taine called the“modern regime” replacing the ancienrégime (Tulard 1985, p. 348).They came tosee themselves as a service elite, men whosewealth, education, professionalism, and dis-ciplined respectability made them pecu-liarly fit to rule the land and lead opinion.And although the continuing influence ofthe old nobility should not be forgotten, itwas essentially this elite that was to domi-nate French life for the best part of a cen-tury after 1815.

Related entries: Local Government; Nobility


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Collins, Irene. 1979. Napoleon and his Parliaments.

London: Edward Arnold.Ellis, Geoffrey. 1983.“Rhine and Loire:

Napoleonic Elites and Social Order,” inGwynne Lewis and Colin Lucas, eds., Beyondthe Terror: Essays in French Regional and SocialHistory, 1794–1815. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.



Whitcomb, Edward A. 1974.“Napoleon’sPrefects,” American Historical Review 79, pp.1089–1118.

186 Notables

OOldenburg, Duchy of

This small north German state on theleft bank of the river Weser, ruled by

the Holstein-Gottorp family, into whichCatherine the Great had been born, be-came an indirect cause or excuse for warbetween Russia and Napoleon in 1812.The tsars tended to treat Oldenburg as afief of Russia, and the link was strength-ened by the marriage in October 1809 ofthe Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna,Alexander I’s favorite sister, to the son ofthe reigning duke of Oldenburg.Therefore,when Napoleon annexed the duchy alongwith the rest of the north German coast,December 1810–January 1811, Alexandertook it as a personal and family insult, andhe made it one of his chief complaintsagainst him. Oldenburg became part of thenew German Confederation in 1815.

Related entries: Russian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Cate, Curtis. 1985. The War of the Two Emperors:

The Duel between Napoleon and Alexander,Russia, 1812. New York: Random House.

Opera Plot (24 December 1800)

This attempt on Napoleon’s life bythe explosion of an “infernal ma-

chine” took place in the Rue Saint-Niçaise,not far from the Tuileries.As the first consulwas on his way to the opera to hearHaydn’s Creation he found a wagon with alarge barrel on it blocking the way. Napo-leon’s escort pushed it aside but it ex-ploded, killing twenty-two onlookers andwounding fifty-six.The passengers in a sec-ond carriage, including Joséphine, herdaughter Hortense, and Caroline Bonapartehad a lucky escape.The plot was the workof royalists, two of whom were arrested inJanuary 1801 and guillotined on 21 April.Napoleon ordered the area to be razed aspart of a project to improve the approachesto the Tuileries.

Related entries: Cadoudal, Georges; Royalists


General Police. Washington, DC: UniversityPress of America.

———, ed. 1996. A Documentary Survey ofNapoleonic France:A Supplement. Lanham,MD: University Press of America, pp. 41–44.

Opposition Movements

Taking into account the effectivenessof Napoleon’s police and his all-

pervasive propaganda, the overall extent ofdomestic opposition to his rule is difficultto determine. In addition to the more-or-

Opposition Movements 187

O

less organized movements of republicansand royalists, a kind of opposition wasmanifested in plots, assassination attempts,strikes by workers, and individual acts ofnonconformity. The police were well in-formed about any such incidents, and theirreports may exaggerate the extent of oppo-sition among a French people in all proba-bility mostly resigned to accepting Napo-leon’s rule. The persistence of Jacobinismshowed the survival of a doctrine whichNapoleon thought he had appropriated forhimself, whereas royalists were the mostsuccessful in maintaining clandestinemovements hidden from the prying eyes ofthe state.

But arguably the greatest threat to Na-poleon came not from those who opposedhim on principle but from the lukewarmor faltering support of his advisers or thosecharged with carrying out his orders. Thefirst doubts probably arose in the army,first among those of his officers who re-tained republican sympathies and thenamong those who opposed the Russiancampaign and Napoleon’s foolish continu-ation of a struggle that was as good as lostin 1813–1814. As Marshal François JosephLefebvre remarked when it was all over:“That little bugger wouldn’t have beenhappy until he had every last one of uskilled” (Vidalenc 1989, p. 136). The gen-eral public as well probably tired of mili-tary bravado. The veteran soldier of theRevolution, General Noguès, observedafter Waterloo:“Napoleon destroyed victo-ries in the mind of the public” (Vidalenc1989, p. 137).

Of course, it would be a mistake to ac-cept as active opponents of Napoleon allthose who, after his downfall, claimed tohave opposed him. The administration waswell populated with trimmers like the pre-fect of the Eure, who listed with equal pre-cision the number of conscripts sent to themilitary depots and the number of draftdodgers and deserters: he sent the first listto Napoleon in February 1814, and the

second to the restored Louis XVIII twomonths later. Indeed, the extent of avoid-ance of conscription is in its own way assignificant as the occasional cry of “LongLive the Republic!” or “Long Live theKing!” from arrested “malcontents and fa-natics.” By the time of his first abdicationNapoleon’s government enjoyed little pres-tige, and it took the blunders of the restoredBourbons to restore it briefly to publicfavor during the Hundred Days.

Related entries: Cadoudal, Georges;Conscription; Counter-Revolution; Fouché,Joseph; Idéologues; Imperial Police; Jacobinism;Opera Plot; Pichegru, Jean-Charles; Royalists;Tribunate

Suggestions for further reading:Lyons, Martyn. 1994. Napoleon Bonaparte and the


Vidalenc, Jean. 1989.“A Survey,” in Frank A.Kafker and James M. Laux, eds., Napoleon andHis Times: Selected Interpretations. Malibar, FL:Krieger. pp. 122–138.

Organic Articles

N apoleon added three Articles orTitles to the Concordat of 1801

with the Catholic Church, viewing themas supplementary regulations strengthen-ing the Church’s dependence on the state.They amounted to concessions to the an-ticlericals in the Senate and the Tribunate.The articles asserted government controlover papal documents entering France, re-quired government authorization for allChurch councils and synods, gave thestate limited control over seminaries, al-lowed the government to regulate clericaldress and religious holidays, and providedfor state regulation of clerical salaries andparish boundaries. The Organic Articleswere never accepted by the papacy, whichsaw them as violations of the spirit of theConcordat, but they were implementedby Napoleon and remained in force after

188 Organic Articles

his downfall and through the nineteenthcentury.

Related entries: Catholic Church; Concordat;Papacy; Pius VII, Pope






Ottoman Empire

I n the age of Napoleon the slow de-cline of the once mighty Ottoman

Empire, which had struck fear into theheart of Christendom for 300 years, was al-ready starting to pose the Eastern Questionof the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, thesultan in Constantinople was still sovereignof lands from the Balkans through AsiaMinor to North Africa. But the governorsof the different territories, such as theMamelukes in Egypt, acted as independentrulers in their own right. The depositionand murder in 1807 of the reforming Sul-tan Selim III, who had attempted to createa Western-style army, weakened an empireparticularly vulnerable to Russian expan-sion in the Danube region and the BlackSea.

Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign plungedthe Ottomans into war against France be-tween 1798 and 1802.Thereafter, however,relations were mostly friendly, due to Ot-toman fear of Russia. Ottoman trade con-cessions to France led to war with Britainand Russia in 1806, during which a Britishnaval squadron stormed through the Darda-nelles. Peace was made with Britain in1809, but the Ottomans remained at warwith Russia until the threat from Napoleon

induced the Russians to make peace in1812.The peace settlements of 1815 left theOttoman Empire intact, but already on theway to becoming the “sick man of Europe.”

Related entries: Coalitions; DanubianPrincipalities; Egyptian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Shaw, Stanford J. 1971. Between Old and New:The

Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III,1789–1807. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress.

———. 1976–77. History of the Ottoman Empireand Modern Turkey. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Oudinot, Nicolas Charles(1767–1847)

D uke of Reggio, marshal of France,Napoleon’s most wounded marshal

nevertheless outlived all the others, dying asa much decorated governor of Les Invalidesat the age of eighty-one. The irascibleOudinot sustained thirty-six wounds intwenty-two campaigns, not counting otherssuffered in bars and theaters. Born at Bar-Le-Duc, the son of a brewer, he enlisted inthe army in 1784, beginning a military ca-reer that lasted for four decades. During therevolutionary wars he fought mostly in theRhineland, and in July 1799 he replacedLouis Gabriel Suchet as chief of staff toAndré Masséna in Switzerland and at thesiege of Genoa.

Oudinot took part in the campaign of1805, when he was wounded at Austerlitzand left incapacitated for over a year. Heplayed a key role in the victory of Friedlandin 1807, for which he was given the rank ofcount, and was wounded again at Essling; atWagram in 1809 he helped secure victoryfor Napoleon despite disobeying orders. Hewas created a marshal in July 1809 andduke of Reggio in April 1810. His rigorousmilitary occupation of the Kingdom of

Oudinot, Nicholas Charles 189

Holland in 1810 was instrumental in forc-ing the abdication of King Louis Bona-parte. As commander of the Second Corpsin the Russian campaign of 1812 Oudinotwas wounded twice and forced to return toFrance. He nevertheless joined Napoleonfor the campaign of 1813 in Germany ascommander of the Twelfth Corps and ledthe right wing in a crucial envelopingmovement at Bautzen before being de-feated by Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte atGross-Beeren on 23 August.

Oudinot was one of the marshals whoforced Napoleon’s first abdication in March1814 and was to remain loyal to the re-stored Bourbons thereafter. During theHundred Days he traveled to Paris to tellNapoleon personally why he could notsupport him, and Napoleon, with unchar-acteristic magnanimity but probably re-membering Oudinot’s numerous sufferingsin his service, allowed him to retire to hiscountry estate. In later life Oudinot was amember of Louis XVIII’s Privy Counciland fought his last campaign when Franceintervened in Spain in 1823.

Oudinot was lucky in not fighting inSpain under Napoleon, allowing him to re-tain his reputation intact. His rough-hewnmanners got him into numerous scrapes,but he was popular with his staff. Napoleonthought him “a decent fellow, but not verybright” (Austin 1987, p. 184). He was, how-ever, bright enough to realize when Napo-leon was fighting a losing battle in1813–1814. Oudinot had eleven childrenby his two wives and his sons continued themilitary tradition of their father.

Related entries: Abdication, First;Austerlitz,Battle of; Bautzen, Battle of; DanubeCampaigns; Essling, Battle of; Friedland, Battleof; Genoa; Germany, Campaigns in; Holland,Kingdom of; Russian Campaign; Switzerland;Wagram, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Austin, Paul Britten. 1987.“Oudinot,” in David


Steigler, Gaston, ed. 1897. Memoirs of MarshalOudinot, duc de Reggio, Compiled from theHitherto Unpublished Souvenirs of the Duchessede Reggio. New York: D.Appleton and Co.

Ouvard, Gabriel Julien(1770–1846)

The scandalous reputation and brazenbehavior of the most notorious fi-

nancier of his age did not stop successiveFrench regimes, including Napoleon’s,from making use of his services. Ouvardhad made a considerable fortune as theprincipal handler of naval contracts underthe Directory, but his dubious methods ledto his imprisonment in 1800. Napoleonhad him released in 1802, and under theprotection of Joseph Fouché in 1804 hecame up with a complicated scheme tosupply provisions for the French and Span-ish armed forces by bringing Mexican andCuban bullion through the British block-ade to Spain on British ships. The schemewas supposed to profit the French treasury,the Dutch bank of Hope-Labouchère, theBritish Barings Bank, the East India Com-pany, merchants in the United States, andOuvard himself. However, it depended onacquiring funds from the Bank of France,which the bank could not afford to pro-vide.The minister of the treasury, FrançoisBarbé-Marbois, was dismissed for havingbelieved Ouvard’s assurances.

Napoleon threatened to have Ouvardshot, but the financier lived to becomebankrupt again. He was imprisoned fordebt in 1809, but released thanks toFouché. In 1810 Ouvard acted as go-be-tween in Fouché’s attempt to come to anagreement with Britain, the act which re-sulted in Fouché being dismissed and Ou-vard being sent back to prison, from whichhe only emerged in 1813. Undaunted, in1814 Ouvard secured the contract to sup-ply the Allied armies occupying France.

190 Ouvard, Gabriel Julien

His banking concerns continued to flour-ish under the Restoration and the JulyMonarchy.

Related entries: Bank of France; Finance;Fouché, Joseph


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Buist, Marten G. 1974. At Spes non Fracta:

Hope & Co., 1770–1815: Merchant Bankers and Diplomats at Work. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Ouvard, Gabriel Julien 191

PPaoli , Pasquale (1725–1807)

The Corsican patriot, at one time thetoast of the salons of Enlightened

Europe, was Napoleon’s boyhood hero.Proclaimed as governor of Corsica, thenstruggling for independence from Genoa,in 1755, Paoli won a high degree of auton-omy for the island and promoted economicand educational advance. When Genoaceded Corsica to France in 1768 Paoli led aheroic defense against overwhelming odds,but with defeat at Ponte Nuovo in May1769 began twenty years of exile. Most ofhis followers, including Carlo Bonaparte,accepted amnesty from the French, andNapoleon was born a subject of the king ofFrance.

In exile in London, Paoli frequented thecompany of Samuel Johnson, JamesBoswell, and other eminent figures inBritish cultural life, while remaining a leg-end in Corsica. He seems to have possesseda remarkable presence and impressive char-acter: Johnson thought that he had “theloftiest port of any man he had ever seen.”In 1789 Paoli expressed support for theconstitutional monarchy established by theRevolution, and on 30 November the Na-tional Assembly on the initiative of AntonioCristoforo Saliceti invited him to return toCorsica. Though by now sixty-five yearsold and in poor health, he was welcomed asa hero as royal governor, but he still clung

to his dream of an independent Corsicaunder either French or British protection.

With the execution of Louis XVI andthe establishment of the Republic Paolibegan to turn toward Britain. A clash withCorsican Jacobins, including Napoleon andLucien Bonaparte, was inevitable. Luciendenounced Paoli as a traitor to the revolu-tionary club of Toulon, but Paoli’s support-ers were in the majority on Corsica: the en-tire Bonaparte family was forced to flee toFrance in June 1793. In 1795 Paoli, nowaged seventy, turned Corsica over to aBritish viceroy, but in 1796 the French re-took the island, and Paoli once again foundrefuge in England.

Related entries: Corsica

Suggestions for further reading:Thrasher, Peter A. 1970. Pasquale Paoli:An

Enlightened Hero, 1725–1807. London:Constable.

Papacy

The papacy under Pius VI (Gianan-gelo Braschi) had not immediately

condemned the Revolution in France forfear of jeopardizing the position of LouisXVI. But in 1791 with the introduction ofthe Civil Constitution of the Clergy, whichdemanded that churchmen take an oath of

Papacy 193

P

loyalty to the state, the pontiff declared theRevolution anathema. However, he coulddo little to influence events in France. Na-poleon invaded the Papal States in 1797,and the French occupied Rome in Febru-ary 1798. After taking refuge in Florence,Pius VI was arrested when the French in-vaded Tuscany and taken to France. He dieda prisoner on 29 August 1799 in Valence,where the mayor recorded the death of“Jean Ange Braschi, exercising the profes-sion of pontiff.”

Napoleon as first consul needed betterrelations with the papacy for domestic po-litical reasons: to end divisions within theFrench clergy and the revolt in the Vendée.The result was the Concordat of 1801, ne-gotiated with the new pope, Pius VII. Rela-tions between Napoleonic France and theVatican deteriorated from 1805 onward,culminating in the excommunication ofNapoleon in 1809 and the imprisonmentof Pius VII in 1812. Napoleon’s cynical atti-tude toward the pope helped to raise theprestige of the papacy among conservativeFrench Catholics, laying the foundations forthe influence of the propapal Ultramontaneparty after the Restoration.

Related entries: Catholic Church; Concordat;Papal States; Pius VII, Pope

Suggestions for further reading:Hales, Edward Elton Young. 1960. Revolution and


———. 1962. Napoleon and the Pope. London:Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Papal States

The territories in central Italy ruled bythe papacy were invaded by Napo-

leon during his first Italian campaign. Bythe Treaty of Tolentino in February 1797,Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna wereceded to the Cisalpine Republic. In 1798the assassination of the French general

Léonard Duphot in Rome led to occupa-tion of the Eternal City by French troopsunder Louis Alexandre Berthier and the re-organization of the Papal States as theRoman Republic.This ephemeral state col-lapsed when Austrian troops occupied mostof the Papal States, but not Rome itself, in1799. By the Treaty of Lunéville (1801) thenorthern states, including Bologna, Ferrara,and Ravenna, formed part of the Italian Re-public, subsequently the Kingdom of Italy,while Pope Pius VII retained possession ofthe lands around Rome and of the port ofAncona. The latter, however, was seized bythe French in 1805 and incorporated intothe Kingdom of Italy in 1808. Rome andwhat remained of the Papal States were an-nexed by Napoleon in June 1809. Thepope’s possessions were restored to him bythe Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815.

Related entries: Cisalpine Republic; ItalianCampaigns; Italy, Kingdom of; Papacy; Pius VII,Pope

Suggestions for further reading:Hales, Edward Elton Young. 1960. Revolution and


Woolf, Stuart. 1991. A History of Italy,1700–1860:The Social Constraints of PoliticalChange. London: Routledge.

Paris, Treaties of

The first Treaty of Paris (30 May1814), imposed by the Allies after

Napoleon’s first abdication, treated Franceleniently in an attempt to bolster the au-thority of the restored Louis XVIII. Francereturned to its borders of 1792, includingterritory that had not been French in 1789such as the former papal enclave of Avi-gnon and the Comtat Venaissin and parts ofthe Rhineland, Belgium, and Savoy. Franceretained all its colonies except Mauritius,Tobago, and Saint Lucia, and no claimswere made for war indemnity.

194 Papal States

The second Treaty of Paris (20 Novem-ber 1815), made after the Hundred Days,was more severe. France was returned tothe boundaries of 1790, meaning those of1789 with the sole addition of Avignon andthe Comtat. Seventeen fortresses in north-ern and northeastern France were to begarrisoned by the Allies for five years, andFrance had to pay reparations of 700 mil-lion francs and restore the artistic treasurestaken from other countries by the revolu-tionary and Napoleonic armies.

Related entries: Abdication, First; HundredDays


of Napoleonic France. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, pp. 331–345, 358–363.


Paul I, Tsar of Russia(1754–1801)

S ucceeding his mother, Catherine theGreat, in 1796, Paul I brought Russia

into the wars against revolutionary Francefor the first time, and despite personal ec-centricities which led to rumors of mad-ness, pursued policies designed tostrengthen Russia both at home andabroad. At first he kept Russia out of thewars, concentrating on consolidating its po-sition in Poland and improving state fi-nances, but Napoleon’s Egyptian campaignchanged his mind. The invasion of Egyptmarked French incursion into an area longconsidered by Russia as its own sphere ofinfluence, and Napoleon’s seizure of Maltaseemed to threaten Russian interests in theMediterranean. At the end of 1798, there-fore, Paul concluded an alliance with theOttoman Empire and joined the SecondCoalition against France. His ultimate aimswere the same as those of the British: to re-

store France to its frontiers of 1792 and torestore the pre-1789 situation in Italy, buthe was more insistent than was William Pitton the overthrow of the republic in Franceand the restoration of the Bourbons.

Russian armies were sent to Italy,Switzerland, and Holland, and the cam-paigns of 1799 saw several Russian successesunder Paul’s favorite general,Alexander Su-vorov. However, Austria, the third memberof the Coalition, deserted its allies in pursuitof its own aims in Italy and Belgium. TheRussian army in Switzerland was isolatedand crushed by the French at the battle ofZurich. Angered by the course of events,Paul left the Coalition at the end of 1799. In1800 he formed the League of Armed Neu-trality in the Baltic against British com-merce and even planned an invasion ofIndia. But a clique of nobles in Russia alliedthemselves with Paul’s son, Alexander, andPaul was assassinated on 23 March 1801.

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Armed Neutrality; Coalitions; Italian Campaigns;Malta; Ottoman Empire; Revolutionary Wars;Switzerland

Suggestions for further reading:Ragsdale, Hugh. 1970.“A Continental System in

1801: Paul I and Bonaparte,” Journal of ModernHistory 42, pp. 70–89.

———, ed. 1979. Paul I:A Reassessment of his Lifeand Reign. Pittsburgh: University ofPittsburgh Center for International Studies.

———. 1988. Tsar Paul and the Question ofMadness:An Essay in History and Psychology.New York and Westport, CT: GreenwoodPress.

Peasants

The peasantry made up the vast ma-jority of the French population

under Napoleon, but as always in Frenchhistory, it is difficult to make generalizationsabout their condition for the whole ofFrance. The Revolution had freed themfrom the burdens of “feudalism,” a libera-

Peasants 195

tion which meant a lot in some regions, butwhich in the more advanced areas ofnorthern and eastern France merely meantthe removal of some minor and anachronis-tic irritants. Peasants no longer paid seigno-rial dues or ecclesiastical tithes and were nolonger subject to seignorial justice.All thesegains were maintained by Napoleon.

However, the economic status of peasantsvaried enormously. More substantial propri-etors, the coqs de village of regions of consoli-dated agrarian property, profited from thepurchase of noble and church lands. Belowthem lived a solid class of those who ownedor leased enough land to maintain their fam-ilies in reasonable comfort by the standardsof the day. These were the leaders in themove toward “agrarian individualism,” thedomination of agriculture by independentpeasant proprietors, which has been such amarked feature of French society until veryrecent times. But wherever the use of com-mon land and collective agricultural prac-tices were essential to the functioning of therural economy, as over broad areas of thesouth, poor peasants lost out.And day labor-ers, owning nothing but the strength of theirbodies, were still dependent on landownersand better-off peasants for their livelihoods.

In general it is safe to say that, apart fromthe crisis years of 1810–1811, the Na-poleonic era was one of relative comfort forthe peasantry.The Continental System shel-tered those peasants producing for the mar-ket rather than merely for subsistence fromforeign competition. Peasants ate better anddressed better then ever before.They were tolook back on the empire as a “golden age,”helping to explain the cult of Napoleon andBonapartist sympathies among the people ofthe countryside in the nineteenth century.

Related entries: Bonapartism; ContinentalSystem; Economy; Rural Code;Taxation

Suggestions for further reading:Agulhon, Maurice. 1982. The Republic in the

Village:The People of the Var from the FrenchRevolution to the Second Republic. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Peter M. 1985. Politics and Rural Society:The Southern Massif Central, c.1750–1880.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1988. The Peasantry in the FrenchRevolution. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Le Goff,T. J.A., and D. M. G. Sutherland. 1991.“The Revolution and the Rural Economy,”in Alan Forrest and Peter Jones, eds.,Reshaping France:Town, Country and Regionduring the French Revolution. Manchester:Manchester University Press.

Pelet, Jean-Jacques(1777–1858)

A n experienced soldier and competentline officer, Pelet was also one of the

founders of France’s military archives andwrote vivid accounts of the Wagram cam-paign and the invasion of Portugal in 1810–1811. In 1805 Pelet joined the staff of Mar-shal André Masséna and fought with him inItaly and Poland, before playing a vital role inthe victory at Wagram (2 July 1809). He wasthe ailing Masséna’s chief aide-de-camp inPortugal, but transferred to Louis Davout’scorps for the invasion of Russia. He tookcommand of the Forty-eighth Regiment inRussia, and during the retreat joined withMichel Ney in ensuring the escape of therear guard. Pelet continued his distinguishedservice in Germany in 1813 and all the majorbattles of the 1814 campaign in France. Heended his active military career commandingthe Young Guard at Waterloo. Although atfirst considered suspect by the restored Bour-bons, Pelet pursued his career in military ad-ministration, becoming head of the GeneralStaff School in 1830.

Related entries: Germany, Campaigns in;Portugal; Russian Campaign;Wagram, Battle of;Waterloo, Battle of



196 Pelet, Jean-Jacques

Horward, Donald D., ed. and trans. 1973. TheFrench Campaign in Portugal, 1810–11:AnAccount by Jean-Jacques Pelet. Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press.

Penal Code

N apoleon’s Penal Code of 1810 re-placed the revolutionary Code of

25 September 1791 and was much harsher.It restored branding, the iron collar, and fet-ters, the deprivation of civil rights, andother penalties abolished by the more en-lightened penal thought of the Revolution.However, it was also much clearer in lan-guage than its predecessor and introducedthe idea of “extenuating circumstances,”which allowed a better adaptation of pun-ishments to individual crimes.

Related entries: Law, Codification of


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Holtman, Robert B. 1967. The Napoleonic


Peninsular War

N apoleon’s intervention in Spain andthe subsequent popular uprising that

began in May 1808 led to a war, Napoleon’s“Spanish ulcer,” which sapped French re-sources and morale through to 1813.“It wasthat miserable Spanish affair,” he later de-clared, “that killed me” (Connelly 1985, p.385). In 1807 Spain was nominally an ally ofNapoleon, but he considered the SpanishBourbon ruling house unreliable and de-cided to install his brother Joseph as king ofSpain. His real aim was the conquest of Por-tugal, an ally of Britain in all but name,which was violating the Continental System.

Following the Treaty of Tilsit in easternEurope Napoleon was free to act. In No-

vember 1807 he dispatched troops into theIberian Peninsula: an army under AndocheJunot marched into Portugal, forcing theroyal family into exile in Brazil, and anotherunder Joachim Murat occupied Madridvirtually unopposed. Shortly before, theSpanish crown prince had overthrown hisfather, Charles IV, and declared himself Fer-dinand VII. Napoleon responded by callingboth kings and a Spanish national junta tomeet him in Bayonne, where he forcedboth Charles and Ferdinand to abdicate infavor of Joseph Bonaparte. Their departurewas followed by an uprising in Madrid, thefamous Dos de Mayo (2 May 1808), whichwas viciously suppressed by Murat and im-mortalized in the painting by FranciscoGoya.

Joseph, crowned king at Burgos, brieflytook possession of Madrid, but was isolatedin his new capital. News of the reverse atBailen and the landing of a British armyunder Arthur Wellesley, later duke ofWellington, in Portugal, where it defeatedJunot at Vimiero, led to his retreat and de-termined Napoleon to intervene person-ally. In November 1808 he advanced onand took Madrid, defeated the Spanishforces sent against him, and set aboutrestoring order, with the utmost brutalitywhere necessary. Only Saragossa, under itsheroic commander, José Palafox, withstoodthe French siege until February 1809. Na-poleon made Joseph commander in chief inSpain and departed for Paris. The Frenchhold over Spain, however, turned out to bean illusion.

Meanwhile a British force under SirJohn Moore had fought an indecisive battleagainst Marshal Nicolas Soult at La Coruñaand been forced to escape on Royal Navyships. But Soult’s advance into Portugal wasrepulsed by Wellington. The marshals hadno confidence in Joseph as a commanderand missed the chance to destroy Welling-ton in the indecisive battle of Talavera(27–29 July 1809).The British commanderwas able to secure control of Portugal, from

Peninsular War 197

which he eventually emerged at the head ofBritish, Portuguese, and Spanish forces toattack the French in Spain.

During 1810 and 1811 the French man-aged to gain apparent control over Spain,

though still engaged in constant combatwith guerrilla bands. Joseph and Soult con-quered Andalusia, and Marshal LouisSuchet occupied Aragon and Valencia.Joseph was king, but the marshals ruled the

198 Peninsular War

Napoleon ordered The Crossing of the Guadarrama in December 1808 (1812) by Nicolas-AntoineTaunay to celebrate the heroism of his troops in the Peninsular War at a time when the outcome of the conflictwas still in doubt. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

provinces: Spain became, in the words ofthe historian Pieter Geyl, “a trainingground in disobedience for the marshals.”

But Wellington remained secure in Por-tugal. In September 1810 André Massénasecured a victory at Bussaco, but was forcedto retreat after failing in the siege of TorresVedras, where Wellington gathered hisforces. Auguste Marmont, replacingMasséna, was similarly incapable of pene-trating into Portugal, and in early 1812Wellington took Ciudad Rodrigo andBadajoz.As the duke prepared to drive intoSpain, Napoleon departed on the Russiancampaign, leaving Joseph as commander inSpain presiding over the unruly marshals.

Wellington, marching into Spain as Na-poleon marched into Russia, defeated Mar-mont at the battle of Salamanca (22 July1812) and advanced on Madrid. Joseph fledto Valencia, and although, after combiningforces with Soult, he was able to retake thecapital, the unperturbed Wellington wentinto winter quarters at Ciudad Rodrigo,emerging in the spring of 1813 as generalis-simo of Allied forces in the peninsula. Na-poleon ordered Joseph to establish hisheadquarters at Valladolid, placing his forceof some 250,000 troops between Welling-ton and the French border. By June Josephhad reluctantly abandoned Madrid forgood, and his forces were scattered betweenValladolid and Bayonne.

Wellington’s forces of 95,000 British,Portuguese, and Spanish troops accompa-nied by swarms of guerrillas materializednorthwest of Valladolid on 4 June, threaten-ing Joseph’s communications with France.Joseph managed to assemble some 70,000troops at Vitoria, but his army was shatteredirrevocably in the battle of 21 June.The warwas all but over. Soult fought a delaying ac-tion in the Pyrenees, while Suchet evacu-ated eastern France. In October 1813Wellington invaded southern France.

The Peninsular War had cost France inthe region of 300,000 casualties and untoldsums of money and material. Once Napo-

leon had abdicated, Ferdinand VII was re-stored to the throne of Spain, but his peo-ple’s rejoicing was short-lived. Ferdinandreneged on his promises of constitutionalgovernment and Spain descended into anera of reaction and oppression.

Related entries: Bailen, Battle of; Bonaparte,Joseph, King of Naples, King of Spain;Bussaco, Battle of; Corunna, Battle of;Ferdinand VII, King of Spain; Goya yLucientes, Francisco de; Guerrilla Warfare;Junot, Andoche; Marmont, Auguste FrédéricLouis Viesse de; Masséna, André; Moore, SirJohn; Murat, Joachim; Portugal; Salamanca,Battle of; Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu; Spain;Suchet, Louis Gabriel;Vitoria, Battle of;Wellington, Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Berkeley,Alice D., ed. 1991. New Lights on the

Peninsular War. Lisbon: British HistoricalSociety of Portugal.


Esdaile, Charles J. 1988. The Spanish Army in thePeninsular War. Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press.

Gates, David. 1986. The Spanish Ulcer:A History ofthe Peninsular War. London:Allen and Unwin.

Glover, Michael. 1974. The Peninsular War,1807–14. Hampden, CT:Archon Books.


Oman, Charles W. C. 1902–1930. A History of thePeninsular War. 7 vols. Oxford: ClarendonPress.

Read, Jan. 1977. War in the Peninsula. London:Faber.

Personality, Cult of

N apoleon has been described by thehistorian Jean Tulard as “the first of

the modern myths.” Much of his propa-ganda and image-making centered on hisown personality, but this cult was onlysemi-modern, in that he self-consciouslyharked back to the cults surrounding theFrench monarchs of the ancien régime, es-pecially Louis XIV. The exaltation of the

Personality, Cult of 199

image of Napoleon began with the militarybulletins of the first Italian campaign, butreached its height under the empire.Artists,writers, and musicians were employed tocelebrate every notable event in his careerand also for the mass production of prints,paintings, and busts of Napoleon. Andbuildings, monuments, and decorations inthe Empire style were adorned with theNapoleonic “N” or the bee symbol.

While popular prints exalted the “littlecorporal,” military hero, and man of thepeople, the heroic image of Napoleonshaped by artists steeped in classical antiq-uity could reach ludicrous proportions, withthe emperor looking nothing like himself,clothed (or unclothed) as Jupiter or Apollo.In similar vein were the Feast of the previ-ously nonexistent “Saint Napoleon,” replac-ing the Feast of the Assumption on 15 Au-gust, and the quasi-religious canonization ofthe emperor in the Imperial Catechism.

In fairness to Napoleon, these extremeswere combined with less absurdlyoverblown imagery: he wanted to be anemperor, an equal among the crownedheads of Europe, over whom a shadow ofdivinity still lingered, but also the hard-working reformer dedicated to the good ofhis people. He was curiously unwilling tohave statues of himself erected in publicplaces. Napoleon’s ideal was that everylower-class household should have a printdepicting him on its walls and every bour-geois salon should be adorned with hisbust.As for the public domain, the whole ofFrance was to be his monument and a re-flection of his personality.

Related entries: Coronation; David, Jacques-Louis; Empire Style; Gros,Antoine Jean; ImperialCatechism; Napoleonic Legend; Propaganda;Vernet, Émile Jean Horace

Suggestions for further reading:Holtman, Robert B. 1950. Napoleonic Propaganda.

Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.Mathews, Joseph J. 1950.“Napoleon’s Military

Bulletins,” Journal of Modern History 22, pp.137–144.


Pichegru, Jean-Charles(1761–1804)

A respected general in the early yearsof the revolutionary wars, Pichegru

had nevertheless been in contact with roy-alists and British agents since 1795 and re-signed from the army in 1796. Elected tothe Directory’s Council of Five Hundred inApril 1797, Pichegru was still suspected oftreason and vaguely involved in royalistplots. Deported to Guyana, he escaped inJune 1798. From London he became in-volved in the Cadoudal conspiracy of 1803,following Georges Cadoudal to Normandyand trying to gain the support of Jean-Vic-tor Moreau. But the plot was betrayed andPichegru arrested on 28 February 1804. Hewas found dead in his cell on 5 April, hav-ing either hanged himself or been strangledon Napoleon’s orders.

Related entries: Cadoudal, Georges; Royalists



Mitchell, Harvey. 1965. The Underground Waragainst Revolutionary France:The Missions ofWilliam Wickham, 1794–1800. Oxford:Clarendon Press.

Pitt, William the Younger(1759–1806)

The second son of William Pitt, firstearl of Chatham, who had led

Britain against France in the Seven YearsWar, the younger Pitt abandoned many ofhis Whig principles in his unyieldingfight against revolutionary France and

200 Pichegru, Jean-Charles

Napoleon. In 1784 as the youngest primeminister in British history, he had favoredindependence for the colonies, the aboli-tion of slavery and the slave trade, reli-gious toleration, concessions to Ireland,and above all reform of government andadministration. But with the outbreak ofthe Revolution in France he abandonedreform, advocated all-out resistance toFrance and French ideas, and introduceda succession of repressive measures againstBritish radicals.

The shock of rebellion in Ireland in1798 made him advocate Union with En-gland, but combined with emancipation forIrish Catholics.When King George III re-fused concessions on the religious question,Pitt first carried through the Act of Unionbut then resigned on 14 March 1801. Hisresignation made possible the negotiationof the Peace of Amiens with Napoleon, butthe breakdown of this settlement in 1804led to his recall as prime minister. Pitt suc-cessfully negotiated the alliances with Rus-sia and Austria, making possible the ThirdCoalition of 1805, but he died on 13 Janu-ary 1806, shortly after hearing the news ofNapoleon’s victory at Austerlitz, which hadshattered the alliance.

Pitt’s policy was based on keepingBritain out of direct military engagementin Europe, instead providing substantialsubsidies for Napoleon’s enemies and di-recting British efforts toward robbingFrance of its colonies. A great orator andshrewd politician, he confessed to igno-rance of military affairs, declaring that he“distrusted extremely any Ideas of my ownon Military Subjects” (Ehrman 1996, p.380). Pitt was buried with great public cer-emony in Westminster Abbey and com-memorated in popular song as “the pilotwho weathered the storm.”

Related entries: Coalitions; Great Britain

Suggestions for further reading:Ehrman, John. 1969. The Younger Pitt:The Years of

Acclaim. London: Constable.

———. 1983. The Younger Pitt:The ReluctantTransition. London: Constable.

———. 1996. The Younger Pitt:The ConsumingStruggle. London: Constable.

Pius VII, Pope (Gregorio Barnaba

Chiaramonti) (1742–1823)

A Benedictine who had been Cardinal-Archbishop of Imola since 1785,

Chiaramonti was elected pope in 1800 afterthree months of voting at an enclave held inVenice rather than Rome. This unusualvenue indicates that the question of relationswith Napoleon, fresh from his victory atMarengo, would dominate Pius’s papacy. Innegotiating the Concordat of 1801 Pius’saims were to retain possession of the PapalStates and increase papal influence in France.But as long as Napoleon remained in powerthese accomplishments were to remain be-yond the pope’s grasp.

By attending Napoleon’s coronation in1804 Pius hoped to win concessions fromthe emperor, but he was to be disappointed.Relations remained uneasy, and whenFrench troops occupied Rome in 1808 andthe rest of the Papal States in 1809, Pius ex-communicated Napoleon. The pope wasarrested and imprisoned, albeit in greatcomfort, first at Savona and then betweenJune 1812 and January 1814 at Fontaine-bleau. As Napoleon’s empire in Europebegan to crumble, he sought a new agree-ment with Pius. After visiting the pope inhis gilded cage for a week in January 1813,he extracted the Fontainebleau Concordat,but Pius refused to ratify it.

Pius was taken back to Italy in January1814 and slowly made his way to Rome.He reentered his capital in triumph on 24May 1814, a few days after Napoleon’s ar-rival on Elba.The Papal States were restoredin the peace settlements of 1814–1815. Piustreated Maria Letizia Bonaparte and her

Pius VII, Pope 201

202

Thomas Lawrence’s Pope Pius VII (ca. 1818–1819) includes in the background Roman works of art looted byNapoleon’s armies and returned to the papal city on his downfall. (Royal Collection Enterprises,Windsor Castle)

half-brother, Joseph Fesch, generously dur-ing their exile in Rome after Napoleon’sfinal defeat, but he could afford to bebenevolent. He emerged from theNapoleonic era as a respected elder states-man and with an aura of martyrdom con-ferred by Napoleon’s contemptuous treat-ment of him. In France and throughoutCatholic Europe the Church enjoyed a newlevel of respect and dignity.

Related entries: Bernier,Abbé Etienne;Catholic Church; Concordat; Coronation; Fesch,Joseph; Organic Articles; Papacy; Papal States


the Pope. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.O’Dwyer, Margaret M. 1985. The Papacy in the

Age of Napoleon and the Restoration: Pius VII,1800–1823. Lanham, MD: University Pressof America.

Plebiscites

The repeated use of plebiscites toconfer an apparent popular legiti-

macy on the constitutions of 1800, 1802,and 1804 was one of the original features ofthe Napoleonic regime. But the results can-not be taken as a reliable guide to publicopinion. Officially the plebiscite of Febru-ary 1800 on the establishment of the con-sulate produced 3,011,007 votes in favorand 1562 votes against. But the voting wasnot secret; it was easily open to intimida-tion and manipulation; the rate of absten-tion was extremely high; and half a millionvotes were added to the “Yesses” for soldiersand sailors unable to vote in their homecommunes. Votes in the later plebisciteswere uncannily similar to those of 1800.

Napoleon was the first figure to use“plebiscitary democracy” to legitimize dic-tatorship, a practice which has become alltoo familiar in the modern world. Whiletheoretically acknowledging the funda-mental principle of the Revolution that

sovereignty resided in the people, theplebiscite became the means by which thepeople abdicated its sovereignty. Napoleoncould identify himself with “the will of thepeople” and brand opposition as “anti-national.” And the recognized organs ofgovernment and representation could bebypassed, creating a direct link between thedictator and the people similar to the mys-tical union supposed to exist in an absolutemonarchy. Numerous dictators in the twen-tieth century have claimed a similar con-nection. Napoleon’s statement as first con-sul, “In France there is but a single partyand a single will,” has a chilling sound tomodern ears.

Related entries: Constitutions; Consulate;Empire


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Lyons, Martyn. 1994. Napoleon Bonaparte and the


Poland

O f all European countries Poland isprobably where Napoleon’s memory

is most revered.The Poles are certainly theonly people to sing about him in their na-tional anthem, evoking the tragic adventureof Jan Henryk Dabrowski’s Polish Legion:“We shall pass Vistula and Warta / We shallbe Polish / Bonaparte has shown us how towin.” This admiration is only partly de-served. Napoleon did establish the Duchyof Warsaw in 1807, encourage Polish exilesin 1806–1807 and again in 1812, and in-spire the creation of the Polish Legions byDabrowski and Jozef Poniatowski. But hisattitude toward Polish national aspirationswas governed by the state of his relationswith Russia. Thus in 1806, while at warwith Alexander I, he declared that: “It is inthe interest of Europe, it is in the interest of

Poland 203

France that Poland should exist.” But whileallied with Russia in 1810 he wrote:“Poland exists only in the imagination ofthose who want to use it as a pretext forspinning dreams.” However, he hadchanged his mind again when preparing forwar with Russia in 1812, telling his minis-ters with some convenient amnesia: “It hasalways seemed to me that the restoration ofPoland is desirable for all the Western pow-ers” (Herold 1983, p. 118).

After the old kingdom of Poland finallyceased to exist following the Third Partitionof 1795 between Austria, Prussia, and Rus-sia, many Polish patriots in exile looked torevolutionary France for help. Dabrowski’sPolish Legion fought under Napoleon in hisfirst Italian campaign and as a Polish divisionof the Grande Armée against the Prussians atJena and Friedland. Poniatowski’s men freedCracow from the Austrians in 1809, unitingthe city to the Duchy of Warsaw. OtherPoles, however, notably Alexander I’s minis-ter and confidant Prince Adam Czartoryski,hoped for a recognition of Polish nationalityunder Russian patronage.

The military events of 1813 left Russiain occupation of most of Poland, andAlexander wanted to proclaim a Kingdomof Poland, of which he would be sovereign.The matter of Poland was debated heatedlyfor three months at the Congress of Vienna.Eventually Austria retained Polish Galiciaand Prussia recovered Poznania. Cracowbecame a “free city,” and the rest of theDuchy of Warsaw, including the capital it-self, became a kingdom to be ruled in per-petuity by the tsar of Russia. Alexander I issued a Constitutional Charter for “Con-gress Poland” in November 1815, providingfor internal self-government, but the Poleswere rapidly disillusioned. The first majoranti-Russian revolt broke out in 1830, afterwhich many Polish patriots once moresought refuge in France.

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Austria; Poniatowski, Jozef, Prince; Prussia;Warsaw, Duchy of

Suggestions for further reading:Davies, Norman. 1981. God’s Playground:A History

of Poland. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Herold, J. Christopher. 1983. The Horizon Book of


Nieuwazny,Andrzej. 1998. “Napoleon andPolish Identity,” History Today 48 (May 1998),pp. 50–55.

Wandycz, Piotr. 1975. The Lands of PartitionedPoland, 1795–1918. Seattle: University ofWashington Press.

Poniatowski , Jozef, Prince(1763–1813)

N apoleon’s only non-French marshalis remembered as an enlightened

patriotic reformer and Polish national hero.Born in Vienna, Poniatowski entered theAustrian army in 1780 and was then com-missioned in the Polish army in 1789. Butthese were the years when Russia, Austria,and Prussia were engaged in the partitionof Poland, and Poniatowski resigned fromthe army and was banished from Poland in1792. In 1794 he joined Tadeusz Kosciusz-ko’s rebellion against the Russians and wentinto retirement after its defeat.

There followed for Poniatowski yearsdevoted to extravagant living and affairs ofthe heart, brought to an end by Napoleon’sdestruction of the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstädt. He commanded one of the threePolish divisions of the Grande Armée in thecampaign of 1806–1807, and after theTreaty of Tilsit was made minister of war ofthe Duchy of Warsaw. His seizure of Galiciaand liberation of Cracow in July 1809made him a national hero. Poniatowski ledthe Fifth Corps in Napoleon’s Russiancampaign in 1812, where his Poles foughtwith a fervor motivated by national hatred.They took part in the storming of Smo-lensk and the battle of Borodino, but Ponia-towski was seriously wounded during theretreat from Moscow when crossing theriver Berezina.

204 Poniatowski, Jozef, Prince

On his recovery Napoleon named Po-niatowski commander of the Eighth Corpsin March 1813. He was wounded again inthe actions preceding the battle of Leipzigand was given his marshal’s baton on thefirst morning of this fateful “Battle of theNations.” On 18 October 1813, the finalday of the battle, with half of his army deador wounded, Poniatowski covered Napo-leon’s retreat.Twice wounded, he attemptedto cross the river Elster on his horse, but wasshot again and killed. In 1816 his remainswere returned to Poland and buried in Cra-cow cathedral next to those of Kosciuszko.

Poniatowski’s motto of “God, Honor,Fatherland” had forced him to serve Napo-leon. Encouraged from childhood, despite acosmopolitan ancestry, to think of himselfas a prince of Poland, he showed great tal-ent as a light cavalry officer, but was tem-peramentally unsuited for the subtleties ofpolitics. Napoleon at first thought him an“inconsequential lightweight,” later changedhis opinion of his military capabilities, butstill regarded him as potentially dangerouspolitically. He died in Napoleon’s service,but his posthumous renown was as a cham-pion of Poland.

Related entries: Borodino, Battle of; Leipzig,Battle of; Poland; Russian Campaign;Warsaw,Duchy of

Suggestions for further reading:Davies, Norman. 1981. God’s Playground:A

History of Poland. 2 vols. Oxford: ClarendonPress.

De Lee, Nigel. 1987.“Poniatowski,” in David G.Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Population

W hen Mme. de Staël asked Napo-leon: “What kind of woman

would you love the most?” he replied:“Theone who would have the most children”(McLynn 1997, p. 163). But Napoleon’s

wish for increasing numbers of youngFrenchmen to swell his armies turned outto be an illusion. The total population ofFrance rose from about 28 million in 1789to about 30 million in 1815, but its share ofthe total European population was falling,as other countries grew faster.

The age of marriage had begun to fallduring the Revolution, helped by more lib-eral legislation on family matters, but with-out any corresponding rise in the number ofbirths.The rule of equal inheritance in Na-poleon’s Civil Code did not encourage largefamilies, whereas in the longer term knowl-edge of contraception and detachment fromCatholicism in many regions helped to pro-mote smaller families.As the birth rate fell, sodid the death rate, but this was a Europeanphenomenon aided by advances in medicineand by the fact that food shortages, althoughthey still occurred,were less deadly than theyhad been under the ancien régime.The fallin the birth rate, on the other hand, was asyet specifically French, only occurring laterin other countries.

The geographical distribution of thepopulation remained unchanged in theNapoleonic period. The urban growth ofthe eighteenth century continued, butplaces with more than 2,000 inhabitantsstill accounted for less than a fifth of thetotal population, and the French peoplewere still not very mobile, most migrationbeing purely seasonal in pursuit of work.

War losses under Napoleon, probablyamounting to between 900,000 and a mil-lion men, had the effect of reducing demo-graphic vitality in the long term by reduc-ing the numbers of men of an age to havechildren. The emperor’s wish for largenumbers of patriotically fertile womencould neither make up for this lack, norhold back ineluctable long-term changes.

Related entries: Civil Code; Peasants


Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Population 205

McLynn, Frank. 1997. Napoleon. London:Jonathan Cape.

Portalis, Jean Étienne Marie(1745–1807)

O ne of the most distinguished lawyersin his native Provence before the

Revolution, the pious and learned Portaliswas an outstanding example of how Napo-leon aimed to use the best available talentsregardless of their political past. Returningfrom exile in Switzerland after the coup of18 Brumaire, Portalis was a member of thecommission that drafted the Civil Codeand participated in the negotiations withPope Pius VII leading to the Concordat of1801. Napoleon appointed him to theCouncil of State, charged with church af-fairs, and in 1804 made minister of ecclesi-astical affairs, presiding over a full-blownbureaucratic department enforcing Napo-leon’s desire to subject all religions inFrance to his will while restoring normallife for worshipers. Portalis died in office in1807, having done much to reconcile theCatholic faithful to Napoleon’s domineer-ing rule.

Related entries: Catholic Church; Civil Code;Concordat; Council of State



Portugal

The Kingdom of Portugal main-tained its independence from Spain

and Napoleon at great human cost, andPortuguese armies played a crucial role inhis defeat in the Peninsular War. Napoleonviewed Portugal as a satellite of Great

Britain, and indeed the Anglo-Portuguesealliance had helped considerably in pre-serving national independence in the lateeighteenth century. The Portuguese re-gent, Dom João, ruling for his mother, theinsane Queen Maria I, was forced into waragainst a Spain supported by France in1801. In the peace settlement the Frenchplenipotentiary, Jean Lannes, extracted lu-crative trade concessions and subsidiesfrom Portugal.

When in 1807 Portugal refused to applyNapoleon’s Continental System in full,France and Spain agreed on a plan for thepartition of “England’s oldest ally.” AFranco-Spanish army under Andoche Junotoccupied Lisbon and central Portugal, andJoão and the rest of the royal family escapedto Brazil, Portugal’s richest colony. How-ever, following the Spanish uprising of May1808, Portuguese nationalists rose againstFrench rule. A British expeditionary forcelanded at Mondego Bay in August 1808.Junot was defeated at Vimeiro and forced toevacuate the country by the Convention ofCintra. The regency was re-established, aBritish army remained in Portugal, and anew Portuguese army raised with Britishfinance and expertise, supervised by aBritish commander in chief, William CarrBeresford.

A second French invasion in 1809 led byNicolas Soult was driven out by the Anglo-Portuguese forces. But Napoleon’s most de-termined effort to subdue Portugal in1810–1811 was only repulsed at great cost.A scorched earth policy, guerrilla warfare,and the lines of Torres Vedras, constructedto protect Lisbon, allowed the duke ofWellington as supreme commander of thearmies to repel French forces led by Soultin the south and André Masséna in thenorth. Anglo-Portuguese collaborationcontinued until the French were driven outof the peninsula in 1813, but the struggleleft Portugal impoverished.The country re-mained under the effective control of aCouncil of Regency headed by Beresford

206 Portalis, Jean Étienne Marie

until 1820, when a liberal revolt led to thereturn of the regent as King João VI.

Related entries: Guerrilla Warfare; Junot,Andoche; Masséna,André; Peninsular War;Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu; Spain;Wellington,Duke of


the Peninsular War. London:Allen and Unwin.Horward, Donald D. 1989.“Wellington and the

Defence of Portugal,” International HistoryReview 11, pp. 55–67.

Livermore, Harold V. 1966. A New History ofPortugal. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Prefects

A ppointed to impose the will of cen-tral government in the departments,

prefects were also the eyes and ears of thegovernment in the localities they adminis-tered and the keystone of Napoleonic ad-ministration in France and the annexed ter-ritories.The rule that prefects would neverbe appointed to the department of theirbirth was only rarely ignored, though manycame from the same region and locals wererecruited in conquered lands. The firstninety-seven prefects were appointed in1800, from a list supervised by LucienBonaparte, and their number reached 130under the empire at its largest in 1810.Theoriginal appointees were mostly experi-enced administrators of bourgeois origin,though over time more nobles were ap-pointed, being especially preferred in theconquered territories.

The creation of the prefectoral corpswas one of Napoleon’s most lastingachievements.Within a short period of timethe new system provided stable, experi-enced, and increasingly professional admin-istration. A bureaucratic hierarchy was es-tablished, and prefects could advance fromsmaller to more important departments:those with major population centers were

considered the top class, and the prefect ofthe most important department, the Seine(which included Paris) enjoyed quasi-min-isterial status. The prefects also representedthe Napoleonic ideal of a fusion of nobleand bourgeois into a new elite of notables.The prefectoral system survives in Franceto this day, and paradoxically, although anumber of Napoleon’s appointees owedtheir positions to the patronage of promi-nent ministers or the Beauharnais family,under successive regimes since 1815 thecorps has usually been more politicizedthan it was in Napoleon’s day.

Related entries: Centralization; Empire; LocalGovernment; Nobility; Notables


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Chapman, Brian. 1955. The Prefects and Provincial

France. London: George Allen and Unwin.Holtman, Robert B. 1967. The Napoleonic

Revolution. Philadelphia: Lippincott.Whitcomb, Edward A. 1974.“Napoleon’s

Prefects,” American Historical Review 79, pp.1089–1118.

Press

N apoleon recognized the power ofnewspapers, made use of them for

his own propaganda, and controlled themthrough rigorous censorship.As emperor hedemanded loyalty, discipline, and obediencefrom the Parisian political press, and in1811 eliminated all but four newspapers:the Moniteur, Journal de l’Empire, Gazette deFrance, and Journal de Paris. Publications inall areas under his control were subject tosimilar restrictions, and journalism as a pro-fession had nothing to thank him for.

However, nonpolitical publishing thrivedunder Napoleon’s rule in France. Scientificand literary journals, mostly in Paris, wereleft unmolested so long as they concen-trated narrowly on their particular interests.At the same time, Napoleon’s insistence

Press 207

that his proclamations and various legal ac-tions should be recorded provided a sourceof revenue for new publications in theprovinces.The provincial papers, authorizedand kept under surveillance by the prefects,published biased versions of political eventsto the glory of the imperial family and theempire. This function diluted their localcharacter, but helped to lay the foundationsfor a more genuine provincial press toemerge in the nineteenth century.

Related entries: Censorship; Propaganda

Suggestions for further reading:Allen, James Smith. 1992. In the Public Eye:A

History of Reading in Modern France, 1800–1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Arnold, Eric A. 1979. Fouché, Napoleon and theGeneral Police. Washington, DC: UniversityPress of America.


Pressburg, Treaty of (26 December 1805)

This treaty imposed on Austria byNapoleon after his victory at Auster-

litz recognized French possession of theItalian territories of Piedmont, Parma, andPiacenza. Austria also ceded Venice, Istria,and Dalmatia to the Kingdom of Italy andrecognized Napoleon as king of Italy. TheHabsburgs lost their western possessions.France’s ally Bavaria gained the Tyrol,Vor-arlberg, the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent,Eichstädt, Passau, Lindau, and Augsburg,while Württemberg became a kingdom andBaden a grand duchy.

Related entries: Bavaria, Kingdom of; Italy,Kingdom of




Privateer War

G iven the Royal Navy’s dominance ofthe seas, commerce raiding by priva-

teers, privately owned vessels licensedby government authorities, also known ascorsairs, became Napoleon’s principalweapon against British maritime power. Inconjunction with the Continental System,privateer raids operating from the westernports of France had a significant effect onBritish international trade. Apart from theChannel, the areas most at risk from priva-teers included the Baltic, the coasts ofSpain, and the Caribbean. In response theRoyal Navy organized escort convoys andpatrolled home waters with “Q-ships,”armed vessels disguised as merchantmen.

In theory privateering was governed bycomplex international conventions, butthese were largely ignored, and the conse-quent abuses and lawlessness of the corsairsled to persistent accusations of piracy on allsides. French privateers recruited seamenfrom all over Europe and became popularheroes of the war, even if Napoleon himselfseemed to give the impression that recogni-tion of their piratical activities was rather be-neath his dignity. He did, however, try to ap-pease neutrals by declaring that Frenchactions against neutral shipping were excep-tional measures for which claims of indem-nity could be entered after the return ofpeace.The privateer war played a vital role inensuring that France was never completelycut off from supplies such as northern Euro-pean naval stores, and privateers remainedactive right up to the end of the wars. In theabsence of a serious French challenge toBritish naval superiority, they were essentialin keeping Napoleon’s war machine operat-ing, even if this was apparently not alwaysappreciated by the emperor himself.

208 Pressburg,Treaty of

Related entries: Continental System; NavalWarfare

Suggestions for further reading:Crowhurst, Patrick. 1989. The French War on

Trade: Privateering, 1793–1815. Aldershot,England: Scolar.

Propaganda

I n 1812 a British Memorial Respecting thePresent State of the British Press

lamented, “There is just one circumstancein which the little Corsican usurper has gotthe start of us.”This was Napoleon’s propa-ganda use of the press: “It is a mortifyingtruth that he has done more mischief bymeans of the Moniteur of Paris than he hasever effected by the united efforts of thecannon and the sword.”As well as stringentcensorship, Napoleon used all possiblemedia to shape public opinion.

From the days of his Italian campaignshe used army bulletins to inform publicopinion of his triumphs and build up hisown image. The military bulletins becamehis major propaganda instrument, castigat-ing the enemy and strengthening morale onthe home front.They “might, with not toomuch imagination,” writes the historianGeoffrey Best, “be seen as the start of thepractice which in course of time, as mediadevelopment made it possible, producedPresident Roosevelt’s fireside chats and thedictators’ radio speeches” (Best 1982, p.119).They enabled Napoleon to be the firstsovereign to speak directly and frequentlyto his subjects.

Newspapers were inevitably Napoleon’smain propaganda instrument, with theMoniteur universel as the official paper forpolitical affairs. Subsidies and news bul-letins given to other papers and orders toprovincial papers to copy the Moniteurcompleted the news management. He didnot hesitate to use the “big lie,” most noto-riously in the failure of the Russian cam-

paign, and had rumors circulated in an at-tempt both to influence opinion and todetermine its condition.

Napoleon used all available media tosupplement his newspaper propaganda.Pamphlets were used more than handbillsor posters.The theater, festivals, and churchservices helped communication with the il-literate. Napoleon frequently selected per-sonally the topics to be dealt with, and agreat deal of the propaganda centered onthe emperor himself and the creation of theNapoleonic legend. Musicians, artists, andwriters were employed with an eye to his-tory to celebrate the outstanding events ofhis career. Images of Napoleon and the em-blems of the empire flooded the countryfrom drawing rooms to humble peasantdwellings.

Assessing the effectiveness of Napole-onic propaganda is difficult if not impossi-ble. His first appeal was to his soldiers andhere he remained a master. But whether itwas as efficacious among the mass of thepeople is a thorny question. Certainly hisenemies would not have been so con-cerned about his propaganda if they hadnot been worried about its effectiveness.With France almost constantly at war theheightened emotional temperature proba-bly worked in Napoleon’s favor. But hewas unwilling to delegate authority in thisarea, and the conditions of the age did notallow the kind of blanket propaganda weare familiar with in the twentieth centuryor the sophisticated activities of modern“spin-doctors.”And in the long run eventsovertake even the best propaganda: from1812 onward they turned irrevocablyagainst Napoleon.

Related entries: Censorship; Empire Style;Imperial Catechism; Napoleonic Legend;Personality, Cult of; Press

Suggestions for further reading:Best, Geoffrey. 1982. War and Society in

Revolutionary Europe, 1770–1870. London:Fontana.

Propaganda 209

210

François Gérard’s Portrait of Napoleon in Coronation Robes (1805) presents Napoleon as emperor in allhis majesty. He wears the coronation robes designed by Jacques-Louis David and is surrounded by the emblems ofpower: the orb, the scepter, and the hand of justice. (Giraudon/Art Resource)


Mathews, Joseph J. 1950.“Napoleon’s MilitaryBulletins,” Journal of Modern History 22, pp.137–144.



Protestants

F rance’s Protestant, predominantlyCalvinist, minority had been granted

equal rights in 1787 in the dying days ofthe ancien régime, and during the Revolu-tion were mostly identified with the revo-lutionary cause, leading to hostility and reli-gious conflict, especially in southernFrance. Napoleon, having signed the Con-cordat of 1801 ordering the lives of FrenchCatholics, wished for a similar agreementwith the Protestants. The Organic Articlesfor the Protestants, negotiated between JeanPortalis and a selection of Protestant nota-bles, were promulgated on 8 April 1802.

As with Catholics and Jews, the legisla-tion for Protestants sought to regularize thechurches and religious worship under statesupervision. The Calvinist community wasdivided into congregations of 6,000 souls,each to be governed by a pastor in collabo-ration with elders chosen from among thehighest paying taxpayers. The traditionalCalvinist church order was thereby modi-fied to bring it into line with Napoleon’scentralized, notable-dominated France.Theless numerous Lutheran congregations,mostly to be found in Alsace and Lorraine,were to be supervised by directories, mostof whose members were named by Napo-leon. The government reserved a right ofveto over the appointment of new pastorsand over alterations in religious doctrine. In1804 Protestant pastors were salaried by thestate. Protestants gladly accepted their new

position within Napoleon’s state, whichseemed to guarantee them against persecu-tion and granted them an official and equalstatus within French society. They were tobe found in numbers in the Napoleonicelite as generals, bankers, and senators.

Related entries: Portalis, Jean Étienne Marie



Poland, B. C. 1957. French Protestantism and theFrench Revolution:A Study in Church and State,Thought and Religion, 1685–1815. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Prussia

The Kingdom of Prussia had risen togreat power status under Frederick

the Great between 1740 and 1786 and hadchallenged the hegemony of the AustrianHabsburgs in Germany. The basis of Prus-sian strength lay in the army created byFrederick and in his enlightened reforms,including an independent judiciary, reli-gious toleration, and an honest and effectivecivil service. But he had not changed arigid class system that erected insurmount-able barriers between the nobility and therest of the population and left many peas-ants living in hereditary subjection to theirlandlords.

Frederick’s successor, his nephew Fred-erick William II (reigned 1786–1797)joined the First Coalition against revolu-tionary France in 1792, but the war ex-posed unsuspected weaknesses in the Prus-sian army. After making peace in 1795,Frederick William showed more zeal incompleting the partition of Poland withAustria and Russia than he did in fightingFrance.The Prussian state reached its great-est extension to that date and securedeleven years of peace with France, but thenew king, Frederick William III, found his

Prussia 211

halfhearted attempts at reform blocked bythe all-powerful nobility. He did, however,seal a new friendship with Russia by thePotsdam Oath of 1805.

It was evident that sooner or later Prussiawould have to stand up against Napoleon’sexpansionism. But when the country belat-edly went to war in 1806 the weaknesses ofthe Prussian state and army were cruelly ex-posed. Defeat in the battles of Jena-Auer-städt was followed in 1807 by the virtualdismemberment of the kingdom in theTreaty of Tilsit. Only Alexander I’s desire tomaintain a buffer state between Russia andNapoleon’s empire saved Prussia from ex-tinction. But the disaster did provide re-formers with the opportunity to regeneratethe Prussian state and army. Ministers led byKarl vom Stein and K. A. von Hardenbergcreated properly functional ministries, re-placing government through personal advis-ers. Legal distinctions between classes wereremoved, serfdom was abolished, and theeducational system modernized. Gerhardvon Scharnhorst, August von Gneisenau,and their supporters rebuilt an army withcareers open to talent, conscription, andpromotion based on merit. But FrederickWilliam still hesitated about committinghimself against Napoleon until the emperormet his nemesis in Russia in 1812.

A Prussian corps under Yorck vonWartenburg was attached to Napoleon’sforces during the campaign in Russia, buton 30 December 1812 Yorck concluded hisown peace with the Russians by the Con-vention of Tauroggen.The new alliance wassealed by the Treaty of Kalisch, and the revi-talized Prussian army proved its value in thecampaign of 1813 and the battle of Leipzigbefore advancing into France in 1814.Thenthe presence of Gebhard von Blücher’sarmy at Waterloo gave Prussia additionalbargaining power at the Congress of Vienna.

In the peace settlement Prussia recoveredthe territories lost in 1807 except those inPoland and acquired parts of Saxony,West-phalia, and various smaller territories along

the Rhineland frontier with France. Prussiawas thus well prepared for industrializationand for becoming the nucleus of Germannationalism in the nineteenth century.However, its eventual success in opposingNapoleon put an end to further social andpolitical reforms.There was no move towardrepresentative government, and Prussia re-tained its image as a caste-ridden societydominated by the military.

Related entries: Blücher, Gebhard Leberechtvon; Coalitions; Frederick William III, King ofPrussia; Germany, Campaigns in; Gneisenau,August Wilhelm Anton Neidhardt von; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of; Kalisch,Treaty of; Leipzig,Battle of; Louise of Mecklenburg, Queen ofPrussia; Nationalism; Quadruple Alliance;Revolutionary Wars; Scharnhorst, GerhardJohann David von;Tilsit,Treaty of;Vienna,Congress of;Yorck von Wartenburg, JohannDavid Ludwig, Count

Suggestions for further reading:Craig, Gordon A. 1955. The Politics of the Prussian

Army. New York: Oxford University Press.Gray, Marion W. 1986. Prussia in Transition: Society

and Politics under the Stein Reform Ministry of1808. Philadelphia:American PhilosophicalSociety.

Haffner, Sebastian. 1980. The Rise and Fall ofPrussia. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Shanahan,William O. 1945. Prussian MilitaryReforms 1786–1813. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.


Simon,Walter M. 1955. The Failure of the PrussianReform Movement. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press.

Pyramids, Battle of the (21 July 1798)

The victory over the Mamelukes,which secured Napoleon’s control

of the Lower Nile during his Egyptiancampaign, was a thoroughly one-sided af-fair. The Mameluke cavalry under MuradBey were totally ineffective against the fourFrench divisions drawn up in squares byNapoleon. Unable to break the squares and

212 Pyramids, Battle of the

suffering heavy losses from French artilleryand musket fire, the Mamelukes retired tothe south, leaving their irregular infantry tobe routed by superior French organizationand firepower. Cairo surrendered to Napo-leon the next day.

Related entries: Egyptian Campaign


Campaigns, 1798–1801. London: Osprey.Herold, J. Christopher. 1962. Bonaparte in Egypt.

New York: Harper and Row.

Pyramids, Battle of the 213

Quadruple Alliance

S igned on the same day as the secondTreaty of Paris (20 November 1815)

the Quadruple Alliance pledged Britain,Austria, Russia, and Prussia to come toeach other’s assistance if the treaty were vi-olated. The members of the Alliance,joined by France in 1818, would meet inconference to safeguard the peace and sta-bility of Europe whenever they werethreatened. It is an indication of the kindof new thinking imposed on diplomats bythe failure to unite consistently in opposi-tion to Napoleon.

Related entries: Paris,Treaties of



Quatre-Bras, Battle of (16 June 1815)

I n this preliminary engagement to thebattle of Waterloo, fought on the same

day as the battle of Ligny, Marshal MichelNey fought an indecisive encounter againstthe duke of Wellington, who was attempt-ing to concentrate his British and Dutchforces. Ney failed to receive the reinforce-ments necessary to do more than disputethe ground around the crossing of theNamur-Nivelles road and the main routefrom Brussels to Charleroi. Wellington, onhearing of Napoleon’s victory at Ligny,withdrew toward Brussels and the defensiveposition of Waterloo.

Related entries: Hundred Days; Ney, Michel;Waterloo, Battle of;Wellington, Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Brett James,Antony. 1966. The Hundred Days:

Napoleon’s Last Campaign from EyewitnessAccounts. New York: Macmillan.

Chandler, David G. 1980. Waterloo:The HundredDays. London: Osprey.

Quatre-Bras, Battle of 215

QQ

RRécamier, Jeanne FrançoiseJulie Adélaïde (1777–1849)

J uliette Bernard, daughter of a notary ofLyon, married Jean Récamier, a rich

banker and friend of her parents, in 1793at the age of fifteen. It was a marriage inname only, and rumor had it that Récamierwas really her father.As hostess of a literaryand political salon under the Directory shecame into contact with the leading figuresof the day, a connection strengthened in1798 by her friendship with Germaine deStaël. But her rejection of the advances ofLucien Bonaparte and friendship with op-position figures led to problems with theNapoleonic regime. Napoleon ordered herto leave Paris in 1805, and she went intoexile in Italy, returning to Paris to reopenher salon after the Restoration. The Ger-man-born Marie-Anne de Gérando said ofher: “The French want only youth, charm,pleasures and vivacity in the sex they sospoil. Madame Récamier is the very em-bodiment of this sort of person” (Woolf1991, p. 216).

Related entries: Empire Style

Suggestions for further reading:Trouncer, Margaret. 1949. Madame Récamier.

London: Macdonald.Williams, Hugh Noel. 1907. Madame Récamier

and Her Friends. London and New York:Harper & Bros.


Regnaud de Saint Jean d’Angély,Michel, Comte (1762–1819)

A s president of the section of the in-terior of Napoleon’s Council of

State, Regnaud was at the center of powerfor over fourteen years. A moderate politi-cian in the early years of the Revolution, hefirst met Napoleon when acting as adminis-trator of the hospitals of the Army of Italyin 1796. In 1799 after the coup of 18 Bru-maire he became a member of the Councilof State, president of its section of the inte-rior in 1801, and in 1804 procureur of theimperial high court and secretary to theimperial family.

Widely seen as the most accomplishedorator of the age, Regnaud was also skilledin recognizing the essentials of a problemand proposing a rational solution. He couldpresent Napoleon’s arguments, no matterhow specious, persuasively.Thus he draftedthe speeches given by Napoleon andJoséphine when their divorce was pro-claimed to the world. But his relentless ad-ministrative activity was mostly concernedwith getting laws, decrees, and regulationsdrafted and put into practice effectively.As amember of the special Council of Adminis-

Regnaud de Saint Jean d’Angély, Michel, Comte 217

R

218

François Gérard portrays Madame Récamier modeling the perfect Empire style, at once tantalizing anddemure.Amid classical décor she reclines in a simple white dress and a golden shawl, with feet and shouldersuncovered. She combines studied perfection with coquetry as the perfect society hostess. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

tration of the Interior, he knew more aboutthe functioning of the Ministry of the Inte-rior than any of his successive ministers andkept a watchful eye on its work.And if nec-essary he could use his oratorical skills todefend draft laws before the LegislativeBody and the Tribunate.

Regnaud also personally reviewed theannual budgets of the departments ofFrance and of all the towns, several thou-sand in all, whose annual revenue exceeded10,000 francs. Napoleon’s success in tightbudgetary control owed much to his inde-fatigable exertions. At the same time hecame to be seen as the most influentialmember of the Council of State, calmlyconsidering all the affairs that came beforeits regular twice- or thrice-weekly meet-ings. As a proponent of well-informedmoderate government Regnaud provided acounterweight to more conspicuous butslippery figures such as Joseph Fouché orCharles Maurice de Talleyrand. In this rolehe played an essential part in the relativelysmooth functioning of Napoleon’s internaladministration.

Related entries: Centralization; Council ofState; Finance; Local Government

Suggestions for further reading:Freedeman, Charles E. 1961. The Conseil d’Etat in

Modern France. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Régnier, Claude (1736–1814)

A s minister of justice between 1802and 1813 and president of the com-

mission of claims of the Council of Statebetween 1806 and 1813, Régnier didmuch to ensure that the rule of law andimpartial justice remained a reality in Na-poleon’s France. He had been president ofthe Council of Ancients under the Direc-tory but supported the coup of 18 Bru-maire and was subsequently involved in the

drafting of the Civil Code. As minister ofjustice his freedom of action was circum-scribed by the watchful eye of arch-chan-cellor Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès,but on the Council of State he ensuredthat citizens with a grievance against thestate officials or courts got a fair hearingand that the facts of each case were cor-rectly established. This kind of oversighthelped to ensure that Napoleon’s highlycentralized administration could not act inan arbitrary fashion with impunity.Thanksto Régnier’s probity and effectiveness, therole of court of appeal for citizens was tobecome the chief function of the Councilof State under post-Napoleonic Frenchregimes. Régnier retired as minister of jus-tice in 1813 and died a few months afterNapoleon’s first abdication.

Related entries: Centralization; Council ofState; Law, Codification of



Freedeman, Charles E. 1961. The Conseil d’Etat inModern France. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Revolutionary Wars

C onflict between revolutionary Franceand the monarchies of Europe began

when France declared war on Austria, soonjoined by the partners of the First Coali-tion, in 1792. The victories of the massFrench armies (large armies made up ofconscripts or volunteers, as opposed to theusual small professional armies) at Valmyand Jemappes amazed Europe and ensuredthe survival of the Revolution. Prussia,Spain, and the Netherlands made peacewith France in 1795, leaving Austria andPiedmont-Sardinia to sustain the fight onthe Continent. Napoleon’s first Italian cam-paign of 1796–1797 forced Piedmont to

Revolutionary Wars 219

withdraw, and he compelled Austria to ac-cept the terms of the Treaty of CampoFormio.

Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign of 1798,designed to strike at British interests in theEast, compelled William Pitt the Younger toorganize a new coalition, with Britain alliedwith Russia, Austria, Naples, Portugal, andthe Ottoman Empire. Fighting resumed inItaly, with the coalition forces commandedby Alexander Suvorov, but quarrels amongthe Allies led to Russia’s withdrawal. Napo-leon, as first consul after the coup of 18Brumaire, had to bring the war to a conclu-sion. His victory at Marengo on 14 June1800 and that of Jean Moreau at Hohenlin-den on 3 December led to the collapse ofthe coalition. Austria made peace by theTreaty of Lunéville in 1801 and Britain bythe Peace of Amiens in 1802. It would notbe long, however, before Napoleon’s ambi-tions led to a renewal of conflict, and thenew series of wars would bear his name,rather than that of the Revolution.

Related entries: Amiens, Peace of;Austria;Campo Formio,Treaty of; Coalitions; Directory;Egyptian Campaign; Great Britain; ItalianCampaigns; Lunéville,Treaty of; OttomanEmpire; Prussia; Spain; Switzerland

Suggestions for further reading:Bertaud, Jean-Paul. 1988. The Army of the French

Revolution. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.

Lefebvre, Georges. 1967. The French Revolutionfrom 1793 to 1799. London: Routledge andKegan Paul.

Rivoli , Battle of (14 January 1797)

The last major battle of Napoleon’sfirst Italian campaign prevented the

Austrians from relieving their large forcetrapped under siege in Mantua. Despite theFrench victories at Bassano and Arcola, theAustrians, coming south from Germany,

launched a two-pronged attack towardMantua. Napoleon, ignoring the weaker ofthe two forces, turned against the largercontingent and defeated it at Rivoli beforeturning on the smaller force near Padua.The starving Austrian garrison in Mantuasurrendered early in February 1797.

Related entries: Italian Campaigns; Mantua

Suggestions for further reading:Marshall-Cornwall, Sir James. 1987.“Massena,” in

David G. Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals.New York: Macmillan.

Roederer, Pierre Louis(1754–1835)

J ournalist, economist, financier, politicaltheorist, and administrator, Roederer

was the only idéologue to support Napo-leon consistently, even though he foundmany of his own ideas thwarted. Born inMetz, the son of a magistrate, Roederer hadsat in the National Assembly between 1789and 1791, gone into hiding during the Ter-ror, and emerged under the Directory aseditor of the Journal de Paris and a memberof the Institut National. During this periodhe elaborated the liberal political and eco-nomic ideas to which he always adhered.Roederer supported the coup of 18 Bru-maire, and during the consulate Napoleonconfided in him frequently, most often afterdinner; he defended the regime before hisfellow idéologues.

Roederer’s respect for constitutionalforms made him the natural choice to draftthe resolution inviting Napoleon to assumethe life consulate with due care and atten-tion. He was appointed president of theSection of the Interior of the Council ofState and director general of public instruc-tion, but his ambitious plans for secondaryeducation were never implemented. Roe-derer’s disagreements with Jean Antoine

220 Rivoli, Battle of

Chaptal and open and justified distrust ofJoseph Fouché led to his dismissal from hisposts in 1802, though he was appointed tothe Senate by way of compensation.

Roederer was given more scope for im-plementing his ideas as minister of financein the Kingdom of Naples under JosephBonaparte between 1806 and 1808. He in-stituted a proper tax-collecting bureaucracyto replace tax-farming, replaced numerousdirect taxes with a single one on land andindustrial property, simplified indirect taxes,established a national bank, and began liq-uidating the public debt.The essence of hisreforms remained in place after the restora-tion of the Bourbon rulers of Naples in1815.

Roederer continued to serve Napoleonas administrator of the Grand Duchy ofBerg from 1810 to 1813, imperial commis-sioner in Strasbourg in 1813–1814, andduring the Hundred Days as commissionerin southeast France. He retired from publiclife in 1815, devoting himself to writinghistories and his memoirs, in which herecorded a number of his conversationswith Napoleon for posterity.

Related entries: Council of State; Education;Idéologues; Naples, Kingdom of


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Margerison, Kenneth. 1983. P.-L. Roederer,

Political Thought and Practice during the FrenchRevolution. Philadelphia:AmericanPhilosophical Society.

Roederer, Pierre Louis. 1989. The Spirit of theRevolution of 1789 and Other Writings on theRevolutionary Epoch. Ed. and trans. MurrayForsyth.Aldershot, England: Scolar.

Romanticism

A t first sight, the revolt against classi-cal formality and restraint and the

unbridled expression of the emotions rep-resented by the Romantic movement in the

arts stands in violent opposition to the neo-classicism favored under Napoleon.Yet theturbulence and drama of Napoleon’s careerand his apparent “shaking of the world” bythe force of his imagination complicatedhis relationship to an inconsistent culturalcreed whose relationship to politics de-pended very much on circumstance. Theexample of Jacques-Louis David exempli-fies how the Romantic revolt could be har-nessed for Napoleonic propaganda. AsDavid moved away from the cool neoclassi-cism of his revolutionary works, the figureof Napoleon provided an ideal subject for amore imaginative, even fantastic form ofexpression.

Romanticism as the expression of thedeepest emotions of the human soul couldtake many forms, but it was clearly opposedto the ordered rationality of theNapoleonic state and Napoleon’s imperial-ism in Europe. The principal early expo-nents of literary Romanticism in France,Mme. de Staël and François René deChateaubriand, both opposed Napoleonvehemently. In Germany the main currentof Romanticism became associated withemotional nationalism, harking back to anidealized Middle Ages and hoping to swayGerman feeling against Napoleonic domi-nation. Neither Romantic individualismnor the medievalism of Walter Scott northe Catholicism of Chateaubriand wouldhave much appeal to supporters of the lastof the Enlightened Despots.

Yet Napoleon’s defeat and exile and theblanket of conformity imposed upon Eu-rope after 1815 helped to turn Romanti-cism against the traditional establishedorder. The growing Napoleonic legendheld a particular appeal to French Roman-tics like Stendhal and Victor Hugo, forwhom Bonaparte’s towering ambition be-came a symbol of opposition to mediocrityand the “conquering bourgeoisie” of theRestoration period.The fact that the rulingclass of notables was largely Napoleon’s cre-ation seemed to pass them by. An idealized

Romanticism 221

image of the exiled Napoleon, broodinggodlike on his Atlantic rock, came to have asingular appeal, turning Romantics fromroyalism to Bonapartism.When allied, as inHugo’s case, to a growing awareness of so-cial injustice, Romantic Bonapartism couldbecome a potent force, but one likely intime to move in a more democratic or so-cialistic direction and away from the mythof the Great Man.

Related entries: Chateaubriand, FrançoisRené,Vicomte de; David, Jacques-Louis;Napoleonic Legend; Staël, Germaine de;Stendhal

Suggestions for further reading:Bainbridge, Simon. 1995. Napoleon and English

Romanticism. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Friedlaender,Walter. 1952. David to Delacroix.Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


222 Romanticism

Anne-Louis Girodet’s extraordinary painting Ossian Receiving the Spirits of French Heroes (1802) showsthe bard Ossian greeting Jean-Baptiste Kléber, Louis Desaix, and other French soldiers killed in Napoleon’sEgyptian and Italian campaigns into the Celtic “Morren,” home of immortal heroes. (Erich Lessing/ArtResource)

Honour, Hugh. 1979. Romanticism. London:Allen Lane.

Porter, Roy, and Mikulás Teich, eds. 1988.Romanticism in National Context. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Talmon, J. L. 1967. Romanticism and Revolt: Europe1815–1848. London:Thames and Hudson.

Roustan Raza (1780–1845)

N apoleon’s Mameluke bodyguard wasborn in Tbilisi; he was kidnapped

and sold into slavery before being recruitedto the Mamelukes and in 1799 given toBonaparte in Cairo. He slept on a mattressoutside Napoleon’s bedroom and accompa-nied him on campaign as his personal gunbearer, sleeping at the entrance of his tent.After the first abdication in April 1814Roustan refused to follow Napoleon toElba, and during the Hundred Days wasimprisoned at Vincennes. Under the JulyMonarchy after 1830 he was given the po-sition of postmaster at Dourdan, where hespent the rest of his days.

Royalists

M oderate royalist opinions weredoubtless widespread in Napole-

onic France, including within the heart ofthe administration, as Napoleon was deter-mined to use the most talented peopleavailable, regardless of their politics. Theabsolutely irreconcilable, those who neversaw Napoleon as anything other than an-other upstart general, were either in exileor reduced to shadowy plots and intrigues.Popular royalism could find little expres-sion except in chouannerie. Napoleon’s rec-onciliation with the Catholic Churchthrough the Concordat reduced royalismamong the clergy to support for draftdodgers and deserters or for the chouanbands of western France.

The effectiveness of the police underJoseph Fouché and later A. J. M. R. Savarykept a lid on royalist plotting after the fail-ure of the Opera Plot of 1800, the conspir-acy around Georges Cadoudal in 1804, andthe subsequent kidnapping and executionof the duke of Enghien. Royalist would-beconspirators could hold clandestine meet-ings in their drawing rooms and transmitpolitical news while on apparent socialcalls, but moving to the stage of taking ac-tion was much more difficult.The only re-ally organized royalist body, the Chevaliersde la Foi (Knights of the Faith), had mem-bers throughout the administration and inthe National Guard, and avoided detectionby creating their own courier system, safefrom the prying eyes of the police. But theiractivities never went beyond some discreetpropaganda and attempts to curb the en-thusiasm of zealous Bonapartist or republi-can colleagues. Napoleon’s downfall wasthe result of military defeat and the chang-ing of sides by his former closest allies, notof the shadowy actions of his permanentenemies.

Related entries: Cadoudal, Georges; CatholicChurch; Chouannerie; Émigrés; Louis XVIII, Kingof France; Opera Plot; Opposition Movements



Lewis, Gwynne. 1978. The Second Vendée:TheContinuity of Counter-Revolution in theDepartment of the Gard, 1789–1815. NewYork: Oxford University Press.



Rural Code

N apoleon wished to complete hiscodification of the law with a Rural

Rural Code 223

Code, but it was only ever published in in-complete form in 1814.The most influen-tial changes in rural society, the abolition offeudalism and consolidation of privateproperty rights, had been achieved underthe Revolution and by Napoleon’s CivilCode. However, the absence of a RuralCode meant that the legal and customaryframework of peasant life continued to varywidely in the different regions of France.

Related entries: Law, Codification of; Peasants



Russian Campaign (1812)

This decisive event, which was tojeopardize all that Napoleon had

gained in the previous eight years, had itsorigins in worsening relations betweenFrance and Russia ever since the Treaty ofTilsit of 1807.The deep and irreconcilabledifferences between Napoleon and TsarAlexander I culminated in a Russian ulti-matum in April 1812 virtually orderingNapoleon to evacuate Pomerania and Prus-sia. On 22 June Napoleon replied with astirring proclamation claiming that Russiahad broken the promises made at Tilsit, thathe had to choose between dishonor andwar, and that the coming conflict would“put an end to the fatal influence whichRussia has exercised over Europe for thepast fifty years” (Gates 1997, p. 206).

Contrary to popular myth Napoleon wasfully aware of the immense problems in-volved in the invasion of Russia and tookmeticulous care in preparing for the cam-paign. “We can hope for nothing from thecountryside,” he told Marshal Davout, “andaccordingly must take everything with us”(Gates 1997, p. 206). Nevertheless, the sheersize of his forces and their attendant suppliesmeant that he would have to engage the

Russians as quickly and as far west as possi-ble. He hoped by a series of marches to con-centrate 400,000 troops against the twoRussian armies commanded by Prince Bar-clay de Tolly and Prince Bagration andeliminate them in a decisive battle. But theRussians retreated eastward, abandoningSmolensk to Napoleon’s multinationalforces and imposing a scorched-earth strat-egy on the unfortunate peasantry, who wereforced to abandon their homes and villages.Ignoring the opinions of some of his advis-ers, Napoleon pressed on toward Moscow,still hoping for the climactic battle. Butwhile the cavalry could advance quickly, therest were held up by poor roads, stiflingheat, and lack of food. Finding little todrink, men and horses died in hundreds.

Finally the Russian army, now com-manded by Mikhail Kutuzov, turned to barthe road to Moscow at Borodino, and inthe resulting bloody battle on 7 September1812 was defeated but not destroyed. Na-poleon moved on and occupied Moscowbut found little comfort there. WhileAlexander rejected all peace overtures, firedestroyed much of the ancient Russian cap-ital. In October Napoleon began his retreat.Delayed by the battle of Maloyaroslavets (24October), the retreat through the same dev-astated country they had crossed earlierturned into a nightmare for the GrandeArmée. Harassed by bands of mobile Rus-sian light troops, slowed down by over-stretched supplies, and weighed down byloot, Napoleon’s forces faced the full rigorof the Russian winter in a sorry state. As afinal disaster, they were forced to cross theriver Berezina under heavy Russian fire andassailed on both banks. By the time Napo-leon left the army to return to Paris on 8December the exhausted Russians hadstopped their pursuit, but only a fragmentof his forces remained alive.

The precise extent of the catastrophe isimpossible to calculate. The military histo-rian David G. Chandler estimates that some570,000 personnel, 200,000 horses, and

224 Russian Campaign

1,050 cannon were lost (Kafker and Laux1989, p. 136).An eyewitness who saw someof the survivors stagger wretchedly intoBerlin recalled: “One saw no guns, no cav-alry, only suffering men crippled by fright-ful wounds, men with hands, arms or feetmissing or else completely destroyed byfrostbite.” Napoleon in a bulletin of 3 De-cember presented a distorted account of thecampaign to the French people, endingwith an assurance that his health had neverbeen better.

But the extent of the disaster could notbe concealed. Prussia immediately begandiplomatic moves to disengage herself fromher alliance with Napoleon, and during theearly months of 1813 most of theNapoleonic satellites in Germany followedsuit. The campaign had ended by placingRussia at the heart of a new coalitionagainst Napoleon. Carl von Clausewitz,who was attached to the Russian army dur-ing the campaign, observed: “The highestwisdom could never have devised a betterstrategy than the one the Russians followedunintentionally.”

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Bagration, Pyotr Ivanovich, Prince; Barclay deTolly, Mikhail Andreas, Prince; Beauharnais,Eugène Rose de; Borodino, Battle of; Davout,Louis Nicolas; Moscow; Murat, Joachim; Ney,Michel

Suggestions for further reading:Brett James,Antony. 1966. 1812: Eyewitness

Accounts of Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. NewYork: Macmillan.

Cate, Curtis. 1985. The War of the Two Emperors:The Duel between Napoleon and Alexander,Russia, 1812. New York: Random House.


Collins, Irene. 1976.“Variations on the Theme ofNapoleon’s Moscow Campaign,” History 81,pp. 39–53.

Duffy, Christopher. 1972. Borodino and the War of1812. London: Seeley.



Palmer,Alan. 1967. Napoleon in Russia. London:André Deutsch.


Tarle, E. 1942. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 1812.London:Allen & Unwin.

Russian Campaign 225

SSaint Helena

N apoleon’s final place of exile is avolcanic island in the South At-

lantic, a British colony occasionally used asa port of call in voyages to and from India.After his second abdication Napoleon hadrequested asylum in England, but the deci-sion to send him to Saint Helena was takenwhile he was still aboard ship in Torbay, andhe arrived on the island on 15 October1815. He settled with a small group ofFrench companions in the sprawling resi-dence of Longwood, where he held courtwith the same formal etiquette as if he werestill in power in Paris. Napoleon was fre-quently unwell, possibly with hepatitis andcertainly with cancer of the stomach. TheIrish naval surgeon Barry O’Meara was re-placed as his personal physician in 1818 bythe incompetent Francesco Antommarchi,sent by Napoleon’s mother.

Napoleon’s life on Saint Helena wasmarked by squabbles among his attendantsand a running feud with the governor, SirHudson Lowe. But he exaggerated his mis-eries so as to build up the legend of hismartyrdom. The publication of O’Meara’sA Voice from St. Helena in 1822 and espe-cially of Las Cases’s Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, dictated by Napoleon, in 1823 fab-ricated a legendary account of his life inwhich his fight for peace, liberty, anddemocracy was foiled by the unyielding

hatred of the British.Through such meansNapoleon’s life became an epic that has be-come folklore.

Related entries: Las Cases, EmmanuelAugustin, Comte de; Lowe, Sir Hudson; Mémorialde Sainte-Hélène; Napoleonic Legend

Suggestions for further reading:Korngold, Ralph. 1960. The Last Years of

Napoleon: His Captivity at St. Helena. London:Victor Gollancz.


———. 1976. Napoleon’s Last Journey. London:John Murray.

Masson, Frédéric. 1949. Napoleon at St. Helena,1815–1821. Oxford: Pen-in-HandPublishing Co.

Thornton, M. J. 1968. Napoleon after Waterloo:England and the Saint Helena Decision.Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Salamanca, Battle of (22 July 1812)

This important victory for the dukeof Wellington was one of the most

significant engagements of the PeninsularWar and destroyed French power in north-ern and central Spain. With Napoleon inRussia, French military authority in Spainwas divided between Joseph Bonaparte andMarshal Louis Marmont, enabling Welling-ton to take the city of Salamanca on 27

Salamanca, Battle of 227

S

June 1812.After several weeks of stalemate,Marmont’s dangerously extended forceswere fooled by Wellington’s pretence thathe was ordering a retreat toward CiudadRodrigo.The French forces were caught byheavy artillery fire and an exceptionalBritish cavalry charge. Marmont was badlywounded, and only the failure of Welling-ton’s Spanish troops to secure a vital bridgeover the river Tormes allowed the French toescape a total disaster. Wellington was nowfree to march on Madrid.

Related entries: Marmont,Auguste FrédéricLouis Viesse de; Peninsular War;Wellington,Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Pimlott, John L. 1987.“Marmont,” in David G.


Young, Peter, and J. P. Lawford. 1972. Wellington’sMasterpiece:The Battle and Campaign ofSalamanca. London:Allen & Unwin.

Saliceti , Antonio Cristoforo(1757–1809)

A prominent Corsican revolutionaryand patron of the young Napoleon,

Saliceti served the Napoleonic empire inItaly but remained a Jacobin at heart. As adeputy to the Estates General at Versailles in1789–1790, Saliceti secured Corsica’s an-nexation to France but also gained pardonsfor Corsican patriots who had opposed theFrench in 1769 and a decree allowing thereturn of Pasquale Paoli from exile. But hisJacobin opinions came to override his Cor-sican loyalties. Elected to the Convention in1792, Saliceti voted for the execution ofLouis XVI. As representative on mission tothe army during the siege of Toulon in 1793he was instrumental in Napoleon’s promo-tion to command the artillery, thus helpingthe young general’s rapid rise to fame.

Saliceti, having demonstrated his capac-ity for brutality in presiding over the reduc-

tion of Toulon, became supplier to Napo-leon’s Army of Italy in 1796 and helped or-ganize the Cisalpine Republic. In the coupof 18 Brumaire he helped obtain Jacobinsupport for Napoleon and was rewarded bynot being sent into the exile reserved forhis fellow radicals. After serving in variousmissions in Italy, Saliceti organized the an-nexation of the Ligurian Republic toFrance in 1805 and in 1806 was sent to beminister of police in Joseph Bonaparte’snew Kingdom of Naples.Acting largely be-hind Joseph’s back, he developed a repres-sive system that made short work of ene-mies of the regime, and on becomingminister of war in 1807, he set about culti-vating support among the Neapolitans.

Saliceti’s position and his capacity for in-trigue were seen as a threat by JoachimMurat when he replaced Joseph as king ofNaples. Murat cut Saliceti down to size andremoved him from the war ministry. Salicetipresented his case to Napoleon, who senthim back to Italy to assist in the seizure ofthe Papal States and the arrest of Pope PiusVII. Saliceti died suddenly in Naples on 23December 1809, but rumors that he hadbeen poisoned by his successor as ministerof police, Antonio Marghella, proved to beunfounded.

Related entries: Cisalpine Republic; Corsica;Jacobinism; Naples, Kingdom of


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Lyons, Martyn. 1975. France under the Directory.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Morton, John B. 1948. Brumaire:The Rise of

Bonaparte. London:T.Werner Levine.

Savary, Anne Jean Marie René(1774–1833)

A s a soldier and then as minister ofthe police between 1810 and 1814,

228 Saliceti,Antonio Cristoforo

Savary was valued by Napoleon as an obe-dient and unscrupulous servant. If there wasdirty work to be done, Savary was the manto do it, and Napoleon expressed his appre-ciation by saying: “I like this fellow verymuch; he would kill his own father if I or-dered it” (Kafker and Laux 1989, p. 136).

The son of a cavalry officer, Savaryserved in the revolutionary wars, becomingaide-de-camp to General Louis Desaix.When Desaix was killed at the battle ofMarengo, Savary joined Napoleon’s staff. In1803 he was assigned to counterintelli-gence work, to which his blind obedienceand moral insensitivity made him wellsuited. He took charge of the abductionand execution of the duke of Enghien andhelped to dupe Charles IV and FerdinandVII of Spain into the meeting at Bayonnethat resulted in their both losing the crown.Savary was rewarded for his work by beingpromoted to general of division in 1805and created duke of Rovigo in 1808.

As minister of police after 1810, he tight-ened press censorship and acted vigorouslyagainst unrest caused by high bread prices.But he lacked the subtlety of his predeces-sor, Joseph Fouché; was heavy-handed andobtuse; and committed the cardinal sin for apoliceman when he was made to lookridiculous during the Malet conspiracy in1812. His laxity toward the opposition sa-lons in Paris was thus rewarded by his be-coming a laughingstock, while his brutalmethods contributed to the growing un-popularity of the Napoleonic regime.Savary’s devotion to Napoleon remainedtotal. After rallying during the HundredDays, he tried to accompany his master intoexile on Saint Helena, but was prevented bythe British. After exile in Malta and Turkey,Savary lived for several years in Rome be-fore briefly returning to military service in1831–1832 in command of the Frencharmy pacifying newly conquered Algiers.

Related entries: Censorship; Enghien, LouisAntoine de Condé, Duc d’; Malet Conspiracy;Opposition Movements


General Police. Washington, DC: UniversityPress of America.

Artom, Guido. 1970. Napoleon is Dead in Russia:The Extraordinary Story of One of History’sStrangest Conspiracies. London:Allen &Unwin.


Kafker, Frank A., and James. M. Laux, eds. 1989.Napoleon and His Times: Selected Interpretations.Malibar, FL: Krieger.

Saxony

S axony, with its capital in Dresden, wasin a weakened condition but of great

strategic significance during the Napole-onic Wars. Elector Frederick Augustus ofSaxony, though officially allied with Prus-sia, remained neutral until 1806, when hewas inveigled into providing 20,000 troopsto aid the Prussian army in the Jena cam-paign. After this crushing defeat Saxonymade peace with Napoleon by the Treatyof Posen (11 December 1806).The territo-rial integrity of Saxony was guaranteed,Frederick Augustus became king, and Sax-ony joined the Confederation of theRhine.

In 1807 Napoleon placed Frederick Au-gustus at the head of the new Duchy ofWarsaw, created out of Prussia’s possessionsin Poland. The alliance with Napoleonforced Saxony to pay a heavy price in thelives of her soldiers. A Saxon corps of19,000 men suffered heavy casualties at Wa-gram in 1809, and of the 20,000 whomarched with Napoleon into Russia in1812 only 2,500 returned home. FrederickAugustus remained loyal to Napoleon in1813, but during the battle of Leipzig largenumbers of his troops deserted to the Allies,and his kingdom was devastated by thecampaign.

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 Sax-ony was reduced to less than half its formersize, but Frederick Augustus retained the

Saxony 229

title of king and the cities of Dresden andLeipzig. Prussian ambitions to seize thewhole of Saxony were thwarted by theother Allies.The kingdom survived in someform until 1918, but after 1871 as an inte-gral part of the German Empire.

Related entries: Confederation of the Rhine;Germany, Campaigns in; Leipzig, Battle of;Wagram, Battle of



Scharnhorst, Gerhard JohannDavid von (1755–1813)

A s the Prussian reformer who bestunderstood the reasons behind

French success in the revolutionary andNapoleonic Wars, Scharnhorst deserves themain credit for establishing a mass Prussianarmy (a large army made up of conscriptsand volunteers instead of the more usualsmall professional army) to oppose Napo-leon in 1813–1814.As early as 1797 he hademphasized the political and psychologicaladvantages enjoyed by the French republi-can armies, and from 1801, while a colonelin the artillery, had devoted himself to thediscussion and publication of new ideasabout military affairs. Only after the Prus-sian disaster of 1806, however, was Scharn-horst able to put his ideas into practice, re-placing caste with merit in the selectionand promotion of officers, modernizing or-ganization, discipline, and tactics, and layingthe foundations for a mass army capable ofengaging Napoleon in an equal struggle.His death in 1813 while serving as chief ofstaff to Gebhard von Blücher deprived thePrussians of probably their best com-mander, but his work was carried on byAugust von Gneisenau.

Related entries: Prussia

Suggestions for further reading:Craig, Gordon A. 1955. The Politics of the Prussian

Army. New York: Oxford University Press.White, Charles Edward. 1989. The Enlightened

Soldier: Scharnhorst and the MilitarischeGesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805. New York:Praeger.

Schönbrunn, Treaty of (14 October 1809)

The humiliating treaty imposed byNapoleon on Austria after his vic-

tory at Wagram forced the Habsburgs topay a crippling indemnity, limit the size oftheir army, and cede territory to France andher allies. France received the Austrian ter-ritories on the Adriatic that became theprovinces of Illyria, and Salzburg and otherAlpine territories were ceded to Bavaria,West Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw, thesouthern Tyrol to the Kingdom of Italy, anda section of East Galicia to Russia. Austriaalso joined the Continental System. For allits harshness, however, the treaty did pre-serve the Habsburg dynasty, whose alliancewith Napoleon was to be cemented by hismarriage to Marie-Louise.

Related entries: Austria; Bavaria, Kingdom of;Illyria




Senate

W hen created by the Constitutionof the Year VIII in December

1799, the Senate was meant to ensure stabil-ity of government under the consulate andto curb Napoleon’s evident dictatorial ambi-tions. Under the presidency of Emmanuel

230 Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann David von

Sieyès it comprised sixty members, thirty-one named directly by the first consul andthe rest by Sieyès and his associates.The Sen-ate chose, from lists submitted to it, themembers of the Tribunate and the Legisla-tive Body, and until 1802 possessed certainrights of appointment in the appeal courtsand financial administration. However, in1801 Napoleon instituted the sénatus con-sulte, a form of decree issued by him and“witnessed” by the Senate. Initially used forimportant political matters, such as theamnesty for émigrés in 1802, these decreesgave a basis in law for the drift to the empire,established by sénatus-consulte in May 1804.

Princes and grand dignitaries of the em-pire were added to the Senate in 1804, andmany other members were named by theemperor, so that by 1814 there were 141senators. The method of recruitment andthe advantages conferred by membership inthe Senate, including a considerable basicsalary of 250,000 francs a year, turned it intoa docile, even servile body.As its powers di-minished, its attraction as a social institutionincreased. Membership, which includedrepresentatives from annexed territories, wasthe sure sign of belonging to the social eliteof the empire. It comes as no surprise, how-ever, to learn that the august senators turnedagainst Napoleon in April 1814.

Related entries: Constitutions; Consulate;Empire; Sénatoreries; Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph




Collins, Irene. 1979. Napoleon and His Parliaments.London: Edward Arnold.

Sénatoreries

F rom 1804 onward a certain numberof members of the Senate were pro-

moted to act as super-prefects in the re-gions of France. Holders of such sénatorerieswere given a residential palace and an urbanseat, while their senatorial salaries weredoubled. Appointed to the part of thecountry from which they came, these privi-leged personages personified Napoleon’saristocratic ideal of public service associatedwith appropriately large landed propertyand income.

Related entries: Local Government; Senate



Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph(1748–1836)

The abbé Sieyès has been describedby the historian François Furet as

“the best symbol of the French Revolu-tion” and “its most profound politicalthinker” (Furet 1992, p. 45). In his famouspamphlet of 1789, What is the Third Estate?he used his reading of Enlightenmentthinkers to attack the privileges of the no-bility and clergy and promote the cause ofpopular sovereignty. Throughout the tur-moil of the Revolution Sieyès followed amoderate popular line, going into eclipseduring periods of Jacobin domination.Asked later what he did during the Terror,he simply asserted: “I survived.” He tookthe lead in drawing up the Constitution ofthe Year III (1795), served on the Direc-tory’s Council of Five Hundred, and be-came a Director himself in June 1799 alongwith Roger Ducos.

Ever fearful of a return to the Terror,Sieyès was worried by Jacobin domina-tion of the Directory’s legislative coun-cils, and to counter this secured the ap-pointment of his allies Joseph Fouché as

Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph 231

minister of police and François Lefebvreas commander of the Army of the Inte-rior. Firmly convinced of the necessity ofa stronger executive, Sieyès became theprime mover in the coup of 18 Brumaire,but made a major mistake in selectingNapoleon for what he saw as a primarilyceremonial role as head of government.Once ensconced in power alongsideSieyès and Ducos, Napoleon changed thecomplicated system devised in Sieyès’sdraft of the Constitution of the Year VIIIand concentrated power in his ownhands.

After resigning as temporary consul,Sieyès was relegated to the Senate, wherehe continued to be influential and againproved his talents as a survivor. He wasnamed a grand officer of the Legion ofHonor in 1804 and given the title of countof the empire in 1808. Banished as a regi-cide in 1815, Sieyès lived in exile in Brus-sels until 1830, when he returned to Paris,where he died on 20 June 1836. Sieyès wasa great deviser of systems, and his castingaside of tradition and history made him anideal target for counterrevolutionarythinkers, who believed that his disregard oftradition and attempt to create an idealconstitution from nothing would lead todisaster. Napoleon also had rejected hiscareful accumulation of checks and bal-ances in favor of personal power of a kindSieyès himself would never have thought ofwielding.

Related entries: Brumaire, Coup of Year VIII;Constitutions; Consulate; Directory

Suggestions for further reading:Clapham, John H. 1912. The Abbé Sieyès:An

Essay in the Politics of the French Revolution.London: P. S. King and Son.


Van Deusen, Glyndon G. 1932. Sieyès: His Lifeand His Nationalism. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.

Woloch, Isser. 1970. Jacobin Legacy:The DemocraticMovement under the Directory. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu(1769–1851)

D uke of Dalmatia, marshal of France,born the son of a notary from Gas-

cony, Soult joined the royal army in 1785and rose rapidly through the ranks duringthe early revolutionary wars, fightingmainly in the Rhineland and Belgium. By1799 he was a general of division serving inSwitzerland under André Masséna. Soultwas seriously wounded and taken prisonerwhile fighting alongside Masséna in thesiege of Genoa in 1800, the action whichallowed the launch of Napoleon’s victori-ous second Italian campaign. From thispoint on Soult was less willing to exposehis person in battle, but he had won the ad-miration of Napoleon for his tactical acu-men and the iron discipline he imposed onhis troops.

Soult was created a marshal in 1804, andas commander of the Fourth Corps led theattack on the Pratzen Heights at Austerlitzand fought with distinction at Jena andEylau. Given the title of duke of Dalmatiain 1808, he led a corps to Spain, where hewas to remain with only one brief inter-ruption until 1814. In 1809 as “major-gen-eral” to King Joseph Bonaparte, Soult wasresponsible for the pursuit of Sir JohnMoore to Corunna, and he invaded Portu-gal, reaching Oporto before being checkedby the duke of Wellington. In 1810 he con-quered Andalusia and remained there as un-crowned king of the province until 1812,when he was forced to withdraw in theface of Wellington’s victories in the north.After briefly joining Napoleon in Germanyin early 1813, he returned to take charge ofFrench forces in Spain. In the last phase ofthe Peninsular War Soult fought a tenaciousdelaying action in the Pyrenees and south-ern France, but was often outmaneuveredby Wellington. When the two faced eachother in the battle of Toulouse Napoleonhad already abdicated.

232 Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu

Soult rallied to Napoleon during theHundred Days, but proved an ineffectivechief of staff during the Waterloo campaign.Exiled until 1819, he returned to public of-fice as minister of war under Louis Philippein 1830 and was prime minister betweenMay 1832 and February 1836 and againfrom May 1839 to March 1840. LikeWellington, he had become a grand oldman and the two old rivals met at the coro-nation of Queen Victoria in June 1838. Hecontinued to serve as minister of war andbriefly prime minister again until 1847,when he was made marshal-general ofFrance, an honor only ever held by twoother men.When he died on 26 November1851 he was survived by Louise Berg, hiswife of fifty-five years, whom he had metwhile fighting in the revolutionary armynear Düsseldorf in 1796.

Soult was widely admired, not least byNapoleon, for his organizational gifts andunderstanding of strategic situations, but hewas also as avaricious as he was energetic,prone to self-indulgence, and seen by themore cultured marshals as retaining themanners of the drill-sergeant he had oncebeen. One of his staff officers observed, atrifle unfairly: “In war he loved vigorousenterprises, but only on condition that hedid not expose his own person too far. . . .This defect came to him with the great for-tune he had amassed” (Griffith 1987, p.467). Soult was unequal to the burden im-posed on him in Spain by Napoleon andquarreled with all the other commanders.His feud with Michel Ney was longstand-ing and of grave consequence for theFrench in the peninsula. But he showedgreat resilience in postponing the momentof final defeat and died as one of France’smost honored soldiers of all time.

Related entries: Austerlitz, Battle of; Corunna,Battle of; Eylau, Battle of; Genoa; Hundred Days;Italian Campaigns; Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of;Moore, Sir John; Peninsular War; Portugal;Toulouse, Battle of;Waterloo, Battle of;Wellington, Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Griffith, Paddy. 1987.“Soult,” in David G.


Oman, Charles W. C. 1902–1930. A History of thePeninsular War, 7 vols. Oxford: ClarendonPress.

Souper de Beaucaire, Le

The most substantial of the youngNapoleon’s political pamphlets was

intended to record the success of the cam-paign of 1793 against the federalist revolt insouthern France and to persuade the peo-ple of Marseille to submit to the armies ofthe Republic. It demonstrates his apprecia-tion of the importance of artillery, soon tobe shown at the siege of Toulon, and looksforward to a repentant and republican Mar-seille becoming the “centre of gravity ofliberty.” Publication of the pamphlet wassecured for Napoleon by Antonio Saliceti.

Related entries: Federalism; Jacobinism;Saliceti,Antonio Cristoforo;Toulon, Siege of

Suggestions for further reading:De Chair, Somerset, ed. 1992. Napoleon on

Napoleon. London: Cassell.

South America

The separation between Spain andher colonies created by Napoleon’s

interference in Spanish affairs and the in-trusion of British naval power into thesouthern Atlantic contributed to the com-plex development of independence move-ments in South America, but their greatestsuccesses only came after 1816.The Britishmade attempts to gain footholds inBuenos Aires and Montevideo in 1806–1807, but plans in 1808 to send militarysupport to Francisco de Miranda inVenezuela were abandoned. In 1811 Na-

South America 233

poleon instructed his minister in Washing-ton to “encourage the independence of allthe Americas” (Herold 1983, p. 306), hop-ing that this would strengthen the UnitedStates at Britain’s expense.This turned outto be a half-correct prophecy. Indepen-dence for Latin America was to open upmarkets for British goods that would haveremained closed if the colonies had re-mained under Spanish rule. South Ameri-can leaders faced the unusual situation ofbeing encouraged, albeit mostly from afar,by both sides in the Napoleonic Wars,while having to rely on their own effortsto attain their goals.

Related entries: Great Britain; Spain; UnitedStates of America

Suggestions for further reading:Esdaile, Charles J. 1992.“Latin America and the

Anglo-Spanish Alliance against Napoleon,1808–1814,” Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 49,pp. 55–70.


Lynch, John. 1986. The Spanish AmericanRevolution, 1808–1826. 2nd ed. New York:Norton.

———, ed. 1994. Latin American Revolutions,1808–26, Old and New World Origins.Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Spain

B y the time of the French RevolutionSpain, once the most powerful coun-

try in Europe, had declined into being asecond-class power. The Bourbon kingswere tied by the “family pact” to Franceand financially dependent on their Ameri-can colonies. King Charles IV declared waron the French Republic in 1793, but peacewas concluded by Manuel Godoy in 1795,a peace that would last until 1808. TheSpanish fleet shared in the French disasterat Trafalgar in 1805, and the British seizedTrinidad from Spain and cut off communi-cations with South America.

After Napoleon ordered the occupationof Spain by French troops in 1808 thecountry’s history is inseparable from that ofthe Peninsular War. Both Charles IV and hisson Ferdinand VII, who had overthrownhim, were deposed and replaced by JosephBonaparte.All Joseph’s good intentions andattempts at reform were hindered by theunpopularity of French rule and the factthat rebels against him always held someterritory, even if only Cadiz, in the name ofFerdinand VII. For five years Joseph, aidedby Spanish ministers, tried to give Spain thebenefits of enlightened government. Hetried to rule according to the Constitutionof Bayonne, which provided for a Corteswith a majority elected indirectly by uni-versal manhood suffrage, introduced lawsbased on the Napoleonic codes, andbrought in such educational and liberaleconomic reforms as were compatible withhis permanent financial problems.

But even most Spanish liberals opposedJoseph’s rule, preferring to support the rebelgovernment in Cadiz. Joseph, perpetually atwar but leaving its prosecution to the mar-shals, might have done much valuable workfor Spain if he had not been imposed onthe country by his conquering brother.TheConstitution of Cadiz, proclaimed by lib-eral rebels in 1812 and later a model for lib-eral constitutions in Europe, was an attemptto improve on the Constitution of Bay-onne. Meanwhile, Spanish regular troopsjoined with the Anglo-Portuguese forces ofthe duke of Wellington in driving Josephfrom his throne in 1813. Ferdinand VII re-turned from exile in France in March 1814and on his return to Madrid disavowed theCadiz constitution. His persecution of hisliberal erstwhile supporters drove many,ironically, into exile in France.

Although Spain regained her indepen-dence from France, the rule of the reac-tionary and authoritarian Ferdinand soondashed any hope for national revival andprogress. Crucially, the loss of her Ameri-can colonies put the country on the road

234 Spain

to bankruptcy. Within eight years Francewas again interfering in Spain, this time toaid the restored monarchy against its liberalopponents.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Joseph, King ofNaples, King of Spain; Charles IV, King ofSpain; Ferdinand VII, King of Spain; Godoy,Manuel; Peninsular War; South America;Trafalgar, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Callahan,William J. 1984. Church, Politics and

Society in Spain, 1750–1874. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.

Carr, Raymond. 1982. Spain: 1808–1975. 2nded. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Connelly, Owen. 1968. The Gentle Bonaparte:ABiography of Joseph, Napoleon’s Elder Brother.New York: Macmillan.

Glover, Michael. 1971. Legacy of Glory:TheBonaparte Kingdom of Spain, 1808–1813. NewYork: Scribners.

Lovett, Gabriel H. 1965. Napoleon and the Birth ofModern Spain, 2 vols. New York: New YorkUniversity Press.


Staël, Germaine de(1766–1817)

The only child of Jacques Necker, thecelebrated finance minister of the last

days of the ancien régime, Mme. de Staëlwas one of the great figures in the salons ofParis between 1797 and 1803 and became adetermined and irritating intellectual oppo-nent of Napoleon. Along with her lover,Benjamin Constant, she had initially wel-comed the coup of 18 Brumaire, but withina year she was helping to write Constant’sspeeches in the Tribunate advocating civiland political liberties. In intermittent exileafter 1804, Mme. de Staël turned the

Staël, Germaine de 235

Francisco Goya’s El Dos de Mayo (1814) is a dramatic depiction of the events of 2 May 1808 in Madrid,marking the beginning of the Spanish uprising against Napoleonic Rule. Goya emphasizes the confused melée ofmen and horses, doing nothing to alleviate the savagery of hand-to-hand conflict. (Alinari/Art Resource)

Necker family home at Coppet in Switzer-land into a residential salon opposed to whatshe called Napoleon’s “chattering tyranny.”

Napoleon’s anger at her arose initiallyfrom her links with Jean Moreau and fromthe feminist and pro-English sentiments ofher novel Delphine (1803). Her other worksincluded On Literature (1800), which associ-ated liberty with human perfectibility, andthe relatively innocuous novel Corinne(1807), the success of which annoyed Na-poleon overmuch. The first edition of OnGermany (1810), her great and positive crit-ical study of German literature and life, wasdestroyed by Napoleon’s police. De Staël’smature political position favored constitu-tional monarchy, but in 1814 she foolishlysupported Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte for theFrench throne before rallying to the Bour-bons. Her hesitant approval of Constant’sActe Additionel during the Hundred Dayswas also somewhat embarrassing.

Mme. de Staël’s belief in humankind’sadvance toward moral perfection throughmaterial progress places her close to theidéologues, but her circle remained distinctfrom them or any other party. Her acuteand hostile assessment of Napoleon’s per-sonality as dominated by the will to com-mand and pragmatic pursuit of power wasprobably the main reason for his implacablehostility toward her.

Related entries: Constant, Benjamin;Romanticism

Suggestions for further reading:Herold, J. Christopher. 1959. Mistress to an Age:A

Life of Madame de Staël. London: HamishHamilton.

Staël, Germaine de, trans.Vivien Folkenflik. 1987.Major Writings of Germaine de Staël. New York:Columbia University Press.

Statistics

A great effort was made under theconsulate and empire to revive and

intensify the collection of demographic andeconomic statistics begun during the eigh-teenth century, but the results were sketchy.The demographic historian Jacques Dupâ-quier has called the supposed statistical ex-cellence of the Napoleonic period a “leg-end” (Bergeron 1981, p. 116). But given thecircumstances a large amount of data wasaccumulated, which has turned out to bemore useful to historians than it was to Na-poleon’s government.

The Bureau of Statistics was establishedin the Ministry of the Interior by LucienBonaparte and Jean Antoine Chaptal, andin 1801 it launched a massive statistical de-scription of France. However, despite theenthusiastic efforts of the Bureau’s chief,Alexandre de Ferrière, reports were slow tocome in and were often incomplete or in-accurate. While overworked staffs in pre-fectures and communes struggled to an-swer primitive questionnaires, personalrivalries and conflicting ideas under suc-cessive ministers of the interior hamperedthe bureau’s work. It continued, however,to produce statistical investigations of vari-ous sectors of the economy until it wasclosed down in 1812.

Outside official circles, local learned so-cieties, concerned with the perennial prob-lem of British industrial supremacy, becameinterested in statistics, and statistical period-icals were published. Napoleon’s interest,based on a desire to control and predict themovement of the population and economicactivity, undoubtedly helped to stimulateinterest in statistics, but it was not until1835 that the modern French statistical ser-vice was launched.

Related entries: Centralization; Chaptal, JeanAntoine; Economy


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Perrot, Jean-Claude, and Stuart Woolf. 1984. State

and Statistics in France, 1789–1815. London:Harwood Academic.

236 Statistics

Stendhal (Henri Beyle)(1783–1842)

The great novelist made a successfulcareer in the military administration

under Napoleon and took part in the re-treat from Moscow in 1812. He was a criticof Napoleon’s policies, the waste of war,and lost liberties, but his major works in the1820s and 1830s indicate how under theconservative, noble-dominated, and ultra-religious restored monarchy many lookedback with nostalgia on the Napoleonic pe-riod. Julien Sorel, the hero of Stendhal’smasterpiece Le rouge et le noir, or Scarlet andBlack (1830), idolizes Napoleon, lookingback to a time when talented men of hum-ble origins could rise to glory and great-ness. His other great novel, La Chartreuse deParme, or The Charterhouse of Parma (1839),praises Napoleonic policy in Italy and con-tains a famous description of the battle ofWaterloo, when the hero, Fabrice delDongo, wanders in confusion through apart of the battlefield, having no idea whatis going on.

Related entries: Napoleonic Legend;Romanticism

Suggestions for further reading:May, Gita. Stendhal and the Age of Napoleon. New

York: Columbia University Press.

Suchet, Louis Gabriel(1770–1826)

D uke of Albufera, marshal of France,Suchet was born the son of a pros-

perous Lyon silk merchant. Full of revolu-tionary fervor, he volunteered for the armyin 1791, and first met Napoleon at the siegeof Toulon in 1793. He subsequently fought,always with distinction, in the first Italiancampaign, but at this time was suspicious ofGeneral Bonaparte and doubtful about his

abilities. As a result he was never a memberof Napoleon’s intimate circle and had towait longer than some less deserving soldiersto get the rewards he merited.While Napo-leon was in Egypt in 1798–1799, Suchetserved in Holland and Switzerland, reachingthe rank of major general, and in the secondItalian campaign of 1800 acted brilliantly assecond in command to André Masséna. Healso served in the Austerlitz and Jena-Auer-städt campaigns, but gained no promotiondespite performing creditably.

By 1808 Suchet had garnered great ex-perience in all kinds of warfare and showedparticular skill as a military organizer andadministrator. But his true reputation wasmade in Spain between 1808 and 1814.Uniquely among French commanders inthe Peninsular War, Suchet not only orga-nized his forces into a disciplined and effec-tive fighting force but also gained a de-served popularity among the Spanishpeople.As military governor of Aragon andthen Catalonia, he won his marshal’s batonby victories over the Anglo-Spanish forcesand guerrilla bands and employed Spanishofficials in an administration that respectedlocal religion and customs. He was giventhe title of duke of Albufera for his captureof Valencia in 1812.

When the French position in Spain be-came untenable in 1814, Suchet conductedan orderly retreat into France and trans-ferred his allegiance to Louis XVIII on pa-triotic rather than opportunistic grounds.During the Hundred Days, however, he ral-lied to Napoleon and successfully defendedsoutheastern France against Austrian orPiedmontese invasion.This was Suchet’s lastact in public life. He was pardoned for hissupport of Napoleon in 1819 and died at hischâteau near Marseille on 3 January 1826.

Suchet’s attitude and conduct in Spainwas in sharp contrast to that of the Frenchsoldiery in general. Partly this was due tohis exhaustive care for his own men, ensur-ing that they were treated fairly, fed prop-erly, given proper medical attention, and

Suchet, Louis Gabriel 237

even paid on time. Suchet and his belovedwife Honorine, a niece of Julie and DésiréeClary, were held in great respect by theAragonese and Catalans. On his death a re-quiem mass was held in Saragossa, an honorit is difficult to imagine being granted toany of Napoleon’s other Peninsular com-manders. Napoleon remarked: “Had I beenserved by two marshals like Suchet, I wouldhave conquered Spain and kept it” (Palmer1984, p. 264).

Related entries: Danube Campaigns; Germany,Campaigns in; Hundred Days; Italian Campaigns;Peninsular War

Suggestions for further reading:Ojala, Jeanne A. 1987.“Suchet,” in David G.


Palmer,Alan. 1984. An Encyclopaedia of Napoleon’sEurope. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Suvorov, Alexander(1729–1800)

The immensely experienced andruthless Russian field marshal Su-

vorov was recalled to arms in 1799 to leadthe Russo-Austrian army charged withwinning back the gains of Napoleon’s firstItalian campaign. He successfully drove theFrench forces from Milan and Turin, butthe victories of André Masséna against hissubordinate commanders in Switzerlandforced the Russians to withdraw to Austria.The discredited Suvorov returned to SaintPetersburg, broken in health, and died a fewweeks later, admired by all who servedunder him but suffering under the petulanthostility of Tsar Paul I.

Related entries: Italian Campaigns; Switzerland

Suggestions for further reading:Longworth, Philip. 1965. The Art of Victory:The

Life and Achievements of Generalissimo Suvorov,1729–1800. London: Constable.

Switzerland

The Swiss Confederation, made up ofa mosaic of thirteen virtually inde-

pendent cantons, was invaded by France in1798 and remained a French protectorate,in reality if not in name, until the fall ofNapoleon. Swiss liberals exiled in Francehad stirred up revolutionary agitation infavor of a unified state, and in November1797 Napoleon had been greeted as a herowhen he visited Switzerland to test publicopinion. But the Directory’s aims in invad-ing the cantons were far from altruistic: theFrench seized the treasury of Berne to fi-nance Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign andsecured control of the strategically impor-tant mountain passes. A unified HelveticRepublic was proclaimed and all resistancecrushed ruthlessly.

The republic introduced a liberal consti-tution based on that of the Directory, but thestrong and tenacious persistence of federalistsentiment led to chronic political instability.Napoleon wanted to disengage fromSwitzerland, leaving it neutral, but politicalchaos threatened. In 1803, therefore, the re-public was replaced under his guidance by anew Helvetic Confederation of nineteencantons with a federal Diet effectively sub-servient to Paris.The new system, which putan end to popular sovereignty but satisfiedneither federalists nor centralists, remarkablyproduced eleven years of peace, as well aseconomic and cultural progress. Switzerlandwas bound to France by a defensive alliance,and the Continental System damaged hertrade. Napoleon was able to use the Confed-eration as a source of troops, about 10,000 ofwhom died during the Russian campaign.

Napoleon ended the French occupationof Switzerland in 1813, and the country re-gained its independence without a struggle.Austrian troops violated Swiss neutrality insupport of cantons which opposed the lib-erals, while the British diplomat StratfordCanning tried to secure agreement for anew constitution which would preserve

238 Suvorov,Alexander

some aspects of the Napoleonic centraliza-tion. All nineteen cantons sent representa-tives to the Congress of Vienna, whileGeneva, Neuchâtel, and the Valais, whichhad been annexed to France, were readmit-ted to the Confederation. After prolongednegotiations, Stratford Canning failed topersuade the cantons to accept greaterunity, and the enlarged Confederation con-sisted of twenty-two cantons, all with theirown currencies, weights and measures, andarmies. The Federal Compact, ratified bythe cantons and guaranteed by the majorEuropean powers, pledged Switzerland topermanent international neutrality.

Related entries: Helvetic Republic

Suggestions for further reading:Ellis, Geoffrey. 1991. The Napoleonic Empire.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities PressInternational.

Oechsli,Wilhelm. 1922. History of Switzerland.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Syria, Campaign in

See Egyptian Campaign

Syria, Campaign in 239

TTalleyrand-Périgord, Charles

Maurice de (1754–1838)

O ne of the most remarkable figures inthe international politics of his day,

Talleyrand acted as Napoleon’s foreignminister before betraying him. In his owneyes Talleyrand’s personal interests alwaysseemed to coincide with those of France,and he may well have been right. Born intoa leading aristocratic family, he was crippledby an accident in childhood, and instead ofthe military career toward which his birthimpelled him, he entered the Church, risingto become bishop of Autun in 1789. Butafter being elected to the Constituent As-sembly he identified himself with the causeof the Revolution and renounced his cleri-cal state in 1791.

Talleyrand entered his natural environ-ment of international politics when he wassent on a diplomatic mission to London inJuly 1792, largely because he had previouslymade the acquaintance of William Pitt.During the Terror he was condemned as atraitor and spent three years in exile in theUnited States, mainly in Philadelphia. Re-turning to France late in 1796, he becameforeign minister of the Directory in July1797.Talleyrand first met Napoleon in De-cember 1797 and joined with him in pro-posing the Egyptian expedition of1798–1799, but he resigned as foreign min-

ister in July 1798 after failing to prevent theformation of the Second Coalition againstFrance. He strongly backed the coup of 18Brumaire and returned to the ForeignMinistry in November 1799, remaininguntil August 1807.

Napoleon called Talleyrand “the mostcapable minister I ever had” (Connelly1985, p. 465), and indeed Talleyrand used allhis talent even in promoting policies ofwhich he disapproved, including the Conti-nental System and the alliance with Russiasealed by the Treaty of Tilsit.Talleyrand be-came the voice of moderation, consistentlyadvocating an end to conquest and agree-ments with Britain and Austria against therising threats of Prussia and Russia. At thesame time, however, he connived in the ex-ecution of the duke of Enghien and the es-tablishment of the empire. He enrichedhimself with imperial titles and demandedand received huge sums of money from thegovernments with which he negotiated,meaning that he could be justly accused ofunbridled cupidity even as he pursued aconsistent and sensible policy. After leavingthe Foreign Ministry after Tilsit, he saw thatNapoleon’s ambitions would ultimatelylead to disaster and established secret con-tacts with Saint Petersburg and Vienna.YetNapoleon continued to consult him anduse him for special missions.The opportu-nities for patriotic treason against the “im-perial madman” were many.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de 241

T

From 1809 onward Talleyrand informedthe Austrian ambassador, Klemens von Met-ternich, of the secret orders sent to Frencharmy commanders. And in 1814, for all hissuspicions, Napoleon does not seem to haverealized that Talleyrand was in close contactwith the advancing Allied commanders.Having helped to force Napoleon’s first ab-dication,Talleyrand became president of theprovisional government and negotiated anagreement with Louis XVIII by which hebecame “Prince de Talleyrand” and foreignminister. The Congress of Vienna saw Tal-leyrand in his element and at his best, ex-ploiting differences among the Allies to se-cure recognition of France as a great power.

Talleyrand’s sure eye for a sinking shipnever deserted him. After relaxing throughthe Restoration in his magnificent châteauof Valençay, he returned to Paris in 1830 tohelp in the overthrow of Charles X and thesuccession of Louis Philippe. His last officialposition was as ambassador to London be-

tween 1830 and 1834, a fitting conclusionto his own peculiar pursuit of the ententecordiale. In all Talleyrand served six regimesand betrayed four of them. But his insis-tence that he had always served the interestsof France was not mere self-justification.Talleyrand’s achievements were as remark-able as his unscrupulousness in exploitingsituations for his personal gain. Napoleonmight have been better off if he had takenmore notice of both his wise counsels andhis capacity for treachery.

Related entries: Austria; Brumaire, Coup ofYear VIII; Consulate; Directory; Fouché, Joseph;Great Britain;Vienna, Congress of

Suggestions for further reading:Bernard, Jack F. 1973. Talleyrand:A Biography.

London: Collins.Brinton, Crane. 1936. The Lives of Talleyrand.

New York: George Allen and Unwin.Connelly, Owen, ed. 1985. Historical Dictionary of


242 Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de

James Gillray’s satirical Tiddy-Doll, the Great French Gingerbread Baker, drawing out a new Batchof Kings (1806) shows the old kingdoms of Europe being pushed into the ash-hole by the “Corsican besom ofdestruction.” While Napoleon pulls out his newly baked kingdoms and duchies,Talleyrand prepares more doughfrom Hungary, Poland,Turkey, and Hanover. (The British Museum, London)

Cooper,A. Duff. 1932. Talleyrand. London:Jonathan Cape.

Norman, Barbara. 1976. Napoleon and Talleyrand:The Last Two Weeks. New York: Stein and Day.


Talma, François Joseph(1763–1826)

The greatest French actor of his daybecame friends with the little-

known General Bonaparte after the end ofthe Terror and was reputedly one of the fewpeople whom Napoleon took into his con-fidence. Talma coached Napoleon in ora-tory, adapting the more natural style he hadintroduced into the highly formal world ofFrench theater, causing Chateaubriand toremark that Talma had taught Napoleonhow to act like an emperor. Talma per-formed before the assembled crownedheads at the Congress of Erfurt in 1808 andin the last play Napoleon attended on 21April 1815.Talma continued his career afterNapoleon’s fall, only retiring shortly beforehis death in 1826.

Suggestions for further reading:Carlson, Marvin A. 1966. The Theater of the French

Revolution. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress.

Collins, Herbert F. 1964. Talma. New York: Faber& Faber.

Taxation

F or the most part Napoleon preservedthe tax system he inherited from the

Directory, but from the first days of theconsulate introduced more rigorous collec-tion by appointing specialist collectors atcommunal, district, and departmental level.The governments of the Revolution hadpreferred direct to indirect taxes, consider-ing them more socially just. The three di-

rect taxes, on land, personal property, andbusiness licenses, were kept at a moderatelevel until forced upward by the disasters of1812–1813, but they could not provide suf-ficient income to sustain Napoleon’s gov-ernment and armed forces. He sharply in-creased indirect taxes, adding new duties onalcohol, salt, and tobacco to the existingminor duties such as registration fees, stampduties, and the Directory’s tax on doors andwindows. The new duties, administered byan office known as the droits réunis, were vi-olently detested, and were either greatly re-duced or abolished after the Restoration.The tax system put in place by the Direc-tory and Napoleon remained largely un-changed until 1914, and Napoleon’s neworganization of tax collection has remainedessentially unchanged to the present day.

Related entries: Centralization; Economy;Finance; Local Government


Princeton: Princeton University Press.Lyons, Martyn. 1994. Napoleon Bonaparte and the


Teplitz , Treaties of (9 September 1813)

The formalization of the alliance be-tween Russia, Prussia, and Austria

against Napoleon committed the signato-ries not to make a separate peace withFrance and to fight for “the re-establish-ment of a just equilibrium between thePowers.” Austria and Prussia were to re-cover all territories lost since 1805, whilethe Confederation of the Rhine and theDuchy of Warsaw were to be abolished.Most issues concerning Germany andPoland, however, were shirked, and the sta-tus of the intermediate states between Prus-sia and Austria was left deliberately vague.

Teplitz,Treaties of 243

Related entries: Coalitions



Tilsit, Treaty of (7–9 July 1807)

S igned after the French victory at thebattle of Friedland at a somewhat the-

atrical meeting between Napoleon andAlexander I on a raft in the middle of theriver Niemen, the various Tilsit documentstransformed the map of central-eastern Eu-rope. Frederick William III of Prussia sawhis kingdom lose about half its territory. ItsPolish provinces became the Duchy of War-saw and its lands west of the Elbe formedthe bulk of the Kingdom of Westphalia,with Jérôme Bonaparte as king. Russia andPrussia both joined the Continental Sys-

tem, and Russia by secret articles ceded theDalmatian coast and the Ionian Islands toFrance. By way of some return, Napoleonencouraged Russia in her designs againstthe Ottoman Empire. The results of Tilsitwere that Prussia ceased to be a great powerand that Britain was left without an ally onthe Continent except for Sweden, itselfvulnerable to Russian attack. Louis AntoineBourrienne was moved to write of themeeting at Tilsit: “One of the culminatingpoints of modern history. . . .The waters ofthe Niemen reflected the image of Napo-leon at the height of his glory” (Horne1996, p. 5).

Related entries: Alexander I,Tsar of Russia;Continental System; Prussia



Butterfield, Herbert. 1929. The Peace Tactics ofNapoleon, 1806–1808. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

244 Tilsit,Treaty of

Gioacchino Giuseppe Serangeli’s 1807 painting is a somewhat romanticized image of Napoleon biddingAlexander I a fond farewell after the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit. (Giraudon/Art Resource)

Horne,Alistair. 1996. How Far from Austerlitz?Napoleon 1805–1815. London: Macmillan.


Toulon, Siege of (September–December 1793)

A fter some years of frustration andfalse starts, Napoleon’s part in the re-

capture of Toulon, the chief French navalbase in the Mediterranean, first brought himfame and promotion to the rank ofbrigadier-general. The city, in revolt againstthe government of the Terror in Paris, hadbeen taken over by royalists, and in August1793 the British admiral Samuel Hood rein-forced the rebels with an Anglo-Spanishforce of 17,000 troops. When the siegebegan on 7 September the artillery com-mander, General Cousin de Dommartin, waswounded, and the government’s representa-tives on mission, led by Paul Barras and An-tonio Cristoforo Saliceti, replaced him withthe young Napoleon Buonaparte, as he wasstill known. Rightly or wrongly, Napoleon’splan, involving the capture of fortificationson the heights above the harbor, was cred-ited with forcing the city to capitulate.Aftera two-day artillery barrage from Napoleon’sbatteries, Hood withdrew on 18 December,and Toulon fell the next day.The republicanauthorities took terrible vengeance on theroyalist defenders of Toulon.“There is a highincidence of mortality among the subjects ofLouis XVII,” wrote the representative LouisFréron (Herold 1983, p. 28). Napoleon was awitness to the massacre, but in later reminis-cences always minimized its extent.

Related entries: Artillery; Barras, Paul FrançoisJean Nicholas,Vicomte de; Federalism; Saliceti,Antonio Cristoforo

Suggestions for further reading:Herold, J. Christopher. 1983. The Horizon Book of


Ratcliffe, Bertram. 1981. Prelude to Fame:AnAccount of the Early Life of Napoleon up to theBattle of Montenotte. London:Warne.

Toulouse, Battle of (10 April 1814)

This pointless engagement may beconsidered as the last battle of the

Peninsular War. Neither the duke ofWellington nor Nicolas Soult was awarethat Napoleon had abdicated when theBritish commander attacked Soult aroundthe city of Toulouse. Soult made good useof the barrier provided by the riverGaronne, and the Anglo-Spanish forcessuffered heavily in storming Toulouse’souter defenses. Soult withdrew his inade-quate and demoralized forces northwardon the night of 11–12 April and learnedof Napoleon’s downfall on the followingmorning.

Related entries: Peninsular War; Soult,Nicolas Jean de Dieu;Wellington, Duke of

Toussaint-L’Ouverture,François Dominique

(1743–1803)

B y the time Napoleon assumed powerin France the fame of Toussaint-

L’Ouverture as a black revolutionary leaderin the colony of Saint-Domingue, theFrench part of Haiti, was widespread in theWest Indies and Europe; he was idolized byblacks and respected by whites. Born aslave, Toussaint was legally freed in 1777,participated in the slave revolt of 1791,fought with the Spanish against the Frenchin 1793, and switched sides in 1794 whenthe French National Convention abolishedslavery. But fighting between Toussaint’s

Toussaint-L’Ouverture, François Dominique 245

forces and French governors had by 1800caused great devastation in Saint-Domingue from which the colony neverrecovered.

In firm control of Saint-Domingue, in1801 Toussaint, ignoring Napoleon’s orders,invaded the Spanish colony of SantoDomingo, where slavery still operated.Now in command of the entire island ofHaiti,Toussaint drew up a new constitutionthat made him governor-general for lifewith near dictatorial powers, including theright to name his successor. He declaredthat Saint-Domingue was “a colony form-ing part of the French empire, but governedby its own laws.”These laws were based inpart on the principles of the Revolution,but with Catholicism as the official state re-ligion. Toussaint declared himself a goodFrenchman, loyal to Napoleon, but therewas no provision for any French official inthe colony.

Toussaint’s position and reputation wasseen by Napoleon as a threat to himself andhis political projects.The first consul was ir-ritated by what he called the “pretensionsof gilded Africans,” while Toussaint’s con-quest of Santo Domingo threatened hisplans for alliance with Spain and therestoration of slavery in Saint-Domingueand Guadeloupe. In January 1802, there-fore, a French invasion force under CharlesLeclerc began a systematic campaign to re-move Toussaint from power. Many of Tous-saint’s supporters deserted him, bringingtheir bands of followers into French service.Toussaint was captured by trickery andtransported to France, where he was con-fined at Fort de Joux in the Alps. He diedthere on 7 April 1803.

Related entries: Haiti

Suggestions for further reading:Bryan, Patrick E. 1984. The Haitian Revolution

and Its Effects. London: Heinemann.James, C. L. R. 1938. The Black Jacobins:Toussaint

L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.London: Secker & Warburg.

Trafalgar, Battle of (21 October 1805)

The celebrated engagement that con-firmed British naval superiority and

thwarted Napoleon’s ambitions in theMediterranean was the culmination of along campaign in which the British admi-rals Horatio Nelson and Cuthbert Colling-wood had sought to bring the Franco-Spanish fleet under Pierre de Villeneuve toa decisive battle.As Villeneuve was attempt-ing to sail from Cadiz into the Mediter-ranean Nelson intercepted him off CapeTrafalgar, some thirty miles south of Cadizat the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar.

Although Nelson, with twenty-sevenships of the line, faced superior numbers,including thirty-three ships of the line andseven frigates, morale on the British shipswas high, whereas Villeneuve was con-vinced that he was doomed to defeat. Onthe gray and squally morning of 21 Octo-ber Nelson hoisted his famous signal: “En-gland expects that every man will do hisduty.” Nelson’s boldness in piercing theenemy line allowed the superior Britishships to engage in close combat, but hisplan to annihilate the Franco-Spanish fleetwas foiled when he was mortally wounded.Nevertheless, eighteen French and Spanishships were sunk or captured, whereas noBritish vessels were lost.The Franco-Span-ish losses in men were staggering, runningto many thousands, and some 1,500 Britishseamen also perished.

Contrary to legend, Trafalgar did notsave Britain from invasion by Napoleon.The Grande Armée had already left theChannel coast for the Danube more than amonth earlier. Although Trafalgar con-firmed British domination of the seas, thedeath of Nelson cast a pall over celebra-tions in London, especially as it was fol-lowed closely by news of Napoleon’s vic-tories at Ulm and Austerlitz. Neither theBritish nor Napoleon immediately grasped

246 Trafalgar, Battle of

the significance of Trafalgar. Only in retro-spect did it come to be seen as decisive,marking as it did the end of any serious at-tempt on Napoleon’s part to challengeBritish naval supremacy.

Related entries: Naval Warfare; Navy, British;Navy, French; Nelson, Horatio, Lord; Spain;Villeneuve, Pierre de

Suggestions for further reading:Bennett, Geoffrey M. 1977. The Battle of Trafalgar.

London: Batsford.Harbron, John D. 1988. Trafalgar and the Spanish

Navy. London: Conway Maritime.Howarth, David Armine. 1969. Trafalgar:The

Nelson Touch. London: Collins.

Tribunate

U nder the Constitution of the YearVIII, the Tribunate, a house of one

hundred members, was supposed to discussdraft laws sent down to it by the Council ofState and recommend their acceptance orrejection. It came to represent the only realopposition to Napoleon’s accumulation ofpower under the consular regime.The idéo-logue Pierre Cabanis, presenting the Consti-tution to the citizenry, had claimed that therole of the Tribunate would be to appeal topublic opinion, censure the acts of govern-ment and its agents, and act as “one of theprincipal guarantees of public liberty.”Much to Napoleon’s irritation, some mem-bers took this seriously.

The original members of the Tribunateincluded Benjamin Constant, Pierre Dau-nou, the poet and dramatist Marie-JosephChénier, and the liberal economist Jean-Bap-tiste Say.This group organized a “Committeeof Enlightenment,” where preparations weremade for debates, and as early as January1800 made detailed criticisms of governmentproposals on a wide variety of issues. Theiraudacity sometimes rubbed off on the Leg-islative Body, even if only rarely to the pointof securing a negative vote.Napoleon purged

twenty tribunes in 1802, replacing them withmore pliant nominees, including LucienBonaparte and Pierre Daru. But the opposi-tion continued to make itself heard over theConcordat, the creation of the Legion ofHonor, and the restoration of slavery in thecolonies.The Constitution of the Year X fi-nally emasculated the Tribunate by reducingit to fifty members and dividing it into sec-tions, each associated with a section of theCouncil of State. It was thereby reduced to amere collection of committees, incapable oforganizing any real opposition to Napoleon’sdictatorial plans.

Related entries: Constant, Benjamin;Constitutions; Consulate; Council of State;Daunou, Pierre Claude François; Idéologues;Opposition Movements



Collins, Irene. 1979. Napoleon and His Parliaments.London: Edward Arnold.

Tuscany, Grand Duchy of

The former Habsburg Grand Duchyof Tuscany was ceded by Austria to

France in the Treaty of Lunéville in 1801and became the core of the Kingdom ofEtruria, ruled by the duke of Parma underFrench protection. However, Napoleon didnot consider the new kingdom servileenough, principally because it continued totrade with the British, and in October 1807Tuscany was annexed to the French Empireand transformed into three departmentsgoverned from Paris. This arrangementproved both inefficient and unpopular, andin 1809 Napoleon tried to placate localopinion by turning Tuscany into a grandduchy with his sister Elisa Bonaparte asgrand duchess.

Elisa’s state remained technically part ofFrance, but she acted independently, keep-

Tuscany, Grand Duchy of 247

ing her brother happy by supplying himwith an army of 10,000 men. Under herenlightened rule the Napoleonic law codeswere introduced in Tuscany; new schoolsand public works were inaugurated; thestate became financially independent; abrilliant court was created in Florence; thestreets and public buildings of Florencewere restored; and local administration im-proved by a French-trained civil service andjudiciary. But Elisa was forced to withdrawfrom Tuscany in 1813 by Joachim Murat’sdefection to the Allies, and the grand duchyreverted to the Habsburgs in 1814. Never-theless, the reforms introduced by Napo-leon’s most talented sister had made a con-siderable contribution to the future of Italy.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Elisa, GrandDuchess of Tuscany

Suggestions for further reading:Hearder, Harry. 1983. Italy in the Age of the

Risorgimento, 1790–1870. London and NewYork: Longman.


———. 1991. A History of Italy, 1700–1860: theSocial Constraints of Political Change. London:Routledge.

Tyrol, Revolts in

The Austrian province of the Tyrolwas ceded to Bavaria, Napoleon’s

closest German ally, by the Treaty of Press-burg in December 1805, but it rapidly be-

came evident that Bavarian rule was unac-ceptable to the people. A French generalwho served there in 1809 wrote: “Thecountry can be compared to a naturalfortress whose belligerent population con-stitutes an equally natural garrison” (Broers1996, p. 169). The Tyrolese found a leaderand folk hero in Andreas Hofer, who, incollusion with the Austrians, launched asuccessful revolt in the Innsbruck region.French intervention was necessary to sup-press the guerrilla bands, causing Napoleonto complain:“I think the German Tyrol willalways be badly governed, that it will neverbe subdued, and will cause us serious trou-ble” (Broers 1996, p. 170).

In February 1813 survivors of Hofer’srising planned a second insurrection in anattempt to force Austria to turn against Na-poleon. The plan was supported by theHabsburg Archduke John, but opposed byKlemens von Metternich, who feared itwould limit his freedom of action in bar-gaining with Napoleon. Emperor Francis Iplaced the archduke under house arrest, andthe rising never took place. Metternich’sapproach proved the wiser, and Austria re-gained the Tyrol in 1814.

Related entries: Guerrilla Warfare; Hofer,Andreas

Suggestions for further reading:Broers, Michael G. 1996. Europe under Napoleon

1799–1815. London: Edward Arnold.Eyck, F. Gunther. 1986. Loyal Rebels:Andreas

Hofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809.Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

248 Tyrol, Revolts in

UUlm, Battle of

(8–20 October 1805)

This series of engagements, forminga kind of prologue to the battle of

Austerlitz, eliminated thousands of Aus-trian troops from further participation inthe war against Napoleon. The Austriansunder the command of General KarlMack were taken by surprise in the city ofUlm when the entire Grande Armée, or-dered to the Danube from the EnglishChannel, materialized between Ulm andMunich. Joachim Murat was given tem-porary command for the attack on Ulm,but it was the gallant action of MichelNey on 14 October that saved GeneralPierre Dupont’s division when it was leftisolated on the north side of the Danube.The squabbling Austrian commanderswere trapped in Ulm as it was bombardedand further French forces arrived. On 17October an armistice was signed, followedthree days later by Mack’s surrender.Some 24,000 Austrian troops tramped outof Ulm under the eyes of Napoleon him-self. When a French officer asked one ofthe Austrians to point out their com-mander to him, the reply came, “You seebefore you the miserable Mack” (Gates1997, p. 25).

Related entries: Danube Campaigns


1803–15. London: Edward Arnold.Maude, Frederic N. 1912. The Ulm Campaign,

1805. London: Special Campaign Series.

United States of America

The political and commercial devel-opment of the young United States

was strongly influenced by its relations withrevolutionary and Napoleonic France andwith Great Britain. American opinionabout Napoleon was divided throughouthis career. Federalists saw him as a despotwho endangered the world and incidentallyAmerican trade with Britain and hercolonies, while the majority Republicanstended to view Britain as their chief tradingrival and on occasions still harbored the il-lusion that Napoleon was fighting for theEnlightenment values embodied in theearly Revolution and in the founding prin-ciples of the American Republic. Napoleonprobably had few enthusiastic admirers inthe United States, but his career was fol-lowed with passionate interest.

When Thomas Jefferson became presi-dent in 1801 concern for American nationalsecurity was being heightened by Napo-leon’s inexorable rise to power. But the firstconsul’s erratic colonial policy and the fail-ure of General Charles Victor Leclerc’s ex-

United States of America 249

U

pedition to Haiti was to have momentousconsequences in the purchase of theLouisiana Territory from France in 1803.For a sum amounting to around $15 mil-lion, the United States doubled in size.Theextent of the purchase was somewhat vague,but included, besides the present-day state ofLouisiana, all of Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas,Oklahoma, Nebraska, North and SouthDakota, Iowa, Minnesota, and parts of Mon-tana, Wyoming, and Colorado. “By this in-crease in territory,” declared Napoleon,“thepower of the United States will be consoli-dated forever, and I have just given Englanda seafaring rival which, sooner or later, willhumble her pride” (Herold 1983, pp.291–292).

As Napoleon’s maritime war againstBritain increased in intensity, America, asthe leading neutral carrier, was caught be-tween the Continental System andBritain’s response in its Orders in Council.But Britain’s dominance of the seas meantthat she imposed the greater damage onAmerican trade and treated American con-cerns lightly. Jefferson attempted pragmati-cally to deal with the British and Frenchrestrictions through the Embargo Act of1807, replaced by the Non-Intercourse Actof 1809, while similar measures were en-acted by his successor, James Madison.British obstinacy resulted in the War of1812, declared by Congress on 18 June,unaware that the Orders in Council hadbeen revoked two days earlier. The war

may have been unnecessary, but its impacton the United States was enormous, mak-ing her stronger and contributing to thedeveloping idea of America’s special des-tiny among the nations.

By the time of Napoleon’s downfall theAmerican Republic had proved its durabil-ity as an independent country and com-pleted its conquest of economic indepen-dence for Britain. Jefferson later describedNapoleon as a “wretch” who had caused“more misery and suffering to the worldthan any other being who ever lived beforehim.” For most Americans the cause of lib-erty and self-government would henceforthbe upheld in their own land rather than inEurope.

Related entries: Continental System; GreatBritain; Haiti

Suggestions for further reading:Egan, Clifford L. 1983. Neither Peace nor War:

Franco-American Relations, 1803–1812. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press.


Kaplan, Lawrence S. 1987. Entangling Allianceswith None:American Foreign Policy in the Age ofJefferson. Kent, OH: Kent State UniversityPress.

Lyon, Elijah Wilson. 1934. Louisiana in FrenchDiplomacy, 1759–1804. Norman: Universityof Oklahoma.

Shulim, Joseph I. 1952. The Old Dominion andNapoleon Bonaparte:A Study in AmericanOpinion. New York: Columbia UniversityPress.

250 United States of America

VVendée Revolt

The Catholic and royalist popular re-volt in western France had begun in

1793 and been ruthlessly suppressed in1796–1797. However, unrest, supplied withweapons provided by royalist agents and theBritish, continued and flared up while theDirectory was in crisis during the summerof 1799. General Gabriel d’Hedouville wasinstructed to negotiate a truce with therebels, and after the coup of 18 BrumaireNapoleon at first maintained this policy.But his real plan was to end the runningsore of the Vendée rebellion by harsh re-pression followed by concessions to therebels’ Catholic beliefs.

General Guillaume Brune undertookthe repression, and by February 1800 orga-nized resistance was at an end, though un-organized chouannerie was never to be elim-inated. Following the Concordat of 1801,which satisfied most of the rebels’ religiousdemands, the remaining leaders laid downtheir arms. Napoleon also spared theVendée the full rigor of the conscriptionlaws.The principal town of the Vendée de-partment, La Roche-sur-Yon, was rebuiltby Napoleon as a center of surveillance forthe region. Laid out geometrically, it wasrechristened Napoléon-Vendée. The PlaceNapoléon in the center of La Roche boastsan equestrian statue of the emperor that hassurvived all changes of regime, which is re-

markable for a region that remains deeplyconservative to this day.

Related entries: Bernier,Abbé Étienne; Brune,Guillaume Marie Anne; Cadoudal, Georges;Catholic Church; Chouannerie; Concordat;Counter-Revolution; Royalism

Suggestions for further reading:Paret, Peter. 1961. Internal War and Pacification:The

Vendée, 1789–1796. Princeton:WoodrowWilson School of Public and InternationalAffairs.



Vendémiaire, Rising of Year IV

The royalist revolt of 13 VendémiaireYear IV (5 October 1795) in Paris

marked Napoleon’s arrival on the Parisianpolitical scene.The first counterrevolution-ary rising in the capital, it was directedagainst constitutional chicanery by theThermidorian Convention to prevent apossible royalist advance in forthcomingelections. Seven Parisian sections declaredthemselves to be in a state of insurrectionon 11 Vendémiaire, and the Conventionnamed a commission for its defense, withPaul Barras as its leading member. Barrascalled upon Napoleon, whom he had en-

Vendémiaire, Rising of Year IV 251

V

countered at the siege of Toulon.The Con-vention had at its disposal only 5,000 men,without artillery or munitions, but Napo-leon sent Joachim Murat to the camp ofLes Sablons to seize its cannons. Skillfullydeploying his new artillery in the streets soas to prevent the rebels from gathering enmasse, Napoleon’s victory was also aided byhis opponents’ lack of combativeness. Nev-ertheless, Napoleon’s “whiff of grapeshot”saved the Thermidorians from the royalistthreat, and as a reward he received com-mand of the Army of Italy.

Related entries: Barras, Paul François JeanNicolas,Vicomte de; Counter-Revolution

Suggestions for further reading:Fryer,Walter R. 1965. Republic or Restoration in

France, 1794–1797. Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press.



Venice

The Venetian Republic remainedneutral in the wars against revolu-

tionary France until Napoleon unilater-ally declared war on 1 May 1797 and eas-ily occupied the city. By the Treaty ofCampo Formio Napoleon handed overthe Venetian territories in Italy and Dal-matia to Austria, but as emperor in 1805he took them back in the Treaty of Press-burg. Between 1806 and 1814 Veniceformed part of the Kingdom of Italy, be-fore returning to Austrian hands, where itremained until 1866. Napoleon andJoséphine had been sumptuously receivedthere in September 1797, but he only vis-ited the city on the lagoon once again,making a spectacular state entry up theGrand Canal on 29 November 1807. Hefamously described St. Mark’s Square as “acathedral open to the skies.”

Related entries: Illyria; Italian Campaigns; Italy,Kingdom of

Suggestions for further reading:Woolf, Stuart. 1991. A History of Italy,

1700–1860:The Social Constraints of PoliticalChange. London: Routledge.

Vernet, Émile Jean Horace(1789–1863)

H orace Vernet gained his principalfame as a war painter under the July

Monarchy after 1830, but his early workprovides some graphic and evocative im-ages of the Napoleonic Wars. His anecdotalpaintings and lithographs of soldiers’ livesand deaths stand in contrast to the battlepaintings of Antoine Jean Gros, although healso attempted some grander scenes such asthe Battle of Sorno-Sierra (1816). As a full-blooded Romantic in the 1820s,Vernet alsocontributed to the Napoleonic legend withhis Apotheosis of Napoleon (1823).

Related entries: Napoleonic Legend

Suggestions for further reading:Wilson-Smith,Timothy. 1996. Napoleon and His

Artists. London: Constable.

Victor, Claude (1764–1841)

D uke of Belluno, marshal of France,Claude Victor Perrin was born of

humble parents in the Vosges. His career isone of the few to justify the saying that inNapoleon’s army every soldier “carried amarshal’s baton in his knapsack.” But he wasnot in the front rank of the Napoleonicmarshals. Victor had enlisted in the RoyalArmy at the age of seventeen, but his mili-tary career began in earnest in 1791, andthanks to the Revolution he rose from ser-geant to general in three years. He owed his

252 Venice

final promotion to his heroic conduct atthe siege of Toulon, when he led a noctur-nal assault on a British redoubt.

Victor fought in both of Napoleon’sItalian campaigns and in Egypt. He distin-guished himself at the battle of Marengo(14 June 1800), but Napoleon refused toshare the credit for this notable victory thatdid so much for his reputation. Victormissed the Austerlitz campaign, but foughtagainst the Prussians in 1806 and led theFirst Corps superbly at the battle of Fried-land (14 June 1807). For his leadership hereceived his marshal’s baton and the mean-ingless title of duke of Belluno (beautifulmoon), apparently the result of a joke byPauline Bonaparte about his short fat legs.He had hoped to become duke ofMarengo.

In Spain between 1808 and 1811 Victoracquitted himself better than some French

commanders, but shared the responsibilityfor Joseph Bonaparte’s defeat at Talavera inJune 1809. He did not figure prominentlyin the Russian campaign of 1812 until hehelped to impose order on the retreat fromMoscow, and he became demoralized at theFrench defeats of 1813 and 1814. Napoleonangrily remarked, “The duke of Belluno’sconduct has been dreadful” (Arnold 1987,p. 519). The humiliated Victor refused tosupport Napoleon during the HundredDays and, having transferred his allegianceto Louis XVIII, became “more royalist thanthe king,” as the French saying goes. His at-titude toward his former colleagues, withwhom he had never been friends, was spite-ful. A grateful Louis made him a peer ofFrance and major general of the RoyalGuard, and he served as minister of war be-tween 1821 and 1823. He retired frompublic life after the Revolution of 1830.

Victor, Claude 253

Jean Emile Horace Vernet’s depiction of Napoleon as he defeats the Austrians in the Battle of Wagram, July 1809.(Corbis-Bettmann)

Victor’s character remains puzzling.Am-bitious and jealous, he was unfortunate inthat the battles he served at with most dis-tinction, Marengo and Friedland, were vic-tories Napoleon refused to share with oth-ers. He continued to serve Napoleon welldespite the insults he received, then servedLouis XVIII with even greater zeal.The ex-iled Napoleon, referring to his conductduring the retreat from Russia, said enig-matically, “Victor was better than onemight suppose” (Arnold 1987, p. 519).

Related entries: Friedland, Battle of; Germany,Campaigns in; Italian Campaigns; Marengo,Battle of; Peninsular War; Russian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Arnold, James R. 1987.“Victor,” in David G.

Chandler, Napoleon’s Marshals. New York:Macmillan.

Victor Emmanuel I, King of Piedmont-Sardinia

(1759–1824)

P iedmont had been forced to withdrawfrom the war against revolutionary

France when Napoleon imposed the Treatyof Cherasco in 1796. Victor Emmanuel,younger son of King Victor Amadeus III,had led the Piedmontese forces against theFrench, and he became king in October1798 when his brother, Charles EmmanuelIV, was forced to abdicate. Between 1799and 1814 mainland Piedmont was annexedto France, but Sardinia, protected by theBritish fleet, remained in Allied hands.Vic-tor Emmanuel returned to his capital ofTurin in 1814, recovering Nice and Savoyfrom France and gaining Genoa. However,the returned king aroused resentmentamong a population that had benefited fromreligious toleration and the Napoleonic lawcodes. Liberal revolt forced him to abdicatein March 1821.


Suggestions for further reading:Woolf, Stuart. 1991. A History of Italy,

1700–1860:The Social Constraints of PoliticalChange. London: Routledge.

Vienna, Congress of

The meeting of the representatives ofEuropean states at Vienna between

15 September 1814 and 9 June 1815 wasdesigned to create a new stable order in Eu-rope following the defeat of Napoleon, anorder based on the principles of monarchi-cal legitimacy and the balance of power.The main decisions were made by Austria,Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, butCharles-Maurice de Talleyrand managed toexploit differences between the victoriousAllied powers, and on 9 January 1815 theCouncil of Four became the Council ofFive, including France.The lengthy meetingof the Congress, marked by innumerableballs, receptions, parades, concerts, and galaperformances, earned it a reputation for fri-volity. But behind the scenes committeesworked to untangle the knotty problemsleft behind by Napoleon’s redrawing of themap of Europe. Also Napoleon’s returnfrom Elba in March concentrated mindsfurther, and the final act with 121 articleswas signed on 9 June 1815.

The Congress of Vienna created a newconservative order. It restored France,Spain, and Portugal to their former posi-tions; it created a Kingdom of theNetherlands uniting Belgium to theUnited Provinces of the northern LowCountries; Sweden received Norway incompensation for Finland, lost to Russia;and it created a German Confederation ofthirty-nine states. Prussia expanded west-ward into Westphalia, Saxony, and Pom-erania, and Austria was compensated forlosses in eastern central Europe by thenew Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia in

254 Victor Emmanuel I, King of Piedmont-Sardinia

northern Italy. Austria now dominatedItaly. The Bourbons returned to Naplesand Sicily, and the Papal States were re-stored. Russia emerged as the dominantpower in eastern Europe, enlarged by Fin-land and by Bessarabia, gained from theOttoman Empire. The tsar also ruled thenew Kingdom of Poland. Britain retainedMalta and other overseas possessions con-quered during the wars.

The Congress recommended an exten-sion of the rights of Jewish communities inEurope and condemned the slave trade. Butit was a disappointment to liberals every-where, and challenges to the new orderwould not be slow to appear, in Germany,Belgium, Poland, and elsewhere.

Related entries: Castlereagh, Robert Stewart,Viscount; Metternich, Klemens WenceslasLothar, Fürst von;Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de

Suggestions for further reading:Dakin, Douglas. 1979.“The Congress of Vienna,

1814–15, and its Antecedents,” in Alan Sked,ed., Europe’s Balance of Power, 1815–1848.London: Macmillan.

Kraehe, Enno Edward. 1983. Metternich’s GermanPolicy,Vol. 2:The Congress of Vienna,1814–1815. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.

Nicolson, Harold. 1946. The Congress of Vienna.London: Constable.

Webster, Charles K. 1934. The Congress of Vienna,1814–1815. London: G. Bell and Sons.

Villeneuve, Pierre de(1763–1806)

A n experienced seaman who hadseen service in the Caribbean be-

fore the Revolution, Rear Admiral Vil-leneuve commanded the outer division ofthe French fleet at the battle of the Nile,from which he escaped with four vesselsand sailed to Malta. In late 1804 the newadmiral Villeneuve took command of theToulon squadron and, joined by the Span-

ish fleet, began the cat-and-mouse gamewith the British navy that was to culmi-nate in the battle of Trafalgar on 21 Octo-ber 1805. One reason for his decision toengage the British off Cadiz was that heknew that Napoleon, with his poor un-derstanding of naval warfare, thought hima coward and intended to replace him.Captured during the battle, Villeneuvewas held prisoner for six months by theBritish. Jane Austen’s brother, Frank, anadmiral in the Royal Navy, met Villeneuveafter Trafalgar and found him “so much ofa Frenchman as to bear his misfortuneswith cheerfulness” (Horne 1996, p. 44).Six months later Villeneuve committedsuicide.

Related entries: Navy, French; Nile, Battle ofthe;Trafalgar, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Bennett, Geoffrey M. 1977. The Battle of Trafalgar.

London: Batsford.Horne,Alistair. 1996. How Far from Austerlitz?

Napoleon 1805–1815. London: Macmillan.Howarth, David Armine. 1969. Trafalgar:The

Nelson Touch. London: Collins.

Vitoria, Battle of (21 June 1813)

The decisive defeat inflicted by theduke of Wellington on the French

army commanded by Joseph Bonaparte andJean-Baptiste Jourdan effectively markedthe end of the Peninsular War. Joseph was infull flight from Madrid with 50,000 menand an endless train of plundered loot, mu-nitions, supplies, and refugees. They facedWellington’s Anglo-Portuguese army of75,000 men on a twelve-mile front west ofthe town of Vitoria, thirty-two miles south-east of Bilbao. Although not all of Welling-ton’s complex maneuvers worked, theFrench were thrown back on Vitoria itselfand then forced to scatter to the east. The

Vitoria, Battle of 255

abandoned loot was too great a temptationfor Wellington’s army, which disintegratedinto a plundering mob, and nearly 42,000French soldiers escaped to fight again insouthern France. The victory, though farfrom glorious, signaled the end of Napo-leon’s rule in Spain, and it was celebratedlavishly in the Allied capitals.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Joseph, King ofNaples, King of Spain; Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste;Peninsular War;Wellington, Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Glover, Michael. 1987.“Jourdan,” in David G.


256 Vitoria, Battle of

WWagram, Battle of

(5–6 July 1809)

N apoleon’s victory over the Austrianarmy commanded by Archduke

Charles, which ended the campaign of1809, was fought between the largestarmies yet seen in European history.173,000 French and their allies faced some155,000 Austrians along a long front to theeast of Vienna. Having failed to cross theDanube at the battle of Essling, Napoleonwithdrew his forces onto the island ofLobau in the great river, facing a ring ofAustrian forces on the north bank.The en-suing battle involved Napoleon launchingvarious corps from the Lobau in the shapeof an arrowhead pointing at the Austriancenter at Wagram.

The inexperience of Saxon and Bavar-ian conscripts and the problems encoun-tered by his commanders against the stub-born Austrian contingents meant thatNapoleon had to deploy all his skill in whatdeveloped into a two-day bludgeoningmatch. In particular, the failure of Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte’s Saxons in a thrust atWagram caused Napoleon to dismiss hismarshal from the army. However, the at-tacks of Louis Davout on the Austrian leftand Jacques Macdonald on the center al-lowed Napoleon to execute a bold marchacross the front and reinforce his own left

under André Masséna when they had beenforced to retreat. By the end of the secondday most of Macdonald’s units, formed intoa massive column, had lost half theirstrength, while batteries of artillery inflictedheavy casualties on both sides.

Napoleon claimed that he could havewon a quick victory if his commanders hadbeen more efficient, and on the morning of7 July was convinced that he faced a thirdday of fighting. But he did not understandthat Charles’s main priority was to preserveas much of the Austrian army as possible.Rather than risk total destruction the arch-duke withdrew toward Bohemia. Napoleon,with exhausted troops and depleted cavalry,was in no position to pursue the Austrians.Charles had been beaten but not routed, andhe had no intention of risking the remainderof his forces in another battle. About one-quarter of the strengths of both armies hadbeen killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.Theslaughter of Wagram ensured that resumingthe war was an impractical proposition forthe Austrians and made peace, eventually tobe signed at Schönbrunn, essential.

Related entries: Bernadotte, Jean-BaptisteJules; Charles,Archduke of Austria; DanubeCampaigns; Davout, Louis Nicolas; Macdonald,Jacques Étienne Joseph Alexandre; Masséna,André


1803–15. London: Edward Arnold.

Wagram, Battle of 257

W

Hankinson,Alan. 1987.“Macdonald,” in DavidG. Chandler, ed., Napoleon’s Marshals. NewYork: Macmillan.


Walcheren Expedition( July–December 1809)

The largest amphibious operation ofthe Napoleonic Wars, this British at-

tack on the estuary of the Scheldt River inthe Low Countries was supported by Vis-count Castlereagh but opposed by GeorgeCanning, and it turned into an unmitigateddisaster. Planned as a diversion for Austria’sbenefit, it only took place after the defeat atWagram. A British army of over 44,000men, supported by 266 ships, was intendedto destroy naval establishments at Flushingon the island of Walcheren and make theriver Scheldt unnavigable for warships.However, stormy weather, the navy’s inabil-ity to blockade Flushing, and the indecisiveleadership of John Pitt, second earl ofChatham, slowed progress, and over 12,000British soldiers were laid low by “Walcherenfever,” a lethal mixture of malaria, dysentery,typhus, and typhoid.The French naval facil-ities at Flushing were destroyed, but the de-bilitated British troops had to be with-drawn. Austria, which had delayed makingpeace after Wagram, finally signed the Treatyof Schönbrunn in October 1809.

Related entries: Canning, George; Castlereagh,Robert Stewart,Viscount; Naval Warfare

Walewska, Marie (1786–1817)

N apoleon’s most celebrated lover wasborn Marie Laczinska in Warsaw. In

1804 at the age of seventeen she was forced

by family arrangement to marry the mucholder Count Anastazy Walewski. Bold andbeautiful, she was presented to Napoleon inJanuary 1807 during his winter campaignin Poland and later captivated him at a ballin Warsaw. She only yielded to his advances,however, when persuaded by Polish patriotsthat it was her national duty.After spendingthe spring with Napoleon at the château ofFinkenstein, she visited him in Paris in1808 and at Schönbrunn in 1809. Theirson, Alexandre Walewski, was born atWalewice in Poland in May 1810 and ac-knowledged by Napoleon as his child.

After his marriage to Marie-Louise, Na-poleon stopped seeing Marie, but she livedin Paris between 1810 and 1813 and waswell provided for. She visited him duringhis exile on Elba in 1814 and saw him againduring the Hundred Days. In 1816, withNapoleon exiled on Saint Helena, Mariemarried his distant cousin, General PhilippeAntonio d’Ornano, and died in childbirthon 15 December 1817.Alexandre Walewskiserved Napoleon III as foreign minister be-tween 1850 and 1855 and presided over theCongress of Paris that ended the CrimeanWar. He died in 1868.

Related entries: Poland

Suggestions for further reading:Sutherland, Christine. 1979. Marie Walewska,

Napoleon’s Great Love. London:Weidenfeldand Nicolson.

Warsaw, Duchy of

F ormed in 1807 from Prussian terri-tory in Poland ceded by the Treaty

of Tilsit, the Duchy of Warsaw, under thenominal rule of Frederick Augustus of Sax-ony, marks the beginning of modern Polishnational identity. It included all the landstaken by Prussia from Poland since 1772,and it was enlarged in 1809 to includewestern Galicia, taken from Austria. The

258 Walcheren Expedition

Napoleonic law codes were introduced,and a bicameral Diet, comprising a Senateand a House of Representatives, dominatedby the Polish nobility, provided active op-position to many government measures.Serfdom was abolished and civil rightsguaranteed to Jews, although these weresuspended for ten years in 1809.

As a result of the duchy’s existencePoland was one of the few regions of Eu-rope where the advantages of Napoleonicrule outweighed the burdens. Its verypresence on the map proved that the Polesstill existed as a nation despite the de-struction of the old Polish state in thePartitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795. Theintroduction of French-style administra-tion and the Napoleonic codes was ofpermanent benefit, as were the educa-tional reforms by Stanislaw Potocki, underwhich Polish replaced German as the lan-guage of instruction in elementary andsecondary schools. Similarly the duchy’sarmy, reorganized by Jozef Poniatowski,especially the Polish Legions that foughtfor Napoleon from Italy to Russia, was togain an almost mythic status within Polishnationalism.

Following Napoleon’s defeat in Russiain 1812,Warsaw was occupied by the Rus-sians in February 1813, and Alexander I in-stalled a provisional government in theduchy. It officially came to an end in 1815,and Warsaw became the capital of the“Congress Kingdom” of Poland underRussian control. But many of theNapoleonic changes in administration, law,and the army were retained, and no at-tempt was made to reimpose serfdom. Na-poleon had unwittingly strengthened Pol-ish nationalism and given it a morepopulist and even democratic content. Al-though it existed for less than ten years, theDuchy of Warsaw changed the future ofPoland and still enjoys a legendary status inPolish history.

Related entries: Poland

Suggestions for further reading:Davies, Norman. 1981. God’s Playground:A

History of Poland. 2 vols. Oxford: ClarendonPress.


Waterloo, Battle of (18 June 1815)

N apoleon’s final defeat was a “close-run thing,” as the duke of Welling-

ton described it, and arguments about whatmight have been have continued to this day,but the result was as decisive as any of hisformer victories. Waterloo is a village tenmiles south of Brussels on the road toCharleroi. Here Wellington established hisheadquarters in a strong defensive positionon a ridge at Mont-Saint-Jean. His Anglo-Dutch army of 68,000 could thereby holdup the march of Napoleon’s 72,000 mentoward the Belgian capital, while Gebhardvon Blücher’s 72,000 strong Prussian forceadvanced from the east to attack the Frenchright flank.The battle took place on a smallplateau, which made Napoleon’s room formaneuver smaller than in any of his majorbattles since Marengo.

Heavy rain on the night of 17 Junemeant that the ground was sodden on themorning of the eighteenth, and Napoleondelayed his attack until the sun had begunto dry it out.The main French infantry at-tack on Wellington’s position around a for-tified farmhouse at Hougoumont wasbeaten off with heavy losses on both sides,while French advances up the ridge, lackingcavalry support, were repulsed. MichelNey’s cavalry engaged in gallant chargesagainst the Anglo-Dutch squares, but metwith stubborn resistance, especially fromthe British, and with concentrated artilleryfire. “Never did I see such a poundingmatch,” observed Wellington (Herold 1983,p. 371). Ney finally dislodged the British

Waterloo, Battle of 259

and Hanoverians defending Wellington’scentral position at about half past six in theevening, but his cavalrymen were too ex-hausted to exploit their advantage, and inany case by now Blücher’s Prussians had ar-rived and the French were caught betweentwo fires.

Napoleon’s final gamble was to throwhis Imperial Guard into the fight, some-thing he had refused to do at Borodino,but it was thrown back by murderous firefrom the Allies. According to the famousbut apocryphal story, General Cam-bronne, when called upon to surrender,replied,“The Guard dies but does not sur-render.” The other version of his answeroften quoted,“Merde!” is probably closerto the truth. All the Guard could do wasto try and cover Napoleon’s retreat as thearmy disintegrated into a mass of retreat-ing refugees. Napoleon had lost some41,000 men in the battle, while Allied ca-sualties were about 22,000. Within fourdays of the defeat Napoleon had signedhis second abdication.

The union of the Prussians withWellington’s multinational force sealed Na-poleon’s fate at Waterloo. He himself triedto blame the disaster on EmmanuelGrouchy’s failure to stop Blücher’s advanceor to join the main French army in time,but Grouchy had only been following hisorders to the best of his ability, if somewhatunimaginatively. Blücher’s arrival was notprovidential. Wellington had been expect-ing it all day, and if anything his lateness al-most turned what should have been certainvictory into defeat.That it did not was dueas much as anything to the persistence andstaying power of the British infantry. ButNapoleon’s own miscalculations about thewhereabouts and abilities of the Prussiansreveal the extent of his own responsibilityfor his defeat.

Related entries: Blücher, Gebhard Leberechtvon; Grouchy, Emmanuel, Marquis de; HundredDays; Imperial Guard; Ney, Michel;Wellington,Duke of

Suggestions for further reading:Brett James,Antony. 1964. The Hundred Days:

Napoleon’s Last Campaign from EyewitnessAccounts. New York: Macmillan.

Chandler, David G. 1980. Waterloo:The HundredDays. London: Osprey.

Hamilton-Williams, David. 1993. Waterloo: NewPerspectives:The Great Battle Reappraised.London:Arms and Armour.


Hibbert, Christopher. 1998. Waterloo. London:Wordsworth Military Library.

Howarth, David Armine. 1968. A Near-RunThing:The Day of Waterloo. London: Collins.

Keegan, John. 1976. The Face of Battle. London:Cape.


Wellington, Duke of (Arthur Wellesley)(1769–1852)

The “Iron Duke” was already an ex-perienced soldier and politician

when he played his most important parts inthe defeat of Napoleon, first as the leadingBritish commander in the Peninsular Warand then as Allied commander at Waterloo.Born in Dublin and educated in part at aFrench military school, Wellesley firstserved in Flanders in 1794, where helearned “what one ought not to do,” andthen in India, where his brother was gover-nor-general. He returned from India in1805 and for the next three years was moreinvolved in politics, serving as chief secre-tary for Ireland, than in military affairs.

Wellesley’s first command in the IberianPeninsula came in 1808, where as com-mander of the British expeditionary forcehe defeated the French under AndocheJunot. He returned to Portugal after thedeath of Sir John Moore in 1809, droveMarshal Nicolas Soult out of Oporto, andfought the indecisive battle of Talaveraagainst the French under Joseph Bonaparte,but he was forced to retreat from Spain inthe face of the numerical superiority of the

260 Wellington, Duke of

French. In September 1809 he was createdViscount Wellington of Talavera.

Wellington was British commander inIberia from 1809 to 1814, marshal-generalof the Portuguese army in July 1809, andgeneralissimo of the armies in Spain in Sep-tember 1812. But he was forced to adopt apatient strategy. In the campaign on 1811,despite successive victories over AndréMasséna, including the battle of Bussaco, heagain had to retreat into Portugal.And eventhe more successful campaign in 1812,which saw Wellington advance into centralSpain and capture Madrid after the battle ofSalamanca, had the same outcome.

In 1813 Wellington, now an earl and aknight of the garter, advanced again intoSpain, this time with decisive results.Whilethe French forces concentrated on Val-ladolid to protect southern France,Wellington forced them back with a seriesof brilliant flanking maneuvers and gaineda crushing victory at the battle of Vitoria(21 June 1813). After overcoming a deter-

mined French counterattack in the Pyre-nees, he took San Sebastian on 31 Augustand Pamplona on 31 October and defeatedSoult at Nivelle on 10 December. By thetime of his victory at Toulouse on 10 April1814 the war was over.Wellington was cre-ated a duke, and named ambassador toParis in July.

Wellington was attending the Congressof Vienna when on 7 March 1815 news ar-rived of Napoleon’s escape from Elba. Hewas immediately named commander inchief of the Anglo-Hanoverian and Dutcharmies, based in Brussels. His troops suc-cessfully held back the forces of MichelNey at Quatre-Bras on 16 June, and twodays later he gained his greatest victory atWaterloo. He contained all Napoleon’s at-tacks until the arrival of the Prussians underGebhard von Blücher gave the Allies nu-merical superiority and French resistancecollapsed.

Waterloo was Wellington’s last battle. Hewas commander in chief of the allied armyof occupation in France until November1818, but thereafter devoted himself to pol-itics. As prime minister in 1828–1829 hecarried through the law for CatholicEmancipation, but his hostility to parlia-mentary reform in 1832 made him politi-cally unpopular. When he died VictorianBritain mourned a great military hero but aless than popular politician.

Related entries: Bussaco, Battle of; HundredDays; Peninsular War; Portugal; Quatre-Bras,Battle of; Salamanca, Battle of;Toulouse, Battleof;Vitoria, Battle of;Waterloo, Battle of

Suggestions for further reading:Esdaile, Charles J. 1990. The Duke of Wellington

and the Command of the Spanish Army,1812–14. London: Macmillan.

Gash, Norman, ed. 1990. Wellington: Studies in theMilitary and Political Career of the First Duke ofWellington. Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press.

Glover, Michael. 1968. Wellington as MilitaryCommander. London: Batsford.

James, Lawrence. 1992. The Iron Duke:A MilitaryBiography of Wellington. London:Weidenfeldand Nicolson.

Wellington, Duke of 261

Thomas Lawrence’s flattering portrait of the Duke ofWellington (c. 1815) bears little resemblance to theimage found in hostile caricatures of Napoleon’s greatadversary. (Victoria & Albert Museum, London/ArtResource)

Westphalia, Kingdom of

C reated from lands formerly held byPrussia, Hanover, and a dozen smaller

states, Westphalia was the largest statefounded by Napoleon on German territoryand was a member of the Confederation ofthe Rhine. Jérôme Bonaparte was installedas king and turned out to be not unpopularwith his subjects. But Napoleon wantedWestphalia to be a model state, serving asthe advanced bastion for the moral con-quest of Germany by French ideals. It was,declared an official of the new regime, “acreation, like the universe itself, in whichthe creator turns primary materials into afinished object” (Sheehan 1989, p. 260). InNovember 1807, therefore, the kingdomwas given a constitution promising civilequality and religious liberty, the abolitionof guilds, serfdom, and aristocratic privilege,and the adoption of Napoleon’s legal codes,open courts, and trial by jury.

Unfortunately, the proclaimed liberty andliberalism was incompatible with Napoleon’sforeign policy and military demands. The

representative Diet met only twice, in 1808and 1810, and the structure of rural societyremained virtually unchanged. Instead of lib-erty and prosperity the people of Westphaliawere faced by the tax collectors, military re-cruiters (taking some 600,000 men, moreper head of population than anywhere elsein Europe), and greedy land-grabbing politi-cians of an increasingly dictatorial and ex-ploitative regime. When Napoleon was de-feated in 1813 the kingdom fell apart, andthe majority of the population greeted itsdemise with relief. However, Jérôme’s short-lived kingdom had in some respects servedas an example to the reformers of Prussia,and some of its successor states, especiallyPrussia, allowed some of his liberal legisla-tion to remain in effect.

Related entries: Bonaparte, Jérôme, King ofWestphalia; Confederation of the Rhine


Kingdoms. New York: Free Press.Sheehan, James J. 1989. German History,


262 Westphalia, Kingdom of

YYorck von Wartenburg, Johann David Ludwig,

Count (1759–1830)

B orn in Potsdam of English descent,General Yorck became a rather un-

likely Prussian national hero in 1812–1813. He had fought in the Jena-Auer-städt campaign of 1806, and he became animportant figure in the revival of thePrussian army defeated by Napoleon, ad-vocating conscription and improved treat-ment of rank-and-file troops. In the Rus-sian campaign of 1812, however, hecommanded the Prussian corps attachedto the French left wing under Marshal

Jacques Macdonald. During the retreat inDecember 1812 he succumbed to Russianpleas for separate negotiations. On 30 De-cember, acting on his own initiative, hesigned the Convention of Tauroggen,withdrawing the Prussian troops from thecampaign. This act provided the impetusfor Prussia’s declaration of war on Francein March 1813 and came to be seen as thesignal for the start of the German War ofLiberation.

Related entries: Prussia; Russian Campaign

Suggestions for further reading:Paret, Peter. 1966. Yorck and the Era of Prussian

Reform, 1807–15. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.

Yorck von Wartenburg, Johann David Ludwig, Count 263

Y

DOCUMENTSDOCUMENTS

This selection of documents is intended toprovide insights into Napoleon’s character,the major events of his career, and his styleof government. Excerpts from his memoirsand proclamations are interspersed withothers providing different and complemen-tary perspectives, ending with assessmentsof his personality by two of his most deter-mined opponents.

CORSICA

In his exile on Saint Helena Napoleonrecalled his native island, glossing overhis early nationalism, but also betraying adegree of nostalgia and affection for itsinhabitants.

Corsica lies twenty leagues from thecoast of Tuscany, forty from that ofProvence, and sixty from that of Spain. Itbelongs, geographically, to the Italianpeninsula, but as Italy is not a nation,Corsica naturally forms an integral part ofFrance. . . .

The isle is woody.The plains and hillsare, or may be, covered with olives,mulberry, orange, lemon, and other fruittrees.The mountainsides are clothed withchestnut trees, among which are villagesnaturally fortified by their position, and onthe mountain-tops are forests of pines, firs,and evergreen oaks.The olive trees are as

large as those of the Levant.The chestnuttrees are enormous, and of the largestspecies.The pines and firs are not inferiorto those of Russia in height and bulk. . . .Oil, wine, silk, and timber are the fourmajor exports that enrich the island. . . .

Corsica is a beautiful country in themonths of January and February. In thedog-days, though, it becomes dry andwater grows scarce, especially in the plains.The inhabitants then like to take upresidence on the sides of the hills, whencethey descend into the low grounds inwinter, either to graze their flocks or tocultivate the plains. . . .

In the course of twenty years, from1769 to 1789, the island of Corsica wasgreatly improved. But all those benefits ofFrench rule had no effect on the hearts ofthe inhabitants, who were anything butFrench at the time of the Revolution.Alieutenant-general of infantry, who wascrossing the mountains, once talked with ashepherd about the ingratitude of hisfellow Corsicans. Enumerating the benefitsof the French administration, he said:“Inyour Paoli’s time you paid double whatyou pay now.”“That is true, Signor,” theshepherd replied,“but then we gave it, andnow you take it.”

Napoleon on Napoleon, ed. Somerset deChair (London: Cassell, 1992), pp. 50–52,54.

Corsica 265

THE SIEGE OF TOULON

In his account of the siege of Toulon Napo-leon denies any role to Paul Barras,AntonioSaliceti, or any of the politicians in securinghis promotion. Everything connected withthe French victory and his advance was dueto his own genius.

For a month I had been carefullyreconnoitring the ground and I had mademyself perfectly acquainted with the wholeterrain. It was I who proposed the plan ofattack that resulted in the reduction ofToulon. I regarded all the proposals of thecommittee of fortifications as totally uselessand was of the opinion that a regular siegewas simply not necessary. If from fifteen totwenty mortars, thirty or forty pieces ofcannon, and furnaces for red-hot ballscould be positioned where they couldmaintain fire upon every point of thegreater and lesser roadsteads, then it wasevident that the combined squadron wouldbe obliged to withdraw.The garrisonwould then be placed in a state ofblockade, being unable to communicatewith the squadron, which would be forcedto stand out to sea.That being so, I wasconvinced that the combined forces wouldprefer to withdraw the garrison, and burnthe French vessels and magazines, ratherthan leave in the fortress 15,000 or 20,000men who sooner or later would be obligedto surrender, but who would then have nobargaining power to ensure terms ofcapitulation for themselves.

In short, I said that there was no need tomarch against the town at all, but only tooccupy the position I proposed.This was atthe extreme point of the promontory ofBalagnier and l’Eguillette. I had discoveredthis position a month before, and hadpointed it out to the General-in-Chief,assuring him that if he would occupy itwith three battalions he would take Toulonin four days. But the English had become,since I first observed it, so sensible of its

importance, that they had disembarked4,000 men there, had cut down all thewood that covered the promontory of LeCaire, which commanded the wholeposition, and had employed all theresources of Toulon, even the galley-slaves,to entrench themselves there, making of it,in their words,“a little Gibraltar.” Now,therefore, the point, which a month agomight have been seized and occupiedwithout opposition, required a seriousattack. It would not be advisable to risk adirect assault. Instead, batteries of 24-pounders and mortars should destroy thebreastworks, which were built of wood,break down the palisades, and throw ashower of shells into the interior of thefort.Then, after forty-eight hours ofvigorous fire, the fort should be stormed bypicked troops.Two days after the fort hadbeen taken, I judged,Toulon would belongto the Republic.This plan of attack wasmuch discussed and the engineer officerswho were present at the council were ofthe opinion that my project was anecessary preliminary to a regular siege, thefirst principle of all sieges being theestablishment of a strict blockade. Fromthis time on there was unanimity ofopinions. . . .

It was at Toulon that my reputationbegan.All the generals, representatives andsoldiers who had heard me give myopinions in the different councils, threemonths before the taking of the town,anticipated my future military career. Fromthat moment I won the confidence of allthe soldiers of the Army of Italy.Dugommier wrote to the Committee ofPublic Safety soliciting the rank ofbrigadier-general for me, and using thesewords:“Reward this young man andpromote him, for if he is ungratefullytreated he will promote himself.”

Napoleon on Napoleon, ed. Somerset de Chair (London: Cassell, 1992), pp.75–76, 83.

266 The Siege of Toulon

ITALY AND THENAPOLEONIC LEGEND

Napoleon’s success as a commander owedmuch to the high morale of his troops andtheir personal devotion to him. During theItalian campaign of 1796–1797 army news-papers, distributed to the soldiers and circu-lated in France helped to create the myth ofBonaparte as an invincible, almost superhu-man figure.

He moves at the speed of light andstrikes like a thunderbolt. He is everywhereat once and misses nothing. . . . If oneexamines his domestic life, one finds a manwho happily divests himself of all grandeurwhen with his family; he has the constantair of a man preoccupied with some grandscheme, which frequently interrupts hismeals and his sleep. He says with simpledignity to those whom he respects:“I haveseen kings at my feet; I could have amassedfifty millions in my coffers; I could easilyhave claimed to be someone other thanwhat I am; but I am a citizen of France, Iam the leading general of La Grande Nation;I know that posterity will do me justice.”

Le Courrier de l’armée d’Italie, 23October 1796; quoted in D. G.Wright,Napoleon and Europe (London and NewYork: Longman, 1984), pp. 98–99.

The testimony of Laure Permon, the futureLaure Junot, duchess of Abrantès, demon-strates that the new cult of personality hadits effect in France. Only Napoleon’s mas-ters in the Directory remained immune toadoration of the Republic’s new star gen-eral and self-styled savior.

The Army of Italy surprised us everyday by the prodigies communicated in itsbulletins.The Directory, which dislikedGeneral Bonaparte, would have liked tohave thrown a veil over the glory of theyoung hero; but the country, which he had

saved from Austrian invasion, the soldiers,whom he led to victory, had thousands ofvoices to proclaim it.

It would be very difficult to conveyeven a slight idea of the enthusiasm withwhich Bonaparte was received when hearrived in Paris.The French people arevolatile, not very capable of constancy intheir affections, but keenly alive to thesentiment of glory. Give them victories,and they will be more than content, theywill be grateful. . . .

Had Bonaparte’s vanity been ever sogreat, it must have been satisfied; for allclasses joined . . . to give him a cordialwelcome on his return to his country.Thepopulace shouted,“Long live GeneralBonaparte! Long live the conqueror ofItaly, the peace-maker of Campo Formio!”The shopkeepers said,“May God preservehim for our glory, and deliver us from theyoke of the Directors!”The higher class,ungagged and unbastilled, ran withenthusiasm to meet a young man who in ayear had advanced from the battle ofMontenotte to the Treaty of Leoben, andfrom victory to victory. He may havecommitted errors, and even very graveones, since that time, but he was then aColossus of great and pure glory.

At the Court of Napoleon: Memoirs of theDuchesse d’Abrantès, ed. Olivier Bernier(New York: Doubleday, 1989), pp. 44–45.

EGYPT

In Napoleon’s retrospective account of theEgyptian campaign he places the motivesbehind it in a global context, justifies hisown behavior, and provides a curious in-sight into his attitude toward religion. Hetypically puts the blame for failure on oth-ers and as always accuses Britain of perfidy.

The expedition to Egypt had threeaims: to establish on the Nile a French

Egypt 267

colony which would prosper without slavesand serve France in place of the republic ofSanto Domingo and all the sugar islands; toopen a market for our manufactures inAfrica,Arabia, and Syria and supply ourcommerce with all the production of thosevast countries, and to gain Egypt as a basefrom which an army of 60,000 men wouldset out to the Indus to excite the Mahrattasand oppressed people of those extensiveregions to insurrections. . . .

The first two of these aims werefulfilled, and notwithstanding the loss ofAdmiral Brueys’s squadron at Alexandria,the intrigue by which Kléber was inducedto sign the Convention of El-Arisch, andthe landing of from 30,000 to 35,000English commanded by Abercrombie atAboukir and Cosseir, the third aim alsowould have been attained—a French armywould have reached the Indus in thewinter of 1801–2—had not the commandof the army devolved, as a result of themurder of Kléber, on a man [GeneralMenou] who, although abounding incourage, business talent, and goodwill, wastemperamentally wholly unfit for militarycommand. . . .

After Alexandria and Cairo had beentaken and the Mamelukes defeated at thePyramids, the question of conquest was stillundecided, unless the ulemas and all theministers of the Muslim religion could beconciliated. Ever since the Revolution, theFrench army had exercised no worship—even in Italy it never attended church.Advantage was taken of this circumstance—the army was presented to the Muslimsas an army of converts, disposed toembrace Mohammedanism.The Coptic,Greek, Latin, and Syrian Christians werenumerous; they wanted to avail themselvesof the presence of the French army toescape the restrictions imposed on theirworship. I opposed this proceeding, andtook care to keep religious affairs on thefooting on which I found them. Every

morning at sunrise, the sheiks of the GrandMosque of Gemil-Azar (a sort ofSorbonne) used to come to my levee. I hadall possible respectful attentions shownthem and I discoursed with them at lengthon the various circumstances of theProphet’s life and on the chapters of theKoran. . . .

After the battle of Aboukir, on 3 August1799, the English commodore sent toAlexandria the English newspapers and theFrench Gazette of Frankfurt for themonths of April, May, and June, whichcommunicated the news of the reversesustained by the Armies of the Rhine andof Italy.We heard of the war of the secondcoalition at the camp at Acre.

I returned to France for three reasons:first, because my instructions authorizedme to do so (I had carte-blanche in allrespects); secondly, because my presencewas necessary to the Republic; thirdly,because the Army of the East, which wasvictorious and numerous, would not, for along time, have any enemy to contendwith.The first object of the Egyptianexpedition had been accomplished; thesecond could not be attained so long asthe frontiers of the Republic were underthreat and anarchy prevailed in itsinterior. . . .When . . . I left the commandto Kléber, it [the French army] must havehad 28,000 men, of whom 25,000 were ina condition to take the field. It isnotorious that, when I left Egypt inAugust 1799, I thought that countryforever secured to France and hoped oneday to be able to realize the second objectof the expedition.As to the ideas I thenentertained on the affairs of France, Icommunicated them to Menou, who hasoften repeated them: I planned therevolution of 18 Brumaire.

Napoleon on Napoleon, ed. Somerset deChair (London: Cassell, 1992), pp.107–112.

268 Egypt

18 BRUMAIRE

Napoleon’s proclamation justifying his rolein the coup of 18 Brumaire manages togive the impression that he had been thevictim of unprovoked hostility and actedpurely for the good of his country. By skil-fully using half-truths and playing uponpopular feelings, he constructs a cleverpiece of propaganda while again demon-strating his own courage, foresight, and po-sition “above party.”

On my return to Paris, I found allauthorities divided, and agreement only onone truth: that the Constitution was halfdestroyed and could not save liberty.

All the parties came to me, and confidedin me their plans, revealed their secrets, andasked me for help, but I refused to be theman of a party.

The Council of Ancients called me; Iresponded to its call.A plan of restorationhad been put together by men whom thenation is accustomed to see as defenders ofliberty, equality, and property:This plandemanded scrutiny, calm, free, exempt fromall influence and fear.Accordingly, theCouncil of Ancients decided to move thelegislative body to St Cloud, and chargedme with commanding the force necessaryfor its independence. I believed it my dutyto my fellow citizens, to the soldiersperishing in our armies, and the nationalglory bought with their blood, to acceptthe command.

The Councils assembled at St Cloud.Republican troops guaranteed theirsecurity outside, but murderers createdterror inside. Several deputies from theCouncil of 500, armed with daggers andpistols, circulated death threats.

The plans which should have beendeveloped were restrained, the majoritydisorganized, the most courageous speakersdisconcerted, and the uselessness of everywise proposition evident.

I took my indignation and grief to theCouncil of Ancients. I demanded assuranceof the execution of its generous plans; Ishowed it the evils of the fatherland, whichthey understood; it united with me,showing new evidence of its constant will.

I presented myself at the Council of500, alone, unarmed, head uncovered, justas the Ancients had received and applaudedme. I came to remind the majority of itswishes and to assure it of its power.

The daggers which threatened thedeputies were immediately raised againsttheir liberator.Twenty murderers threwthemselves on me and aimed at my chest.The grenadiers of the legislative body,whom I had left at the door of the hall,hearing, interposed themselves between themurderers and myself. One of thegrenadiers had his clothes pierced by adagger blow. He was carried out.

At the same instant, cries of “outlaw!”were raised against the defender of the law.This was the fierce cry of murderers againstthe force destined to put them down.

They pressed around the President, withthreats in their mouths and arms in theirhands.They ordered him to proclaim“outlaw”; I was warned and ordered himwrested from their fury, and six grenadiersof the legislative body snatched him.Immediately after that, the grenadiers ofthe legislative body charged into the halland cleared it.

The factions, intimidated, dispersed andwithdrew.The majority, safe from theirattacks, returned freely and peacefully tothe meeting hall, heard the propositionswhich were put before them of publicsafety, discussed and prepared the salutaryresolution which will become the newprovisional law of the Republic.

Frenchmen, without doubt you willrecognize in this conduct the zeal of asoldier of liberty. Conservative, tutelary,liberal ideas are returned to their rights bythe dispersal of the factions oppressing the

18 Brumaire 269

Councils and who, having become themost odious of men, have not ceased to bethe most contemptible.

Eric A.Arnold, ed., A DocumentarySurvey of Napoleonic France (Lanham, MD:University Press of America, 1994), pp.20–22.

MARENGO

A.-C. Thibaudeau, prefect in Bordeaux,noted in his memoirs how the victory ofMarengo, which brought Napoleon’s secondItalian campaign to a triumphant conclu-sion, was greeted with huge popular enthu-siasm throughout France. The first consulhad, it appeared, brought peace and glory toFrench arms through another masterstroke.

The victory at Marengo decided thefate of Italy and proved a happy omen forFrance.The Cisalpine Republic was re-established, the Ligurian Republicliberated, the annexation of Piedmontsecretly prepared.The First Consul andthe Catholic Church formed an allianceat Milan.The Church sang his triumphsand treated him as a sovereign.Thevictory anthems and the mood oftriumphant joy spread to Paris, toBordeaux and throughout the Republic.A campaign so short, so brilliant and sodecisive had never previously beenwitnessed. Covered in laurels, the FirstConsul swiftly travelled across Italy, laidthe foundation stone of the restoration ofthe Place de Bellecoeur at Lyon, and thenreturned to Paris, able to say, with justice,like Caesar: veni, vidi, vici. He arrived onthe 13 Messidor (2 July) 1800 at twoo’clock, with a slight wound from anaccident to his carriage.The wholepopulation flowed into the courtyard andgarden of the Tuileries palace. Everyone’sface expressed a joy which had not beenseen for a long time.

Mémoires de A.-C.Thibaudeau1799–1815, quoted in D. G.Wright,Napoleon and Europe (London and NewYork: Longman, 1984), pp. 101–102.

THE RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT

The Concordat of 1802, reconciling theCatholic Church to the Consular regime,was of prime importance in securing Na-poleon’s position and resolving the reli-gious conflict in France. In his proclama-tion of 17 April, Napoleon as alwaysemphasizes his personal role in ending thedivisions that had tormented France for adecade, but he suggests wrongly that theinitiative came from Pope Pius VII.

Frenchmen! From the bosom of arevolution inspired by the love of thefatherland suddenly exploded in yourmidst religious dissensions, which becamethe plague of your families, thenourishment of factions, and the hope ofyour enemies.

An insane policy tried to stifle themunder the debris of the altars, under thevery ruins of religion. By its commands,pious solemnities ceased where citizenswere called by the sweet name of brothers,all were recognized as equal under thehand of God who created them.Thedying, alone with their grief, no longerheard that consoling voice which callsChristians to a better life, and even Godseemed exiled from nature.

But public conscience, the sentiment ofthe independence of opinion, rose up andsoon, distracted by external enemies, theirexplosion brought devastation into ourdepartments. Frenchmen forgot that theywere French and became the instrumentsof foreign hatred.

On the other hand, passions wereunchained, morals were without support,hope in the future was denied, all wereunited to bring confusion into society.

270 Marengo

To put an end to this confusion, it wasnecessary to set up religion on its baseagain and to take only measures acceptedby religion itself.

It was the sovereign Pontiff who theexample of centuries and reason directedto appeal to unite opinions and reconcilehearts.

The head of the Church pondered inhis wisdom and in the interest of theChurch the proposition that the interest ofthe state had dictated.

His voice was heard by the pastors; whathe approved, the Government agreed to,and the Legislators passed a law of theRepublic.Thus vanished all the elements ofconfusion; thus faded all qualms whichcould alarm consciences, and all obstaclesthat malevolence could oppose to thereturn of internal peace.

Ministers of a religion of peace, may themost profound forgetfulness cover yourdissensions, your woes, and your faults, maythis religion that unites you attach you bythe same ties, by indissoluble ties, to theinterest of your fatherland.

Exert for it all the force and ascendancyof spirit that your ministry gives you; thatyour lessons and examples may form inyoung citizens the love of our institutions,respect for and attachment to the tutelaryauthorities which have been created toprotect them; may they learn from you thatthe God of peace is also the God of armies,and that He fights alongside those whodefend the independence and liberty ofFrance.

Citizens who profess Protestantreligions, the law equally extends to you itscare. Let this morality, common to allChristians, this morality so holy, so pure, sofraternal, unite them all in the same love ofthe fatherland, in the same respect for itslaws, in the same affection for all themembers of its great family.

Never let doctrinal struggles alter thesentiments inspired and commanded byreligion.

Frenchmen, let us all be united for thehappiness of the fatherland and humanity; letthis religion, which civilized Europe, still bethe bond which brings humanity together,and let the virtue it demands always beassociated with the light that illuminates us.

Proclamation of 17 April 1802, in EricA.Arnold, ed., A Documentary Survey ofNapoleonic France (Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, 1994), pp. 118–120.

THE IMPERIAL CATECHISM

Not the least advantage of the religious set-tlement from Napoleon’s point of view wasthat the Church could be incorporated intothe effort to inculcate young French peoplewith the ideals of the Napoleonic state.TheImperial Catechism shows the cult of theemperor and the strong state in its most ex-treme and almost caricatural form.

Q.What are the duties of Christians inrespect to the Princes who govern them,and what in particular are our duties toNapoleon I, our Emperor?

A. Christians owe to the Princes whogovern them, and in particular we owe toNapoleon I, our Emperor, love, respect,obedience, loyalty, military service, thetaxes levied for the preservation anddefence of the Empire and of his throne;we also owe him our prayers for his safetyand the spiritual and temporal well-beingof the state.

Q.Why are we obliged to all of theseduties to our Emperor?

A. First, because God, who createdempires and distributes them according toHis will, in heaping on our Emperor gifts,both in peace and war, has established himas our sovereign and rendered him theminister of His power and image on earth.To honor and serve our Emperor is thus tohonor and serve God himself. Second,because our Lord Jesus Christ, both by His

The Imperial Catechism 271

teaching and example, has Himself taughtus what we owe our sovereign: He wasborn according to the law of CaesarAugustus; He paid the prescribed tax, andHe even ordered us to render unto Godthat which belongs to God, and Heordered us to render unto Caesar thatwhich belongs to Caesar.

Q.Are there not particular reasonswhich should attach us more strongly toNapoleon I, our Emperor?

A.Yes, because it is he whom God raisedin difficult circumstances to re-establishpublic worship of the holy religion of ourfathers and to be the protector of it. He hasrestored and preserved public order by hisprofound and active wisdom; he defendsthe state by his powerful arm; he hasbecome the anointed of the Lord by theconsecration which he received from thesovereign Pontiff, Head of the ChurchUniversal.

Q.What should one think of those whofail in their duty to the Emperor?

A.According to the Apostle Saint Paul,they would be resisting the orderestablished by God Himself, and wouldrender themselves worthy of eternaldamnation.

Q.Are the duties that we owe to ourEmperor equally binding on us to hislegitimate successors, in the orderestablished by the Constitutions of theEmpire?

A.Yes, without doubt, because we readin Holy Scripture that God, Lord ofHeaven and Earth, by a command of Hissupreme will and by His providence, givesempires not only to one person inparticular, but also to his family.

Q.What are our obligations to his civicofficers?

A.We owe them honor, respect andobedience, because they are agents of theauthority of our Emperor.

Q.What is forbidden to us by theFourth Commandment?

A.We are forbidden to be disobedientto our superiors, to injure them, or tospeak ill of them.

Excerpt from Imperial Catechism:Lesson VII, Continuation of the FourthCommandment, from Eric A.Arnold, ed.,A Documentary Survey of Napoleonic France(Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmerica, 1994), pp. 222–224.

PERFIDIOUS ALBION

Napoleon always sought to portray the out-break of war as the fault of the other side. Ina long tirade he wrote for the official gov-ernment newspaper, Le Moniteur, in 1803,the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens isentirely due to British greed and ambition.

If France had possessed ambitiousschemes and ideas of aggrandizement,would she not have kept all Italy under herdirect influence? Would she not haveannexed the Batavian Republic,Switzerland and Portugal? Instead of theseeasy acquisitions, she wisely offers to limither territory and power, and she acceptsthe loss of the huge territory of SantoDomingo as well as of the large sums ofmoney and the armies which have beensent to recover that colony. She makesevery sacrifice so that peace maycontinue. . . . For the sake of indulging hermalignant and all too powerful passions,England disturbs the peace of the world,wantonly violates the rights of nations,tramples on the most solemn treaties, andbreaks her pledged faith—that ancient andeternal faith which even savage hordesacknowledge and religiously respect.

One sole obstacle stands in the way ofher policies and her ambitions—victorious,moderate, prosperous France; her vigorousand enlightened government; herillustrious and magnanimous leader.These

272 Perfidious Albion

are the targets of England’s delirious envy,of her constant attacks, of her implacablehatred, of her diplomatic intrigues, of hermaritime conspiracies, and of the officialdenunciations of France to her Parliamentand subjects. But Europe is watching;France is arming. History writes: Romedestroyed Carthage!

Le Moniteur, May 1803, in D. G.Wright,Napoleon and Europe (London and NewYork: Longman, 1984), p. 103.

ENLIGHTENED GOVERNMENTIN THE EMPIRE

Napoleon’s letter to his brother Jérôme,newly installed as king of Westphalia,demonstrates how authoritarian rule in thesatellite states ideally was to be combinedwith rational and progressive ideals. Thepeople would be grateful for a new reign ofliberty, replacing the obscurantism andtyranny of the old regime. Napoleon’s de-mands for taxes and soldiers for his armiesin fact destroyed the efforts of even a rela-tively popular ruler like Jérôme, but manyof the beneficial aspects of imperial rulewere retained after 1815.

My Brother, you will find enclosed withthis letter the constitution of yourkingdom. . . .This constitution comprisesthe conditions on which I renounce all myrights of conquest and the rights I haveacquired over your country.You must followit faithfully.The wellbeing of your people isimportant to me not only for the influencethat it will have on your glory and mine, butalso for the prospect of Europe as a whole.Do not listen to those who say that yourpeople, accustomed to slavery, will receiveour kindness ungratefully.There is moreunderstanding in the Kingdom ofWestphalia than one would lead you tobelieve, and your throne will only be

established on the confidence and love ofyour population.What the people ofGermany impatiently want is individuals ofno noble rank whatsoever, but who havegreat talent and who will have equal right toyour consideration and employment, andthat every sort of servitude or ofintermediaries between the sovereign andthe lowest class of people will be totallyremoved.The benefits of the Code Napoléon,public trials, the establishment of juries, willbe, above all, the distinctive characteristics ofyour rule.And, if I must tell you mythoughts, I count more on their effects forthe extension and consolidation of your rulethan on the greatest military victories. It isessential that your people enjoy a liberty, anequality, a wellbeing unknown to the peopleof Germany, and that this liberalgovernment produces, one way or another,the most salutary changes to the system ofthe Confederation of the Rhine and thepower of your rule.This manner ofgoverning will be a more powerfulbarricade between you and Prussia than theElbe, fortresses, and the protection ofFrance.What people would wish to returnto arbitrary Prussian government when itwill have tasted the benefits of a wise andliberal administration? The people ofGermany, like those of France, Italy, andSpain, want equality and liberal values. Ihave guided European affairs for some timeand I have become convinced that theburden of privileges was contrary to generalopinion. Be a constitutional king. If reasonand the spirit of the age do not suffice, inyour position good sense dictates it.You willfind that having public support is a naturaladvantage over your neighbors who areabsolute kings.

Letter to Prince Jérôme Bonaparte, 15November 1807, in Eric A.Arnold, ed., ADocumentary Survey of Napoleonic France(Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmerica, 1994), pp. 250–251.

Enlightened Government in the Empire 273

THE NATIONALIST RESPONSE

What Napoleon showed in his instructionsto Jérôme that he did not understand wasthat the power of nationalism could bestronger than forms of government andcould be directed against both the absolutemonarchs and himself. As Friedrich vonSchiller wrote in 1804: “The German Em-pire and the German nation are two differ-ent things. The glory of the Germans hasnever been based upon the power of itsprinces.” Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Addressesto the German Nation, a series of lecturesgiven in occupied Berlin in 1807–1808, areamong the founding texts of a culturallybased German nationalism.

It is only by means of the commoncharacteristic of being German that we canavert the downfall of our nation, which isthreatened by its fusion with foreignpeoples, and win back again an individualitythat is self-supporting and quite incapable ofany dependence on others. . . .We alonemust help ourselves if help is to come tous. . . . By means of the new education wewant to mold the Germans into a corporatebody. It is the general aim of these addressesto bring courage and hope to the suffering,to proclaim joy in the midst of deep sorrow,to lead us gently and softly through thehour of deep affliction. . . .The German, ifonly he makes use of all his advantages, canalways be superior to the foreigner. . . .Only the German really has a people and isentitled to count as one; he alone is capableof real and rational love for his nation.

In D. G.Wright, Napoleon and Europe(London and New York: Longman, 1984),pp. 115–116.

THE PENINSULAR WAR

Napoleon’s views on the war in Spain andPortugal show him at his most egotistical. If

only he had been able to take commandhimself, he tells us, and if only his policyhad been followed by his subordinates, thenthe war could have been won. But there isalso a kind of grudging recognition thatNapoleon’s style of swift decisive actioncould not deal with a national uprising andguerrilla warfare.

The Spanish war ended in 1809. Inthree months I had beaten and dispersedthe four Spanish armies of 160,000 men,taken Madrid and Saragossa, and forcedGeneral Moore to re-embark, after losinghalf his army, his stores, and military chests.Spain was conquered.When the war withVienna obliged me to return to France, thewar of Spain recommenced. King Josephwas not competent to direct it. Englandmade unheard-of efforts and her armiesobtained some success in Portugal. Spainwas surrounded by seas on three sides andEnglish fleets unexpectedly carried newforces into Catalonia, Biscay, Portugal, theKingdom of Valencia, and Cadiz.

The error committed in Spain was notthat of proceeding too rapidly, but that ofproceeding too slowly after my departure.Had I remained there a few months, Iwould have taken Lisbon and Cadiz, unitedall parties, and pacified the country. Myarmies never lacked military stores,clothing, or provisions. . . .The guerrillaswere not formed until two years later, whenthey arose as a result of the disorders andabuses which had crept into the wholearmy, except the corps of Marshal Suchet,which occupied the Kingdom of Valencia.The Anglo-Portuguese became as skillful inmaneuvers as the French army; the latterwas afterwards defeated through theaccidents of war, maneuvers, and strategicalerrors, at Talavera, Salamanca, and Vitoria.Spain was lost after a struggle of five years.The argument on the lack of fortresses isextremely misplaced—the French Armyhad taken them all.The Spaniards formerlyoffered the same resistance to the Romans.

274 The Nationalist Response

The people of conquered nations becomethe subjects of the victor only through amixture of policy and severity and by beingamalgamated with the army.These pointswere not successfully managed in Spain. . . .

After the re-embarkation of the Englisharmy, the King of Spain remained inactive,wasting four months. He should havemarched on Cadiz,Valencia, and Lisbon—political means would then have done therest. No-one can deny that had the Courtof Austria not declared war and I had beenable to remain four months longer inSpain, all would have been over.Thepresence of a general is indispensable—heis the head, the whole of an army. It wasnot the Roman army that subdued Gaul,but Caesar himself: nor was it theCarthaginian army that made the Republictremble at the gates of Rome, but Hannibalhimself; neither was it the Macedonianarmy which reached the Indus, butAlexander; it was not the French armywhich carried the war to the Weser and theInn, but Turenne; nor was it the Prussianarmy which, for seven years, defendedPrussia against the three greatest powers ofEurope, it was Frederick the Great.


1812:THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

In his exile on Saint Helena Napoleon per-sisted in looking back on the Russian cam-paign as a glorious episode and justifyinghis decision to undertake the invasion interms of the containment of Russia.

The history of the campaign in Russiawill never be well known, because theRussians either do not write at all or writewithout the slightest regard for truth, whilethe French are afflicted by a strange maniafor dishonoring and decrying their own

glory.The Russian war became a necessaryconsequence of the Continental System themoment the Emperor Alexander violatedthe conventions of Tilsit and Erfurt, but aconsideration of much greater importancedetermined me to begin it. I thought thatthe French Empire, which I had created byso many victories, would be dismemberedat my death and the scepter of Europewould pass into the hands of a tsar, unless Idrove back the Russians beyond theDnieper and raised up the throne ofPoland, the natural barrier of the empire. In1812 Austria, Prussia, Germany, Switzerlandand Italy marched under the French eagles.Was it not natural that I should think themoment had come to consolidate theimmense edifice I had raised, but on whichRussia would lean with all her weight aslong as she could send her numerousarmies, at pleasure, to the Oder? Alexanderwas young and vigorous, like his empire; itwas to be presumed that he would surviveme.This is the whole secret of that war. Nopersonal feeling was ever concerned in it, aspamphleteers have pretended.Thecampaign of Russia was the most glorious,the most difficult, and the most honorableto the Gauls of all that are recorded inancient and modern history.The Russiansare very brave troops and their whole armywas united.At the battle of Moskva[Borodino] they had 170,000 men,including the Moscow troops. Kutuzov hadtaken up a fine position, and occupied itjudiciously.All advantages were on hisside—superiority in infantry, cavalry andartillery, an excellent position, and a greatnumber of redoubts. Nonetheless he wasvanquished. Intrepid heroes—Murat, Ney,Poniatowski—it is to you that the glory ofthe victory is due! What great, whatbrilliant actions might history cull fromthese events!


1812:The Russian Campaign 275

Those who took part were entitled to takea slightly different view. Eugénie de Coucy,wife of Marshal Oudinot, en route to joinher wounded husband in Vilnius in Sep-tember 1812, met her friend General Jean-François Jacqueminot, who voiced thedoubts within the army.

“What a strange circumstance,” he said,“is your presence in the midst of this desert,madame la duchesse! Oh, that all-devouringambition which leads us to the end of theworld, which disorganizes every existenceand paralyzes every industry! And to whatwill it bring us? We are all done for.”

This diatribe, the first I had hearduttered against the Emperor since mymarriage, this violent discontent on thepart of a man who was as brave as he wasenthusiastic, petrified me with surprise. Ilistened in silence.

“Yes,” he continued,“misfortuneswithout end have already reached and areincreasingly threatening our army, and I donot know which of us will ever see Franceagain.”

Memoirs of Marshal Oudinot, duc deReggio, compiled from the hitherto unpublishedsouvenirs of the duchesse de Reggio by GastonSteigler (New York: D.Appleton and Co.,1897), pp. 154–155.

Lieutenant-General de Fezensac describedthe horrors of the retreat from Moscow,showing something of the reality behindNapoleon’s vainglory.

The sufferings which we were destinedto undergo in places, the destruction ofwhich had been equally the object ofRussians and French, may be easilyconceived.Where we found a few housesstill standing, the inhabitants were absent.We had now nothing to look forward tobefore Smolensk, which was eighty leaguesdistant. Until our arrival there, we wouldseek in vain for either flour, meat, or forage

for our horses.We were reduced to thoseprovisions we had brought from Moscow,and these, trifling as they were, like allplunder, most unequally distributed. Oneregiment had preserved its oxen, and was inwant of bread.Another had flour, and waswithout meat.This inequality prevailedeven in the same regiment. Somecompanies had abundance, while otherswere starving; and though commandingofficers endeavoured to effect somethinglike an equal distribution, egotism andselfishness succeeded in evading theirsuperintendence and evading theirauthority. Moreover, to preserve ourprovisions, the horses that drew them alsohad to be preserved, but these perished innumbers every day for lack of food.Thesoldiers who strayed from their ranks toseek wherewith to relieve their hunger fellinto the hands of the Cossacks and armedpeasants.The route was covered withammunition wagons condemned to beblown up, with cannons and carriages leftto their fate, their teams having no longerthe strength to draw them. From the veryfirst day, our retreat had the semblance of arout.The Emperor continued to wreak hisvengeance on all buildings. Marshald’Eckmühl [Davout], commanding therearguard, was ordered to burn everything,and never was an order carried out soliterally. Detachments were sent as far asthe proximity of the enemy would permit,to the right and left, to burn the chateauxand villages.Yet even the sight of theseconflagrations was not the most distressingwhich we encountered.A column ofRussian prisoners marched immediately inour front, escorted by troops of theConfederation of the Rhine.They barelyreceived a little horse flesh for food, andtheir guards massacred those who could nolonger march.We came across some oftheir corpses, which, without exception,had their skulls knocked in. I must do thesoldiers of my regiment the justice torecord their indignation on beholding

276 1812:The Russian Campaign

these evidences of so dark a deed.Moreover they were not insensible to thecruel reprisals which this conduct exposedthem to, should they chance to fall into thehands of the enemy.

A Journal of the Russian Campaign of1812, translated from the French of Lieut.-General de Fezensac (London, 1852; rept.Cambridge: Ken Trotman Ltd., 1988), pp.75–77.

In a speech to the Senate on his return toParis, Napoleon emphasizes how he has al-ways acted in the interests of peace and sta-bility at home, justifies his monarchy, man-ages to imply that he invaded Russia for herown good, and adopts a rather casual atti-tude to the sufferings of his soldiers.

Senators, what you have said is mostpleasing to me. I have at heart the gloryand power of France, but my first thoughtsare solely for that which could perpetuateinternal calm and always shelter my peoplefrom the discords of factions and thehorrors of anarchy. It is upon these enemiesof the happiness of the people that I have,with the will and love of the French, builtthis throne, to which the fate of theFatherland is henceforth tied.

Some timid and cowardly soldiers losethe independence of nations, but faint-hearted magistrates destroy the authority ofthe laws, the rights of the throne, and thesocial order itself.

The most beautiful death would be thatof a soldier who dies on the battlefield, ifthe death of a magistrate dying in thedefense of his sovereign, the throne, andthe laws, would not be even more glorious.

When I undertook the regeneration ofFrance, I requested of Providence a fixednumber of years. One destroys in aninstant, but one can only rebuild with theaid of time.The greatest need of the state isthat of courageous magistrates.

Our fathers had a rallying cry:“TheKing is dead, long live the King!”These

few words comprise the principaladvantages of the monarchy. I think that Ihave studied well the spirit that my peopleshave shown throughout the centuries; Ihave thought about what has made thedifference between epochs of our history; Iwill think on it again.

The war that I am waging against Russiais a political war. I have waged it withouthatred. I could have wished to spare her theills which she has done to herself. I couldhave armed a great part of the populationagainst her, by proclaiming the liberty ofthe serfs, as a great number of villagesdemanded of me. But, when I learned ofthe degradation of this numerous class ofthe Russian people, I rejected this measurewhich would have condemned manyfamilies to death, devastation, and the mosthorrible torments.

My army has sustained losses, but that isdue to the harshness of the season.

I accept the wishes that you express tome.

Speech to Senate, 20 December 1812,in Eric A.Arnold, ed., A DocumentarySurvey of Napoleonic France (Lanham, MD:University Press of America, 1994), pp.104–105.

FRANCE IN 1814

Eugénie de Coucy, Mme. Oudinot, recordsthe widespread disillusion and war-weari-ness as Napoleon’s regime tottered towardcollapse following defeat in Germany andthe campaign of France.

France had long since been exhausted,not so much of money, for the countriesconquered by us still supplied this, but ofmen.This last scarcity, which it wasendeavoured to remedy by every kind ofconscription, threw whole families intodespair and want.They were really bled tothe uttermost.The poor man had to give his

France in 1814 277

last son and in him lost his support; and inthe fields it was often the women and girlswho led the plough. Husbandry suffered asmuch as individuals.And the same disastersoccurred in the towns. Numerous familiescondemned themselves perpetually tocripple their fortunes in order to save theyoung man whom other measures ended byreaching. Great names, great fortunes, inshort, all that might have hoped forindependence were compelled to assist atleast in the recruiting of guards of honor.

In any case, the young man servingunder the flag, whatever the feeling ofrepulsion with which his antecendentsmight inspire him for the government, sawnothing but honor before him, and servedwith courage and loyalty. But it was in thefamilies that resentment was felt.The crapewith which the Russian and Leipzigcampaigns had covered France had not yetdisappeared. Bitter tears were still beingshed. People realized that, by yielding acertain number of his conquests ofpreceding years, the Emperor might havesaved France from this invasion. . . . Peace!The cry was in every heart: for of glory, theeveryday food of the country, France hadhad a sufficient share.

Memoirs of Marshal Oudinot, duc deReggio, compiled from the hitherto unpublishedsouvenirs of the duchesse de Reggio by GastonSteigler (New York: D.Appleton and Co.,1897), pp. 252–253.

1815:THE FINAL GAMBLE

Ignoring the kinds of feeling recorded byMme. Oudinot, Napoleon in his Proclama-tion to the French People on his escapefrom Elba blames others for the defeats of1813–1814. He identifies himself with thepeople and calls upon them to reject anygovernment imposed by foreigners.Anyonewho opposes him is a traitor.

Napoleon, by the grace of God and theconstitutions of the state, Emperor of theFrench, etc., etc.

Frenchmen, the defection of the dukeof Castiglione [marshal Augereau] deliveredLyon defenseless to our enemies.The army,of which I had confided command to him,was, by the number of its battalions, thebravery and patriotism of the troops whichcomposed it, able to fight the Austrianarmy which opposed it, and to arrive at therear of the left wing of the enemythreatening Paris.

The victories of Champaubert,Montmirail, Château Thierry,Vauchamp,Mormans, Montereau, Caronne, Reims,Arcis-sur-Aube, and St-Dizier, theinsurrection of the brave peasants ofLorraine, Champagne,Alsace, Franche-Comté and Burgundy and the position thatI had taken in the rear of the enemy army,separating it from its supply dumps, fromits reserves, from its convoys and all itsequipment, placed it in a desperatesituation. It would have found its grave inthose vast regions that it had so pitilesslyplundered, when the treason of the duke ofRagusa [marshal Marmont] surrenderedthe capital and disorganized the army.

The unexpected behaviour of these twogenerals, who betrayed at the same timetheir fatherland, their Prince and theirbenefactor, changed the outcome of thewar.The disastrous situation of the enemywas such that at the end of the incidentwhich took place before Paris, he waswithout ammunition and separated fromhis reserve supplies.

In these great and new circumstances,my heart was torn, but my spirit remainedresolute. I consulted only the interest of thefatherland. I exiled myself on a rock in themiddle of the sea. My life was and still hadto be useful to you. I did not allow thegreat number of citizens who wished toaccompany me to share my fate: I thoughttheir presence would be useful in France,

278 1815:The Final Gamble

and I only took with me a handful of bravefellows necessary as my guard.

Raised to the throne by your choice, allthat has been done without you isillegitimate. For twenty-five years France hashad new interests, new institutions, a newglory, which could only be guaranteed by anational government and by a dynasty bornin these new circumstances.A prince whowould reign over you, who would sit on mythrone thanks to the very armies whichravaged our territory, would seek in vain tobolster himself by the principles of feudalrights; he could only assure the honor andthe rights of a small number of individuals,enemies of the people who, for twenty-fiveyears, have condemned them in all ournational assemblies.Your peace at home andrespect abroad would be lost forever.

Frenchman, in my exile I heard yourcomplaints and wishes.You wereclamouring for a government of yourchoice, which alone is legitimate.You wereblaming me for my long sleep, you werereproaching me for sacrificing the greatinterests of the state to my own comfort.

I crossed the sea in the midst of all sortsof perils. I arrived among you to regain myrights, which are yours.

Everything that certain individuals havedone, written, or said since the taking ofParis, I will ignore forever. It will have noinfluence on the memory that I retain ofthe important services that they haverendered, because there are events of such anature that they are beyond humancomprehension.

Frenchmen, there is no nation,however small it might be, which does nothave the right to reject the dishonor ofobeying a prince imposed by atemporarily victorious enemy.WhenCharles VII re-entered Paris andoverthrew the ephemeral throne of HenryVI, he recognized that he held his throneby the valor of his brave men and notfrom a prince-regent of England. It is

likewise to you alone and to thecourageous soldiers of the army that Igive and will always dedicate every duty.

Proclamation of 1 March 1815, in EricA.Arnold, ed., A Documentary Survey ofNapoleonic France (Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, 1994), pp. 345–348.

THE FINAL ACT

Napoleon’s second abdication, with its mas-terly understatement that “circumstancesappear to have changed,” sees the emperorregretting nothing and posing as a sacrificialvictim to foreign hatred.

Frenchmen, in beginning the war tomaintain national independence, I countedon the joining of all efforts, of all wills, andon the co-operation of all nationalauthorities. I was justified in hoping forsuccess, and I defied all the declarations ofthe powers against me.

Circumstances appear to have changed.

I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatredof the enemies of France. May they besincere in their declarations of onlywishing for my person!

My political life is ended, and I proclaimmy son, under the title Napoleon II,Emperor of the French.

The present ministers will temporarilyform the Government Council.Theinterest that I have in my son binds me toinvite the Chambers to recognize, withoutdelay, the urgency of the law.

Unite for the public safety, and toremain an independent nation.

At the Elysée, 22 June 1815.

From Eric A.Arnold, ed., A DocumentarySurvey of Napoleonic France (Lanham, MD:University Press of America, 1994), pp.357–358.

The Final Act 279

NAPOLEON ON WAR

In these general reflections recorded on SaintHelena, Napoleon gives his advice on gain-ing success in war, based on unity of com-mand, concentration of forces, and decisiveaction.Any aspiring Napoleon should also,headvises, study the great commanders of an-cient and modern times. Napoleon also be-trays his reading of the classics by using theold cliché of Fortune as a woman, so stressingthe importance of seizing favorable opportu-nities when they present themselves.

Every war ought to be methodical,because every war ought to be conductedin conformity with the principles and rulesof the art and without an object. It shouldbe carried on with forces proportional tothe obstacles that are foreseen.There aretherefore two sorts of offensive war—onethat is well understood and conformable tothe principles of the science and one that isill understood and which violates thoseprinciples. . . .

There should be only one army, forunity of command is of the first necessityin war.The army must be kept united.Thegreatest possible number of forces must beconcentrated on the field of battle.Thefavourable opportunity must be seized, forfortune is female—if you balk her today,you must not expect to meet with heragain tomorrow.

Make offensive war like Alexander,Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus,Turenne,Prince Eugene, and Frederick the Great.Read again and again the history of theireighty-eight campaigns and model yourselfon them: that is the only way to become agreat commander and to attain the secrets ofthe art.Your genius, when thus enlightened,will lead you to reject maxims contrary tothe principles of these great men.


GERMAINE DE STAËL

Although she gives the wrong impressionwhen she implies that she was the onlyone to see through Napoleon from the be-ginning, Mme. de Staël’s unremittinglyhostile views on Napoleon are among themost acute of his contemporaries. Theyalso shed unflattering light on Napoleon’smisogynistic, “Mediterranean” attitude to-ward women.

During the twelve years of exile towhich Napoleon condemned me, I oftenthought that he would be unable to bearthe misery of being deprived of France,having no memory of France in his heart.Nothing but the rocks of Corsica retracedhis childhood days; Necker’s daughter wasmore French than he. . . .

I guessed Napoleon’s character andpolitical schemes more quickly than mostpeople, and I am proud of that.Aninfallible instinct enlightens all real friendsof liberty about such things. But myposition at the beginning of the Consulatewas dreadful, because good society inFrance at the time thought Bonaparte thevery man to save them from anarchy orJacobinism.As a result, my spirit ofopposition earned me a lot of disapproval.Anyone who can see as far as tomorrow inpolitics arouses the wrath of people whocan see no further than today. I must say ittook even more strength to bear thepersecution of society than to exposemyself to the persecution of power.

I have always kept the memory of oneof those society tortures (if it is all right tospeak that way) that French aristocrats areso good at inflicting whenever it suits themon people who do not share theiropinions.A large part of the old nobilityhad rallied to Napoleon; some, as we haveseen since then, trying to recapture theirformer habits as courtiers, others hopingthat the first consul would bring back theold monarchy. Everyone knew I was

280 Napoleon on War

strongly against the system of governmentNapoleon was preparing, and thesupporters of arbitrary governmentfollowed their usual custom of callingopinions that tended to elevate the dignityof nations “antisocial.” If anyone were toremind the émigrés who came back underBonaparte how furiously they blamed thefriends of liberty who were still loyal to thesame theory, they might learn indulgencefrom remembering their mistakes.

I was the first woman exiled byNapoleon, though he banished manywomen of opposing opinions soonafterward. One of the most interesting wasthe Duchess of Chevreuse, who died ofthe heart condition brought on by herexile.As she lay dying, she could not getNapoleon’s permission to come back toParis one last time to consult her doctorand see her friends again.Where couldsuch luxuriating in evil come from, if notfrom a hatred of all independent beings?Women annoyed Napoleon as rebels; theywere of no use to his political designs, onthe one hand, and were less susceptiblethan men to the hopes and fears dispensedby power.As a result, he took pleasure insaying hurtful and vulgar things towomen. His pursuit of etiquette wasmatched by his hatred of chivalry: a badchoice to make from the manners offormer times. From his early habits ofRevolutionary days he also retained acertain Jacobin antipathy to brilliant Parissociety, which was greatly influenced bywomen; he was afraid of the art of teasingwhich we must admit is characteristic ofFrenchwomen. If Bonaparte had beenwilling to keep the proud role of greatgeneral and first magistrate of theRepublic, he would have floated with theheight of genius above all the littlestinging barbs of salon wit. Once hedecided to become a parvenu king, thebourgeois gentleman on the throne, hewas exposing himself to the kind ofsociety satire which can only be repressed

by the use of espionage and terror: andthat is how, in fact, he repressed it. . . .

Shortly after the Eighteenth Brumaire,Bonaparte was given a report that I hadspoken out in private society against theburgeoning oppression whose growth Icould foretell as clearly as if I could seeinto the future. Joseph Bonaparte, whosewit and conversation I liked, came to seeme saying:“My brother is complainingabout you. Only yesterday he asked me:‘Why isn’t Mme. de Staël supporting mygovernment? What does she want?Payment on her father’s account? I willorder it.To live in Paris? I will give mypermission.’”“Good Lord,” I replied.“It’sa question of what I think, not what Iwant.” I do not know if that answer wasever reported to Bonaparte, but I amconvinced at any rate that he made nosense of it if he did hear it, because hedoesn’t believe anybody can have sincereopinions about anything. Bonaparteconsiders every kind of morality aformula which has no more significancethan the complimentary close of a letter.After you have assured yourcorrespondent that you are his humbleservant, he has no right to requireanything of you. In the same way,Bonaparte believes that anyone who sayshe loves liberty, or believes in God, orprefers a clear conscience to self-interest,is just a man following the forms ofetiquette to explain his ambitiouspretensions or selfish calculations.Theonly kind of human being he does notunderstand is people who are sincerelyattached to an opinion, whatever theconsequences. Bonaparte considers suchmen either fools or shopkeepers trying toraise their own prices.As we shall see, theonly mistakes he has ever made in thisworld have been about decent people,whether as individuals or, even more, asnations. . . .

I do not think that Bonaparte hadalready made his plan for universal

Germaine de Staël 281

monarchy when he first took charge ofthings. I believe his system was, as he toldone of his friends shortly after theEighteenth Brumaire, to do “somethingnew every three months, so as to capturethe imagination of the French nation. InFrance, anyone who does not move aheadis lost.” He had promised himself to stampout French liberty and Europeanindependence day by day; he did not losesight of this goal, but he was able to adaptto circumstances. If the obstacle was toobig, he would go around it; if the wind wasblowing too strongly in the oppositedirection, he stopped short. He is a mostimpatient man at heart, but he has a talentfor standing still when necessary. He getsthis from the Italians, who are capable ofcontrolling themselves to reach their heart’sdesire exactly as if they had picked out thisgoal in cold blood. It was by alternatingtrickery and force that he conqueredEurope. Europe is a big word, though.What was Europe? At the time, it consistedof a few ministers, none of whom had asmuch wit as one would find in a randomsample of the men they governed.

Major Writings of Germaine de Staël, trans.Vivian Folkenflik (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1987), pp. 370–371, 375,376–377.

BENJAMIN CONSTANT

In his The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpationand their Relation to European Civilization(1814), Benjamin Constant considers Napo-leon as usurper and conqueror. It is usurpa-tion itself that explains Napoleon’s “evil,”more than the fatal flaws in his character. Healso, interestingly, sees Napoleon as a manout of his time, a throwback to an age be-fore international communications andcommerce and the growth of public opin-ion.Within a year of writing this assessment,it is worth remembering, Constant was col-

laborating with Napoleon by drawing upthe Additional Act to the constitutions ofthe empire during the Hundred Days. . . .

I shall not be accused of trying tojustify someone whom I never wished toacknowledge. But I believe that thosewho attribute his enterprises, his crimesand his fall to a perversity or folly peculiarto him, are in the wrong. On the contrary,he seems to me to have been powerfullyaffected both by his position as usurperand by the spirit of his century. Indeed, itwas in his nature to be more affected bythese causes than any other man wouldhave been.What characterized him wasthe absence of all moral sense, that is of allsympathy, all human emotion. He wasself-interest personified; if that self-interestproduced results which were disastrouslyodd, it is because it rested upon twoopposed and irreconcilable terms,usurpation, which made despotismnecessary, and a degree of civilizationwhich made it impossible. From this thereresulted contradictions, incoherences, aviolent double reaction which have beenwrongly taken for individualeccentricities. . . .

Had France remained at peace, herpeaceful citizens, her idle warriors wouldhave observed the despot, would havejudged him, and would have communicatedtheir judgments on him.Truth would havepassed through the ranks of the people.Usurpation would not have long withstoodthe influence of truth.Thus Bonaparte wascompelled to distract public attention bybellicose enterprises.War flung onto distantshores that part of the French nation thatstill had some real energy. It prompted thepolice harassment of the timid, whom itcould not force abroad. It struck terror intomen’s hearts, and left there a certain hopethat chance would take responsibility fortheir deliverance: a hope agreeable to fearand convenient to inertia. How many timeshave I heard men who were pressed toresist tyranny postponing this, during

282 Benjamin Constant

wartime till the coming of peace, and inpeacetime until war commences!

I am right therefore in claiming that ausurper’s sole resource is uninterruptedwar. Some object what if Bonaparte hadbeen pacific? Had he been pacific, hewould never have lasted for twelve years.Peace would have re-establishedcommunication among the differentcountries of Europe.These communi-cations would have restored to thought itsmeans of expression.Works publishedabroad would have been smuggled into thecountry.The French would have seen thatthey did not enjoy the approval of themajority of Europe: their prestige couldnot have been sustained. Bonaparteperceived this truth so well that he brokewith England in order to escape the Britishnewspapers.Yet even this was not enough.While a single country remained free,Bonaparte was never safe. Commerce,active, adroit, invisible, indefatigable,capable of overcoming any distance and ofinsinuating itself through a thousandroundabout means, would sooner or laterhave reintroduced into the empire thoseenemies whom it was so important to exilefrom it. Hence the Continental blockadeand the war with Russia.

What I assert about the means ofusurpation, I assert also about its fall. Iclaimed that it must fall by the inevitableeffect of the wars which it requires. Somehave objected that, had Bonaparte not madesuch and such a military error, he would nothave been overthrown. Not this time butsome other time; not today but tomorrow. Itis only too natural that a gambler, who everyday takes a new risk, should some day meetwith the one which must ruin him. . . .

I confess that I believe it is moreimportant to show that the evils inflictedby Bonaparte on France derived from thefact that his power had degenerated intousurpation, and thus put the blame onusurpation itself, rather than on someindividual as a unique being, made for evil,and committing crimes out of neithernecessity nor self-interest.The firstperspective teaches us great lessons for thefuture; the second transforms history into asterile study of isolated phenomena, andinto the mere enumeration of effectswithout causes.

Benjamin Constant, Political Writings,trans. and ed. Biancamaria Fontana(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1988), pp. 161, 163, 164, 165.

Benjamin Constant 283

CHRONOLOGYCHRONOLOGY

1769 15 August Birth of NapoleoneBuonaparte at Ajaccio, Corsica.

1779 January Napoleon enters school atAutun.

April Napoleon enters the MilitaryAcademy of Brienne.

1784 30 October Napoleon enters the ÉcoleMilitaire in Paris.

1785 September–October Napoleon graduatesfrom the École Militaire and is assignedto La Fère Artillery Regiment atValence.

1788 June Napoleon is attached to theSchool of Artillery at Auxonne.

1789 May Beginning of the FrenchRevolution with the meeting of theEstates General.

14 July Storming of the Bastille.

1791 1 April Napoleon promoted to firstlieutenant.

1 October Constitution of 1791establishes constitutional monarchy.

1792 February First Coalition against Franceformed by Prussia and Austria.

20 April France declares war onAustria.

28 May Napoleon promoted tocaptain.

10 August Louis XVI overthrown.

September Napoleon and his brotherLucien active in Jacobin clubs inCorsica.

22 September Proclamation of theFrench Republic.

1793 March The Buonaparte family isforced to flee from Corsica.

July Beginning of the Terror.

August–September Napoleon at siegeof Toulon.

16 September Napoleon appointedcommander of the French artillery.

22 December Napoleon promoted togeneral of brigade.

1794 6 February Napoleon assigned toArmy of Italy.

28 July/10 Thermidor Year II End ofTerror and execution ofRobespierre.

9–20 August Napoleon jailed atAntibes as a Jacobin.

1795 March–May Napoleon transferred toParis; he turns down assignment tothe Vendée.

21 August Napoleon assigned toBureau Topographique.

5 October/13 Vendémiaire Year IVSuppression of revolt in Paris byNapoleon’s “whiff of grapeshot.”

Chronology 285

16 October Napoleon promoted togeneral of division.

26 October Napoleon appointedcommander of the Army of theInterior.

3 November/12 Brumaire Year IVBeginning of Directory.

1796 2 March Napoleon appointedcommander of the Army of Italy.

9 March He marries Joséphine deBeauharnais.

6 April Beginning of Napoleon’s firstItalian campaign.

10 May Battle of Lodi.

15 May Napoleon enters Milan.

15–17 November Battle of Arcola.

1797 14 January Battle of Rivoli.

2 February Surrender of Mantua.

18 April Preliminary peace of Leobenmarks end of first Italian campaign.

17 October Treaty of Campo Formio.

1798 19 May Napoleon’s expedition sailsfrom Toulon for Alexandria andbeginning of the Egyptian campaign.

21 July Battle of the Pyramids.

1 August Battle of the Nile.

29 December Second Coalition formedagainst France.

1799 20 February Napoleon invades Syria.

19 March–20 May Siege of Acre.

18 June Purge of Directory;Napoleon’s ally, Paul Barras,consolidates his power.

24 August Napoleon sails for France.

16 October Napoleon in Paris.

9–10 November Coup of 18 Brumaire;Napoleon, Sieyès, and Ducosappointed temporary consuls.

12 December Constitution of Year VIII.Napoleon is first consul; Cambacérès

and Lebrun are second and thirdconsuls.

1800 7 February Constitution approved byplebiscite.

15–23 May Napoleon crosses theAlps.

Early June Beginning of second Italiancampaign.

14 June Battle of Marengo. End ofsecond Italian campaign.

5 November Negotiations forConcordat open with the papacy.

3 December Battle of Hohenlinden.

24 December “Opera Plot” attempt toassassinate Napoleon.

1801 9 February Treaty of Lunéville withAustria.

15 July Concordat signed with PopePius VII.

30 August French army in Egyptsurrenders to the British.

1802 26 January Napoleon becomespresident of the Republic of Italy.

25 March Treaty of Amiens withBritain.

1 May New education systemlaunched with creation of lycées.

19 May Legion of Honorestablished.

2 August Napoleon named Consul forLife.

4 August Constitution of Year X.

1803 11 March Camps established atBoulogne to train army for invasionof England.

18 May Rupture of Treaty of Amiensleads to resumption of war betweenFrance and Britain.

1804 February–March Royalist plot tokidnap Napoleon—arrests of GeneralsMoreau and Pichegru and GeorgesCadoudal.

286 Chronology

20 March Execution of the duke ofEnghien.

21 March Civil Code promulgated.

18 May Proclamation of the FrenchEmpire.

19 May Marshals of the empirecreated.

2 December Coronation of Napoleonas emperor.

1805 26 May Napoleon becomes king ofItaly.

7 June Eugène de Beauharnais namedviceroy of Italy.

9 August Third Coalition formed—Austria joins Britain and Russiaagainst France.

25 August The Grande Armée leavesBoulogne for Germany.

20 October Battle of Ulm.

21 October Battle of Trafalgar.

14 November Napoleon entersVienna.

2 December Battle of Austerlitz.

26 December Treaty of Pressburg withAustria.

1806 30 March Joseph Bonaparte becomesking of Naples.

4 April Publication of ImperialCatechism.

May–June Creation of Kingdom ofHolland with Louis Bonaparte asking.

12 July Napoleon establishes theConfederation of the Rhine.

July Formation of Fourth Coalitionled by Prussia, Russia, and Britain.

25 September Prussian army invadesthe Confederation of the Rhine.

6 October Napoleon takes commandof the Grande Armée in Germany.

14 October Battles of Jena-Auerstädt.

27 October Napoleon enters Berlin.

21 November Continental Systeminaugurated by Berlin Decrees.

18 December Napoleon entersWarsaw.

1807 7 February Battle of Eylau.

14 June Battle of Friedland.

7–9 July Treaty of Tilsit betweenFrance, Russia, and Prussia.

30 November Occupation of Lisbon byGeneral Junot marks the beginning ofthe Peninsular War.

1808 1 March Organization of the imperialnobility.

18 March Ferdinand VII proclaimedking of Spain.

2 May Revolt in Madrid againstJoachim Murat’s troops marksbeginning of Spanish revolt againstFrench rule.

7 July Joseph Bonaparte crownedking of Spain; Murat and CarolineBonaparte become king and queen ofNaples.

30 July Joseph evacuates Madrid.

8 October Napoleon meets AlexanderI at Erfurt.

5 November Napoleon assumescommand of the army of Spain.

13 December Napoleon recapturesMadrid.

1809 16 January Battle of Corunna;Napoleon leaves Spain.

6 April Fifth Coalition formed byBritain,Austria, and rebel Spain.

22 April Battle of Eckmühl.

26 April British army under ArthurWellesley (later duke of Wellington)lands at Lisbon.

17 May France annexes the PapalStates.

21–22 May Battle of Essling (Aspern).

Chronology 287

5–6 July Battle of Wagram.

14 October Treaty of Schönbrunnbetween France and Austria.

30 November Napoleon announcesintention to divorce Joséphine.

15 December The divorce ispronounced.

1810 17 February Rome annexed to FrenchEmpire.

1 April Napoleon marries Marie-Louise of Austria.

1 July Holland annexed to France;Louis abdicates as king.

29 September Battle of Bussaco.

13 December North Germanterritories annexed to FrenchEmpire.

31 December Alexander I breaks withContinental System.

1811 January–December Preparations forRussian campaign.

20 March Birth of Napoleon II, kingof Rome.

1812 30 May Sixth Coalition formed byRussia and Sweden with supportfrom Britain and rebel Spain;Napoleon takes command of GrandeArmée in East Prussia and Poland.

24–25 June The Grande Armée crossesthe Niemen, beginning the Russiancampaign.

22 July Battle of Salamanca.

7 September Battle of Borodino.

14 September Napoleon entersMoscow.

October Duke of Wellington (thenViscount Wellington) made alliedcommander in Spain.

19 October French begin retreat fromMoscow.

23 October Malet conspiracy in Paris.

26–28 November Remnants of GrandeArmée cross the Berezina.

5 December Napoleon leaves his army;Murat takes command.

19 December Napoleon reaches Paris.

1813 January–April The Grande Arméecompletes its retreat into Germanyunder Eugène de Beauharnais afterMurat returns to Naples.

26 February Treaty of Kalisch betweenPrussia and Russia.

16 March Prussia declares war onFrance.

2 May Battle of Lützen.

21 May Battle of Bautzen.

21 June Wellington defeats JosephBonaparte at Vitoria.

26–27 August Battle of Dresden.

16–19 October Battle of Leipzig(“Battle of the Nations”).

October–November Collapse of theConfederation of the Rhine andNapoleon’s power in Germany.

1814 January–March Campaign of France.

11 January Murat defects to Allies.

10–18 February Napoleon scores aseries of victories against the invadingAllies in eastern Europe.

12 March Wellington’s Allied armyenters Bordeaux.

31 March Marshals Marmont andMortier surrender Paris to the Allies.

2–3 April The Senate and theLegislative Body proclaim thedeposition of Napoleon.

6 April Napoleon abdicates in favor ofhis son.

11 April Napoleon abdicatesunconditionally.

1 May Treaty of Paris; Louis XVIIIproclaimed king of France.

288 Chronology

4 May Napoleon starts his exile onElba.

29 May Death of Joséphine atMalmaison.

1814–1815 September–June Congress of Vienna

1815 25 February Napoleon sails from Elba.

1 March Napoleon lands in Francenear Cannes.

20 March Napoleon arrives in Paris;beginning of the Hundred Days.

16 June Battles of Ligny and Quatre-Bras.

18 June Battle of Waterloo.

22 June Napoleon’s secondabdication.

7 July Allies enter Paris.

2 August Napoleon declared prisonerby the Allies.

7 August Napoleon leaves Plymouthfor exile on Saint Helena.

16 October Napoleon’s exile begins.

20 November Second Treaty of Paris.

1821 5 May Death of Napoleon on SaintHelena.

1840 15 December Napoleon’s remains arereturned to Paris and interred in theInvalides.

Chronology 289

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INDEXINDEX

Aaland Islands, 13Abdication, First, xx, 1, 19,

51–52, 61, 78, 102, 155,184, 190, 219,223

Abdication, Second, xxi, 2,102, 122, 227, 279

Abensberg, Battle of, 74Aboukir, Battle of, 89, 142,

169, 171Académie Française, 56Acre, Siege of, 89, 142Acte Additionnel, xx, 2–3, 52,

64, 65, 121, 236Acton, Lord (historian), 179Adda, River, 149–150Additional Act. See Acte

AdditionnelAdige, River, 5, 49Agriculture, 87

See also PeasantryAgueda, River, 58Aix-Les-Bains, 20Ajaccio, xii, xiii, 3, 33, 34, 35,

69, 100Alessandria, 157–158Alexander I,Tsar of Russia,

xvii, xix, 1, 3–4, 9, 13,15, 20, 21, 51–52, 61, 73,94, 95, 104, 105, 109,137, 138, 145, 150–151,155, 157, 165, 169, 170,187, 195, 203–204, 212,224, 244, 259

Alexandria, 88, 89, 138, 168,185

Algiers, 229Alle, River, 105–106Alpone, River, 5

Alsace, 87, 126, 145, 211Alvintzi, Josef, 5–6Ambleteuse, 142American Philosophical

Society, 33Amiens, Peace of, xv, 4–5,

32–33, 60, 149, 182, 201,220

Ancona, 129, 194Andalusia, 14, 198, 232Angers, 24Angoulême, Duke of, 116Anjou, 57Annoux, 77Antommarchi, Francesco, 227Antwerp, 22, 49, 168Apotheosis of Napoleon (Vernet),

252Aragon, 198, 237Aranjuez,Tumult of, 56Arcola, Battle of, 5–6, 11, 42,

114, 128, 142, 220Bonaparte au Pont d’Arcole

(Alice Guy), 178Arenenberg, 20Armed Neutrality, 6, 67, 79,

195Army, French, 6–7, 141

general staff, 25Lazare Carnot and, 49Pierre Daru and, 74–75See also Grande Armée

Art of Warfare, Napoleonand, 7–8, 105, 112–113,280

Artillery, 8, 161, 233Aspern, Battle of. See Essling,

Battle of

Atala (Chateaubriand), 56Augereau, Charles, 5, 8–9, 16,

17, 49, 111, 161Augsburg, Bishopric, 208Augusta of Bavaria, 18, 19Austen, Frank, 255Austerlitz, Battle of, xvii, 3–4,

9–10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 23,51, 55, 61, 63, 73, 78,113, 134, 138, 142, 171,189, 195, 201, 208, 232,246, 249

Austerlitz campaign, 85, 237,253

Austria, xiii, xv, xvii, xviii, xix,10–11, 18, 47, 54–55, 63,81–82, 95, 103, 110, 124,159, 164–165, 208, 215,241, 243, 247, 252

and coalitions, 60–61,120–121, 201

at Congress of Vienna,254–255

Danube Campaigns, 73–74Italian Campaigns, 127–129Louis Bonaparte finds

refuge in, 34and Poland, 204and Prussia, 211–212and Revolutionary Wars,

219–220Autun, 241

college, xii, 34Auxerre, military school, 77Auxonne, artillery school, xiiiAvignon, 42, 194, 195

Bacciochi, Felix, 30

Index 305

Badajoz, 199Baden, 26, 94, 208Bagration, Pyotr Ivanovich, 10,

13–14, 39, 96, 142, 224Bailen, Battle of, 14, 197Balzac, Honoré de, 164Bamberg, 25Bank of France, 14, 107, 166,

190Barbé-Marbois, François, 190Barclay de Tolly, Mikhail,

Prince, 13, 14–16,138–139, 224

Barings Bank, 190Bar-le-Duc, 189Barras, Paul, xiv, 16–17, 82,

102, 245, 251–252and coup of 18 Brumaire,

40–42Barrès, Maurice, 178Bassano, Battle of, 17, 49, 142,

220Batavian Republic, 4, 17, 42,

183Battle of Sorno Sierra (Vernet),

252‘Battle of the Nations’. See

Leipzig, Battle ofBautzen, Battle of, 15, 17–18,

27, 83, 104, 109, 184, 190Bavaria, Kingdom of, 18, 19,

63, 109, 120, 208, 230,248

Bayonne, 56, 110, 169, 197,199, 229

Constitution of, 33, 234Beauharnais,Alexandre de,

18–19, 20Beauharnais, Eugène de, xvii,

18–19, 20, 21, 39, 58,103, 109, 112, 116, 155,173

as viceroy of Italy, 129, 163Beauharnais, Eugénie

Hortense de, 19–20,33–34, 187

on Caroline Bonaparte, 28Beauharnais, Joséphine de, xiv,

xx, 16, 18–19, 20–21, 37,60, 114, 187, 252

coronation, 68divorce, xviii, 100, 217portrait, 93

Beethoven, Ludwig Van, 11

Belgium, 11, 21–22, 27, 47, 49,87, 134, 183, 194, 195,232, 254

Bellerophon HMS, xxi, 2Benningsen, Count Levin Von,

96, 105Berchtesgarden, 18Beresford,William Carr,

206–207Berezina, River, 85, 138–139,

204, 224Berg, Grand Duchy of, 22, 91,

171, 221Berg, Louise, 233Bergeron, Louis (historian),

185Berlin, xvii, 82, 104, 108, 132,

150, 165, 225Berlin Decrees, xvii, 23, 66,

165Bernadotte, Jean-Baptiste, 19,

22, 23–24, 27, 49, 60, 64,78, 147, 161, 190, 236,257

Bernard, Henri, 124Berne, 238Bernier, Etienne, 24–25, 125Berthier, Louis, 25–26, 113,

149, 161, 194Besançon, 166Bessarabia, 255Bessières, Jean-Baptiste, 161Best, Geoffrey (historian), 126,

209Beugnot, Claude, 22Biberach, Second Battle of, 111Bichat, François, 123Biens Nationaux, 26, 59, 62Bignon, Louis, 26Bilbao, 255Blücher, Gebhard Von, xxi,

26–27, 81, 101, 110,116, 122, 132, 147,148,151, 212, 230,259–260, 261

Bohemia, 103Army of, 81, 146–147

Bologna, 57, 194Bonaparte at Arcola (Gros), 5Bonaparte, Carlo, xii, 27–28,

30, 35–36, 193Bonaparte, Caroline, 28–30,

171–173, 187Bonaparte, Charles Joseph, 32

Bonaparte, Elisa, 27, 30–31as grand duchess of Tuscany,

247–248Bonaparte, Jérôme, xvii, 13,

31–32, 38, 115, 244as king of Westphalia, 262

Bonaparte, Joseph, xii, xvii,xviii, xix, 1, 2, 14, 27,32–33, 45, 56, 60, 112,134, 151–152, 173,189–190, 227–228, 232,253, 255, 260

as king of Naples, 175as king of Spain, 197–199,

234 Bonaparte, Louis, xvii, xix, 17,

20, 33–34, 112, 144as king of Holland, 121,

183 Bonaparte, Lucien, xiii, xv, 2,

27, 34–35, 115, 193, 207,217, 236, 247

and coup of 18 Brumaire,40–41

on Felix Bacciochi, 30 Bonaparte, Maria Letizia, xii,

27, 30, 35–36, 100,201–203

on Caroline Bonaparte,28–29

Bonaparte, Napoleon Joseph(Bonapartist Pretender),32

Bonaparte, Pauline, 36–38,89–90, 92–93, 144, 253

Bonaparte, Prince Napoleon(Bonapartist Pretender),32, 38

Bonaparte Visiting the PlagueVictims at Jaffa (Gros),114–115

Bonapartism, 38–39, 176, 196Romantic, 221–222

Bordeaux, xx, 42, 87, 99Bordentown, New Jersey, 33Borghese, Prince Camillo, 37Borodino, Battle of, xix, 13, 15,

18, 39, 78, 116, 138, 170,173, 184, 204, 224

Boswell, James, 193Boulogne, xvi, 111Bourges, 155Bourgoin,Thérèse, 54Bourrienne, Louis, 40, 244

306 Index

Boyen, Hermann Von, 132Boyer, Charles, 178Boyer, Christine, 35, 115Brando, Marlon, 178Brazil, 197, 206Bremen, 91Brest, 181Brienne, Military School, xii,

27, 40Brittany, 57, 116Brive-La-Gaillarde, 42Brixen, Bishopric, 208Brumaire, Coup of 18 (1799),

xv, xvi, 9, 16, 21, 23, 24,32, 35, 40–42, 46, 49, 53,70, 75, 82, 102, 128, 134,137, 142, 144, 145, 155,161, 162, 168, 169, 170,171, 206, 217, 219, 220,228, 232, 235, 241,269–270

Brune, Guillaume, 42–43, 161,251

Brunswick, Duke of, 132Brussels, 16, 47, 77, 116, 215,

232, 259, 261Bucharest,Treaty of, 138Buenos Aires, 233Bulgaria, 13Bunzlau, 139Burgos, 197Burgundy, 48, 158, 159Burke, Edmund, 70Bussaco, Battle of, 43, 162, 199,

261

Cabanis, Georges, 123, 247 Cadiz, 234, 246

Constitution, 100, 234 Cadoudal, Georges, 45, 57,

200, 223Caen, 40Cairo, 80, 88, 89, 127, 138, 168,

213, 223Calabria, 113

Revolt in, 45–46, 117 Caligiero, Battle of, 55Calvi, 182Cambacérès, Jean-Jacques de,

46–47, 65, 105, 112, 156,219

Cambronne, General, 260Camerino, 129Campbell, Sir Neil, 89–90

Campo Formio,Treaty of, xiv,11, 47, 103, 128, 142,152, 167, 219–220, 252

Canary Isles, 182Cannes, xxCanning, George, 47–48, 50,

149, 258Canning, Stratford, 238–239Canova,Antonio, 37Cape St.Vincent, Battle of, 182Caprara, Giovanni, Cardinal, 24Capri, 151Carl August, Duke of Weimar,

48Carnot, Lazare, 16, 48–49, 54,

86, 121Carrara, 30Caserta, 28Castaños, Francisco, 14Castiglione, Battle of, 8, 49,

128Castlereagh, Robert Stewart,

Viscount, 48, 50, 149,165, 258

Catalonia, 237Army of, 9, 111

Câteau-Cambrésis, 169Catherine of Württemberg,

Princess, 31, 32Catherine Pavlovna, Grand

Duchess, 187Catherine the Great, 187, 195

Napoleon compared to, 94 Catholic Church, xvi, 50–51,

62, 100, 125, 188–189,193–194, 201–203, 206,223

in Belgium, 21–22in Cisalpine Republic, 58and education, 88in Illyria, 124in Naples, 33property, 26See also Concordat, Pius VII

Caulaincourt, Louis de, 50,51–52, 121

Censorship, 52, 207–208Centralization, 52–53, 168Ceva, 56Cévennes, 54Ceylon, 4, 151Chabrol, Comte de, 121Chaillot, 16Châlons, 101

Champagny, Jean-Baptiste, 53,158

Champaubert, Battle of, 101Chandler, David G (historian),

224–225Chanteloup, 54Chaptal, Jean-Antoine, 53, 54,

126–127, 220–221, 236Charlemagne, xvii, xxii, 67–68,

179Charleroi, xxi, 40, 215, 259Charles,Archduke of Austria,

19, 54–55, 73–74, 85, 95,103, 157, 257

Charles Emmanuel IV, King ofPiedmont-Sardinia, 254

Charles, Hippolyte, 20–21Charles IV, King of Spain, 56,

83, 99–100, 110,111–112, 197, 229, 234

Charles X, King of France,115, 150, 161, 242

Charles XII, King of Sweden,xix

Charlottenburg, 151Chartreuse de Parme, La

(Stendhal), 237Chateaubriand, René de, 52,

56, 80, 122, 176, 221, 243Château-Thierry, Battle of,

101Châtillon-sur-Seine, 159Chaumont,Treaties of, 101Chénier, Marie-Joseph, 247Cherasco,Treaty of, 56–57,

167, 254Cherbourg, 168Chevaliers de la Foi, 223Chouannerie, 45, 57, 70, 223,

251Cintra, Convention of, 206Cisalpine Republic, xiv-xv,

xvi, 47, 57–58, 129, 148,152, 163, 194, 228

Cispadane Republic, 57Ciudad Rodrigo, 228

siege of, 58, 199 Civil Code, xvi, xxi, 31, 46,

58–60, 62, 124, 144, 205,206, 219, 224

See also Law Civil Constitution of the

Clergy, xvi, 24, 50,193–194

Index 307

Clary, Désirée, 23 60, 238Clary, Etienne, 60Clary, Julie, 32, 33, 60, 238Clausewitz, Carl Von, 39, 108,

132, 225Cleves, 171Coalitions, 60–61

First, xiv, 11, 211, 219Second, xv, 11, 57, 88–89,

120, 128, 151–152, 157,162, 195, 220, 241

Seventh, xix, 108Sixth, xixThird, xvii, 11, 73, 138, 201

Code Napoléon. See CivilCode

Code of Civil Procedure, 144Code of Criminal Procedure,

61, 144Coimbra, 43Colli, Michael Von, 167Collingwood,Admiral

Cuthbert, 181, 183, 246Comédie Française, 95Commercial Code, 61–62,

86–87, 144Compiègne, 25, 56Comtat Venaissin, 194, 195Concordat, xvi, 21, 24, 26,

32–33, 45, 50–51, 57, 62,70, 91, 125, 188–189,194, 201, 206, 223, 247,251, 270–271

Condillac, Etienne de, 123Condorcet,Antoine Nicolas,

123Confederation of the Rhine,

xvii, xx, 18, 22, 48, 61,63, 80, 103, 229, 243,262

Consalvi, Cardinal Ercole, 62Conscription, 63–64

in Illyria, 124 Conservatoire des Arts et

Métiers, 54Constant, Benjamin, xx, 2–3,

52, 64, 65, 121, 123,235–236, 247, 282–283

Constantine, Grand Duke, 9Constantinople, 42, 74, 189Constitutions, 64–65

of Year III, 231of Year VIII, xv, 41, 65, 90,

91, 146, 230, 232, 247

of Year X, xv, 2–3, 65, 90,247

Consulate, xv-xvi, 65–66, 82,102, 146

Continental System, xvii-xviii,xix, 23, 40, 66–67, 87,95, 102, 126, 165–166,196, 208, 241, 244, 250

Austria and, 230Belgium and, 22Denmark and, 79effects in Great Britain, 114,

181effects in Italy, 129Grand Duchy of Berg and,

22Holland and, 34, 121, 183Illyria and, 124Naples and, 173, 175Neuchâtel and, 25Portugal and, 197, 206Russia and, 4, 61Sweden and, 23Switzerland and, 238

Copenhagen, 82Battle of, 6, 48, 67, 79, 182,

185 Coppet, 235–236Corinne (de Staël), 236Cornwallis,Admiral Lord, 50,

181Coronation, xvii, 24, 51,

67–68, 91, 100Coronation of the Emperor

Napoleon (David), 68, 77 Corsica, xii, xiii, 3, 27, 34,

35–36, 68–69, 89, 108,131, 168, 182, 193228,265

Corsican Rangers, 151 Corunna, Battle of, 69–70,

169, 197, 232Council of State, 46, 53, 54, 64,

65, 70, 91, 102, 146, 206,217–219, 247

commission of claims, 219Section of the Interior,

220War Department, 42

Counter-Revolution, 42, 45,57, 70–71, 81

See also Royalists Courcelles, 159Cracow, 204, 205

Criminal Code, 144Cuneo, 56Czartoryski,Adam, 3, 204

Dabrowski, Jan Henryk,203–204

Dalberg, Karl Von, 63, 103, 123Dalmatia. See Illyria

Dandolo,Vincenzo, 124Danton, Georges, 42Danube, River, 95, 249, 257

Danube Campaigns, xvii,xviii, 13, 73–74, 95

Danubian Principalities, 74Danzig, Siege of, 145Darcet Family, 127Daru, Pierre, 74–75, 141, 247Daunou, Pierre, 75, 123, 247David, Jacques-Louis, 68,

75–77, 92, 114, 128,221

Davout, Louis, 2, 13, 31, 39,77–78, 85, 96, 116,121–122, 132, 161, 196,224, 257

De Gaulle, Charles, 38Death of Marat (David), 77Decrès, Denis, 78–79,

181–182Delphine (de Staël), 236Denmark, 24, 79

and Armed Neutrality, 6 Dennewitz, Battle of, 23, 109Denon, Dominique Vivant, 79,

173–174Departments, 146, 207

Charente, 156Corse du Sud, 3of Empire, 91of Grand Duchy of

Frankfurt, 103Hérault, 46of Kingdom of Italy, 129Landes, 82Liamone, 3Manche, 168Seine, 156, 207Seine-et-Oise, 168

Desaix, Louis, 158, 222, 229Description de l’Egypte, 80, 88Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 119Destutt de Tracy,Antoine, 123Dieudonné,Albert, 178Dijon, 135

308 Index

Diplomatic Service, 26, 51–52,80–81

Directory, xiv-xv, 16, 23, 36,37, 46, 47, 57, 75, 81, 82,88, 91, 104, 128, 131,134, 144, 145, 149–150,167, 190, 200, 217, 219,220, 241, 243

Coup of 18 Brumaire,40–42

Joseph Bonaparte and, 32of Ligurian Republic, 148Lucien Bonaparte and, 35rule in Belgium, 21Sieyès and, 231–232and Switzerland, 238

Disasters of War,The (Goya),112, 117

Dnieper, River, 85Dommartin, Cousin de, 245Donauwörth, 73D’Ornano, Philippe, 258Dos de Mayo (Goya), 112, 197,

235Dourdan, 223Dresden, 78, 81–82, 108, 111,

132, 152, 165, 169, 230Battle of, 11, 104

Dubrovnik, 124Ducos, Roger, 40–42, 65, 82,

231–232Dumas,Alexandre, 164, 178Dumas, Mathieu, 75Dundas, Henry, 88Dupâquier, Jacques (historian),

236Duphot, Leonard, 60, 194Dupont, Pierre, 14, 249Duroc, Géraud, 82–83Düsseldorf, 22, 233

East India Company,British, 190Dutch, 17

Eblé, Jean-Baptiste, 85Eckmühl, Battle of, 74, 78, 85Ecole des Mines, 54Ecole Militaire, Paris, xii-xii,

40, 77, 86Ecole Normale, 86Ecole Polytechnique, 86, 87,

167–168Ecoles Centrales, 86Ecoles Secondaires, 86

Economy, French, 86–87Continental System and,

66–67under Directory, 81

Economy, Italian, 129Ecouen, 88Education, xvi, 53, 86, 87–88,

152–153in Kingdom of Italy, 129Roederer and, 220technical, 54

Egyptian Campaign, xv, 16, 19,20, 33, 40, 60, 77, 78, 79,82, 88–89, 92137–138,142, 143, 159–161,167–168, 171, 182,184–185, 238, 241, 253,267–268

formation of SecondCoalition, 220

Russia and, 195 Eichstädt, Bishopric, 208El Halepi, Suleiman, 138Elba, xvi, xx, 1, 2, 4, 36, 37, 61,

89–90, 121, 158, 159,223, 254, 258,261

Elbe, River, 19, 78, 81Army of the, 17

Elchingen, Battle of, 184Elections, 90Eléments d’Idéologie (Destutt de

Tracy), 123Elizabeth-Marie of Bavaria,

Princess, 25Elster, River, 146–147, 155,

205Émigrés, xvi, 26, 70, 80, 91, 94,

142, 143, 185, 231Emperor Distributing Eagles,The

(David), 77Empire, xvii-xx, 47, 65–66,

91–92Empire Style, 92–94, 200,

218Grand Dignitaries of, 112,

185 Enghien, Louis Antoine de

Condé, Duc d’, 3, 47, 51,56, 94, 223, 229, 241

England. See Great BritainArmy of, xvi, xvii, 73, 112

Enlightenment, 3, 112Napoleon and, xxii, 94, 249Paoli and, 193

Erfurt, 108Congress of, 95, 243

Essling, Battle of, 55, 74, 95,113, 142, 162, 189, 257

Etruria, Kingdom of, 247Eylau, 105

Battle of, xvii, 9, 13, 15, 78,95–97, 109, 116, 143,171, 184, 232

Federalist Revolt, xiii, 70, 99,233

Fédéré Movement, 99Feldkirch, Battle of, 9Ferdinand IV, King of Naples,

175Ferdinand VII, King of Spain,

56, 99–100, 110, 112,197, 199, 229, 234

Ferrara, 57, 194Ferrière,Alexandre de, 236Fesch, Joseph, 21, 36, 100,

201–203Film, Napoleon on, 178Finance, 14, 100–101, 107,

166, 190–191in Kingdom of Naples, 221local, 219

Finkenstein, 258Finland, 13, 15, 254, 255Five Days, Battles of, 101Flahaut, Charles de, 20Flanders, 87, 260Fleurus, Battle of, 134“Flight of the Eagle”, 90Florence, 28, 30, 33, 34, 38, 90,

194, 248Flushing, 258Foch, Ferdinand, xiiFontainebleau, 1, 51, 201

Concordat of, 62, 201Fontainebleau Decree, 66,

102Treaty of, 1, 110

Forrest,Alan (historian), 63–64Fort de Joux, 246Fouché, Joseph, 2, 45,

102–103, 107, 125, 156,190, 219, 221, 223, 229,231–232

and Coup of 18 Brumaire,40–42

and Hundred Days,121–122

Index 309

on murder of duke ofEnghien, 94

France, Campaign of 1814,xix-xx, 101, 113, 116,145, 161, 166, 170, 196

Francis I (II), Emperor, xvii,xviii, xx, 1, 11, 54, 103,104, 158, 159, 176, 248

Franconia, 145Franco-Prussian War, 38, 178Frankfurt, Grand Duchy of, 91,

103–104Frauendorf, 15Frederick Augustus, Elector of

Saxony, 229–230, 258Frederick the Great, 26–27,

104, 211Napoleon compared to, 94

Frederick VI, King ofDenmark, 79

Frederick William II, King ofPrussia, 211

Frederick William III, King ofPrussia, 104, 132, 137,150, 211–212, 244

Freemasonry, 104–105French Revolution, xiii-xv, 65,

91, 243Catholic Church and, xvi,

50festivals, 77Jean-Antoine Chaptal and,

54law, 144Lazare Carnot and, 48–49Lucien Bonaparte and,

34–35Metternich and, 165Napoleon and, xii, xv-xvi,

xxii, 68, 163, 178Paoli and, 193Papacy and, 193–194peasantry in, 195–196Saliceti and, 228Sieyès and, 231–232Spain and, 234Talleyrand and, 241Terror, xiii, 34–35, 46, 53,

54, 75, 104, 144, 169,220, 231, 245

William Pitt and, 201See also Revolutionary

Wars Fréron, Louis, 245

Friedland, Battle of, xvii, 13,15, 51, 61, 73, 105–106,109, 113, 116, 142, 170,184, 189, 204, 244, 253

Fuentes de Onoro, 163Fuller, J.F.C. (historian), 113Furet, François (historian), 67,

231

Galicia, 204, 230, 258 Gance,Abel, 178Garonne, River, 245Gascony, 232Gates, David (historian), 95–96Gaudin, Martin, 107, 166Generals, 49, 107–108Geneva, 120, 239Genoa, xvii, 47, 61, 69, 108,

114, 128, 148, 162, 189,193, 232, 254

See also Ligurian Republic George III, King of Great

Britain, 201Gérando, Marie-Anne de, 217Gérard, Etienne, 117Gérard, François, 29, 32, 93,

210, 218Géricault,Théodore, 172German Confederation, 18,

165, 187, 254German War of Liberation,

xviii, 108–109, 263Germany,

campaigns in, xix, 17–18,55, 108–109, 116, 141,152, 155, 170, 196, 232

freemasonry in, 105On Germany (de Staël), 236Romanticism in, 221

Geyl, Pieter (historian), xxii,199

Ghent, 121, 150Gillray, James, 5, 242Girodet,Anne-Louis, 222Glasgow, 168Gneisenau,August Von,

109–110, 148, 212, 230on Great Britain, 114

Godoy, Manuel, 56, 99–100,110, 234

Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Laurent,82, 110–111, 161

Goya, Francisco, 111–112, 117,197, 235

Grande Armeé, xvii, xviii, xix,6–7, 18, 73, 74–75, 77,85, 105, 109, 112–113,138–139, 141, 143, 161,224, 246, 249

Bavarian Corps, 111Polish Division, 204

Gray, Randal (historian), 170Graz, 34Great Britain, 110, 113–114,

193, 200–201, 215, 220,241

Armed Neutrality and, 6Cadoudal in, 45and Coalitions, 60–61and Congress of Vienna,

254–255Continental System and,

xvii-xviii, 66–67, 165financial power, 101foreign policy, 47–48, 50,

149Joseph Bonaparte exiled in,

33and Louis XVIII, 150Lucien Bonaparte in, 33naval superiority, 180–181,

246–247Orders in Council, xviii, 23,

165, 250and Ottoman Empire, 189and Peace of Amiens, 4–5projected invasion of, xvi-

xvii, 23, 142relations with United

States, 249–250and South America,

233–234strategy against Napoleon,

xviiiWar of 1812, 250

Grenelle, 54Grenoble, 121Gros,Antoine Jean, 5, 92, 96,

114–116, 252Gross Beeren, Battle of, 23,

109, 190Grouchy, Emmanuel de, 105,

116–117, 161–162, 260Guadeloupe, 246Guastalla, 1, 37Gudin, Charles, 132Guerrilla Warfare, 117–118

in Calabria, 45–46

310 Index

in Peninsular War, 198–199,206

in Tyrol, 248 Guiana, 131, 200Guieu, Jean, 5Guitry, Sacha, 178Guy,Alice, 178Guyenne, 171

Haiti, 37, 119, 144–145,245–246, 249–250

Hamburg, 40, 78, 91Hamilton, Emma, 182Hamilton, Sir William, 182Hanover, xvi, 23, 170Hanseatic Cities, 23, 42, 66, 91Hardenberg, K.A.Von, 212Hedouville, Gabriel d’, 251Heilsberg, Battle of, 13Heliopolis, 138Helvetic Republic, 119–120,

238Hercules and Diomedes (Gros),

115–116Herzen,Alexander, xiiHesse-Cassel, 26Historical Documents and

Reflections on theGovernment of Holland(Louis Bonaparte), 34

Historical Essay on the TemporalPower of the Papacy(Daunou), 75

History of France Since the 18Brumaire (Bignon), 26

Hitler,Adolf, xix, xxi, 176Hoche, General, 19Hof, 15Hofer,Andreas, 11, 18, 120,

248Hohenlinden, Battle of, 11, 18,

116, 120–121, 128–129,158, 169, 184, 220

Hohenlohe, Prince Von, 132Holland, 9, 22, 42, 66, 105,

142, 169, 237Kingdom of, xvii, 17, 20,

91, 121, 189–190Louis Bonaparte as king of,

34, 121See also Netherlands

Holstein, 142Holstein-Gottorp family, 187Holy Alliance, 4

Hood, Samuel, 245Hope & Co, 183, 190Horne,Alistair (historian), xiiHübscher, Catherine (Mme

Lefebvre), 145Hugo,Victor, 164, 178, 221,

222Humboldt,Alexander Von, 94Hundred Days, xx-xxi, 2–3, 9,

20, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33, 34,35, 36, 42, 49, 52, 53, 54,61, 64, 65, 75, 78, 90,100, 102, 107, 110, 111,116, 121–122, 134, 137,143, 145, 150, 155, 158,159,161, 163, 166, 168,170, 188, 190, 195, 221,223, 229, 233, 236, 237,253, 258

Murat and, 28, 173Ney and, 184

Hungary, 103Hyde de Neuville, Jean

Guillaume, xv, 157

Idéologues, 75, 123–124, 220 Illyria, 11, 47, 91, 117, 124,

134–135, 159–161, 230,244

Istria, 208 Imperial Catechism, 125, 200,

271–272Imperial Guard, 6, 39, 105,

108, 113, 125, 143, 148,260

Old Guard, 1, 125, 145, 170Young Guard, 170, 196

Imperial Nobility, 26See also Nobility

Imperial University, xvi, 87,126

Inconstant (brig), 90India, 88, 185, 195, 227, 260Industry, 54, 67, 87, 126–127

in Belgium, 22, 67in Italy, 129

Ingres, Jean AugusteDominique, 177

Inn, River, 18Innsbruck, 120Institut National, 80, 127, 168,

220Institute of Egypt, 80, 88, 127,

168

Interior,Army of the, xiv, 16,232

Invalides, Les, xxi, 31–32, 33,134, 167, 176, 178, 189

Ionian Islands, 47, 244Ireland, 260

Dublin, 260Galway, 151Union with Great Britain,

50, 114, 201 Istituto Elisa (Lucca), 30Italian Campaigns, xiv, xv, 5–6,

13, 17, 23, 33, 40, 47, 49,55, 56–57, 82, 108,127–129, 142, 143, 148,157, 159–161, 162, 167,194, 196, 204, 219–220,232, 237, 238, 253

Murat and, 171and Napoleonic legend, xiv,

5, 114, 176, 267Italian Royal Guard, 19Italy, 110, 195, 254–255

Army of, xiv, 8, 20, 42, 49127–129, 137, 155, 161,162, 217, 228

freemasonry in, 105Jacobinism in, 131Kingdom of, 19, 57–58,

103, 124, 129–130, 163,194, 208, 230, 252

Monge in, 167Republic of, xvi, 57–58,

163, 194

Jackson,Andrew, 33 Jacobinism, xiii-xiv, 81,

131–132, 188in Corsica, 193in Genoa, 148Jacques-Louis David and, 77Lucien Bonaparte and,

34–35Napoleon and, 94Saliceti and, 228

Jacquemart,Auguste, 127Jefferson,Thomas, 249–250Jemappes, Battle of, 219Jena, University of, 48Jena-Auerstädt, Battles of, xvii,

9, 23, 27, 51, 61, 78, 104,108, 109, 113, 116, 132,142, 145, 150, 171, 184,204, 212, 232

Index 311

Jena-Auerstädt-Friedlandcampaign, 73, 108–109,229 237, 263

and Napoleonic Legend,178

Jews, 133, 255in Duchy of Warsaw, 259in Grand Duchy of

Frankfurt, 104João VI, King of Portugal,

206–207John,Archduke of Austria, 19,

120, 248Johnson, Samuel, 193Jouberthon,Alexandrine, 35Jourdan,Annie (historian), 163Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste, 55,

133–134, 161, 255Jourdan Law, 63

July Monarchy, xxi, 166, 170,178, 191, 223, 233, 242,252

Chamber of Deputies, 143 Junot,Andoche, xviii, 124,

134–135, 163, 197, 206,260

Kalisch,Treaty of, 137, 212 Katzbach, Battle of the, 109Keith,Admiral, 181Kellermann, François

Christophe, 137, 158,161

Kiel,Treaty of, 23King of Rome. See Napoleon

IIKlagenfurt, 47Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 89,

137–138, 222Klein Görschen, 152Knights of St John, 4, 157Koblenz, 165Kohn, Hans (historian), 179Kolberg, 109Königsberg, 85, 105, 132Kosciuszko,Tadeusz, 204, 205Kulm, Battle of, 109Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich,

4, 9, 13, 15, 39, 73,138–139, 170, 224

La Fère,Artillery Regiment,xiii

La Harpe, Frédéric-César de, 3

La Meilleraye, 26La Plaigne, Eléonore Deruelle

de, 141La Plaigne, Léon de, 141La Roche-Bernard, 57Laborde, General, 156Lacuée, Jean, 141Lafayette, Marie Joseph de, 2,

141–142Landshut, Battle of, 74Lannes, Jean, 17, 95, 105–106,

142–143, 161, 184, 206La-Roche-sur-Yon, 251Larrey, Dominique, 143Las Cases, Emmanuel

Augustin, Comte de, xxi,143–144, 163–164, 227

Latin America, 190, 233–234Lausanne, 34Lavoisier,Antoine, 54Law, 219

Cambacérès and, 46Codes, 58–60, 61–62Codification of, 53, 70,

144Lawrence,Thomas, 202, 261Le Mans, 57Leberton, Henriette, 163Lebrun, Charles, 65, 112, 144Leclerc, Charles Victor, 37, 119,

144–145, 246, 249–250Lefebvre, François, 120, 145,

161, 188, 232Legion of Honor, 82, 146, 155,

168, 185, 232, 247Legislative Body, 65, 70, 90,

146, 219, 231, 247Leipzig, 108, 152, 230

Battle of, xx, 11, 15, 27, 78,82, 104, 109, 110,146–148, 155, 184, 205,212, 229

Leoben,Truce of, 47, 128Leon, 69Les Sablons, 252Ligny, Battle of, 27, 110, 116,

148, 215Ligurian Republic, 47, 108,

148, 228Lille, 14, 126Limoges, 133Lindau, Bishopric, 208Lindenau, 146–147Lisbon, 48, 206

Liverpool, Earl of, 50, 149Livorno, 34Ljubljana, 124Local Government, 53, 54,

149, 186, 207, 219in Grand Duchy of

Frankfurt, 104 Lodi, Battle of, xiv, 116, 128,

142, 149–150Loire,Army of the, 78Lombardy, 11, 128, 149, 157

Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, 254–255

Lombard Republic, 57See also Milan

Lonato, Battle of, 128London, 15, 113–114, 151,

183, 200, 246Paoli in, 193

Longwood, 227Lorient, 181Lorraine, 82, 183, 211Louis Napoleon. See Napoleon

III, EmperorLouis Philippe, King of France.

See July MonarchyLouis XVI, King of France,

xiii, 27, 48, 77, 82, 159,193, 228

Louis XVIII, King of France,xx, 1, 2, 14, 23, 24, 25,45, 75, 78, 89, 94, 102,111, 121–122, 134, 150,163, 167, 184, 190, 194,237, 242, 253–254

Louise of Mecklenburg,Queen of Prussia, 104,150–151

Lowe, Sir Hudson, xxi, 143,151, 227

Lübeck, 91Lucca, Elisa Bonaparte as

Duchess of, 30Luddites, 114Ludlow, 35Lunéville,Treaty of, xv, 4,

32–33, 121, 151–152,158, 194, 220, 247

Lützen, Battle of, 17, 27, 81,109, 152, 184

Lycées, xvi, 86, 87, 152–153Lyon, 9, 14, 99, 100, 217, 237

Macdonald, Francesco, 28

312 Index

Macdonald, Jacques, 9, 109,152, 155–156, 161, 257,263

Macerata, 129Mack, Karl, 73, 249Madison, James, 250Madrid, xviii, xix, 14, 100, 112,

116, 169, 171–173, 197,199, 255, 261

Magdeburg, 49Maida, 45–46Maine, 57Maison Bonaparte, 3, 69Maistre, Joseph de, 70Maitland, Captain, xxi, 2Malet, Claude, 156

Malet Conspiracy, xix,156–157, 229

Malmaison, xx, 2, 20, 21, 36, 93Maloyaroslavets, Battle of, 19,

224Malta, 4, 88, 157, 195, 229,

255Mamelukes, xv, 88, 189,

212–213Manhès, Jean-Baptiste, 46Mantua, xiv, 5–6, 17, 49, 57,

120, 128, 157, 220Marbot, Captain, 105Marengo, Battle of, xv, 11, 19,

49, 105, 121, 128, 142,148, 157–158, 161, 162,171, 220, 229, 253, 270

Maret, Hugues, 51, 53, 75, 158Marghella,Antonio, 175, 228Maria I, Queen of Portugal,

206Maria, Luisa, Queen of Spain,

56, 99, 110Marie Antoinette, Queen of

France, 159Marie, ou les peines d’amour

(Louis Bonaparte), 34Marie-Louise, Empress, xviii,

xx, 1, 11, 21, 28, 37, 47,53, 89, 100, 103, 141,159, 165, 174, 185, 230,258

portrait, 160 Marmont,Auguste, xx, 1, 147,

152, 159–161, 199,227–228

as governor of Illyria, 124 Marne, River, 101

Marseille, 36, 56, 99, 126, 233,237

Marshals, xix, xx, 1, 161–162bad relations between, 78,

142, 184, 233Peninsular War, 198–199

Martinique, 20Masséna,André, 5, 8, 17, 19,

42, 43, 46, 49, 55, 58, 74,108, 110–111, 128, 134,148, 149, 161, 162–163,184, 189, 196, 199, 206,232, 237, 238, 257, 261

Mauritius, 194Mauzaisse, Jean-Baptiste, 59Maximilian I, King of Bavaria,

18, 19, 25Melas, Friedrich Michael Von,

128, 157–158Melzi D’Eril, Francesco, 129,

163Memoirs

Caulaincourt, 52Godoy, 110Grouchy, 117Laure Permon, 135, 267Lucien Bonaparte, 35Marmont, 161Roederer, 221

Mémoires d’Outre-Tombe(Chateaubriand), 56

Mémorial de Sainte Hélène, 143,163–164, 178, 179, 227

Menou, Jean-François, 89Merton Place, 182Metternich, Klemens Von, 11,

53, 81, 103, 159,164–165, 242, 248

on Auguste Marmont, 124on Felix Bacciochi, 30on Joseph Fesch, 100on Maria Letizia Bonaparte,

36Metz, 220Meudon, 116Mézières, 48Michelet, Jules, 68Milan, xiv, 57, 114, 128, 149,

158, 238Milan Decrees, 23, 66,

165–166Mincio, River, 49, 157Miranda, Francisco de, 233Modena, Duchy of, 57

Moldavia, 74, 138Mollien, Nicolas François, 14,

166Moncey,Adrien de, 107, 161,

166–167Mondego Bay, 206Mondovi, Battle of, 128, 167Monge, Gaspard, 86, 167–168Montalivet, Jean-Pierre

Bachasson, Comte de,168

Montebello, 6Battle of, 142

Montesquieu, CharlesSecondat, Baron de, 94

Montevideo, 233Montfaucon, Peace of, 24Montmirail, Battle of, 101Montpellier, 27, 46, 54, 74Moore, Sir John, 69–60,

168–169, 197, 232, 260Moreau, Jean-Victor, xvi-xvii,

xxi, 45, 55, 116,120–121, 128–129, 144,155, 158, 169, 184, 200,220, 236

Morny, Duke of, 20Mortefontaine, 28, 33Mortier, Joseph, xx, 1, 73, 82,

105–106, 161, 169–170,171

Moscow, xix, 39, 78, 85, 138,170–171, 173, 204, 224,237

Moselle,Army of the, 134Mount Tabor, Battle of, 89Mulhouse, 120, 126Mulini,Villa dei, 89Munich, 19, 249Münster, 22Murad Bey, 212Murat, Joachim, xv, xviii, xx,

xxi, 13, 17, 19, 22, 28,30, 39, 61, 78, 82, 96,111, 112, 132, 142, 151,161, 171–173, 184, 197,248, 249, 252

as king of Naples, 175, 228 Musée Napoléon, 79, 173–174

Nantes, 57, 87, 102 Naples, 4, 60, 182, 220, 255

Caroline Bonaparte asqueen of, 28

Index 313

Joseph Bonaparte as kingof, 33

Napoleonic Kingdom of,xvii, 111, 134, 173, 175,228

revolts in, 45–46Roederer in, 221

Napoleon at the Battle of Eylau(Gros), 96, 115

Napoleon Crossing the Great St.Bernard (David), 76

Napoleon II, King of Rome,xviii, xx, 1, 2, 33, 35,102, 159, 176

portrait, 160 Napoleon III (Louis

Napoleon), Emperor,xxi, 19–20, 22, 31–32,33–34, 38, 161, 173, 176,178, 179, 258

Napoleon in Exile:A Voice fromSaint Helena (O’Meara),151, 227

Napoléon vu par Abel Gance,178

Napoleonic Institute (Lucca),30

Napoleonic Legend, xxi, 5, 38,114–115, 143, 149–150,163–164, 176–178, 179,227, 252

Murat and, 173Romanticism and, 221–222

Nassau, 22National Archives, 75National Guard, 6, 99, 170,

223Corsica, xiiiDunkirk, 169Limoges, 133–134Paris, 42, 141, 166

Nationalism, xxi, 179–180German, 63, 109, 151, 274Italian, 28, 58, 118, 129Polish, 118, 203, 258–259South Slavs, 124

Naumberg, Battle of, 9Naval Warfare, 180, 208Navy, British, 180–181, 208Navy, French, 78, 167,

181–182Nelson, Horatio, Lord, xv,

xviii, 67, 88, 180–181,182–183, 184–185, 246

Neoclassicism, 65, 76–77,92–93, 221

Netherlands, 168, 183, 219,254

Kingdom of, 61See also Batavian Republic,

Belgium, HollandNeuchâtel (Switzerland), 25,

239Neuilly, 54New York, 33Newspapers. See PressNey, Michel, 17–18, 19, 23, 39,

58, 78, 96, 105, 109, 116,152, 155, 161, 163,166–167, 183–184, 196,215, 233, 249, 259–60,261

Nice, xiv, 162, 163, 254Niemen, River, xvii, xix, 85,

244Nile, Battle of the, xv, 88, 181,

182, 184–185, 255Nisbet, Frances, 182Nivelle, 261Nobility, 185–186, 207

in diplomatic service, 80Imperial, 146

Noguès, General, 188Nolay, 48Norfolk, 182Normandy, 42, 57, 87, 126, 200North,Army of the,

Allied, 23, 147French, 113, 169, 183–184

Northumberland HMS, xxiNorway, 23–24, 254Notables, 90, 108, 146, 186,

221Protestant, 211

Novi, 148

Oath of the Horatii (David),76–77

Oder, River, 109Oldenburg, Duchy of, 66, 187O’Meara, Barry, xxi, 151, 227On Literature (de Staël), 236Opera Plot, 45, 131, 187, 223Oporto, 232, 260Opposition Movements,

187–188See also Jacobins, Royalists

Organic Articles, 62, 188–189

Protestant, 211 Orléans, 24–25Ostend, 168Ottoman Empire, xv, 4, 13, 42,

60, 74, 88–89, 138, 185,189, 195, 220, 244, 255

Savary exiled in, 229 Oudinot, Nicolas, 17–18, 23,

109, 161, 189–190Ouvard, Gabriel, 190–191

Padua, 17, 220 Paganini, Niccolo, 30Palafox, José, 197Palise, 166Pamplona, 261Paoli, Pasquale, xii, xiii, 27, 32,

34, 35–36, 69, 168, 193,228

Papacy, 188–189, 193–194See also Papal States, Pius VII

Papal States, xviii, 22, 51, 66,129, 194, 201, 228, 255

Paris, xi, xiii, xiv, xv, xxi, 2, 8,15, 33, 34–35, 36, 40, 54,78, 92, 104, 110, 126,143, 156–157, 165, 232,251–252, 261

Clichy gate, 166Collège Mazarin, 127Elysée Palace, 2fédérés, 99Louvre, 79, 159, 173–174military division, 170monuments, xxi, 10, 92, 168National Guard, 42, 166Notre Dame, 68Pantheon, 115region, 87Rue St. Niçaise, 187salons, 20, 37, 217, 229, 235Treaties of, 22, 50, 157, 165,

194–195Tuileries, 40, 176, 187See also Ecole Militaire, Les

Invalides Parker, Sir Hyde, 67Parma, 1, 32, 208

Duke of, 152, 247 Passau, Bishopric, 208Patterson, Elizabeth, 31–32, 38Pau, 23Paul I,Tsar of Russia, 3, 6, 67,

79, 138, 157, 195, 238

314 Index

Peasantry, 51, 195–196, 224Civil Code and, 59conscription and, 63–64

Pecori, Giustina, 31Pelet, Jean-Jacques, 196–197Penal Code, 144, 197Peninsular War, 33, 43, 48, 50,

58, 69–70, 85, 113, 135,161, 197–199, 206–207,234, 237, 245, 253, 255,274–275

guerrilla warfare in,117–118

Soult and, 232Wellington and, 260–261See also Spain

Percival, Spencer, 149Pérignon, Dominique-

Catherine, 161Permon (Junot), Laure,

Duchess of Abrantès,135, 267

Perregaux, Jean Frédéric, 14Personality, Cult of, 199–200

See also Napoleonic Legend Peschiera, 49Pétain, Marshal Philippe, 38,

176Pétion,Alexandre, 119Piacenza, 1, 208Picardy, 87Pichegru, Jean-Charles, xvi-

xvii, 45, 169, 200Piedmont, xvi, 56–57, 128,

148, 208and Coalitions, 60–61Kingdom of Piedmont-

Sardinia, 60, 108, 167,219–220, 254

Pinel, Philippe, 123Piombino, 30Pitt, John, Earl of Chatham,

258Pitt,William the Younger, 4, 5,

10, 47–48, 50, 113–114,138, 195, 200–201, 220,241

Pius VI, Pope, 193–194Pius VII, Pope, xvi, xviii, 21,

22, 24, 35, 37, 50–51, 62,68, 75, 77, 100, 125, 194,201–202, 206, 228

Pizzo, 173Plebiscites, 90, 203

February 1800, 41 Plymouth, xxiPo, River, 56, 57Poland, 49, 138, 162, 165, 196,

203–204, 211, 212, 243,255, 258–259

Polish Legions, 203–204,259

See also Warsaw, Duchy of Police, 45, 102, 125, 188, 223,

227–228Gendarmerie, 107

Polotsk, Battle of, 111Pomerania, 27, 224, 254Poniatowski, Jozef, 39, 147,

161, 203–204, 204–205,259

Ponte Nuovo (Corsica), 193Pontoise, 144Population, 205–206Portalis, Jean, 24, 58, 206, 211Portici Palace, 28Portland, Duke of, 48Portugal, xviii, 4, 58, 66, 105,

110, 134, 142, 162–163,169, 184, 196, 197–199,206–207, 220, 232, 254,260

Army of (French), 43, 161,162, 184

See also Peninsular War Posen,Treaty of, 229Potocki, Stanislaw, 259Potsdam, 263

Potsdam Oath, 212 Poznania, 204Prefects, 35, 53, 54, 149, 168,

186, 207in Grand Duchy of

Frankfurt, 103–104in Kingdom of Italy, 129

Press, 42, 52, 121, 207–208, 209Journal de Paris, 220Journal des Savants, 75Moniteur, Le, 158, 272–273

Pressburg,Treaty of, 10, 11, 18,73, 74, 124, 208, 248,252

Prina, Giuseppe, 129Prince Imperial (Bonapartist

Pretender), 38Privateer War, 208–209Propaganda, 42, 176–178,

207–208, 209–211

British, 35Jacques-Louis David and,

75–77, 221 Protestants, 211Provence, 42, 206Prussia, xvii, xix, 22, 27, 48, 63,

81, 95, 104, 137,150–151, 211–212, 215,219, 224, 225, 241, 243,244, 262, 263

and Armed Neutrality, 6army, 26, 108, 109–110,

132, 230and Coalitions, 60–61and Congress of Vienna,

254–255and Danube Campaigns,

73–74Metternich and, 165and Poland, 204

Pultulsk, Battle of, 142Pyramids, Battle of the, xv, 88,

212–213Pyrenees, 142, 166, 232, 261

Quadruple Alliance, 215Quatre Bras, Battle of, 184,

215, 261

Rahna, 152 Ratkau, 27Ravenna, 194Récamier, Jeanne, 56, 77,

92–93, 217portrait, 218

Recollections (JacquesMacdonald), 155–156

Regensberg, 73, 85Battle of, 74

Regnaud de Saint Jeand’Angély, Michel,217–219

Régnier, Claude, 219Republicans, 188

and Acte Additionnel, 3Idéologues, 123See also Jacobinism

Restoration, 26, 40, 49, 52, 53,75, 82, 107, 121–122,142, 155, 158, 163, 178,191, 217, 243

Chamber of Deputies, 107House of Peers, 111, 166Privy Council, 190

Index 315

Royal Guard, 253Ultramontanes, 194

Revolutionary Wars, xiii-xv, 4,55, 133–134, 142, 143,169–170, 189, 200219–220, 232

in Germany, 137–138, 145See also Italian Campaigns

Reynier, Jean, 45Rhine,Army of the, 20, 111,

143, 144, 169Rhineland, 47, 49, 110, 145,

183–184, 189, 194, 212,232

Continental System and, 67,87

freemasonry in, 105Rhône, River, 42

Army of the, 9Ried,Treaty of, 18Rijeka, 124Rivoli, Battle of, 11, 42, 128,

142, 220Robespierre, Maximilien, xiii,

xiv, 34–35, 131Rochambeau, Jean-Baptiste de,

119Rochefort, xxi, 2, 33, 122, 181Roederer, Pierre-Louis, 22,

123, 175, 220–221Romagna, 194Romanticism, 56, 115, 164,

221–223Rome, 16, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,

56, 80, 100, 110, 194,201, 203, 229

Army of, 110–111Roman Republic, 75, 167,

194Rostock, 26Rostopchin, Count Fedor, 170Rouen, 14, 126Rouffach, 145Rouge et le Noir, Le (Stendhal),

237Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 94Roustan Raza, 223Royalists, 16, 24–25, 45, 57, 81,

166, 169, 187, 200, 223,251

Ultras, 111Rüchel, Ernst Von, 132Rudé, George (historian), xxiiRumyantsev, Count, 138

Rural Code, 144, 223–224Russia, 3–4, 51, 63, 95, 110,

137, 187, 195, 215, 230,241, 243, 244

Armed Neutrality and, 6and Coalitions, 60–61, 201,

220and Congress of Vienna,

254–255and Continental System, 4,

66–67and Danube Campaigns,

73–74Napoleon’s invasion of, xix,

4, 11, 13, 14–16, 19, 31,39, 47, 75, 78, 83, 111,116, 125, 134, 138–139,141, 143, 145, 155,156–157, 158, 166,170–171, 173, 184, 190,196, 204, 224–225, 229,238, 253, 263, 275–277

and Ottoman Empire, 189and Poland, 203–204and Prussia, 211–212

Sacher,Abram Leon(historian), 133

Saint Helena, xxi, 2, 3, 50, 78,122, 143, 151, 163–164,167, 227, 229, 258

Saint Lucia, 194Saint Napoleon, Festival of,

125, 200Saint Petersburg, 51, 82, 151,

238Saint-Cloud, 156

Coup of 18 Brumaire in,40–42

Saint-Cyr, girls’ school, 30Saint-Denis, 122Salamanca, 58, 69, 169

Battle of, 161 199,227–228, 261

Saliceti,Antonio Cristoforo,xiii, 131, 148, 193, 228,233, 245

Salzburg, 18, 230San Martino, villa, 89San Sebastian, 261Saragossa, 142, 197, 238Sarrelouis, 183Saunders, David (historian),

15

Savary,Anne Jean, 125, 156,223, 228–229

Savigny-sur-Orge, 78Savona, 201Savoy, 194, 254

See also Piedmont Saxony, 81–82, 102, 109, 146,

165, 212, 229–230, 254Say, Jean-Baptiste, 123, 247Scharnhorst, Gerhard Von,

109–110, 152, 212, 230Scheldt, River, 258Schimmelpennink, Rutger Jan,

17Schönbrunn, 258

Peace of, 11, 18, 103, 120,124, 165, 230, 257, 258

Schubert, Franz, 11Schwarzenberg, Karl, Prince

Von, 81–82, 101,146–147

Science, 48–49, 54, 167–168scientific journals, 207

Scott, Sir Walter, 35, 221Sébastiani, Horace, 74Second Empire. See Napoleon

IIISedan, 155

Battle of, 38 Selim II, Sultan, 74Selim III, Sultan, 189Senate, 1, 2–3, 35, 41–42, 46,

54, 65, 70, 82, 91, 123,137, 142, 146, 168, 221,230–231, 232Sénatoreries, 231

Sens, 40Serangeli, Gioacchino

Giuseppe, 244Sérurier, Philibert, 161Seychelles, 131Sicily, 46, 173, 175, 255Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph, xv,

65, 82, 123, 230–231,231–232

and Constitution of YearVIII, 64–65


Silesia, 18, 139Army of, 27, 81, 101, 147

Smith, Sir Sidney, 45–46, 138Smolensk, 13, 19, 138, 173,

204, 224

316 Index

Soissons, 159Soult, Nicolas Jean, 9, 69–70,

161, 169, 197, 199, 206,232–233, 245, 260, 261

Souper de Beaucaire, Le, 131, 233Spain, xviii, xix, 14, 26, 35, 56,

99–100, 105, 110,111–112, 113, 145, 170,197–199, 206, 219,234–235, 246, 254

Army of, 134British policy towards, 48and Coalitions, 60–61and Continental System,

66–67Joseph Bonaparte as king

of, 33See also Peninsular War

Speranski, Mikhail, 3Spirit of Christianity,The

(Chateaubriand), 56Spree, River, 17Staël, Germaine de, 16, 52, 64,

91, 123, 205, 217, 221,235–236

opinions on Napoleon, xii,280–282

Stalin, Joseph, xxiiStatistics, 35, 53, 236Steiger, Rod, 178Stein, Karl Vom, 212Stendhal, 75, 164, 178, 221, 237Stockholm, 24Strasbourg, 86, 165, 221Stuart, Sir John, 46Styria, 103Suchet, Louis, 161, 189, 199,

237–238Supreme Being, Cult of, xvi,

50Suvorov,Alexander, 13, 138,

195, 220, 238Sweden, xix, 23–24, 42, 60, 79,

110, 244, 254and Armed Neutrality, 6army, 26

Switzerland, 31, 33, 34, 36, 42,49, 77, 184, 206,238–239

Army of, 74, 162freemasonry in, 105military campaigns in, 13,

162, 166, 170, 189, 195,232, 237, 238

See also Helvetic RepublicSyria, 88–89, 138, 168

Taine, Hippolyte, 186 Talavera, Battle of, 134, 197,

253, 260Talleyrand, Charles Maurice

de, xiv, xv, 1, 2, 16, 20,24, 40, 51, 53, 122, 150,156, 158, 165, 219,241–243, 254

on Caroline Bonaparte,29–30


on Joseph Fouché, 102Tallien, Jean, 20Talma, Joseph, 95, 243Taunay, Nicolas-Antoine, 198Tauroggen, Convention of,

212, 263Taxation, 53, 100–101, 107,

243Tbilisi, 223Tengen, Battle of, 73Teplitz, 82

Treaties of, 243–244Thorngrove, 35Thugut, Franz Von, 55Thuringia, 108Tilsit,Treaty of, xvii, 4, 13, 15,

22, 27, 66, 74, 81, 95,105, 109, 137, 150–151,197, 204, 212, 224, 241,244–245, 258

Tobago, 194Tolentino,Treaty of, 194Tolstoy, Leo, xi, xii, xixTopographical Bureau, xivTorbay, 227Tormes, River, 228Torres Vedras,

Lines of, 206Siege of, 199

Tortona, 56Toul, 110Toulon, xiii, 36, 88, 99, 181,

182, 185, 193siege of, xiii, 16, 49, 70, 82,

99, 131, 134, 144, 159,182, 228, 233, 237, 245,252–253, 266

Toulouse, Battle of, 232, 245,261

Toussaint L’Ouverture,François, 37, 119,245–246

Trafalgar, Battle of, xvii, 78,113, 180, 181, 182–183,234, 246–247,255

Trent, Bishopric, 208Tres de Mayo (Goya), 112Tribunate, 49, 53, 64, 65, 70,

74, 75, 90, 123, 146, 219,231, 235, 247

Trieste, 28, 30, 102, 124Trinidad, 4, 234Tulard, Jean (historian), 34,

176, 199Turin, 157, 238, 254Tuscany, 89, 194

Elisa Bonaparte as ruler of,30

Grand Duchy of, 91, 152,247–248

Tyrol, 18, 129, 208, 230revolt in, 11, 117, 248

Ulm, 82 Battle of, xvii, 73, 113, 138,

142, 184, 246, 249United States of America, 2,

31–32, 35, 66, 80,116–117, 142, 169, 190,249–250

Louisiana Purchase, 111,183

Talleyrand exiled in, 241 Urbino, 129

Valais, 120, 239 Valençay, 100, 242Valence, xiii, 168, 194Valencia, 198, 199, 237Valladolid, 199, 261Valmy, Battle of, xiii, 137, 219Valtelline, 57Vandamme, Dominique, 85,

109Vanguard HMS, 182Vaubois, General, 157Vauchamps, Battle of, 101Vendée, xiv, xvi, 8, 19, 24, 45,

50, 51, 57, 70, 116, 137,166, 194, 251

Vendémiaire, Rising of Year IV,xiv, 16, 20, 42, 171,251–252

Index 317

Venezuela, 233Venice, 11, 47, 129, 152, 161,

201, 208, 252History of the Venetian

Republic (Daru), 75Venetia, 57

Venus Reclining (Canova), 37Vernet, Horace, 252, 253Verona, 6Versailles, 25Verviers, 22Vicenza, 17Victor Amadeus III, King of

Piedmont-Sardinia, 56,254

Victor, Claude, 157–158, 161,252–254

Victor, Emmanuel I, King ofPiedmont-Sardinia, 254

Victoria, Queen of GreatBritain, 233

opinion of JérômeBonaparte, 32

Vienna, 1, 23, 53, 55, 73, 74,82, 95, 128, 159, 171,176, 204, 257

Congress of, xx, 11, 18, 48,50, 104, 124, 165, 194,204, 212, 229–230, 239,242, 254–255, 261

Villanova, 5Villeneuve, Pierre de, 182, 246,

255Vimiero, Battle of, 197, 206Vincennes, 94, 223Visconti, Giuseppina, 25Viterbo, 35

Vitoria, Battle of, 33, 134, 199,255–256, 261

Voltaire (François-MarieArouet), 94

Vorarlberg, 18, 208 Vosges,252

Wagner, Friedrich, 147 Wagram, Battle of, xviii, 11,

19, 23, 55, 61, 74, 78,113, 116, 143, 155, 162,289, 229, 230, 257–258

Wagram campaign, 25, 31,73–74, 85, 95, 134, 161,196

Walcheren Expedition, 22, 50,113, 258

Walewice, 258Walewska, Marie, 141, 258Walewski,Alexandre, 258Walewski,Anastazy, Count,

258Wallachia, 74Warsaw, Duchy of, xvii, 4, 26,

78, 91, 203, 204, 229,230, 243, 244, 258–259

freemasonry in, 105 Waterloo, Battle of, xxi, 2, 3,

21, 22, 27, 31, 38, 61, 65,113, 125, 143, 148, 170,196, 212, 237, 259–260,261

Emmanuel Grouchy and,116

Waterloo campaign, 78, 90,110, 116–117, 122, 173,215, 253

Wavre, 116Weimar, 48, 108, 132Wellington, Duke of, xviii, xx,

xxi, 33, 43, 50, 58, 116,118, 122, 134, 161, 162,184, 197–199, 206, 215,227–228, 232, 233, 234,245, 255–256, 259–260,260–261

Westphalia, 254Jérôme Bonaparte as king

of, 31Kingdom of, xvii, xx, 63,

85, 212, 244, 262, 273Weyrother, Franz Von, 9What is the Third Estate?

(Sieyès), 231White Terror, 57William I, Prince of Orange-

Nassau, 22Wilson-Smith,Timothy

(historian), 93Wittgenstein, Prince, 152Wolfe, Charles, 169Women

and Civil Code, 59education of, 87–88fashion, 92–93Napoleon on, 205, 281

Würmser, Dagobert Von, 17,49, 128

Württemburg, 208

Yorck Von Wartenburg, Johann,212, 263

Zurich, Battle of, 162, 195

318 Index