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PoliticalPartyOrganisationinEastAsiaTowardsanewframeworkfortheanalysisofpartyformationandchange

by

OLIVERHELLMANN

Athesissubmittedto

TheUniversityofBirmingham

forthedegreeof

DOCTOROFPHILOSOPHY

DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandInternationalStudies

SchoolofGovernmentandSociety

CollegeofSocialSciences

TheUniversityofBirmingham

July2009

University of Birmingham Research Archive

e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.

–ABSTRACT–

Atpresent,progressivetheory‐buildingintheareaofpoliti‐

calpartyorganisationisbeinghamperedbythecontroversy

overhowmuchfreedomofchoicedecision‐makerswithina

partyenjoyinrelationtotheirenvironment.Thispieceofre‐

searchwill therefore develop an analytical framework that

transcends this debate by acknowledging the causal effects

ofbothstructuresandparty leadership.Basedon the ideas

ofhistorical institutionalism, itwillarguethatpartyorgani‐

sation is the product of strategic decisionsmade in a stra‐

tegicallyselectivecontext.Theframeworkisthenappliedto

political parties in the newer democracies of South Korea,

Taiwan,thePhilippinesandIndonesia.Theselectionofcases

ismotivatedbythefactthatEastAsiahassofarbeenlargely

ignoredbysystematicstudiesofpoliticalpartyorganisation.

Aswill be seen, post‐autocratic environments in the region

stronglyfavourpoliticalpartiesthataremerefaçadesforin‐

formal patron‐client networks. However, we can also find

parties characterised by a higher level of formal organisa‐

tionalstrength,includingpartiesthatsharemanysimilarities

with the classical mass party. These parties thus demon‐

stratethatpoliticalactorsareabletodevelopalternativeor‐

ganisationalresponsestothesamestructuralcontext.

FürMamaundPapa

Ichhabdannmalfertigstudiert.

Acknowledgements

Somewhatsurprisingly,IwouldliketobeginbythankingtheESRCfornotpaying

me amaintenance scholarship, as this proved a greatmotivation to finish the

PhDwithinthreeyears.OthersourcesofmotivationIwouldliketoacknowledge

aretheLittleCreaturesbrewery,theZeitgeistpub,mybicycle,cutelittlekittens

andmyfriends–thankyouforremindingmethatlifeisgood.Moreover,Icould

not have finished the PhDwithin such a short timeframewithout the encour‐

agementandconstantsupportofmysupervisor, IngridvanBiezen. In the long

tradition of Dutchmanagers (such as Johan Cruyff, Leo Beenhakker and Guus

Hiddink),shegavemethedisciplineIneeded,whileatthesametimeproviding

anopen ear formyproblems, and cheeringmeup in timesofmethodological,

theoreticalandempiricalstruggle.Inaddition,Iamverymuchindebtedtomany

peopleforhelpingmewithmyfieldwork.Inparticular,Iwouldliketothankthe

followingpeopleforsettingmeupwithinterviewpartnersandgivingmeuseful

adviceonseeminglymundane,butatthetime,highlyconfusingmatters(suchas

buying a SIM card, hagglingwith taxi drivers orwhere towatch theEuroCup

final):Jin‐MinChunginKorea,ChynSanJuaninthePhilippines,MarcusMietzner

inIndonesiaandDafyddFellatSOAS.Finally,IwouldliketoapologisetoKatie

forleavingherhomealoneforseveralmonths,andthankherforherlovingspirit

andputtingupwithme, especiallyduring the lastmonthsofwritingup.How‐

ever, firstand foremost, this thesis isdedicated tomyparents,who–although

alwaysquestioningthevalueofapoliticalsciencedegree–havehelpedandsup‐

portedmeendlesslyovertheyears.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Listoftables ...................................................................................................................................................... i

Listoffigures ...................................................................................................................................................ii

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................ iii

Noteonromanisation................................................................................................................................ vii

1. THESTRUCTUREAGENCYDIVIDEINTHEPARTYORGANISATION

LITERATURE........................................................................................................................................1

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................1

ThedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope.........................................5

Structuralistapproachestopartyorganisation .........................................................17

The“lifecycle”approach...........................................................................................................18

The“periodeffect”approach ..................................................................................................26

The“generationeffect”approach..........................................................................................38

Voluntaristapproachestopartyorganisation............................................................45

2. THEORETICALFRAMEWORK..................................................................................................55

Historicalinstitutionalism.......................................................................................................56

Whatareinstitutions? ................................................................................................................59

Thestructuringeffectofinstitutions ...................................................................................61

Institutionalformationandchange......................................................................................64

Summary ..........................................................................................................................................71

Explainingpartyformationandchange...........................................................................74

Politicalpartiesasconstellationsofpower ......................................................................74

Electoralstrategies ......................................................................................................................76

Strategicallyselectivecontexts ..............................................................................................81

Linkingelectoralstrategiesandorganisationalpreferences ....................................86

Summary ..........................................................................................................................................94

3. METHODOLOGICALIMPLICATIONS ....................................................................................98

Measurement ...................................................................................................................................98

Theenvironmentalcontext......................................................................................................99

Partyorganisation..................................................................................................................... 103

Datacollection ............................................................................................................................. 112

Dataanalysis ................................................................................................................................. 116

Caseselection ............................................................................................................................... 121

4. SOUTHKOREA .............................................................................................................................. 127

Theenvironmentalcontext .................................................................................................. 128

Actorsandtheirstrategies ................................................................................................... 132

Theeraofthe“threeKims”................................................................................................... 133

Thepost‐Kimspartysystem................................................................................................. 139

Partyorganisation ..................................................................................................................... 146

Membership................................................................................................................................. 147

Candidateselection .................................................................................................................. 157

Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions....................................... 167

Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 173

5. TAIWAN............................................................................................................................................ 178



Aone‐partydominantsystem(1991‐2000) ................................................................. 184

Atwo‐partysystememerges................................................................................................ 192


Membership................................................................................................................................. 198



Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 225

6. THEPHILIPPINES ....................................................................................................................... 229



Elitefamiliesinpost‐MarcosPhilippines........................................................................ 235

Politicalpartiesascoalitionsbetweenfamilies ........................................................... 241


Membership................................................................................................................................. 250



Adeviantcase:AKBAYAN! .................................................................................................... 260

Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 262

7. INDONESIA...................................................................................................................................... 265



Conflictbetweenpersonalisticfactions........................................................................... 272

Socialidentitiesasdriversofvotingbehaviour........................................................... 278


Membership................................................................................................................................. 285



Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 297

8. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 301

Towardsanewframeworkforpartyorganisationanalysis ............................. 301

Asiancontextsandactors’strategies ............................................................................. 306

PartyorganisationinEastAsia .......................................................................................... 312

Membership................................................................................................................................. 313



Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 324

TheimplicationsforthestudyofpartyorganisationsinWesternEu

rope .................................................................................................................................................... 327

Bibliography............................................................................................................................................... 335

Interviews ................................................................................................................................................... 379

Appendix...................................................................................................................................................... 384

–i–

LISTOFTABLES

Table1: TheorganisationaldevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope

16

Table2: Structuralistapproachestopartyorganisation 45

Table3: Determinantsofpartyorganisation 54

Table4: Basicelementsofpartyorganisation 110

Table5: DemocracyinEastAsia 123

Table6: Caseselection 125

Table7: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinSouthKorea 129

Table8: SouthKorea–Partysystemindicators 134

Table9: SouthKorea–ResultsforNationalAssemblyelections 137

Table10: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinTaiwan 180

Table11: Taiwan–Partysystemindicators 185

Table12: Taiwan–ResultsforLegislativeYuanelections 187

Table13: Taiwan–Voters’attitudestowardsthenationalidentityissue 188

Table14: Taiwan–Partymembership 199

Table15: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinthePhilippines 233

Table16: Philippines–Partysystemindicators 242

Table17: Philippines–ResultsforHouseofRepresentativeselections 244

Table18: Socio‐economicdevelopmentinIndonesia 269

Table19: Indonesia–Partysystemindicators 273

Table20: Indonesia–Parliamentaryelectionresults 275

–ii–

LISTOFFIGURES

Figure1: Electoralstrategies–Strategicallyselectedoutcomes 86

Figure2: Partyorganisation–Strategicallyselectedoutcomes 91

Figure3: Dimensionsofcandidateselection 108

Figure4: Taiwan–Inclusivenessoftheselectorateintheprocessofcandidateselection

216

–iii–

ABBREVIATIONS

CDA ChristenDemocratischAppèl(ChristianDemocraticAppeal)

CKP CreativeKoreaParty

DJP DemocraticJusticeParty

DLP DemocraticLiberalParty

DP DemocraticParty

DPP DemocraticPeople’sParty[SouthKorea]

DPP DemocraticProgressiveParty[Taiwan]

DPP DewanPimpinanPusat(CentralExecutiveBoard)[Indonesia]

DPR DewanPerwakilanRakyat(People’sRepresentativeCouncil)

DS DemocraticidiSinistra(DemocratsoftheLeft)

FN FrontNational(NationalFront)

FPÖ FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs(AustrianFreedomParty)

GAD GrandAllianceforDemocracy

GNP GrandNationalParty

Golkar PartaiGolonganKarya(PartyofFunctionalGroups)

GPB BritishPound

ICMI IkatanCendekiawanMuslimIndonesia(AssociationofIndonesianMuslimIntellectuals)

IDR IndonesianRupiah

KAMPI KabalikatngMalayangPilipino(PartneroftheFreeFilipino)

–iv–

KBL KilusangBagongLipunan(NewSocietyMovement)

KDLP KoreanDemocraticLabourParty

KMT Kuomintang(NationalistParty)

KRW SouthKoreanWon

LABAN LakasngBayan(PeoplePower)

Lakas‐CMD Lakas‐ChristianMuslimDemocrats

Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP LakasngEDSA‐NationalUnionofChristianDemocrats‐UnitedMuslimDemocratsofthePhilippines

LAMMP LabanngMakabayangMasangPilipino(StruggleofthePatrioticFilipinoMasses)

LDP LabanngDemokratikongPilipino(StruggleofDemocraticFilipinos)

LFP LibertyForwardParty

LP LiberalParty

M/E Membership‐electorateratio

M/V Membership‐voterratio

MDP MilleniumDemocraticParty

NAMFREL NationalMovementforFreeElections

NCNP NationalCongressforNewPolitics

NDRP NewDemocraticRepublicanParty

NKDP NewKoreaDemocraticParty

NKP NewKoreaParty

NP NacionalistaParty[Philippines]

NP NewParty[Taiwan]

NPC NationalistPeople’sCoalition

–v–

NPRP NewPoliticalReformParty

NPUPP Non‐PartyforaUnifiedPeople’sParty

NTD NewTaiwanDollar

NU NahdatulUlama

PAN PartaiAmanatNasional(NationalMandateParty)

PBB PartaiBulanBintang(CrescentStarParty)

PCI PartitoCommunistaItaliano(ItalianCommunistParty)

PD PartaiDemokrat(DemocraticParty)

PDI PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia(IndonesianDemocraticParty)

PDI‐P PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan(IndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle)

PDP PartidoDemokratikoPilipino(PhilippineDemocraticParty)

PFP PeopleFirstParty

PHP PhilippinePeso

PKB PartaiKebangkitanBangsa(NationalAwakeningParty)

PKS PartaiKeadilanSejahtera(ProsperousJusticeParty)

PP People’sParty

PPD PartyforPeaceandDemocracy

PPP PartaiPersatuanPembangunan(UnitedDevelopmentParty)

RDP ReunificationDemocraticParty

TAIP TaiwanIndependenceParty

TSU TaiwanSolidarityUnion

UDP UnitedDemocraticParty

–vi–

ULD UnitedLiberalDemocrats

UNDP UnitedNewDemocraticParty

UNIDO UnitedNationalistDemocraticOrganization

UPP UnitedPeople’sParty

–vii–

NOTEONROMANISATION

Inorder tocreateLatinscript readings forChineseandKoreancharacters this

thesisuses thePinyinand theRevisedRomanisationsystemsrespectively.The

onlyexceptionsarewidelyrecognisednames that followalternativeguidelines

of romanisation (such asKuomintang). Chinese and Korean names within the

textaregivenwiththesurnamefirst.

POLITICALPARTYORGANISATIONINEASTASIA

–1–

‐1‐

THESTRUCTURE‐AGENCYDIVIDEINTHE

PARTYORGANISATIONLITERATURE

Introduction

Theoriesthathelptoexplainpartyorganisationscan,broadlyspeaking,bedivided

into two strands, depending onwhether they stress the importance of contextual

factors, or rather focus on the political actor. Several scholars of political parties

haveinthepastmoreorlessexplicitlymadereferencetothishighlyunsatisfactory

stand‐off between these two seemingly contradictory interpretations of party for‐

mationandadaptation.Probablytheclearestdescriptionofthecurrentsituationof

theory‐buildinginthefieldofpartyorganisationcomesfromvanBiezen,whopoints

out that it is yet not clear “howmuch structure actually matters and howmuch

room it leaves forparties as active agents” (2003a:179). Similarly,Müller (1997)

distinguishesbetweenan“environmentalist”anda“purposive‐action”approachto

OLIVERHELLMANN

–2–

theproblemofhowtoexplaindifferentformsofpartyorganisation.Lessexplicitly,

thisdebateisalsoreflectedintheconceptsofpartyorganisational“change”and“in‐

novation”,withchangedefinedasthe“differencefoundbetweentwopointsintime

inthewayapartyoperates”,whereasinnovationisunderstoodas“thepartofthat

changewhichisintentionallybroughtaboutbysomeagentsinsidetheparty”(Hei‐

darandSaglie2003:223;emphasisadded).Likewise,Harmel(2002)makesadis‐

tinction between the “life‐cycle” approach and “system‐level trends” approach on

theonehandandthe“discretechange”approachontheother.Althoughheargues

thatthethreeprimarilydifferastothetypeorpatternofchangetheyareaimingto

explain,heacknowledgesthattheformerputsmoreemphasisoninternalandenvi‐

ronmentalfactorsrespectively,whilethelatterseestheinterestsofpartyactorsas

theprimesourcefororganisationalchange.

Althoughthisstructure‐agencydivideseriously limitsourunderstandingof the

processesofpartyformationandchange,therelevantliteraturehasnotyetoffered

any ways to transcend the obvious tension between the different theoretical ap‐

proaches to party organisation. Therefore this thesis will develop an analytical

framework,which,basedonthecentralideasofhistoricalinstitutionalism,acknow‐

ledgestheexplanatorypowerofbothstructuresandagency.Inparticular,itwillbe

argued that, althoughstructural contexts favourcertainstrategiesoverothers, ac‐

tors are able to develop divergent strategic responses to the opportunities pre‐

sentedbyaparticularcontext.Inotherwords,althoughpoliticalpartieswithinthe

sameenvironmentwilltendtoexhibitcertainregularitiesintheirorganisation,the


–3–

outcomeofanygivendecisiononhowtoorganiseapartyisunpredictable,sinceac‐

tors are always able to choose alternative courses of action. As a result, because

therecanbemore thanonestrategy torespondtoaparticularcontext, thedevel‐

opmentofpoliticalpartiesisbestseenasaconstantconflictbetweendifferentparty

internalgroupings,allofferingdifferentorganisationalstrategies.

Theframeworkwillthenbeappliedtostudytheorganisationofpoliticalparties

in thenewerdemocraciesofSouthKorea,Taiwan, thePhilippinesand Indonesia.1

The selection of cases wasmotivated by the fact that – in contrast to other geo‐

graphical regionshit by the “thirdwave”ofdemocratisation2 –politicalparties in

EastAsiahavenotyetbeenthesubjectofanysystematicanalysis.Whilethestudy

will thus contribute to our understanding of party formation and change in East

Asia,wehopethattheanalyticalframeworkitselfwillproveusefulasageneraltool

forpartyscholarswithverydifferentgeographicalareasofexpertise.Mostnotably,

wehopethattheanalyticalframeworkwillmakeacontributiontostudyofWestern

Europeanparties,whichstillformsthebasisformostexistingtheoriesofpartyor‐

ganisation.

Inorder toachievetheseobjectives thestudywillbestructured into twomain

parts.Thefirsthalfwillbedevotedtothedevelopmentoftheanalyticalframework.

1Theterms‘SouthKorea’and‘Korea’willbeusedinterchangeablythroughoutthetext.2Huntington(1991)distinguishesbetweenthreehistoricwavesofdemocratisation,whichwereseparatedbytworeversewavesofauthoritariansetback.The“firstwave”(1828‐1926)haditsoriginintheAmericanandFrenchrevolutionsandslowlyweakenedafterthecomingintopowerofMus‐soliniinItaly.WiththeendoftheSecondWorldWarthe“secondwave”(1943‐62)wasinitiatedbythevictoryofthealliedforces,butitcametoanearlyendwhenmilitarycoupsinLatinAmericabroughtdownanumberofdemocraticallyelectedgovernments.Finally,thethirdandlast“wave”hasbeensetoffbythefallofthePortugueseright‐wingdictatorshipin1974.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–4–

This, first of all, requires reviewing the existing literature on party organisation

along the structure‐agency divide, which will show that the strengths of one ap‐

proacharetheweaknessofanotherapproachandviceversa.Havingestablishedthe

needforamoreintegrativeperspectiveonpartyorganisation,wewillthenusethe

dialectical understanding of the relationship between structures and agency sug‐

gestedbyhistoricalinstitutionalismtointegrateexistingtheoriesofpartyorganisa‐

tionfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisintoasinglemodel.Thiswillbefollowedbya

methodology chapter, in which, most importantly, we put forward a newway to

conceptualisepartyorganisation,sinceexistingtypologiesaretoocloselyconnected

tostructuralisttheoriesofpartyformationandchange.

Theanalytical frameworkdevelopedinthis firstsectionwill thenbeappliedto

politicalpartiesinthenewerdemocraciesofEastAsia.Ineachcountrychapterwe

willoutline themainpropertiesof theparticularcontext,discusshowpoliticalac‐

tors develop different electoral strategies within this context and finally demon‐

stratehowthesestrategiestranslate intopartyorganisation.Aswillbeshown,we

arenotwitnessingtheemergenceofparticulartypeofpartyorganisationacrossall

countriesorwithinsinglepolities–asstructuralist theorieswouldwantus tobe‐

lieve–norareweconfrontedwithaconfusingmultiplicityofdifferenttypesofparty

organisation,astheagent‐centredtheorieswouldexpect.Rather,theorganisationof

political parties in East Asia is the product of strategic decisionsmade by know‐

ledgeableandreflexiveactorswithinacontextthat favourscertainstrategiesover

others.


–5–

ThedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope

Existingtheoriesofpartyorganisationcanbegroupedintotwostrands,depending

onwhether theyattributemore importance to structuresor agents.However, the

theorisationonpartyorganisationnotonlysuffersfromadividebetweenstructural

andvoluntaristapproaches,butalsofromageographicalandculturalbias.Most,if

notalmostalltheoriesofpartyorganisationalchangeandadaptationhavebeende‐

veloped in the context of the established democracies inWestern Europe.With a

fewexceptions,thestudyofpoliticalpartiesinnewlydemocratisingpolitiesinother

parts of theworldhasnot generatednew theoretical insights.Rather, analyses of

partyorganisation inthe“thirdwave”ofdemocracytendtoemployexistingparty

models.Hence,beforeoutliningthedifferenttheoriesthathavebeenofferedtoac‐

count for theorganisational formationandadaptationofpoliticalparties, it seems

necessary to briefly summarise the historical development of political parties in

WesternEurope,whichservesastheempiricalunderpinningofthesetheories.

Ofthemanytypologiesofpoliticalparties(seeKrouwel2006),thehistoricalnar‐

rativewillfollowtheclassificationbyKatzandMair(1995),whichhasproventobe

themostinfluential.Onecentralcharacteristicofthisclassificationisthateachparty

typetakesapreviouslyexistingoneasreferencepoint.Hence,thehistoricalnarra‐

tivewouldbe incomplete if itdidnot include the factors that caused thedevelop‐

ment of an existing type into a new type. Obviously, these factorswill reflect the

specificstructuralistapproachassociatedwiththewritingsofKatzandMair,which

OLIVERHELLMANN

–6–

will be critically assessed later in this chapter. At themoment, however, this ap‐

proach serves as a heuristic device to paint a coherent picture of party organisa‐

tionaldevelopmentinWesternEurope.

Thegeneraltrajectoryofpartyorganisationaldevelopmentintheindustrialised

democraciesoftheWesthasfrequentlybeendescribedasindecline.Severalschol‐

ars argue thatpolitical partieshave lostmanyof their core functions tootheror‐

ganisationsofinterestrepresentationandhenceportraypoliticalpartiesinasevere

crisisfromwhichtheywillalmostcertainlyneverrecover.3Themainproblemwith

thisgloomypictureisthatitisbasedontheideaofpartiesasunitaryactors.Ifwe

insteaddistinguishthreedifferentelements–orfaces–ofpartyorganisation,itbe‐

comesclear thatonly the “partyon theground”hasbecome less important,while

the“partyincentraloffice”andparticularlythe“partyinpublicoffice”haveinfact

beenstrengthened(Mair1994;KatzandMair2002;seealsoWebb2002).Thetrend

in party development in Western Europe should therefore not be interpreted as

generaldecline,butmoreaccuratelyasorganisationalchangeandadaptation(Bar‐

toliniandMair2001).Hence,itmakessensetodescribethehistoricaldevelopment

ofWesternparties along the changingpower relationsbetween the three facesof

partyorganisation.Moreover, asouranalytical frameworkwill be centredaround

party internal power relations as the centralmechanism to explainpolitical party

3Argumentspresentedinordertosupportthethesisof“partydecline”differmarkedlyintheirlevelofgeneralisation.Whereassomeauthorsinterprettheweakerroleofpartiesinthepoliticalprocessasauniversaltrend(forexampleSchmitter1999),othersinsistonamorenation‐specificapproach(forexampleReiter1989;SchmittandHolmberg1995).


–7–

development,thishistoricaldiscussionwillserveasanimportantreferencepointto

integrateourfindingsintotheexistingliteratureonpartyorganisation.

Broadly speaking, thepartyon theground refers to themembershiporganisa‐

tionofaparty.Memberscanbedistinguishedfromthegeneralelectorateastothe

obligationsandprivilegesthattheyhavebeenassignedbytheparty(Heidar2006:

301). The party in central office, on the other hand, ismore difficult to define. In

verysimpletermsitcanbedescribedasthenationalheadquartersofthepartycon‐

sistingof twodifferentgroups: (1) theparty leadershipand(2) thepartybureau‐

cracy(Katz2002:98).Finally,thepartyinpublicofficeisself‐explanatory,encom‐

passingthosepartymemberswhoholdofficeasmembersofparliamentorcabinet

ministers.

Although theyhaveneverbeen clearly stated, anumberofdifferent indicators

canbedrawnfromtheliteraturethatscholarshaveusedtomeasurethepowerrela‐

tionsbetweenthe three facesofpartyorganisation.Certainly, themost frequently

analysedindicatoristhesizeofpartymembership.Infact,theargumentsofthead‐

vocatesofthe“partydecline”thesisaremostlybuiltuponthedecreasingnumberof

membersinWestEuropeanpartiesduringthepastdecades.Anotherindicatorused

todeterminethedistributionofpowerwithinpoliticalpartiesisintra‐partydemoc‐

racy.Theproceduresusedtoelectthepartyleadershipandtonominatecandidates

for public elections are a valuable gauge todrawa general power‐mapof a party

(Katz2001).Finally,thedistributionofresourcesrelevanttoelectoralcompetition

OLIVERHELLMANN

–8–

isalsoemployed touncover theparty‐internalbalanceofpower (Katz1996).The

mostimportantresourcesincludemoney,staff,andaccesstomedia.

Accordingtothese indicators, thedominantorganisational faceofthefirstpar‐

tiestoemergeinproto‐democraticEuropeinthe18thand19thcenturywasalmost

certainly the party in public office. Although it is questionable whether one can

reallytalkofadominant face,since,asamatterof fact,whathasbeentermedthe

“cadre party” (Duverger 1964) or the “party of individual representation” (Neu‐

mann1956)wasnothingmorethanalooseallianceofnotableswiththeaimofget‐

tingtheircandidateselectedintoparliament.Anextra‐parliamentarypartywasvir‐

tuallynon‐existent,andthepartyinpublicofficethustendedtobetheonlygroupin

thepartythathad“theneedortheopportunitytomakecollectivedecisions”(Katz

andMair2002:115‐116).

Thecadrepartywasnotbasedonanenduringlocalmembershiporganisation,

butifthepartyrequiredpeopletohelpinmobilisingvotesitwouldprimarilyrely

on the personal networks of friends and clients of itsmembers.Membershipwas

restrictedtothosewithindependentandpersonalaccesstopoliticallyrelevantre‐

sources.InthewordsofDuverger(1964:64),adherencetothecadre‐partytypeis

acompletelypersonalact,basedupontheaptitudesorthepeculiar

circumstances of a man; it is determined strictly by individual

qualities.Itisanactthatisrestrictedtoafew:itisdependentupon

rigid and exclusive selection. If we define a member as one who


–9–

signsanundertakingtothepartyandthereafterregularlypayshis

subscription,thencadrepartieshavenomembers.

Theonlyfunctionofthesmallelitistcircleofparty“members”wastonominatecan‐

didatesforelection.In‐betweenelectionstheselocalalliancesofnotableswouldbe

dormant, leaving the party’s representatives in parliament with an absolute free

mandateandineveryrespectresponsibleonlytotheirownconsciences(Neumann

1956:404).Theselectionofcandidateswasahighlyinformalprocess,withthepat‐

ronsusuallynominatingoneofthemselves(Katz2001:283).

Takingallthisinmind,itisnotdifficulttounderstandwhythecadrepartyhad

no need for a strong party in central office. Since the individual members could

themselves provide the resources necessary for electoral success (i.e.money and

votes),theywerenotdependentoncentralresources,andthereforefeltnoneedto

defertoacentralauthority(KatzandMair2002:115).

Thecrucial context for theemergenceof theelitist cadrepartywas therégime

censitairewith its restrictive suffrage requirements linked towealthandproperty

(Daalder2001:42).Asthenumberofpeoplewhocouldmeettheserequirementsin

theearlystagesoftheprocessofindustrialisationwasrelativelysmall,politicalpar‐

tiesonlyhad tomobilisea smallnumberof votes inorder toget their candidates

elected.Thisdidnotrequirehighlysophisticatedelectoralcampaigns,butsufficient

votes could simply be secured throughpersonal contacts held by the partymem‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–10–

bers.Inotherwords,thepersonalinfluenceofthemembersinpublicofficemadean

extra‐parliamentaryorganisationredundant.

This all changedwhen restrictions onworking‐class organisation, whichwere

increasinglyseentobeincompatiblewithliberal ideas,becamemorerelaxed,thus

allowingsocialgroupslockedoutofthepoliticaldecision‐makingprocesstoorgan‐

isetheirownparties“outside”parliament.Asthesegroupslackedtheresourcesof

therulingeliteparties,theytriedtoattractasmanymembersaspossible,thereby

substituting individual quality with quantity (Duverger 1964: 23). Members not

onlyprovidedasourceofincomeforthepartybyhavingtopayregularmembership

dues,buttheyalsocontributedfreelabourbothduringandbetweenelectioncam‐

paigns.Moreover,sincethe“massparty”–alternatively“partyofsocialintegration”

(Neumann1956)–usuallyrepresentedaparticularandclearlydefinedsocialorre‐

ligious segment of society, thus embodying an ideological visionof a better social

order, members represented a valuable basis for spreading that ideology (Ware

1996:66).

Inreturnfortheircontributions,themasspartygavemembersasayininternal

matters,suchastheelectionofleaders,thenominationofcandidatesforpublicelec‐

tions,andtheformulationofpolicygoals.Decision‐makingwasorganisedinahier‐

archicalsystemofdelegation,withthelowerlevelselectingrepresentativesonthe

nexthigherlevel.Theideabehindthiswasthatthepartyleadershipandthemem‐

bers of the party in public office should act as agents of themasses. At the same

time, the party tried to insulate its members from counter‐ideologies through


–11–

propaganda,partypress,andparty‐organisedactivitiesinallspheresoflifefromthe

cradle to thegrave(Neumann1956:405).Like theparticipatoryrightsgranted to

members, theseactivities, suchassportclubs, readinggroupsetcetera,also func‐

tionedasincentivesforpeopleoutsidethepartytoenlistasamember.

All this, the administration of the membership registry, the collection of

membership dues, the management of voluntary work, the publication of party

newspapers,andthesupervisionofancillaryorganisationscreatedthenecessityfor

a strongparty central office staffedby full‐timeprofessionals.However, given the

symbioticrelationshipbetweenthepartyonthegroundandthepartyincentralof‐

fice–theformersupplyingthepartywiththeresourcesnecessaryfor itssurvival,

while the latter provides central co‐ordination – it is difficult to determine the

dominant organisational face of the mass party (Katz and Mair 2002: 117). The

party in public office, on the other hand, was clearly subordinate to the extra‐

parliamentaryorganisation.

With progressing industrialisation, which meant that more and more people

wereabletomeettherequirementsoftherégimecensitaire,andtheincreasingelec‐

toralsuccessofsocialistanddenominationalparties,theclassiccadrepartieswere

forcedtomobilisevotesbeyondtheirtraditionalconstituenciesintheuppersocio‐

economicstrataofsociety.Thismadeitnecessarytoemulatethemasspartyasan

organisational type, and to openmembership to thewider electorate.As a conse‐

quence, a stronger central organisation became indispensable, which would co‐

ordinatecampaignactivitiesandadministerthegrowingpartyontheground(von

OLIVERHELLMANN

–12–

Beyme1985:161).Theprototype forapermanentcentralpartyorganisationwas

themuch cited Birmingham Caucus of the British Liberals, established by Joseph

Chamberlainin1877.

However,asKatzandMair(1995:11‐12)argue,itwasunappealingtothelead‐

ersofthecadrepartytocopythemasspartymodelineveryrespect.Firstofall,or‐

ganisationallyencapsulatingclearlydefinedsegmentsofsocietyseemedineffective,

sincethegroupsthatwouldhavebeenlefttothemwerepermanentminorities(for

examplefarmers,industrialists).Secondly,theideathattheextra‐parliamentaryor‐

ganisationoughttobedominantwentagainsttheinterestsofthosealreadyestab‐

lishedingovernment.Andfinally,asthepartiesoftheupperandmiddleclasses,and

asthepartiesingovernment,theywerenotsodependentonthematerialresources

providedbypartymembers.Consequently,

the leadersof thetraditionalpartiestendedtoestablishorga‐

nizationsthat looked likemassparties in form(regularmem‐

bers, branches, aparty congress, apartypress), butwhich in

practiceoftencontinuedtoemphasizetheindependenceofthe

parliamentaryparty.

(KatzandMair1995:12)

Indoingso,theycreatedaneworganisationalform,whichthemasspartieswould

thenfeelpressuredtoimitatefromthe1950son:the“catch‐allparty”(Kirchheimer


–13–

1964) or “electoral‐professional party”model (Panebianco 1988). Although these

partieswerestillbasedonlargemembershiporganisations,theroleofpartymem‐

bers was downgraded considerably. This showed primarily in three ways (see

Krouwel 2003: 28). First of all, one could observe stagnation in the size of party

memberships.Inaddition, insteadofbeinglimitedtoaspecificsegmentofsociety,

thesocialprofileofpartymembershipbecamemorebalanced.Andlastbutnotleast,

partiesofferedfarfeweropportunitiesformembershipactivity,astheycloseddown

manyoftheancillaryorganisations.

Simultaneously, the party in public office witnessed a significant increase in

power–vis‐à‐visboththepartyonthegroundandthepartyincentraloffice.Hav‐

ing gained a taste of office, the parliamentary leaders of themass party naturally

wantedtogetre‐elected,andhencedevelopedaninterestinbroadeningtheirelec‐

toralappealbeyondtheiroriginalclassgardée(Mair1997:102).However,inorder

tobeabletopursueacatch‐allstrategy,thepartyinpublicofficeneededtofreeit‐

selffromthecontrolofthepartyontheground.Inachievingthis,thepartyinpublic

officeprofitedfromtwodevelopments.Firstly,technologicalinnovationsinsystems

ofmasscommunicationrevolutionisedelectoral campaigning.Partiesput lessem‐

phasisonlabour‐intensivecampaignsstressingindividualcontactwithvotersatthe

locallevel,butcampaignsbecamemorestandardisedatthenationallevel,astelevi‐

sionbroughtpoliticians closer to thepeople (Farrell1996). Secondly, through the

introduction of public subsidies for political parties the party in public office ob‐

taineditsownsourceof income(Katz1996:121).Takentogether, thismeantthat

OLIVERHELLMANN

–14–

thepartyinpublicofficebecamelessdependentontheresourcesprovidedbyparty

members–freelabourandmoney.

Thebalanceofpowerwithinthecatch‐allpartycanbedescribedasaconflictbe‐

tweenthepartyonthegroundandthepartyinpublicofficethatwasplayedoutin

thepartyincentraloffice(KatzandMair2002:122).Broadlyspeaking,theconflict

revolvedaround thequestionofwhether theparty in central office shouldbe the

agentofthepartyonthegroundincontrollingtheparty inpublicoffice,orrather

theagentofthepartyinpublicofficeinorganisinganddirectingtheirsupportersin

thepartyontheground.

Eventually,thepartyinpublicofficewonthestruggleforparty‐internalpower,

because the trendsmentionedabovehavebecomeevenmoreapparent.Moreand

morepeoplenowmakeuseofnewcommunication technologies in theireveryday

lives,andthe levelofstatesubventions forpoliticalpartieshassteadily increased.

Theresultingdominanceofthepartyinpublicofficewithrespecttotheotherfaces

ofpartyorganisationledKatzandMair(1995)todiagnosetheemergenceofanew

partytype,the“cartelparty”,whichisbelievedtobethedominantpartyorganisa‐

tionalformincontemporaryWesternEurope.

Thecartel‐partythesisclaimsthatestablishedpoliticalpartiesseektomonopo‐

lisetheaccesstopoliticalpowerbylimitingtheintensityofinter‐partycompetition

throughinformalagreements.Theycreateanoligopolisticcartelwithinwhichthey

allocatestateresourcestothemselves,givingthemasignificantelectoraladvantage

inrelationtooutsidechallengers.Clearly,thisalsohasalargeimpactonthedistri‐


–15–

bution of resourceswithin the parties themselves, as it is principally the party in

publicofficethatnegotiatesthetermsofthepartycartel.Notonlydoesthepartyin

publicofficetendtobetheprimebeneficiaryofstatesubventions,but,inaddition,it

heavilyprofits fromthegrowingnumberofpublicly fundedstaff inparliamentary

offices(KatzandMair2002:123).Together,thesecrucialorganisationalresources

ensure the party in public office a more or less undisputed position of privilege

withinthepartyorganisation.

Giventheincreasingself‐sufficiencyofthepartyinpublicoffice,partymembers

havebecomemuchlessimportantforelectoralsuccess.This isreflectedinthede‐

clining levels of partymembership that can be observed throughoutWestern Eu‐

rope(MairandvanBiezen2001).Thepartyeliteinparliamentincreasinglyseems

toperceivepartymembersasadisadvantageratherthananasset,andpoliticalpar‐

ties seemmuch less interested in recruiting newmembers. At the same time, the

remainingmembership has been atomised, meaning thatmembers exercise their

participatory rights as individuals rather than through delegates (Katz and Mair

1995:21).Thisbecomesparticularlyapparentinthemethodsusedtoselectcandi‐

datesforpublicelections,wheremoreandmorepartiesarefollowingtheprinciple

of “onemember, one vote”. The causalmechanism identified behind this trend is

againthedesireofthepartyinpublicofficetomaintainelectoralsuccess.Inorderto

enjoy the necessary autonomy to pursue aggressive electioneering, party leaders

giveeachmemberanindividualvote,therebyleavingnopowertotheintermediary

party structures, which are usually crowded with the most ideologically radical

OLIVERHELLMANN

–16–

members(Katz2001;Scarrow,WebbandFarrell2000).Infact,manypartieshave

opened their processes of candidate selection to the general electorate, thereby

makingadistinctionbetweenmembersandnon‐membersdifficult.

TABLE1: THEORGANISATIONALDEVELOPMENTOFPOLITICALPARTIESINWESTERNEUROPE

Cadreparty Massparty Catchallparty Cartelparty

Timeperiod 18‐19thcentury 1880s‐1960s 1945‐1970s 1970s‐today

Dominantface noclearboundar‐iesbetweenfaces

symbioticrela‐tionshipbetweenpartyonthegroundandpartycentraloffice

conflictbetweenpartyonthegroundandpartypublicofficeplayedoutinthepartycentralof‐fice

clearlypartyinpublicoffice

Membership virtuallynon‐existent;usuallyfriendsandfamilyofthepartyelite

extensiveandsociallyhomoge‐neous

stagnatingandsociallyhetero‐geneous

distinctionbe‐tweenmembersandnon‐membersisblurred

Decisionmaking informalandhighlycentralised

organisedinahierarchicalsys‐temofdemocraticdelegation

therulesregard‐ingpartyinternaldecision‐makingbecomefiercelycontested

highlyinclusive:onemember,onevote

Organisationalresources

personalcontactsandmoneycon‐centratedinthehandsofthepartynotables

partymemberscontributefreelabourandpayregularmember‐shipdues

technologicalrevolutionandstatesubsidiesmakeresourcesprovidedbypartymemberslessimportant

partyinpublicofficevirtuallyself‐sufficient

Source: OwncompilationbasedonKatzandMair(1995;2002)andKatz(1990;1996;2001).


–17–

The organisational development of political parties inWestern Europe is summa‐

risedinTable1.Itwasimportanttooutlinethehistoricaltrajectoryofpartyorgani‐

sationsintheestablisheddemocraciesbecausethegreatmajorityoftheoriestoex‐

plain different types of party organisation have been developed in this particular

empirical context. However, as the next sectionwill show, the history of political

partiesinWesternEuropeismuchmorecomplexthantheabovetablesuggestsand

fullofcasesthatexistingtheoriesfailtoaccountfor.Thisfailureresultsfromthefact

thatexistingtheoriespaytoomuchattentiontoeitherstructuresoragency,without

acknowledgingthedialecticalrelationshipbetweenthetwo.Inshort,thehistorical

developmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEuropejustoutlinedwillhelpus,firstof

all,highlighttheweaknessesofexistingapproachestowardspartyorganisationand,

secondly,demonstratehowtheanalyticalframeworkdevelopedherecancontribute

toourunderstandingnotonlyofpoliticalpartyformationandadaptationinnewer

democraciesbutalsopoliticalpartydevelopmentinWesternEurope.

Structuralistapproachestopartyorganisation

Theoriesthatemphasisestructuralfactorsinordertoaccountfordifferentformsof

party organisation have been arranged into three distinctive groups (van Biezen

2005;seealsoBartoliniandMair2001:328‐330).Thesecanbedistinguishedonthe

OLIVERHELLMANN

–18–

basisofhowmuchimportancetheyattributetoexternalorinternalfactorsrespec‐

tively.Whilethe“life‐cycle”approachconceivespartyformationandadaptationas

anendogenousprocessofmaturationthatwillalwaysunfold in thesameway,re‐

gardlessofthecontextaroundtheparty,the“periodeffect”approach–usedabove

tooutlinethehistoricaldevelopmentofWesternEuropeanparties–arguesthatthe

organisationalstructuresimplementedbypartieswill,incontrast,tendtoreflectthe

environmentalcircumstances inwhichthesepartiescompete.Finally, the“genera‐

tioneffect”approachmaintainsthatthetypeofpartyorganisationisverylikelyto

beindicativeofthecontextualfactorsthatformedthesettingfortheparty’sinitial

formation.Inotherwords,theformationofapoliticalpartywillbedeterminedby

externalstructuralfactors,whereasthefurtherdevelopmentwillbeconstrainedby

theinternalpartystructuresoriginallyadopted.

The“life‐cycle”approach

Probablythemostwidelycitedtheorythatcanberelatedtothelife‐cycleapproach

isRobertMichels’well‐known“iron lawofoligarchy”. Studying theGermanSocial

DemocraticPartyintheearly20thcentury,Michelsclaimsthatallpartiesthatattain

acertaindegreeofcomplexitywillundergoacentralisationofpowerinthehandsof


–19–

asmallnumberofleaders.Thisissummarisedinhisfamousdictum:“Whosaysor‐

ganization,saysoligarchy”(Michels1962:365).

The causal mechanism underlying Michels’ argument involves two different

stages.Firstofall,Michelsestablishesthenecessityofleadershipinlargeorganisa‐

tions, arguing that beyond a certain size technical specialisation and a division of

labourbecomeindispensable.Thiswillforcethepartytoreplacedirectdemocracy

byasystemofdelegation,which,inturn,willgiverisetoadistinctionbetweenlead‐

ersandfollowers.Althoughthisfirststepintheargumentationseemsalmostbanal,

itneverthelessformsthecrucialbasisforthesecondstageinMichels’lineofreason‐

ing,whenhecontendsthatthisnewlyemergedleadershipwillnecessarilybecome

oligarchic.

Michelsofferstwodifferentsetsoffactorsthatwillencourageleaderstoactoli‐

garchically.Tobeginwith,exercisingpowerhasanumberofpsychologicaleffects

onthoseinleadershippositions,since,accordingtoMichels,thedesiretodominate

isinherenttohumannature.Itfollowsfromthisthat

[…]everyhumanpowerseekstoenlarge itsprerogatives.Hewho

hasacquiredpowerwillalmostalwaysendeavourtoconsolidateit

and to extend it, tomultiply the rampartswhich defend his posi‐

tion,andtowithdrawhimselffromthecontrolofthemasses.

(ibid.:206)

OLIVERHELLMANN

–20–

Moreover,leaderswillseekoligarchicalcontroloftheparty,becauseofthematerial

benefits attached to their status within the party organisation. These would de‐

creaseinvalueiftheyhadtosharethemwithalargergroupofpeople.

Afterhavingansweredthequestionofwhypartyleaderswouldtrytocentralise

powerwithintheirelitistcircle,Michelsgoesontoexplainhowthisisachieved.The

principalcauseheidentifiesinthisregardisthemeretechnicalindispensabilityof

leadership:

The technical specialisation that inevitably results from all exten‐

sive organisation renders necessarywhat is called expert leader‐

ship. Consequently the power of determination comes to be con‐

sideredoneofthespecificattributesofleadership,andisgradually

withdrawnfromthemassestobeconcentratedinthehandsofthe

leaders alone. Thus the leaders, who were at first no more than

executiveorgansofthecollectivewill,soonemancipatethemselves

fromthemassesandbecomeindependentofitscontrol.

(ibid.:70)

Inotherwords,asthepartyorganisationbecomesmoresophisticated,sowilllead‐

ersbecomemoreexpert inrunning theorganisation.Thiswillmake ithard tore‐

place them,which, in turn,makes leaders feelmoresecureand less responsive to

rank‐and‐fileinfluence:Theleaders’monopolyofexpertiseinmanyareaswillmean


–21–

thatordinarypartymembershavetodependontheirjudgement,exposingthemto

theleaders’control.Toolsusedbythepartyleadershiptomaintaincontroloverthe

party on the ground include themanipulation of party finances, control over the

partypress,andparticularlythe“tacticofresignation”.

WhileMichels’“ironlawofoligarchy” iswithoutdoubtthemostprominentex‐

ample of the life‐cycle approach, other authors also perceive the development of

partyorganisationsasasinglecommontrajectorythatallpartieswillbeforcedto

follow.OneexampleisthestudyofpartiesinNorwayandDenmarkbyHarmeland

Svåsand(1993),inwhichitisarguedthatthe“entrepreneurialissuesparties”found

in these two countriesdid all go through the same threephasesof organisational

progression.Eachstage, theauthorsargue,requiredparticular typesof leadership

skillstodealwithitsspecialchallenges.Duringthefirstphase,buildingapartyor‐

ganisation is less vital, but the emphasis is ondevelopingamessageanddrawing

attention to the party. This will be more successful to the extent that the leader

drawsattentiontohim‐orherself.Inthesecondphase,ontheotherhand,establish‐

ingroutinisedproceduresanddevelopinganelectoralapparatuswillenjoyhighest

priority.Hence,theleaderfirstandforemostrequiresorganisationalskills.Finally,

duringthethirdphasetheprimaryfocusisonsolidifyingareputationasareliable

partner in government, which calls for a “moderator” and “stabiliser” as party

leader.

WhatthisapproachhasincommonwithMichel’sthesisisthattheybothexplain

differenttypesofpartyorganisationswithdifferentstagesinaparty’slife.Similarto

OLIVERHELLMANN

–22–

living organisms, proponents of the life‐cycle approach argue, political parties go

through a process of maturation, and their organisational structures will reflect

their current developmental stage. In otherwords, just as a human being experi‐

ences different phases of physical development (baby, child, adolescent, adult),

whichareallassociatedwithparticularchangesinthebody,apoliticalpartyisper‐

ceivedtogrowupalongauniversalpaththatcanbedividedintodifferentsegments.

Hence, all parties on the same stage of developmentwill be characterised by the

same typeoforganisation.Thismeans that if twoparties areestablished simulta‐

neouslyinverydifferentcontexts,totallyisolatedfromeachother,theywilldisplay

verysimilarorganisations,simplybecausetheyareboth“new”.Moreover,theyare

thenpredictedtorunthroughthesamephaseofmaturation,eventuallybothreach‐

ingthefinalstageoforganisationalmaturity.Unlikelivingorganisms,however,po‐

liticalpartiesarenotperceivedashavingamaximumlifeexpectancy.

Accordingly,we should expectpolitical parties in youngdemocracies to follow

thesametrajectoryaspartiesinWesternEuropedid,developingfromcadreparties

tomassparties,andsubsequentlyadoptingthecatch‐allpartytype,followedbythe

cartel‐party type. However, while such a scenario can probably be dismissed on

mereempiricalevidence(cf.vanBiezen2005:153),thisshouldnotleadustodisre‐

gard the life‐cycle approach completely. In fact, speculations about more general

trends in thedevelopmentofpartyorganisations, suchasoligarchic tendencies in

internal decision‐making, are much less easy to falsify. It does indeed require a


–23–

muchmoreabstractargumenttoteardownthedeterministictheoriesdevelopedby

Michelsandhisdisciples.

Certainly themainweaknessof the life‐cycleapproach is its generalneglectof

partyactorsandtheirinterests.Picturingpartyorganisationalformationandadap‐

tationasaprocessofmaturation similar to thoseof any life formdenies the sub‐

stantial differences between the natural and the social world. Unlike the entities

studiedbynaturalscientists,socialactorsdonotalwaysreactinthesamemanner

toaspecificstimulus.Rather,theobjectsofanalysisinsocialsciencearecapableof

learningandactingdifferentlyunderthesameconditions.

ThiscanbeexemplifiedbylookingatthedevelopmentofGreenpartiesinWest‐

ernEurope,whichinstitutedhighlytransparentandinclusivestructuresofdecision‐

making.Infact,itcouldbearguedthat–knowingaboutMichels’ironlawofoligar‐

chy–thesepartiesdeliberatelytriedtocountertheoligarchicaltendenciesfoundin

establishedpoliticalparties(cf.Kitschelt1988).Forinstance,inthecaseoftheGer‐

manGreens(DieGrünen),whichisprobablythebestdocumentedexample,theor‐

ganisationalphilosophyofBasisdemokratiewasclearlyaimedatpreventingthede‐

velopmentofaprofessionalparty leadershipthatwouldthenbecomeincreasingly

indispensableandthusdifficulttocontrol(Poguntke1993:138).Severalruleswere

implemented to put this democratic ideal in practice. To begin with, the original

partycharterprovided forasystemofmidtermrotationofparliamentaryseats to

those lower in the party list. Moreover, it embraced the idea of the “imperative

mandate”, which ruled that deputies who deviated from the policy resolutions

OLIVERHELLMANN

–24–

passedbythepartyassemblycouldberemovedfromoffice.Regardingthepartyin

central office, itwas decided that party posts should not be salaried,while party

leadershiptenureandre‐eligibilitywerelimited.

Inshort,contrarytoMichels’ironlaw,manygrassrootsmembersinGreenpar‐

tiesdeeplydistrust leadership,anddonotfollowthemblindly.Andalthoughmost

Green parties have, since their formation, crafted considerable organisational re‐

forms that abolished several of the sacred “new politics” principles of intra‐party

democracy, there iswidespread consensus among scholars thatGreenparties are

stillfarawayfromconventionalpartiesintermsoftheirorganisation(forexample

Rihoux 2006; Burchell 2001). Put differently, the oligarchical trends in Western

EuropeanGreenpartiesaremuchweakerthanthe life‐cycleapproachwantsusto

believe.Hence,Michels iswrongwhenhesays that “historicalevolutionmocksall

theprophylacticmeasuresthathavebeenadoptedforthepreventionofoligarchy”

(1962:368).Rather,anticipatingtheoligarchicaltendenciesoforganisations,actors

arenotrestrictedtosittingbackandwatchingtheprocessofmaturationunfold,but

theycanindeedconsciouslyworkagainstthesetendencies.

Moreover, the life‐cycleapproachdoesnotonlydenyanyrole toagentswithin

theparty,but italso ignores theenvironmentaroundtheparty.Even ifweaccept

theideathatpartyformationandadaptationcanbeunderstoodasanendogenous

process of maturation, we need to make certain assumptions about the external

conditions (cf.Harmel2002:121). Similar to any livingorganism,politicalparties

needacertaininputfromtheenvironmentinordertomoveontothenextstageof


–25–

their organisational development. In otherwords, progress in the life‐cycle is not

onlydependentupon internaldynamics, but thesedynamics, in turn, are thepro‐

ductofexternalfactors.Similarly,thespeedofpartyorganisationalchangewillalso

bedeterminedbytheenvironmentsurroundingtheparty.

Having outlined theweaknesses, it is necessary to point out that the life‐cycle

approachalsohas its strengths. In fact,what itdoes, it stresses the importanceof

internalfactorsinordertounderstanddifferentformsofpartyorganisation.Inpar‐

ticular,thepossibleeffectsofpartysizehaveinthepastmotivatedmuchresearch.

Forinstance,Tan(1998),disintegratingMichels’ironlawofoligarchyintomeasur‐

able variables, tests the impact the number of partymembers has on intra‐party

participationandthedistributionofpowerwithinpartyorganisations.Hisfindings

onlypartlysupportMichels’hypotheses.While,ontheonehand,largemembership

decreasesmeaningful participation by partymembers and encourages free‐riding

behaviour,organisational complexity (resulting from largemembership size)does

notnecessarily result ina centralisationofpowerat the topof thehierarchy.The

firstrelationshiphasbeenconfirmedinamorerecentstudybyWeldon(2006).Re‐

garding the second relationship, Lundell (2004) comes to a conflicting conclusion

whenheidentifiesacorrelationbetweenpartysizeandtheprocedureofcandidate

selection forpublicelections:The larger theparty, themorecentralised theselec‐

tionofcandidateswilltendtobe.

Tosumup,similartotheageingoflivingorganisms,thelife‐cycleapproachper‐

ceivespartyorganisationalformationandadaptationasauni‐directionalprocessof

OLIVERHELLMANN

–26–

maturation. Indoingso, it totallydeniesanyexplanatorypowertoagencyandthe

externalenvironmentaroundtheparty.However, the life‐cycleapproachdeserves

tobeacclaimedfordrawingourattentiontothepossibleimpactofinternalfactors

whenexplainingdifferentformsofpartyorganisation.

The“periodeffect”approach

While the life‐cycle approach focuses exclusively on endogenous dynamics to ac‐

count for different formsof party organisation, the “period effect” approach gives

sole attention to the external environment. Particular types of party organisation

aresaidtoderivefromcompetitionwithotherparties,whichallhavetoparticipate

in democratic elections under the same external circumstances. The basic thesis

claimsthatifapartyisgoingtocompetesuccessfullywithotherparties,itneedsto

lookandactlikethem.However,advocatesofthisapproacharestillundecidedon

which levelofanalysismattersmost inexplainingpartyorganisational structures.

One group – nowadaysparticularly associatedwith thewritings ofKatz andMair

(1995) – argues that political parties are converging towards a common type of

partyorganisation,sincetheylikewisehavetorespondtouniversaltrendsthatare

observableinallmoderndemocracies.Others,ontheotherhand,claimthatparties


–27–

aredivergingastotheirorganisation,thusstressingexplanatoryfactorsonthedo‐

mesticlevel(forexampleDetterbeck2005;Gallagher1988a).

The first argument goesback to themuch citeddebatebetweenDuverger and

Epsteinrevolvingaround thequestionofwhichorganisational structurewouldbe

most likelytodominatedemocraticpoliticsaftertheSecondWorldWar.Duverger

(1964) argued that the mass party, with its large membership and its extensive

networkof localbranches,was superior to the cadreparty, as itprovidedamore

effectiveapparatustosecurelargequantitiesofresourcesneededforelectoralcom‐

petition. Consequently, there would be a “contagion from the left”, meaning that

otherpartieswouldfeelforcedtocopytheorganisationalformofsocialistpartiesin

ordertoattainahigherlevelofcompetitiveness.Incontrast,Epstein(1980)claimed

thatAmerican‐styleparties,whichsharedmanysimilaritieswiththeclassicalcadre

partyinproto‐democraticEurope,weremuchmoresuitedtocopewiththechallen‐

gesofmodern election campaigns. Epsteinmaintained that the largemembership

organisation and the encapsulation of specific social groupswould cost themass

party thenecessary flexibility to react to social changes in the electorate.He thus

suggestedparty leaders cutdownonpartymembers, and insteadmobilise voters

directly throughmassmedia. Only thenwould themass parties be able to retain

theircompetitiveness.Inotherwords,Epsteindidnotexpecta“contagionfromthe

left”tocharacterisethedevelopmentofpartysystemsinWesterndemocracies,but

rathera“contagionfromtheright”.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–28–

Scholars who accept that the cartel party is now the dominant organisational

typeinWesternEurope,wouldarguethatneitherDuvergernorEpsteinwereright

in their predictions. As has already been outlined further above, both the “leftist”

masspartyand the “rightist”cadreparty felt compelled tocraftorganisational re‐

formsthatledtotheemergenceofanewcommonformofpartyorganisation.While

the leadersof thecadrepartyestablishedorganisedmembershipbranchessimilar

tothoseofthemassparty,withoutgivinguptheindependencethattheypreviously

hadenjoyed,theleadersofthemasspartymadeorganisationalchoicesthatwould

limit the influence of the party on the ground,without completely abolishing the

membershiporganisation(KatzandMair2002:120‐121).

Factors that facilitate the rise of the party in public office as the dominant or‐

ganisational faceofaparty,advocatesofthecartel‐partythesisargue,arebroader

historicaldevelopmentsthataffectalldemocraciesinthesameway.Associalidenti‐

tiesareweakeningduetothegeneralimprovementoflivingstandards,theexpan‐

sionofthewelfarestateandbettereducation,votersareincreasinglyconceivedas

free floating. An encapsulation of the electorate through grassroots organisations

hasthereforebecomelargelyinefficient.Rather,themostpromisingelectoralstrat‐

egyistomakeacatch‐allappealtothewiderelectorate.Pursuingsuchastrategyis

now possible because party leaders have become largely independent from con‐

strainingopinionsexpressedbythepartyontheground.Asaresultofthetechno‐

logical progress in the field ofmass communication and the availability of public

fundingforpoliticalparties,partymembersnolongerenjoythesamepowerfulposi‐


–29–

tionwithinthepartyorganisationastheydidduringtheeraofthemassparty.Party

leaderscannowaddressvotersdirectlyviatelevisionortheinternet,withouthav‐

ing to rely on door‐to‐door canvassing or leafleting carried out by unpaid party

members.Inaddition,subsidiespaidbythestatemeanthatmembershipdueshave

becomeamuchlessimportantsourceofincome.

Inordertoexplainwhythecartelpartyneverthelessstillmaintainsamember‐

shiporganisedintolocalbranches,anumberofenduringbenefitshavebeenidenti‐

fied fromtheparty leadership’sperspective.Whilevoluntary labourandmember‐

shipdueshavenot lostall theirvalueasorganisational resources, in recent times

otherfunctionsofpartymembersareperceivedtohavebecomerelativelymoreim‐

portantforelectoralsuccess(seeKatz1990;Scarrow1996:42‐45).Tostartwith,a

largemembershiporganisationgivesvoterstheimpressionthatthepartyispopular

andstrongly rooted in society.Moreover,members themselvesareassumed tobe

mostloyalvotersinelections,andthroughtheireverydaycontactstheymayadvise

otherpeoplehow tovote. Inaddition,membersprovidea channelof communica‐

tion,whichkeeps theparty leadership in touchwithpopularopinion.And finally,

thepartymembershipcanbeusedasarecruitmentpoolforfuturepoliticalleaders.

Toputitbriefly,advocatesofthecartel‐partythesisarguethatdespitethedecreas‐

ingimportanceofvolunteerworkandfinancialcontributionsbymembers,political

partiesstillregardamembershiporganisationasanadvantageintheelectoralcon‐

test.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–30–

In order to attractmembers, contemporary parties – similar to the traditional

massparty–granttheirmembersrightsofdemocraticparticipation.However,un‐

likeleftistpartiesintheearly20thcentury,thecartelpartydoesnotorganiseinter‐

naldecision‐making inahierarchicalsystemofdelegation,butdecisionsaremade

byvoteofthefullmembership.Thishighlyinclusiveorganisationofpartyinternal

democracyassuresthepartyleadershipthenecessaryfreedomofactiontopursue

aggressiveelectoralstrategies,since,duetotheiroftendisaggregatednature,grass‐

roots partymembers arenot very likely tomount a serious challenge against the

positionsadoptedatthetop.

All parties, the cartel‐party thesis goes, will display the organisational trends

just outlined: Party membership will decrease in size – without vanishing com‐

pletely,intra‐partydemocracywillbecomeincreasinglyinclusive,andresourceswill

moreandmorebeprovidedby thestate.Altogether, these trendswillgiverise to

party inpublicofficeas thedominantorganisational faceofanyparty.Concerning

thedevelopmentofpolitical parties in youngdemocracies,we should thenexpect

partiestomakean“evolutionaryleap”(Smith1993)overpreviousstagesoforgani‐

sationaldevelopment,andtoconvergetowardsthecartelpartytype.Infact,thisis

thescenarionumerousstudiessuggest(forexamplePuhle2001;Olson1998).The

argument is that political parties in young democracies competewithin the same

environmentaspartiesincontemporaryWesternEurope:Stablepoliticalidentities

have only developedweakly, state funding for political parties has been available


–31–

instantly,andpartyleaderscancommunicatetheirmessagesdirectlytotheelector‐

atethroughmassmedia.

However,basedoncontradictingempiricalevidencefrombothWesternEurope

andnewdemocracies,theperceptionofpartydevelopmentasamoreorlesssimul‐

taneoustransformationofallpartysystemsduringparticularperiodsinhistoryhas

come under heavy criticism. Rather, a second group within the period‐effect ap‐

proachargues,factorscapableofexplainingdifferenttypesofpartyorganisationare

to be found on a lower level of analysis than universal trends and developments.

Consequently,weshouldnotexpectallpoliticalpartiestoconvergetowardsacom‐

monorganisationaltype.Forinstance,vonBeyme(2000:202)claimsthatthecatch‐

allpartyneveremergedintheAnglo‐SaxonandScandinaviandemocracies.Factors

identifiedbyotherscholarsashavingadeterminingeffectonwhetherpartieswill

adoptthecartelpartymodelincludepoliticalinstitutions(Detterbeck2002),politi‐

cal party funding laws (Young1998) and the ideological polarisation of the party

system(Yishai2001).4

Whilemoststudieswithinthe“periodeffect”refertotheseestablishedmodelsof

political party organisation, there is also a small number of studies that develop

theirowntypologiestoaccountfordifferentformsofpartyorganisationthatcanbe

foundacrossmoderndemocracies.Oneexample isKitschelt’s(1995) investigation

ofpartiesinpost‐communistEasternEurope,whichdistinguishesthe“charismatic”,

the “clientelistic” and the “programmatic party”. Although this typology ismainly

4SeealsoTable3onpage54.

OLIVERHELLMANN

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based on the criterion of how partiesmobilise voters, it alsomakes reference to

partyorganisation.Broadlyspeaking,boththeprogrammaticpartyandtheclientel‐

isticpartymakehighinvestmentsinorganisationalstructures,whereasthecharis‐

maticpartyavoidshighcostsoforganisation‐building.However,whiletheorganisa‐

tionoftheprogrammaticpartyusuallyrestsonabstractrulesandregulations,clien‐

telisticpartiestendtobebuiltonhighlyinformalpersonalnetworksthatensurea

constantflowofresourcestothepartyfollowing.Kitscheltlistsseveralfactorsthat

helptopredictwhichpartytypeislikelytoemergewithinanewdemocracy.These

include the typeof thepre‐democraticauthoritarianregime, theprocessofdemo‐

cratic transition, the institutions implemented at the end of this process, and the

timepassed since the first free and fair elections.Moreover,Kitschelt claims, it is

alsonecessarytoconsidermorehistorical factorssuchaswhetherthecountryex‐

perienced democratic government before autocratic rule and the timing of ind‐

ustrialisation.

A somewhatdifferentmethod thathasbeenused to studydifferences inparty

organisationistofocusonlyoncertainelementsratherthantoapplyabroadtypol‐

ogy.Inparticular,theselectionofcandidatesforpublicofficehasreceivedmuchat‐

tention, probablybecause thedegree of intra‐partydemocracy is seen as a useful

indicatorforhowwellpartiesfulfiltheirfunctionasintermediaryinstitutions.Cor‐

responding to thestudyofpartyorganisationmoregenerally, themostsignificant

variablesthathavebeenidentifiedashavinganimpactontheprocedureofcandi‐

dateselectionarethesocio‐politicalcontext,theinstitutionalsetting,andtheparty


–33–

system.Twobasiccausalmechanismscanbeidentifiedbehindthesevariables.The

firstoneisbasedonthenotionofideas:Politicalpartieswillopencandidateselec‐

tion tobroaderparticipation, ifmasspolitical cultureor theparty’s own ideology

understandsparties as an important institution topromotedemocracywithin the

widersociety– inotherwords, if intra‐partydemocracy isperceivedasanend in

itself (Gallagher1988a;1988b).On theotherhand, thesecondmechanismofcau‐

salityiscentredaroundmoreoutcome‐orientedexpectationstowardspoliticalpar‐

ties. Scholars have isolated numerous factors that will allow a political party to

justifyagreaterdegreeofleadershipcontrolovercandidateselection.Allthesefac‐

torshaveincommonthattheyarepositivelycorrelatedwithhigherlevelsofuncer‐

taintyastopoliticalandelectoraloutcomes,andthusrequirepoliticalpartiestoen‐

terintoagreementsandcoalitions,which,inturn,requireseliteselectionofcandi‐

dates in order to increase party discipline and enforce the necessary inter‐party

understandings.Factorsthathavebeenfoundto increasetheneedforsuchagree‐

ments arepacted transitions (Field2004), strategically complex electoral systems

(Siavelis 2002; Thiébault 1988), parliamentarism (as opposed to presidentialism)

(Gallagher1988a;1988b),andhighlyfragmentedpartysystems(FieldandSiavelis

2006).Conversely, thereare factors thatwill forcepoliticalparties to adoptmore

inclusiveproceduresofcandidateselection.Onesuchfactorisinter‐partycompeti‐

tion:Ifthereisspaceforsuccessfulsplinterparties,partyleaderswillbewillingto

delegatecandidateselectiontolargergroupsinordertoincreasethelikelihoodthat

resourcefulcontenderswillsticktotheparty(Poiré2003).

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In sum, theperiod‐effect approach seesdifferent party organisations as a pro‐

duct of their environment. Parties competing under the same conditions are ex‐

pectedtoadoptthesameorganisationalfeatures.Theunderlyingcausalassumption

isthatunderacertainsetofcontextualcircumstancesthereisalwaysatypeofparty

organisation that will yield the best results. Hence, similar to Darwin’s theory of

evolution,politicalpartiesareperceivedtofindthemselvesinastruggleforsurvival

ofthefittest,adjustingtotheenvironmentinordertobeascompetitiveastheirop‐

ponents.Partiesthatdonotfollowthelogicofcompetitionwillbepunishedbythe

electoralmarket.Althoughtheymightnotsharethesamedestinyasextinctspecies

suchasthedodobirdortheTasmaniantiger,partiesthatrefusetoadapttotheen‐

vironmentwilleventuallybecomepolitically irrelevant.However,advocatesof the

period‐effect approach do not agree onwhich environment should be considered

themostimportant.Whileonegrouparguesthatpoliticalpartiesallovertheworld

areincreasinglycompetingunderthesamecircumstancesofamodernsociety,thus

converging towards the cartel party, another group stresses divergence between

partyorganisations,contendingthatthemost importantexplanatoryvariablescan

befoundonthedomesticlevel.

Disregarding theirdifferences,bothcampswouldprobablydismiss theviewof

partyformationandadaptationasanevolutionaryprocessastooharsh.Infact,they

pointoutthemselvesthattherearealwaysexceptionstothegeneraltrend.Forin‐

stance,whileKatzandMair (1995)admit that thecartelisationprocess isuneven,

withnoteverypartyadoptingtheorganisationalcharacteristicsofthecartelparty,


–35–

Gallagher,studyingcandidateselectionacrossindustrialiseddemocracies,observes

some“residualvariance”thatcontradictswhatcouldtheoreticallybeexpectedfrom

thecontext(1988b:265).However,proponentsoftheperiod‐effectapproachdonot

seemtobeawareofthewidertheoreticalimplicationsoftheseexceptions.Iftheex‐

ternalenvironmentfailstoexplaindifferencesintheorganisationofpoliticalparties

competingwithinthesameenvironment,weneedtolookforpossibleexplanations

atlowerlevelsofanalysis–eitheratthepartylevelorevenattheindividualactor’s

level. Hence, by admitting that there are a number of empirical exceptions to the

theoretical assumptions, the period‐effect approach hints at its own weaknesses,

namelythenegligenceofbothinternalandagentialfactors.

ThedevelopmentoftheItalianpartysystemisanexcellentexampletoillustrate

this, as different partymodels have always existed next to each otherwithin the

sameenvironment(BardiandMorlino1994:244).Upuntilitsimplosionintheearly

1990s,theChristianDemocraticParty(DemocraziaCristiana,DC)wastheonlyma‐

jorpartythatcouldorganisationallybecharacterisedasacatch‐allparty.Theother

twomainpartiesfollowedthemodelofthemassparty:BoththeCommunistParty

(PartitoCommunistaItaliano,PCI)andtoalesserextenttheSocialistParty(Partito

Socialista Italiano,PSI)werestructuredaccording toLeninistprinciplesofworker

andpeasantmobilisation.Themass‐partyideaalsoreflectedintheorganisationof

theneo‐fascistSocialMovementParty(MovimentoSocialeItaliano,MSI),whichhad

abandonedthetraditionalfascistmilitiamodel,butwasbasedonadensenetwork

ofterritorialbranches.Althoughthesepartieswentthroughconsiderableorganisa‐

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–36–

tionalchangeintheearly1990s,theyhaveretainedcertaincharacteristicelements

of the mass party (Bardi and Morlino 1994; Pamini 1998). Simultaneously, new

party types emerged, such asBerlusconi’sForza Italia (Go Italy!),whichhasbeen

describedasa“businessfirmparty”(HopkinandPaolucci1999)withonlyrudimen‐

taryorganisationalstructuresandaninsignificantmembership.

ThemultiplicityofdifferentpartyorganisationthathavecoexistedinItalyatany

giventimehintsattheexplanatorypoweroffactorswhicharelargelyignoredbythe

period‐effectapproach.Forinstance,ithasbeensuggestedthat“themaintenanceof

organisationalstructureshasbeeneasier forpartieswithstronger identities, such

asextremeorradicalparties”(Morlino2001:135).Thiscouldbeanindicationthat

thegoalsandideasofactorswithinthepartyplayanimportantroleinaccounting

fordifferenttypesoforganisation.Moreover,thecombinationoftraditionalorgani‐

sational elements of the mass party with modern electoral communication tech‐

niques, as in the PCI‐reestablishment Partito Democractico della Sinistra (Demo‐

craticPartyoftheLeft,PDS)(seeGiannettiandMulé2006:471)–orDemocraticidi

Sinistra(DemocratsoftheLeft,DS)asithasbeencalledsince1998–suggeststhat

partyactorsarenotatthemercyoftheenvironment,buttheyareabletodevelop

divergingcoursesofactiontoreacttonewopportunitiespresentedbythecontext.

Inadditiontoagential factors, ithasalsobeenclaimedthat theorganisationaldif‐

ferencesbetweenItalianpartiescanbeexplainedby internaldynamics.Themany

enduringcharacteristicsofthetypicalmasspartywithintheDS,Pamini(1998:152)

argues, aredue to the strengthof theextra‐parliamentaryparty:Thus far, thede‐


–37–

mandsofthepartyleadershipforagreaterfreedomofactioninordertoformulate

aninter‐classelectoralplatformhavebeensuccessfullyrestrainedbythepowerful

positionofthepartyontheground.

However,whiletheperiod‐effect thussuffers fromaneglectofagentialand in‐

ternal factors, it highlights the importance of the environment around parties in

order tounderstanddifferent formsofpartyorganisation–avariable thathasno

placeinthelife‐cycleapproach.Ashasalreadybeenarguedabove,internaldynam‐

icscannotbeunderstoodwithouttakingintoaccountcontextualfactorsaroundthe

party.Moreover,itisimpossibletoseehowpartyactorsshouldmakeorganisational

decisions without paying any attention to the opportunities and constraints pro‐

videdby their environment. For instance, goingback to the above exampleof the

Italianpartysystem,itwasimpossiblefortheleadersofthetraditionalmassparties

toignorethetechnologicalprogressinmasscommunicationaswellastheshrinking

of thesocialclasses theyclaimedtorepresent. Inotherwords,environmental fac‐

torsalwayshaveanimportantinfluenceonthedecisionsmadebypartymanagers.

Inconclusion,theperiod‐effectapproachunderstandspartyformationandadap‐

tationasaprocessofevolution,withallpartieshavingtoadapttotheenvironment

in the sameway in order tomaintain their competitiveness. Therebyour focus is

drawntoexternalvariablesaroundtheparty.Yet,advocatesoftheperiod‐effectap‐

proachdonotagreeonthequestionofwhichenvironmentshouldbeconsideredthe

mostimportantone.Whileonegrouparguesthatpartiesareincreasinglycompeting

under the same conditions, another group argues that domestic factors constitute

OLIVERHELLMANN

–38–

thecrucialenvironment toexplaindifferent formsofpartyorganisation.Nonethe‐

less, as both approaches ignore internal as well as agential variables they suffer

fromthesameweaknesses.

The“generationeffect”approach

The third structuralist approach topartyorganisation,which is closely associated

withthewritingsofPanebianco(1988),canbelabelled“generationeffect”.Itdiffers

from the two approaches alreadydiscussedby clearly distinguishing between the

phaseof formationandthesubsequentphaseofadaptation,stressingtheexplana‐

torypowerofeitherexternalfactorsorinternaldynamics.Regardingtheformation

ofaparty, theorganisationalconfigurationofaparty isbelievedtobedetermined

bytheenvironmentalcircumstances.Theparticularpowerpatternreflectedinthe

organisationof thepartywill thendrive the furtherdevelopment. Inotherwords,

thecapacityofapartytoadapttoitsenvironmentwillbeheavilyconstrainedbyits

internaldynamics.

AlthoughPanebiancoisprimarilyinterestedinpartyinstitutionalisation,defined

as the process throughwhich an organisation “becomes valuable in and of itself”

(ibid.: 53),we can still infer important theoretical ideas for the studyofpartyor‐

ganisations. Essentially, Panebianco argues that different levels of institutionalisa‐

tionareduetohowapartywasformed,its“geneticmodel”:


–39–

Aparty’sorganizationalcharacteristicsdependmoreupon itshis‐

tory, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consoli‐

dated, thanuponanyother factor.The characteristicsof aparty’s

originareinfactcapableofexertingaweightonitsorganizational

structureevendecadeslater.Everyorganizationbearsthemarkof

itsformation,ofthecrucialpolitical‐administrativedecisionsmade

byitsfounders,thedecisionswhich“molded”theorganization.

(ibid.:50)

Theorganisationaldecisionstakenbytheparty’sfounders,accordingtoPanebianco,

aretheproductofthefounders’interestsandgoalsaswellastheenvironmentalfac‐

torssurroundingtheformationoftheparty:

During the organization’s formative phase, the leaders, whether

charismatic or not, normally play a crucial role. The spell out the

ideologicalaimsofthefutureparty,selecttheorganization’ssocial

base,its“huntingground”,andshapetheorganizationonthebasis

of theseaimsandthissocialbase– taking intoaccount,ofcourse,

available resources, different socio‐economic and political condi‐

tionsindifferentpartsofthecountry,etc.

(ibid.:53)

OLIVERHELLMANN

–40–

Panebianconamesthreecentralfactorstodescribeaparty’sgeneticmodel.Thefirst

one concerns the party’s construction, which can either occur through territorial

penetrationorterritorialdiffusion.Territorialpenetrationmeansthatapartyestab‐

lishesanetworkoflocalbranchesthroughoutthecountry,whileinthecaseofterri‐

torialdiffusionthepartyisfoundedbyindependentgroupsoflocaleliteswhocome

together at the national level. The second principle determining a party’s genetic

model isthepresenceorabsenceofanexternal“sponsor” institution.Accordingly,

Panebianco distinguishes between externally legitimated parties and internally le

gitimatedparties.Finally,thethirdfactortotakeintoaccountistheroleofcharisma

inaparty’s formation. It isnecessarytoanswerthequestionofwhethertheparty

wasessentiallycreatedby,andasavehiclefor,acharismaticleader.

Eachoftheseelementsofparties’geneticmodelsisrelatedtocertaindegreesof

institutionalisation. Whereas the organisational construction through penetration

tendstoproduceastronginstitution,constructionthroughdiffusionwillratherlead

toaweak institution,becausetheorganisationalresourcesare in thehandsof the

many competing elites, thus forcing the organisation to develop through compro‐

miseandnegotiation.Similarly,thepresenceofanexternalsponsoringorganisation

generallyresultsinaweakinstitutionalisation,astheexternalsponsorshouldhave

no interest in strengthening theparty for thiswould inevitably reduce theparty’s

dependenceuponit.Incontrast,internallylegitimatedpartiesaremuchmorelikely

tobecomestronginstitutions.Finally,inorderforapartytoreachahigherlevelof

institutionalisation, it should not be built on charisma, since a charismatic leader


–41–

will–similartoanexternalsponsoringorganisation–resiststronginstitutionalisa‐

tionbutkeepthepartyunderhispersonalcontrol.

Inotherwords,thelevelofpartyinstitutionalisationwillverymuchdependon

thedistributionof powerwithin a party.Aparty canbe expected to reach a high

level of institutionalisation, if organisational resources are monopolised at the

“centre” of the partywithin a cohesive coalition of leaders. On the other hand, if

powerisdiffusedamonglocalelites,orifthepartyisdependenteitheronanexter‐

nal sponsoringorganisationoron a charismaticpersonality, institutionalisation is

veryunlikely.

Inprinciple,changetotheorganisationalstructures initiallyestablished ispos‐

sible. Identifyingthecausesforchange,Panebiancoadoptsaseeminglyintegrative

approachwhenhesaysthatchangeis

the result of deliberate choices (madewithin the dominant coali‐

tion) influencedbyboundedrationalityandanonymouspressures

(e.g. resistance to change, environmental changes, technological

changes etc.)which interactwith the choices toproducebothde‐

siredinnovationsandcounter‐intuitiveeffects.

(ibid.:242)

Organisationalchangehappensinthreephases.Firstofall,anorganisationalcrisis

mustbeunleashedbystrongenvironmentalpressure,suchaselectoraldefeat.This

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–42–

willunavoidablyharmthereputationofthedominantcoalitionwhichwasunableto

handlethecrisis,andthepartywillthen–inthesecondphase–witnesstheforma‐

tionofnewalliancesandthereplacementof the leadinggroup.Finally,duringthe

thirdphasetherulesofpartyinternalcompetitionarechanged.However,asPane‐

biancopointsout,“noinstitutioncan[…]entirelyescapefromitspast”(ibid.:261).

Inotherwords,thefreedomofchoiceofthenewleadinggroupindesigningorgani‐

sationalinnovationsisseverelylimitedbyexistinginternalstructures.Hence,traces

oftheparty’sgeneticmodelwillalwaysremainvisibleintheparty’sorganisation.

Itisprobablythisemphasisofaparty’sinitialformationandthecontinuingcon‐

strainingpoweroftheorganisationalstructuresinitiallyimplemented,whichisthe

mainweakness of the generation‐effect approach. Although Panebiancomentions

the roleof agency in the constructionofpartyorganisations, hedenies the actors

within thepartymuch freedomtosubstantiallyalter theorganisationalconfigura‐

tion.Moreover,Panebiancountenablyunderestimatestheneedforpoliticalparties

toadapt toachangingenvironment inorder toremainelectorallycompetitive(cf.

Ware1996:104).Rather,inhisunderstanding,theorganisationofpoliticalparties

willalwaysreflectthechoicesmadebythepartyfounderswithintheenvironmental

circumstances that surrounded theparty’s founding, as theorganisation is able to

enduredespitechanges inthesameenvironmentordespitechanges intheactors’

interests.

However,therearemanyempiricalexamplesofpoliticalpartiesthathavebeen

abletoshedhistoricalbaggage,effectivelyerasingthetracesoftheirorganisational


–43–

past. Two interesting cases in this regard are the Austrian Freedom Party (Frei

heitlicheParteiÖsterreichs,FPÖ)andtheFrenchNationalFront(FrontNational,FN).

In contrast to Panebianco’s predictions, although extremely dependent on their

leaders’charisma–JörgHaider(upuntil2000)andJean‐MarieLePenrespectively–

boththeseextremeright‐wingpartieshaveachievedrelativelyhighlevelsofinstitu‐

tionalisation (PedahzurandBrichta2002).Putdifferently, judging fromtheircon‐

temporaryinstitutionalstrength,itwouldbeextremelydifficulttoimaginethatboth

theFPÖandtheFNwereoriginallyfoundedasapersonalvehicleofpowerfortheir

charismatic leaders. Certainly, as charismatic leadership still plays a role in both

parties, the geneticmodel undeniablymatters to explaindifferent party organisa‐

tions.However,theconstrainingeffectofparty’soriginonitsorganisationaldevel‐

opmentisexaggerated.

Yet,thisshouldnotleadustooverlookthestrengthsofPanebianco’swork.Not

onlydoesthe“generation‐effect”approachstresstheimportanceofcontextualfac‐

torstoexplaintheinitialformationofaparty,andtheeffectsofinternalstructures

tounderstandthefurtherorganisationaldevelopment,butbyclearlydistinguishing

betweenthestagesofformationandchangeitteachesusthatwemustnotsimply

analyseasnap‐shotofpartyorganisationatpresent,sincethismightproducewrong

results.Rather,wealsohavetoinvestigateunderwhichcircumstancestheseorgani‐

sationalregulationswereestablishedinthefirstplace.Theproblemisthatsincethe

time of the original founding of the party the environment might have changed,

while thepartyorganisationhasremainedunaltered.Studyingthepartyorganisa‐

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–44–

tiononlyatthepresentstage,wewouldthenconcludethatitisaproductofthecon‐

temporarycontext,while, in fact, theorganisationaldecisionswere takenwithina

muchearlierenvironment.Thepartyorganisationretained itsoriginal form,how‐

ever,becauseinternaldynamicsandtheinterestsoftheactorswithinthepartyim‐

pededenvironmentalchangetotranslateintoorganisationalchange.

Tosumup,thegeneration‐effectapproachmaintainsthattheinitialformationof

apartywillbedrivenbyenvironmental factors.Thesubsequentdevelopmentwill

thenbeconstrainedbytheinternalstructures.Similartoalivingorganism,thede‐

velopmentofthepartyorganisationislimitedbytheavailablegeneticpool,meaning

that the internal structures only offer the party actors a very limited number of

choices as to organisational reform. However, by perceiving party organisational

development in such away, the generation‐effect approach overrates the import‐

anceofinternaldynamics,andneglectsagentialandexternalfactorstounderstand

different types of party organisation. Itsmain strength, on the other hand, lies in

makingadistinctionbetweenthestagesof formationandadaptation,which is im‐

portantinordertoidentifythecorrectcausesbehindthedevelopmentofaparticu‐

larpartyorganisation.

ThethreestructuralistapproachesareagainsummarisedinTable2.Whilethey

allhavetheirownspecificstrengths,theyallsharethesameweakness,namelythe

negligenceofagentialfactors.Asthischapterhasthusfarshowshown,partyinter‐

nal actors shouldnot be excluded fromany theoryof party organisation. It is not

conducivetoourunderstandingofpartyformationandchangeifwetreatpolitical


–45–

partiesaslivingorganisms,anddescribetheirorganisationaldevelopmentasmatu‐

rationorevolution,oraslimitedbytheirgeneticpool.Rather,asthemanyempirical

exampleshavedemonstrated,partiesareabletoreactdifferentlytothesamestimu‐

lus,sincetheindividualswhocomprisethepartiesareknowledgeableandreflexive.

TABLE2: STRUCTURALISTAPPROACHESTOPARTYORGANISATION

Lifecycle Periodeffect Generationeffect

Theoreticalclaim maturation:partyor‐ganisationsareper‐ceivedtogrowalongacommonpaththatcanbedividedintodifferentorganisationalstages

evolution:politicalpar‐tiesareperceivedtofindthemselvesinastruggleofthefittest,adjustingtotheenvironmentinordertobeascompeti‐tiveastheiropponents

gene‐pool:establishedastheproductofacer‐tainenvironment,thepartyorganisationsub‐sequentlyonlyoffersalimitednumberofpossi‐bilitiesforchange

Strenghts stressestheimportanceofinternalfactors

stressestheimportanceofexternalfactors

makesadistinctionbe‐tweenthestagesoffor‐mationandchange

Weaknesses neglectsexternalandagentialfactors

neglectsinternalandagentialfactors

overratestheexplana‐torypowerofinternalstructures

Voluntaristapproachestopartyorganisation

In stark contrast to the strictly structuralist approaches just presented, other

authorsstress the independent roleofpoliticalactors in theconstructionofparty

OLIVERHELLMANN

–46–

organisations.Thatistosay,itisnotenvironmentalconditionsandinternaldynam‐

ics that shape the organisational structures of a party, but the deliberate will of

thoseindividualsactingwithintheparty.Broadlyspeaking,itisarguedthatactors

withinthepartycanplaytwopossiblerolesintheprocessofpartychange.Onthe

onehand,theyplayaninterveningrole–decidingonwhichexternalchangeswillbe

transformedintoorganisationalresponses–whileontheotherhandalsobeingable

toshapetheorganisationofthepartymorepro‐activelywithouttheneedforanen‐

vironmental stimulus. Therefore, party change can either be goal‐motivated or

power‐motivated(HarmelandJanda1994).

Goal‐motivatedchangehappensasaresponsetoexternal“shocks”.However,in

contrasttotheperiod‐effectapproach,whichexplainspartyorganisationasapro‐

cessofthebestpossibleadaptationtotheenvironment,intheviewofthevolunta‐

ristapproach,thepartywillonlyconsiderneworganisationalalternativesiftheac‐

torswithinthepartyperceiveaneedfororganisationalchangeinthelightoftheir

interests and strategies (Wilson 1994; see also Appleton andWard 1997). Party

leadersandtheirgoalsarethusseenasthekeyinterveningvariablebetweenenvi‐

ronmental pressures andorganisational adaptation. In order tobe translated into

reformstothepartyorganisation,changesintheparty’senvironmentmustbeper‐

ceivedasashockbythepartyleadership.Whatconstitutessuchashockwilldepend

onthepartyleadership’sprimarygoal(HarmelandJanda1994:269‐271).Borrow‐

ing fromthe literatureoncoalition formation(seeStrom1990;BudgeandKeman

1990; Laver and Schofield 1998) the voluntarist approach to party organisation


–47–

usuallydistinguishes fourdifferentgoals thatcanbeheldby theparty leadership:

(1) votes, (2) office, (3) policy, and (4) intra‐party democracy. Themost obvious

shock for vote‐maximisers would be electoral failure. Office‐maximisers, on the

otherhand, understand suchdevelopments as a shock that aredirectly related to

their participation in government. Themost significant shock to policy advocates,

whoareneitherinterestedinwinningvotesnoringainingaccesstooffice,wouldbe

relatedtotheparty’spolicypositions,whilethoseleaderstryingtomaximiseintra‐

party democracy would see any major alteration to the party membership as a

shock.

Power‐motivatedorganisationalchange, incontrast,happenswithoutanexter‐

nalstimulus.Inotherwords,partyinternalactorsandtheirinterestsarethemselves

theultimatecauseforchange.Thevoluntaristapproachclaimsthatweshouldthus

expectreformstothepartyorganisationiftherehasbeeneitheraleadershipchange

or a change indominant faction.Anew leader is likely to alter theorganisational

structuresheinheritedfromhispredecessorforseveralreasons(Harmel,Tanand

Janda1995:5).Firstofall,differentleadershavedifferentabilitiesandorientations,

andwillthereforeevaluatesituationsdifferently.Secondly,leaderswillusuallywant

toleavetheirmarkupontheorganisation,assuringthemselvesavisibleplaceinthe

party’s history. Thirdly, organisational reforms are an important strategy to con‐

solidatethenewlyachievedpower.Andfourthly, leadershipchangesaregenerally

destabilising events. However, the extent towhich changes of leaderwill actually

resultinpartychangewilldependonanumberofadditionalfactors.Mostimport‐

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–48–

antly, theextenttowhichthenewleader’sdesiresandstrategiesforthepartyare

differentfromthoseofthepredecessorwillhaveadecisiveimpactonthescopeof

organisational change.Moreover,weneed to take into consideration thepersonal

abilities of the leader to answer the question of whether he will be able to fully

realisehis ideas (seealsoHarmelandSvåsand1993).Finally, theextent towhich

thepartyiswillingtofollowtheleaderisalsopartoftheequation.Thislatterfactor

consistsof twocomponents:First, advocatesof theactor‐centredapproachargue,

extensiveorganisationalchangeismorelikelyinpartieswheretheleadershipposi‐

tionisequippedwithfar‐reachingpowers.Second,thelikelihoodoforganisational

change is greater if leadership change goes togetherwith a change in the party’s

dominantfaction.

Ithasalsobeensuggestedthatdominantfactionchangeitselfcanbeasourceof

significant party organisational change (Harmel andTan2003).However, aswith

leadershipchange,thestrengthoftherelationshipbetweenchangeindominantfac‐

tionandreformofthepartyorganisationissubjecttoseveralinterveningfactors.To

startwith–andverysimilar towhathasbeensaidabout leadershipchange– the

extent of party change after the emergence of a new dominant faction will very

muchdependontheintensityoffactionalrivalry.Thegreaterthedistancebetween

factionsandtheirorganisationalpreferences,themoreextensivetheorganisational

changewillbe.Second,theabilityofthenewlydominantfactiontofullyenforceits

organisationalpreferencesrestsonwhether thechange in the internalpowerdis‐

tributionhas resulted in thecomplete, rather than justpartial, replacementof the


–49–

dominant coalition. If the former dominant faction still holds on to significant or‐

ganisational resources, substantial party change is rather unlikely. Finally, we

should expectmoreparty change if the dominant faction change coincideswith a

change inparty leadership. If the leadershippositionsof thepartyarenotheldby

membersofthenewlydominantfaction,theleadershipmightresistdramaticparty

change.Inotherwords,“thecombinationofleadershipandfactionalchange[…]cre‐

atesopportunitiesforchangethataregreaterthanwhateithereventwouldaccom‐

plishalone”(Harmel,TanandJanda1995:17;emphasisintheoriginal).

Aslightlydifferentexampleofanactor‐centredapproachisAldrich’s(1995)an‐

alysis of the formation of political parties in the United States of America. Using

game theoreticalmodels,Aldrich showshowparties are institutions able to over‐

comeproblemsofcollectiveactionandsocialchoice.Althoughthemainaimofthe

studyisrathertoexplainwhypartieswereestablishedinthefirstplace,andevenif

rationalchoicecanindeedbeaccusedofbeinglatentlystructuralist(Hay2002:103‐

104),theanalysisisstillfoundedonanindividualisticbasis,therebyhintingatthe

possibilityofpoliticalactorsaffectingtheorganisationalstructuresofpoliticalpar‐

tiesintheirowninterests.

Whilethislatterapproachhasnotgainedmuchprominenceintheliterature,the

theoreticalframeworkdevelopedbyHarmelandJandahasrepeatedlybeenapplied

to explain different cases of party organisational change. However, the empirical

evidence is inconclusive.Müller (1997), studying thedevelopmentof theAustrian

SocialistParty(SozialdemokratischeParteiÖsterreichs,SPÖ),maintainsthatleader‐

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shipchangeandchangeinthedominantfactionarebothvaluablefactorstoexplain

partyorganisationalreforms.Incontrast,Bille(1997)findsthatpastchangesinthe

organisationoftheDanishSocialDemocraticParty(Socialdemokraterne,SD)cannot

be attributed to different interests held by the various leaders that have been in

chargeoftheparty.Similarly,Duncan(2007),whoanalysesthehistoryoftheDutch

ChristianDemocraticAppeal(ChristenDemocratischAppèl,CDA)concludesthatthe

HarmelandJandamodelofpartychangerequiresseveralrefinements.Despitesuf‐

feringadisastrouselectoraldefeatin1994andlosinggovernmentofficeforthefirst

time since 1918 the CDAdid not change extensively because of the nature of the

Dutch party system, its specific history, and secondary goal priorities held by the

party.

Thelaststudyhintsatthepossibilitythatthevoluntaristapproachtopartyor‐

ganisationmightoversimplifytheprocessofpartyformationandadaptationbyonly

lookingatthepartyactors’interest.Ittherebydeniesthefactthatinternalandex‐

ternal structures favour certain organisational strategies over others in order to

achievethegiveninterests.Asthestructuralistapproachesallpointout,structures

matter and it doesnotbecome clearwhywe should ignore their findings andex‐

plaindifferentformsofpartyorganisationonlybytheinterestsofthepartyleader‐

shipandthedominantfaction.

Inordertoachievetheirgoalsparty internalactorsneedtotakeintoconsider‐

ation the opportunities and pressures provided by the environment. Policy‐

maximisers,forinstance,shouldincludemanyelementsofthemassparty,asthese


–51–

willhelpthemtostayincontactwiththesocialgroupstheywishtorepresent,and

tokeepthepartyinpublicofficeunderclosecontrol.However,whichoftheseele‐

mentsarenecessarytogaininfluenceonpolicyoutcomeswillverymuchdependon

thecontext.Whileinthemid‐20thcenturymanypartiescameclosetotheidealtype

ofthemassparty,henceleadingDuvergertopredicta“contagionfromtheleft”,con‐

temporarypolicy‐seekingparties,asintheItalianpartysystem,makeincreasinguse

ofmoderntechnologiesofmasscommunication,andhaveabolishedtheworkplace

branchsystem,sincenowadaysfarfewervotersfit intoclearlydefinedsocialcate‐

gories. Epstein, expecting a “contagion from the right”, argued that theAmerican‐

stylepartywasmuchbettersuitedtomobiliselargenumberofvotes.Thus,ifvote‐

maximiserswanttoachievetheirgoalstheyshouldinsteadorganisetheirpartyac‐

cording to the catch‐all type. The cartel‐party thesis, on the other hand, assumes

thatallpartiesareprimarilyoffice‐seeking,tryingtogetaccesstothecartelinorder

toparticipateinthedistributionofstateresources.Itiseasiertogainaccessintothe

cartel,thebasicargumentgoes,ifthepartyadoptstheorganisationalcharacteristics

ofthepartiesalreadysafelypositionedwithinthecartel.Inotherwords,nomatter

what interestsparty‐internalactorspursue, theirstrategiccalculationswillalways

havetoincludetheexternalenvironmentaroundtheparty.

Moreover, party organisers will have to take into account the structures pro‐

videdbythepartyitself.AlthoughtheHarmelandJandamodelofpartychangein‐

corporatesthepoweroftheleadershippositionasoneinterveningvariable,itfails

to include broader internal dynamics. For instance, maximisers of intra‐party de‐

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mocracywill have to be aware of the dangers ofMichels’ “iron law of oligarchy”,

whichtheywillhavetocounterbycertainorganisationalmeasuresthatwillprevent

the leadership from becoming indispensable. Put differently, knowing about such

organisationaltrendswillforcepartyinternalactorstoreactaccordingly.

Other factors not considered by Harmel and Janda regard power‐motivated

changes.Whilethemodelarguesthatsomepartychangecanbeexplainedwithout

anexternalstimulus,butsimplythroughleadershipanddominantfactionchanges,

itfallsshortofexplainingthesereconfigurationsofparty‐internalpower.However,

acomprehensivetheoryofpartychangeshouldcertainlyincludevariablesthatcan

haveanimpactonthedistributionofpowerwithinapoliticalparty.Inlinewiththe

argumentsmadebyPanebianco,parties arebestunderstoodasvery conservative

organisations that try to safeguard the power relations that existed among the

groupsthatinitiallyestablishedtheparty.Inotherwords,thepowermapofapoliti‐

calpartydoesnotjustchange,butitwilltakeanexternaltrigger–orevenaninter‐

nal trigger (suchas thedeathof a leader)– to significantlydisturb thebalanceof

power.Withoutknowingwhatconstitutessuchatrigger,everytheoryofpartyor‐

ganisationalchangewillremainincomplete.

To sumup, the voluntarist approach topartyorganisation–mostly associated

withthemodeldevelopedbyHarmelandJanda–understandsdifferentpartytypes

as the product of the interests of the party leadership and the dominant faction.

However, it largely ignores the structuring effect of both the environment around

thepartyandtheparty‐internaldynamics.Inaddition,itfailstoexplainchangesin


–53–

leadershipand in thedominant faction,whichshouldbeconsideredasan integral

element of any general theory of party change. Nevertheless, the voluntarist ap‐

proachmustbepraisedforintroducingthepartyactors’interestsandgoalsintothe

analysisofpartyorganisations ‐ factors thatare largelyneglectedby thestructur‐

alistapproaches.Thedifferentcausalfactorsofferedbythestructuralistandvolun‐

taristapproachestopartyorganisationaresummarisedinTable3.

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TABLE3: DETERMINANTSOFPARTYORGANISATION

ExamplesofindicatorsAnalyticalapproach

VariablesFormation Adaptation

Globaltrends internalcreation(Duverger1964)

accesstomassmedia availabilityofpublicfunding partisanidentities(KatzandMair1995)

Socio‐politicalcontext autocraticregime processoftransition(Kitschelt1995)

economicdevelopment(RandallandSvåsand2002)

politicalculture(Detterbeck2002)

Institutions systemofgovernment(CroissantandMerkel2001)

electoralsystem directdemocracy(Detterbeck2002;2005)

territorialorganisation typeofpublicfinancing(Young1998)

partylaws

Partysystem numberofparties ideologicalpolarisation(Yishai2001)

natureofcompetition(Warner1997)

contagion

Structuralist

approaches

Politicalparty historicalantecedent(vanBiezen1998)

geneticprocess externalsponsorinstitution(Panebianco1988)

ideology(Gallagher1988a;1988b)

size(Michels1962)

Socialgroup factions(HarmelandTan2003)

factionalcoalitions(HarmelandJanda1994)

Voluntarist

approaches

Leadership partyleaders factionleaders(HarmelandJanda1994)


–55–

‐2‐THEORETICALFRAMEWORK

Inorder toexplain theoriginandthesubsequentdevelopmentofpolitical institu‐

tions,numerousscholarshave fora long time insistedonan integrativeapproach

towardsthestructure‐agencydebate(forexampleThelenandSteinmo1992).The

studyofpoliticalparties,however,hassofarremainedtotallyunaffectedbythison‐

tological shift in comparative politics.5 As the previous section has shown, to ac‐

count for different forms of party organisation the relevant literature still offers

either structuralistor voluntarist theories.Noattempthasbeenmade to integrate

theseintoageneralexplanation.Thisseriouslyweakensourunderstandingofparty

formation and adaptation, since theweaknesses of the structuralist approach are

thestrengthsofthevoluntaristapproach,andviceversa.Moreover,advocatesofthe

structuralistapproachdonotagreeonwhetheruniversal,domesticorpartyinter‐

nalfactorsshouldbeconsideredthemostimportantones.

5AsHall(2003:387:387)argues,“[C]omparativepoliticshasmovedawayfromontologiesthatas‐sumecausalvariableswithstrong,consistent,andindependenteffectsacrossspaceandtimeto‐wardsonesthatacknowledgemoreextensiveendogeneityandtheubiquityofcomplexinteractioneffects”.Inotherwords,manyscholarsnowrecognisetheunpredictablenatureofhumanbehaviour.Oneareathateffectivelycombinesstructureandagencyis,forinstance,thestudyofdemocratictran‐sitions(seeMahoneyandSnyder1999).

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Consequently,inordertogainabetterinsightintotheprocessofpartyorganisa‐

tionaldevelopmentweshouldsynthesiseexistingexplanatoryvariablesfromdiffer‐

entlevelsofanalysisintoasingletheory.Thissectionwillarguethathistoricalinsti

tutionalismoffersseveralusefulideasastohowtomanagesuchanintegration.The

goals of this chapter are therefore to outline the basic theoretical propositions of

historicalinstitutionalismandusethesetoconstructanintegrativetheoryofparty

organisationalformationandchange.

Historicalinstitutionalism

Untilatleasttheearly1950spoliticalscienceconsistedoflittlemorethanthestudy

of institutions. Scholars mainly engaged in the formal‐legal comparison of whole

systemsofgovernment,tryingtofindnormativeargumentsforthebestinstitutional

order.Thisallchangedthroughthe“behaviouralrevolution”.Ratherthanproducing

descriptive analyses of the political system, the focus of scholarly attention was

shiftedtowardstheinputsfromsociety intothepoliticalsystem.Researchparticu‐

larlycentredonformsofmasspoliticalparticipation,suchasvoting,andtheactions

ofinterestgroupsandpoliticalparties.Asthemainaimbecametodeveloptheories

thatcouldexplainwhyindividualsandorganisationsofinterestaggregationbehave

inthewaytheydo,politicalinstitutionswerereducedtoa“blackbox”inwhichsoci‐


–57–

etalinputsareinvisiblyconvertedintooutputsofthepoliticalsystem.However,the

empiricalobservationthat“processesinternaltopoliticalinstitutions,althoughpos‐

siblytriggeredbyexternalevents,affecttheflowofhistory”(MarchandOlsen1984:

739)hasledtoacomebackofinstitutionsinpoliticalscience.

While behaviouralists argued that institutionswere notmore than the simple

aggregation of individual preferences, the “new institutionalism” claims that the

same individualswillmakedifferentdecisionswithindifferent institutions.Yet, in

contrast to the “old” institutionalism, which employed a descriptive‐inductive

method, new institutionalists are experimenting with deductive approaches that

startfromtheoreticalpropositionsaboutthewayinstitutionswork(Lowndes2002:

95).Onthebasisofthesepropositions,itispossibletodistinguishthreebasictheo‐

reticalvarietieswithinthenewinstitutionalism:(1)sociological(normative) insti‐

tutionalism,(2)rationalchoiceinstitutionalism,and(3)historicalinstitutionalism.

Onageneral level,all threeapproachesagreethat institutionsare“therulesof

thegame” (Rothstein1996:145).Theyvary,however, in the specific criteria they

usetocharacteriseaninstitution.Moreover,thethreestrandsofinstitutionaltheory

donotconcurinhowinstitutionsaffectthechoicesofpoliticalactors,howinstitu‐

tionsarereproduced,andhowtoexplaininstitutionalchange.AccordingtoHalland

Taylor (1996), these differences arise from the assumptions the distinctive ap‐

proachesmakeabouthumanbehaviour.Rational‐choiceinstitutionalismfollowsthe

“calculusapproach”,arguingthatindividualsarerationallycalculatingutilitymaxi‐

misers. Proponentsof sociological institutionalism,on theotherhand, found their

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workonthe“culturalapproach”,whichseesindividualsassatisficers,theirbehav‐

iour constrained by their own interpretation of the world. Historical institution‐

alism, Hall and Taylor argue, finds itself in‐between these two approaches, using

eithertheoneortheother.

Theproblemwith thisdistinctionbetweenthevariousapproaches is that it ig‐

noresthepotentialofthenewinstitutionalismtotranscendthelongunfruitfulde‐

bate between structure and agency. Theoretically, by stressing the role of human

behaviourintheconstructionofinstitutions,thenewinstitutionalismdrawsatten‐

tiontotheinteractionbetweeninstitutionsandindividuals,andacknowledgesthat

both influence each other (Lowndes 2002: 102). However, as Hay and Wincott

(1998)maintain,boththe“calculus”andthe“culturalapproach”arelatentlystruc‐

turalist,notallowingmuchspaceforagency.Weshouldtheninsteaddistinguishbe‐

tween rational‐choice and sociological institutionalism as quasi‐structuralist ap‐

proachesononeside,andhistorical institutionalismontheotherside,whichdoes

not vacillatebetween “calculus” and “cultural” considerations, but – in contrast to

HallandTaylor’sargumentation–isfoundedonverydistinctiveontologicalprem‐

ises.Accordingly,theprospectsforintellectualborrowingbetweenthedifferentap‐

proachesof thenew institutionalismaremuchmore limited thanwidelybelieved.

Onlytheparticulartheoretical foundationsofhistorical institutionalism,numerous

scholarsargue(forexample,HayandWincott1998;Koelble1995),promisetotake

usagooddealfurthertoaresolutionofthestructureandagencydebate.Thisisbe‐

cause,mostsignificantly,historicalinstitutionalistsseetheworldintermsofcircu


–59–

lar causal relationships between actors and structures, rather than unidirectional

linksofcausation,witheither actorscreatingstructuresor structuresdetermining

actors’behaviour.

Whatareinstitutions?

Thedefinitionofaninstitutiongivenbyhistoricalinstitutionalismismuchlessab‐

stractthanthoseprovidedbytheotherapproaches.Whereasrational‐choiceinsti‐

tutionalismholdsahighlyfunctionalistviewofinstitutions,describingthemascol‐

lectionsofdecision‐makingrulesfordetermininghowindividualactionswillbeag‐

gregated into collective decision (Peters 1999: 45), sociological institutionalism

understandsan institutionasasetof“rulesofappropriateness”(MarchandOlsen

1984:741),whichcomesintoexistencethroughtheinterpretationofthedominant

institutional values by the individualmembers. Historical institutionalism, on the

otherhand,usesarather“down‐to‐earth”definitionofinstitutions.Historicalinsti‐

tutionalistsdefineinstitutionsbyexampleratherthanbyanunderlyingmechanism,

oranoverarchingprinciple(Peters1999:66).

Thereasonbehindthelessabstractdefinitionofaninstitutiongivenbyhistorical

institutionalists can be directly linked to their specific ontological foundations. As

hasalreadybeenpointedout,rational‐choiceandsociologicalinstitutionalismmake

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certainassumptionsaboutgeneralregularitiesdrivinghumanbehaviour.Theythen

apply their deductivemodel to the real world in an attempt to confirm their as‐

sumptions. These assumptionsmust necessarily be incorporated into their defini‐

tionofaninstitution,intheirquesttoexplainwhyinstitutionsarecreatedandhow

institutionsaffectpoliticaloutcomes.Historical institutionalists, incontrast, takea

muchmore inductive approach to theanalysisof institutions.Theyusually “begin

withempiricalpuzzlesthatemergefromobservedeventsorcomparisons”(Thelen

1999: 373). Accordingly, an historical institutionalist’s definition of an institution

derivesdirectlyfromempiricalobservations,whichwillthenbeclassifiedtomake

themavailabletopoliticalanalysis.Unlikeinthe“calculus”and“cultural”approach

to institutionalism, the definition of an institution does therefore not contain any

cleartheoreticalexpectationsofhowagentswillbehave.

By generally stressing the “intermediate” character of institutions (Thelen and

Steinmo1992:2)–meaningthat institutionsresidesomewherebetweenthestate

asanentityandindividualbehaviour–historicistswould,withoutdoubt,character‐

ise political parties as institutions. Aswith any institution, parties are purposeful

human constructions that embody the “rules of the game”. When establishing a

party,actorsexplicitlyortacitlyagreeuponasetofrulesofbehaviourthatwillhelp

themtomakedecisionsaimedatfulfillingatleastthemostbasicfunctionofallpo‐

liticalparties,namelytocompeteinpublicelections.


–61–

Thestructuringeffectofinstitutions

Thisdirectlyleadstothequestionofhowinstitutionsingeneral–andpoliticalpar‐

tiesinparticular–structurehumanbehaviour.Startingfromthebasicassumption

that “conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at theheart of politics”

(Hall andTaylor 1996: 937), historical institutionalismpoints out the various op‐

tionstotheresolutionofpoliticalconflict.Institutionsareconceivedas“filters”that

selectivelyfavoursomeinterestsoverothers(Immergut1998:20).Incontrasttoa

purepluralistapproach,historicalinstitutionalistsarguethattheinstitutionalstruc‐

tureofapolitywilllimitthenumberofwaysinwhichpoliticalactorscancombine

theirresources(Krasner1984:228). Inshort,an institutionshapesthegoals,pre‐

ferences, and strategies of the political actors competing within its boundaries,

thereby steering the resolution of conflict, and ultimately affecting the outcomes.

Thisstandsinstrongoppositiontothepositiontakenbytheproponentsofrational‐

choice institutionalism,whoargue that thepreferencesof the individualareexog‐

enoustoinstitutions(Rothstein1996:147).

However,historicalinstitutionalismisnotdeterministicinitspropositionsabout

theeffectsofpoliticalinstitutions.Rather,itisrecognisedthatthesameinstitution

mayproducecompletelydifferentoutcomeswithindifferentsocialandculturalset‐

tings. Inotherwords,historical institutionalistsviewcausalityasbeingcontextual

(Immergut 1998: 19). Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16‐17) identify four distinct

causesforthevariabilityintheimpactofinstitutionsoverspaceandtime:(1)broad

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changesinthesocio‐economicorpoliticalcontexttransformapreviouslylatentin‐

stitution into an increasingly important institution; (2) changes in the socio‐

economiccontextorthepoliticalbalanceofpowerfacilitatetheentryofnewactors

whopursuetheir(new)goalsthroughexistinginstitutions;(3)exogenouschanges

producea shift in thegoalsor strategiespursuedwithinexisting institutions; and

(4) political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institu‐

tionsthemselves.Thatistosay,politicalactorsdonotonlychoosetheirstrategies

accordingtotheinstitutionalstructurestheyfindthemselvesin,buttheyalsotake

intoconsiderationthewidersocial,cultural,andeconomiccontext.Moreover,actors

areable to learnabout theeffectsof institutions,andundercertaincircumstances

mayaltertheirstrategiesinordertoproducedifferentoutcomes.Historicalinstitu‐

tionalismthusstressesindeterminacyandmulti‐causality.Inthisview,institutions

areonlyonefactoramongotherswhentryingtoaccountforpoliticaloutcomes(Hall

andTaylor1996:942).However,asinstitutions,thestructuralcontextdoesnotde‐

termine actors’ strategies, but actors candevelopdifferent strategies to dealwith

problemsposedtothembythecontext.PutinthewordsofHayandWincott(1998:

954):

[a]ctorsarestrategic,seekingtorealizecomplex,contingentandof‐

ten changinggoals.Theydo so ina contextwhich favours certain

strategiesoverothersandmustrelyuponperceptionsofthatcon‐


–63–

textwhichareatbestincompleteandwhichmayveryoftenreveal

themselvesinaccurateaftertheevent.

Similarly,whenanalysingtheeffectofpoliticalpartiesonactorswithinthepartywe

shouldalwaystakeintoconsiderationthecontextaroundtheparticularparty.More

thanotherinstitutions,however,politicalpartiesseemtobeabletodominatetheir

environment,aspartiesfillthoseotherinstitutions,onwhichhistoricalinstitution‐

alistsusually focus(forexample, legislatures,bureaucracies),with life.Conversely,

political parties are organised by the same actors, who decide on legislation and

other political outcomes. In other words, actors within parties enjoy a compara‐

tivelylargeamountoffreedomtowardstheirenvironmentastheycontrolavehicle

withwhichtheyareable tochangetheenvironmentaccordingto theirown inter‐

ests. Consider the cartel‐party thesis, for instance: Parties co‐operated to exclude

contendersbyintroducingpublicfundingandchangingotherpartylaws(Katzand

Mair1995).Inasimilarwaypartiescanworktogethertochangeotherrulesofthe

electoralcompetition,suchasthevotingsystem.Moreover,thereisstillmuchcon‐

troversyovertheextenttowhichpartiesreflecttheinterestsofthemasselectorate.

WhileDowns(1957)arguesthatpartiesadapttheirpolicyprogrammestothede‐

mandsofvoters,others(forexampleDunleavy1991)claimthatpartiesareableto

actively shapevoters’preferences. In short,what theseexamples show isnot that

actorswithinpoliticalpartiesaretotallyindependentfromtheenvironmentaround

theparty,butthattheymightbemoreindependentthanactorswithinthoseinstitu‐

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tionsusuallyanalysedbyhistoricalinstitutionalists.Thatistosay,partyinternalac‐

torsarenotonlyabletoadapttheirstrategiestothecontext,astheorisedbyhistori‐

calinstitutionalism,buttheyareinsomecasesalsoabletochangetheenvironment

inordertomakethecontextfittheirstrategies.

Institutionalformationandchange

Whilehistorical institutionalism thusmaintains that institutionshaveaneffect on

the behaviour of individuals actingwithin these institutions, it also acknowledges

the capability of political actors to consciously shape institutions. It thereby dis‐

agreeswiththesociologicalapproach,whichmaintainsthatinstitutionsarelargely

shapedbyculture(MarchandOlsen1984).Yet,a frequentlycitedproblemofhis‐

toricalinstitutionalismisthefactthatitseemsmuchstrongerinexplainingpersis‐

tence than formationandchange(Peters1999:67‐71; ThelenandSteinmo1992:

15). Historicists adhere to the idea of “path dependency”, by which in a general

sense they simplymean that “historymatters”. Essentially, they put forward the

argmentthat


–65–

the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or

whenapolicyisbeinginitiated,willhaveacontinuingandlargely

determinateinfluenceoverthepolicyfarintothefuture.

(Peters1999:61)

Inotherwords,institutionsareabletopersistintheabsenceoftheforcesrespon‐

sible for their original establishment– aphenomenon that economists captureby

the concept of “increasing returns”. In a process of increasing returns, the proba‐

bility of maintaining a once adopted institutional pattern increases with its con‐

tinuedadoption,becauseovertimethebenefitsofthechosenpatternwillincrease

incomparisonwiththebenefitsofpreviouslyavailableoptions(Pierson2000).6

Perceiving institutionaldevelopmentasaprocessof self‐reinforcingreproduc‐

tion causes a dilemma, however, since any “convincing account of institutional

changemustcontainwithinitselfitsownnegation,andyetsomehowremainconsis‐

tent”(Immergut2005:290).Historicalinstitutionalismtriestoescapethisdilemma

bydistinguishingbetween themechanismof reproduction anda separate logic of

change.Broadlyspeaking,historicistsunderstandthedevelopmentofinstitutionsas

achainof longperiodsofpersistencedividedbymomentsof institutional innova‐

tion. Borrowing from evolutionary biology, Krasner (1984; 1988) introduced the

conceptof“punctuatedequilibrium”intotheanalysisof institutions. Incontrastto 6OneoftencitedexampleistheQWERTYtypewriterkeyboard,whichgainedanadvantageovercompetitors,althoughitisgenerallynotregardedasthemostefficientalternative.However,being“thefastestoutofthegate”wascritical.NowthatpeoplehavebecomeaccustomedtowritingwiththeQWERTYkeyboard,andcomputerproducershaveadjustedtheindustrialstandardaccordingly,thecostsofswitchingtosomepreviouslyavailablealternativeareveryhigh.

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the conventional Darwinian view of evolution as a slow, continuous process of

change,proponentsofpunctuatedequilibriumarguethatchangetakesplacerapidly

in geographically isolated groups. They therefore do not assume that constant

causes explain the evolution of living organisms, but they stress uncertainty and

chance.7Similarly,historicalinstitutionaliststheorisethatthehistoryofinstitutions

is punctuated with moments when structural factors are least determining and

whenactorshave thegreatestdegreeof freedomto shape institutional change. In

otherwords,duringsuch“critical junctures”(CollierandCollier1991)themecha‐

nismofinstitutionalreproductionisdisrupted,givingspacetoagencyandchoice.In

order toexplain critical junctureshistorical institutionalistsusuallypoint toexog‐

enous crises – typically shocks from changes inmacro‐structures. Such crises can

causethebreakdownofexistinginstitutions,whichwillthencreateroomforpoliti‐

calconflictovertheshapeofanewinstitutionalarrangement.

However, bymere empirical observation it is possible to criticise the punctu‐

ated‐equilibriummodelonthegroundthatpunctuationsneitherseemtobeasuffi‐

cientoranecessaryconditionforinstitutionalchange.Firstofall,institutionsregu‐

larlypersistdespite external shocksof far‐reachinghistorical importance, suchas

warsorrevolutions.Moreover,notall institutionalchangehappenswithinpunctu‐

ations,butinstitutionsalsoevolveduringperiodsofsupposedstasis.

7Forexample,StephenJayGould,oneofthedrivingmindsbehindthetheoryofpunctuatedequilib‐rium,arguesthatwingsoriginallyonlyservedforthermoregulation,i.e.tolowerexcessbodytem‐perature.Aswingsgrewinsizeformoreeffectivethermoregulation,theyco‐incidentallyalsodevel‐opedanaerodynamicfunction,allowinganimalswithwingstofly(Gould1987).


–67–

In order to dealwith the firstweakness, Thelen (1999: 397) suggests thatwe

shouldacknowledgethat“differentinstitutionsrestondifferentfoundations,andso

theprocessesthatarelikelytodisruptthemwillalsobedifferent”.Putdifferently,

what constitutes an external shock will depend on the mechanism assumed to

underlietheprocessofinstitutionalreproduction.Ausefulcontributionintothisdi‐

rection has been made by Mahoney (2000a), who identifies four possible causal

mechanismsbehindthephenomenonofpathdependency.Thefirstoneisbasedon

autilitarianexplanation:Actorsrationallychoosetoreproduceinstitutions,because

any potential benefits of transformation are outweighed by the costs. A second

theorymakesuseoffunctionalistideasinordertoexplainthereproductionofinsti‐

tutions.Itisarguedthatpathdependencyhappensaseveryinstitutionisembedded

intoalargesystemwithinwhichitfulfilscertainfunctions.Third,institutionalper‐

sistence has been explained through the distribution of power among actors. The

basicideaofthistheoryisthatanyinstitutioninitiallyempowersacertaingroupat

the expense of other groups. The advantaged group will then use its additional

powertodefendtheoriginallyimplementedinstitutionalorderagainstpressurefor

changefromlesspowerfulgroups.Finally,afourthexplanationforpathdependence

isbuilt around thenotionof legitimacy.According toadvocatesof this theoretical

position,institutionalreproductionoccursbecauseactorsviewaninstitutionasle‐

gitimateandthusvoluntarilyoptforitsreproduction.

Dependingonthespecificmechanismofinstitutionalreproduction,onlyparticu‐

larchangesintheenvironmentaroundtheinstitutionwillbeperceivedasashock

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bytheactorswithintheinstitution.Hence,utilitariantheoristsoftenemphasisehow

increased competitive pressures can lead to institutional transformation, while

functionalistaccountsarguethatinstitutionalchangeusuallyrequiresanexogenous

shockthatputspressureontheoverallsystem,makingagiveninstitution’sfunction

obsolete and demanding its transformation to preserve the system in the envi‐

ronmental setting. Scholarswho adopt a power‐basedmechanism of institutional

reproduction,ontheotherhand,wouldarguethatchangesintheenvironmentcon‐

stitute a shock when they weaken the elites and strengthen subordinate groups

withintheinstitution.Andfinally,legitimationexplanationsofpathdependencyde‐

fineshocksasevents that triggerchanges in thevaluesorsubjectivebeliefsofac‐

tors.

Theproblemwithmostoftheseapproachestoinstitutionalreproductionisthat

theymustnecessarilyresorttoelementsexogenoustothetheoryinordertoexplain

change.Thisisapointfrequentlyraisedbycriticsofhistoricalinstitutionalism,who

arguethathistoricisttheoryshouldbeabletoaccountforchangethroughreference

to the nature of institutions themselves (see for example Harty 2005). Only the

power‐basedexplanationof institutional reproductionseems to fulfil this require‐

ment, as it assumes that institutions reproduce through a continuous conflictual

process,whichitselfwilleventuallyleadtoinstitutionalchange(cf.Mahoney2000a:

523).Inotherwords,bothreproductionandchangecanbeexplainedthroughcon‐

flictbetweenelitesandsub‐ordinategroups.Inlightofthis,thepower‐basedtheory


–69–

ofreproductionpromisestobethemostcoherentapproachtothestudyofinstitu‐

tionalchange.

Thepower‐basedapproachtothestudyofinstitutionsfitsinperfectlywiththe

moregeneralargumentsofhistoricalinstitutionalismregardingtherelationshipbe‐

tweenstructuresandagency.Asdiscussedearlier,agentsactstrategicallyandpos‐

sesstheabilitytodevelopdifferentstrategieswithinthesamecontext.Conversely,

contexts are strategically selective, favouring certain strategies over others. This

means thatover timesuchstrategic selectivitywill throwupsystematically struc‐

turedoutcomes.However,theseoutcomesarebynomeansinevitable,asstrategic

agentscanformulatealternativestrategiestodealwiththeopportunitiesprovided

bythecontext(Hay2002:129‐130).Inotherwords,withinthesameinstitutionwe

cantheoreticallyexpectseparategroupstofollowdifferentstrategies.Thesestrat‐

egieswillthenfeedintocorrespondingpreferencesregardingthenatureofthein‐

stitution,sinceanyinstitution–asstructuresingeneral–willfavourcertainstrat‐

egiesoverothers.

Therefore, similar to the arguments of power‐based accounts of institutional

change,politicalpartiesshouldnotbeseenasunitaryactorswithasinglegoal,but

consistingofcoalitionsofpoliticalactorswhopursuetheirindividualinterestsand

goals. Justaspolitics ingeneralcanbeseenasaprocessofconsensusandconflict

amonginterdependentindividuals,intra‐partypoliticsisalsomarkedbyconsensual

andconflictualrelationshipsamonginterdependentpartysub‐groups(Maor1997:

147).Asalreadyhypothesisedbythevoluntaristapproachtopartyorganisation,the

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conflictbetweenthese intra‐partygroups,so‐calledfactions,canhaveasignificant

influenceonorganisationalchange(HarmelandTan2003).Accordingly,reproduc‐

tionofthepartyorganisationhappensasthedominantfactionwilltrytopreserve

the organisational configuration, from which it gains an unequal share of power

(Panebianco1988).

Whilemakingadistinctionbetweendifferentmechanismsofinstitutionalrepro‐

ductioncanhelpexplainwhynotall large‐scaleexternaleventscauseinstitutional

change,itstillleavesuswiththequestionofwhysomeinstitutionalchangedoesnot

requireanexternalshock.Asasolutiontothisproblemithasbeenrecommended

thatwe give up the zero‐sum view of institutional change versus institutional re‐

production,andinsteadallowformodesofchangethatgobeyondthecasesofinsti‐

tutionalbreakdownorwholesalereplacementasimpliedinthepunctuatedequilib‐

riummodel. Two possible concepts in this regard are institutional “layering” and

institutional “conversion” (Thelen2003).While layeringmeans that newarrange‐

ments are set on top of pre‐existing institutional structures, conversion describes

thesituationwhenexistinginstitutionsareredirectedtonewpurposes.Inshort,ra‐

ther than picturing institutional development in terms of a sharp dichotomy be‐

tweenpunctuationsandstasis,weshouldaimforananalysis“thatseekstoidentify

what aspects of a specific institutional configuration are (or are not) renegotiable

andunderwhatconditions”(ibid.:233;emphasisintheoriginal).

Similarly,inthecaseofpoliticalparties,externalshocksthatleadtoinstitutional

breakdownandwholesale replacement are relatively rare, and certainlymore ex‐


–71–

ceptionalthanhistoricalinstitutionalismsupposes.Thereasonisthatconstitutional

institutionsmustalmostnecessarilybereplacedincaseofabreakdown,whilepar‐

tiescansimplydieandbereplacedbyotherexistingparties.Incontrast,thoseinsti‐

tutions thatare typically regardedas theanalyticalobjectofhistorical institution‐

alismneeda functionallyequivalent replacement for the largerpolitical systemto

fulfilitsfunction.

Hence, when explaining party organisational change we are generally dealing

withchangethatfallsbetweenthetwoextremesofinstitutionalbreakdownandin‐

stitutionalstasis.Againcorrespondingtothetheoreticalviewsof thepower‐based

strand within historical institutionalism, it is argued that such incremental party

changehappenswhencertainindividualsorfactionswithinthepartyexperiencean

increaseintheirrelativepowervis‐à‐visotherindividualsandfactions,thusleading

toaredistributionofpowerwithintheparty.

Summary

Although there is stillmuch controversyoverhow toexplain institutional change,

historicalinstitutionalismprovidesanappealingtheoreticalframeworkwithwhich

totranscendthestructureandagencydebate.Itsmainpropositionscanbeformu‐

latedasfollows:

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(1) Structuresinfluencehumanbehaviourbyfunctioninglikeafilterthatselec‐

tivelyfavourssomestrategiesoverothers.

(2) However, although this means that outcomes within the same structural

contextwillexhibitacharacteristicregularitywhenobservedoveralonger

timeframe,theoutcomeofanyparticularstrategiccalculationisunpredic‐

table, since actors can choose alternative courses of action to respond to

opportunitiespresentedbythecontext.

(3) Asaresult,atanypointintime,weshouldnotbesurprisedtofindactors

offeringdifferentstrategicresponsestothesamecontext.

(4) Institutionalreproductionandchange is thereforebestseenasaconstant

conflictbetweendifferentgroupswithinthatparticularinstitution,holding

divergentviewsastothenormsandregulationsthatconstitutetheinstitu‐

tion.

Insum,whenaccountingforpoliticaloutcomes,historicalinstitutionalismacknow‐

ledgestheexplanatorypowerofinstitutions,externalfactors,andagency.Theseare

exactlythethreegroupsoffactorsthatcanbefoundinthepartyorganisationlitera‐

ture,representedbythe“life‐cycle”,the“periodeffect”,the“generationeffect”,and

the voluntarist approaches respectively. Hence, historical institutionalism again

demonstrates–albeitonamoreabstract level than inthepreviouschapter– that

thestrengthsofoneapproachtowardspartyorganisationaretheweaknessesofthe

another approach and vice versa. Actors cannot simply form and change political


–73–

partiesaccording to theirowngoals,asclaimedby thevoluntarist theoryofparty

organisation,buttheirfreedomofactionis,firstofall,curtailedbypowerrelations

withintheparty.Moreover,theirorganisationalstrategymustbeorientedtowards

theenvironmentalcontextaroundtheparty.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatparty

organisationswillbetheproductofeitherinternalorexternalstructures,asargued

bythe“life‐cycle”and“periodeffect”approachesrespectively–or,infact,drivenby

a successive combination of the two, as hypothesised in Panebianco’s “generation

effect”approach–butactorsareable todevelopdivergingstrategies toovercome

theproblemsposedby structures around them. Inotherwords, historical institu‐

tionalismteachesusthatthedividewithinthepartyorganisationliteratureisweak‐

eningourunderstandingofpartyformationandchange.

Historicalinstitutionalismnotonlyhelpsustocriticiseexistingtheoriesofparty

organisation, but, at the same time, it offers an abstractmodel throughwhich to

constructastrongertheoryofpartyorganisation.Thatistosay,thereisnoneedto

refuseexistingtheoriesofpartyformationandchangealtogether,butweonlyneed

to re‐define the relationsbetweenexisting theorieson thebasisof the theoretical

claimsmadebyhistoricalinstitutionalism.Thisispreciselytheaimofthefollowing

section,namelytoconstructageneralframeworkfortheanalysisofpartyorganisa‐

tionbysynthesisingcausalfactorsfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisfoundtohavean

influenceontheorganisationofpoliticalparties.

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Explainingpartyformationandchange

Politicalpartiesasconstellationsofpower

Politicalparties,aswithanyotherinstitution,areconstellationsofpowerbetween

differentactors.Theseconstellationscanbeexplicitlycodifiedintheformalnorms

andregulationsofthepartyorinformallysupportedbygeneralpractice.Inthisre‐

garditisimportanttonotethatinformalinstitutionsaretobeunderstoodasmore

thanmerebehaviouralregularities.Theyare“sociallysharedrules,usuallyunwrit‐

ten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned

channels”(HelmkeandLevitsky2004:727).Therefore,althoughpartystructuresin

the“thirdwave”ofdemocratisationareinmanycasesnon‐bureaucraticandinfor‐

mal,suchinformalityshouldnotbeconflatedwithweaknessorlackoforganisation

(Levitsky 2001). Numerous partiesmaintain solid informal organisations that are

bothextensiveandenduring. Inotherwords, ignoring the informalpoliticswithin

manypoliticalpartiesinyoungdemocracieswouldreducetheanalyticaldepth,re‐

sulting in an inadequate understanding of how these parties actually operate

(Erdmann2004: 75). Existingmodels of party organisation, unfortunately, largely

failtoincorporateinformaldynamicsintotheiranalyticalframeworks.

Only if actors decide to translate the power relationships between them into

formalruleswillpoliticalpartiesdevelopthethreefacesofpartyorganisationthat


–75–

havebeenacceptedbymanyasthemostpowerfulconcepttodescribethedevelop‐

mentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEurope.However,thenumberofpossiblepower

constellationsbetweenthethreeelementsislimited.Infact,asthehistoricaldevel‐

opment of European parties has taught us – both empirically and theoretically –

therecanonlybetwodifferentmodelstoformallydistributepowerwithinaparty:

Either theparty inpublicoffice is thedominant faceorpower lieswith theparty

centraloffice. In‐betweenthese twoconstellations therecanbe transitionalstages

ofpowerdistribution.Moreover,thepartyontheground–thethirdorganisational

face–canbestrongerorweaker,therebyweakeningthepositionoftherespective

dominantpartyelement.However,thepartyonthegroundcanneverbethedomi‐

nantpartyelementitself,becauseit facesacollectiveactionproblem.Thepartyin

centralofficewillalwaysbestronger,asitisanecessaryvehicletoorganisecollec‐

tiveactionamongtheindividualmembersoftheparty.

Inotherwords,politicalpartiesareneverunitaryactorsbutrathercollectionsof

individualsandsub‐partyfactionswithoftendiverginginterestsandstrategies.The

powerrelationsbetweentheseactorscanbeeitherformalisedintheparty’sofficial

decision‐making rules or established informally through mutual understanding.

Thisisinlinewithoneofthecentraltenetsofhistoricalinstitutionalism:thatactors

candevelopdifferentstrategieswithinthesamecontext.Therelevantstrategiesto

considerwhen trying to account for party organisations are strategies relating to

the electoral market. This follows from Sartori’s influential definition of political

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parties,whichidentifiestheparticipationinelectionsforpublicofficeasthedefin‐

ingpropertyofpartiesvis‐à‐visothervoluntaryorganisations:

Apartyisanypoliticalgroupidentifiedbyanofficiallabelthatpre‐

sentsatelections,andiscapableofplacingthroughelections(free

ornonfree),candidatesforpublicoffice.

(Sartori:1976:63)

Thisistosay,actorsdonotformapoliticalpartyforthesakeofestablishinganor‐

ganisation,butthepartyisprimarilyavehicletoparticipateinpublicelections.Asa

result,theorganisationofthepartyisnotbasedonaseparateorganisationalstrat‐

egy,butitwillalwaysbecloselylinkedtotheactors’electoralstrategy.

Electoralstrategies

Broadlyspeaking, therearetwodifferentstrategiespoliticianscanusetomobilise

votersandlinktheirrespectivepartytotheelectorate:(1)programmaticprinciples

or(2)clientelisticexchangecircuits(Kitschelt2000).8Bothoftheselinkagemecha‐

nismsare, broadly speaking, basedonexchange relationsbetweenpoliticians and

8Kitscheltalsolistscharismaasathirdelectoralstrategy.However,wewilltreatcharismaasasecondarystrategyandthereforediscussitlateron.


–77–

voters,whotradematerial incentives forpoliticalsupport.However, theydiffer in

termsoftheproceduretheseexchangerelationsadopt,asclientelismdescribesdi

rect exchange relations, compared to indirect exchange relations. This property is

capturedbytheclassicaldefinitionofclientelismofferedbyLemarchandandLegg

(1972:151‐152):

Politicalclientelism[…]maybeviewedasamoreorlesspersonal‐

ized,affective,andreciprocalrelationshipbetweenactors,orsetsof

actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually

beneficialtransactionsthathavepoliticalramificationsbeyondthe

immediatesphereofdyadicrelationships.

Whileithasrightfullybeenpointedoutthatthepatroninaclientelisticrelationship

can also be the party organisation, rather than any individual within it (Hopkin

2006:409), the importantquestion toask inorder toestablishwhether there isa

direct exchange relation between the party/politician and the voters is:Whowill

benefit from thedistributionofmaterial incentives?Whereas in clientelismvoters

willonlybe included in thedistributionofmaterial incentives if theycomplywith

rules of the exchange gameby providing political support, programmatic benefits

haveapublic‐goodqualityandvoterscannotbeexcludedfrombenefitingfromthem

(Stokes2007).Thatistosay,clientelisticlinkagestargetbenefitseithertoindividu‐

alsor small groups,whoareexpected to supportpoliticianswith controlover re‐

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sources.Assuch,theresourcesdistributedthroughclientelisticexchangenetworks

can be either of an individualistic nature – includingmaterial goods (money and

othergifts),employment(bothprivateandpublic)andservices(suchashelpwith

theauthorities,protectionetcetera)–orofacollectivenature(forinstance,public

infrastructureprojectsortheprovisionofcommunityfacilities).9

However,inreality,itisoftenverydifficulttoclearlydistinguishbetweenthese

latterbenefitsandprogrammaticbenefits. Inmanycases theclassofbeneficiaries

targeted by a given programmatic strategy can be very narrowly defined (for in‐

stance, steelworkers,warveterans, theunemployed)and resourcesare therefore

madeavailabletoverysmallgroupsonly.Conversely,ifclientelisticbenefitsareal‐

locatedtolargergroups(forinstance,definedbygeographyorconstituency),politi‐

cians cannot exclude non‐supporters living in those areas from enjoying the re‐

sourcesprovided.Hence, inorder tomakeabetterdistinctionpossibleweshould

askasecondquestion:Arethereanyfacilitiesforthepoliticiantoeffectivelymoni‐

tor or enforce the direct exchange linkages (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007)?

Whereas in clientelistic relationships such monitoring mechanisms are available,

they are absent from programmatic linkages between politicians and voters. In

otherwords, inclientelism,onlyvoterswhoactuallyvote for thepoliticianare in‐

9Theallocationofpublicemploymentinreturnforelectoralsupportwillbedefinedaspatronage.Manyotherauthorsusepatronageandclientelisminterchangeably,butthisanalysiswillkeepthemstrictlyseparate.Moreover,inordertoclarifyafurthertermoftenusedindiscussionsofclientelism,thedistributionofporkbarrelwillbedefinedhereasthelawfulclientelisticallocationofgovernmentspendingtothepolitician’selectoraldistrict–asopposedtovotebuyingwhichisalmostalwaysil‐legal.Patronage,ontheotherhand,hastobelocatedsomewhereinthegreyareabetweenillegalityandlegality.


–79–

cluded in thedistributionof resourcesand thepoliticianhasaccess tomonitoring

systemsthroughwhichtocontrolwhethertheydidsoornot.

The enforcement of the clientelistic exchange agreement can be achieved

through various differentmeasures (see Schaffer and Schedler 2007). First of all,

political parties and politicians may choose to manage the exchange of material

benefitsandvotesthroughestablishedsocialnetworksandpersonalrelationships.

Accordingly,candidatesoftenrecruitpeoplewithahighsocialstatusintheirrespec‐

tivelocalcommunitiesasintermediariesbetweenthemselvesandthevoters,asthis

is likely to imposeonvotersastrongmoralobligationtovoteas instructed.How‐

ever, inaddition,partieswillalsoneedtomonitorthevotebycircumventingelec‐

toralsecrecy,astheimpositionofsanctionswillhavetobebasedontheknowledge

about non‐compliance. In order to monitor how individuals vote, politicians can

makeuseofvariousstrategies.Forinstance,voterscanbegivencarbonpapertore‐

cordhowtheyvoted,or,inmoremodernsocieties,voterstakeaphotooftheircom‐

pletedballotwiththeirmobilephonetosendasapicturemessagetothevotebro‐

ker.Anotherwayistogivethevoterafakedorstolenfilled‐inballotpaperbefore

enteringthepollingstation.Thevotercaststhefilled‐inballotandgivestheofficial

ballotpaperheorshereceivedinthepollingstationtothevotebrokerwaitingout‐

side. Alternatively, politicians can offer larger groups of voters incentives for ab‐

staining fromvotingaltogether.Finally,politicianscanalsomonitor theaggregate

turnoutofvillagesorneighbourhoods.Thisstrategyisespeciallyrelevantinplaces

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wherecandidatesandtheiragentsdistributematerialincentiveswidelywithinlar‐

gergeographicalunits.

Again,thesemonitoringsystemsensure–oraretobeunderstoodasanattempt

toensure–thatthegoodsthepoliticianpromisedinreturnforvotingsupportwill

onlybedistributedtoactualsupporters.Programmaticelectoralstrategies, incon‐

trast, lack similarmonitoring systems,whichmeans that there is amuch greater

likelihoodthatevennon‐supporterswillbenefitfromtheallocationofresourcesaf‐

ter theelection.However,we candistinguishprogrammatic strategies in termsof

how clearly they define the target group for the redistribution of goods.While a

catch‐all strategy seeks to aggregate thewidest possible variety of social interest,

narrowprogrammaticstrategiesaimataclearlyspecifiedelectoralclienteleconsist‐

ing of individuals who define themselves as belonging to a distinct social group.

Hence,inthelattercase–similartoclientelisticstrategies–voterswillbemobilised

through “club goods” – benefits for subsets of citizens that impose costs on other

subsets(KitscheltandWilkinson2007:11).

Inadditiontoclientelistimandthetwoprogrammaticstrategiesjustoutlinedwe

canidentifytwofurtherelectoralstrategies:charismaandcoercion.Charisma,inthe

classicalWeberian sense, refers to “supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifi‐

callyexceptionalpowersandauthorities” (Weber1964:358),meaning thatpoliti‐

cianscanmobilisevotessimplythroughtheirpersonalskillsandpowersofpersua‐

sion.Electoralstrategiesarecoercivewhenpoliticiansmakeuseofviolenceandin‐

timidation in order to achieve electoral success. Both these strategies, however,


–81–

should only be considered secondary strategies,which are used in a combination

with either a clientelistic or aprogrammatic electoral strategy (Hicken2007: 54).

Whereascharismaclearlyhasnaturallimits,suggestingthatonlyaverysmallnum‐

berofpoliticianscanrelyoncharismaalone,theuseofviolenceisverycostinten‐

siveandcarriesgreatpersonalrisk.Bothstrategiescantheoreticallycombinedwith

eitherclientelismorprogrammaticappeals.

Strategicallyselectivecontexts

Having identified thebasic electoral strategiespolitical actors canuse tomobilise

voters,we shouldnow turnour attention towards the structural environment.As

historicalinstitutionalismteachesus,thecontextaroundactorsisitselfstrategically

selective,meaningthatitwillfavourcertainstrategiesoverothers.Inotherwords,

when choosing between potential courses of action, actors will have to take into

consideration the environment inwhich their strategy is to be realised. As social

agents areknowledgeable andable to enhance theirunderstandingof the context

around them–and the constraints andopportunities this context imposes– their

intentionalconductwillproducesystemicallystructuredoutcomes.Inotherwords,

wewillnotseeaconfusingarrayofstrategies,butthecontextwillselectforacer‐

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tainoutcome,thereby–incombinationwiththelearningeffectonagents–causing

certainregularitiestoemergeovertime.

However–andthisisaveryimportantpoint–althoughtheoutcomeisstrategi‐

callyselectedfor,itisbynomeansinevitable.Firstofall,inordertorealisetheop‐

portunities inherent in a particular environmental context, access to strategic re‐

sourcesiscrucial.Thatistosay,althoughcontextualfactorsfacilitatethestrategies

ofactorswithaccesstotheseparticularresourcesovertheexpenseofthosewithout

access,thelattercandevelopalternativestrategies–requiringdifferentsetsofre‐

sources–todealwiththeproblemsposedtothembythecontext.Secondly,inorder

toactstrategicallyactorsmustinterpretthecontext.Asinterpretationsoftheenvi‐

ronmentcanvarybetweenactors,actors’strategicresponseswillaccordinglydiffer.

Inshort,wecanmakecertainpredictionsaboutthemostlikelyoutcome,butactors

arealwaysabletodevelopstrategiesthatwilldeviatefromthisstrategicallyselec‐

tedoutcome–eitherbecausetheycontroldifferentsetsofresourcesorholddiffer‐

entsetsofideasthroughwhichtointerpretthecontext.Moreprecisely,weshould

notbesurprisedtofindclientelistic,catch‐allandnarrowlyfocusedelectoralstrat‐

egieswithinthesamestructuralenvironment.

Keepingthesebasictheoreticalpropositionsinmind,thefirstthingtonoteabout

newerdemocraciesasacontextfortheformationandadaptationofpoliticalparties

is that they are strategically selective towards clientelism and catch‐all program‐

matic appeals. The reasons lie in the sequence of democratisation in the “third

wave”,whichhasbeenverydifferentfromearlierwavesofdemocratisation.Firstof


–83–

all, unlike inEurope,processesofnationalunificationand industrialdevelopment

did not precede politicalmobilisation, nor have these processes necessarily been

realisedsince(Randall2001).Consequently,electoralstrategiesaimingtomobilise

clearlydefinedsocialgroupsarelikelytobeunsuccessful,associalgroupidentities

willnottranslateintovotingbehaviour.Secondly,whilethe“firstwave”ofdemocra‐

tisation is best described as a gradual process, the democratic transitions in the

“thirdwave”havebeenrelativelysudden,notleavingpoliticalpartiesenoughtime

to formulateclearprogrammaticplatformsanddevelopcloseties tospecificvoter

clienteles.

While the context in newer democracies thus militates against narrow pro‐

grammaticstrategies,weneedtolookatstructuralfactorsatthepolityleveltode‐

cidewhetherthespecificenvironmentfavourseitherclientelisticorcatch‐allstrat‐

egies. Contextual environments that are strategically selective towards clientelism

are those characterised by a high level of poverty.10 Themost convincing explan‐

ationas towhy thepoorareaneffective target for clientelisticpractices refers to

incomeinequalityasthecausalmechanism(RobinsonandVerdier2002):Acontext

of low socio‐economic development favours clientelistic over programmatic strat‐

egies, it isargued,becausevotersare likely toaccept low‐valuerewards inreturn

fortheirelectoralsupport,whiletheupperclass,payingforboththeserewardsand 10Otherfactorsthatarefrequentlymentionedashavingapositiveeffectontheeffectivenessofclien‐telisticelectoralstrategiesaretheinstitutionalcontext–inparticulartheelectoralsystem(forexam‐plePersson,TabelliniandTrebbi2003;KunicovaandRose‐Ackerman2005)–andmasspoliticalcul‐ture(forexamplePutnam1993).However,theempiricalevidenceisfarfromconvincingandtherel‐evantliteratureisunderstandablydividedoverthesetwofactors.Rather,itisarguedherethatal‐thoughboththeinstitutionalcontextandmasspoliticalculturecancontributetoapersonalisationofpolitics,thisshouldnotautomaticallybeequatedwithclientelism.

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themaintenanceofthemonitoringsystem,willonlyhavetoinvestasmallshareof

theirownresources.Economicdevelopment,ontheotherhand,willmakeclientel‐

istictransfersmoreexpensive,astheywillhavetobepaidbyagrowinguppermid‐

dleclass,increasinglytargetedatalowermiddleclass.Thatistosay,paymentsbe‐

comemoreandmoreexpensivetopoliticians.Asaresult,thebeststrategyforpo‐

liticalpartiesistowithholdtherewardfromthevoter.Knowingthattheparty,even

ifitwins,islikelynottorewardvoters,votersarealwaysbetteroffdefecting.

However,thisdoesnotmeanthatinacontextofhighereconomicdevelopment

programmaticcatch‐all strategies targetedspecificallyat thegrowingmiddleclass

becomethestrategicallyselectedoutcome.Infact, ifclientelismisestablishedasa

repeated game, it can be strategically selected for even in higher developed soci‐

eties.Viewedfromagametheoreticalperspective,clientelismwillnotworkunder

conditions of higher economic development as a one‐shot game.But if the dyadic

relationshipbetweenthepoliticianandthevoter isembedded inasocialnetwork

thiswillhelpsolve theprisoner’sdilemma(Stokes2007).Hence, theoretically,es‐

tablishing a clientelisticnetwork in a relativelydeveloped society is verydifficult,

because–asexplainedinthepreviousparagraph–theinitialgameisverylikelyto

result inoneofthetwosidesdefecting. Instead, theclientelisticexchangemustbe

reproducedovertime,assuringbothsidesthattherespectiveothersidewillcomply

withtheagreement.

Morespecifically, innewerdemocracies, theenvironmental contextwill favour

clientelismasastrategyofvotermobilisation,iftheformerautocraticregimeused


–85–

clientelisticmeanstogainsupport fromthepopulation.11However, itwillalsode‐

pendon the typeofdemocratic transitionas towhether theclientelisticnetworks

willbeabletosurvivetheendofnon‐democraticrule(cf.Kitschelt1995).Inother

words,whendescribingthecontextaroundpartiesinnewdemocraciesweneedto

ask two questions: (1)Who held power under the autocratic regime and (2) did

theseactorsuseclientelismtolegitimise(or“buy”legitimisationfor)theirpower?If

theanswertothesecondquestionis“yes”,wethenneedtoaskwhethertheseac‐

torswereable tomaintain theirpositionsofpower throughthedemocratic trans‐

formationofthepoliticalsystem,orwhetherthetransitionwastriggeredandcon‐

trolled by the pro‐democratic opposition from below, leading to a total “replace‐

ment” (Huntington1991)of theregime. Ifelementsof theautocratic regimewere

abletomaintaintheirpositionsofpower,weshouldexpectthemtousetheiraccess

tostateresourcestobothsustainthemonitoringnetworkandprovidematerialin‐

centivesforvoters.

The relevant contextual environment to make predictions about the electoral

strategies to emerge in new democracies is summarised in Figure 1. However, it

mustagainbenotedthatthesepredictionswillalwaysbeimperfect.Asthisanalyti‐

calframeworktriestointegratebothstructureandagency,wecanonlypredictout‐

comesthatarestrategicallyselectedfor.Thatistosay,theseoutcomesarenotinevi‐

11Whethertheautocraticregimehadbeenabletoestablisheffectiveclientelisticnetworkswillhavedependedonanumberofotherfactorscommonlyidentifiedintheliteratureascausesforclientelism–mostimportantly,thedegreeofstatecontrolovertheeconomy(Wilkinson2007)andthedegreeofbureaucraticprofessionalisation(Shefter1994).Formattersofsimplificationthesefactorswillbeexcludedfromouranalyticalframeworkorotherwisethehistoricalchainofcausalitywouldbecomeuncontrollable.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–86–

table,butactorscanalwaysdevelopalternativeelectoralstrategiesthatgoagainst

thestrategically selectedoutcome. Inparticular,weshouldnot ruleout thepossi‐

bilityofactorsdevelopingnarrowprogrammaticappealstargetedatclearlydefined

socialgroups–astrategicoptionthatwewouldtheoreticallynotexpectinnewde‐

mocraciesofthe“thirdwave”.

Linkingelectoralstrategiesandorganisationalpreferences

Actors are theoretically not only able to develop alternative strategieswithin the

same environmental context, but actorswith different strategies can also co‐exist

FIGURE1:ELECTORALSTRATEGIES–STRATEGICALLYSELECTEDOUTCOMES


–87–

withinthesamepoliticalparty.Asaresultofthis,partiesshouldnotberegardedas

unitary actors but rather as collections of individuals and sub‐party factionswith

oftendiverginginterestsandstrategies.Acknowledgingthisnotionofpoliticalpar‐

tiesascoalitionsoffactions–andlargelyreflectingourearlierdistinctionbetween

clientelistic and programmatic electoral strategies – Sartori (1976: 76‐77) distin‐

guishes“factionsofprinciple”and“factionsof interest”.Whilefactionsofprinciple

primarilyservetoarticulatedifferentpolicy ideas, themain functionof factionsof

interest,ontheotherhand,istoallocatepostsandresourcesamongtheirmembers.

Put differently, factions of principle develop programmatic appeals, whereas fac‐

tionsof interestareclientelisticnetworksconnectingpoliticians tovoters through

theallocationofresources.

Basedon theirparticular electoral strategies, these factionsholddifferentpre‐

ferencesastotheorganisationoftheparty:Whereasfactionsofprinciplewillpush

foratransformationofinter‐factionalpowerrelationsintoasetofformalrules,fac‐

tions of interest will resist a formalisation of decision‐making procedures. Politi‐

ciansfollowingaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobilisationshouldtheoreticallynot

be interested in the formal party organisation as the central arena for decision‐

making, because clientelism is built around particularistic relationships. Under

these circumstances, collectivedecision‐makingmechanismsbecomeunnecessary,

butconflictwillratherberesolvedthroughtheallocationofresources:

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Because[clientelism]reliesonmaterialincentivesandself‐interest,

itunderminestheveryessenceoftheorganizationusingit:thepo‐

liticalparty[…]Withself‐interestasthelinkbetweenvoterandthe

party,andbetweenpoliticianandtheparty,sacrificesforthecollec‐

tive goodof theparty areunlikely to occur […] [Clientelism]pre‐

ventscollectivedecision‐makingbythevotersandbytheparty.

(Warner1997:535)

Consequently, the formalpartyorganisationwill bewithout a realpurpose, but it

willonlyactasaformalcloakaroundtheclientelisticnetworks.Thereisnoneedto

investintheformalorganisation,asallfunctionsusuallyattributedtopoliticalpar‐

ties,suchastherecruitmentofcandidatesorthemobilisationofsupporters,canbe

performedbytheclientelisticmachine.Fortheformalpartyorganisationthismeans

thatthedifferentelements–thepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthe

party in public office – are indistinguishable, simply because, asDuverger (1964)

explainedinregardtotheclassicalcadreparty,admissiontothepartywilldepend

ontheindividual’scapacitytocontributepoliticallyrelevantresourcesthatcanthen

beusedtomaintainandextendtheclientelisticnetworks.Asaresulttherewillbea

largepersonaloverlapbetweenthethreefaces,makingitimpossibletodrawclear

boundariesbetweenthem.

Politiciansfollowingaprogrammaticstrategy,ontheotherhand,willnecessarily

haveto invest in thepoliticalpartyasanarena forcollectivedecision‐makingand


–89–

conflict resolution among diverse interests. This imperative follows from the fact

that

thepartymustspeakwithamoreor lesssinglecollectivevoicein

order to create ameasureof confidence amongvoters that itwill

pursuethepolicyobjectivesafterelectionsithasannouncedbefore

anelection.

(KitscheltandWilkinson2007:9)

However, how parties will organise collective decision‐making will depend on

whether their programmatic strategy targets clearly definable social groups or

whetheritisratheracatch‐allstrategy.Ifpoliticiansaimtomobiliseadistinctelec‐

toralclientele,theywillassignahighvaluetoconstituencyrepresentationandde‐

velopapolicyplatformthatclearlyreflectstheinterestsofthisconstituency.Conse‐

quently, ideological consistencyand conformity are importantkeys to achieve the

party’sgoal,whichiswhypoliticiansfollowinganarrowprogrammaticstrategyof

votermobilisationshouldbeinterestedinstrengtheningthepartycentralofficein

order to increase discipline among the representatives in public office. If, on the

otherhand,politiciansaimtoappeal tothewiderelectorate, theyshouldbe inter‐

ested in a powerful parliamentaryparty, because theparties’ electedofficialswill

needconsiderablefreedomofactiontoprovethemselvesasmanagersofthepublic

good. Hence, as in the case of electoral strategies targeting well‐defined social

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–90–

groups,thereisstillaneedforformalmechanismsofcollectivedecision‐makingin

ordertoarticulatepolicyobjectives,butthesepolicyobjectiveswillbeformulatedin

verygeneralterms,makingitnecessarytotakemoreconcretepoliticaldecisionin

parliamentonaneverydaybasis.

However, whether to strengthen the party central office or the parliamentary

partyisnotonlytheproductofactors’ interests,butactorswillagainhavetotake

intoconsiderationthestructuralcontext.Asthemoregeneralliteratureonorgani‐

sations points out, the environment surrounding an organisation should be de‐

scribedaccordingtoitsdegreeofuncertainty.12Thebasictheoryclaimsthatorgani‐

sationsnaturallyresistunpredictability,andwillthusadaptaccordinglyinorderto

render the outcomes of their actions more certain (see Burns and Stalker 1961;

LawrenceandLorsch1967).Correspondingly, it ishypothesisedherethattheout‐

comestrategicallyselectedforbyacontextofhighuncertaintyisacentralisationof

powerwithinthepartyorganisationandthusamorepowerfulpartycentraloffice.

Inotherwords,underconditionsofhighenvironmentaluncertainty,actorsfollow‐

ingacatch‐allstrategywillbeundergreatpressuretostrengthenthepartycentral

officeinordertoincreasepartydiscipline–althoughthisoutcomeisbynomeans

inevitable.

In newdemocracies, environmental uncertainty for political parties is particu‐

larlyhigh,giventhatvoterloyaltiesareoftenonlyweaklydeveloped,whichreflects

12Thisisatleasttheassumptionofcontingencytheory,whichisconsideredthedominantapproachtoorganisationdesign.Foranapplicationoftheconceptofuncertaintytothestudyofpartyorgani‐sationseePanebianco(1988:204).


–91–

in high levels of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility (Mainwaring

1998).Moreover,loyaltiesalsotendtobeunderdevelopedwithinparties,leadingto

frequentinter‐partyconflicts(vanBiezen2003b:216).Theseconflictsareparticu‐

larly damaging when they affect the stability of government coalitions, thereby

jeopardising theparty’s capacity to influencepublicpolicyoutcomes. In short, the

context for politicians following a catch‐all electoral strategy should be described

along the following indicators for environmental uncertainty: party system frag‐

mentation,electoralvolatilityandgovernmentdurability.

FIGURE2:PARTYORGANISATION–STRATEGICALLYSELECTEDOUTCOMES

OLIVERHELLMANN

–92–

Whereas a programmatic electoral strategy thus requires a party organisation to

provideformaliseddecision‐makingprocedures,thetwosecondaryelectoralstrat‐

egiesoutlinedabove–similartoclientelism–donotneedlargeinvestmentsintothe

political party as an abstract institution. In the case of charisma, decision‐making

authority will flow naturally from the leader’s personality (cf. Panebianco 1988),

whileparties following a coercive electoral strategywill onlyhave to invest in an

informalmilitant group.Hence, just as clientelism, charisma and coercionwill re‐

ducethefunctionofthepartyorganisationtothatofaformallegalcloak,meaning

thatthethreeelementsofpartyorganisationwillbeindistinguishable.Whencom‐

binedwithprogrammaticstrategies,weshouldstillexpectpartiestodevelopformal

procedures for decision‐making, but, depending on howmuch the party relies on

eithercharismaorcoercionasanelectoralstrategy,thesesecondarystrategiescan

createinformalchannelsofauthoritythatwillcircumventtheformalregulations.

However, thecentral causalmechanisms toexplaindifferent typesofpartyor‐

ganisationarestillclientelisticincentivesandprogrammaticappeals.Usingtheseas

thelinkbetweenthestructuralcontextandorganisationalpreferences,wecannow

identifythestrategicallyselectedoutcomesintermsofpartyorganisation(seeFig‐

ure2).Aswasdiscussedearlier, thecontextofyoungdemocraciesclearly favours

either clientelistic or catch‐all electoral strategies andwe should therefore expect

eitherpartieswithoutformalorganisational facesorpartieswiththepartycentral

officeasthedominantelementasthestrategicallyselectedoutcome.However,ac‐

tors following a catch‐all strategywill have to take into consideration the level of


–93–

environmentaluncertainty:Ifenvironmentaluncertaintyishightheywillbeunder

greatpressuretostrengthenthepartycentralofficeratherthantheparliamentary

party.

Basedon the idea that actors candevelopdifferent strategieswithin the same

party,weshouldthenseethereproductionandchangeofpartiesasaconstantcon‐

flictbetweeninternalactors,eachpushingfortheorganisationalstructuresthatwill

best allow the implementation of their respective electoral strategy. Accordingly,

factionsof interestwillresista formalisationofdecision‐makingnorms,while fac‐

tions of principle will be interested in strengthening the role of the party as the

principalarenafordecision‐making.Dependingonwhetherthelatterfollowacatch‐

alloranarrowlyfocusedelectoralstrategy,theywillworktowardsamorepowerful

parliamentarypartyorastrongerpartycentralofficerespectively.Inotherwords,

thedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesisnotalinearprocess,asmaintainedbystruc‐

turalistapproachestopartyorganisation,butitisanopen‐endedprocessdrivenby

conflictingelectoralstrategieswithinthesamecontext.However,unlikevoluntarist

approachessuggest,thecontextstrategicallyselectsforacertainoutcome,thereby

strengtheningcertainactorsoverothers.

Asthepower‐basedstrandwithinhistorical institutionalismmaintains,thedis‐

tributionofpowerbetweenactorswithinthesamepartyisthusthemechanismto

explainboththereproductionofthepartyorganisationandorganisationalchanges.

Partyorganisations reproduceover timeas conflicting interests createadeadlock

situation,withneither sidebeingable toadvance their interestsany further.Con‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–94–

versely, changes to party organisation will become possible if the distribution of

powerwithinthepartyisaltered.Thiscanhappenundereitheroftwoconditions:

(1) therelevantenvironmentaround thepartychanges tosuchanextent that the

strategicallyselectedoutcomebecomesadifferentone;or(2)a factionchoosesto

changeitsstrategyinattempttodealmoreeffectivelywiththeproblemsposedby

thegivencontext.Inotherwords, inthefirstcasethecontextchangeswhilestrat‐

egiesstaythesame,whereasinthesecondcaseactorsoffernewstrategiesforun‐

changedenvironmentalconditions.

Summary

Fromthetheoreticalframeworkjustoutlineditshouldhavebecomeclearthatpre‐

dictingthedevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinnewdemocraciesperseisimpossible.

Thatistosay,itisveryunlikelythatpartiesinnewdemocracieswillfollowexactly

thesamepathoforganisationaldevelopmentastheircounterparts inWesternEu‐

rope,norshouldweexpectthemtotakean“evolutionaryleap”towardsmorecon‐

temporary models of party organisation found in the established democracies in

Westernindustrialisedcountries.Furthermore,itishighlyimprobablethatallpar‐

tiesinnewdemocracieswillconvergetowardsacommontypeofpartyorganisation


–95–

thatwillclearlydistinguishthemfrompartiesformedinearlierwavesofdemocrati‐

sation.

Making predictions about the development of political party organisations in

newly democratic societies becomes impossible, as our analytical framework ac‐

knowledges the importance of human agency. Accordingly, allwe can predict are

strategically selected outcomes, as contextual environments favour certain out‐

comesoverothers.Theseoutcomes,however,arebynomeansinevitableasactors

areabletodevelopalternativestrategieswithinthesamecontext.Weshouldthere‐

fore allow for the possibility that different strategies may compete against each

otherbothwithinthesamepolityandthesamepoliticalparty.Thedevelopmentof

politicalpartiesisthusbestdescribedasaconstantconflictbetweendifferentparty

internalactorsfollowingdifferentstrategiesandinterests.

Giventhatthedefiningfunctionofpoliticalpartiesistocompeteinpublicelec‐

tions, actors’ electoral strategies become the key to understand different types of

partyorganisation.Broadly speaking,we candistinguishbetweenclientelistic and

programmaticstrategiesforvotermobilisation,withthelatterfurtherdifferentiated

astowhethertheplatformisnarrowlydefinedoraimedataggregatingawiderange

ofsocialviews.While theenvironmentalcontext innewdemocraciesof the “third

wave”strategicallyselectsforclientelisticandcatch‐allstrategies,itdependsonthe

particular context inwhichactorsmake their strategic calculationsas towhichof

thesetwowillbethemostlikelyoutcome.Generally,acontextcharacterisedbylow

levelsofincomeinequalityand/orademocratictransitionlargelycontrolledbyan

OLIVERHELLMANN

–96–

autocraticregimethatmadewideuseofclientelisticincentivestolegitimiseitsnon‐

democratic rule will strategically select for clientelism as the dominant electoral

strategy.

Electoral strategies are then closely linked to preferences for certain types of

partyorganisation:Whileactorsfollowingaclientelisticstrategyforvotermobilisa‐

tionwillresistaformalisationofdecision‐making,actorscampaigningonprogram‐

maticappealswillbe interested in strengthening the formalpartyorganisationas

the central arena for decision‐making.More precisely, those campaigning on nar‐

rowlyfocusedprogrammaticappealswillpushforacentralisationofpowerinthe

partycentraloffice,whereasactorswithacatch‐all strategywill try tostrengthen

the party in public office vis‐à‐vis the other elements of party organisation.How‐

ever,innewdemocraciesenvironmentaluncertaintyforpoliticalpartiestendsbeto

relativelyhigh,makingitdifficulttorealisethislatteroption.

Asactorswithinthesamepartycanfollowdifferentelectoralstrategiesandthus

holddifferentpreferencesastotheorganisationoftheparty,theorganisationalde‐

velopment of political parties is best described as an on‐going conflict between

partyinternalgroupingswithaninterestineitherreproducingortransformingthe

party organisation. This conflict will lead to party change if changes in the envi‐

ronmentstrengthengroupsrejectingthecurrentnormsandregulations,orifactors

decidetochangetheirstrategies.However,inordertorealisetheopportunitiescre‐

ated by environmental changes actorsmust both control the necessary resources

andinterpretthesechangesasopportunitiesinthefirstplace.Moreover,changing


–97–

strategieswillnotalwaysleadtoarelativeincreaseinpower,ascontextsarestra‐

tegicallyselective,favouringcertainstrategiesoverothers.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–98–

–3–

METHODOLOGICALIMPLICATIONS

In a logical sequence, the theoretical assumptions that constitute our analytical

framework shape our research methodology. Thus, this chapter will discuss the

methodologicalimplicationsofconceptualisingthedevelopmentofpoliticalparties

as a constant conflict between strategic actors in a strategically selective context.

Thisinvolvesoperationalisingthevariablesthatconstituteourtheoryofpartyfor‐

mationandchange,decidingonappropriatemethodsofdatacollectionandanalysis,

andselectingthecases.

Measurement

Theprecedingchapter identified severalvariables thatneed tobe taken into con‐

siderationwhenexplainingpartyformationandchange.Thesevariablesmustnow


–99–

beoperationalisedinordertomakethemempiricallymeasurable.Asageneralrule

fortheprocessofoperationalisation,thechosenindicatorsmustadequatelycapture

thefullcontentoftheconcepttheresearcherseekstoanalyse(AdcockandCollier

2001).

Theenvironmentalcontext

To remind ourselves, in order to make a prediction about electoral strategies –

whicharethekeytounderstandingdifferenttypesofpartyorganisation–theenvi‐

ronment around political parties in new democracies should be described along

threevariables: (1) theautocraticregime, (2) theprocessofdemocratic transition

and(3)thelevelofsocio‐economicdevelopment.Thesevariablesdonothaveade‐

terministicinfluenceonhumanbehaviour,buttheywillhelpustopredictoutcomes

thatarestrategicallyselectedforbytheyenvironment.Since“thirdwave”democra‐

ciesasacontextmitigateagainstnarrowprogrammaticelectoralstrategies,theonly

twooutcomeswe should expect are either clientelistic practices or catch‐all cam‐

paigns. Clientelismwill always be the strategically selected outcomeunder condi‐

tions of low socio‐economic development, which provide the perfect breeding

groundforvote‐buyingand/orpatronage.Mostimportantly,inlessdevelopedsoci‐

eties,clientelismdoesnotneedtobeestablishedasarepetitivegame,butitcanbe

OLIVERHELLMANN

–100–

setupfromzero.Inordertomeasurethelevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentthe

following indicatorswillbeused: (1)GDPpercapita, (2) theGinicoefficient13, (3)

thedegreeofurbanisationand(4)theliteracyrate.Whereasthefirsttwoindicators

arerelatedthequestionofhowmuchoftheirresourcespoliticianswillneedtoin‐

vestintheestablishmentofaclientelisticnetwork,thelattertwoindicatorshavean

influence on how well the system to monitor voters’ compliance will work: It is

mucheasier tomaintain effectivemonitoring systems in rural areas,whilepoorly

educatedvotersmightnotknowabout theunlawfulnessofvote‐buyingandother

clientelisticmethods.

However,ifclientelismisestablishedasarepetitivegame,clientelisticelectoral

strategiescanalsobethestrategicallyselectedoutcomeinmoremodernsocieties.

Innewdemocraciesthiswill,firstofall,dependonwhethertheoutgoingautocratic

regimeusedclientelistimtolegitimiseitspower.Unfortunately,theliteraturedoes

notofferanytypologyofnon‐democraticregimesthatwouldcapturethedifferences

weareinterestedin.14Itisthereforenecessarytobuildourowntypology,basedon

twoseparatedimensions.Firstofall,weneedtoaskhowtheregimelegitimisedits

rule:Was thecurtailmentofpoliticalpluralism justifiedonlybyuniversalisticmo‐

tives–suchastheneedfordevelopmentandmodernisation,religiousbeliefs,politi‐

cal ideologies, an externalmilitary threat or nationalism – or did the regime also

13TheGinicoefficientisameasureofinequalityofthedistributionofincome.Itisdefinedasaratiowithvaluesbetween0and1:0correspondstoperfectincomeequality,while1correspondstoper‐fectincomeinequality.14ProbablythemostinfluentialtypologyofautocraticregimesistheconceptualisationbyLinz(2000),whichisorganisedaroundthreecoredimensions:(1)thedegreeofpluralism,(2)thedegreeofmobilisation,and(3)thedegreeofideology.


–101–

maintainclientelisticexchangerelationswiththepopulationthroughwhichto“buy”

politicalsupport?Secondly, inorder toestablishwhether theelementscontrolling

theseclientelisticrelationshipswereabletore‐establishthemselvesaspoliticalac‐

tors in thenewdemocracy it isnecessary toask:Whoruled?Possibleanswers to

thisquestionareasingleleader,apoliticalparty,themilitaryorthebureaucracy.

However,inorderfortheclientelisticnetworkstosurvivethetransformationof

thepoliticalsystem,thedemocratictransitionmustatleastbepartlycontrolledby

theregimeelites:Iftheregimeiscompletelyremovedfrompower,thismeansthat

the clientelistic networkswill decay, as they are disconnected from the supply of

public resources. Following Huntington (1991), we can distinguish threeways in

which an autocratic regime can be developed into a democracy: (1) “transforma‐

tion”, (2) “replacement” and (3) “transplacement”. In a transformation the regime

takestheleadininstitutionalisingdemocracy,whileinareplacementtheregimeis

overthrown,allowingoppositiongroupstocontroltheprocessoftransition.Trans‐

placement,ontheotherhand,describesthesituationwhenneithertheregimenor

thepro‐democratic oppositionhave thenecessarypower to control the transition

processindependentlyofeachother.Democratisationwillhencelargelyresultfrom

jointaction.Inotherwords,elementsoftheauthoritarianregimewillbeablekeep

positionsofpower ina transformationandareplacement,whereasareplacement

providestheworstconditionsfortheregimetomaintainitsclientelisticnetworks.

We should therefore expect the context to favour catch‐all electoral strategies

over clientelism under conditions of high socio‐economic development, provided

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–102–

thattheexitingautocraticregimedidnotuseclientelisticappealsto“buy”legitima‐

tionforitsnon‐democraticuseofpower–orifitdid,thatthedemocratictransition

wastriggeredfrombelowandcompletelyremovedtheautocraticelitesfrompower.

Asexplainedinthepreviouschapter,actorsfollowingacatch‐allstrategytomobi‐

lisevotersshouldbeinterestedinstrengtheningthepartyinpublicoffice.However,

if environmental uncertainty is high, these actorswill be under great pressure to

centralisepowerinthepartycentralofficeinordertoincreasepartydiscipline.En‐

vironmental uncertainty for political parties can bemeasured along the following

dimensions: party system fragmentation, electoral volatility and government lon‐

gevity. Party system fragmentation can be expressed as the “effective number of

parties”throughtheindexdevelopedbyLaaksoandTaagepera(1979),whichtakes

accountofboththenumberofpartiesinthesystemandtheirshareofvotes/seats.A

widelyusedmethod to capture electoral volatility is thePedersen index,which is

equaltothenextpercentageofvoterswhochangedtheirvotesbetweentwosubse‐

quentelections(Pedersen1979).Finally,governmentstabilityismeasuredinyears,

usingthefollowingcriteriatodeterminetheendofacabinet:(1)newelections,(2)

change in party composition or (3) change in primeministership/presidency (Li‐

jphart 1999: 132). Environmental uncertainty is higher, the higher party system

fragmentationandelectoralvolatility,andthelowergovernmentdurability.


–103–

Partyorganisation

Several typologies of party organisation have been offered (see Krouwel 2006).

Theseare,however,notwithoutmajorweaknesses.Firstofall,mostpartymodels

were developed in the context of politics inWestern Europe (cf. Wolinetz 2002:

137).Thismakesthemdifficulttoapplytothenumerouspartiesthathaveonlyre‐

cently emerged through the third wave of democratisation in other parts of the

world. Due to this “travelling problem” (Sartori 1970), the real‐world differences

between political parties in young democracies and their counterparts in estab‐

lisheddemocraciesintheWestareoftenobscured.Moreover,existingtypologiesof

partyorganisationsufferfroma“transformationbias”(vanBiezen2003a:178),as

mostoftheexistingpartytypesactuallyreflectmodelsofpartychangeratherthan

modelsofpartyorganisationperse.However,ageneraltheoryofpartyorganisation

mustnecessarilybebasedonpartymodelsthatcanaccommodatetheoreticalclaims

onbothpartyadaptationandformation.

Broadlyspeaking,therearetwosolutionstotheseproblems.Oneistodevelopa

newtypologythatcancapturethebroadempiricalvariationamongpoliticalparties

indifferentpartsoftheworld(seeGuntherandDiamond2003),theotheristodis‐

integrateexistingpartymodels into their singleelements (seevanBiezen2003b).

Thelatteroptionhasundeniableadvantages,sinceitmuchmoreeffectivelyaddsto

existingknowledgeconcerningtheorganisationofpoliticalparties.Introducingyet

anothertypologyofpoliticalpartieswouldmakeitdifficulttocompareourresults

OLIVERHELLMANN

–104–

with those that have already been generated by the existing literature. However,

simplydisintegratingexistingtypesisnotenough,butthesingleindicatorsthatwe

obtainmustbeclusteredaccordingtoameaningfulmatrixthatdefinestheinterplay

betweenthesedefiningcharacteristics(Sartori1984:46‐50;1993).

Inordertointegratethenewmodelintotheongoingdebatessurroundingparty

organisation,thepowerrelationsbetweenthe“partyontheground”,the“partyin

centraloffice”andthe“partyinpublicoffice”promisetooffersuchameaningfulor‐

ganisingmatrix.Theserelationsareextremelyvaluable,sincetheyhaveasignificant

effect on the linkagesbetween civil society, political parties, and the state.Hence,

theparticularfunctioningofademocracywillalwaysdependontheinternalpower

relations of theparties competingwithin its boundaries (cf.Katz andMair 1995).

Accordingtothedemocraticideal,politicalpartiesshouldfunctionas“gatekeepers”

(Easton1965) of the political systemby aggregating social interests into possible

policyoptions.Partiesfulfilthisroleasabridgebetweencivilsocietyandthestate

when,asintheeraofthemassparty,thereisasymbioticrelationshipbetweenthe

partyonthegroundandthepartyincentraloffice.Ifthepartyinternalpowerpen‐

dulumswingstoofartowardsthepartyontheground,thepartywillnotbeableto

realise demands from civil society against the interests of the state bureaucracy.

Conversely, if it swings too far towards the party in public office, the party will

transformintoanagentofthestate,removedfromcivilsociety.Ifnocleardistinc‐

tioncanbemadebetweenthethreefaces(similartotheclassicalcadreparty),civil

society,thepartysystem,andthestatewillalsobeindistinct.


–105–

Whendisaggregatingexistingmodelsofpartyorganisationweobtainanumber

offormalindicatorsthatservetoevaluatethepowerdistributionbetweentheparty

ontheground,thepartyincentraloffice,andthepartyinpublicoffice.Inorderto

assesstherelativestrengthofthepartyonthegroundscholarsusuallyrelyonthe

size of the party membership. The simplest measure by which to assess party

membership strength is simply to compare the absolute number ofmembers be‐

tweendifferentpartiesovertime.However,althoughsucharawmembershipcount

isvaluable information for the individualparty, itdoesnotallowus tocontrol for

such intervening variables as the size of the electorate.Hence, itmust be supple‐

mentedwithmoresophisticatedmethodstoevaluatethestrengthof themember‐

shiporganisation.Onemethodistoexpresstheabsolutenumbersasapercentageof

theparty’sownelectorate.Yet,theweaknessofthistechniqueisthatitwronglyas‐

sumeseachparty tohavea fixedelectorate (Katzetal.1992:331).Therefore, the

betterindicatorforpartymembershipstrengthistheratioofaparty’smembership

totheoverallnationalelectorate.

Theproblemwithstandardisedmembershipfiguresingeneral,however,isthat

thefiguresvaryaccordingtotheparty’sperformanceinattractingmembers,which

again isdependentonanumberof factorsbeyondthecontrolof theparty leader‐

ship.Thus, ifwewant to includesomespace foragency inour theoryofpartyor‐

ganisation,wealsoneedtotakeintoaccounttheheightofbarriersseparatingparty

members fromnon‐members, becauseonly these can – at least in theory – inten‐

tionallybeshapedby theactorswithin theparty.Generally, the levelof inclusive‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–106–

nessofapartycanbedeterminedbytheextentofdutiesandprivilegesattachedto

partymembership,andby theeaseordifficultyofenrolment (Scarrow1996:30).

On amore specific levelwe can ask the following questions to operationalise the

easeofaccesstopartymembership:

(1) Isenrolmentopenorrestricted(Duverger1964:72)?Doesthepartyrequire

thatindividualsmeetcertainconditions,suchasage,ethnicityornationality?

(2) Howformalisthemembershipprocedure?Forinstance,joiningsocialistpar‐

tiesintheearly20thcenturyrequiredthewould‐bemembertofollowaleng‐

thyapplicationprocedurethat,amongotherformalities,involvedsigningthe

party’sstatutes,andsecuringsponsorshipfromexistingmembers.Moreover,

oneoftenhadtogothroughaprobationaryperiodinordertobegrantedfull

memberrights.

(3) Domembersneedtopayregulardues?Andifso,howmuchdotheyhaveto

pay?Inordertoallowforcross‐countrycomparisonthelevelofmembership

duesshouldbeputinrelationtotheaverageper‐capitaincome.

Howhigh theparty sets thebarriersofpartymembership tellsus a lot about the

typeofmemberstheparty is lookingtoattract.Broadlyspeaking,wecansaythat

the lower the barriers the less engagement in party‐internal politics is excepted

frommembers.Inthisregard,Scarrow(1994:51)distinguishesfivedifferentforms

of activities for party members (ranked in increasing order according to the in‐


–107–

tensityofengagement):(1)statistic,(2)donor,(3)ideas,(4)volunteer,and(5)can‐

didate. It isreasonabletoclaimthatthepartyonthegroundwillweakest, ifparty

membersareonlyperceivedasstatistic.Itwillbemorepowerful,ifpartymembers

are recruitedas importantprovidersofmoney, ideas, and free labour.Finally, the

partyonthegroundwillbestrongestif,inaddition,itisalsoperceivedasapoolof

potentialcandidatesforpublicelections.

Measuring thestrengthofpartyon theground–basedonacombinationof its

numerical strength and its inclusiveness – provides very little value, ifwe do not

alsoconsidertherelativepowerofthetwootherorganisationalfaces.Asecondand

morecomprehensiveindicatorofthedistributionofpowerwithinapoliticalpartyis

theprocedureused toselectcandidates forpublicelections.Whereasmanyof the

functionsoriginallymonopolisedbypoliticalpartiesarenowalsoexercisedbyother

institutions,competingforgovernmentaloffices–andthenecessaryrecruitmentof

political leadership–remainstheexclusiverealmofparties.Hence,giventherela‐

tive importanceofelectoralcompetitionasamotivationtoestablishandsustaina

party, the selectionof candidates inevitablybecomesoneof the central objects of

party internal power struggles (Gallagher 1988a). In other words, the process of

candidateselectionisnotonlyanindicatorofthedistributionofpowerwithinapo‐

liticalparty,butitalsoinfluencesthedistributionofpower.

Existingmodels of party organisation usually putmost emphasis on the inclu‐

sivenessoftheproceduresofcandidateselection,askingwhoisentitledtovote in

thedecision‐makingprocess(seeKatz2001).Hence,ifwewanttocompareparties

OLIVERHELLMANN

–108–

inyoungdemocracies to theircounterparts inWesternEurope,weshould include

thesameindicatorinouranalyticalframework.Accordingtotheoperationalisation

ofcandidateselectiondevelopedbyRahatandHazan(2001),theselectorate,i.e.the

bodythatnominatesthecandidatesforelection,canbeclassifiedonacontinuum.At

themostinclusiveextreme,everycitizenhastherighttoparticipate.Atthemostex‐

clusiveextreme,ontheotherhand,theselectionofcandidateswillonlybedecided

by a single party leader. Themain categories in‐between these two extremes are

summarisedinFigure3.

However, this indicator alone isnot enough tomeasure thedistributionof power

withinapoliticalparty,as theparty leadershipmayuseotherregulations tohave

significant influenceon theoutcome.Thisparticularlyapplies tonorms ruling the

Allcitizens PartymembersPartymembers+

additionalrequirements

inclusive exclusive

1)Candidacy

ElectorateParty

membersSelected

partyagencyNon‐selectedpartyagency

Selectedpartyleader

Non‐selectedpartyleader

inclusive exclusive

2)Selectorate

Source:RahatandHazan2001

FIGURE3:DIMENSIONSOFCANDIDATESELECTION


–109–

access tocandidacy:Who is allowed topresenthis orher candidacy in the candi‐

date‐selectionprocess?Again, this dimension canbe classified in a continuum:At

theinclusiveend,everyvotercanstandaspartycandidate;attheexclusiveend,po‐

tentialcandidateswillhavetofulfilaseriesofrestrictiveconditions(seeFigure3).15

Iftheprocedureofcandidateselectionunderanalysiscanbeplacedatthehighly

inclusiveend,theresearchercancertainly identifytheparty inpublicofficeasthe

dominantorganisationalface.Thisisbecausemembershiprecordsadministeredby

thepartyincentralofficewillnotplayanimportantroleinmobilisingsupport,and

becausethepartyonthegroundwillbeatomised.However,itbecomesdifficultto

measurethedistributionofpowerwhenpartyagenciesareinvolvedinnominating

thecandidatesorelectingthepartyleader(whothenmonopolisesnomination).Of‐

ten,suchagenciesarecomposedofrepresentatives fromthedifferent faces–par‐

ticularlyfromthepartyincentralofficeandthepartyinpublicoffice,makingitdif‐

ficulttoisolateadominantface.Consequently,weshouldsupplementcandidatese‐

lection,whichonlypaintsaverygeneralpower‐mapofaparty,withmoreaccurate

indicatorstodeterminetheinternalbalanceofpower.

BasedontheworkbyvanBiezen(2000;2003b)onpoliticalpartiesintheyoung

democraciesofSouthernandEast‐CentralEurope,wecanidentifyanumberofas‐

pects in theofficialpartyrules thatwillhelp todescribe therelationshipbetween 15TheframeworkbyRahatandHazanincludestwofurtherindicators.Oneisthedegreeoftheterri‐torial(orfunctional)decentralisationofcandidateselection.However,thisconcepthashardlyanyinfluenceontheinternalbalanceofpowerbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisation,andwillthusnotbeincludedhere.ThesameappliestothefourthindicatordevelopedbyRahatandHazan–thequestionofwhethereachcandidateisdeterminedexclusivelybyvotesorwhetheranagreed‐uponlistisratifiedbytheselectorate.Thisdimensionhasprobablyagreaterimpactontheproblemofwhogetsnominated,hencecandidaterecruitment(seeNorris1996).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–110–

theparty incentralofficeandtheparty inpublicoffice.Firstly,weshouldexplore

how much independence the party in public office enjoys from the extra‐

parliamentary organs. The party statutes can be expected to include a number of

provisionsthatrulethepositionof theparty inpublicoffice,suchasthenormsof

behaviour of the party’s parliamentary representatives, the establishment of the

parliamentaryfraction’sinternalrules,theselectionofitsleader(ship)ortheformu‐

lationofpublicpolicy.Secondly,wemusttakeintoconsiderationthedegreeofper‐

sonneloverlapbetweentheorgansoftheextra‐parliamentaryofficeandtheparty

inpublicoffice, lookingatboth theoffice rules that regulateexofficio representa‐

tion,andtheactualextentofpersonneloverlap.Thirdly,itishelpfultoaskwhode‐

cidesabouttheallocationoffinancialresourceswithintheparty.Andfinally,thedis‐

tributionofparty‐fundedstaffcanalsobeavaluableindicatortomeasurethepower

relationsbetweenthepartyincentralofficeandthepartyinpublicoffice.

TABLE4: BASICELEMENTSOFPARTYORGANISATION

Indicators

Membership absolutesize membership‐electorateratio inclusiveness

Candidateselection opennessofcandidacy inclusivenessofselectorate

Controloverparliamentaryparty

officialsubordination personaloverlap financialdecision‐making allocationofstaff


–111–

Tosumup, thepowerrelationsbetween the three facesofpartyorganisationcan

effectivelybemeasuredbydescribingpartiesalongthreedimensions:(1)member‐

ship, (2) candidate selectionand (3) tiesbetweenextra‐parliamentaryandparlia‐

mentaryorgans.Thesethreecentralelementsofpartyorganisationandtheirbasic

propertiesareagainsummarisedinTable4.

Feeding these indicators back into our organisingmatrixwill then allowus to

measurethedistributionofpowerbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisation.As

areminder,therearethreepossiblepowerconstellations:(1)Thethreefacesarebe

indistinguishable,(2)thepartyincentralofficeisthedominantfaceor(3)theparty

inpublicoffice is thedominant face.Thethreecentralelementsofpartyorganisa‐

tionare indistinguishable ifpartymembership ishighlyexclusive– that is,admis‐

siontomembershipisdependentonwhetherthepersoninquestioncancontribute

resources thatmake him a strong candidate in public elections – the selection of

candidateshighlycentralised,andthepartybureaucracyalmostnon‐existent,while

the leadershipoftheparliamentarypartyoftenperfectlyoverlapswiththe leader‐

ship of the party as awhole.On the other hand, the party in public officewill be

dominantorganisational face ifbothpartymembershipandtheselectionofcandi‐

datesarehighlyinclusive,withthelatteroftenorganisedasopenprimaries,andthe

parliamentarypartycontrollingmostoftheparty’sresourcesanddecision‐making.

Finally, the party central office will be the dominant face, if admission to party

membership is located somewhere between highly inclusive and highly exclusive,

candidateselectiondecidedbymembershipvotewithinthepartyandcontrolover

OLIVERHELLMANN

–112–

resources and decision‐making exercised by the party bureaucracy and the party

leadership.

Datacollection

As the previous section demonstrated, different types of datawill be required to

empiricallytestourtheoryofpartyformationandadaptation.Weneedtofillvari‐

ous levelsof analysiswithempirical information, ranging from theenvironmental

context,theformalorganisationofpoliticalpartiesandthepowerrelationsbetween

partyinternalgroupstoactors’electoralstrategies.Dependingonthenatureofthe

data,socialscientistsmakeuseofawidevarietyofdatacollectiontechniques.Inour

case, documentary analysis and elite interviews are certainly the most adequate

methods. Concerning the sequencing of these two stages it should be noted that

wheninterviewingelites,oneshouldnotonlyhavedetailedknowledgeoftheinter‐

viewee,butalsoofthefactssurroundingtheeventortheactivitystudied.Therefore,

interviewsshouldtakeplacetowardstheendofthedatacollectionprocess(Lilleker

2003:212)andweshallbeginwithadocumentaryanalysis.

Usually,threedifferenttypesofdocumentsaredistinguished:(1)primarysour‐

ces,(2)secondarysourcesand(3)tertiarysources(Burnhametal.2004:165).Pri‐

mary sources are “those thatwerewritten (or otherwise came intobeing) by the


–113–

peopledirectlyinvolvedandatatimecontemporaryornearcontemporarywiththe

period being investigated” (Finnegan 1996: 141). Primary sources that should be

usedintheanalysisofpartyorganisationsarepartystatutesandotherpartydocu‐

ments,suchasfinancereports,membershipstatisticsorproceedingsofpartymeet‐

ings.Secondarysources,ontheotherhand,consistofotherevidenceproducedsoon

aftertheevent,andusuallymadeavailabletoalargerpublic.Whenstudyingparty

organisations,printedmassmedia–oneexampleofsecondarysources–servesasa

good source to learn more about the inner‐workings of parties, and the socio‐

political context around them. The same applies to tertiary sources, which differ

fromsecondarysourcesinhavingbeencreatedmuchlateraftertheevent,suchas

booksandacademicjournalarticles.Thesealsohelptheresearchertogetabetter

understandingofthepartiesunderanalysis,andtostructuretherespectivecontext.

The problemwith documentary sources in general is that they are of varying

quality.While it ismoredifficult todeterminethereliabilityofsecondaryandter‐

tiarysources,Scott(1990:6)suggestsfoureasilymanageablecriteriatoassessthe

qualityofprimarydocuments:

(1) Authenticity:Istheevidencegenuineandofunquestionableorigin?

(2) Credibility:Istheevidencefreefromerroranddistortion?

(3) Representativeness: Is theevidencetypicalof itskind,and, ifnot, is theex‐

tentofitsuntypicalityknown?

(4) Meaning:Istheevidenceclearandcomprehensible?

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Officialpartydocumentsarelikelytobeauthenticandmeaningful.Issuesofrepre‐

sentativenessandcredibilitywillprobablyexercisetheresearchersomewhatmore.

Representativenesscouldbeaproblemiftheresearcherisdeniedaccesstocertain

documents, or when some documents have been destroyed. While this could be

simplystatedintheanalysis,itismoredifficulttoestablishcredibility.Oneexample

arepartymembershipfigures.Politicalpartieshaveatendencytoexaggeratetheir

membershiplevels,andthereisverylittletheanalystcandoaboutthisbuttoaccept

thefiguresmadeavailablebytheparties(MairandvanBiezen2001:7‐8).

Havinganalysedthemostrelevantdocuments,wecanthenproceedtointerview

elites.Interviewsfulfilseveralpurposes.Notonlycantheybeusedtofillgapsinthe

data,butmostimportantlytheyhelpustounderstandhowpartiesworkinreality–

behindtheformalproceduresandnorms–aswellasgivingusanideaoftheper‐

ceptionsandstrategiesheldbytherelevantpartyactorswhendesigningtheorgani‐

sation.Commonly,threedifferenttypesof interviewsareidentified:(1)structured

interviews,(2)semi‐structuredinterviews,and(3)unstructuredinterviews(Punch

1998:175).While instructured interviewsthe interviewerreadsoutveryspecific

questionsexactly inthesameorderastheyareprintedontheinterviewschedule,

very often offering the interviewee a fixed range of answers, unstructured inter‐

views tend tobevery similar in character toa conversation,with the interviewer

tryingtocoveracertainrangeofbroadertopics.Inasemi‐structuredinterview,on

theotherhand,theresearcherhasalistofquestions,buttheintervieweehasagreat

dealofleewayinhowtoreply.


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Aswewanttocomparebetweenpartiesandelitesinordertoexplainwhypar‐

tiesorganiseindifferentways,unstructuredinterviewsarenotagoodchoice,since

a comparison always requires a certain level of standardisation across cases

(Bryman2001: 315).However,we should not structure the interviews toomuch,

because elites “appreciate being treated as individuals” (Zuckerman 1972: 174).

Moreover, aswe are unlikely to have nearly perfect knowledge after the stage of

documentary analysis, questions should ratherbeopen‐ended, allowing the inter‐

viewees to bring in their full expertise aswell as their perceptions of the events

underanalysis(AberbachandRockman2002:674).However,ultimately,thedegree

ofstandardisationappliedtotheinterviewwilldependonwhoweareinterviewing.

Generallyspeaking,conventionalsamplingtechniquescanusuallynotbeusedin

eliteinterviewing,sincerespondentsarenotofequalweight(Burnhametal.2004:

207).Rather, intervieweesshouldbechosenon thebasisof their relevance to the

researchquestionandtothetheoreticalframework.Thus,inourcase,wewillinter‐

viewpoliticalpartyelitesinordertocollecttheinformationabouttheformalparty

organisation,andacademicexpertsaswellasotherelites(suchasNGOleaders)to

getan insight into the informalpowerdynamicswithin theparties studied.More‐

over,thelatterinterviewswillhelpusunderstandthemeaningandrelevanceofour

theoreticalconceptsinthedifferentcountries,asthesecanconsiderablydifferfrom

ourWesternEuropeanunderstanding.Consequently,wewillusestructured inter‐

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–116–

viewswithpoliticalpartyelites16inordertoensurefullcomparabilitybetweenthe

politicalpartiesandsemi‐structuredinterviewswithpartyexternalelites.

Similartodocuments,eliteinterviewscansufferfromproblemsofcredibility.In

somecasestheintervieweescanhavedifferentperceptionsofwhatthefactsareor

theymayalsoattempttorewritehistoryintheirownfavour.Inordertodealwith

thisproblemDavies(2001)–writingabouteliteinterviewinginsecurityandintelli‐

gence studies – suggests applying themethod of “triangulation”. Thismeans that

data the researcherhas collected from interviews is cross‐referenced, firstly,with

data obtained from primary documents and, secondly, with published secondary

andtertiarysourcematerial.Whereinterviewsconflictwithwrittenrecords,thelat‐

tershouldbetakenasthefinalauthority.Ifinterviewscomeintoconflictwithother

interviews,theuncertaintymustbereportedinthetext.

Dataanalysis

Oncethedatahasbeencollected,itcanbeusedtobuildgeneraltheories.Following

Lijphart(1971;1975),wecandistinguishthreesocialscientificmethodsthatcanbe

usedforhypothesis‐testing:(1)thestatisticalmethod,(2)thecomparativemethod

and (3) the case‐study method. The first two methods are based on John Stuart

Mill’s “methods of experimental inquiry”, which are “modes of singling out from 16 See Appendix for questionnaire.


–117–

amongthecircumstanceswhichprecedeorfollowaphenomenonthosewithwhich

itisreallyconnectedbyaninvariablelaw”(Mill1875).Inotherwords,bychanging

thecircumstancesinwhicharelationshipamongvariablesisobserved,rivalobser‐

vationscanberuledoutandhypothesestested. Inpoliticalscience,themostcom‐

mon units of analysis are countries. Countries are compared to control for those

socio‐political variables that are not part of the hypothesised causal relationship,

allowingtheresearchertoexaminetheeffectoftheindependentvariableonthede‐

pendent variablewithmore confidence.As such,both the statistical and the com‐

parativemethodcanbeseenasaninferiorsubstitutefortheexperimentalmethod,

which involves thecontrolledmanipulationof theobjectofanalysisunder labora‐

toryconditions,butwhichduetopracticalandethicalimpedimentsisnotavailable

inthesocialsciences.

The crucial difference between the statistical method and the comparative

method is the number of cases compared (Lijphart 1971: 684). The statistical

method,which isMill’s“methodofconcomitantvariations”,comparesmanycases.

Thisisalsoreferredtoas“variable‐oriented”research(Ragin1987),sincecasesare

notcompareddirectlytoeachother,butonlybroadpatternsofcovariationareas‐

sessed,makingitpossibletoinferavariable’saverage,neteffectinallcontexts.The

comparativemethod,ontheotherhand,comparesasmallnumberofcases.Itisdi‐

videdprimarilyintotwotypesofsystemdesign:the“mostsimilarsystemsdesign”

(MSSD) and the “most different systems design” (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune

1970).WhileMSSD,whichisbasedonMill’s“methodofdifference”,comparescases

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–118–

thatareashomogeneousaspossibleexceptthevariablesunderanalysis,MDSD,or

Mill’s“methodofagreement”,servestoanalysecasesthat,ideally,donotshareany

featuresbutthevariablesthatarepartofthetheorytobetested.Thesetwodesigns

ofcomparisonarethusreferredtoas“case‐oriented”(Ragin1987),becausethere‐

searcher focuses on the similarities and differences among cases, rather than the

analyticalrelationshipbetweenvariables.

Large‐N comparisons generally suffer from two seriousweaknesses (cf. Land‐

man2000:25;MackieandMarsh1995:185).Firstofall,collectingdataforthelarge

numberofcasesnecessaryforasignificantstatisticalanalysiscanbedifficult,time‐

consuming and expensive. As the above paragraphs on data collection explained,

data on party organisations and their relevant environments is usually not easily

availablebutmustbegatheredthroughlaboriousprocessesofdocumentaryanaly‐

sisandeliteinterviewing.Assuch,analysingalargenumberofcasesseemsalmost

impossible. Second,byapplying concepts toabroader rangeof cases, global com‐

parisons often suffer from “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970), as themeaning

associatedwiththeoriginalconceptfailstofittherealityofthenewcases.Rather,in

cross‐cultural research,we should constantlykeepour conceptsopen for revision

byengagingin“acontinuousdialecticaltackingbetweenthemostlocaloflocalde‐

tailandthemostglobalofglobalstructure”(Geertz1983:69).Doingsoisnearim‐

possibleifconceptsusedinthetheoryofpartyorganisationdevelopedabove(such

aspartymembershiporclientelism)arenumericallycodedforstatisticalanalysis.


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The problems associated with the statistical method suggest that we should

compareasmallernumberofcasesinstead.Regardingthequestionofwhattocom‐

pare, theanswer lies in the theoreticalassumptionsofour theoretical framework:

Since–byacknowledgingtheimportanceofagency–wedonotruleoutthepossi‐

bilityofdifferent typesofpartyorganisationemergingwithin thesamecontextat

thesametime,politicalpartiesshouldbechosenastheunitofanalysis,notcount‐

ries.However,thisisnotonlyalogicalconsequenceofourdialecticalunderstanding

of the relationship between structure and agency, but the comparison of sub‐

national units is in fact a useful tool to control for variation (Snyder2001).Thus,

MSSDbecomestheautomaticallyselectedresearchdesigntostudypoliticalparties

withinthesamepoliticalsystem,becauseallpartiescompetewithinthesameenvi‐

ronment. It followsfromthisthat–withallcontextualvariablesbeingequal–dif‐

ferenttypesofpartyorganisationcan,withgreatconfidence,beexplainedbyactors’

diverging electoral strategies and the distribution of power between these actors

withinthedifferentpoliticalparties.

Inordertoisolateenvironmentalfactorsthathaveaneffectonactors’choiceof

electoralstrategieswewillthenhavetocomparebetweencountries,therebyinject‐

ingcontextualvarianceintotheresearchdesign.However,applyingeitherMSSDor

MDSDinastrictsensedoesnotseempossibleinthissecondstep.Thisisbecauseit

wouldbe impossible toestablishunithomogeneity,which isabasicassumptionto

makecausal inferences (Kingetal.1994:91‐94).Putdifferently,while in the first

stepweassumedthatpoliticalpartiesareheterogeneouswithinthesamecontext,

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wewouldnowhavetoassumethat theyarehomogeneous.Asaresult,weshould

applythecomparativemethodinalessrigorousway,onlyusingitasaroughguide‐

linefortheconductofourinquiry.17Infact,asRaginpointsout,weneedtodistin‐

guish between formal characteristics of case‐oriented methods, as formulated by

Millandothers,andtheirapplication.Thatistosay,case‐orientedmethodsshould

notbeusedinarigidormechanicalmanner,but,instead,theyshouldonlybeused

tocarryonadialoguewiththeempiricalevidence,helpingustopinpoint“patterns

ofconstantassociation”(Ragin1987:42).

Forthatreason,toisolateenvironmentalfactorsthatconstrainpoliticalactorsin

developingelectoralstrategies,wewillapplyourframeworktodifferentcountries.

Wewillthereby–throughthecomparisonofthesecountries–establishpatternsof

constant association. Admittedly, our causal inferenceswill beweaker than those

producedbyarigorousapplicationofthecomparativemethod.However,byrepli‐

cating our findings over several countries our evidence will, first of all, be more

compellingthanifweusedthesinglecasestudymethod.Moreover,causalitycanbe

increased throughmethodsofwithincaseanalysis, suchaspatternmatching,pro‐

cess tracing and causal narrative (Mahoney2000b;Mahoney2003). In particular,

processtracingoffersastrongalternativetomakingcausalinferenceswhenitisnot

possibletodosothroughthemethodofcontrolledcomparison(GeorgeandBennett

2004:214).Broadlyspeaking, theprocess‐tracingmethodattempts to identify the

17Thiswouldalsohelpusavoidmoregeneralweaknessesofthecomparativemethod,suchasthedegreesoffreedomproblem,thecombinedcausesproblemandthedifferentcausesproblem.ForacritiqueoftheMSSDandtheMDSDseeRagin(1987),Lieberson(1992)andFaure(1994).


–121–

causal chain between an independent variable and the outcomeof the dependent

variable.Hence,ratherthanexaminingmultiple instancesofX1→Y(as in large‐N

statisticaldesigns),theresearchersexaminesasingleinstanceofX1→X2→X3→X4

→Y(Gerring2007:173).Inotherwords,itisthequalityoftheobservation,notthe

quantityofobservations,thatisrelevantinevaluatingthetruthclaimsofaprocess‐

tracingstudy.Iftheresearchercanconnectempiricalevidencetoaconvincinghis‐

toricalsequencethatlinkscauseandeffect,heisinagoodpositiontoassertthatthe

relationshipunderanalysisiscausal.

Caseselection

There iswidespread consensus among scholarsofdemocratic transitions thatpo‐

liticalpartiesplayasignificantroleintheconsolidationofdemocracy(forexample

Morlino1998;Pridham1990;Sandbrook1996).Unsurprisingly, then,asignificant

numberofcomparativestudieshavebeenproducedinrecentyearsthatstudythe

developmentofparties in thedifferent regions thatwerehitby the thirdwaveof

democratisationduringthepastthreedecades.Therearenumerousworksanalys‐

ingpoliticalpartiesinEasternEurope(forexampleKopecký1995;Kostelecký2002;

Lewis 2000), Southern Europe (for example Bosco and Morlino 2006; Diaman‐

dourosandGunther2001;IgnaziandYsmal1998),LatinAmerica(forexampleDix

OLIVERHELLMANN

–122–

1992;Levistky2003;MainwaringandScully1995),andweevenfindcomparisons

ofpartiesacross regions (forexamplevanBiezen2003b).Astoundingly,however,

East Asia, which got caught by the thirdwave in themid‐1980s, has so far been

widelyignoredbypoliticalpartyresearch.18Asamatteroffact,mostoftheveryfew

analysesofEastAsianpartieshavenotbeenwrittenbydistinguishedexperts,but

rather by scholars specialising on single countries. The resulting reports tend to

overlookthemoretheoreticalandmethodologicaldebateswithinthegenerallitera‐

tureonpoliticalparties,insteadfocussingondescriptionandfailingtoapplygener‐

allyacceptedtypologiesorexistingtheories.Whenauthorsmovebeyondapurede‐

scription,explanationstendtoremainlargelycase‐specificwithaverylowlevelof

abstraction.Moreover, scholars do not engage in cross‐national comparisons, but

ratherlockthemselvesintheircountryofspecialisation.

Admittedly, different from the regions that have so far been in the analytical

focusofpoliticalpartyresearch,EastAsiaonlydescribesgeographicalborders,nota

commonculturalandhistoricalheritage. In fact, it is consistentlypointedout that

“Asia”isnomorethanaEuropeaninvention.Nevertheless,thisheterogeneityacross

EastAsiansocietieshasnotpreventedpoliticalscientistsfromtreatingEastAsiaas

asingleregionincomparativestudiesofdemocratisationanddemocraticconsolida‐

tion(seeforexampleCheng2003;Croissant2004;HsiehandNewman2002;Laot‐

hamatas1997).Inotherwords,thereisnoreasontodismissacomparisonofEast 18Thisgeographicaltermoftencausesconfusion.NortheastAsiaisusuallydefinedascomprisingofthefollowingcountries:thePeople’sRepublicofChina,thetwoKoreas,Japan,andTaiwan.SoutheastAsiaencompassesIndochina(Vietnam,Laos,Cambodia,Thailand,Myanmar,Malaysia,andSinga‐pore)aswellasIndonesia,thePhilippines,andEastTimor.TogetherthesetworegionsaretermedEastAsia.


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Asianpoliticalpartiesasnotfeasible.Rather,asystematicanalysisofpoliticalpar‐

tiesinthenewdemocraciesofEastAsiaislongoverdue.

TABLE5: DEMOCRACYINEASTASIA

CountryPoliticalrights

Civilliberties

Averagescore

StatusElectoral

democracy?

Cambodia 6 5 5.5 Notfree noChina 7 6 6.5 Notfree noEastTimor 3 4 3.5 Partlyfree yesIndonesia 2 3 2.5 Free yesJapan 1 2 1.5 Free yesLaos 7 6 6.5 Notfree noMalaysia 4 4 4.0 Partlyfree noMyanmar(Burma) 7 7 7.0 Notfree noNorthKorea 7 7 7.0 Notfree noPhilippines 3 3 3.5 Partlyfree yesSingapore 5 4 4.5 Partlyfree noSouthKorea 1 2 1.5 Free yesTaiwan 2 1 1.5 Free yesThailand 7 4 5.0 Partlyfree noVietnam 7 5 6.0 Notfree no

Notes:Politicalrightsandcivillibertiesratingsrangefrom1to7,with1representingthehighestand7thelowestleveloffreedom.Eachpairofpoliticalrightsandcivillibertiesratingsisaveragedtodetermineanoverallstatusof“free,”“partlyfree,”or“notfree.”Thosewhoseratingsaverage1.0to2.5areconsidered“free”,3.0to5.0“partlyfree”,and5.5to7.0“notfree”.Toqualifyasan“electoraldemocracy”astatemustsatisfythefollowing:(1)amultipartypoliticalsystem,(2)universaladultsuffrage,(3)regularlycontestedelectionsconductedinconditionsofballotsecrecyandintheabsenceofmassivefraud,and(4)publicaccessofmajorpoliticalpartiestotheelectoratethroughthemediaandopenpoliticalcampaigning.Source: FreedomHouse(2007)

TheMarcosregimeonthePhilippineswasthefirsttobewashedawaybythe“third

wave”ofdemocratisationinFebruary1986.Subsequently,democracywasalsoin‐

stalledinTaiwan(1986‐1992),SouthKorea(1987/88),Thailand(1992),Cambodia

(1993),Indonesia(1999)andmostrecentlyEastTimor(2002).However,thedemo‐

cratic system installed inCambodiaby theUnitedNationsonly lasted for a single

OLIVERHELLMANN

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nationalelection,whileThailand,too,revertedtomoreauthoritarianformsofgov‐

ernmentafteramilitarycoup inSeptember2006.Hence, in its2007report,Free‐

domHouse only lists six EastAsian countries as “electoral democracies”: Taiwan,

SouthKorea,Indonesia,thePhilippines,EastTimorandJapan(seeTable5).Thelat‐

ter two,however,willbeexcluded fromthisanalysis: Japanbecause ithasbeena

democracysincetheendoftheSecondWorldWarandisthereforenotcomparable

with“thirdwave”democracies,aspoliticalpartiesformedunderverydifferentcir‐

cumstances;EastTimorbecause ithasonlybeenan independentstatesince2002

andheldlegislativeelectionsonlyonce,inJune2007,meaningthatpartieshavenot

hadenoughtimeyettodevelopanorganisationalapparatus.Wewillthusstudypo‐

litical parties in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia – in a time

framerangingfromthefirstfreeandfairelectionstoDecember2008.19

Forourcaseswewillonlychoosepoliticalpartiesthathavecompetedinthetwo

latestelectionsandhaveobtainedat least threepercentof thevotes in the latest

election.Choosingpartiesaccordingtotheirelectoralsuccessandtheiragedoesnot

constitute a selection bias – as selecting cases on the dependent variable is con‐

sideredhighlyproblematic(Geddes1990)–butitisratheranattempttokeepthe

numberofcasesmanageableandselectcaseswherepartyorganisationalchangeis

actuallypossible.Toexcludeirrelevantcaseswheretheoutcomehasnorealpossi‐

bilityofoccurringisanotherkeyguidelineforselectingcases(MahoneyandGoertz 19Inthe2008FreedomHousereport,thePhilippines’politicalrightsratingdeclinedfrom3to4asaresultofserious,high‐levelcorruptionallegations;thepardonofformerpresidentJosephEstrada;andaspikeinpoliticalkillingsintherun‐uptolegislativeelections.Thecountryisthereforecur‐rentlynotlistedasan“electoraldemocracy”anymore.However,thereisnoneedtoretrospectivelyexcludethePhilippinesfromouranalysis,asthisisonlyarecentdevelopment.


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2004) andwe should thus not include parties in the analysis that are simply too

youngtohaveexperiencedorganisationalchange.Applyingthesetwocriterialeaves

uswith17casessummarisedinTable6.

TABLE6: CASESELECTION

Country Politicalparties

SouthKorea GrandNationalParty(GNP,Hannaradang) UnitedDemocraticParty(UDP,TonghamMinjudang) KoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDLP,MinjuNodongdang)

Taiwan NationalistParty(KMT,Kuomintang) DemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP,Minjindang)

Philippines LiberalParty(LP,PartidoLiberalngPilipinas) NacionalistaParty(NP)a StruggleofDemocraticFilipinos(LDP,LabanngDemokratikongPilipino) NationalistPeople’sCoalition(NPC) PartneroftheFreeFilipino(KAMPI,KabalikatngMalayangPilipino)a FilipinoLakas‐ChristianMuslimDemocrats(Lakas‐CMD)

Indonesia PartyofFunctionalGroups(Golkar,PartaiGolonganKarya) IndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle(PDI‐P,PartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan)

NationalAwakeningParty(PKB,PartaiKebangkitanBangsa) UnitedDevelopmentParty(PPP,PartaiPersatuanPembangunan) ProsperousJusticeParty(PKS,PartaiKeadilanSejahtera)b NationalMandateParty(PAN,PartaiAmanatNasional)

Notes:aForthe2004elections,theNacionalistaPartyandKAMPIjoinedpresidentArroyo’sK‐4coalitionandthereforenoseparateelectionresultswerereportedforthesetwoparties.However,asbothpartiescom‐petedtheelectionstheystillfulfilourcriteriaforcaseselection.bThePKSparticipatedinthefirstfreeelectionsin1999underthenameJusticeParty,butthenhadtochangeitsnamepurelyforlegalreasons.

Overthenextfourchapterswewillapplyourtheoreticalframeworktoeachofthe

four countries listed above, in order to discuss the environmental context, actors’

strategic choices within this context and how electoral strategies translate into

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party organisation. Following these chapters, we will then compare our findings

acrossthecountriesinfinalchaptertoidentifypatternsofconstantassociation.


–127–

–4–

SOUTHKOREA

Thepost‐authoritarianparty system in SouthKorea is dominatedbyhighly elitist

parties,which – similar to the classical cadre party – are characterised by almost

perfect overlapbetween theparty on the ground, the party central office and the

party inpublicoffice,making it verydifficult todistinguish the three faces.At the

sametime,theminorKoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDLP,MinjuNodongdang)

features a strong party central office. However, although this constellation seems

verysimilartopartysystemsin19thcenturyEurope,itisveryunlikelythatKorean

partieswill followthesamepathofdevelopmentastheircounterparts inWestern

Europe.Rather,aswillbeshown,partyorganisationinSouthKoreaistheproductof

actors’strategicdecisionswithinastrategicallyselectivecontext.

OLIVERHELLMANN

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SouthKoreawasdrawnintoauthoritariangovernmentalcontrolintheearly1950s

whentheKoreanWarprovidedthepretexttodemolishthedemocraticsystemthat

theAmericanshadinstalledafterliberatingthepeninsulafrom35yearsofJapanese

colonialismin1945.However,regimecohesionwasnotverystrong,aselitefactions

frequentlyputschedagainsteachother,andshortdemocraticinterludesalternated

with longer periods of autocratic rule. The central pillars of the regimewere the

military,thebureaucracyand–asajuniorpartner–largebusinessconglomerates

(jaebol). Operatingwithin the legalistic frame of a pseudo‐democracy, the regime

tolerated opposition parties, but competition for political offices was subtly cur‐

tailed so the elites’ claim to powerwould not be threatened. The elites sought to

gainlegitimacyfortheirauthoritarianrulebyemphasisingthemilitarythreatposed

byNorthKoreaand–closelyrelated–theneedforeconomicdevelopment.

Inparticular, itshigheconomicefficiencyprovedtobeapowerfulsourceof le‐

gitimacy(seeTable7). Notonlydidtheeconomicstrategyofexport‐orientedind‐

ustrialisation lead to a general improvement of living standards, but profitswere

directlychannelledto individualcitizensthroughclientelisticnetworksconnecting

theregimewiththeelectorate.Theregimemobilisedthefinancialresourcesneces‐

saytonurturetheclientelisticexchangeofparticularisticmaterialgiftsagainstpo‐

liticalsupportthrough“quasi‐taxes”,whichlargebusinesses–particularlythejaebol

–wererequiredtopayforpreferentialtreatmentintheallocationofstatesubsidies,


–129–

public loans, import licenses et cetera (Kang 2002). Payments were organised –

eitherbeforeelectionsasclassicalvote‐buyingorin‐betweenelectionsasirregular

gifts(forexampleforweddingsorfunerals)–throughtheextensivepartyapparatus

oftheregime’sDJP(DemocraticJusticeParty,Minjeongdang).

TABLE7: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTINSOUTHKOREA

GDPpercapita(USDollars)

GiniCoefficientDegreeof

urbanisation(inpercent)

Literacy(inpercent)

SouthKorea 4,467(1988)22,029(2005)

0.400(1988)0.316(2007)

74.4(1990)80.8(2005)

95.5(1990)99.0(2006)

Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)

UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)

Source: UnitedNationsESCAP(undated);UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(undated);Hong(1996)

Interestingly,notonlytheregimemobilisedvotersthroughclientelismbuttheop‐

position, too, employed clientelistic linkage mechanisms to gain votes. However,

giventheirrelativelackofresources,oppositioncandidatescouldnotengageasac‐

tively in the distribution of clientelistic rewards as the regime party’s legislators

(Park1988:1057).20Asaresult,oppositionpoliticianswouldinadditioncampaign

onthedemandforpoliticaldemocratisation,whichiswhytheoppositiontendedto

enjoystrongsupportamongmoreaffluent,bettereducatedurbanvoters,whilethe

regimegainedthemajorityofvotesinruralareas–aphenomenonthatcametobe

20Theoppositiongeneratedtheresourcesnecessaryforaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobilisationthroughtheprivatewealthofitscandidates,privatedonationsandbysecuringpublicinfrastructureprojectsfortheirconstituencies.

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knownasyochonyado(villagesforthegovernment,citiesfortheopposition)(Kim

H.N.1989:487).Confirming the central assumptionofmodernisation theory, eco‐

nomic development had given rise to a new urban middle‐class, which was no

longerwillingtoacceptarestrictionofitsparticipatoryrights.21

Thepro‐democratic oppositionperformedbetter in cities, as the regime’spro‐

grammeforeconomicmodernisationwasprimarilybasedoncheaplabourandre‐

pressive employment laws, causing the income gap between the urban working

classandtherestofthepopulationtowidenaccordingly.In1980,whentheKorean

economy plunged into a deep recession, forcing the government to implement a

rigid adjustment and stabilisation programme, theworking class again felt them‐

selvestobethebigloserduetotheseneweconomicpolicies,and–withthesupport

of students and intellectuals – took its protest to streets (Croissant 1998: 176).22

Finally,itisimportanttomentionthatbytheearly1980s,theregime’sscenarioofa

permanentmilitarythreatfromNorthKoreahadlostmuchofitscredibility(Potter

1997:235).

Confronted with this apparent loss of legitimacy, the regime decided to hold

“nearly” freeand fairelections foranewNationalAssembly in1985, inwhich the

newly formed opposition party NewKorea Democratic Party (NKDP, SinhanMin

judang)undertheleadershipofKimDae‐jungandKimYoung‐samwonasurprising

29.3%ofthevotes.TheNKDPsubsequentlybaseditsstrategyontwoelements:ob‐ 21ForadetaileddescriptionoftheambiguousandcomplexroleofthemiddleclassintheSouthKoreandemocratisationprocessseeKoo(1991).22Themostviolentprotestwastheso‐called“5.18Uprising”insouth‐westernGwangjuwhen,afteramassrallyon15May1980,demonstratorstookcontrolofthecity.Theregimeansweredafewdayslaterwiththedeploymentofelitetroops,leavinghundredsdeadandthousandsinjured.


–131–

structive opposition in parliament and – in alliancewith other pro‐reformmove‐

ments –mass public demonstrations (Cheng andKim 1994: 136). Eventually, the

increasing political pressure forced the regime to invite the opposition tomutual

talks on constitutional reforms. When these negotiations failed after only a few

months,theoppositioncampmobilisedlargepartsoftheurbanpopulation.Thisleft

the regimewith the choice ofwhether to return tomore violent repression or to

continue along the path of liberalisation. However, political pressure from the

United States, which in the late 1980s abandoned its policy of supporting anti‐

communistregimesevenagainstthewilloftheircitizens,plusSeoul’shostingofthe

1988OlympicGames–whichmovedSouthKoreaintothespotlightofinternational

attention–benefitedthesoft‐linerswithintheregime.Hence,inJune1987,there‐

gimeacceptedmostoftheopposition’sdemands,andresumedthenegotiationsover

constitutionalreform.

Thus,thetransformationofSouthKorea’smilitary‐bureaucraticautocracyintoa

politicalsystemwithfreeandfairelectionstookplacethroughaprocessofbargain‐

ingbetweentheregimeandthedemocraticopposition.Bythemid‐1980sbothsides

werelockedinanuneasystalematethatcouldonlybebrokenthroughanegotiated

compromise(Saxer2002:54‐61).Asaresultofthis,bothactorswereabletocon‐

tinue their clientelistic strategiesofvotermobilisation, aswillbedescribed in the

nextsection.

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Actorsandtheirstrategies

The1990shavebeendescribedbyobserversofKoreanpoliticsasthe“threeKims”

era, as electionsweredominatedby threepoliticianswith the same family name:

KimYoung‐sam,KimDae‐jung andKim Jong‐pil. The two largest parties inKorea

today are the final product of strategic games played by these highly charismatic

politicians:While theGrandNationalParty(GNP,Hannaradang) isstrongly linked

toearlierpartiesundertheleadershipofKimYoung‐sam(DLPandNKP),theUnited

DemocraticParty(UDP,TonghamMinjudang)isthelastlinkinalongchainofpar‐

ties that harboured politicians loyal to Kim Dae‐jung (PPD, DP, NCNP, MDP, Uri

Party,UNDP).KimJong‐pil’sparty,theULD,ontheotherhand,lostnearlyallsignifi‐

canceinthe2004NationalAssemblyelection,whenitonlywonfourparliamentary

seatsandevenKimJong‐pilhimself failedtosecureamandate.Asaresultof this,

threeof thenewly‐elected lawmakers left theparty to formthePeopleFirstParty

(PFP,GungminJungsimdang),whiletheonlyremainingassemblymandecidedtojoin

theGNPin2006.23Theonlyotherrelevantpartythatwasnotfoundedshortlybe‐

fore the 2008National Assembly election is the KoreanDemocratic Labour Party

(KDLP)–establishedin2000.

23In2008,thePFPwasthenabsorbedbythenewlyfoundedLibertyForwardPartyledbyLeeHoi‐chang,who,afterleavingtheGNP,hadrunasanindependentcandidateinthe2007presidentialelec‐tions,finishingthird.


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Theeraofthe“threeKims”

The strongest party to emerge out of the 1988 elections was the former regime

party,theDJP(DemocraticJusticeParty,Minjeongdang),whichwasnotsurprising,

giventhatthepro‐democracymovementhadsplitintwo.Alreadyduringtheconsti‐

tution talks,KimDae‐jungandKimYoung‐samsplit away from theNKDP to form

the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, Tongil Minjudang). Only a few months

later,KimDae‐jung established theParty forPeace andDemocracy (PPD,Pyeong

mindang)inordertocompeteinthe1987presidentialelections.Yetanotheroppo‐

sitionpartywas foundedbyKimJong‐pil,whohadservedasprimeminister from

1971to1975–theNDRP(NewDemocraticRepublicanParty,Sinminjudang).

When, ina surprisingmove in1990,KimYoung‐sammergedhisRDPwith the

former regime party DJP to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP,Minjadang),

thisheraldedtheeraofthe“threeKims”.Atthesametime,themergerbetweenthe

two parties meant the end of the democracy‐authoritarianism cleavage. Instead,

coming fromdifferent regions, the threeKimsmercilessly overplayed the existing

rivalries between their home regions, thereby turning regional identities into the

most important factor to explain voting behaviour throughout the 1990s (Sonn

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–134–

2003).24Initially,thevoteinthesouth‐easternregionofYongnamwasdividedbe‐

tweenKimYoung‐samandRohTae‐woo,theleaderoftherulingDJP,whohadhis

familyrootsinthesameregion.However,whenbothpoliticiansmergedtheirpar‐

tiesin1990tobecometheDLP,theycreatedamonopolyofregionalrepresentation

by the “threeKims” throughwhicheachof theKimswasguaranteed the fullelec‐

toralsupportfromtheirrespectivehomeregion.Thisreflectsintheeffectivenumber

of political parties, which throughout the 1990s hovered around the three‐party

mark(seeTable8).

TABLE8: SOUTHKOREA–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORS

ENEPa ENPPb Volatility

1988 3.87 3.34 ‐1992 2.96 2.37 95.151996 3.51 2.83 77.252000 2.81 2.30 80.802004 3.17 2.32 51.352008 4.36 2.92 55.60Average 3.45 2.68 72.03

Notes:aEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiesinelectionstotheNationalAssembly.After2004,whenasecondvotewasintroducedtoelectapartyontheclosedpartylist,thenumberiscalculatedontheshareofvotespartiesreceivedinthesingle‐memberconstituencies.bEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesintheNationalAssembly.Source: Author’sowncalculationsbasedonTable9.

24WhileKimYoung‐samisfromYongnam,locatedinthesoutheastoftheKoreanpeninsula,Kim

Dae‐junghashisfamilyrootsinthesouth‐westernregionofHonam.KimJong‐pil,finally,mobilisedmostofhisvotersintheChungchongregiontothenorthofHonam.AlthoughthesethreeregionsdoonlyrepresentapartoftheKoreanelectorate,anunknownnumberofvoterslivinginotherpartsofthecountry in their thirdor fourthgeneration tended tovoteaccording theregional rootsof theirregionalfamilybackground.


–135–

Theconflictbetweenthesouth‐westernandsouth‐easternpartoftheKoreanpenin‐

sulaclearlyhas its roots in theunequal socio‐economicdevelopmentbetween the

regions(KimW.B.2003).25However,afterthedemocratictransition,theeconomic

aspectoftheregionalconflictlostmuchofitssignificance.Instead,regionalismbe‐

camemainlydrivenbytheregionaloriginofcandidates,asrecentresearchshows

that post‐authoritarian governments allocated state resources evenly to their re‐

spectivehomeregionandtheopposition’sregion(HoriuchiandLee2008).

WhilethecharismaofthethreeKimswasthusonestrategypartiesreliedonto

mobilise voters, clientelism was the other. Although Kim Dae‐jung would not be

electedintogovernmentuntil1997,hestillattractedasubstantialamountofcorpo‐

rate–mostlyundeclared–donations(ThorntonandKorvick2003:282).Asinthe

governingparty, thismoneywasthenchannelledtocandidatestobuildandmain‐

tainclientelisticlinkagestovoters.Typicalactivitiestostrengthentheloyaltywithin

theseclientelisticnetworksrangedfromofferingcondolencesatfunerals,tomaking

giftsatweddings,toplacingsupportersinjobs,to

intercedingwiththepoliceorcourts for favorabletreatmentand inthe

caseoflegislatorswhoarelawyers,pleadingbeforethecourtonbehalfof

constituents; helping to obtain business licenses, permits, or registra‐ 25SoutheasternYongnam,homeregionofformermilitarydictatorsParkChung‐hee(1961‐1979)andChunDoo‐hwan(1980‐1988),wasthepreferredtargetforlargeindustrialandinfrastructuralpro‐jectsduringtheperiodofstate‐ledeconomicmodernisationinthe1960sand1970s.SouthwesternHonam,ontheotherhand,remainedlargelyexcludedfromtheKoreaneconomicmiracle,keepingitslargelyagriculturallybasedeconomy.Moreover,duringtheauthoritarianregimetheeconomicandpoliticalelitewasmainlyrecruitedfromYongnam,whileHonam–comparedtoitspopulationsize–sufferedfromseriousunderrepresentation.

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tions through administrative agencies; helping to get promotions and

transfersinpublicorprivateagencies;providingassistanceinobtaining

bankloansorinsecuringrelieffundsandawiderangeofcompensations

foraccidents,planningandzoningprojects,shoddyworkbyconstruction

companies, industrial pollution, and so on; making financial donations

and contributions, such as those to assist constituents with living ex‐

penses,children'sschoolexpenses,andlocalfestivals;andhelpingtore‐

solveconstituents'taxdisputeswiththerevenueoffice.

(Park1988:1059)

Asaresultoftheircharismaandtheircontrolovereffectiveclientelisticnetworks,

the three Kims – Kim Young‐sam, Kim Dae‐jung and Kim Jong‐pil –more or less

sharedthetotalnationalvotebetweenthemthroughoutthe1990sandweretheall

dominating players in the post‐autocratic party system. Beforewithdrawing from

thepolitical stage, the threeKimsaltogether established tenpolitical parties:Kim

Young‐samthree,KimDae‐jungfourandKimJong‐pilthree.Theysawtheirparties

merelyasfunctionalvehiclestogainaccesstopower,creating,dissolving,merging

andrenamingthemasitsuitedtheirpersonalinterests(KimB.‐K.2000:60;Heoand

Stockton2005:685).This strategicgame the threeKimsplayedwith theirparties

translatedintoextremelyhighelectoralvolatilityfiguresinthe1990s(seeTable8).


–137–

TABLE9: SOUTHKOREA–RESULTSFORNATIONALASSEMBLYELECTIONS

1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008Party

Va Sb V S V S V S V S V S

DJP 34.0 41.8 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐RDP 23.8 19.7 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PPD 19.3 23.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NDRP 15.6 11.7 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐DP(1) 1.3 0.3 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐DLP ‐ ‐ 38.5 49.8 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐DP(2) ‐ ‐ 29.2 32.4 11.2 5.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐UPP ‐ ‐ 17.4 10.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NPRP ‐ ‐ 1.8 0.3 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PP ‐ ‐ 1.5 0.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NKP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 34.5 46.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NCNP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 25.3 26.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ULD ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 16.2 16.7 9.8 6.2 2.8 1.6 ‐ ‐NPUPP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.9 0.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐GNP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 39.0 48.7 35.8 41.1 37.4 51.2MDP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 35.9 42.1 7.1 2.1 ‐ ‐DPP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 3.7 0.7 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐Uri ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 38.3 53.1 ‐ ‐KDLP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 13.0 0.8 5.6 1.7UDP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 25.1 27.1ProPark ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 13.1 4.7LFP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 6.8 6.0CKP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 3.8 1.0Other 6.1 3.0 11.6 7.0 11.8 5.4 11.7 2.2 3.0 1.2 8.2 8.3

Notes:aShareofvotes(inpercent)bShareofseats(inpercent)Source: Croissant(2001);PsephosElectionArchive(undated)

BelowtheKims,factionleaderscompetedforthepartypresident‘sfavour,without

everacquiringenoughpowertoseriouslychallengetheKims.Factionsdidnotde‐

velophighlevelsofinstitutionalisation,andalldecisionsweremadebythefaction

leader. Factional coherence among the clearly identifiable members was mainly

basedonpatron‐clientelismratherthansharedideologicalinterests(Yun1994).In

otherwords,partieswere largeclientelisticnetworkswith theparty leaderas the

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highestpatron,who–duetothefactthehecouldbesureoftheexclusiveelectoral

supportfromhisrespectivehomeregion–couldtakeallsignificantorganisational

decisionswithouttheinterferenceofotheractorswithintheparty.

Theenvironmentalcontext inKoreaduringthe1990sfavouredtheclientelistic

strategies of the three Kims for several reasons. First of all, as to be expected in

“third wave” democracies, the conditions for the electoral mobilisation of social

classesbasedon ideologywerebad,meaning thatpoliticianscampaigningonpro‐

grammaticappealsdidnotposeaseriouselectoralchallenge.Mostimportantly,the

virulentanti‐communismoftheoutgoingautocraticregimehadpreventedsocialist

orsocial‐democraticparties fromforming(KangW.T.1998),while thebanon the

formationofindependenttradeunions–whichstayedinplaceuntil2002–meant

thatworkerswerenotorganisedoutsidethestatecorporatiststructures.Thismade

itverydifficulttomobilisethesegroups.Instead,thethreeKimswereabletoturn

the regional conflict between the south‐eastern and south‐westernparts ofKorea

intothemostimportantelectoralcleavage.Secondly,boththeoldregimeelitesand

the pro‐democratic opposition successfully transferred the clientelistic networks

theyhadbeenusingintheregime’spseudo‐electionsintothenewdemocraticarena.

Althoughtheprocessofexport‐ledindustrialisationhadresultedinadramaticim‐

provement of living standards for the general population, patron‐client relation‐

ships had become embeddedwithin social life and thus continued to play an im‐

portantroleinthevoters’electoraldecision.Andthirdly,independentfromtheen‐

vironmentalcontext,thethreeKimsradiatednaturalcharisma,therebyactingasa


–139–

magnetforvotesanddonations.

Thepost‐Kimspartysystem

Poweronlybecamemoreevenly spreadamongotherpoliticianswithin themajor

politicalpartiesoncetheKimsleftthepoliticalarena.WhenKimYoung‐sam’sterm

as president came to an end in 1997, his influencewithinhis ownparty declined

steeply,ashewouldnolongerbeabletodistributestateresourcesandpatronageto

his supporters in return for loyalty. Instead, influential factions grouped around

otherpresidentialhopefuls,withLeeHoi‐chang,whohadservedasprimeminister

underKimYoung‐sam,eventuallyemergingastheprimusinterparesandtheparty’s

presidentialcandidatein1997.26

Similarly, as Kim Dae‐jung’s presidency was reaching the constitutional five‐

yearlimit,hebeganlosingauthoritywithintheMDP.Finally,afterheresignedfrom

thepartychairmanship in2001(to focushisenergiesonhis lastmonthsaspresi‐

dent), a number of corruption scandals and a disastrous defeat in the 2001 by‐

election, a number of young reform‐minded politicians emerged as a new force

within theMDP. Themost significant figureswere Chun Jung‐bae, Shin Ki‐nam –

26Theauthorowesmuchoftheinformationaboutthedevelopmentofinter‐factionalconflictwithinKoreanpartiescontainedinthisandthefollowingparagraphstopersonalcommunicationwithJin‐MinChung(16Apriland23April2008)andWookKim(17April2008).

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bothhumanrights lawyers–andChungDong‐young, a formerTV‐anchorman.All

threepoliticianshadbeennominatedbyKimDae‐jungascandidates for the1996

National Assembly election to give the party a younger image. The faction led by

these politicians (commonly known in Korea as Chun‐Shin‐Chung) rallied behind

RohMoo‐hyunwhowasnominatedastheMDP’scandidateforthe2002presiden‐

tialelectionandthendefeatedLeeHoi‐changoftheGNPbyasmallmargin.

After thisdefeat,reform‐mindedpoliticiansalsogainedmorepowerwithinthe

GNP–albeittoamuchlesserextentthanintheMDP–eventuallyforcingLeeHoi‐

changtostepdownaspartypresident.ChoeByung‐yul,againaratherconservative

politician, was elected as his successor in 2003. However, the progressive camp

more or less restored the balance of power only a few days later when reform‐

oriented Hong Sa‐duk became the party’s floor leader in the National Assembly.

Amidcontinuingdemandsforpartyreform,Choe’spresidencyonlylastedforafew

months. InMarch2004,hewasreplacedbyParkGeun‐hye.Being thedaughterof

ex‐dictatorParkChung‐hee,Parkenjoyedstrongsupportamongconservativeforces

within the GNP, while her corruption‐free image also pleased more progressive

thinkers.Shewasthereforeapartypresidentacceptabletobothsides.

Meanwhile,intheMDP,themovementaroundChun‐Shin‐Chungwasverydisap‐

pointedbythemerelymarginalsupportthepartyshowedfornewlyelectedpresi‐

dentRohMoo‐hyunandthus,inSeptember2003,splitawayfromtheMDPtoform

theYeollinUridang(generallyabbreviatedtoUriParty,“ourparty”). Inadditionto

42 of the MDP’s 103 lawmakers, this newly established party also attracted five


–141–

legislatorsoftheGNP.Moreover,itabsorbedtheReformPartyundertheleadership

ofYuSi‐minthathademergedoutofRohSaMo–themasssocialmovementuniting

supportersofRohMoo‐hyuninthe2002election.TheYuSi‐mingroupsoonestab‐

lisheditselfasthedominantfactionintheUriParty:Asthemostferventsupporters

ofRohtheyprofitedenormouslyfromRoh’shighpopularityratingsduringtheearly

stagesofhispresidency–morethananyothergroupingwithintheUriParty.

In the GNP, factions again began to form around presidential hopefuls. While

ParkGeun‐hye–withherelectionasthepartychairmanin2004–hadestablished

herselfasoneofthem,LeeMyung‐bak,themayorofSeoul,slowlyascendedasher

maincompetitor.Thetwopoliticiansrepresentverydifferentgroupingswithinthe

GNP:Parkhasthesupportoftheolderguardofpoliticianswithconstituenciesinthe

GNP’s traditional stronghold in the southeast of theKoreanpeninsula; Lee enjoys

thebackingofmoreprogressiveassemblymenfromSeoulandtheprovincesaround

Seoul. LeeMyung‐bak seems to havewon the power struggle for now, as hewas

nominated as the GNP’s presidential candidate for the 2007. However, as several

Parksupporters,whohadlefttheGNPshortlyaftertofoundthePro‐ParkAlliance,

wereabletowinparliamentaryseatsinthe2008NationalAssemblyelections,Park

is seen bymany as the actualwinner of the latest elections,whichwill definitely

strengthenherpositionwithintheGNP.

TheUriPartyalsowitnessedamajorreshuffleofinternalpowerbeforethe2007

presidentialelections.AfterpresidentRoh’spopularitydroppeddramatically–lead‐

ingtoaseriesofhumiliatingdefeatsfortheUriPartyinthe2005by‐elections–the

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Yu Si‐min faction’s power within the party decreased simultaneously. Finally, as

politicianswantedtodistancethemselvesfromRohasfaraspossibleinordernotto

jeopardisetheirchancesinthe2007and2008elections,80outof152lawmakersof

the Uri Party left the party to establish the UNDP in August 2007. Factions soon

groupedaroundthosepoliticianswithgoodchancesofwinningtheparty’snomina‐

tionasthepresidentialcandidate:theaforementionedChungDong‐young,SonHak‐

gyu (the former governor of Gyeonggi‐dowho had joined the UNDPwith a small

group of progressive politicians from the GNP) and Lee Hae‐chan (former prime

minister under RohMoo‐hyun). Chungwon the party’s nomination, butwas then

defeatedinalandslidebyLeeMyung‐bak.Beforethe2008NationalAssemblyelec‐

tion, theUNDPwasmergedwith theDP– thesuccessorof theMDP– to formthe

UDP,withSonHak‐gyuelectedasitschairman.

Inshort,afterdepartureofthethreeKims,conflictarosewithinbothofthepar‐

tiesbetweenoldpartyelitesandyoungerpoliticians.As theseyoungerpoliticians

werenotembeddedintotheexistingclientelisticstructurestheyhadtodevelopdif‐

ferentstrategiesinordertobeelectedintooffice.Theydidsobyreintroducingeco‐

nomicincentivesintotheregionalcleavageandextendingregionalismtootherparts

oftheKoreanpeninsula.Infact,accordingtoHyeokYongKwon,oneoftheleading

experts on electoral behaviour in Korea, economic voting and the distribution of

pork have become the most important factors to explain voting in national elec‐

tions.27OneexampleforthisrecenttrendisLeeMyung‐bak’spromiseinthe2007

27PersonalcommunicationwithHyeokYongKwon,7April2008.


–143–

presidential election to use public funds to turn Seoul’s greenbelt into amassive

housingprogramme, therebyproviding investment opportunities for voters in his

homeconstituency.28Putinmoreabstractterms,becausetheseyoungerpoliticians

lackprivateresourcestoestablishpatron‐clientrelationships,theyareusingpublic

goodstomobilisevoters.Theydosonotinalegalgreyzonebutthroughthelawful

distributionofporkbarrelprogrammes.Thisrepresentsanotabledeparture from

earlierclientelisticstrategiesandthusconfirmsoneofthecentraltenetsofourana‐

lyticalframework,thatsocialactorsareabletodevelopalternativestrategieswithin

thesamecontext.

However,whilethesestrategiesdonotdiffercategoricallyfromthestrategically

selectedoutcome,astheyarestillclientelisticinnature,realdisparitiesbecomeob‐

vious when looking into the Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP), which is

populatedwith actors campaigning onprogrammatic electoral appeals. TheKDLP

emergedoutof thepro‐democraticstudentmovement,whichhadalwaysbeendi‐

vided into twomain streams: theNationalLiberationand thePoliticalDemocracy

factions.TheNationalLiberation’smainpoliticalaimwasthereunificationofKorea

and – strongly influencedbyNorthKorea’s Juche ideology – the realisationof au‐

tonomy of the Korean nation fromUS imperialism,while the Political Democracy

factionwerefollowersoftraditionalMarxist‐Leninist ideasandthusputmoreem‐

phasisontheliberationoftheworker,asopposedtotheliberationofthenation.Ac‐

cordingly, both streams also differed in their strategies: Whereas the National

28TheauthorisverymuchindebtedtoEun‐JeungLeeforpointingoutthisexample(personalcom‐munication,15April2008).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–144–

Liberationstressedparticipationintheregularpoliticalprocessandsoughttobuild

a“unitedfront”ofallKoreansthatwouldalsoincludethemiddleclass,thePolitical

Democracygrouptookaclass‐basedapproachthatonlyaimedatimprovingthepo‐

sitionoftheworkingclassthroughorganisingstrikesanddemonstrations.However,

withthefoundingoftheKoreanConfederationofTradeUnions(KCTU)in1995,the

PoliticalDemocracymovement slowly adopted amore participatory strategy, and

soonjoinedtheNationalLiberation’seffortstoestablishanindependentprogress‐

ive party that could successfully competewith the existing parties created by the

threeKims.

Finally,cooperationbetweenthetwogroupsendedinthefoundingoftheKDLP

inJanuary2000.WhiletheKDLPdefinesitsconstituencyasincludingfarmers,small

businessentrepreneurs, theurbanpoor,women, thedisabled,youth,studentsand

concernedintellectuals,itisprimarilyapartythatseekstorepresentKorea’swork‐

ing class (Gray 2008: 119). The party’s electoral breakthrough came in the 2002

localelections,inwhichitreceived8.3%ofthevotes.Then,in2004,tenKDLPcan‐

didates were elected into the National Assembly, making the KDLP the country’s

thirdlargestparty.However,analysesofthe2004electionsshowthatthepartywas

notverysuccessful ingaining thesupportof its coreconstituency,butmostvotes

seems to have been “protest votes”, which suggests that mobilising the Korean

workingclassisstillaverydifficulttask(LeeandLim2006:328).Infact,theKDLP

wasunabletorepeatitssuccessinthe2008elections,whenitonlywonfivelegisla‐

tiveseats.


–145–

AstheNationalLiberationhadbeenthedrivingforcebehindthefoundingofthe

KDLP itwas initially thedominant factionwithin theparty.However, thecontinu‐

ationofKimDae‐jung’ssunshinepolicythroughRohMoo‐hyun–finallyleadingto

aneight‐pointpeaceagreementbetweenSouthandNorthKoreainOctober2007–

madeitdifficultfortheNationalLiberationtojustifytheKDLP’scontinuingstrong

focusontherelationswiththecommunistregimeinthenorth.Hence,thePolitical

Democracyfactionwasstrengthened,andforthefirsttimeintheparty’shistoryfac‐

tionalfissuresbecamevisibletothepublic,whentheparty’snominationprocessfor

the2007presidentialelectionturnedintoaracebetweenKwonYoung‐ghilfromthe

NationalLiberation factionandShimSang‐jeong fromthePoliticalDemocracy fac‐

tion.WhenKwonwonthenomination,severalmembersofthePoliticalDemocracy

faction,includingShim,lefttheKDLPtofoundtheNewProgressiveParty(NPP).

Tosumup,thepost‐autocraticcontextinSouthKoreaclearlyfavoursclientelistic

over programmatic electoral strategies. Both old regime elites and the pro‐

democratic opposition were able tomaintain their clientelistic networks through

thedemocratic transition, and– although the socio‐economic conditions thatpro‐

videdthebreedinggroundforthesenetworkshavelargelydisappeared–thedistri‐

bution of clientelistic rewards still plays an important role when accounting for

votingbehaviourinKorea.Inrecentyears,youngerpoliticianshaveemergedwithin

themajorparties,challengingtheoldguardsandtheirclientelisticnetworks.Lack‐

ing the resources to maintain similar networks, these younger politicians have

introducedeconomicincentivesintotheregionalcleavagethroughtheallocationof

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–146–

publicgoodstotheirownconstituencies.However,whilethis iscertainlyaninter‐

estingcasetostudystrategiccalculations,themoststrikingevidenceforactorsbe‐

ingabletodevelopalternativestrategieswithinthesamecontextistobefoundin

theKDLP,wherefactionsarecampaigningonnarrowlyfocusedprogrammaticplat‐

forms–somethingweshouldtheoreticallynotexpectinyoungdemocraciesofthe

“thirdwave”.

Partyorganisation

Basedon thedifferentelectoralstrategiespoliticalactorspursue inSouthKorea–

clientelistic andprogrammatic –we should expect a similar diversity of party or‐

ganisations. In fact, as will be seen in the following sections, the parties of Kim

Young‐samandKimDae‐jungservedmerelyasformalcloakstocovertheirexten‐

sivepatron‐clientnetworks,makingitverydifficulttodistinguishbetweenthethree

faces of party organisation. This is still true for the twomajor parties today, but

younger politicians have successfully pushed for a formal regulation of candidate

selection,makingtheprocesslessdependentonmoneyandotherresources.Incon‐

trast,intheKDLP,wherepoliticiansfollowprogrammaticstrategiesforvotermobi‐

lisation, the three faces of party organisation are clearly distinguishable,with the

partycentralofficeenjoyingthemostpowerfulposition.


–147–

Membership

Politicalparties inSouthKoreaportraythemselvesas largemembershiporganisa‐

tionsbasedondensenetworksoflocalbranchesthatcoverthewholecountry.For

instance, in his analysis of party institutionalisation in neo‐democratic Korea,

Köllner (2003:7) cites a longerpassage fromaGNPbrochure, inwhich theparty

triestoconveytheimpressionthatitsmembersareintegratedintoacomplexorga‐

nizational hierarchy,which gives everymember the possibility of participating in

theinternaldecision‐makingoftheparty:

TheGrandNationalParty(HannaraParty)consistsof theCentralParty

(PartyHq),16City&ProvincialChaptersand253districtpartieseachof

whichhasasecretariat.[…]Thecity&provincialconventionconsistsof

150to300representatives.Itperformssuchfunctionsaselectingrepre‐

sentatives for theNationalconvention,operating thecommitteesof the

CentralCommittee,choosingthechairmenofcity&provincialchapters,

deliberatingonmattersrecommendedbythedistrictparty,andsubmit‐

ting recommendations of every kind to Central Party. […] The district

conventionconsistsof100to150representatives.Itperformssuchfunc‐

tionsaschoosingthechairmenofdistrictchapters,electingrepresenta‐

tives for the National Convention, and submitting recommendations of

everykindtoCentralParty.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–148–

However, inreality, the localbranchesofpoliticalparties inKoreaareusually just

the personal politicalmachine of the assemblyman or candidate in the respective

constituency. The formal local party chapter only serves as a cloak for the politi‐

cian’spersonalnetworkof supporters at thegrassroots level.Thesenetworksare

thetruesourceofpoliticalidentityforpartymembers.Peopledonotjointhelocal

partyorganisationbecause they share theparty’s ideologicalpositionsorbecause

they feel theybelong toadistinctivesocialgrouping. Instead, “thedistrictparty is

based[…]onpersonalandparticularisticbondsbetweenapoliticalbossandfollow‐

ers”(Park1988:1051).Hence,partymembersareusuallyrecruitedamongfriends

and relatives of the local political boss, or they join because they are otherwise

sociallyconnectedtotheboss,suchasthroughschooltiesorregionalprovenance.

Moreover,partymembershipnetworksareheldtogetherbytheboss’provisionof

particularisticbenefitsandfavoursinreturnforelectoralsupport.

Thestatusofthelocalpartybranchasanautonomousmembershiporganisation

fromthepartycentralatthenationallevelisfurtherreinforcedbythefactthatthe

membership register is kept by the district chapter chairprivately, not by the re‐

gionalbranchofficially.29Thepoliticalbossthushasexclusiveaccesstoallmember‐

shipdata,whichmeansthatanyeffectivecommunicationbetweenthepartyhead‐

quarters and the individualmemberwill be dependent on the boss’ cooperation.

Thepowerfulpositionoftheassemblymanorcandidatewasfurtherstrengthenedin

2004,whenanamendmenttothePartyLawActabolishedtherequirementforpar‐

29PersonalcommunicationwithYong‐HoKim,12April2008.


–149–

ties to be based on a dense network of local party chapters.30 Although themain

purposeofthisamendmentwastolowertheexpensesforpoliticalpartiesinorder

toreducetheneedtoacceptillegaldonations,localbosseshavefoundwaystomain‐

tain the institutionalisationof their personal networkswithoutparty funding. For

instance,workthatwaspreviouslydonebyfull‐timepartystaff, isnowoftendele‐

gatedtofriendsandfamilyortoemployeesintheboss’ownprivatecompany.31In

otherwords, thepersonalnetworksofsupportersofassemblymenandcandidates

arenowestablishedastheparties’grassrootsorganisation,aspoliticalpartiesonly

haveofficialrepresentationattheprovinciallevel.

Outsidetheformalpartyorganisationeverylegislatormaintainsotherinformal

vote‐gatheringmachinesthatdonotfunctionundertheofficialbanneroftheparty.

These so‐called sajojik can take different forms. Some common examples include

friendshipsocieties,clangroups,alumnigroups,hikingclubs,andotherrecreation

groups.Usually, the assemblymandoesnotdirectly influence theoperationof the

informalgroupsaffiliatedwithhimorher,andwillonlyactastheirsponsorandad‐

visor.Inthecaseoflong‐servingparliamentarians,thesajojikarecharacterizedbya

certaindegreeof stability,but theyhaveneverachieved the same levelof institu‐

tionalisationasthepersonalvote‐gatheringmachinesfoundinneighbouringJapan

30Upuntil2004Articles25and26ofthePartyLawActrequiredpoliticalpartiestohavedistrictof‐ficesinatleastone‐tenthoftheelectoraldistrictsandfiveofthesevenmainmetropolitanareas.Dis‐trictbrancheshadtoconsistofatleast30members.31OneexamplegivenbyHeikeHermanns(personalcommunicationwiththeauthor,16April2008)isthecaseofaGNPcandidateinthe2008NationalAssemblyelection,whoturnedherEnglishlan‐guageschoolintothevirtuallocalpartybranch,withmembersofstaffhavingtohelpoutwiththeorganisationofthecampaignandotheradministrativework.Insuchcasesmoneyisusuallypaidunderthetable,oremployeesarecompensatedwithagiftorafreemeal.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–150–

(koenkai) (Köllner 2003: 8).32 Regarding membership, it must be noted that al‐

thoughtherecanbehighpersonaloverlapbetweentheformalpartybranchandthe

sajojik,membersofthelatterdonotautomaticallybecomeformalpartymembers.

A slightly different type of support organisation to the sajojik emerged in the

run‐uptothe2002presidentialelection,whenfollowersofRohMoo‐hyunusedthe

internet to forma fanclub,knownasRohSaMo (literally,gatheringof thepeople

wholoveRoh).Thisvirtualsupportgroupattractedalotofattention,mostlyfrom

youngervoters,who–disillusionedwiththeoldstyleofpolitics–cametogetheron

thewebtodebatepolicyissuesandmobilisevotesforRoh–ahumanrightslawyer

andformanyarealalternativetotheoldguardofpoliticians.Asthisonlinenetwork

ofsupportersprovedtobeanimportantpoolofvotersbehindRoh’selectoralsuc‐

cess(WalkerandKang2004:843),similarwebsitesmushroomedbeforethe2004

NationalAssembly.Thistime,however,fanwebsiteswerecreatedontheinitiative

ofthecandidates–notbythesupportersthemselves–whotriedtoattractvisitors

withonlinegames,personalblogs,videosandothercontents.Sincethen,however,

thevirtualnetworksofsupportershavedramaticallydeclinedinimportance,since

the new Election Law revised in 2004 stipulates that internet portals should not

post any content,which supports or opposes a political party or a candidate 180

daysbeforetheelection(Article93). In fact, in the2007presidentialelectionsthe

internethardlyplayedanyroleatall(WooandLee2008).

32ForadetailedanalysisoftheJapanesekoenkaiseeBouissou(1999).


–151–

Althoughthereisthusaformalconceptofpartymembershipthatdistinguishes

partymembers fromordinarycitizens, it seemsabitmisleading to speakofparty

membership, as voters join parties through their personal loyalty to the local as‐

semblymanorcandidate.Moreover,thecriteriathatdefinepartymembersarevery

limited.PartiesusuallyrefertothePoliticalPartyAct,whichstatesthatanyperson

olderthan19years(20yearsupuntil2005)mayjoinaparty–withtheexceptionof

publicofficials,whichincludedmostteachers,and,upuntil2000,labour‐unionfunc‐

tionaries. In addition, membership fees are relatively low and generally not en‐

forced.Forexample,therulesofKimYoung‐sam’sNKP(1995‐1997)prescribedthat

partymembers should pay at least 1,000KRW (about 0.50GBP) (KimY.H. 1998:

145). The successor party of the NKP, the GNP, charges 2,000 KRW per month,

whichmembersare, again,notobliged topay33,while theUDPdoesnot specify a

fixedsum,butmemberscanmakeavoluntarycontribution34.Inotherwords,join‐

ingeitherofthesepartiesonlyrequiresfillinginamembershipform.Whatismore,

cases have been reported when people were even signed up as party members

withouttheirownknowledge.35Thiscommonlyhappenswhentheheadofavolun‐

tarysocialorganisationhasstrongpersonalconnectionstoalocalbossandsimply

transfersthemembersofhisorherorganisationintothepartymembershipregis‐

ter.

33PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.34PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.35PersonalcommunicationwithEun‐JeungLee,15April2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–152–

TheonlymajorpoliticalpartyinSouthKoreathatattacheshigherrequirements

topartymembership is theKDLP.36 Inordertobegranted fullpartymembership,

individuals must pay a monthly fee that ranges from 5,000 KRW (2.50 GBP) for

thosewithout a regular income (i.e. students, housewives, senior or disabled citi‐

zens)to10,000KRW(5GBP)foreverybodyelse.Moreover,inadditiontosigninga

declaration, saying that they will adhere to the party statutes, aspiringmembers

needtoattendanintroductorylecturetofamiliarisethemwiththeparty’spolicies

anddecision‐makingstructures.IncontrasttotheothermajorpartiesinKorea,the

KDLP keeps amembership register at the party central office, with two full‐time

membersofstaff responsiblesolely for themaintenanceof theregister.TheKDLP

alsodistinguishesitselffromitscompetitorsinthatitsmembersareorganisedinto

150genuinepartybranchesacrossthecountry,eachwithlocalorganisationatthe

neighbourhoodorworkplacelevel.UnlikeinotherKoreanparties,thelocalchapters

areorganisedbythepartyasanorganisation,notbyalocalbossashisorherper‐

sonalmachine.

In2004, thenewly foundedUriParty experimentedwith the introductionof a

membershipmodelsimilartotheoneofKDLP,tryingtoenforceregularduesamong

itsmembers.Initially,themonthlymembershipfeewassetto8,000KRW(4GBP),

butover thenextmonths itwascontinuously reduced to6,000and then to2,000

KRW,beforefinallydroppingtheobligationofaregularfinancialcontributioncom‐

pletely.ThestatutesofUriPartyhadoriginallyalsostipulatedthatpartymembers

36TheinformationinthisparagraphwasobtainedthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.


–153–

shouldattendat leastonepartymeetingamonth,butaswiththemembershipfee

thisrequirementwassoonabandoned.37Clearly,thesemeasurestomaketheparty

membership less inclusive reflect the strategic calculationsof thedominantYuSi‐

mingroupwithintheUriParty,whichcontainedlargenumbersofferventRohMoo‐

hyunsupporters.

TheKDLPalsodiffersfromthetwoolderpartiesregardingmembershipactivity.

InboththeUDPandtheGNP–andintheirrespectiveparentparties–membersare

usually dormant andwill only become active shortly before elections, when they

helpwiththeelectoralcampaign.OnecommonsightinthestreetsofmajorKorean

citiesduringthe2008electoralcampaign,forinstance,wasgroupsofsupportersof

thelocalcandidate–alldressedintheparty’scolours–performingchoreographed

dancestotheparty’sofficialpopsong.38Notsurprisinglythen,partymembersofthe

GNPandUDPreceivenosignificant training fromtheparty.TheNKP,KimYoung‐

sam’sparty,usedtomaintainaCentralTrainingCentreatthecentral leveltopro‐

videpoliticaleducationforpartyofficialsandactivists,but,asYong‐hoKim(1998:

148) points out, the effectiveness of these training programmeswas highly ques‐

tionable.

In theKDLP, in contrast,members are active throughout the year. The party’s

localchaptersusuallyholdtwomeetingsperweek:onepoliticalmeeting, inwhich

currenteventsandpartyrelatedmattersarediscussed,and–inthestyleofsocialist

37PersonalcommunicationwithYong‐hoKim,12April2008.38Usually,thecampaignsongsarelightupbeatpoptunes–sometimesbasedonthemelodyoffa‐mouscharthits–whichintheirlyricswillconstantlyrepeattheparty’snameandparty’snumberonthevotingballotaswellasthekeywordsoftheparty’spledges.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–154–

partiesinearly20thcenturyEurope–onesocialmeeting,wherememberscometo‐

getherforactivitiessuchashikingtours.Moreover,althoughthereisnoinstitution‐

alisedtrainingprogrammeforpartymembersassuch,localchapterscanrequestad

hoctrainingsessionsfromthepartycentral,which,accordingtotheparty’sownre‐

port,happensveryfrequently.39

Afterthiscross‐partyanalysisofpartymembershipithasbecomeclearthatthe

traditionalpartiesontheonesideandtheKDLPontheothersideareaimingtore‐

cruitverydifferenttypesofmembers.Whatismore,inthecaseoftheGNPandthe

UDP–andthepartiesofKimYoung‐samandKimDae‐jungrespectively–itisprob‐

ablyevenbetternottospeakofpartymembership,asindividualsprimarilyjointhe

personal network of the local assemblyman or candidate. In fact, neither of these

twopartiesmakesanycentrallycoordinatedeffort torecruitnewmembers.How‐

ever, at the same time, both parties do not hold off presenting largemembership

figures.Whileinthemid‐1990sKimYoung‐sam’sNKPclaimedtohaveaboutthree

millionmembers (KimY.H.1998:146), in2008 its successor, theGNP, stillmain‐

tains to have a membership of 1,070,000.40 Similarly, the UDP purports to have

roughlyonemillionmembers.41Thisroughlytranslatestoamembership/electorate

ratioof2.6%foreachofthemajorparties.However,itiswidelyknownthatKorean

parties vastly inflate theirmembership figureswhen prompted by political scien‐

39ThisparagraphisbasedoninformationprovidedbytheKDLPthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththeauthoron15April2008.40PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.41PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.


–155–

tists in order to create the impression that they have strong support in society

(Köllner2002:11).

In the Korean context, in contrast, political parties do not even seem to value

membersasstatistic,sincetheirclientelisticstrategiesdonotrequirepartiestogive

theillusionthattheyarestronglyrootedinsociety.Forthecandidates,ontheother

hand,membersarealoyalpoolofvoters.Whiletheyalsoprovidefreelabourduring

election campaigns, this contribution is far from vital for electoral success.More‐

over, votes can also bemobilised outside the formal party structure through the

numerous sajojik affiliated with each candidate. In other words, members within

bothtraditionalpartieshavevirtuallynopower,asthereisverylittletodistinguish

them from regular voters. Correspondingly, members do not enjoy significantly

moreparticipatoryrightsintheparties’internaldecision‐makingprocessesthanthe

averagecitizen,aswillbeshowninthenextchapter.

Ontheotherhand,intheKDLP,thepartyonthegroundenjoyssomeconsider‐

ablepower.Firstofall,thefactthatmemberspayregularlyfeesmakesthemavalu‐

ablefinancialassettotheparty.AccordingtotheKDLP’sowndeclaration,in2007,

about50per centof theparty’s total incomecame frommembershippayments.42

This again stands in stark contrast to thebudget structureof the twomore tradi‐

tional parties, which in 2003 obtained only 16 per cent (GNP) and 12 per cent

(MDP)oftheirtotalincomefrommembershipdues(NationalElectionCommission

undated).However,itmustbenotedinmanycases,theseduesarepaidbythepo‐

42PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–156–

liticalbossofthemember’slocalbranch,notbythemember.Secondly,thefactthat

theKDLPholds regularmeetingsat the local level andorganisespolitical training

sessionsforitsmembers,showsthatthepartyperceivesitsmembershipasapoolof

candidates for public election. This – in addition to their financial contribution –

givesKDLPmembersyetanothersourceofpowerwithintheparty.

As a result, themembership figurespublishedby theKDLP, as opposed to the

blown‐up figuresof theothermajorparties, actuallyhold significance.Asof2008

thepartyclaimedtohaveabout80,000members,ofwhichroughly50,000paytheir

duesregularly.43However,onlythelattergroupareregardedasfullmemberswho

aregivenvotingrightsintheparty’sdecision‐makingprocesses,whichthusclearly

distinguishes themfromtheordinaryvoteroutsidetheparty(seenextsection for

more details). The figure seems reliable, and is supported by the literature (Gray

2008: 119). In terms of membership strength the 50,000 members translate to

0.13%ofthetotalelectorate–or5.1%oftheparty’selectoratein2008.Particularly

theM/EratioisrelativelylowwhencomparedtotheaverageM/Eintheestablished

democraciesofWesternEurope(seeMairandvanBiezen2001:9),butintheSouth

Koreancontextofalarminglyhighlevelsofpoliticalapathythismustbeinterpreted

in a different light, particularly if we remind ourselves that the KDLP is the only

partythatchargesmembershipfees.44

43PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.44OneindicatorforpoliticalapathyinSouthKoreaisthedeclininglevelofvoterturnout.Inthe2008NationalAssemblyelectionsturnouthitarecord‐low46percent,down14.6percentagepointsfromthe2004electionsand11.2%fromtheelectionsin2000.ForananalysisofrecentpublicopinionsurveysonKoreans’viewsondemocracyandpoliticsseeShin,ParkandJang(2005).


–157–

Tosumup,traditionally,thepartyonthegroundinKoreanpartiesishardlyre‐

cognisable. Members are merely passive subjects in the personal network of the

localassemblymanorcandidate,andtheyhardlydifferfromtheaveragevoterout‐

sidetheparty,sincemembershipobligationsandrightsarenegligible.Theonlyex‐

ceptiontothisgeneralpatternistheKDLP–foundedin2000–whichtosomeex‐

tent tries to emulate the grassroots organisation of the classical socialist party in

early20thcenturyEurope.BecauseintheKDLPpartymembershipisattachedtoa

numberofdemandingcriteria,members–intheirroleasfinancialsupportersand

potentialcandidates–carrysomesignificantweight.

Candidateselection

Whilethemembershipstructureofpoliticalparties–exceptforthenewlyfounded

KDLP–hasremainedthesamesincetheendoftheauthoritarianregime,therehas

beensomesignificantchangeinthewaystherelevantpartiesselecttheircandidates

forpublicelectionsatthenationallevel.Fundamentally,thedevelopmentofcandi‐

dateselectionprocedurescanbedividedintoa“threeKims”phaseandapost‐“three

Kims” phase. Although Article 31 of the old Party Law Act demanded that “the

nominationofpublicpostcandidatesbypartiesmustbemadeinademocraticman‐

ner”,theselectionofcandidateshasonlyrecentlybecomemoreinclusive.Formore

OLIVERHELLMANN

–158–

thanadecadeafter the first and freeelections in1987decision‐making in all rel‐

evantpartiesofSouthKoreahadbeenhighlycentralised.Allcontroloverthenomi‐

nationofelectoralcandidatesrestedwiththepartyleader(KimY.H.1998:151),and

it isprobablynotanexaggerationtosay that “theyranthepartiesas if theywere

feudallords”(Im2004:189).

Athoroughdescriptionofcandidateselectionduringthe“threeKims”eracanbe

found inK.S.Kim’s(1997)casestudyof the1996NationalAssemblyelection.The

usualpractice inKoreanpartiesthenwastoselectadistrictpartychair,who–al‐

most automatically – became the party’s candidate of that district in the coming

election.Inordertonominatethelocalpartychairs,bothKimYoung‐sam’sNKPand

KimDae‐jung’sNCNPestablishedakindofscreeningcommittee.Thesecommittees,

composedofhigh‐rankingpartyofficials,reviewedbothincumbentsandnewlyap‐

plyingcandidates,andsubmittedtheirrecommendationstothepartypresident.The

president thenmade the final decision on whom to nominate. In the case of the

NCNP,partyleaderKimDae‐jungannouncedthathewouldnotalterthescreening

committee’sselectionofdistrictchairs,but itwasamatterofcommonknowledge

thathisintentionswerecarriedoutbycloseaidesinthecommittee.

In other words, the selection of candidates was perfectly monopolised by the

partyleader.Infact,nominationforaNationalAssemblymandatecouldbebought

fromtheparty leader inreturn foradonation(Chon2000:72).Besidescorporate

donations,thispracticewasthemoststablefinancialresourceforpartiesduringthe

“threeKims”era–particularlyforoppositionparties,astheselackedthepowerto


–159–

influencegovernmentpolicies.Thepricevariedaccording to theprospectsof suc‐

cess.Thehigheronewantedtoberankedonthepartylist–usedinadditiontosin‐

gle‐member plurality in Korea’s parallel electoral system – themore onewas ex‐

pectedtodonatetotheparty.

Using the process of candidate selection as an indicator for the distribution of

powerwithinpoliticalpartiesduringthe“threeKims”era,wecanfollowThornton

andKorvick(2003:292)andofferthefollowingsummary:

Thishighlycentralized leadershipstylehascontributedto low levelsof

internal party democracy. Party members are dependent on the party

leaderforpoliticaladvancement,andoppositionorcriticismoftheparty

leadershipistantamounttopoliticalsuicide.Loyaltytothepartyleader

isoftenrewardedwith“safe”electoraldistricts.

The processes of candidate selection in Korean parties have only become more

democraticsince the late1990s.The firstparty toorganise itsnominationsystem

according to more abstract regulations was the NKP. When Kim Young‐sam an‐

nouncedhisretirementfrompoliticsaftertheendofhispresidentialtermin1997,

thepartyhadtoappointanewcandidatefortheupcomingelections.Thenewlyim‐

plementedrulesgovernedthatthepresidentialcandidatewastobeelectedbythe

delegates in theNKP’snational convention.Moreover, the ratio of ex‐officioposts

versuselecteddelegatesintheconventionwasshiftedfrom40:60to15:85.Inorder

OLIVERHELLMANN

–160–

to register a bid for candidacy, the recommendationof at least 50delegates from

threeregionswasrequired(LeeH.C.2002).Overall,theseregulationsmarkedahis‐

toricalmilestone,asitwasthefirsttimesincethebeginningofthedemocratictran‐

sitioninSouthKoreathatapresidentialcandidatewasselectedthroughcompetition

amongmultipleaspirants.Ontheotherhand,theselectionofcandidatesforparlia‐

mentaryelectionsremainedhighlycentralisedinaspecialcommitteeofpartylead‐

ers. Candidateswere evaluated by criteria such as public visibility, loyalty to the

party, connectionswith the top leader, and likelihoodof victory (ParkC.W. 2000;

seealsoKöllnerandFrank1999:96).

TheselectionofcandidatesbecamemuchmoreinclusivewhenKimDae‐jungleft

thepoliticalarenafouryearslater.Tonominateacandidateforthe2002presiden‐

tialelections,histhenparty,theMDP,implementedasystemthatcombinedaclosed

andanopenprimary.Votingfortheopenprimarytookplaceinseveralcities,and

voteswerethenaveragedwiththeresultsofavoteamongpartymembers.Shortly

after,theGNP,thesuccessorpartyoftheNKP,adoptedthesamesystemtoselectits

presidentialcandidate.

However, in order to fully understand themeaning of these seemingly demo‐

craticreforms, it isnecessarytotakeintoconsiderationthemembershipstructure

ofKoreanparties.Aswasexplainedintheprevioussection,partymembersarepri‐

marilypassivesubjectsatthe lowerendsofa localboss’patron‐clientnetwork. In

return for particularistic services, members promise the boss electoral support.

Whilewehavesofaronlydiscussedhowtheseclientelisticpracticesaffectelections


–161–

outsidetheparty,itiscommonpracticethatthebosswillalsodemandhisorhercli‐

ents’votesinsidetheparty.Hence,inthecaseofaclosedprimary,forinstance,the

bosswill instructhisorhermemberstovoteforthecandidateendorsedbyhisor

herfaction,or–ifheorshestandsforelection–forhim‐orherself(LeeH.C.2002).

Similarly, votes inanopenprimary caneffectivelybemobilised through theboss’

sajojik.Inotherwords,openinguptheselectionofthepresidentialcandidatetothe

widerpartymembershipandgeneralelectorate,didnotstrengthenthepartyonthe

ground,butitsimplydistributedthepowerthathadoriginallybeenmonopolisedin

thehandsofthepartyleaderamongalargergroupofpoliticalbosses.

In the KDLP, in contrast,members enjoy genuine voting rights, which are not

underminedbyinformaldependenciesonlocalbosses.Moreover,itsproceduresof

candidateselectionagainunderlinethevaluethatthepartyattachestomembers,as

tonominatethepresidentialcandidateforthe2002electiontheKDLPheldaclosed

primary,withoutextendingvotingrightstothecommoncitizen.Hence,membersof

theKDLPnot only differ fromnon‐members in their obligations, but also in their

rights. The party on the ground in the KDLP is thereforemuch stronger than the

grassrootsmembers in the traditional parties,who only carry out voting instruc‐

tionsgivenbytheirrespectivepatron.

Thesameappliesforthe2004NationalAssemblyelections,forwhichthethree

traditionalparties–theGNP,theUriParty,andthedwindlingMDP–organisedthe

selectionofcandidates inverysimilarwaysto2002,and,again,basednomination

on the combined resultof a closedandanopenprimary,wherebybothoutcomes

OLIVERHELLMANN

–162–

wereweightedequally.However,tobeabletoparticipateintheprimary,candidates

needed the endorsement of their party’s “independent” screening commission.

Thesecommissionswereappointedbythepartyleadership,andconsistedofparty

officialsandpopularpersonalitiesofKoreansociety(suchasclerics,professorsor

writers).Moreover,thepartyleadershipreserveditselftherighttomakeso‐called

“strategic”selections.Thatistosay,theleadershipcouldnominatecandidateswith‐

outtheneedofaprimary,iftheyfeltthatthiswasnecessarytosecureelectoralvic‐

tory.And, in fact, the leadersofthethreepartiesmadeextensiveuseofthatright:

TheGNPonlyheld15primariesforatotalof228nominations(6.6%),theUriParty

86inatotalof229districts(37.6%),andtheMDP73outof217(33.6%)(Kimand

Kim2005).Inotherwords,theselectionofcandidateswas–toaveryhighdegree–

stillcontrolledbythepartyleadership.

The only exceptionwas again the KDLP, which held a closed primary in each

constituency tonominate thecandidates for theSMPrace inKorea’sparallelelec‐

toralsystem.Thecompositionofthepartylistwasdecidedbytheparty’sexecutive

committee, but it then needed to be approved by the vote of the whole party

membership.Moreover,indrawingupthepartylist,theleadershipisboundbyspe‐

cificrulesintheparty’sconstitution,suchastherequirementthatthefirstcandidate

onthelistmustbeadisabledperson.45

For the 2007presidential election the two traditional partieswent away from

the50‐50formulaandadoptedmuchmorecomplicatedrules.Particularlythesys‐



–163–

teminstitutionalisedbytheGNPseemedapatchworkofdifferentmethodsandse‐

lectorates.Whiletheoverallselectoratesizewas231,652(representing0.5%ofthe

totalelectorate),voteswerenotcountedequally.20percentofthevotescamefrom

“representativepartymembers”.Thisgroupconsistedof4,811memberswhowere

holding apublic office eitheron thenational, provincial or local level, and41,386

regularpartymemberswhowereappointedbytheseofficeholders.Another30per

centofthevotecamefrom“otherpartymembers”(69,496),whosevotewasagain

splitbetweenmemberswhohadpaidaregularmembershipfeeof2,000KRWforat

least 18 months, and all other members. Moreover, the party conducted phone

interviewswithrandomlyselectedvotersoutsidetheparty,whichaccountedfor30

percentofthetotalvote.Asthis“citizencommittee”wassupposedtoembodythe

averageKoreanelectorate,thiswasdoneuntilenoughrepresentativevotesfromall

agegroupsandbothgendershadbeencollected.Finally, inordertofillthelast20

percentoftheselectorate,thepartycommissionedthreeindependentsocial‐survey

organisationstoask5,490randomlychosencitizensfortheircandidatepreferences.

46

TheUNDP–successoroftheUriParty–alsochangeditsproceduretoselectits

presidential candidate, albeit less drastically than the GNP. A two‐round process

wasadopted,inwhichthefirstroundservedtofindthefivetop‐runnersthatwould

thenbeallowedtoparticipateinthesecondround.Theselectorateinthefirstround

consistedof randomly selectedvoters throughanopinionpoll (50per centof the

46PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–164–

totalvote)and10,000randomlyselectedpartymembers(another50percent).In

thesecondroundanopenprimarywasheld,thatcounted90percenttowardsthe

finalresult.Inordertoparticipateintheprimary,voterscouldvoteinoneofeight

multi‐provincialprimariesortheycouldalsocasttheirvotebysendingatextmes‐

sage from theirmobilephone.47The remaining10per centof the final vote came

fromapublicopinionpollconductedacrossthecountry.48

TheKDLP,again,didnot invitecommoncitizenstoparticipatein itsprocessto

nominate the presidential candidate for 2007, but, similarly to the UNDP, a two‐

roundsystemwasadopted.Thenewrulesstipulatedthatasecondroundofvoting

wouldbeheldifinthefirstroundnocandidatewonanabsolutemajorityofvotes,

whileonlyallowingthetwotoprunnerstoparticipateinthesecondround.Inboth

roundsthesizeoftheselectoratewas50,117,equallingthenumbermembersregu‐

larlypayingthemembershipfee.Memberscouldexercisetheirvoteeitherinoneof

227votingstationsacrossthecountry,oronlineontheparty’swebsite.49

While theKDLPkept itsclosedprimarysystemtonominatecandidates for the

2008NationalAssemblyelection,thetraditionalpartiesagainrevisedtheirproced‐

ures by abolishing the possibility of holding primaries at the district level. The

nominationof candidates thusbecame the exclusivedomainof the “independent”

screeningcommittees.InboththeGNPandtheUDP–thesuccessoroftheUNDP–

thiscommitteewasnominatedbytherespectiveparty’sexecutivecommittee.Inthe 47Beforebeingabletoparticipateinthemobile‐phonevotevotershadtoregisterontheparty’sweb‐site.Personaldetailsneededforregistrationwerekepttoaminimum:name,residentregistrationnumber,addressandphonenumber.48PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.49PersonalcommunicationwiththeKDLP,15April2008.


–165–

caseoftheGNP,thecommitteehadelevenmembers–sixfromoutsidethepartyand

fivepartymembers.Amongthesixoutsiderswereuniversityprofessors,leadersof

NGOs and a former public prosecutor,while of the five insiders twowere assem‐

blymenandthreepartypoliticianswithoutpublicoffice.50Similarly,theUDPnomi‐

natedsixmembersfromoutsidetheparty–twouniversityprofessors,a lawyer,a

medicaldoctor,amuseumdirectorandapoet–andfourassemblymenfromwithin

theparty.51

It thus seems that with the introduction of the screening committees the two

traditionalpartieshaverevertedtotheun‐democraticstyleofthe“threeKims”era.

However,thereformsmustbeseeninthelightofinter‐factionalconflictwithinthe

parties.Astheoldguardswithinthepartystillcontrolledthevastmajorityofparty

members,anyeffortstodemocratisetheprocedurehadtoopenthedecision‐making

process tonon‐membersoutside theparty.However,evenoutside theparty long‐

establishedpoliticianshaveacompetitiveadvantage,sincetheypotentiallycontrol

largesharesof theelectorate throughtheirsajojik. Inotherwords,youngerpoliti‐

cians needed to find other ways to ensure a fair competition, which is why they

pushed for the introductionof independent screening committees. These commit‐

teesrefused tonominatecandidateswhohadbeen foundguiltyof corruptionand

50PersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP,17April2008.51PersonalcommunicationwiththeUDP,24April2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–166–

otherillegalactivities.52Thisparticularlyaffectedtheoldguards,who–inorderto

fueltheirclientelisticnetworkswithresources–aremuchmorelikelytoengagein

corrupt activities than younger politicians. The committees seemed to have been

quiteindependentintheirdecisionsanditnowseemsmoredifficult, ifnotimpos‐

sible,tobuyanominationfromoneoftwomajorparties.53

Tosumup,thissectionsupportstheconclusionformulatedaftertheearlierdis‐

cussionofthemembershipstructureofKoreanparties:Thepartyonthegroundin

thetwotraditionalpartiesisvirtuallypowerless.Whileduringthe“threeKims”era

candidateselectionwasdecidedonlybythepartyleader,theformallymoredemo‐

craticproceduresinstitutionalisedthereafterdidnotsucceedincuttingthroughthe

informal patron‐client networks that connect the party leaders to the grassroots

membership.Asaresult,youngerpoliticianshavepushedveryhardtomovecandi‐

dateselectionoutsidethepoliticalparty–eitherbyconductingpublicopinionpolls

orgiving thedecision‐makingpower to independent screeningcommittees. In the

KDLP, on theotherhand, candidate selection is organised according to effectively

democratic rules. However, different to itsmembership structure, the KDLP does

notfollowtheclassicalmass‐partymodel,whichisusuallyassociatedwithahierar‐

52Forinstance,prominentfiguresthatwereeliminatedbytheUDP’sscreeningcommitteeincludedformerpresidentialchiefofstaffParkJi‐won,KimHong‐up–KimDae‐jung'ssecondson–andLeeYong‐hee,afour‐termlawmaker.Parkwasconvictedoftaking100millionKRW(50,000GBP)inbribesfromtwolocalconglomerates,whileKimHong‐upwasfoundguiltyofreceivingabout2.5bil‐lionKRW(1.2millionGBP)fromseveralcompaniesinJuly2002.LeeYong‐heereceivedasuspendedjailtermfortakingbribes.53TheonlyallegedcaseofaboughtNationalAssemblyseatinthe2008electionconcernedtheProPro‐ParkGeun‐hyeAlliance–asplinterpartyfromtheGNP–whichplacedpubliclyunknownYangJung‐ryeasthenumberonecandidateonitspartylist–afterhermotherhaddonated1.55billionKRW(about782,000GBP)totheparty.However,thepartyclaimsthatitonlyborrowedthemoneytocoverelectoralcampaigncosts.


–167–

chicalsystemofdelegation,butrathermorecontemporarymodelsofpartyorgani‐

sationandtheprincipleof“onemember,onevote”.Thisweakensthepartyonthe

ground,asmembersareatomisedandwillthushavedifficultiescoordinatingaseri‐

ouschallengetotheothertwofaces.However, inordertodeterminewhichof the

organisationalfaceswithineachoftheKoreanpartiesshouldberegardedasdomi‐

nant,letusturntothenextsection.

Distributionofresourcesanddecision‐makingpositions

Whendiscussing the distribution of internal resources inKoreanpolitical parties,

wecanonceagainobservesignificantdifferencesbetweenthepartiesof thethree

Kims,ontheonehand,andtheirsuccessorpartiesontheother. Duringthe“three

Kims” era, all politically relevant resourceswere channelled through thehandsof

the respective party leader. Given that the three Kims shared almost the total

national vote among them, aspiring politicianswere practically forced to join the

partyofoneoftheKims.Establishingafourthpartyorstandingasanindependent

candidate would have been futile, since the regional electoral strongholds of the

threeKimswereimpossibletobreak.Moreover,thethreeKimsdidnotonlyattract

themajorityofvotes,butatthesametimeactedasa“magnet”forsubstantialfinan‐

cialdonations.Similarlytovoters,whowouldnotwastetheirvoteonafourthparty,

OLIVERHELLMANN

–168–

businesseswouldnot invest inaparty thatcouldnotbeexpected towin.Particu‐

larlytherulingpartywasthusapopularchoiceforcorporatedonations,whichwere

oftenpaidas“quasi‐taxes”–principallybythelargeconglomerates,thejaebol(Kang

2002;seealsoParkB.S.1995).

Asdonationsweregivendirectlytothepartyleader,thisledtotheemergenceof

a hierarchical exchange ofmoney and loyalty through a system of patronage em‐

beddedwithinthepoliticalparties.Moneywashandeddowntothefactionleaders

fortheirpoliticalsupport,whowouldtheninjectthemoneyintotheirownclientel‐

isticnetworksuntilitreachedthegrassrootsmembers.Thishighdegreeofcontrol

thethreeKimsexertedoverboththecollectionanddistributionofpartyfundsmade

assemblymenandcandidateshighlydependentontheirrespectivepartyleader.Ex‐

pressed in thewordsof a civic group leader cited inThorntonandKovick (2003:

293), “money is thechannel throughwhichpartybosseskeepcandidatessubordi‐

nate”.

However,notonly assemblymenand candidatesdependedon theparty leader

fortheirpoliticalsurvival,butthewholepartyasanorganisation.Thisexplainsthe

short lifespanofKoreanpoliticalparties throughout the1990s,sincepartiesonly

existedatthemercyoftheirleader,andweredissolved,mergedorrenamedaccord‐

ingtotheleader’sowninterest.Incasetheleaderchosetoleavetheparty,theparty

wouldsimplydie,asithadnovalueinitself.AlthoughthepartiesofthethreeKims

werehighlybureaucratised, thepartybureaucracywouldusually follow theparty


–169–

leaderintohisnewpartyorceasetoexistwiththenewone.54Thisshowsthatthe

party centralwas best understood as the “property” of the party boss, solely em‐

ployedtoperformorganisationalandadministrativetasks.

Asaresultofthisdependencyonthepartyleader,thethreeKimsalsomonopo‐

lised all decision‐making responsibilities. In the parliamentary party, the unques‐

tionedauthorityoftheleaderwasfurtherstrengthenedbythepracticeofnominat‐

ing a large number of fresh candidates who, when and if elected, were placed

aroundacoreofveryexperiencedparliamentarians.Theseexperiencedlawmakers

conducted thework in committees and theparty’s caucus according to theguide‐

lines of the party leader. While more experienced parliamentarians were often

boundtothepartyleaderbydecadeslongpoliticalloyalty,thenewlyelecteddepu‐

tieswere normally inexperienced, did not have their own political networks, and

dependedverymuchonthesupportofthepartypatronwhenitcametotheirpoliti‐

calcareer(Croissant2002).Finally–asanindicatorofthepartyleader’sdecision‐

makingauthorityandafactorthatfurtherreinforcedhisauthority–thefloorleader

wasnotusuallychosenbytheAssemblymembersofthepartybutappointedbythe

partypresident.

ThedependencyonindividualpartyleadersdecreasedwhenthethreeKimsleft

politics.Moreover,stricterpoliticalfinancinglawswerecrafted,whichmeantthatit

becamemoredifficultforindividualpoliticianstocollectlargecorporatedonations.

54Forinstance,thesecretariatofKimYoung‐sam’sNKPwasalargeorganisationwiththree‐tierof‐ficesonageographicalbasis(thecentraloffice,theprovince/cityofficesandtheelectoraldistrictoffices),employingabout1,200full‐timestaff.KimDae‐jung’sNCNP,whichwasinoppositionthen,stillhad300partyemployeesonitspayroll(KimY.H.1998:150).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–170–

Already in1999,presidentKimDae‐jung launchedanational anti‐corruptionpro‐

gramme,whichtightenedtheregulationsondonationsandcontributions,imposing

ceilingsontheamounts individualsandcorporatebodiescouldgiveto thecentral

party organisation or a local branch.Moreover, the newPolitical FundAct estab‐

lished an annual government subsidy forpolitical parties calculated at the rate of

800KRW(0.40GBP)foreachvotecastinthemostrecentNationalAssemblyelec‐

tion.However,givenboththehighrunningexpensesofKoreanpartiesandtheem‐

barrassingcorruptionscandalsurroundingKimDae‐jung’sownsonin2000,theef‐

fectiveness andwholeheartedness of these reformsmust be seriously questioned

(Ferdinand2003:65).

Amore serious attempt to reform political financing laws wasmade in 2004.

Firstofall,alowerlimitforfinancialcontributionswasset,asthemaximumamount

moneyeachassemblymanisallowedtocollecteachyeardecreasedbyhalf– from

threebillionKRW(150,000GBP) tooneandahalfbillionKRW–while themaxi‐

mumamounteachvotercandonateayearwasloweredto20millionKRW(10,000

GBP),whichisonlyonesixthofthepreviouslimit.Secondly,thenewlawsregulate

unidentifiablemoney:Themaximumamountforanonymousdonations,perperson

and per donation, is now 100,000 KRW (50 GBP) – lowered by one tenth – and

donations larger than 500,000KRW (250GBP)must nowbe transferred through

checkorcreditcard.Thenewpoliticalfundinglawswerepassedthroughtheinitia‐

tiveofyoungerpoliticiansacrossdifferentparties.Theydidthiswiththesupportof

civilsocietyorganisations,whichhadbeenblackballingcorruptpoliticianssincethe


–171–

late 1990s, thereby putting public pressure on those legislatorswho opposed re‐

formingthepoliticalfinancelaws(seeHorowitzandKim2002).

However,althoughformalpoliticalfundinglawshavebecomemoreeffective,the

partybureaucracyremainspowerlessasanorganisationalelement.Tostartwith,an

amendmenttothePoliticalPartyActin2002stipulatesthatpartiesareonlyallowed

tohave150salariedemployeesatthecentralpartylevel,meaningthattheparties

had to considerably slim down their bureaucratic apparatus.Moreover, the party

centralofficeenjoysnorepresentationinanyoftheparties’decision‐makingbodies.

ThemembersofboththeGNP’sandUDP’sexecutivecommitteeareallelected,and

therearenodesignatedex‐officiopostswithin thesebodies.55Similarly,no repre‐

sentativeofthepartybureaucracyhasvotingrightsintheparties’NationalAssem‐

blycaucuses,butthesearecomprisedofassemblymenonly,whowillalsoelecttheir

floorleaderwithoutinterferencefromoutside.Finally,inbothparties–andincon‐

trasttothetypicalWesternEuropeanmodel–thegeneralsecretaryhasinthepast

alwaysbeenaparliamentarian,appointedbythepartychairman(inthecaseofthe

GNP)ortheexecutivecommittee(UDP).56

Thepartybureaucracydoesnothaveanypowertodemandparticipationinthe

parties’decisionmaking,becausethepartyinpublicofficeislargelyself‐sufficient.

Firstofall,aswasdiscussedearlier,assemblymenhavetheirownnetworksofsup‐

porters and do not have to rely on the party central office to communicate with 55TheexecutivecommitteeoftheGNPconsistsofninemembers,allofwhomneedtobeapprovedbythepartycongress.The10membersoftheUDP’sexecutivecommittee,ontheotherhand,areelectedbyallpartymembers.56TheinformationinthisparagraphwasobtainedthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththeGNP(17April2008)andtheUDP(24April2008)respectively.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–172–

grassrootsmembers. Secondly, assemblymen are financially independent, as their

respective party’s contribution to their electoral campaign budget isminimal, but

themoneycomesalmostexclusivelyfromdonationsthecandidatecollectshim‐or

herself.Finally,parliamentariansareprovidedwithadministrativeassistantsbythe

NationalAssembly,anddonotdependonstaffallocatedbythepartycentraloffice.

In theKDLP, in stark contrast, theparty central office ismuchmorepowerful.

Firstofall,theparty’sconstitutiondeclaresthatthepartycentralofficemustberep‐

resented in all decision‐making bodies. Accordingly, the supreme committee, the

party’shighestexecutivebody,iscomposedofthepartychairman,theleaderofthe

parliamentaryparty,thegeneralsecretary,thechairpersonofthepolicycommittee

andsevenotherelectedmembers.Thegeneralsecretary,who–incontrasttoother

Koreanparties– isusuallyapartybureaucrat,alsoparticipates in themeetingsof

theparty’scaucusintheNationalAssembly.Moreover,KDLPparliamentariansare

notonlyobligedtoforwardalldonationstheycollecttothepartycentraloffice,but,

inaddition,theymusthandovermuchoftheirassemblymansalarysotheydonot

earnmorethantheaverageKoreanworker.57

Tosumup,duringthethreeKimseraallpoliticallyrelevantresourcesweremo‐

nopolisedbythepartyleader.SinceKimYoung‐samandKimDae‐jungleftpolitics,

resources in theirrespectiveparties(andtheirsuccessorparties)havebeenmore

evenlydistributedamonga largernumberofpoliticians,withaparticularconcen‐

trationintheNationalAssembly.However,itisdoubtfulwhetherwecanthuscon‐



–173–

clude that theparty inpublicoffice is thedominantorganisational face in this re‐

gard.Firstofall,significantresourcesarealsoheldbypoliticalbosseswhodonot

occupyapublicoffice.Secondly,itisnotthepartyinpublicofficeassuchthatcon‐

trolstheresources,butrathereachindividualpoliticiancontrolshisorherownre‐

sources.Incontrast,intheKDLPpoliticalresourcesaremainlylocatedintheparty

centraloffice,which,consequently, isalsoempoweredtoparticipate in theparty’s

decision‐makingprocess.

Summary

Theenvironmental context inpost‐autocraticSouthKoreaclearly favoursclientel‐

isticoverprogrammaticelectoralstrategies:Firstofall,similartoothernewerde‐

mocraciesofthe“thirdwave”,theworkingclassisdifficulttomobiliseforelectoral

meansbecauseofthevirulentanti‐communismandtherepressiveanti‐unionlaws

that accompanied the process of industrialisation under the authoritarian regime.

Secondly, both the regime and the pro‐democratic opposition used clientelistic

formsofelectoralmobilisationintheregime’spseudo‐elections,andthroughane‐

gotiated democratic transition were able to transfer their patron‐client networks

into the new democratic arena. These networks are deeply embedded in Korean

masspoliticalcultureandhavethustakenonalifeoftheirown–independentofthe

OLIVERHELLMANN

–174–

conditionsof lowsocio‐economicdevelopmentthatallowedtheirestablishment in

thefirstplace.

Therefore, as clientelism is the outcome strategically selected for by the envi‐

ronmentalcontext,themajorpoliticalpartiesinSouthKoreaarenothingbutafor‐

malfaçadeforinformalpatron‐clientnetworksthatconnectpoliticiansandvoters.

Verymuch like in theclassical cadreparty inearly‐democraticEurope, the formal

partyorganisationsremainsunderdevelopedandthethreefacesofpartyorganisa‐

tionareindistinguishable:Partymembersdonotdiffermuchfromcommoncitizens

in terms of their rightswithin and their obligations towards the party, the party

centralleadershipselectsitselfascandidatesforpublicelectionsandthepartycent‐

ralofficeismerelyapassivebureaucraticbodywithoutanyindependentdecision‐

makingpower.

However, after losing their charismatic leaders, Kim Young‐sam andKimDae‐

jung, themajorKoreanpartieshave increasinglybecomeaffectedby internal con‐

flictsbetweenfactionsofyoungerpoliticiansandoldguards.Astheseyoungerpoli‐

ticiansarenotembeddedintotheexistingclientelisticnetworksandlacktheneces‐

sary private resources to establish similar patron‐client relationships, they intro‐

duced public economic incentives into the regional electoral conflict. Simulta‐

neously,theyhavebeentryingtooverpowertheoldergenerationwithinthemajor

parties by introducing party membership fees – which failed – give the right to

nominate candidates forpublic election to independent forcesoutside theparty–


–175–

eitherthroughscreeningcommitteesorpublicopinionpolls–andpassstricterpo‐

liticalfinancelegislation.

While thesemeasureshavenot led to theemergenceofanewtypeofpolitical

party in SouthKorea, party internal processes have becomemore formalised and

transparent.Thisisparticularlytruefortheselectionofcandidatesforpublicelec‐

tion,whichisnowlessdependentonresourcescontrolledbyindividualpoliticians

andfactions,particularlyvotesandmoney.Moreover, theparty internalallocation

ofresourcesismuchmorecloselyregulatedbylaw,makingitimpossibleforsingle

politicianstogaincontroloftheparty,ashappenedduringthe“threeKims”era.In

otherwords,asintheclassicalcadreparty,thedifferentelementsofpartyorganisa‐

tion are still indistinguishable, as extra‐parliamentary organisation is minimal.

However,verysimilartoKoole’s(1994)“moderncadreparty”thereseemstoexista

stronger link of accountability between theparty public office andboth theparty

membersandthewiderpublic.

Althoughthesepartyinternalconflictsareagoodexampleofhowactorscande‐

velopdifferentstrategieswithinthesamecontext,whichthentranslateintodiver‐

gingpreferencesregardingthepartyorganisation,theoutcomeisnotverydifferent

from the outcome strategically selected for the environment. Therefore, a much

morevaluablecasetostudyistheKDLP,whichistheonlymajorpartythatbreaks

withthetraditionalpatternofKoreanpoliticalpartyorganisation.Tobeginwith,the

massmembershipwithintheKDLPholdssignificantpowerasitcontributessignifi‐

cantlytotheparty’sfinancialsurvival.Inreturnforthiscontribution,themember‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–176–

ship is granted significant participatory rights in the party’s process of candidate

selection.However,candidateselectionisorganisedasaclosedprimary,whichat‐

omisesandthussomehowweakensthepartyontheground.Thisgivesconsiderable

powertothepartycentraloffice,whichadministersthepartymembershipregister,

thusforcingthepartyinpublicofficetorelyonthebureaucracyforanycommunica‐

tionwith the rank‐and‐file.Moreover, the party in central office also controls the

financial resources of the party and has considerable participatory rights in the

party’s internaldecision‐makingprocedures.Wecan thusconclude that– in stark

contrasttothetwoothermajorKoreanparties–itisthepartyincentralofficethat

dominatestheKDLP.Thisparticularoutcomeis,again,closelylinkedtothekeyac‐

tor’s electoral strategy,which, in the case of theKDLP is basedon anarrowly fo‐

cusedprogrammaticplatform.Thus,similartothesocialistmasspartiesinlate19th

century,theKDLPneedsastrongpartybureaucracyinordertodisciplinethemem‐

bersofthepartyinpublicoffice.

Inshort, theKDLPisaperfectexampleofhowactorscanmakedivergingstra‐

tegic choices within the same environment. This could be because actors in the

KDLPeither lack thenecessary resources to establish clientelisticnetworksor in‐

terpret the context through a different set of ideas than other actors. However,

whatever thereason, the importantpoint tonote is that theoutcomestrategically

selectedforbythecontext–elitistpartiescharacterisedbythelackofformalfaces

ofpartyorganisation– isbynomeans inevitable.Moreover, as thebitter internal

conflictswithinthetwomajorKoreanpartiesshow,eventhestrategicallyselected


–177–

outcomeisnotadirectproductoftheenvironment,butitisconstantlycontestedby

actorswithdifferentsetsofresourcesorideas.Therefore,althoughtheconstellation

ofpartyorganisations inpost‐autocraticKorea is very similar toparty systems in

19thcenturyEurope,withmasspartieschallengingthehegemonicpositionofcadre

parties, this should not be understood as a case of “history repeating itself”, but

partyorganisationsinKoreaaretheproductofstrategiccalculationsmadeinapar‐

ticularcontextthatfavourscertainstrategiesoverothers.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–178–

–5–

TAIWAN

Political parties in Taiwan share many similarities with contemporary parties in

WesternEurope,asthepartyinpublicofficeisclearlythedominantorganisational

element.However,asouranalysiswillshow,theyarrivedatthisstagenotthrough

an“evolutionaryleap”,buteachofthepartiesfollowedaverydistinctivepathofor‐

ganisationaldevelopment,constrainedbytheinter‐factionalconflictwithineachof

thepartiesandtheparticularenvironmentalcontext.


The change of the Taiwanese political system from a one‐party state to a fully‐

fledged democracy happened through a transformation guided from above (Tien

1997:124).TherulingKuomintang(KMT,ChineseNationalistParty)neverlostcon‐


–179–

troloftheprotractedtransitionprocess,whilethepro‐democraticoppositioncould

onlysitandwatchasdifferentgroupingswithintheregimenegotiatedthenewrules

of the electoral game. Therefore, the clientelistic networks the regime had built

aroundlocalpowerbrokersinordertomobilisevotersinlocal‐levelelectionssur‐

vived the transformation of the political system andwe should expect these net‐

workstobeusedtoactivateelectoralsupportalsounderthenewdemocraticrules–

despitethehighlevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentthatcharacterisesTaiwanto‐

day.

TheKMTimposedmartiallawonTaiwanin1949afterthenationalgovernment

ofChinaaroundChiangKai‐shekwasforcedtofleethemainlandfromtheadvancing

communist forces. Thatway,Taiwanbecame the last fallbackposition for theRe‐

publicofChina, leadingtoasuddeninfluxoftwomillionpartyfunctionaries,state

officials, soldiers andentrepreneurs.TheKMT,whichafter thedefeat reorganised

itself according toLeninistprinciples inorder toemulate theCommunistPartyof

China(CPC), soonbeganto “colonise” the islandbyplacingpartycadres inallkey

positions of the state apparatus – including themilitary – and integrating society

intopartymassorganisations (Dickson1993).All otherpartieswerebanned, and

electionsonlyheldatlocallevel,whilethedistributionofseatsinthenationalpar‐

liamentwas “frozen”.TheTaiwanese,who still constituted theoverwhelmingma‐

jorityof society,were thuspracticallyexcluded fromthepoliticaldecision‐making

OLIVERHELLMANN

–180–

process.58 The KMT legitimised its authoritarian rule by declaring itself to be the

solelegalgovernmentofChina,withtheaimoftemporarilyrebuildingmilitaryforce

onTaiwanbeforeretakingthemainlandfromthecommunists.Moreover,legitimacy

also stemmed from the miraculous economic development that Taiwan enjoyed

underKMTgovernment(Roy2003:104).Muchofthiseconomicsuccesscanbeex‐

plainedbystrongstateinterventionintothemarket(Wade2004).TheKMTshaped

themarket by laws, regulations and fiscal policies, but also by becoming an eco‐

nomicactoritself,usingitsmonopolyonvitalinputs–suchassteel,petrochemicals

and heavy machines – to build an “array of satellite suppliers and subservient

downstreamfirms”(ChengandChu2002:200).

TABLE10: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTINTAIWAN




Literacy(inpercent)

Taiwan 7,981(1990)

17,116(2008)

0.312(1990)

0.326(2000)

74.1(1989)

80.0(2008)

94.0(1990)

97.2(2004)

Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)

UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)

Source: DepartmentofInvestmentServices(undated);GovernmentInformationOffice(undated);Tsai(1996)

58Theterm“Taiwanese”inthisregardreferstoethnicChinese,whoimmigratedtoTaiwanfromthe17thcenturyonwardsmainlyfromthecoastalregionsofFujianandGuangdong.Today,slightlylessthan85percentoftheisland’spopulationareconsideredasTaiwanese,whereasmainlandChineseaccountforapproximately14percentofthepopulation(Copper1996:12).


–181–

However,when,inthelate1970s,itbecameclearthattheinternationalcommunity

wasnolongerwillingtosupporttheKMT’sclaimofsovereigntyoverChina,theKMT

suffered a severe blow to its credibility (Wachman1994: 135). At the same time,

Taiwan’srapidindustrialisationhadledtotheemergenceofanewmiddleclass(see

Table 10), which clearly reflected the sub‐ethnic division in society: “As national

politicswasprimarily reserved formainlanders, […]Taiwanesepursuedeconomic

advancementforsocialupwardmobility”(Cheng1989:482;emphasisadded).The

politicaldemandofthegrowingmiddleclasswasclear:Taiwanshouldbegoverned

bytheTaiwanesemajority,notbyasmallminorityasapartofChina.

UndertheleadershipofChiangChing‐kuo,thesonofChiangKai‐shek,whosuc‐

ceededhisfatherinpowerin1978,theKMTreactedtothislossoflegitimacywitha

strategy of “Taiwanisation”, opening top ranks in the party and in government to

sub‐ethnicTaiwanese(Hood1997:65).Consequently,theproportionofTaiwanese

members of the KMT’s central standing committee rose from 14.3% in 1973 to

57.1% in 1993 (Huang 1996: 119‐120). By the late 1980s this sub‐ethnic divide

within theKMTgaverise to the formationof two larger factions: theMainstream,

includingmostlyTaiwanese,and theNon‐mainstream,mainlyagroupingofmain‐

land‐bornpoliticiansandchildrenofmainlandersbornonTaiwan.Boththese fac‐

tionsconsistofanumberofsmaller factions,whichareallmoreserious thanten‐

denciesorcliques,sincemembersneedtoenlistofficially,andtheleadershipteam

meetsregularlytodiscussfactionmatters(ChengandChou2000:61‐62).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–182–

Simultaneously, the regime decided to hold “supplementary” elections on the

nationallevelinordertoreplacethoseparliamentarianswhohadeitherbecometoo

oldtogovernorhadpassedaway.Marginalised intheparty internalpowergame,

membersof theMainstream factionstarteddeveloping linkswith local factions to

mobilisesupport in theseand localelections(Hood1997:109).Local factions(di

fang paixi) are large interpersonal networks that are held together byguanxi – a

term connoting social ties and connections (kin, patron‐client, friendship, neigh‐

bourhood,schooletcetera)(Bosco1992:158).Theelectoralmobilisationof these

groupswasachievedthroughvote‐brokers(calledtiauakainTaiwanese),utilising

politicalcampaigns,personalrelationships,themobilisationofemployeesandvote‐

buying.

Thebanonpoliticalpartiesremainedinforce,butoppositioncandidatesbegan

tocoordinatetheircampaignactivitiesintheso‐calleddangwai‐movement(literally,

“outside theparty”).However, therewasdisagreementoverwhether thiswas the

beststrategytobringdowntheKMTregime,resultinginasplitbetweenradicaland

moderategroupings(Tsang1999:12).WhereasboththeMainstreamfaction,ledby

KangNing‐hsiang,andtheFormosafactionadvocatedpoliticalchangethroughelec‐

tions,theNewTidefactionwascommittedtopushfordemocratisationfromoutside

thesystem.Astheoppositionstillhadhardlyanyinfluenceoverlegislation,there‐

sulting frustrations favoured the radicalswithin thedangwai (ChengandHaggard

1990:68).At thesame time, the regimeperceived the limitedelectoral successof


–183–

thedangwaiasaseriousthreat,whichprovokedasplitwithintheregimebetween

hard‐andsoft‐liners,withthehard‐linersinstantlygainingtheupperhand.

Themoreradicaltacticsofthedangwai–whichwerecentredonsocialmobilisa‐

tion–weresooncrushedbytheregimehardlinerswhenamassdemonstrationheld

inKaohsiungon10December1979wasputtoaviolentendbyriotpolice,andmost

leadersoftheradicalfactionwithintheoppositionwerejailed.Thistippedthebal‐

anceback in favourof themoderate forces intheoppositioncamp,which, inturn,

advantagedtheKMTsoft‐liners,whosoonresumedtheprocessofpoliticalliberali‐

sation (Cheng1989:486‐487). With themoderates in control, thedangwai again

concentrated on institutionalising a competitive electoral organisation, eventually

leading to the founding of theDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP,Minjindang) in

September1986.TheKMTsilentlytoleratedthismove,beforeproclaimingtheend

ofmartial lawand,onlyafewweekslater,theprohibitionofpoliticalassociations.

Thefirstfreeandfairelectionsforanationalparliamentwereheldin1991.


ThestrategiccalculationsmadebytheKMT’ssoft‐linersturnedouttobecorrect,as

thepartysucceededinstayinginpoweruntil2000.TheelectoralsuccessoftheKMT

duringthatdecadewastoalargeextentbasedontheMainstreamfaction’sclientel‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–184–

isticconnectionswithlocalfactions.Ontheotherhand, lackingsimilarclientelistic

links, both theNon‐mainstream factionwithin theKMTaswell as theDPPdevel‐

opedprogrammaticappeals.Therefore,whentheDPPtookpowerattheturnofthe

millennium, clientelism ceased to be a viable strategic option. This is because the

KMTfounditselfexcludedfromaccesstostateresources,whiletheDPPwasunable

touseitsnewly‐achievedexecutivepowertoestablishclientelisticlinkageswiththe

electorate, since its electoral success was largely built on criticising the growing

levelofcorruptionduetheKMT’sclientelisticmoneypolitics.

Aone‐partydominantsystem(1991‐2000)

Someauthorshavedescribed theprocessofdemocratisation inTaiwanasa “pro‐

tractedtransition”(Rigger2000),giventhattheKMTcontinuedtodominateparty

politics for almost a decade after holding the first free and fair elections. In fact,

throughoutthe1990s,theeffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesneverexceeded

2.5, as theKMT successfullymanaged tomaintain its absolute parliamentaryma‐

jority. Similarly, volatility remained at a relatively low level for newdemocracies,

indicatingthatvotersdidnotswitchtheirvotesfromtheregimepartytootheral‐

ternatives(seeTable11).Asaresult,theDPP,asthemainoppositionparty,failedto


–185–

significantly increase its seat share in 1990s elections and never posed a serious

threattotheformerregimeparty(seeTable12).

Turningourattention towards the intra‐party level,we canobserve that, from

thebeginning,apower‐sharingagreementwas institutionalisedwithin theDPP to

accommodate thedifferentgroupings:While themoderatesdominated theparty’s

decision‐makingapparatus(thepartychairandthecentralstandingcommittee),the

NewTideobtainedadisproportionateshareofpostsinthepartybureaucracy(Rig‐

ger 2001a: 25). In order to diminish the influence of theNewTide, themoderate

forceswithin theDPPmergedwith the Formosa Faction,which had risen to high

prominence after its leaderswere pardoned and released from prison in the late

1980s.

TABLE11: TAIWAN–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORS

ENEPa ENPPb Volatilityc

1992 1.95 1.86 ‐1995 2.51 2.42 16.701998 2.65 2.25 11.302001 4.12 3.47 28.602004 3.71 3.25 7.102008 2.30 1.75 23.30Average 2.85 2.50 17.40

Notes:aEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiescalculatedontheshareofvotesinelec‐tionstotheLegislativeYuan(for2008usingthevoteforthesingle‐memberconstituency).bEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesintheLegislativeYuan.cFor2008basedonthevoteforthesingle‐memberconstituency.Source: Author’sowncalculationsbasedonTable12.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–186–

FactionalpoliticsintheDPPwerethuscharacterisedbyintenseconfrontation.Con‐

flict between the two factions revolvedmainly around the search for an efficient

electoral strategy.Once theKMT followed throughwith its promise to liftmartial

lawandholdfreeandfairelections,theissueofdemocraticreformlostitsvalueasa

vehicleforvotermobilisation(Rigger1999:148).Itsoonbecameapparentthatthe

DPPhadbeennothingmorethanan“umbrella”partyforadversariesoftheKMTre‐

gime.Whereas theFormosa factiongatheredmostof theopposition’spolitical ce‐

lebrities,thuscombiningcharismawithacatch‐allprogrammaticstrategy,theNew

Tidefollowedaverynarrowideology,stressingthesub‐ethniccleavageandcalling

blatantlyforTaiwaneseindependencefrommainlandChina.TheFormosagroup,in

contrast, took a much more moderate standpoint, and argued that self‐

determination could only be achieved through open debates and referenda (Chao

2002: 108). Both factions also differed as to their level of institutionalisation.

WhereastheFormosafactioncouldbeclassifiedasapersonalisedfaction,theNew

Tide is virtually a “partywithin a party” (Arrigo 1994: 161)with its own profes‐

sionalstaff,andahighlysophisticatedorganisationalapparatus.

IntheinitialyearsaftertheDPP’sfounding,theFormosafactionprevailedover

theNewTide.However, thingschangedwhenoverseasadvocatesofTaiwan inde‐

pendencewere allowed back into the country.Many of the returning exiles soon

joinedtheDPP,therebytippingtheinter‐factionalbalanceinfavouroftheNewTide

(Wachman1994:118).ThisallowedtheNewTidetolaunchacredibleattackonthe

party’s policy platform at the 1991 national party congress to include the goal of


–187–

Taiwanindependence.Afterseveralroundsofnegotiationsthetwofactionsfinally

cametoacompromise.TheFormosafactionwasallowedtorenewitspartyleader‐

ship, while the New Tide’s urge for national sovereignty for Taiwan became the

DPP’sofficialideologicalline(ChengandHsu1996:147).

TABLE12: TAIWAN–RESULTSFORLEGISLATIVEYUANELECTIONS

1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008aParty

Vb Sc V S V S V S V S V S

KMT 53.0 59.0 46.1 51.8 46.4 54.7 28.6 30.2 32.8 35.1 53.5 71.7DPP 31.0 31.7 33.2 32.9 29.6 31.1 33.4 38.7 35.7 39.6 38.2 23.9NP ‐ ‐ 13.0 12.8 7.1 4.9 2.6 0.4 0.1 0.4 ‐ ‐TAIP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.4 0.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PFP ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 18.6 20.4 13.9 15.1 0.3 0.9TSU ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 7.8 5.8 7.8 5.3 0.9 0.0Other 16.0 9.3 7.7 2.5 15.5 8.9 9.0 4.5 9.6 2.8 3.1 3.2

Notes:aTheshareofvotesforthe2008electionsiscalculatedontheabsolutenumberofvotesreceivedbypartiesinthesingle‐memberconstituencies.bShareofvotes(inpercent)cShareofseats(inpercent)Source: Rinza(2001);LinJ.W.(2002);ChenC.F.(2006);TaipeiTimes(2008)

Thus,theissueofnational identitywasintroducedintotheelectoralarena,almost

immediatelydevelopingintothemostimportantfactorwithwhichtoexplainvoting

behaviour (Hsieh 2002: 38). If the KMTwanted to compete successfullywith the

DPPunder thenewdemocratic rules, itneeded to takeastandon thequestionof

national identity. This caused intense factional conflict within the former regime

party.Whereas theconservativeNon‐mainstreamheld theorthodoxview that the

government inTaipeiwas thesole legitimategovernmentofChina,whichhad the

OLIVERHELLMANN

–188–

dutytopromoteChineseunificationandnationalism,theMainstream–althoughnot

rulingoutthepossibilityofaunifiedChinainthefuture–maintainedthatTaiwan

wasdefactoindependent(Hood1996).

TABLE13: TAIWAN–VOTERS’ATTITUDESTOWARDSTHENATIONALIDENTITYISSUE(%)

EISa MISb SQSc MUSd EUSe

December‘92 6.2 6.3 30.6 30.1 26.9January‘95 6.6 8.6 51.1 20.7 12.9March‘96 9.1 12.4 53.5 15.4 9.7January‘99 12.9 14.8 43.5 17.4 11.4June‘00 6.2 15.3 46.0 22.4 10.1

Notes:aExtremeindependencesupporter.bModerateindependencesupporter.cStatusquosupporter.dModerateunificationsupporter.eExtremeunificationsupporter.Source: Hsieh(2001:935)

AscanbeseenfromTable13,publicopinionbenefitedtheKMTMainstream,asthe

largestshareofvoterswasgroupedaroundthecentreofthespectrum,eitherpre‐

ferringtoretainthestatusquoorsupportingunificationwithChinaonlyundercer‐

taincircumstances.Moreover, theMainstreamfaction’sstrong linkswith local fac‐

tions proved to be very effective channels for electoralmobilisation, allowing the

MainstreamtobecomethedominantfactionwithintheKMT(Hood1997:109).Al‐

ready in 1988, Taiwanese Lee Teng‐hui had been elected the party’s chairman,

thereby automatically also becoming president of theRepublic of China.With the

governmentresourcesathisdisposal,Leeslowlyconsolidatedhispowerbybring‐


–189–

ingpeoplewhosupportedhimintoimportantdecision‐makingpositionswithinthe

partyandthestate(Tan2002:157).UndertheleadershipofLeeTeng‐huitheKMT

thenshiftedtowardsamoremoderatepositionontheTaiwanidentityversusChi‐

neseidentityspectrum(Fell2005:111).

Wecanthereforesummarisethatbothmajorparties inTaiwanwereeachsplit

into two larger factions, which differed considerably in their electoral strategies.

Thisagainsupportsourviewthatsocialagentsareabletodevelopalternativestra‐

tegicreactionstothesamecontext.IntheKMT,theMainstreamfaction,basedonits

close linkwithlocal factions, followedaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobilisation.

Thefactionalsogaveitselfabroadprogrammaticimagetodistanceitselffromthe

Non‐mainstream, which campaigned on very narrowly defined programmatic ap‐

peals,pushingforre‐unificationwiththeChinesemainland.IntheDPP,too,factions

weredividedoverstrategiesforvotermobilisation:WhiletheFormosafactioncam‐

paignedonabroadprogrammaticplatform,supportedbythecharismaofits lead‐

ers,theNewTidetargetedverynarrowlydefinedsocialgroupswithitscallforTai‐

wanese independence.The reasonswhy thesevariousactorsdevelopeddivergent

electoralstrategiesarebeyondthescopeof thisanalysis–most likelybecauseac‐

torsholddifferentsetsofresourcesorideas–buttheimportantpointtonoteisthat

themajorTaiwanesepartiesweredeeplyrivenbyfactionalism.

However,intheDPP,theinter‐factionalconflictoverthebestelectoralstrategy

lessenedthroughthe1990s.WhentheDPPmovedtothefarleftoftheunification‐

independencespectrumin1991,thiswasheavilypenalisedbytheelectorate,asthe

OLIVERHELLMANN

–190–

partyonlywon29.34%ofthevotesinthefirstfreeandfairelectionstotheNational

Assembly (compared to 71.17won by the KMT). After this disastrous defeat, the

DPPbegantoredraftitsindependencepolicy,bringingitintolinewithpublicopin‐

ion (Rigger 2001a: 126). However, the failure of the pure Taiwan independence

platformdidnotweakenthepositionoftheNewTidewithintheDPP.Infact,forthe

subsequentyearstheDPPwascontrolledbyabalancedNewTide‐Formosacoalition

that was pitted against smaller factions that emerged in the early 1990s (Fulda

2002: 331). Rather, theNewTidemoderated its own ideology (Chao 2002: 113).

Particularlyafterthe1996presidentialelection,whichwasovershadowedbymili‐

tarymanoeuvresheldbythePeople’sRepublicofChinaintheTaiwanStrait,ithas

becomeclearthatTaiwaneseindependencecanonlybeachievedbyriskingamajor

war.Inthesameyear,agroupofdie‐hardradical independenceadvocatesleftthe

DPP,andfoundedtheirownparty–theTaiwanIndependenceParty(TAIP,Jianguo

dang).

WhentheDPPmovedfurthertothecentreoftheideologicalspectrum,theKMT

hadtofollow,ifitdidnotwanttolosetheelectoralfightforthemedianvoter.This,

again, helped theMainstream to tighten its grip on power. Moreover, bymoving

away from the revolutionary mission of the KMT, and taking a more Taiwan‐

orientedstance,theMainstreamdisappointedmanywhowishedtoupholdthepo‐

litical legacyofChiangKai‐shek.Ultimately, in1993, theNewAlliance,a factionof

mainlysecondgenerationmainlanderswithintheNon‐mainstream,decidedtosplit

awayfromtheKMTinordertoestablishtheNewParty(NP,Xindang)(Hood1996:


–191–

477).This gave theMainstreamyetmore leverageover theKMTdecision‐making

apparatus,allowingLeeTeng‐huitomovethepartyevenfurthertothecentreofthe

nationalidentityspectrum.Finally,afterwinningthe1996presidentialelectionLee

andhis factionultimatelybeat theNon‐mainstream in the inter‐factional struggle,

makingthedistinctionbetweenthetwofactionsobsolete.Asanexpressionof this

dominance Lee proclaimed his “two‐states theory” in July 1999, which held that

TaiwanandthePeople’sRepublicofChinaenjoyed“specialstatetostaterelations”

(Schubert2004:540).

However, Lee’s leadership did not go unchallenged, as the highly charismatic

JamesSoongemergedasa seriousopponent.Onceclosepartyassociates,Leehad

appointedSoongasthegovernorofTaiwanProvincein1993.59Thingsbecamesour

between the twowhenLeeperceivedSoong’s increasingpopularitywith theelec‐

torateasathreattohisownstatusandthusdidnotnominateSoongasprimeminis‐

terin1996,althoughSoongfeltthatasthegovernorofTaiwanheshouldhavenatu‐

rallybeenselected.Moreover,in1998,theLeegovernmentdecidedtoabolishTai‐

wanProvinceasanadministrativeunit,thereby–asSoongandhissupportersbe‐

lieved–destroyingSoong’spowerbase.Finally,whenSoonglosttheKMT’snomina‐

tionforthepresidentialcandidatein2000againstLienChan,whoLeeendorsedas

hissuccessor,SoongleftthepartytostandasanindependentandestablishthePeo‐

pleFirstParty(PFP,Qinmindang)shortlybeforethe2001LegislativeYuanelections.

59WhentheKMTarrivedinTaiwanin1949theadministrationthatruledTaiwanasaprovinceoftheRepublicofChinawasleftuntouched.However,sinceTaiwanalsobecamethelastterritorytobeef‐fectivelyruledbythegovernmentoftheRepublicofChina,thisgaverisetoanodddoubleadminis‐trativestructure.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–192–

Atwo‐partysystememerges

Lee’s powerful positionwithin the KMT suddenly collapsedwhen Lien Chan only

finished third in the presidential election behind the DPP’s Chen Shui‐bian and

JamesSoong.RumoursstartedspreadingwithintheKMTthatLeehadonlyfavoured

theunpopularLienChantosecretlysupportChenShui‐bian,whootherwisewould

nothavebeenstrongenoughtobeatSoong.Asaresult,Leehadtoresignfromthe

partychairmanshiptotakeresponsibilityforthedevastatingresult,andLienChan

waselectedashissuccessorbythenationalpartycongress in June2000. Immedi‐

atelyafterassumingchairmanship,LienChanformedareformcommitteetoexam‐

ine ways that the party could reform itself andmake itself competitive in future

elections(Tan2002:158).OnestrategicmistakeidentifiedwastheKMT’sproblem‐

aticpositionat the ideologicalcentreof thenational identityspectrum.UnderLee

Teng‐hui,theKMTattackedboththeDPPforpushingforindependence,andtheNP

foradvocatingrapidunification.ItwasfeltthatthiscontradictorytonelosttheKMT

votesonbothsides(Fell2005:120).Accordingly,thenewpartyleadershipdecided

tomovethepartybacktothecentre‐right.Moreover,theMainstream’srelianceon

itslinkswithlocalfactionsforelectoralmobilisationhadpavedthewayfororgan‐

isedcrimeintotheLegislativeYuanandledtoincreasinglevelsofpoliticalcorrup‐

tionatthenationallevel(Yuetal.2008).TheDPPsuccessfullyattackedtheKMTon

the“blackgold”issue,forcingthepartytotakeatougherlineoncorruptionandcut‐

tingtheconnectionstolocalfactions.


–193–

Consequently, since 2000 more programmatic‐oriented forces have come to

dominate the KMT,which, in turn, have reintroducedmany traditional principles

into the party’s policy platform. TheKMT clearly returned to the formula of “one

China, twopoliticalentities”,whichadvocatesunificationofTaiwanandthemain‐

landinaChineseconfederation(Schubert2004:541).Asaresultoftheideological

shifttotheright,supportersofthepoliciesadvocatedbyLeeTeng‐huilefttheKMT

inorder toestablish theTaiwanSolidarityUnion (TSU,TaiwanTuanjieLianmeng),

shortlybeforethe2001LegislativeYuanelections.However,thisdidnotmeanthe

endofideologicalconflictwithintheKMT,astheKMTsawtheemergenceofanew

faction,theBentupaifaction.60ThefactionarosebecauseKMTpoliticiansincentral

andsouthernTaiwan,wherecompetitionwiththeDPPisfiercest,sawthenecessity

totakeamoremoderatepositiononthenationalidentityissueinordernottojeop‐

ardisetheirelectoralchances.61WangJinpyng,speakeroftheLegislativeYuansince

1999,iswidelyseenastheleaderoftheBentupai.

Hence,while theKMThas remembered its ideological roots, theDPPhas con‐

tinued its ideologicalmoderation.Sincewinning thepresidency in2000, theparty

has repeatedly expressed itswish to conserve the status quo in the relations be‐

tweenTaiwanandPRC,whileleavinganydecisionaboutfuturechangestotheTai‐

60Bentuliterallymeans“homeland”.InpoliticalTaiwan,thetermbentupaireferstoanypublicfigureorgroupwhoidentifywithTaiwanandgiveprioritytothewell‐beingoftheTaiwaneseaheadofcon‐cernsfortheChinesenation.61Traditionally,theKMTisstrongerinthenorthofTaiwanaroundthecapitalofTaipeibecausethisareawasthemaintargetforpublicinfrastructuralinvestmentsundermartiallaw.Moreover,TaipeiisweremostsupportersoftheKMTsettledaftertheyfledthemainlandin1949.Conversely,votersinthesoutharemorelikelytofeelTaiwaneseratherthanChineseandsupportanindependentTai‐wan(LeeP.S.andHsu2002).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–194–

wanesepopulation(Chao2003).AstothefactionalconfigurationwithintheDPP,it

canbenotedthattheNewTideisnowtheonlyfoundingfactionleft,astheFormosa

factionincreasinglymergedintootherfactionsandceasedtoexist.Themainreason

foritsdisintegrationwasthedecisionofitslong‐termpatron,XuXinliang,torunas

anindependentcandidateinthe2000presidentialelection(Fulda2002:331).Other

prominent Formosa members established their own factions: Zhang Junhong

founded theNewEra faction, XuRongshuorganised theNewEnergy faction. The

NewEnergyandothersmallerfactionsalliedattheparliamentaryleveltoformthe

MainstreamAllianceinordertosupportpresidentChenShui‐bianintheLegislative

Yuan.

Chen Shui‐bian also won the 2004 presidential election, thereby forcing Lien

ChantostepdownasKMTchairman.InordertoelectanewleadertheKMT–for

the first time in itshistory–helda closedprimary in2005 that allowedallparty

memberstoparticipate inthevoting.Twopoliticiansputforwardtheircandidacy:

Wang Jinpyng andMaYing‐jeou, the thenmayor of Taipei. The primary again re‐

flectedtheideologicalconflictwithintheparty.WhileWanghadtheloyalsupportof

theBentupai, Ma, born in Hong Kong tomainland parents, represented themore

traditionalforcesintheKMT.MadefeatedWangwithaclear72to28percentmar‐

gin, butwas forced to step down as chairman only two years laterwhen hewas

chargedovermisuseofpublicfundsduringhistenureasmayorofTaipei.However,

afterhewasfoundnotguilty,Mamadeaswiftcomebackandwasnominatedasthe

KMT’scandidateforthe2008presidentialelection.


–195–

Meanwhile,theDPP’sthevictoryinthe2004presidentialelectionsallowedChen

Shui‐bian to further consolidate its power over the smaller personalised factions.

ThisdominancecontinueddespitesharplydroppingpopularityratingsforChenaf‐

teraseriesofcorruptionandinsidertradingscandalsinvolvingChenandhisfamily

becamepublicin2006.Accordingtosomeobservers,thisisprobablyduetothefact

thatseveralfactionleaders–withChen’sknowledge–werealsoinvolvedincorrup‐

tion,givingCheneffectiveblackmailmaterial.62

ThecaseofTaiwanconfirmsoneofthecentraltheoreticalfoundationsofhistori‐

calinstitutionalism:Surroundedbythesameexternalcontext,partyinternalactors

havesincetheintroductionoffreeandfairelectionssimultaneouslydevelopedvery

different electoral strategies tomobilise voters.Within the KMT, theMainstream

factionused itsstrong linkswith local factionsto integratevoters intoclientelistic

exchange networks, while the Non‐mainstream faction – either because it lacked

similarpatron‐clientlinksorbecauseitsinterpretationoftheenvironmentdidnot

allow the faction to recognise these opportunities – developed programmatic ap‐

pealstargetingtraditionalKMTsupportergroups.Similarly,usingaresource‐based

approachtoexplaindifferentelectoralstrategies,fortheDPPclientelismasanelec‐

toral strategy was not an option either, since it took the party nine years to be

elected into national government. Therefore, the major factions within the DPP

competedoveraprogrammaticprofilefortheparty:WhiletheNewTide–atleast

initially–pushed fora ratherextremistplatform,openly calling for independence

62PersonalcommunicationwithI‐ChouLiu,8May2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–196–

from China, the Formosa faction combined a catch‐all electoral strategy with the

charismaticqualitiesofitsleaders.

A central aspect of theDPP’s programmatic profilewas the call for clean gov‐

ernment,wherebythepartycreatedapublicdiscourseveryhostiletoclientelism.In

otherwords,whentheDPPwonthepresidencyin2000thepartywasunabletouse

itsaccesstostateresourcestoemployaclientelisticstrategyforvotermobilisation,

but it had to follow through with its electoral promises to implement anti‐

corruptionreforms(seeGöbel2004).An importantcondition for thisdiscourse to

emergewasclearlythehighlevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentinTaiwan,mean‐

ing that voters were not caught in a dependency relationship but able to assess

otheroptionsanddefect from theclientelisticgame.Clientelismonly continues to

play a role in local‐level elections, where electoral districts are small enough for

peopletoknoweachotherandvoterswillthusfinditverydifficultnottovotefor

theirrespectivelocalfaction(Mattlin2004).Fuelledbyitsearlyelectoralsuccessat

locallevel,eventheDPPhasdevelopedextensiveclientelisticlinkageswiththeelec‐

torateincounty,townshipandvillageelections.63

Concerning the organisational development of political parties in Taiwan, we

shouldthereforeexpecttheKMTMainstreamtoinvestmostofitsresourcesintoin‐

formal clientelistic networks, while the Non‐mainstream should be interested in

strengtheningthepartyasaformalinstitutionfordecision‐making.Similarly,inthe

DPP,theFormosafactionandothersmallerpersonalisedfactionsheavilyrelyingon

63PersonalcommunicationwithChung‐liWu,1May2008.


–197–

the charisma of their leaders for voter mobilisation should have little interest in

strengtheningthepartycentraloffice.TheNewTide,ontheotherhand,which–at

leastintothesecondhalfofthe1990s–campaignedonaclearprogrammaticplat‐

form, can be expected to push for strong formalmechanisms to centrally enforce

partydiscipline.

Partyorganisation

Aswill be shown in the following sections, our expectations are indeedmet. This

means that, currently, as theNon‐mainstream is now the dominant faction in the

KMT,whiletheDPP’sNewTidehasbroadeneditsownprogrammaticappealsintoa

broadcatch‐allstrategy,thetwomajorpoliticalpartiesinTaiwansharemanysimi‐

laritieswith their counterparts in contemporaryWesternEurope: Partymembers

donotdiffersignificantlyintheirrightsandobligationsfromordinarycitizens,the

procedures of candidate selection are highly inclusive – extending participatory

rightstovotersoutsidetheparty–andtheroleofthepartybureaucracyislimited

totheprofessionaladministrationoftheparty’sresources.Thisalltranslatestothe

party inpublicofficebeing thedominantelementofpartyorganisation.However,

partiesinTaiwanarrivedatthisstagenotthroughan“evolutionaryleap”,butthey

followed very distinctive paths of organisational development, constrained by the

OLIVERHELLMANN

–198–

inter‐factionalconflictwithineachof thepartiesand theparticularenvironmental

context.

Partymembership

InTaiwan, as in SouthKorea,manypartymembersdonot join thepartybecause

they identifywith theparty’s ideologyorpolicyprogramme,butbecause theyare

recruitedthroughthepersonalnetworkofapoliticianwithintheparty.Thepoliti‐

cianwillthenpaythemembershipfees,administerthemembershipIDsandinstruct

themembershowtovoteinpartyinternalelections.However,thisformof“party”

membership–solelymotivatedthroughtheinterpersonalrelationshipbetweenthe

memberandthepolitician–isnotthegeneralcase.Whileitisimpossibletopresent

figures thatwould reflect the exact share ofmemberswho are simply power re‐

sourcesinthehandsofapoliticalboss,anumberofindirectindicatorscanhelpto

achievearoughestimate.Firstofall,thefactthatthereareseveralwordsinpolitical

Taiwan to describe this type ofmembers – rentoudangyuan (literally, headmem‐

bers)orkoudaidangyuan(pocketmembers)–thusdistinguishingthemfromregular

partymembersinamoreWesternEuropeanunderstanding,showsthattheyarenot


–199–

thegeneralrule.64Moreover,pocketmembershaveusuallybeenregardedmoreasa

problemoftheDPPratherthantheKMT,simplybecausetheKMThasamuchlarger

membership, therebymaking itmoredifficult forsinglepoliticians tohavea large

enoughpersonalnetworkofsupportersthatcouldinfluencepartyinternaldecision‐

makinginhisorherfavour.

TABLE14: TAIWAN–PARTYMEMBERSHIP

KMT DPP

Ma M/Vb M/Ec M M/V M/E

TotalM/E

1950 80,043 n/a n/a ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1975 1,448,106 n/a n/a ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1990 2,546,429 n/a n/a ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1991 2,570,904 42.1 17.8 24,546 1.2 0.1 17.91992 2,617,651 52.0 18.6 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1995 ‐ ‐ ‐ 49,674 1.6 0.4 ‐2000 2,200,000 47.2 15.7 150,000 5.1 1.1 16.82005 900,000 28.2 6.4 400,000 11.5 2.9 9.32008 1,000,000 18.9 7.0 250,000 6.6 1.8 8.8

Notes:aPartymembership–realfiguresandestimates.bMembership/voterratio.cMembership/electorateratio.Source: WuC.L.(1997:236);Guo,HuangandChiang(1998:195);andpersonalcommunicationwiththe

politicalparties.

Undertheone‐partyregimeoftheKMTpartymembershipfigureshavetraditionally

been relatively high. In an attempt to imitate the organisational structures of the

Communist Party of China (CPC), the KMT, in the early 1950s, started building a

64Theterm“headmembers”referstothefactthatmemberswhosemembershipfeesarebeingpaidbypowerfulbossesarenothingmorethanpiecesinthestrategicgamesplayedbythesebosses.Simi‐larly,“pocketmembers”isusedtodescribethecommonpracticeofbosseskeeping“their”members’membershipcardsintheirown“pockets”andonlyhandingthemouttotheactualmemberbeforeapartyinternalelection.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–200–

massmembershipfoundationthatwouldincorporateallsectorsofsocietyintothe

party.Memberswereorganised into about30,000party cells in geographical and

administrativeunits(downtovillagelevel)aswellasattheworkplace(suchasin

government offices, schools, businesses and the transportation sector). Party

membershipsizegrewfrom80,043in1950tomorethan2.6millionin1992.Even

aftertheintroductionoffreeandfairelections,themembershiplevelremainedwell

abovethe2millionmark,whichtranslatesintomoreorless14percentofthetotal

electorate. However, these figures were based on outdated records that included

peoplewho had died, changed residence, or shifted party loyalties. Consequently,

whentheKMTaskeditsmemberstore‐registerin2000–afterthedevastatingde‐

feat in the presidential elections – this resulted in amembership of 900,000 – or

aboutsixpercentofthetotalelectorate(seeTable14).

However, the sharp drop inmembership figureswas not only the result of an

updateof theofficialmembership records,but the re‐registrationprocess also in‐

cludedmeasuresthatwereaimedatexcludingpocketmembers–orfakemembers

(whoonlyexistedonpaper)–fromtheparty.Inordertore‐registerpartymembers

hadtopaytheirannualmembershipfeeatalocalconveniencestore,andthensend

the receipt together with the completed membership form to the national KMT

headquarters. Collective receipts that listed more than one membership fee pay‐

mentwerenotaccepted.Whatismore,thenationalpartyconductedspotchecksto

makesurethatthecitizenswhoregistereddidindeedexistandprovidedthecorrect

contactdetails.


–201–

Although this systemstill contains some loopholes, recruitingpocketmembers

has definitely become more difficult, as can also be deduced from the smaller

membershipfigureafter2000.Inotherwords,wecanassumethatthemajorityof

partymembersjointheKMTbecausetheyfeelpsychologicallyattachedtoitsideo‐

logicalprogramme,andnotduetotheirroleasaclient inapatron‐clientrelation‐

ship.Thereforethere‐registrationprocessmustbeunderstoodasanattemptbythe

Non‐mainstream faction, which re‐established itself as the dominant faction after

thedisastrous2000presidentialelection,tocleansethepartymembershipofMain‐

streamfollowers.WhiletheMainstreamhadbeenattractingthelargestshareofits

supportersthroughtheclientelisticdistributionofmaterialrewards,supportersof

theNon‐mainstreamaremore interestedincollective incentives–sharingthefac‐

tion’s goal of reunificationwith the Chinesemainland in the long run – and thus

morelikelytopayregularpartymembershipfees.

One party internal group that has traditionally been characterised by a high

share of die‐hard ideologists is the party’sHuang Fuhsing division.65 This special

branch consistsmainly ofmilitary servicemen and veterans aswell as their rela‐

tives,mostofwhomaremainlandChineseandstillhavestrong feelings forChina.

TheHuangFuhsing had losta largenumberof itsmembersdue toLeeTeng‐hui’s

pro‐Taiwanpolicy,butwhentheKMTreturnedto itsmore traditionalpositionon

theChinaquestionmanyre‐joinedtheparty(particularlyfromtheNP),bringingthe

65PersonalcommunicationwithChung‐liWu,1May2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–202–

membershipfigureofthesub‐partygroupingbacktoabout200,000(TaipeiTimes

2001).

IntheDPP,becausethepartymembershipismuchsmaller,pocketmembersare

amore serious problem.As can be seen fromTable 14, evennine years after the

party’s founding only 50,000 voters had registered asDPPmembers. Evenbefore

the2000presidentialelectionsthefigurehadonlyrisento150,000.Thesuddenin‐

creaseto400,000afterChenShui‐bian’shistoricalvictorywas interpretedbyDPP

leadersasasignthat fearsofpersecutionbasedonpoliticalaffiliationstillexisted

underthenewlycrafteddemocraticrules.However,astheDPPbecamethepartyin

power, thereby gaining immense powers of patronage and government spending,

thisalsoledtoanincreaseofpocketmembers.EstablishedfiguresintheDPPsud‐

denlyfoundthemselvesclosetorealpoliticalpowerandmanysawtherecruitment

ofpocketmembers as an effectiveway topromote their own interestswithin the

party(Rigger2001a:65). Inotherwords, theballooningof theDPP’smembership

sizeafter2000mustbetakenwithapinchofsalt,sincealargenumberofmembers

onlyjoinedbecausetheywerepaidbypoliticallyambitiousbosses.

In2006theDPPpassedaresolutionstipulatingthatthepartywouldexpelpeo‐

plewho"buy"members,andthatthosewhoselltheirnameswouldnotbeableto

jointheparty for twoyears.Clearly, theNewTide factionwithintheDPPmustbe

interestedincombatingpocketmembers,sincethefaction’smembershiphastradi‐

tionally been highly exclusive, making admission dependent on ideological com‐

mitments.However,aswillbeshownbelow,theDPPisfinanciallydependentonthe


–203–

membershipduespaid forpocketmembers.Moreover,a largeshareof thepocket

membersisrecruitedbylocal‐levelpoliticians.Crackingdownonpocketmembers

couldthereforeprovokethesepoliticianstorunasindependents,therebyreducing

theDPP’salreadysmallpoolofcandidatesevenfurther.

Asaresult,unlike intheKMT, theresolution issued in2006wasnotaccompa‐

niedbyanymeasuresthatwouldeffectivelyhelptoidentifypocketmembers,such

as re‐registeringpartymembership inperson.Thedramaticdropof themember‐

shipsizeto250,000in2008thusseemstobeunrelatedtothismeasure,particularly

since in the same yearWuChin‐tai, amember of theDPP’s youth committee still

complainedthat“theoldsystemofcollectivevoting[ofpocketmembers]willcon‐

tinueandthesameoldfaceswillruntheparty”(WuC.T.2008).

WecanthussumupthatthemajorityofpartymembersinTaiwanjoinaparty

because they identify with its policy goals. However, particularly within the DPP

there isa largeshareofpocketmembersamongtherankand file,while theKMT,

which–becauseofitslargermembershiphadneverbeenaffectedbythisproblem

tothesameextent–implementedfairlyeffectivemeasurestoexcludepocketmem‐

bers from the party in 2000. Pocketmembers do not enjoy any powers as party

members,sincetheirmembershipfeesarepaidbytherespectiveboss,whowillalso

instructthemhowtovoteinpartyinternalelections.Thequestionthatremainsto

beansweredishowpowerfulregularmembersare.

TherequirementstobecomeamemberinoneofTaiwan’stwomajorpartiesare

relativelylow.Theonlyobligationsthatcomewithpartymembershipareabidingto

OLIVERHELLMANN

–204–

therespectiveparty’sstatutesandpayingregularfees.Upuntil2000,theKMTdid

not evenenforce thepaymentofmembershipdues.A strictly enforced feeof 200

NTD(about3.30GBP)perannumwasonlyintroducedinthecontextofthemember

re‐registrationprocess66,whichshouldbeunderstoodprimarilyasastrategicmove

bytheNon‐mainstreamfactiontomakeitmoredifficultfortheMainstreamfaction

tosustaintheirclientelisticnetworks.Incontrast,DPPmembershavealwaysbeen

requiredtopayregularpartyduesorotherwisetheirpartyrightswillbesuspended.

Atthemomenttheannualfeeamountsto300NTD(about5GBP).67WhiletheDPP

reliesheavilyon these fees for its financialsurvival, theKMT,aswillbediscussed

later, has a number ofmore profitable sources of income, withmembership fees

only accounting for a small share of the party’s overall budget. In other words,

members in theDPPhold an important resource,which– in comparison–makes

themmore powerful thanmemberswithin the KMT. Yet, we should remind our‐

selvesthat,often,themembershipfeesarepaidcollectivelybypoliticalbosses,not

bythemembersthemselves.

However, the fact that the KMT regularly communicates with its members

(through an electronic newsletter and a frequently updated news‐section on the

party’swebsite), provides training to the heads of the local branches (in election

campaigning, votemonitoringet cetera) andholds introductory seminars fornew

members,showsthat thepartyvalues itsmembersmorethan justasamerestat‐

istic. Similarly, the DPP sends aweekly electronic newsletter to itsmembers and

66PersonalcommunicationwiththeKMT,12May2008.67PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May2008.


–205–

frequently communicates with the rank‐and‐file via e‐mail and text‐messaging.

Moreover, thepartyalsohasa trainingprogrammethat includespresentationsby

seniorparty leadersonparty idealsaswellaseducativesessionsonpartyregula‐

tionsandthepartyplatform.

Nevertheless,in‐betweenelectionsmembersinbothpartiesarelargelyinactive.

Before2000,intheKMT,eachlocalbranchwasrequiredtoholdamonthlymeeting

andreportbacktothenationalpartycentral,butthiswasamereformalitytokeep

upthefaçadeofaLeninistmassparty.68IntheDPP,localbranchesenjoyahighde‐

greeofindependencefromthepartycentral(Rigger2001a:58).Therefore,theac‐

tivityofmemberswillvaryfrombranchtobranch,withthoselocalpartychapters

that are filledwith pocketmembers usually characterised by the lowest levels of

membershipactivity.

Wecanthusconcludethat,ingeneral,thepartyonthegroundinboththeKMT

andtheDPPisnotaverypowerfulorganisationalelement.Putincomparativeper‐

spective, it is probably safe to say that partymemberships in Taiwan show very

similar characteristics to partymemberships in contemporaryWestern European

politicalpartiesintermsofsizeandinclusiveness.69However,themembershipor‐

ganisationsinboththeKMTandDPPhavedevelopedinverydifferentways,which

canbeexplainedthroughthedifferentelectoralstrategiesfollowedbythemainfac‐

tionsineachoftheparties.WhereastheKMT’sMainstream,whichusedclientelistic

68PersonalcommunicationwithI‐ChouLiu,8May2008.69Asamatteroffact,thetotalmembership/electorateratioinTaiwanisevenhigherthaninanyWesternEuropeandemocracyinthelate1990s,withtheexceptionofAustriaandFinland(seeMairandvanBiezen2001).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–206–

networkstomobilisevoters,wasnotinterestedinastrongpartyontheground,the

Non‐mainstream,followingaprogrammaticelectoralstrategy,pushedforalessin‐

clusive–andthusmorepowerful–partymembership,asthiswouldexcludemem‐

berswhowerenotideologicallycommitted,butwhoonlyjoinedthepartyaspocket

memberspaidbyleadingpoliticiansoftheMainstreamfaction.Asaresult,whenthe

Non‐mainstreambecame theKMT’s dominant faction in 2000, the party asked all

memberstore‐registerandintroducedmembershipfees.

IntheDPP,ontheotherhand,pocketmembersremainacharacteristicfeature,

as the membership is relatively small and many politicians – particularly those

competinginlocalelections,whereclientelismcontinuestoplayanimportantrole

forthemobilisationofvoters–donotfaceanysanctionswhenpayingthemember‐

ship fees for their supporters. The New Tide faction, which, like the KMT’s Non‐

mainstream, follows a programmatic strategy to gather votes, has been unable to

crack down on the problem of pocketmembers, since the party is financially de‐

pendentontheregularfeespaidforthesemembersbylocalbosses.Instead,asthe

nextsectionwillshow,theNewTidehas,overthepastfewyears,openedtheselec‐

tionofcandidates forpublicelections to thewiderelectorate inorder todiminish

theinfluenceofpocketmembersintheinternaldecision‐makingprocess–astrat‐

egyalsopursuedbytheKMT’sNon‐mainstream.


–207–

Candidateselection

InbothlargerTaiwanesepartiestheprocedurestonominatecandidatesforpublic

electionsonthenational levelhavegonethroughsomeconsiderablechangesover

thelasttwodecades.Alreadyinthelate1980stheKMTmadesignificantreformsto

itsregulationsofcandidateselection.Inordertopickcandidatesforthe1989“sup‐

plementary”electionstotheLegislativeYuan,theregime‐partysoftenedthehighly

exclusivenominationsystemthathadbeenuseduptothattime,andheldaclosed

primary.Soonafter,theDPPannounceditsintentiontoadoptaverysimilarprimary

system,hencealsoleavingtheselectionofcandidatestotherank‐and‐file.

IntheKMT,wheretheNon‐mainstream–althoughincreasingly losingpower–

wasstillthedominantfaction,aclosedprimarywasusedtomakeitmoredifficult

fortheMainstreamfactiontouseitsstronglinkswithlocalfactionsasaresourcein

the inter‐factional conflict. Itwas hoped that by forcing candidates to compete in

party primaries, the party would not have to negotiate with local factions over

nominationsandresourcesheldby local factionscouldgraduallybetakenoverby

theparty(RobinsonandBaum1993). Inotherwords, “thepartywasusing inner‐

partydemocratizationasa tool in its inner‐partypowerstruggleagainst local fac‐

tions”(Fell2006:176).

Moreover, the Non‐mainstream calculated that conservative party members,

particularlythosegroupedintheHuangFuhsing,wouldbeeasiertomobilisethan

the less ideologically‐committed supporters of the Mainstream faction (Wu C.L.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–208–

2001: 108). Similarly, in the DPP, the dominant Formosa faction estimated a nu‐

mericaladvantageovertheNewTide,basedonthetwofactions’differingorganisa‐

tionalstructures.AsRigger(2001a:27)pointsout,

[f]romthebeginning,theFormosaFactionwascentredonperson‐

alities, not issues. […]Aspiring politicians affiliatedwith Formosa

becausetheywantedtopartakeofitspoliticalresources:itspower

innominationsforelectoralandpartyoffices,itscontactswithpo‐

litical heavyweights, and its connections with local political net‐

works capableofmobilizingvotes and raisingmoney.The faction

didnot imposemuchdisciplineonitsmembers,nordid itrequire

themtoembraceaparticularideologyofplatform.Theonlyobliga‐

tion Formosa imposed upon faction members was to support its

leadersincontestforpowerwithintheparty.

TheNewTide,incontrast,wascharacterisedbystrongideologicalidentity.Admis‐

siontothefactionwasbasedonquality,notquantity.Evengrassroots‐levelactivists

were required to pay regular dues, attendmeetings, and commit vast amounts of

time and energy to faction activities.Hence, the Formosa faction couldbe sure to

rallymoresupportfortheircandidateswithinthepartythantheNewTide.Asare‐

sult,aclosedprimarywasimplementedinthelate1980s.


–209–

Taiwanesedemocratisationtookacrucialstepwhentheregimedeclaredtohold

electionsforanewNationalAssemblyin1991,andanewLegislativeYuanoneyear

later. Intherun‐uptothese foundingelections, theKMTcraftedconsiderablepro‐

ceduralrevisions.Candidateswerenowselectedbywhatthepartycalleda“revised”

closedprimary. In thenewsystempartymemberswere still givenavote,but the

outcomedidnotserveastheonlyfoundationonwhichthecentralstandingcommit‐

tee nominated the candidates. The evaluation by local cadres contributed 40 per

centin1991,and50percentin1992(WuC.L.2001:109).TheDPP,incontrast,re‐

tainedthegenuineclosedprimarysystem.

In the followingyears theKMTcontinued to curtailmembershipparticipation.

Toselect candidates for the1995LegislativeYuanelectionand the1996National

Assembly election, the former regimeparty conductednon‐bindingopinion inqui‐

riesamongitsmembers.Allpowertonominatecandidateswasnowwiththecent‐

ralstandingcommittee.Thenominationofthecentralstandingcommitteemembers

inturnwasverymuchcentralisedinthehandsofthepartychairmanwho,sincethe

14thpartycongressin1993,appointedhalfofthemembersplusone,whilethere‐

mainingmembersneededtheapprovalofthecentralcommittee,whichagainwasto

beelectedbythedelegatesinthenationalcongress(Huang1996:112).

ThisincreasingcentralisationofthecandidateselectionprocesswithintheKMT

canbeexplainedbythegrowingdominanceoftheMainstreamfaction.Inparticular,

after leading figuresof theNon‐mainstream left theparty in1993toestablish the

NP, the Mainstream tightened its grip on party internal power. Centralising the

OLIVERHELLMANN

–210–

nomination procedure became necessary to nourish the clientelistic networks on

whichtheMainstreamfactionbaseditsstrategyofvotermobilisation.Localfactions

notonlyreceivedmaterialrewardsinreturnfortheirelectoralsupport70,butlocal

factionmemberswerethemselvesnominatedascandidates.Asaconsequence,the

percentage of legislators with a local faction background increased steadily

throughoutthe1990s,leadingsomeobserverstoestimatethatabout60percentof

KMTlegislators inthe1992LegislativeYuanrepresentedlocal factions(ChenM.T.

1996:189).InordertostrategicallyallocatenominationstolocalfactionstheMain‐

streamneeded to centralise theprocedure for candidate selectionandabolish the

closedprimarysystem,whichdidnotallowformuchcontrolovertheoutcome.

TheDPPalsodevisednewrulesthatcurbedthepowerofthemembership,albeit

farlessdrasticallythantheKMT.In1995and1996thepartyselectedcandidatesby

holding a ballot among party officers and elected officials at the national level as

wellasamongpartymembers,withbothresultscontributing50percenttothefinal

outcome(Guo,HuangandChiang1998:200‐201).AsintheKMT,thisreformofthe

candidate selection procedure can be explained by changes in the inter‐factional

powerbalancewithin theparty.With theNewTidegrowing increasinglystronger

vis‐à‐vistheFormosafaction,bothfactionswereeventuallylockedinastalemateby

themid‐1990s.Dueto thisperfectbalanceofpower, theDPPadoptedasystemof

candidateselectionthatpleasedbothmajorfactions:Whilethe50percentthrough

70Partofthesematerialrewardswastakenfromthepartycoffers,butthelargestshareconsistedofpublicresources,extractedfromlocalmonopolyandoligopolyrightsand“moneymachines”likethecreditdepartmentsofthefishermens'associations(yuhui),thewaterconservancyassociations(shuilihui),andthefarmer'sassociations(nonghui).


–211–

membershipvotessatisfied theFormosa faction, theadjacent50percent through

partycadrevoteswasaconcessiontotheNewTide,whichhadanumericaladvan‐

tageintheintermediaryparty‐structures.

1996notonlysawelectionstotheNationalAssembly,butalsothefirstpopular

presidentialelectionsinthehistoryoftheRepublicofChina.Inordertoselecttheir

presidential candidate, bothmajor parties implemented systems thatwere rather

differentfromtheonesusedfortheselectionofcandidatesforparliamentaryelec‐

tions.Accordingtothenewlydesignedregulations,thepresidentialcandidateofthe

KMTneededthesupportoftheparty’snationalconvention.Delegatesincludedtwo

categories:700ex‐officiodelegates, and1,400electedby thegrassrootsmembers

(Wu C.L. 2001: 109). TheDPP, on its part, employed a primary consisting of two

stages.Thefirststageequalledthesystemusedfortheselectionoflegislativecandi‐

dates.Inthesecondstage,thetwowinnersthencompetedinanopenprimary.For

this, theDPP carried out 49 publicmeetings atwhich the candidates spoke, after

whichvoteswerecollected(Rigger2001a:78).

Thedifferentselectoratesforthenominationofpresidentialandlegislativecan‐

didatesareeasy toexplain.Regarding theKMT,althoughrelativelydemocraticon

paper,thesystemtoselectthepresidentialcandidatewas,inreality,stillhighlycen‐

tralised, as the national convention “served as nomore than a rubber stamp for

partychairLeeTeng‐hui’sdecisions”(Fell2006:180).IntheDPP,consideringthat

thenominationofthepresidentialcandidateisawinner‐takes‐it‐allgame,itwould

have been difficult to reach an agreement through inter‐factional negotiations,

OLIVERHELLMANN

–212–

whichiswhyamoredemocraticprocedureneededtobeinstitutionalised.Anopen

primaryallowsforthelargestselectoratepossible,therebyalsomakingitdifficultto

influencethefinaloutcomethroughthemobilisationofpocketmemberswithinthe

party.

Whereas theKMTheld on to the regulations just described up until 2001, the

DPP introducednewregulationsagainbeforethe1998electionsto theLegislative

Yuan. Party cadres and elected party officials were excluded from the decision‐

makingprocess.Instead,nominationswerebasedonapartymemberprimaryand

publicopinionsurveys,withbothresultsbeingweightedequally.71Ashasbeende‐

scribedabove,afterthedisastrous1996presidentialelections,theNewTidefaction,

whichwasgrowingstrongerandstronger,felttheneedtomoderateitsideological

stanceandmoveawayfromitsunrestrictedindependencepolicy.Thismadeitne‐

cessary for the faction’s leadership to gain independence from themore ideologi‐

callyradicalmembersintheintermediaryparty‐structures.Asamatteroffact,the

foundingoftheTAIPdidnotattractmanypro‐independencehardlinersfromwithin

theDPP(Rigger2001b:954)Hence,inlinewiththemoretheoreticalargumentsde‐

velopedbyKatz (2001) and Scarrow,WebbandFarrell (2000), theNewTidede‐

cidedtorendertheselectoratemoreinclusive.TheNewTideoptedforpublicopin‐

ion polls for two main reasons. First of all, members‐only primaries would have

translatedintoanumericaladvantagefortheFormosafaction.Secondly,theexperi‐ 71TheDPPconductsthepublicopinionpollsthroughitsownsurveycentre,whichhaseightfull‐timestaffmembers.Respondentsareofferedalistofprospectivecandidates,andaskedtochoosetheirfirstandsecondpreferences.Partymembersarenotsurveyed.Theresultsofthesurveysarekeptsecret,evenfromthecandidates,whoaregivenonlytheirownresultsandasummaryoftheircom‐petitors’results.


–213–

ence with an open primary in the run‐up to the 1996 presidential election had

shownthatfarfewerballotswerecastatthemassmeetingsthanexpected(Rigger

2001a: 99),meaning that outcome could be influenced by those politicians in the

partycontrollingalargeshareofpocketmembers.

Moreover,theDPPredesignedthenominationprocessforthe2000presidential

election.Underthenewrules,acandidateneededtheendorsementof40partyoffi‐

cials(includingprofessionalstaffandelectedofficials). Ifmorethanonecandidate

hadreceivedarecommendation,thepartywouldhaveheldaclosedprimary(Rig‐

ger2001a:101).However,asitturnedout,onlyonecandidatewasrecommended.

In this case the party regulations only demanded a three‐fifths approval by the

nationalpartycongress,which,accordingtoFell(2006:186),wasmerelyaquestion

ofrubber‐stampingChenShui‐bian’scandidacy.

Facing the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections, the KMT adopted the system em‐

ployed by the DPP for the 1998 elections. Candidates were chosen on an equal

weightingoftwofactors:aclosedprimaryandpublicopinionsurveys.Thelogicbe‐

hind this radical reformcanagainbe found in theparty internal conflictbetween

differentfactions:AfterthehumiliatingdefeatofLienChaninthe2000presidential

electionsandLeeTeng‐hui’s resignationasparty chairman,more traditional, pro‐

grammaticallyorientedforceswithintheKMTregainedpowerandbegantodestroy

theMainstream’s capacities to followa clientelistic strategy of votermobilisation.

Theythushadtocutthelinkstolocalfactionsbymakingitmoredifficultforanyone

withintheKMTtoallocatenominationstolocalfactionsinreturnforelectoralsup‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–214–

port.Hence,ratherthancentralisingtheselectionofcandidatesinthepartyleader‐

ship,publicopinionpollswere introduced.Thebasiccalculationwas thatbecause

manyofLeeTeng‐hui’sfollowershadbeenrecruitedthroughlocalfactionsandthus

weregenerallyassociatedwithorganisedcrime,corruptionandotherillegalactivi‐

ties,theywereunlikelytodoverywellinpublicopinionpolls.However,inorderto

includepartymembers in the internaldecision‐makingprocess in return for their

financial contribution, public opinion pollswere supplementedwith a closed pri‐

mary. The compulsory re‐registration of partymembers and the introduction of

membership fees meant that most pocket members had been excluded, with the

shareofideologicallydrivenmemberslikelytoincrease.

WhiletheKMTintroducedpublicopinionpollsforthefirsttimein2001,theDPP

decidedtoputmoreweightontheopinionpolls,whichnowconstituted70percent

of the total result.This ratiowas thenagainadoptedby theKMTbefore the2004

parliamentaryelections,while theDPPdidnotundertakeanyproceduralreforms.

Inbothpartiesthesechangescanagainbeexplainedbytherespectivedominantfac‐

tionincreasingitspowerevenfurther‐theNewTideintheDPPandtraditionalfor‐

ces–nowrallyingbehindpresidentMaYing‐jeou–intheKMT.

However,notonlydid theKMTcopy theDPP’s system toselect candidates for

parliamentaryelections,butitalsotookonaverysimilarsystemforthenomination

ofitspresidentialcandidatein2004.Accordingtothenewlyintroducedregulations,

acandidatemustobtaintheendorsementof50,000partymembers.Ifonlyonecan‐

didatemeets the required benchmark, voting will be held at the party’s national


–215–

congress.Otherwiseaclosedprimaryandopinionpollswillbeusedtofindthewin‐

ner.Yet,asinthecaseoftheDPP,therewasonlyoneapplicant,meaningthatboth

parties only alloweddelegates in thenational party congress toparticipate in the

decision‐makingprocess.Therealdecisionwasmadebehindcloseddoorsandthen

merelyrubber‐stampedbythedelegates’vote(Fell2006:183).

Thedevelopmentof candidate selection in theKMTandDPP is summarised in

Figure4.As canbe seen,bothpartiesbeganwith relatively inclusive selectorates,

givingallpartymemberstherighttovote.However,theythenmovedtowardsmore

exclusive procedures of candidate selection. The KMT, in particular, underwent a

considerable regression to a much less democratic past, when before the 1995

Legislative Yuan election the nomination of candidateswas centralised in a party

agency (central standing committee) that was half‐elected, half‐appointed by the

party leader.TheDPPalsoreachedits lowinselectorate inclusiveness in1995,by

basingnominationsonanequallyweightedvotebypartymembersandaselected

party agency (party cadres). Since then, however, both parties have returned to

moreinclusivemethodsofcandidateselection.Theynowemployaratherunusual

combinationofbindingopinionpollsandclosedmemberprimaries.Bindingopinion

polls, which are not covered by the analytical framework by Rahat and Hazan

(2001), should be settled halfway between open and closed primaries, since they

take candidate selection outside the political party, while choosing the voters

throughscientificsamplingmethods.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–216–

TheparticulardevelopmentofcandidateselectioninTaiwancanagainbeexplained

bytheinter‐factionalconflictwithineachofthemajorparties.IntheKMT,candidate

selectionwascentralisedbecausetheMainstreamfaction,whichgrewincreasingly

powerfulthroughouttheearly1990s,followedaclientelisticstrategyofvotermobi‐

lisation,meaning that the allocationof nominations for public electionshad to be

concentratedinthehandsofthepartyleadership.IntheDPP,ontheotherhand,the

selectionofcandidatesunderwentaprocessofcentralisation–albeitlessdramati‐

cally than in the KMT – as the increasingly powerful New Tide, following a pro‐

grammatic electoral strategy, wanted to transfer decision‐making power to the

intermediarypartystructuresinordertoincreasepartydiscipline.

0

2

4

6

1989

1991

1992

1995

1996

1998

2001

2004

KMT

DPP

FIGURE4: TAIWAN–INCLUSIVENESSOFTHESELECTORATEIN THEPROCESSOFCANDIDATESELECTION

Notes:Thedifferentcategoriestomeasuretheinclusivenessoftheselectoratewerecodifiedasfol‐lows:(1)non‐selectedpartyleader,(2)selectedpartyleader,(3)non‐selectedpartyagency,(4)selectedpartyagency,(5)partymembers,and(6)electorate.


–217–

Thisprocesswasreversedonlyafewyearslater,whentheNewTidebroadened

itsprogrammaticappealsintoacatch‐allelectoralstrategy,forcingthepartyleader‐

shipto free itself fromtheconstraininggripof thehardcore ideologistswithinthe

party.However,atomisingthepartymembershipthrougheitheranopenoraclosed

primarywasnotanoption,asthiswouldhaveplayedintothehandsoftheFormosa

and other smaller personalised factions,which controlled a large share of pocket

members.TheNewTidethereforeoptedforbindingpublicopinionpollsinorderto

limit theopportunities forvote‐buying.Basedonsimilarstrategiccalculations, the

KMT’sNon‐mainstream,afterre‐establishing itselfastheparty’sdominant faction,

copied this system to diminish the influence of theMainstream’s clientelistic net‐

worksoverthefinaloutcomeofthecandidateselectionprocedure.


While the twomajor Taiwanese political parties showmany similarities with re‐

gardstothetwoorganisationaldimensionsdiscussedsofar,theydiffersubstantially

in their endowmentwith politically relevant resources – particularly financial re‐

sources:WhereastheKMTisconsideredbysometobethewealthiestpartyinthe

world, the financial survival of the DPP has long been hanging from a very thin

thread, and to this day the party has to operate under an extremely tight budget

OLIVERHELLMANN

–218–

(Rigger2001a:69).TheKMT’s financialsuperiority lies in itsbusinessoperations,

whichthepartysetupinTaiwanafterfleeingtheChinesemainlandfromthecom‐

munist forces.Theseenterprises, includingconstructioncompanies, financial insti‐

tutions,computercompanies,electricalappliancecompanies,newspapersandtele‐

visionstations,wererunincloseassociationwiththestateandprosperedwiththe

strong economic development in Taiwan. As of the turn of the century, estimates

suggestthattheKMT’saccumulatedassetswereworthasmuchas200billionNTD

(about3.4millionGBP)(Matsumoto2002:360).

Whenthedemocratisationprocesssetininthelate1980stheKMTwasreluctant

togiveup itsorganisationalwealth.Althoughthepartyclaims itswealthhasbeen

accumulated through legalmeans, there isvery little transparency in themanage‐

mentofthefinancialresourcesastheKMT’sassetshaveneverbeendisclosedtothe

publicoreventopartymembers.Before1994allpartyassetswereheldinaccounts

underthenamesofindividualpartyleaders.Whenthepartytookcontroloftheas‐

sets, a centralised finance committeewas established to supervise party finances,

andpartyregulationsweredevelopedtorestrictthebuyingandsellingofpartyas‐

sets.Moreover,in2005,facingincreasingpublicaccusationsofcorruptionanddirty

moneypolitics,theKMTdecidedtotransferallitsassetsintoafundmanagedbya

privatefinancialmanagementcompany,whilethepartyitselfwouldceasetoengage

in any profit‐seeking activities. However, the KMT still benefits from the revenue

generatedbyitsassetsaswellasfromprofitsmadefromsellingassets,thusprovid‐


–219–

ingthepartywithalargewarchest,whichensuresthattheKMTdoesnothaveto

relyonmoretraditionalfundraisingactivitiesforitsorganisationalsurvival.72

TheDPP,incontrast,hastofollowastrategyofdiversificationandcurrentlyde‐

pendsonfourprimarysourcesofincome:(1)governmentsubsidies,(2)mandatory

contributions from elected politicians, (3)membership dues, and (4) private and

corporate donations (Rigger 2001a: 67‐69). Public subsidies for political parties,

introducedin1997,aretheDPP’smainsourceoffunding.However,astheywillde‐

pendontheparty’selectoralperformance, theyarenotaverystablesourceof in‐

come.Inthepresidentialelection,partiesreceive30NTD(0.51GBP)foreachvote

obtainedabovethethresholdofone‐thirdofthevotesrequiredforelection,whilein

legislativeelectionspartiesreceiveasubsidyof10NTD(0.17GBP)pervoteforeach

voteobtainedabovethethresholdofthree‐quartersofthevotesrequiredforelec‐

tion.Onlytheformersubsidy,however,ispaiddirectlytotheparty.Moreover,par‐

ties that surpass the threshold of five per cent of national votes in the legislative

electionsreceiveanannualsubsidyof50NTD(0.86GBP)pervote.

Inaddition to thepublicsubsidy, theDPPrequires itselectedofficials topaya

certainpercentageoftheirincomefromthegovernmenttotheparty.Thenational

presidentmustcontribute8millionNTD(137,000GBP),thevicepresident5million

NTD (86,000 GBP), the party chairperson 5 million NTD, committee members

500,000NTD(8,600GBP),nationallegislators300,000NTD(5,200GBP),localrep‐

resentatives200,000NTD(3,400GBP)andpartylistlegislators100,000NTD(1,700

72PersonalcommunicationwithShiow‐duanHawang,15May2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–220–

GBP).73 However, as with public subsidies, this source of income will again ulti‐

matelydependontheparty’selectoralperformance.TheDPPthusalsocontinuesto

relyonbothmembershipfeesaswellasprivateandcorporatedonations.

Yet,neitherofthesetwolattersourcesofincomebenefitsthepartycentraloffice.

Firstofall,astheparty’sownregulationsstipulate,ninetypercentofmembership

duesaretobeallocatedtopartybranches,andonlytheremainingtenpercentto

thenationalheadquarters.74Secondly, inTaiwan’scandidate‐centredelectoralsys‐

tem,candidatesgenerallyfinditeasiertoraisefundsthanpoliticalparties(Kovick

2003).Whatismore,theDPPstatutesrulethatthosefinancialcontributionsraised

bythelocalbrancharetostaywiththelocalbranch.Inotherwords,thepartycent‐

ralofficeadministersonlyasmallproportionoftheparty’sincome,mostofwhichis

spentoncoveringtheexpensesofthecentraloffice itself.Asaresult,“theparty is

almosttotallywithoutfinancial leveragetouseindiscipliningitscandidates”(Rig‐

ger2001a:69).Inotherwords,candidatescanexpectverylittlefinancialassistance

from the party for their electoral campaigns. Rather, candidates need to raise the

necessaryfundsthemselves.

IntheKMT,ontheotherhand, thenationalpartyheadquarterscontrolsavery

largeshareof the fundsat thedisposalof theKMT’scandidates (Ferdinand2003:

60).Thisdependenceofthecandidateonthecentralpartyisfurtherreinforcedby

thefactthattheTaiwaneseelectionlawrequiresindividualcandidatestofileacam‐

paign spending report,while there areno restrictions as to the amount theparty

73PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May2008.74PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May2008.


–221–

headquarters can spend.Moreover, KMT candidates verymuch rely on the party

centralofficeforthemobilisationofcampaignworkersandvotersamongtheparty

rank‐and‐file75,whereas in theDPP,wherethemembershipregister ismaintained

bythelocalbranches,and–aswasdiscussedearlier–manybrancheshavebeenhi‐

jackedbylocalbossesfortheirownparticularisticinterests,thepartycentraloffice

playsamuchlessimportantroleintheorganisationofelectoralcampaigns.Orput

inmoregeneralterms,thepartycentralofficeintheKMTseemstobeamorepow‐

erfulorganisationalelementthantheDPP’sbureaucracy.

However,interestingly,theimportanceoftheKMT’scentralofficeasanadminis‐

trative apparatus does not automatically translate into decision‐making power

withintheparty.Traditionally,theKMToperatedaccordingtoatop‐downLeninist

hierarchyinwhichthehigherbodiesappointedthosebeneaththemandallpower

originatedfromthechairperson.Hence,thechairpersonwouldnominateallmem‐

bersofthecentralstandingcommittee,whowouldthenselectthemembersofthe

centralcommittee,who,inturn,appointedthedelegatesforthenationalassembly.

Whilefirstchangestotheseregulationswerealreadyimplementedunderthelead‐

ershipofLeeTeng‐hui(seeabove),morefar‐reachingreformswereonlypassedin

2001.Accordingtothenewrules,thedelegatesofthenationalassemblywilleither

beelectedbyallpartymembersatthelocallevel(900delegates)orbedrawnfrom

elected leadersandpartyofficials(600delegates, includingcommitteeandbranch

chairpersons).Thenationalassemblywillthenelectthe210membersofthecentral

75PersonalcommunicationwithSzu‐yinHo,6May2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–222–

committee,which then, finally,nominates the31membersof thecentral standing

committee.76Inotherwords,therehasneverbeenaprovisionthatguaranteedparty

bureaucratsaseatinthetwohighestexecutivebodiesoftheparty,buttheirnomi‐

nationalwayshadtobeconfirmedbyeitherthenexthighestornextlowestbodyin

theparty.

Astobeexpected,thesameappliestotheDPP.Thenationalcongress,thehigh‐

est decision‐making body in the party, is composed of 150 delegates that are di‐

rectlyelectedbylocalpartymembers,and150nationallyelectedleadersrepresent‐

ingtheDPPingovernment.Thenationalcongressthenelectsa31‐membercentral

executive committee, which, in turn, selects 10 of its members to serve on the

party’scentralstandingcommittee.77

Therefore,asthepartycentralofficedoesnotenjoyautomaticdecision‐making

power in the KMT or the DPP, the distribution of professional staff between the

partybureaucracyandthepartyinpublicofficeasanindicatorforthedistribution

ofpowerwithinthepartycanbemisleading.Infact,neitherpartyallocatesanyfull‐

time staff to the party in public office. Any assistants to the legislators are either

paidbythestateorbythelegislatorsthemselves.Hence,althoughbothpartiesem‐

ployaround100membersofstaffintheirheadquarters–withtheKMTemploying

another700acrossitslocalbranches78–neitheroftheparty’sbureaucracyplaysan

76PersonalcommunicationwiththeKMT,12May2008.77PersonalcommunicationwiththeDPP,8May200878Personalcommunicationwiththerespectivepoliticalparty.


–223–

autonomousroleinpartyinternalpolitics,buttheyareratheranadministrativetool

atthedisposalofthepartyinpublicoffice.

Thisimpressionisconfirmedbylookingattheregulationsconcerningtheinner‐

workingsof theparty inpublic office.79 First of all, theparliamentary caucusesof

boththeKMTandDPPelecttheirownleadershipwithout interferencefromother

bodiesoftherespectiveparty.Secondly,novotingpowerisgiventomembersofthe

partycentralofficetakingpartinmeetingsofthecaucus.Andthirdly,theparliamen‐

taryparties of both theKMTand theDPPmake their owndecision‐making rules.

This inparticularconcernstheregulationstoenforcedisciplineamongthe legisla‐

tors.Bothparliamentarypartiesestablishedasystemoffinesthatpenaliselegisla‐

torsfornotattendingimportantplenarysessionsorvotingagainsttheofficialparty

line.

Wecan thus summarise thatorganisational resourcesarehighly centralised in

theKMT,whereasintheDPPtheyaremoreevenlydistributedamongelectedpoliti‐

cians, candidatesand localbranches. In theKMT, theparty inpublicoffice largely

depends on the central office for financial support and communicating with the

rank‐and‐file.IntheDPP,ontheotherhand,candidatescultivatetheirownsources

ofincomeandhaveeasyaccesstothepartymembershipregisterthroughthelocal

branches. However, the vital role of the KMT’s bureaucracy in administering the

profits generated through the party’s business assets and in maintaining the

membershipregisterdonottranslateintoformaldecision‐makingpower.Itisthus

79Theinformationcontainedinthisparagraphwascollectedthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–224–

highlyquestionablewhetherthebureaucracy’sadministrativefunctionsamountto

aqualitativelydifferentpositionofthepartycentralofficewithinthepartyinternal

powerstructure,compared to thatof theDPP. Rather,as in theDPP, theparty in

publicofficeseemstodominateoverthecentraloffice.

Thisdistributionofpowerbetweenthepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpub‐

licofficeisperfectlyinlinewiththeelectoralstrategiesfollowedbythemainactors

withineachoftheparties.Factionsadoptingaclientelistic(theKMT’sMainstream)

orcharismaticstrategy(theDPP’sFormosa)werenot interested inastrongparty

centraloffice,becauseactorswouldhavehadtopooltheirpoliticalresourcesunder

the party’s centralistic control. Similarly, factions pursuing more programmatic

strategies – theNon‐mainstream in theKMT and theNewTide in theDPP – also

haveaninterestinapowerfulpartyinpublicoffice,sincetheydonottargetclearly

defined social groups but develop broader policy appeals. In order to do so they

needsufficientautonomyfromthepartycentraloffice.Theonlyfactionthatshould

have been interested in a strong, disciplining role of the central office over the

party’s legislatorswas theNewTide, in the early 1990s,when the faction openly

called for independence fromTaiwan.However, neitherwas theNewTide strong

enoughtorealisesuchareform,nordidtheDPPcontrolenoughresourcestogain

controloveritslocalbranchesandelectedpoliticians.


–225–

Summary

ThecaseofTaiwanconfirmsoneofthecentralassumptionsofhistoricalinstitution‐

alism–thatagentsareknowledgeableandreflexive,andthusabletodevelopdiffer‐

ent strategies to overcome the same environmental barriers. During the KMT’s

authoritarian ruleonlyonegroupwithin the rulingparty, theMainstream faction,

developedclientelisticnetworks tomobilisevoters in thepseudo‐democraticelec‐

tions.Giventhetop‐downprocessofdemocratisationthesenetworkssurvivedthe

introductionof freeand fairelections,andallowed theMainstreamtobecomethe

dominant factionwithin theKMT. Incontrast,othergroupings in theKMT,mainly

theNon‐mainstream faction,aswellas themainoppositionparty, theDPP,devel‐

opedprogrammaticappealsastheirelectoralstrategy.Thiscouldpossiblybedueto

thefactthattheseactorshelddifferentsetsofideastotheNon‐mainstream,ordue

to their lack of similar links to local vote brokers. Assuming the latter, setting up

newclientelisticnetworkswasnotanoption,sinceboththeKMT’sNon‐mainstream

andtheDPPremainedexcludedfromaccesstopublicresources,whilethehighlevel

of socio‐economicdevelopmentmeant that investingpoliticians’private resources

wasunlikelytobesuccessful.Instead,theDPPturnedtheKMT’smoneypoliticsinto

an effective campaign issue, ultimately superseding the KMT in power in 2000.

However,thisdidnotmeanthattheDPPcouldnowchangetoaclientelisticstrategy

ofvotermobilisation,asits“blackgold”campaignhadcreatednegativepublicopin‐

ionagainstvote‐buyingandotherparticularisticmeansofelectoralcampaigning.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–226–

Theconflictbetweenthesedifferentelectoralstrategiesclearlyreflectsintheor‐

ganisationaldevelopmentofpoliticalpartiesinTaiwan.Inordertofacilitatetheim‐

plementationofitsclientelisticdealings,theKMT’sMainstreamcentralisedalldeci‐

sion‐makingandthepowertoallocatepoliticallyrelevantresources.Asaresult,the

boundariesbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisationslowlybegantofade.Only

whenthepartylostthe2000elections,givingtheNon‐mainstreamtheopportunity

tore‐establish itselfas thedominant faction,wasthisprocessreversedbymaking

thepartymembershiplessinclusive,democratisingcandidateselectionandrender‐

ingtheallocationofresourcesmoretransparent.Assuch,thepartyinpublicofficeis

nowthestrongestorganisationalfacewithintheKMT.

ThesamecanbesaidabouttheDPP.However,theDPParrivedatthesamestage

viaaverydifferentpathoforganisationaldevelopment.Throughoutthe1990s,the

increasinglydominantNewTidepushedforastrongerpartycentralofficeinorder

to increase party discipline. However, it faced opposition by the Formosa faction,

whichmobilisedvotersprimarily through the charismaof its leaders andabroad

catch‐allstrategy,andwasthereforeinterestedinmakingthepartyinpublicoffice

thedominantorganisationalface.Moreover,astheDPPhasseverefinancialdifficul‐

ties, theNewTidewasunable to introducemoreexclusivepartymembershipcri‐

teria (particularly higher membership fees) and make politicians financially de‐

pendenton theparty centraloffice.Asa result, theonly significantorganisational

changetookplaceincandidateselection,wheredecision‐makingpowerwasshifted

to the intermediary party structures. However, this decision was soon reversed


–227–

whentheNewTidemoderated itsownpolicyplatform,making itnecessarytore‐

gain independence from hardcore ideologists among the mid‐level functionaries.

Thefactionthereforeintroducedbindingopinionpollsin1998,which,atthesame

time,underminedtheinfluenceofpocketmembersinanyvotingprocess.

As a result, bothmajor political parties now share central characteristicswith

political parties in contemporary Western Europe: The inclusiveness of party

membership falls somewhere between “indistinguishable from ordinary citizens”

and “highly selective”; the selection of candidates is open to citizens outside the

party;andthepartyinpublicofficedecidesabouttheallocationofresources.Politi‐

calpartieswereabletoestablishthepartyinpublicofficeasthedominantorganisa‐

tional face, because environmental uncertainty for political parties in post‐

autocraticTaiwan is relatively low(as indicatedby the low levelsofpartysystem

fragmentationandelectoralvolatility).Therefore,actorscampaigningonacatch‐all

electoral strategy did not feel forced to strengthen the party central office to in‐

creasepartydisciplineasameanstocontrolexternaluncertainty.Infact,itcanbe

argued that on the inter‐party level the twomajor political parties exhibit typical

cartelbehaviour.This canbeexemplifiedby the reformof theelectoral system in

2008, which replaced the single nontransferable vote systemwith singlemember

plurality, thereby considerably reducing the electoral chances of smaller political

parties. Inotherwords, similar tomanycontemporaryparties inWesternEurope,

thetwomajorpoliticalpartiesinTaiwanworktogethertokeepenvironmentalun‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–228–

certaintyataminimum,whichallowstheparliamentarypartytomaintainitsinde‐

pendencefromtherestoftheparty.

However,despitethesestrikingsimilaritiesbetweenTaiwanesepartiesandtheir

contemporarycounterpartsinWestern,thisdoesnotmeanthattheformertookan

“evolutionaryleap”asthe“periodeffect”approachwouldwantustobelieve.Rather,

as our analysis has shown, eachmajor political party followed its owndistinctive

path of organisational development, constrained by the inter‐factional conflict

withineachofthepartiesandtheparticularenvironmentalcontext.


–229–

–6–

THEPHILIPPINES

UnlikeinSouthKoreaorTaiwan,thedemocratisationofthepoliticalsysteminthe

Philippineswasnotdrivenbysocio‐economicgrowth.Asaresult,theenvironment

politicalactorsfacewhendevelopingelectoralstrategiesheavilyfavoursclientelism

asamechanismtomobilisevoters.Similartotheclassicalcadreinearly‐democratic

Europe, parties are therefore nomore than formal cloaks around highly informal

patron‐client networks. However, this does notmean that political parties in the

Philippinesarefollowingtheexactsamepathoforganisationaldevelopmentaspar‐

ties in Europe. Rather, because of the particular context in the Philippines, pro‐

grammaticmasspartiesareveryweak,meaningthatthereislittlepressureonthe

majorpartiestoopenupforwiderparticipation.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–230–


TheprocessofdemocratictransitioninthePhilippinescanprimarilybecharacter‐

isedasareplacement,asitbeganasasociety‐ledupheaval.Thisupheaval,however,

requiredalmostnoviolence,sincepartsofthearmedforcessidedwiththereformist

civiliangroups (Wurfel1990). Ithasbeenargued thatanoverthrowwas theonly

way to re‐establish democratic rule, because the highly personalistic character of

FerdinandMarcos’ dictatorshipmeant that therewere no collective interests that

couldbesavedonceMarcosrelinquishedoffice(Thompson1996).Hence,asthere

was little hope he couldwin competitive elections,Marcos refused to negotiate a

democratisationofthepoliticalsystembutheldontopoweraslongashecould.

Marcos justifiedthedeclarationofmartial lawin1972withtheneedforpeace

andorder–overplayingthestrengthofthecommunistinsurgency–andtheprom‐

iseofeconomicgrowth.Congresswasclosedandthetwotraditionalparties,theNa

cionalistaPartyandLiberalParty,soonwithered,astheirlegislativefunctionswere

supplantedbypresidentialdecreesandinstructions.Thereby,Marcosputanendto

the two‐partycycle,which, since theendof theAmericancolonialperiod,haden‐

sured that the country’s elites would alternate in government “with almost me‐

chanicalregularity”(Thompson1995:15).Hethusbarredtheotherelitesfromac‐

cess to thegovernment‐distributedporkbarrel,but instead–after initially imple‐

menting a number of auspicious reforms –Marcos’ authoritarian rule lapsed into


–231–

“cronycapitalism”,whichonlynurturedfamilymembersandclosefriendswithjobs

inthestateapparatus,operatinglicences,statecontracts,andcheapcredit.

AsaresultofMarcos’patrimonialistsdealings,thePhilippineeconomydeterio‐

rated,realwagesdeclined,andruralpovertyincreased.Thisandtheincreasingpat‐

rimonialisationof themilitary,whichseriouslyundermined itsprofessionalisation

and fighting effectiveness, led to a dramatic growth of the communistmovement.

Faced with a severe loss of legitimacy, Marcos decided to liberalise the system.

Hence,in1978,legislative“elections”wereheld,and,in1981,Marcosdeclaredthe

liftingofmartiallawandcalledforpresidentialelections.Fraudandtheabsenceof

realopposition,however,robbedtheelectoralprocessofanylegitimisingeffect,and

thedominanceofMarcos’NewSocietyMovement(KilusangBagongLipunan,KBL)

remainedunthreatened.Moreover, theKBLboughtelectoralsupportdirectly from

votersthroughclientelisticexchangemechanisms.Inordertofacilitatethemonitor‐

ing of voters,Marcos introduced thebarangay as the smallest administrativeunit

(100to500people),withthebarangaycaptainusuallyactingasvotebroker(Wur‐

fel1988:131).

The legitimacy crisis worsened when opposition politician Benigno Aquino,

uponreturningfromexileintheUnitedStatesin1983tocompeteinthe1984par‐

liamentary elections, was shot at Manila airport. This clumsy assassination, evi‐

dentlyplannedbyMarcos’wife,Imelda,andhermilitaryallies,energisedtheexist‐

ingoppositionandpoliticisednewsectorsofsociety(Timberman1991:126).The

civiliancoalitionagainstMarcos–theCatholicChurch,themiddleclassandtheold

OLIVERHELLMANN

–232–

economicelite–cooperatedinformingapollwatchersgroup,NAMFREL(National

Movement for Free Elections). Under the monitoring activities by NAMFREL, the

pro‐democratic opposition, led by theUnitedNationalistDemocraticOrganization

(UNIDO) and thePartido Demokratiko PilipinoLakas ng Bayan (Philippine Demo‐

craticParty‐People’sPower,PDP‐Laban),performedrelativelybetter.

Inaneffortto,again,demonstratehispolitical legitimacy,Marcoscalledasnap

presidentialelectioninFebruary1986.However,againstMarcos’strategiccalcula‐

tions, the reform movement united behind Corazón Aquino, widow of Benigno

Aquino,astheirsinglecandidate.OnlytheCommunistParty,variouslabourunions

and peasant organisations chose to boycott the elections. When voting finished,

Marcoswasdeclaredthewinner,butNAMFRELandotherpollwatchingorganisa‐

tions reportednumerouscasesofelectoral fraud.Aquinorespondedbyappearing

beforeaManilacrowdofmorethanhalfamilliontoproclaimherownvictoryand

to launchacampaignof civildisobedience. Itwas the involvementof themilitary,

however,thattippedthescales,whenafactionofyoungofficersledbythedefence

minister,JuanPonceEnrile,andthedeputychiefofstaff,FidelRamos,seizedcontrol

ofabuildinginthearmedforcesheadquartersanddeclaredtheirrebellionagainst

Marcos (Wurfel 1990: 119‐122). Having no firepower, the rebels turned to the

Aquino camp forprotection.Theevent that followedwentdown inhistory as the

“peoplepower”revolution,astensofthousandsofciviliansfollowedanappealover

theradiobyCardinalSintosupporttherebelswithfoodandhumanshields.With

therefusalofthesecurityforcestoactagainstcivilians,theUnitedStatesintervened


–233–

topersuadeMarcos to leave the country for exile inHawaii.Aquinowasdeclared

presidentandsetaboutrestoringthedemocraticconstitutionalstructure.

TABLE15: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTINTHEPHILIPPINES




Literacy(inpercent)

Philippines 719(1990)

1,192(2005)

0.468(1991)

0.445(2005)

27.0(1990)

48.0(2000)

93.6(1990)

92.6(2005)

Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)

UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)

Source: UnitedNationsESCAP(undated);UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(undated);Solon(1996)

UnlikeinSouthKoreaandTaiwan,theprocessofdemocratisationinthePhilippines

wasnot accompaniedby socio‐economicdevelopment.Although theeconomyhas

been slowly growing since the overthrow of Marcos, this growth has yet not re‐

flected in a more even distribution of wealth (see Table 15). In other words, al‐

thoughthedemocratictransitioncanbecharacterisedasacompletereplacementof

the authoritarian regime, we should expect the environment in the post‐Marcos

Philippines tobe favourable to clientelistic strategiesof votermobilisation, as the

economicelitecanusetheirrelativefinancialstrengthtoinvestintheestablishment

ofnewexchangenetworks.Thisisencouragedevenfurtherbythelowdegreeofur‐

banisation, which helps to ensure that voters do not defect from the clientelistic

OLIVERHELLMANN

–234–

game,asmostvoters live insmall ruralcommunities,whichareeasier tomonitor

forelectoralcompliance.


Infact,studiesofvotingbehaviourhaveshownthatvotersinthePhilippinestendto

supportthecandidatewhois“helpfultothoseinneed”and“establishesgovernment

programsfordevelopment”(InstituteforPoliticalandElectoralReforms2004).The

effectivenessof clientelistic strategies tomobilisevotershas ledobserversofFili‐

pinopoliticstodescribethepost‐Marcospoliticalsystemas“elitedemocracy”(Bello

andGershman1990)or“caciquedemocracy”(Anderson1988),basedontheobser‐

vationthatthecountryisrunbyasmallnumberofinfluentialfamilies.Atthesame

time,thereishardlyanypressurefromthelowerspheresofsociety.Neitherhasthe

large non‐governmental organisation (NGO) community been able to break the

dominanceof traditionaleliteclans(Eaton2003),norhavepoliticalpartiesrepre‐

sentingthepoorsucceededinplayingamoresignificantroleintheelectoralcompe‐

tition(Quimpo2005).


–235–

Elitefamiliesinpost‐MarcosPhilippines

Most lawmakers in the post‐authoritarian Philippines come from political clans –

thatis,theyaretiedtoafamilybasewhosemembersarecurrentlyholdingoronce

heldelectiveposts.IntheHouseofRepresentatives,twoofeverythreecongressmen

aremembersofpoliticalclans.80Thevastmajorityof thesearesecond‐andthird‐

generation politicians with parents and grandparents who had in the past been

elected into public office (Co et al. 2005: 50). In most cases they will also have

multiplerelativeswhoarecurrentlyinpublicoffice.

Democratic politics in the Philippineswork according to the logic that – once

electedintopublicoffice–politicianswillseektotransformthepublicofficeintoa

privatelegacyfortheirfamily.Filipinocultureputsstrongemphasisonthefamilyas

thebasicunitofsociety,withfamiliesoftenperformingabroadrangeofeconomic,

socialandpolitical functions.Thispoliticade familia, conditionedby interpersonal

reciprocityandsocialobligations,ensures“thattheFilipinoismoreinclinedtoper‐

ceivetheworldintermsofhowoutsideresourcescouldbeusedtoimprovethatsta‐

tusofthefamilyinsocio‐economicterms”(Roces2000:188).AsWurfel(1988:34)

explains,

[t]hefamilyhaslongbeenthecenterofFilipinosociety.Asinmost

80Forinstance,80percentofthecongressmenelectedin1987couldbeclassifiedasbelongingto“traditionalclans”(Gutierrez,TorrenteandNarca1992:25).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–236–

parts of SoutheastAsia kinship is essentially bilateral; that is, an‐

cestryistracedthroughboththemother’sandthefather’sline.Ef‐

fectivekinshiptiesaremaintainedwithrelativesofbothparents.A

bilateralsystemgivesapotentiallyhugenumberoflivingkin,espe‐

ciallyasfivetotenchildrenarenotuncommoneventodayineach

nuclearfamilyofeachgeneration.

TheFilipinoconstitutioncontainsexplicitprovisionsonpoliticalclans,openingthe

possibility for a law that prohibits political dynasties.However, such a law is un‐

likelytobepassedinthenearfuture.Similarly,theexistingconstitutionallawthat

bansrepresentativesfromseekingmorethanthreeconsecutivetermsisnotanef‐

fective obstacle either, since clans simply field other family members to replace

thosewhofacetermlimits,or–inothercases–theplaceoftheincumbentistaken

byrivalclans.

ElectionsinthePhilippines,inotherwords,canthusbestbedescribedasanar‐

chiccompetitionamongdominantelitefamilies.81Inordertobeelectedintooffice,

politiciansprimarilymobilisetheirkinshipnetworksandfamilyassets.Iftheywin,

theywill repay their family by using their legislative post to expand the family’s

economicinterests–forexamplethroughloans,monopolies,taxexemptions,cheap

foreignexchangeorsubsidies. Inaddition, legislatorswill strengthentheirrespec‐

tivekinshipnetworkthroughthedistributionofpatronage:

81Theterm“anarchic”isborrowedfromthetitleofMcCoy’s(1994)openingchapterinthebookofthesametitle“Ananarchyoffamilies”.


–237–

Onceinoffice,theypavethewayforotherrelativestobeeitherap‐

pointedtothebureaucracyorelectedtogovernmentposts.Within

afewyears,anewlyelectedlegislatorwilllikelyhavekininlocalof‐

fice, various government agencies, and state‐owned corporations.

Beforelong,thenextgenerationtakesover.

(Coroneletal.2004:11)

However,whilethisexplainsthegeneralreproductionofelitefamilydominancein

theFilipinoCongress, itcanneitherexplainhowthesefamiliesbecametheelite in

the firstplacenorwhysomepoliticaldynastieshavedisappearedwhilenewones

haveemerged.TherehasalwaysbeenaFilipinoupperclass,whosepositionisbased

oncombinedeconomicandpoliticalpower,asParedes(1994)pointsout.However,

the composition of this class – the actual families that comprise it – is constantly

changing.Wemustthusdistinguishbetweendifferenttypesofpoliticalclans,which

use very different resources and strategies to compete successfully in the demo‐

craticgame.

Traditionally,thenationalpoliticaloligarchywascomposedofmembersofweal‐

thy landowning families – particularly those involved in export agriculture – that

emergedinthe19thcentury,suchastheAranetas,theCojuangcos,theJacintos,the

MadrigalsortheYulos.Today,thesefamiliesaremuchlesspowerful,asisindicated

by the relatively small percentage of lawmakers in the House of Representatives

who own agricultural land (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism 2004).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–238–

However,becauseoftheirsheerwealththetraditionallandedelitesarestillastrong

electoral force.Moreover, theirplantationsprovidethesefamilieswithanefficient

machine tomobilisevotesamong theirworkersand tenants,while theirhacienda

organisationcanbeusedtoconducttheelectoralcampaign.

Theinfluenceoflandedfamiliesbegantowaneafter1945,astheJapaneseoccu‐

pationofthePhilippinesduringtheSecondWorldWarhaddisruptedthetraditional

economy, while the landowners’ collaboration with the Japanese weakened their

moral hold on the peasantry. A new type of elite swiftly moved into this power

vacuum: localwarlords.Politicalwarlordismwas the result of theproliferationof

armsandtheweakeningofthecentralauthorityintheprovincesattheendofthe

war.FamousfamiliesthatrosetopowerthrougharmedviolenceincludedtheLluch‐

BadellesclanofLanao– thoughtheywere latereclipsedbythemoreviolentwar‐

lordAliMohamadDimaporo–theRemullasofCaviteandtheDuranosofCebu.Al‐

thoughwarlordisminthenarrowsenseisnowadayslimitedtoveryfewareas,par‐

ticularlyMindanao,many clans still relyonviolence and coercion inorder towin

elections – a phenomenon that has beendescribed as “bossism” (Sidel 1999) and

“authoritarian clientelism” (Franco 2001). During the campaign period election‐

related violence can range from intimidating and threatening people with bodily

harm, tokidnappingsandmurder,aswellasarsonandbombings.Notonlycandi‐

datesandtheircampaignstaffaretargeted,butalsotheirsupportersaswellasor‐

dinaryvoters.Onelectionday itself, thethreatanduseofviolencealsoextendsto

poll watchers and election officials, and it is no rarity to see burning voting sta‐


–239–

tions.82Thestate,onitspart,isunabletoenforcetherulesofthedemocraticgame,

whichhas ledtotheobservationthat“membersof thegoverningclassare[…]ex‐

emptfromtheruleoflaw”(Rogers2004:116).

The1960ssawtheemergenceofyetanothertypeofpoliticalclan:thenouveaux

riches.Unlikethetraditionalelite,thesefamilies–amongthemtheEnriles,Puyats,

Sarmientos andSilverios–didnothaveabase in landholdings, but theyamassed

wealththroughindustrialmanufacturing.Theythenexpandedtheireconomicbase

afterwinningoffice, therebygainingaccess togovernmentcreditand licensesand

government‐administeredforeignaidandloans.Inordertogetanideaofhowthis

business elite dominates electoral politics in the Philippines, one can look at the

socialcompositionofCongress. In2001,onaverage,eachmemberoftheHouseof

Representativesheldassetsworth22millionPHP(262,000GBP)–accordingtothe

legislators’ownreportingandthusprobablyunderstated‐while intheSenatethe

averagenetworthwas59millionPHP(704,000GBP).Incontrast,in2000,thetypi‐

calFilipinohadanannualincomeofabout150,000PHP(1,800GBP)(Coroneletal.

2004).

Finally, in the1990sanumberofnewpoliticaldynastieswerebuilt simplyon

popularity.While, in thepast,popularstarlets fromshowbusinessandsportshad

onlybeenhiredbyestablishedpoliticianstoattractvoters,celebrities increasingly

realised that they themselves had the potential to win public office, thereby – in

82Accordingtodifferentpresssources,126peoplewerekilledand148otherswoundedinviolenceleadinguptoandduringthe2007parliamentaryandlocalelections.Inthe2004presidentialelec‐tions,election‐relatedviolenceclaimed189lives.ForolderfiguresseePatinoandVelasco(2004).

OLIVERHELLMANN

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somecases– laying the foundation for influential showbizclans.Themostpromi‐

nentamongthesearetheEjercitosaroundmoviestarJosephEstrada,theRevillas–

actorRamonRevillahas80childrenwithdifferentwives,manyofwhomholdpublic

office – and the family of Robert Jaworski, former basketball player and coach.

Meanwhile, anumberofmore traditionalpolitical familieshavebeen trying to in‐

crease their own popularity by either marrying a celebrity83 or going into show

businessthemselves.84

WecanthussummarisethatFilipinoelectoralpoliticsaredominatedbyasmall

numberof influential families,whousedifferent resources towinelections.How‐

ever, the differences between traditional landed elites,warlords, nouveaux riches

andcelebrities isnotclear‐cut.Rather, theyall followamixofelectoralstrategies,

primarilyrelyingonclientelism,withcharismaandcoercionascomplementarysub‐

strategies.

83Forinstance,in2002,NegrosOccidentalrepresentativeJulio'Jules'LedesmaIVwalkeddowntheaislewithmoviestarAssuntadeRossiinatelevisedceremonyathishacienda.Earlier,Batangasrep‐resentativeandnowSenatorRalphRectowedpopularmovieactressVilmaSantosin1992,amar‐riagethathelpedcatapultthethird‐generationlegislatorintotheSenate.OthercelebritymarriagesofpoliticalclansintheHouseincludethoseofNegrosOccidentalrepresentativeCarlosCojuangco,sonofSanMiguelCorporationchairmanEduardo'Danding'Cojuangco,tothelateactressRioDiaz,andthatofAntonio'Tonyboy'FloirendotoformerMissUniverseandTVhostMargieMoran.84Severalpoliticianshosttalkshowsonradioortelevision.Forinstance,IlocosNorterepresentativeImeeMarcos,daughterofFerdinandMarcos,anchoredanentertainmenttalkshowonthepopularradiostationDZBB,andhasmadeappearancesinTVsoapsandcomedies.RenatoCayetano,whodiedin2003,waselectedtotheSenatein1998mainlybecausehehostedapopularradioandTVtalkshowwherehegavefreelegaladvice.


–241–

Politicalpartiesascoalitionsbetweenfamilies

Politicalclansdonotcontrolapoliticalpartyeach,butpartiesareusuallycoalitions

ofseveralpowerful families(McCoy1994:8).However,thesecoalitionsarehighly

unstable,which iswhy it is difficult to establish personal continuity between the

myriadofpoliticalparties thathaveemergedanddied since theoustingof Ferdi‐

nandMarcos in1986.As clans enter intonew coalitionswithother clans, theold

partywillbedissolvedandanewpartywillbefoundedinordertoprovideaformal

framework – or organisationalmanifestation – for the newly forged coalition.We

canthussummarise,inthewordsofCoroneletal.(2004:7),that

[l]ookingatthehistoryofthePhilippinelegislaturesfromthe1898

MalolosCongress,itwouldseemthatfamilies,notparties,aretheir

most enduring feature. Regimes come and go but the families re‐

main.Politicalpartiesareformedanddisbandedbuttheclansthat

makethemupstayon.

ThefluidnatureoftheFilipinopartysystemreflectsclearlyintherelativelyhighef

fective number of political parties and the high degree of electoral volatility (see

Table16).However,despitethetransientlifeofpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippines,it

isstillpossibletofindpartiesthatfulfilourcriteriaofcaseselection.Themostnot‐

ablecasesarewithoutdoubttheLiberalParty(PartidoLiberalngPilipinas,LP)and

OLIVERHELLMANN

–242–

theNacionalistaParty(NP).Foundedin1907,whenseveralpro‐independencepar‐

tiesunitedtocontesttheelectionstothefirstFilipinoparliament,theNPistheold‐

estpartyinthePhilippines.ItdominatedPhilippinepoliticsuntil1945,whentheLP

formedasasplinterparty.From1946until1972(theyearMarcosdeclaredmartial

law), these twoparties constituted theparty systemand regularly shifted control

over thepresidencybetweenthem.However,afterMarcos’authoritarian interreg‐

numthefragmentationofthepartysystemexploded,leavingtheNPandtheLPas

twopartiesamongmany.

TABLE16: PHILIPPINES–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORSa

ENEPb ENPPc Volatility

1987 7.68 5.84 ‐1992 4.81 3.84 43.001998 3.10 2.69 48.502001 ‐ 5.03 ‐2004 ‐ 4.06 ‐2007 ‐ 4.60 ‐Average 5.20 4.34 45.75Notes:aThevotingresultsprovidedbytheelectoralcommissionCOMELEChaveoftenbeenincompleteinthepast,henceforsomeyearsnoindicatorscouldbecalcu‐lated.bEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiesbasedonthefirstvoteinelectionstotheHouseofRepresentatives.cEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesintheHouseofRepresentatives.Source: Author’sowncalculationsbasedonTable17andTeehankee(2002;

2006).

Of themyriad of political parties that have been established since the ousting of

FerdinandMarcosin1987,onlyafewhavebeenabletosurviveforlongerthanone

election, while, at the same time, regularly winning national parliamentary man‐


–243–

dates.OneofthemistheLabanngDemokratikongPilipino(StruggleofDemocratic

Filipinos, LDP), which was formed in 1988 from a merger between two parties

closely associatedwith thenpresident CorazonAquino:Lakas ngBayan (LABAN),

the coalition that had supported Aquino in the 1987 presidential election, and a

splintergroupofPartidoDemokratikoPilipino(PDP), ledbyAquino’sbrother, Jose

‘Peping’Cojuango.

Unable to secure the LDP’s nomination as presidential candidate for the 1992

elections,FidelV.Ramos,defenceministerunderAquino,leftthepartytoestablish

thePartidoLakasTao(Lakas).Onlyafewmonthslater,hethenmergedLakaswith

theNationalUnionofChristianDemocrats(NUCD),whichwasledbythensecretary

for foreign affairs RaulManglapus. Shortly after, theUnitedMuslimDemocrats of

thePhilippines(UMDP)joinedthebandwagon,givingRamosthenecessarysupport

towinthepresidency.

For the1998 elections, Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP joined a coalitionwithKAMPI (Ka

balikat ngMalayangPilipino, Partner of the Free Filipino), a splinter groupof the

LPD that supported thepolitical aspirationsofGloriaMacapagal‐Arroyo.TheLDP,

ontheotherhand,formedacoalitioncalledLabanngMakabayangMasangPilipino

(LAMMP)withtwootherparties:theNationalistPeople’sCoalition(NPC)–founded

in1992asagroupingofsmallerpartiesandmembersoftheNP(Rodriguezwing)–

and thePartidongMasangPilipino (PMP)ofmoviestar JosephEstrada.WhileEs‐

trada won the presidency, Arroyo of the Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP‐KAMPI coalition as‐

sumed the vice‐presidency. However, when, in 2001, Estrada was forced to step

OLIVERHELLMANN

–244–

down,Arroyoautomaticallybecamepresident.

TABLE17: PHILIPPINES–RESULTSFORHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVESELECTIONSa

Party 1987 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007

GovernmentCoalition 29.5 0.5 4.4 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐LABAN 14.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐PDP‐Laban 12.0 ‐ 0.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.7LP 8.5 ‐ 2.5 6.8 9.0 12.0 6.6UNIDO 8.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐KBL 6.5 2.0 0.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐GAD 5.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐NP 2.0 3.0 0.5 ‐ ‐ ‐ 3.3LDP ‐ 43.0 8.3 ‐ 9.0 5.0 1.3Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP ‐ 21.5 49.0 50.5 36.0 40.0 38.0NPC ‐ 17.0 10.8 4.1 23.0 23.0 11.6LP‐PDP ‐ 6.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐LDP/Lakas ‐ ‐ 12.3 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐LAMMP ‐ ‐ ‐ 25.0 ‐ ‐ ‐KAMPI ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 20.3Independents 11.5 0.5 3.4 0.9 4.0 2.0 1.7Partylist ‐ ‐ ‐ 6.4 9.0 10.0 8.7Other 3.5 6.5 7.8 6.3 8.0 10.0 6.8

Notes:aShareofseats(inpercent).Source: Hartmann,HassallandSantos(2001);Teehankee(2006);HouseofRepresentatives

(undated)

These parties again played the most important role in all subsequent elections.

However,thecoalitionlandscapehasbeensubjectedtosignificantchanges.In2001,

thethreecoalitionpartnersofLAMMP–LDP,NPCandPMP–formedanewcoali‐

tion,PuwersangMasa(ForceoftheMasses),alongwithothersmallerparties.Sup‐

porters of Arroyo, on the other hand formed the People Power Coalition (PPC),

comprising Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP, the Liberal Party and a number ofminor parties.


–245–

Beforethe2004electionthecoalitionswerere‐shuffledagain,withKAMPI,LP,La‐

kas, NPC and NP forming the Coalition of Experience and Fidelity for the Future

(Koalisyon ngKaranasan atKatapatan saKinabukasan, K4) supporting incumbent

presidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo,whiletheLDPandanumberofsmallerparties

united behind opposition candidate FernandoPoe Jr. in the Coalition forNational

Unity(KoalisyonngNagkakaisangPilipino,KNP).Finally,in2007,supportersofAr‐

royo – most notably Lakas, KAMPI and the LDP – grouped under the banner of

TEAMUnity,while those in favour of impeachingArroyo established theGenuine

Opposition.

ItcanthusbesummarisedthatwiththeexceptionoftheNPConlythetwotradi‐

tionalparties,LPandNP,andpartiesofformerpresidents,theLDP(Aquino),Lakas

(Ramos)andKAMPI(Arroyo),havebeenable tomaintain themselves in theparty

system.Moreover,alreadythisshorthistoricaloverviewhintedatthelogicofparty

formationinthePhilippines:Politicalpartiesareestablishedasfamiliesrallybehind

presidentialcandidatesinlargeelectoralcoalitions.Politicalclanswhosupportthe

winningpresidential candidate canexpect tobe rewardedafter theelections.The

presidentialsystemofthePhilippinesisoneofspoils:Thepresidentcanappointhis

orherchoicestomorethan6,000positionsinthebureaucracy.Traditionally,these

aregivenouttopoliticalsupporters.Moreover,beingapresidentialallyalsomeans

accesstogovernmentloans,contracts,andotherbenefits.

In return, thepresidential candidatewill expectelectoral support.Familiesare

themselves highly efficient political machines to mobilise votes and ensure that

OLIVERHELLMANN

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these votes are properly counted in the election process, but families also extend

thesemachinesbeyondfamilyloyalties–particularlyiftheyareaimingforofficeat

thenationallevel.Acongressman'spoliticalmachinetypicallyincludesanetworkof

lideratthevillageorbarangaylevel.Thelidercanbeeitherthebarangaycaptain,a

councilmember,oranyotherinfluentialperson,suchasasuccessfullocalentrepre‐

neurortheheadofacommunityorganisation.Thisliderinturnmobilisesanetwork

of supporters for the candidate,whowill helpwith the election campaign (for in‐

stance,byputtinguppostersandconductingdoor‐to‐doorcanvassing),serveaspoll

watchersonelectionday,andlastbutnotleastgivetheirvotetothecandidateen‐

dorsedbythelider.Theliderusuallygetspaidforhisorherwork;insomecaseshe

or she even receives regularmonthly allowances from the congressman’s payroll,

while sometimes liders are bought off by other candidates who offer bigger re‐

wards.85

Astheinfluenceofafamily–andtheeffectivenessoftheirpoliticalmachine–is

usuallylimitedtothelocallevelandthefamily’sownbailiwick,familieswhowishto

win thepresidencyoraseat ineither theSenateor theHouseofRepresentatives,

will have to enter into coalitions with families who dominate other geographical

areas of the country. In return, the latter will expect their fair share of state re‐

sources. Political parties are thus, put simply, the formal manifestation of these

temporary patron‐client networks, in which the access to state resources is ex‐

changedfororganisationalsupportduringelections(votermobilisation,campaign‐

85Theinformationcontainedinthisandthefollowingparagraphwasgainedthroughpersonalcom‐municationwithRamonC.Casiple,19June2008.


–247–

ing,pollwatching).Or in thewordsofCoet al. (2005:82): “Parties represent the

mechanism for rendering and sustaining [the] exchangeof political resources and

support”. It thus still holds true what Landé (1965: 24) observed about Filipino

democraticpoliticsinthemid‐1960s:

Candidates fornationalofficeneedvotes,which local leaderswith

theirprimaryholduponthe loyaltyof theruralelectoratecande‐

liver. Local leaders in turn needmoney to do favors for their fol‐

lowers, and this the candidate forhighoffices cansupply […]The

result is a functional interdependence of local, provincial, and

nationalleaderswhichpromotesaclosearticulationofeachlevelof

partyorganizationwiththoseaboveandbelowit.

Moreover, parties not only serve as the formal framework for coalitions between

political clans fromdifferent administrative levels, but therearealsoanumberof

legalprovisionsthatencouragetheseelitistfamiliestoestablishpoliticalparties.For

instance,beingamemberofapoliticalpartyallowsacandidatetoextendthelegal

campaign‐spendinglimit,aspartiesareallowedtospendanadditional5PHP(0.06

GBP) per voter registered in the constituencieswhere the party is fielding candi‐

dates.Yet,mostimportantly,theelectorallawstipulatesthatonlythethreestrong‐

estpartiesaretoreceivedetailedcopiesofthecertificateofcanvassthatisbasedon

the tally of elections returns from the different polling precincts. Access to these

OLIVERHELLMANN

–248–

documentsprovidesastrongsafeguard for thecandidateagainstbeingcheated in

thevotecountingprocess.

However,despitethesereasonstoestablishpoliticalparties,thebindingpower

ofthecoalitionagreementsbetweenthedifferentfamiliesisveryweak,andboun‐

daries between political parties are thus highly permeable. Candidates frequently

run for several differentparties at the same time;political clans –while affiliated

withoneparty–oftensupportcandidatesofotherparties;andsometimespolitical

partyaffiliationdoesnotbecomeclearatall.

Afterelections,winningcandidateswhosupportedanon‐successfulpresidential

runnerwill, in largenumbers, flocktothepartyofthenewlyelectedpresident.As

Villanueva points out, “[p]oliticians change party identification as fast as they

changetheirclothes”(1996:180).86However,thepresidentwillnotdistributestate

resources exclusively to his own party, but in order to build a broad coalition of

supportinparliamentresourcesalsoflowtootherparties.Forinstance,asof2008,

presidentArroyowasthechairpersonofthreeparties,whichagainshowsjusthow

little political party boundariesmatter as an organising principle for the political

process. Rather, political clans and the coalitions forged between them – often

acrossparties–arethekeytounderstandingFilipinopolitics.

Tosumup,thepost‐autocraticenvironmentalcontextinthePhilippinesstrategi‐

cally selects for clientelism,whilemilitating against programmatic electoral strat‐

egies.Most importantly, thehigh levelof income inequalityand the lowdegreeof

86Forinstance,rightafterthe2004elections,24outof210legislatorschangedtheirpartyaffiliationintheHouseofRepresentatives(Teehankee2006:239).


–249–

urbanisation increase the certainty that setting uppatron‐client relationshipswill

notfailwitheitherofthetwosidesdefecting.Thecontextthusgivesanadvantageto

political actorswith the necessary resources to establish a clientelistic network –

thatis,thecountry’seconomicelite.Thiselitederivesitseconomicpowerfromdif‐

ferentsources–traditional landownership, largebusiness,celebritystatusor local

monopoliesofviolence–but, irrespectiveof the source, actorswill thenuse their

accesstogovernmenttoenhancethewealthoftheirfamiliesevenfurther.However,

as historical institutionalismmaintains, even in a context strongly biased toward

one outcome, social agents should be able to develop alternative strategies that

deviatefromthisstrategicallyselectedoutcome.Infact,towardsthebottomendof

theFilipinoparty systemwe can findpoliticalparties that campaignonprogram‐

maticappealstoattractvoters.Themostnotableexampleofthese,AKBAYAN!,will

be discussed in a separate section, as its electoral success is too limited to be in‐

cludedinourinitialcaseselection.

Partyorganisation

Ascanbeexpectedfromthepreviousdiscussionofelectoralstrategies,allmajorpo‐

liticalparties in thePhilippinesareverysimilar in theirorganisational structures.

First of all, parties are generally characterised by the total lack of a rank‐and‐file

OLIVERHELLMANN

–250–

membership.Asaresult,thesmallelitistcircleofpartyleaderslargelyselectthem‐

selvesascandidatesforpublicoffice,whileaccessintothesehighlyexclusiveparties

hastobeboughtwithpoliticallyrelevantresources.Itfollowsfromthisthatthereis

noclearseparationbetweenthethreefacesofpartyorganisation,buttheparty in

publicofficelargelyoverlapswiththepartyontheground,whichthereforemeans

thatthereisnoneedforapartycentralofficeoutsidetheparliamentaryparty.

Partymembership

Asshouldhavebecomeclearfromthepreviousdiscussion,theFilipinopartysystem

is largelycomprisedofpartiesthatareessentiallycoalitionsof influential families,

providing a clientelistic network that links local political bosses at the barangay

level to national politicians. Not surprisingly then, themembership base of these

parties is almost entirely drawn from the politically active elite, particularly from

powerfulpoliticalclans(Velasco1999:176).OrasRocamoraputsit,Philippinepo‐

liticalpartiesare“unabashedboysclubs”(2002:para.13). Inotherwords,parties

donothaveordinarymemberswhojointhepartybecauseofcollectiveincentives,

but the partymembership overlaps with the party’s pool of candidates, meaning

thatonlythosewhocanbeexpectedtowinapoliticalmandatewillbeconsideredas

partymembers.


–251–

AlthoughFilipinopoliticalpartiesclaimtohaveordinarymembers,noneofthe

majorpartiesmaintainsamembershipregisterthatwouldlistallthememberswith

theirpersonaldetailsandcontactaddress.Whatismore,thereisnoformalproced‐

urethatneedstobeobservedwhenapplyingforpartymembership,nordoparties

handoutmembershipcardsthatwouldidentifytheirmembersassuch.Intheircon‐

stitutions,politicalpartiesonlylistanumberofcriteriathatmembersneedtofulfil,

ranging fromveryspecificrequirements, suchasminimumageorFilipinocitizen‐

ship, to very vaguely formulated conditions, such as expressing a belief in the re‐

spectiveparty’s ideologyandobjectives.87 Hence,whatFilipinopartiesrefer toas

ordinary“members”arenothingbutloyalsupporterswhodonotdifferfromcom‐

moncitizensinanyrespect.Membershipfiguresprovidedbythepartiesarethere‐

forewithoutanymeaning,asarereferencesto“members”intheparties’formalde‐

cision‐makingstatutes.Moreover,thesesupportersarenotloyaltothepartyitself,

buttheyaremobilisedthroughclientelisticnetworksofleadersatthelocallevel.If

theselocalelitesdecidetojoinadifferentparty,becausethelatteroffersbetterma‐

terialreturnsfortheirpoliticalsupport, thesupporterswillbetransferreden‐bloc

tothenewparty.

However,notonlyisitdifficult–ifnotimpossible–todistinguishordinaryparty

members fromregularvoters,butevenontheelite levelpartyaffiliationdoesnot

alwaysbecomeclear.Duringelections,duetothefactthattheelectorallawallows

parties to nominate candidateswho arenot partymembers, often confusing elec‐

87Personalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–252–

toralslatesofmixedpartycandidatesarecreated.Andevenafterelectionsitisvery

difficulttoidentifythepoliticalpartytowhichpoliticiansbelong,aspartyloyaltyis

generally very weak. Party defections are thus a daily part of political life in the

Philippines.

Moreover,thehighlyelitistnatureofFilipinopoliticalpartiesalsoreflectsinthe

parties’ local organisational structures. Although political parties are by law re‐

quired to establish party chapters in the majority of the country’s regions and,

within each region, in themajority of provinces, towns and barangays, this legal

provision is rarely enforced. Rather, the common practice is for the local party

leader’sresidenceoroffice toserveas theparty’s localbranch(LeonesandMora‐

leda1998:310).In‐betweenelectionsthe“branch”willbedormant,andusuallyno

full‐timemembersof staffwillbeemployed.Onlyshortlybeforeelectionswill the

branch become active and perform campaign‐related functions. Labour‐intensive

campaignworkthat–inWesternEuropeanparties–isusuallycarriedoutbyparty

members on a voluntary basis, such as door‐to‐door canvassing, organisingmass

eventsorposting campaignposters,will bedelegated to localpoliticians’ clientel‐

isticnetworks.Clientsperformthisroleaspartoftheirpromiseofpoliticalsupport

inreturnformaterialbenefits.88

Political parties in thePhilippines, as an abstract organisation, do thusnot re‐

cruit members – neither as financial assets (through the regular payment of

membershipfees)norasfreelabour.Giventhatpartiesonlyplayanegligiblerolein

88PersonalcommunicationwithJoelRocamora,26June2008.


–253–

voters’decisionsintheelectionprocess,partiesdonotevenseemtobeinterestedin

membersasstatistics,whichcouldcreateapublic imageofpartiesaseffectiveag‐

gregatorsofsocialinterests.Instead,theonlyfeaturethatdistinguishespartymem‐

bersfromordinarycitizensisthattheyhavebeennominatedbytherespectivepar‐

tiesascandidatesforanupcomingelection.ThemembershipsizeofthemajorFili‐

pino parties is therefore always limited to the number of nominations for public

elections.Asthenextsectionwillshow,inordertogainaccesstothishighlyexclu‐

sivecircleofpartymembers,individualswillhavetoprovidepoliticallyrelevantre‐

sourcesthatwillmakeupforthelackofamasspartymembership.

Inshort,themajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippinesarecharacterisedbyatotal

absence of a party on the ground, as there are no criteria that clearly distinguish

rank‐and‐file members from ordinary voters. Rather, we find all party members

concentratedinthepartyinpublicoffice.However,evenhereit isverydifficultto

establishwho isamemberandwho isnot,as theboundariesbetweenpartiesare

highly permeable. It is thus very doubtful whether elected politicians identify as

members of a party in public office. Instead, as discussed earlier, politicians are

morelikelytoidentifywiththeirownpoliticalclan.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–254–

Candidateselection

Intheirconstitutions,allmajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippinesmakespecificpro‐

visionsregardingtheselectionofcandidatesforpublicelection.Inmostpartiesthe

respectiveparty’snationalconventionissupposedtonominatethecandidates(La‐

kas,LDP,LP,NPandKAMPI),whileintheNPCthenationalcentralcommittee,the

party’s highest executive body, has the right to decide on the selection of candi‐

dates.89However,giventhelackofamasspartymembership,itisobviousthatthese

formalregulationsarenothingbutafaçadetoportraypoliticalpartiesasdemocrati‐

callyorganisedinstitutionsthateffectivelymediatebetweensocietyandthestate.A

moreprecisedescriptionofthelevelofinternaldemocratisationinFilipinopolitical

partiesisprovidedbyLeonesandMoraleda(1998:307):

Althoughmost political partiesmay claim that almost all sectoral

groups arewell represented in their organizational structure and

membership, the real influence – that is, in decision‐making and

control–remainslargelywithitselite‐dominatedhigherorgans.

In fact,party conventions in thePhilippines– if theyareheldatall90–havebeen

89Personalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.90Forinstance,theconstitutionofLakasstipulatesthatapartyconventionshouldbeheldatleasteverytwoyears.However,inpractice,lackofsufficientfinancialresources–thepartyclaims–haspreventedtheconventionfrommeetingonaregularbasis.


–255–

compared toRomanorgies,whichareorganisedby theparty leadership solely to

entertain the clientswith “wine,womenandsong” (Rocamora2001:6).As itwas

discussedearlier,nationalpoliticiansneedthesupportof localfamiliesinorderto

mobilise voters at the grassroots level. In turn, local politicians are dependent on

national candidates and their parties for financial support. It is thus at the party

conventionswheretheseinformalexchangeagreementsarecelebrated,andpoliti‐

cians from lower administrative levels are rewarded for their loyalty towards the

nationalelites.91

Candidatesfornationalelectionsarethusnotselectedbydelegatestotheparty

convention,asstipulatedinmostoftheparties’conventions,butrather,becauseof

the total lack of a party on the ground, the party in public office selects itself. In

otherwords,inordertobenominatedasacandidateforalargerparty,politicians

needtogainaccesstothesmallelitistcircleofpartymembers.Theselectionofcan‐

didatesisthereforelargelynon‐transparentandundemocratic,andwillprimarilybe

decidedthroughhorse‐tradingandbargaining(Coetal.2005:95).Factorsthatwill

play an important role in these negotiationswill be the candidate’s past electoral

performance, politicalmachinery, popularity (name recall and public acceptance),

geographicalbaseandsupport,andfinancialresources(Rocamora1998:6).Thede‐

cision whether a candidate will be admitted to the party is made by the highest

executivebodyintheparty,whichisusuallycomprisedofhigh‐rankingincumbent

91Forinstance,Rocamora(2001:6)receivedreportsthatduringtheLakasconventionin1998about60millionPHP(716,000GBP)wasdistributedtothedelegatesinordertosecureDeVenecia’snomi‐nationastheparty’snextpresidentialcandidate–300,000PHP(3,600GBP)toeachmemberofCon‐gress,200,000PHP(2,400GBP)togovernors,and100,000PHP(1,200GBP)tocitymayors.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–256–

(orformer)electedofficials.Incumbents,ontheotherhand,will–asageneralrule–

benominatedautomatically.

However,asHutchcroftandRocamora(2003:278)pointout,“itisthenumberof

candidatesthatdeterminesthenumberofparties,notviceversa”.Thatistosay,ifa

candidate isrefusedbyoneparty,heorshewillsimplyestablishanotherpartyor

formasplintergroup.Theproceduresforcandidateselectionarethereforenotonly

highlyinformal,but–becauseofthevolatilepropertiesoftheFilipinopartysystem

–theyalsofailtoreducethenumberofcandidates.Nevertheless,ascandidateswill

aimtobenominatedbythepartyofastrongpresidentialcandidate–inordertobe

included in the distributive coalition after the election – candidate selection still

servesasavaluableindicatorforthepartyinternaldistributionofpower.

WecanthussumupthatinallmajorFilipinopoliticalpartiesthepartyinpublic

officewillsimplyre‐nominateitself.However,electedpoliticiansarenotveryloyal

towardstheirpartyandtheywillgenerallytrytojointhepartyofthepresidential

candidate,whotheythinkismostlikelytowin.Presidentialcandidates,inturn,are

lookingforlegislativecandidateswhoarethemselvesstrongcandidates,soafterthe

electiontheywillhavebroadsupport inCongress.Accesstoapartywill therefore

dependonthecandidate’sbargainingskillsandpoliticallyrelevantresources.


–257–


Partymembership–andhenceanominationforpublicelections–canthusliterally

bebought fromtheparty leadership.Thishas ledCoetal. (2005:101)toobserve

that,although“thereisnolegalrestrictiontopartymembership,inpracticethesys‐

tem excludes those who cannot afford to shoulder or attract sufficient campaign

funds.”However,itmustbenotedthattheresourcescandidatesneedinordertobe

admittedtothepartyarethennottransferredtothepartyasanabstractinstitution,

buttheyaredistributedtootherindividualpoliticianswithinthepartyinreturnfor

politicalsupport.AsRocamora(2001:6)explains,

[t]o gain the support of lower level leaders in support of his/her

nomination by the party, [and] to organize the campaign, candi‐

dateshave to spendprodigiousamountsofmoney.Thehigherup

theladder,culminatinginthepresidentialcandidate,themoreyou

havetospend.Notjustforyourowncampaign,buttofinancethose

ofpartymatesandothersupporters running for lower levelposi‐

tions.

Putdifferently,itiscommonpracticeinFilipinopartiesforcandidatesataparticu‐

laradministrativeleveltoshoulderthecampaignexpensesofthenextlowerpoliti‐

caloffice.Thatistosay,thecampaignexpensesofbarangaycaptainsarefundedby

OLIVERHELLMANN

–258–

thecouncillor,whilethecouncillors’expensesarecoveredbythemayor,andsoon,

untilthesubsidyladderreachesthecandidateforpresident.

Thepoliticalparty itselfhas traditionallynotbeenamajorsourceof campaign

fundinginthePhilippines.Thisislargelyduetothefactthatpartiesthemselvesdo

notcultivatetheirownsourcesofincome.Sincethereisnopublicfundingavailable

forpoliticalparties,mostparties(LDP,LP,NP,NPC)do largelyrelyonmandatory

contributionsfromtheirelectedofficials.92Private–includingcorporate–donations

are almost exclusivelypaid to individual candidates, not toparties. The twomain

sources for candidates’ campaign funds are ethnic Chinese businessmen and the

“grey”economy(ArlegueandCoronel2003:231).TheethnicChinesedominatethe

businesssector,butbecauseoftheirnumericalminoritystatustheyareeffectively

barred from the political process, thereby leaving campaign financing as the only

way to safeguard their business interests. Grey contributions, on the other hand,

come mainly from illegal gambling, prostitution and drug smuggling syndicates,

seekingtheprotectionofthepolitician.

Thepartycentralofficethuscompletelydependsonthepartyinpublicofficefor

its financial survival.As a result, theparties in thePhilippineshardlyhave anor‐

ganisational representation outside of parliament. Usually, parties do not have

national headquarters, but the party central office tends be located in the private

officeof itsparty leader. In‐betweenelectionspartieshardlyemployany full‐time

staff, andevenduring campaigningperiodsmanyof the functions thatweusually

92Personalcommunicationwiththepoliticalparties.


–259–

associate with the party bureaucracy will be performed by externally contracted

media professionals (Velasco 1999: 175). In other words, political parties in the

Philippinesdonotonlylackapartyontheground,butalsoapartyincentraloffice.

Those members of staff employed to co‐ordinate the election campaign or fulfil

otheradministrativerolessimplyservethepoliticalambitionsoftheparty leader‐

ship–theydonotthemselvesholdsignificantpoliticalresourcesanddonotqualify

asadistinctiveorganisationalelementwithintheparty.

Thepartyinpublicofficeisthusthedominant–orevenonly–faceinpolitical

parties in the Philippines. However, again, political resources are not held by the

partyinpublicoffice,butbyindividualpoliticians.Thisisthemainreasonwhythe

partyleadershipinCongresscannotexertpressureonlegislatorstoenforcevoting

behaviour along the official party line (Croissant 2003: 82). Rather, the degree of

cohesioninthepartyinpublicofficeisverylow,asisreflectedinthefrequentoc‐

currences of party switching. This further contributes to the difficulty identified

earlierofclearlydistinguishingbetweenthreedistinctiveelementsofpartyorgani‐

sationwithinmajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippines.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–260–

Adeviantcase:AKBAYAN!93

AKBAYAN!was founded in1998 inorder tocompete forseats in thenewly intro‐

ducedpartylistsystemfortheHouseofRepresentatives.94Thepartyonlywonone

mandate in the firstelectionbut thencontinuously increased itsnumberofrepre‐

sentatives–twoin2001andthreein2004–beforesufferingasetbackinthelatest

electionsin2007,whenitonlywonenoughvotesfortwoseatsintheHouseofRep‐

resentatives.IncontrasttothemajorpoliticalpartiesinthePhilippines,AKBAYAN!

hasworkedveryhardtodevelopaprogrammaticplatform,primarilytargetingthe

socially marginalised with demands for far‐reaching reforms of the political and

socialsystem.Thisprogrammaticelectoralstrategyclearlyreflectsintheparty’sor‐

ganisation,which is verydifferent to the typical elitistpartydescribed in the sec‐

tionsabove.

Tobeginwith,AKBAYAN! is theonlyFilipinopartywithacentralmembership

register anda sophisticatedmembership ID card system.Although thepartydoes

not require itsmembers to pay regular dues,membership is tied to a number of

other requirements that clearly distinguish members from ordinary voters. Most

importantly,newmembershavetoattendabasicintroductoryseminarwherethey

93AllinformationinthefollowingparagraphswasgainedthroughpersonalcommunicationwithAKBAYAN!,23June2008.94Upto52seats(20percentoftotalseats)areallottedinaseparateballotonanationallistaccord‐ingtoproportionalrepresentation.PartiesneedtwopercentofthetotalvalidvotesforthePR‐listsinordertogainparliamentaryrepresentation.Theyobtainoneseatforeverytwopercentofthetotalvotes,butcanonlyholdamaximumofthreeseats.Thus,only14ofthepossible52seatswerefilledin1998,20in2001,and24in2004.


–261–

learnabouttheparty’sprinciplesandstructures.Theyarethenassignedtoaparty

unit–eitherbasedongeographyorfunctionality–wheremembersareexpectedto

regularlyparticipateinpartyactivities.Typicalactivitiesoflocalpartybranchesin‐

cludesupportingassociatedNGOsintheirwork,providingassistancetolocalcom‐

munities(suchaspara‐legalaid,education,basichealthcare)andhelpingtoorgan‐

isecitizens’protestregardingissuesclosetotheparty’scentralprinciples.

Inreturnfortheirvoluntarylabour,partymembersaregivenextensivepartici‐

patoryrightsregardinginternaldecision‐making.Hence,theselectionofcandidates

forpublicelectionisnotdecidedbehindcloseddoorsbyasmallcircleofpartylead‐

ers, as in all themajorFilipinoparties, but theprocedure isorganised in ahighly

democratic fashion. For instance, the composition of the party list for the lower

houseofCongressmustbeapprovedbythepartycongress,whichconsistsofrepre‐

sentatives from each of the party’s local chapters.Nominations for local elections

aredecidedbyvotefromallmembersintherespectivelocalpartybranch.

Politicallyrelevantresourcesaremobilisedbytheparty,notbyindividualmem‐

bersorcandidates.AKBAYAN!’smainsourcesofincomeare(indescendingorderof

importance):foreignfinancialsupportforjointprojectswithNGOs(asdirectforeign

fundingforpoliticalpartiesisillegal),localgovernmentprogrammes,contributions

frompublicofficials,fund‐raisingactivities(suchasconcerts)anddonations.Local

branches are usually financially self‐sufficient,while theparty central office is re‐

sponsibleforfundingelectoralcampaigns,membershiptrainingandeducationpro‐

grammes.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–262–

Given the importantroleof thepartybureaucracy inmaintaining themember‐

shipregisterandmobilisingresources,representativesofthepartycentralofficeare

givenex‐officioseatsontheparty’sexecutivecommittee.Specifically,theexecutive

committee comprises the party’s Congress representatives as well as the party

president, vice‐president, the general secretary and five additionalmemberswho

areelectedbytheparty’snationalconvention.Thepartycentralofficethusclearly

hasmorepowerthanthepartyinpublicoffice,allowingittostrictlyenforcedisci‐

plineamongtheparty’selectedrepresentatives.

Summary

Fromthisdescriptiveanalysis itcanthusbeconcludedthatpoliticalparties inthe

Philippinessharemanyorganisationalsimilaritieswiththeclassicalcadrepartyof

19th century Europe. The most striking analogy is the difficulty of clearly distin‐

guishingbetweenthedifferentelementsofpartyorganisation.Rather,thepartyin

publicoffice largelyoverlapswiththepartymembership,sincetheonlycriteriato

separatemembers fromordinarycitizens is theparty’snominationasacandidate

forpublicelection.Theprocedureforcandidateselectionisthushighlyinformaland

obscure, with the party in public office usually nominating themselves. Similarly,

partieshardlymaintainanorganisationalapparatusoutsideofparliament,butgen‐


–263–

eraladministrativefunctionsandcampaignstrategiestendtobemanagedbyparty

externalprofessionals,whoarehiredattheexpenseofthepartyinpublicoffice.

This observation is clearly in linewith the clientelistic electoral strategies fol‐

lowedbythemajorparties inthePhilippines.Partiesaremerelyformalcloaksfor

more informal alliances between political families, linking national politicians to

local bosses through the exchange of political support for material inducements.

Theseclientelisticchannelsserveasthemainvehicletomobilisevotes,recruitcan‐

didatesandallocateresources,whilethepoliticalparty’sprimaryreasonforexist‐

ence is to provide a formal label for the clientelistic alliances between powerful

familiesinordertocoordinateelectoralcampaigningefforts.Moreover,thelogicof

party formationalsohasa legaldimension,asonly the threestrongestparties re‐

ceivedetailedcopiesoftheofficialelectionresults.Consequently,thereisnoneedto

developastrongformalpartyorganisation,whichmakesitimpossibletodistinguish

betweenthepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpublicof‐

fice.

However, while the environmental context favours a clientelistic strategy of

votermobilisation, there are a few cases of political parties developing program‐

matic appeals, themostnotableexamplebeingAKBAYAN!. Similar to the classical

masspartyin late19thcenturyEurope,AKBAYAN!wasestablishedoutsideofgov‐

ernment,withtheaimofchallengingelitistpartiesthatusetheiraccesstostatere‐

sourcestomobilisevotersthroughpatron‐clientexchangerelationships.Eitherbe‐

causethepartylacksthenecessaryresourcesorbecausepartyinternalactorsusea

OLIVERHELLMANN

–264–

differentsetofideastomapthecontextualterrain,AKBAYAN!developedprogram‐

maticappeals.This,inturn,madeitnecessarytodevelopapartyorganisationthat

aggregatessocialintereststhroughstronggrassrootslinksandarticulatesthesein‐

terestsaspolicyproposals throughastronglydisciplinedparty inpublicoffice.So

far, however, this strategyhasnot translated intomajor electoral success and the

Filipinopartysystemremainsdominatedbyclientelisticpartieswithoutnotableor‐

ganisationalfoundations.

ThecaseofthePhilippinesthereforeagaindemonstratesthatactorscandevelop

differentelectoralandorganisationalstrategieswithinthesamecontext.However,

theneo‐democraticenvironmentinthePhilippinesheavilyfavoursclientelismover

otherstrategies.Thisisbecausehighlevelsofpovertymeanthatvotersareunlikely

todefectfromtheclientelisticexchangeagreement,whilelowdegreesofurbanisa‐

tion facilitate themonitoringofvoters’behaviour.Asa result,politicalpartiesare

generallynomorethanaformalfaçadeforhighlyinformalpatron‐clientnetworks,

linkingpoliticianstovoters.Actorsdevelopingprogrammaticappeals,ontheother

hand,faceenormousdifficulties.Itthereforeseemshighlyunlikelythatmassparties

willenjoysimilarelectoralsuccesscomparedtocommunistandsocialistpartiesin

late 19th century Europe. Thus, rather than following the same path of organisa‐

tionaldevelopmentastheircounterpartsinWesternEurope,politicalpartiesinthe

Philippinesmightbeabletomaintaintheirhighlyelitistcharacterforanunforesee‐

abletimetocome.


–265–

–7–

INDONESIA

SimilartothePhilippines,thepost‐authoritarianpartysysteminIndonesiaisdomi‐

natedbypoliticalpartiesclosetotheclassicalcadreparty.Thesepartiesareheavily

populatedbyelementsof theancienrégime,whocontrolled thedemocratic trans‐

formationfromaboveandwerethusabletokeeptheirinfluentialpositionswithin

extensivepatron‐clientnetworks.However,theregime‐populatedpartiesfaceseri‐

ous electoral competition from parties campaigning on programmatic appeals,

whichwereestablishedbyactorsopposingtheregime.Themostnotableexampleof

theseparties is theProsperous JusticeParty (PKS),which, aswewould expect, is

basedonamasspartymembershipandcharacterisedbyastrongpartycentralof‐

fice. This should not be interpreted as a confirmation of the “life cycle” theory of

partyorganisation,withIndonesianpartiesfollowingthesamepathofdevelopment

asWestern European parties. Rather, aswill be explained, party organisations in

Indonesiaaretheproductofstrategicdecisionsmadeintheparticularcountrycon‐

text.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–266–


ClassifyingtheendofSuharto’s“NewOrder”regimeinIndonesiainMay1998isnot

without difficulties. Although the collapse of the regime was initiated by student

protestsandmassriots, thepro‐democraticoppositiondidnothaveany influence

on the transformation of the political system. Rather, negotiations over the new

rulesof thepoliticalgametookplacealmostentirelybetweensoft‐linerandhard‐

liner groups within the authoritarian regime, not between regime defenders and

challengers (Malley 2000: 153). As a result, the transition to democracy left the

statusesofmanyelementsof theauthoritarianregimeuntouched,providing these

elementswiththeopportunitytore‐positionthemselvesunderthenewdemocratic

rulesbycapturingexistingpartiesorestablishingtheirownparties.

Suharto, then a major‐general in the Indonesian army, seized power in 1967,

throughastealthycoupd’étatagainstthefirstpresidentofIndonesia,Sukarno,who

had abolished democracy in 1957 to rule under martial law. While the officially

stated goal of the New Orderwas socio‐economic development, political stability

andsecurityweredeclaredasitsnecessaryconditions(Vatikiotis1998:33‐35).The

ideologicalcentrepieceofthisurgeforharmonyinsuchanethnicallyandreligiously

diversesocietyas IndonesiawasthenationalphilosophyofPancasila.95 Inaccord‐

ancewithPancasila,only40percentofparliamentwasopenlyelected,andmulti‐

95Literallythe“fivepillars”,orprinciples,Pancasilacomprises:(1)beliefinoneGod,(2)justandcivilisedhumanitarianism,(3)aunitedIndonesia,(4)democracyguidedbywisdom,throughconsul‐tationandrepresentation,and(5)socialjusticeforalltheIndonesianpeople.


–267–

partypoliticswerevirtuallybannedbymergingalloppositionpartiesintotwolar‐

gerparties.Thesecular‐nationalistpartieshadtouniteunderthebannerofthePar

taiDemokrasiIndonesia(IndonesianDemocraticParty,PDI),whiletheMuslimpar‐

tieswere forced to fuse into thePartai PersatuanPembangunan (UnitedDevelop‐

mentParty,PPP).TheregimeitselfusedGolonganKarya(orGolkar)asitselectoral

vehicle.96

Political power under the New Order was initially shared by four actors: (1)

presidentSuharto,(2)thearmedforces,(3)thebureaucracy,and(4)largebusiness

conglomerates,mostlyownedbyethnicChinese(Liddle1985;1999).Attheheartof

theregimelaidacomplicatedsystemofpatronagethroughwhichSuhartoskilfully

managedcompetingtensionsbetweentheelites,andwhichsoonallowedSuhartoto

becomethedominantplayer.Personal loyaltyinSuharto’sincreasingly“sultanistic

regime”(ChehabiandLinz1998)wasrewardedwithpromotions,businesslicences,

subsidies, loans and other gifts. This system worked extremely well, as the New

Orderregimedelivereditspromiseofsocio‐economicmodernisation,henceproduc‐

ingenoughspoilstobedistributedamongtheelites.

Inlinewiththeargumentsofmodernisationtheory(seeLipset1981),however,

through the success of its economic policies theNewOrder regime gave rise to a

96Asitwasnotregardedasapartyinthelegalsense,butratherasa“functionalgroup”,Golkarwasnotrestrictedbygovernmentregulationsontheconductofparties.Incontrast,boththePDIandthePPPwereseriouslyconstrainedintheirelectioncampaigns.Forinstance,neitherpartywasallowedtodirectlycriticisethegovernmentoritspolicies,nocampaigningwasallowedinvillages(wheremostpeoplelived),andgovernmentpermissionwasrequiredforallrallies.Furthermore,partynomineesforlegislativeofficewerescreenedbytheregimeforpossible“extremeleft”(communism)or“extremeright”(militantMuslim)connectionsortendencies.Andfinally,neitherthePDInorthePPPwasallowedtohavebranchesbelowthedistrictlevel.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–268–

newmiddleclass.Manymembersofthisemergingurbanmiddleclassfounditdiffi‐

culttoadjustfromthecollectivismintheirvillagestotheinvidualisminbigcities,

suchas Jakarta,andturned fromtheir “statistical” Islamtowardsmoreactivepar‐

ticipation in search for moral guidance and orientation.97 This growing Islamist

movement soon became a hotbed for political discontent that threatened the sta‐

bilityoftheNewOrder(Hefner2000:123‐126).Suhartorespondedtothismenace

by announcing a new policy of openness, or keterbukaan. Moreover, he co‐opted

Muslim leaders,suchasAmienRais, intotheregime, throughtheestablishmentof

theAssociationofIndonesianMuslimIntellectuals(ICMI)in1990,andbyenactinga

numberofconservativereligiouslaws.

Still,severalinfluentialIslamicleaders,includingAbdurrahmanWahid,thehead

of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation,Nahdatul Ulama (NU), decided not to

join the ICMI, and continued to publicly debate the need for political reforms.

Meanwhile, thePDI, now ledby Sukarno’s daughter,Megawati,managed towin a

historic15percentofthevoteinthe1992legislativeelectionsbyappealingdirectly

tothelowerclasseswhofeltmarginalisedbytheprocessofindustrialisation.How‐

ever,astheregimesoonmovedtoagainendtheeraofopenness,ittookanexternal

triggertobringdownSuharto.WhentheAsianeconomiccrisishitIndonesiainlate

1997,studentsandtheurbanpoorpouredintothestreetsinthousands,protesting 97DuetotheparticularpatternofIslamicconversion,IndonesianMuslimsformaveryheterogeneouscommunity.Firstofall,itispossibletodistinguishpracticingMuslimsfromnominalMuslims:WhilesantriareMuslimsofastrictorthodoxy,abangan,althoughacknowledginganadherencetoIslam,ordertheirlivesaccordingtomoreindigenouspreceptsandpractices.Moroever,santricanbefur‐thersubdividedintomodernistsandtraditionalists.WhereasmodernistsacceptthevalidityofnonebuttheprimarytextsoftheIslamictradition(theQur’anandtheHadith,thetraditionsoftheprophetMohammed),traditionalistsalsolooktowardsmysticismandritualpractice.


–269–

againstunemployment, foodshortagesandeconomichardship,whichtheyblamed

on Suharto’s patrimonialistic and nepotistic dealings. Themost violent riots took

place in Jakarta on 14‐15May, 1998,mainly targeting properties and businesses

ownedbyethnicChinese,leavingmorethan1,000dead.

TABLE18: SOCIO‐ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTININDONESIA




Literacy(inpercent)

Indonesia 516(1998)

1,824(2007)

0.310(1999)

0.376(2007)

48.0(2000) 90.0(2000‐05)

Germany 29,461(2006) 0.283(2007) 75.2(2005) 99.0(2006)

UnitedKingdom 33,238(2005) 0.360(2007) 89.7(2005) 99.0(2005)

Source: UnitedNationsESCAP(undated);UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(undated)

Atthesametime,sincetherewerenolongeranyeconomicrewardsforsupporting

Suharto,manyelitesabandonedtheirsupportfortheregime(Eklöf1999:235).Of

crucial importance was the decision by the armed forces to refrain from force

againstthestudentsortheriotersinJakarta.Anessentialparameterinthesestra‐

tegic calculationswas the organisational weakness of the pro‐democratic opposi‐

tion.AfterafailedattemptbyAmienRais,whoresignedfromtheICMIin1997,to

unite hisMuhammadiyahwithWahid’sNU andMegawati’s PDI into a broad anti‐

Suhartoalliance, itbecameclearthattheoppositionmovementwasrivenbyideo‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–270–

logical andpersonal feuds.98Hence, the ruling elite agreed to demands for demo‐

cratization,andforcedSuhartotostepdown,because“[t]herewerefewprospectsof

aseriousoverturningofthesocialorder”(Aspinall2005:264).

These calculations were supported by the socio‐economic context in the late

1990s.Althoughtherawfiguressuggestthattheprocessoflateindustrialisationled

toarelativelyfairdistributionofincomecomparabletothoseofWesternEuropean

countries(seeTable18),thereareinrealitywidedisparitiesbetweendifferentgeo‐

graphical areas, andpocketsofpovertyalsoarealsoevidentwithinmoreaffluent

provinces (World Bank 2006: 36‐37). Moreover, Indonesia is characterised by a

relativelylowlevelofurbanisation,creatingperfectconditionsfortheimplementa‐

tionofclientelisticstrategiesofvotermobilisation.Inotherwords,weshouldexpect

elementsoftheNewOrderregimetousetheiraccesstostateresources,whichwas

left untouched by the process of democratisation, to attractmostly impoverished

votersinalargelyruralcontext,throughthedistributionofclientelisticincentives.

98MuhammadiyahisthemainorganisationtorepresentmodernistMuslims.Itwasestablishedin1912,andnowencompassesapproximatelytwelvemillionmembers.Inlinewithitsphilosophy,namelytoreconcileIslamwiththemodernworldthrougheducationandwelfare,Muhammadiyahisbasedonabroadnetworkofeducationalinstitutionsrangingfromkindergartenstouniversities.NahdatulUlama(NU)isthemaintraditionalistIslamicorganisation.Foundedin1926,itcommands,atpresent,thesupportofsome30millionMuslims.Alsoactiveineducationandwelfare,NUrunsthemajorityofruralreligiousboardingschools(pesantren).


–271–


Indeed, the strategic calculationsmade by the former regime elites held true. As

several observers of Indonesian politics point out, the first free and fair elections

conductedin1999didnotundermineelitestatusesandinterests,butmanymem‐

bersof theoldelitewereable to reconstitute theirpositionsofpower in thenew

democratic environment (for example Case 2002: 69; Ghoshal 2004: 515). In a

widelyacceptedargumentSlater(2004)observesthatthemajorpoliticalpartiesin

post‐authoritarian Indonesianow forma “cartel”,whichmakes itverydifficult for

newpartiestowinparliamentaryrepresentation.Thecartelisbuiltoninformal,in‐

ter‐personal networks that span across party boundaries, and highly restrictive

partylaws.99Theobviousevidencefortheexistenceofsuchacartelisthepractice

offormingoversizedcoalitions,whichinvolvemorepartiesthanneededforalegis‐

lativemajority.100 The “cartelised elite sees politics to a great extent as business”

(Ufen2006:29),andalargegovernmentcoalitionisthemechanismwithwhichto

99Toparticipateinthe1999parliamentaryelectionspartieshadtohavebranchesinatleast9outofthe27provincesofthecountry,andwithinthem,atleastinone‐halfoftherespectiveadministrativesub‐units.OnlythosepartiesconqueringatleasttwopercentoftheseatsinthePeople’sRepresenta‐tiveCouncil(DewanPerwakilanRakyat,DPR)oratleastthreepercentoftheseatsinlocallegisla‐tureswerethenallowedtoruninthe2004election.Similarly,onlypartiesorcoalitionsofpartiesthatobtainedaminimumofthreepercentoftheseatsorfivepercentofthevotesinthe2004par‐liamentaryelectionwereallowedtonominatecandidatesforthepresidentialelection.Forthe2009presidentialelection,theminimumwillbe15percentoftheseatsand20percentofthevotes.100WhileMegawatiSukarnoputri formedaKabinetPelangi (RainbowCoaliton), includingherparty(PDI‐P),Golkar,PPP,PANandotherparties,hersuccessorYudhoyono formed theso‐calledKoalisiKerakyatan(People’sCoalition),whichalliedhisPDwithsixotherparties,givinghimthesupportof73.6%ofrepresentativesintheDPR.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–272–

distributethespoilsofofficeevenlyamongthemembersofthiselite.Electoralcom‐

petitionisthuslargely

about furtheringdominanceover the institutionsof the state, and

their resources and coercive power, and about developing net‐

worksofpatronageandprotection.

(RobisonandHadiz2004:245)

ThemajorpoliticalpartiesinIndonesiaarethusfilledwithrent‐seekingpoliticians,

who are exclusively interested in gaining office in order to get access to state re‐

sources.Elitesthenusetheseresourcestomaintainclientelisticnetworkstomobi‐

lisevoters.However,aswillbeseen,verylittleisactuallydistributedtotheelector‐

ate, but clientelism is rather a mechanism to accommodate elites both at the

nationalandthelocallevel.

Conflictbetweenpersonalisticfactions

Thepost‐autocraticpartysysteminIndonesiaisdominatedbyactors,whoalready

playedanimportantroleundertheNewOrderregime:Golkar,itstwosatellitepar‐


–273–

ties(thePPPandPDI‐P101),andthepartiesofreligiousleadersWahidandRais,the

National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) respec‐

tively.Thesefivepartiesemergedasthewinnersinthe1999elections,butthenlost

electoralstrengthinthe2004elections,whichtranslatesintoanincreasinglevelof

partysystemfragmentation(seeTable19).Allfivepartiesfollowclientelisticstrat‐

egiesforvotermobilisation,whichisclearlyreflectedinthefactthatconflictwithin

thepartiesisnotdrivenbyideologicaldifferences,butpartyinternalfactionsgroup

around individual politicianswho control patronage andotherpolitically relevant

resources.

TABLE19: INDONESIA–PARTYSYSTEMINDICATORS

ENEPa ENPPb Volatility

1999 5.10 4.68 ‐2004 8.55 7.07 28.55Average 6.86 5.88 28.55Notes:aEffectivenumberofelectoralpartiescalculatedontheshareofvotesinelec‐tionstothePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.bEffectivenumberofparliamentarypartiesinthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.Source: JohnsonTan(2006)andauthor’sowncalculationbasedonAnanta,

ArifinandSuryadinata(2005)

Thispatternofparty internal conflict isparticularlyobvious in the formerregime

party, Golkar,where no single politician has so far been able to establish him‐ or

herselfasthedominantleader.Rather,theoustingofSuhartoleftapowervacuum

101ThePDI‐PwasestablishedasasplinterpartyfromthePDIin1998.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–274–

intheparty,withseveralindividualscompetingforthepositionatthetop.102When

then vice‐president Habibie took over from Suharto inMay 1998, Golkarwas di‐

vided into two groups: one led by Habibie himself, consisting mainly of civilians

closelylinkedtoSuharto,theotheramilitaryfactioncriticalofSuharto.TheGolkar

chairmanelection in July1998turned intoanopencontestbetweenthesegroups,

withAkbarTandjung, the candidateof theHabibie group,winningoverhis oppo‐

nent, and themilitary leavingGolkar–at least in termsof formal structure.How‐

ever,soonafterhisvictory,Akbardecidedthatitwastimetodistancehimselffrom

Suharto andHabibie. As the former chairmanof the Islamic StudentsAssociation,

Akbarbenefitted fromastrongnetworkofsupporterswithin theparty,andwhen

Habibiewithdrewhispresidential candidacy for the1999elections– afterhis ac‐

countabilityspeechhadbeenrejectedbyparliament–Akbarbecamethedominant

leaderofGolkar.

However,Akbar’sdominancewasonlyshort‐lived,asseveralaffluentbusiness‐

menenteredthepartyinordertobenominatedasGolkar’spresidentialcandidate

for2004.Themostpowerfulof thesewereAburizalBakrie, chairmanof the large

Bakrieconglomerate,SuryahPaloh, themedia tycoonbehindMetroTVandMedia

Indonesia,AgungLaksono,thefounderofAdamAirandnowspeakerofthePeople’s

Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and Prabowo Subianto,

Suharto’sson‐in‐law.Despitethesecandidates’economicpower,Golkar’spresiden‐

tial nomination, nevertheless, went to General Wiranto, who had risen to power

102Foramoredetailedanalysisofinter‐factionalconflictwithinGolkarafterthefallofSuhartoseeTomsa(2006)andSuryadinata(2007).


–275–

through a steepmilitary career under theNewOrder, eventually appointed army

chiefofstaffin1997.Similarly,theGolkarchairmanelectionwasalsofiercelycon‐

tested,withWirantosupportingAkbar,butallotherbigplayersthrowingtheirsup‐

portbehindJusufKalla.Kalla,againanaffluentbusinessman,hadrunsuccessfullyas

vice‐presidentforYudhoyonoandthusofferedmuchbetteraccesstostatepatron‐

agethanAkbar.

TABLE20: INDONESIA–PARLIAMENTARYELECTIONRESULTS

1998a 2004Party

Vb Sc V S

PDI‐P 33.8 30.8 18.6 19.8Golkar 22.5 24.0 21.6 23.1PKB 12.6 10.2 10.6 9.5PPP 10.7 11.8 8.2 10.5PAN 7.1 7.0 6.4 9.6PBB 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.0PD ‐ ‐ 7.5 10.2PKS ‐ ‐ 7.3 8.2Other 11.4 13.6 17.2 7.1

Notes:a38additionalseatswerereservedforthearmedforces.bShareofvotes(inpercent)inelectionstothePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.cShareofseats(inpercent)inthePeople’sRepresentativeCouncil.Source: Rüland(2001);naThalang(2005)

Inotherpartiesthedistributionofpowerismuchclearer.Thisisespeciallytruefor

thePDI‐PandthePKB,inwhichtheparties’respectiveleaders,MegawatiSukarno‐

putriandAbdurrahmanWahid,“havealmostcultstatusandattractunquestioning,

OLIVERHELLMANN

–276–

oftenfanatical,loyaltyfrommanyoftheirgrassrootssupporters”(Fealy2001:102).

InthecaseofthePDI‐P,thisloyaltyislargelybasedonMegawatibeingthedaughter

ofSukarno– the founderofmodern Indonesia–andheractive role inopposition

againstSuharto.Hence,despitedramaticvotelossesinthe2004parliamentaryelec‐

tion(seeTable20),Megawatiandherclanledbyherhusband,TaufikKiemas,con‐

tinuetoexertimmeasurablepoweratthetopoftheparty.103Criticsarerigorously

silenced and often only left with the option of exiting the party. So, for instance,

MegawatiopponentsaroundleadingpartyexecutiveArifinPanigoroestablishedthe

so‐called PDI‐P ReformMovement (Gerakan Pembaruan) in December 2005. The

driving forcebehind thismove,however,wasnotan interest indemocratising in‐

ternaldecision‐making,asthenameofthenewpartymaysuggest.Rather,because

thedifferencesbetweenMegawatiandtheYudhoyonogovernmentseemedirrecon‐

cilable,Arifinandhiscronieswereeffectivelybarredfromaccesstolucrativestate

resources.

Similarly,inthePKB,AbdurrahmanWahidhasbeenabletofightoffanyserious

internaloppositionagainsthisleadership.AsthegrandsonofthefounderofNahda

tulUlama(NU),WahidenjoysextraordinarysupportamongmodernistMuslims,al‐

lowinghimtomaintainhispowerfulpositionwithinthepartydespitechallengesby

MatoriAbdulDjali, in2001, andAlwiAbdurrahmanShihabandSaifullahYusuf in

2004‐5,whichbotheventuallyhadtobesettledincourtaseachsideclaimedtobe

thetruerepresentativeofthePKB.Between2006and2007,somelocalpartychap‐

103PersonalcommunicationwithIgnasKleden,14July2008.


–277–

tersrefusedtofollowdirectionsfromtheleadershipinJakarta,resultingintheclos‐

ureof40partybranches,butWahidremainsinstrongcontroloftheparty,asisre‐

flectedinthefactthatSaifullahleftthePKBinJanuary2007tojointhePPP.More‐

over,thePKBsplitonceagaininMay2008whenWahidoustedMuhaiminIskandar

aspartychairman,whothenclaimedtoleadtherealPKB–thusleadingtothecur‐

rentsituationwheretherearetwoPKBs.

Albeit less powerful thanWahid, Amien Rais, the former leader of Indonesia’s

second‐largestMuslimorganisation,Muhammadiyah,alsoplaysastrongrolewithin

hisownparty,PAN.Althoughherelinquishedformalcontrolof thepartyafterthe

2004 election,AmienRais is still ensured influencewithin thePAN, afterpushing

throughtheelectionofacloseconfidant,businessmanSustrinoBachir,asnewparty

chairman.104Amien also retains the influential positionof chairmanof theparty’s

advisorycouncil.ThestrongestopponentofBachirisHattaRajasa,thecurrentgen‐

eralsecretaryofPANandcabinetministerfortransportation.UnlikeWahid,Amien

Raisisunabletoextinguishpartyinternalopposition,largelybecauseMuhammadi

yah, incontrast toNU, isnotapersonalisedbutanabstractorganisation,meaning

thatAmienRaisdoesnotenjoyunconditionalgrassrootssupport.105Infact,thecon‐

nectionbetweenMuhammadiyah andPANhasbecome increasingly looseover the

years,eventuallyendinginastatementissuedbytheMuhammadiyahleadershipin

2006thatexplicitlyallowedtherank‐and‐filetovoteforanypartytheywanted.

104PersonalcommunicationwithRizalSukma,15July2008.105PersonalcommunicationwithIgnasKleden,14July2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–278–

IncontrasttobothPKBandPAN,afurtherMuslimparty,thePPP,hasneverbeen

dominated by a charismatic leader. From 1998 to 2007 the party was under the

leadershipofHamzahHaz,anexperiencedbutuninspiringcareerpoliticianwhohad

been active in politics since the earlyNewOrder days. For a long timeHamzah’s

leadershipremainedlargelyunchallenged,andthemostseriousconflictwastaken

outsidethepartywhenthepopularpreacherZainuddinMZdefectedfromthePPP

in2002andfoundedtheReformStarParty(PartaiBintangReformasi,PBR).How‐

ever,in2005,agroupledbydeputychairmanandcabinetministerSuryadharmaAli

organisedahugeinformalgatheringofhundredsofpartyexecutivesfromalladmin‐

istrative levels,whichseverelyweakenedHamzah’s leadership, leadinghim toan‐

nounce thathewouldnotcontest thechairmanship in2007.Again,whileHamzah

losthispositionasvice‐president in2004,Suryadharma, inhisroleasministerof

cooperativesandstateandmediumenterprises inpresidentYudhoyono's cabinet,

couldprovidemuchbetteraccesstothestate’sinstitutions.

Socialidentitiesasdriversforvotingbehaviour

Internalconflictwithin themajorpoliticalparties in Indonesia is thereforealmost

exclusively about the distribution of patronage and other politically relevant re‐

sources. Ideological issues, on the other hand, are very rarely sources of internal


–279–

conflict,sinceactorswithinthemajorpartiesarenotinterestedindevelopingpolicy

platforms. Interestingly, thisseemstocontradict theelectoralbehaviourofvoters,

whoshowstrongreligious,regionalandsocialaffiliations,leadingtoastrikingcon‐

tinuityinvotingpatterns(Ananta,ArifinandSuryadinata2004;King,Baswedanand

Harjanto2005).Inotherwords,althoughpartieshavedoneverylittleinthewayof

developing clear policy directions that would relate to the interests of the social

groupswho support them, electoral studieshave revealed long lasting allegiances

betweenthemajorpartiesandthevariousreligious,classandregionalgroupingsin

Indonesiansociety.

Tomaintaintheseallegiancespartiesbuildconnectionswithlocalnotableswho

haveastronginfluenceoverthecultural,economicandpubliclifeintheregion,and

whowilltheneitherimplicitlyendorsethepartyorexplicitlyinstructtheirfollow‐

ershowtovote(Sherlock2004:22‐23). Ifvotersseeapartyaswell‐connected to

theleadersofaparticularsocialgroup,thepartyisconsideredtobeabletorepre‐

senttheinterestsofthatsocialgroup.Moreover,partiesnotonlybuildnetworksof

localnotables toestablish themselvesas representativesofwell‐definedsegments

inIndonesiansociety,butsomeofthem–especiallythePDI‐P,thePANandthePKB

–relyheavilyonthepersonalityoftheirrespectiveleader.106Hence,whileMegawati

still embodiesher father’svision for social justice, thusmaking thePDI‐Pparticu‐

larly popular among rural and urbanworkers, both the PAN and the PKB benefit

106ForamoredetailedanalysisofpartyleadersasanimportantfactortoexplainvotingbehaviourinIndonesiaseeLiddleandMujani(2007).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–280–

fromthepersonificationofreligioustraditionsintheirrespectiveleaders–modern‐

istIslaminAmienRais,traditionalistIslaminWahid.

Inshort,themajorpoliticalpartiesinIndonesiaallfollowaclientelisticstrategy

ofvotermobilisation,whichinsomecasesissupportedbythecharismaoftheparty

leader.107However,verylittletricklesdowntothevoterthroughtheseclientelistic

networks,asthephenomenonofvote‐buyingisalmostunheardofintheIndonesian

context (Hadiwinata2006).Rather, citizensvoteaccording to their religious, class

or regional identity. Therefore, as van deWalle (2003: 313) observed for African

partysystems,

itismoreusefultothinkofclientelisticpoliticsasconstitutingpri‐

marilyamechanismforaccommodationandintegrationofafairly

narrowpoliticalelitethanasaformofmasspartypatronage.Most

of thematerialgains fromclientelismare limitedto thiselite.The

stronger link between political elites and the citizenry is through

thelesstangiblebondsofethnicidentity.

Inotherwords,votermobilisationinIndonesiaisorganisedthroughintra‐elitenet‐

works based on clientelistic exchange relationships between politicians at the

nationallevelandlocalnotables.Thesenetworkssurvivedthedemocratictransition

andallowedelementsoftheoldregimetomaintaintheirpositionsofpowerinthe

107Moreover, several localpoliticiansused their considerable financial resources tohireorganisedgangsofthugs(preman)tointimidatebothvotersandothercandidates(Wilson2006:270‐5).


–281–

electoralmarket.However,thepatron‐clientrelationshipsinheritedfromSuharto’s

regimedonot reachdown tovoter level.This is because, in the regime’spseudo‐

elections,voteswereboughtthroughthelocalbranchesofthestateadministration,

which iswhyvoters in Indonesia todayarenotused to receivingmoney for their

votesfromparties.108Instead,theconnectionbetweenthepoliticianandthevoteris

madeascommonpeopleadoptlocalnotablesastheirbabak,orfather,basedonre‐

ligious, ethnic or class identities (see Cederroth 2004). That is to say, there is no

need for politicians to extend the clientelistic network beyond local notables, be‐

causevoterswillvoteforthepartyendorsedbytheirrespectivebabak,irrespective

ofmaterialincentives.

Thecontext inpost‐SuhartoIndonesiathusfavoursactorswhohavetheneces‐

sary resources to integrate localpowerholders intoa clientelisticnetwork.These

actors are – as the examples of Golkar and PAN illustrate in particular – mostly

membersofIndonesia’seconomicelite.Moreover,otheractors,especiallyeliteswho

belongedtotheclosecirclearoundSuharto’sregime,wereabletothetransferthe

clientelisticconnectionstheyhadbeendevelopingthroughdecadesofauthoritarian

ruleintothedemocraticarena,suchasHamzahHaz,theleaderofthePPP,Wiranto

and Akbar of Golkar, or current president Yudhoyono. Finally, some actors base

theirelectoralstrategynotonlyonclientelism,butalsobenefitfromtheirpersonal

charisma –most notablyWahid andMegawati. However,whatever actors’ source

forclientelisticpower, theseactors formaclosecartelbasedonpersonalrelation‐

108PersonalcommunicationwithAniesBaswedan,17July2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–282–

ships thatensuresgovernmentparticipation,whileexcludingsmallerparties.This

therebyallowsallelitesaccesstopublicresourcesasanadditionalsourcetofurther

consolidatetheirclientelisticnetworks.

Yet,whilethecontextualenvironmentclearlyselectsforclientelisticstrategiesof

votermobilisation,itisimportanttopointoutthatnotallrelevantpoliticalparties

followaclientelisticstrategy,henceconfirmingourargumentthatsocialagentscan

developalternative strategic responses to the same context.Themostnotable ex‐

ampleofaprogrammaticparty is thePKS,whichwasestablishedunder thename

JusticePartyinJuly1998byactivistsoftheIslamiststudentmovement.Whilstnot

openlypushing foran Islamicstateor theadoptionofsharia law, theparty’splat‐

formfocusesontheneedtoeducatethemassesonshariathroughda’wah(inviting

peopletolearnabouttheQu’ranandotherIslamicsources),whichimpliesthatthe

PKSseesthe incorporationof Islamic lawintotheconstitutionasa longtermgoal

(Baswedan2004).Thepartyonlyachieved1.8%ofthevotesinthe1999,failingto

achievethetwo‐percentelectoralthresholdthatwaslegallyrequiredtocompetein

the 2004 legislative elections. Itwas thus reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice

Party,andthistimemanagedtowin7.3%ofthevotesand45outof550seats,mak‐

ingthePKStheseventh‐largestpartyinparliament.

ThePKS’ssearchforapolicyplatformclearlyreflectsintheconflictbetweenits

partyinternalfactions.Foralongtimethepartyhadbeenabletocontainitsinternal

differencesandpreventadividingschism.However, factional tensionssurfaced in

the run‐up to the 2004 presidential election, deriving from the tension between


–283–

Islamistgoalsandacommitmenttodemocracy.Whilethepartymainstreamaround

thenpartyleaderHidayatNurWahidwantedPKStosupportAmienRaisasapresi‐

dentialcandidate,ahardlinefactionaroundtheparty’sgeneral‐secretaryAnisMatta

argued that thePKSshouldput itsweightbehindGolkar‐nomineeWiranto,who–

althougha lessdevoutMuslim thanAmienRais–wasconsideredashavingmuch

betterchancesofwinningtheelection.FactionalisminthePKSisthusnotdrivenby

patronageandclientelism.Rather,thepartyissplitbetweenmoderatescommitted

to Islam and democracy, and more radical forces who seek power in order to

achieveIslamistgoals.109

Thedrivingmotivationsbehindactors’strategiccalculationsareagaindifficultto

identifyandnotpartofthisanalysis.Takingamoreresource‐focusedapproach,we

couldarguethat–asthePKSwasformedexternally tothepartycartel–theparty

lackedthenecessarymeanstodevelopaclientelisticstrategyforvotermobilisation

and thus had to focus on programmatic appeals instead. Alternatively, we could

buildanargumentbasedonideas,arguingthatagentswithinthePKSholdcertain

viewsabouttheirenvironment,whichdonotallowthemtorealisetheopportunities

for clientelism presented by that environment. More precisely, actors in the PKS

could genuinely be interested in introducing sharia law through da’wah, leading

themtorejectclientelismasparticularisticrelationshipsnotconducive to theuni‐

versalextensionofIslam.

109PersonalcommunicationwithRizalSukma,15July2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–284–

WhateverthereasonbehindthePKS’sprogrammaticplatform,thecentrallesson

tobedrawnfromthisexample is that–althoughthecontextualenviromentalwill

strategically select for a particular outcome – this outcome is not inevitable, but

social actors can follow alternative courses of action. However, the characteristic

regularity thatwe can identify in themajor political parties in post‐authoritarian

Indonesia is that they are dominated by elites who had been embedded into Su‐

harto’sdistributivecoalition.Aftertheintroductionof freeandfairelectiontheel‐

ites used these inter‐personal channels and their access to state resources for an

electoral strategy based primarily on clientelism. Itmust be noted, however, that

clientelismintheIndonesiancontextismainlyastrategytoaccommodatethepoliti‐

cal elite,while voters are linked topoliticians through religious, ethnic and social

identities.

Partyorganisation

TheclientelisticstrategiesofthemajorIndonesianpartiesclearlyreflectintheiror‐

ganisation,asallinternaldecisionsaremadeinformally,whiletheformalelements

ofthepartyorganisationareimpossibletodistinguish.Rather,asinthePhilippines,

thepartymembership largelyoverlapswith theparty inpublicoffice andaparty

bureaucracyisalmostnon‐existent.Actorsinvestheavilyinthemaintenanceofin‐


–285–

tra‐elite clientelistic networks, with the function of the formal party organisation

reducedtoamerefaçade.Incontrast,thePKS,whichfollowsaprogrammaticstrat‐

egyofvotermobilisation,hasdevelopedastrongmassmembershiporganisation,in

whichthepartycentralofficeclearlyplaysthedominantrole.

Membership

In accordance with the amended Law on Political Parties, which was ratified in

December2007,apoliticalpartyinIndonesiamusthavebranchesin60percentof

theprovinces,50percentof thedistricts ineachprovince,and25percentof the

sub‐districts in each district. These requirements were put into effect, as it was

fearedthat–inthemulticulturalsocietythatisIndonesia–politicalpartiescouldbe

usedtopromoteracial,religiousorethnichatred,ortoencouragethesecessionof

certain regions from the Indonesian state. In accordance with these legal regula‐

tions,allmajorIndonesianpartieshaveestablishedformalrepresentativeofficesin

most provinces and inmany districts across thewhole archipelago. For instance,

Golkar,which as the former regime party enjoyed a considerable head start con‐

cerningtheconstructionofanorganisationalapparatus,claimstohave30provin‐

cialbranches,around380districtand3,900sub‐districtbranches.110

110PersonalcommunicationwithGolkar,2July2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–286–

However,ingeneral,thequalityoftheseofficesandtheirabilitytocommunicate

withthepeopleatthegrassrootslevelisverypoor.Infact,partybranchesareusu‐

allyonlyorganisedasanemptyshellinordertomeetthelegalrequirementssetout

inthepartylaw.In‐betweenelectionsIndonesia’spartyorganisationswitheraway

and party activities are almost non‐existent (Johnson Tan 2006: 107). Given the

littleinterestnationalpartyleadershipshaveinorganisingandmaintainingastrong

localorganisation,partybrancheshave,inmostcases,been“hijacked”bylocalnot‐

ables – such as wealthy businesspeople, well‐connected bureaucrats, traditional

noblemen, or violent gangsters. Thepoliticians thenuse the local party branch to

contestforpublicofficesatloweradministrativelevels,whichthroughtheprocess

of decentralising administrative governance and fiscal governance – initiated in

1999–havebecomeincreasinglyinteresting(Hadiz2004;Choi2004a).

Local party branches are thus highly independent from the central party

(Buehler and Tan 2007). This independence goes so far that in order tomobilise

supportfortheelectioncampaign,candidatesfornationalelectionswillhavetopay

the party branches in their respective constituency for their loyalty.111 In other

words,adyadicpatron‐clientrelationconnectsthenationalpoliticiantotheheadof

thelocalpartybranch.Thelatterwillthenusethismoneytoreimbursepartywork‐

ersfortheirservicesduringthecampaign(suchascanvassing,puttinguppostersor

participatinginamassrally).Thepaymentismadeeitherincashorthroughother

111PersonalcommunicationwithBennySubianto,3July2008.


–287–

gifts, suchasa freemeal, vouchers for local transportorentertainment througha

musicshow.

Ordinarypartymembers,whowouldperformthesecampaign‐relatedtasksona

voluntarybasis–asisthecommonpracticeinmostWestEuropeanparties–donot

exist in Indonesia. Political parties provide membership figures on request, but

withoutapartymembershipregisterandasophisticatedsystemofmembershipID

cards,thesefiguresarewithoutvalue,sincedistinguishingpartymembersfromor‐

dinaryvotersbecomesimpossible.Theparties’statutesmerelylistanumberofvery

generalrequirementsmembersneedtomeet–withGolkarmakingadistinctionbe‐

tweenmembersandcadres112–not includingthepaymentofregularmembership

fees.113Instead,party“members”arepaidbytheparty–orrather,thelocalpoliti‐

cian–toputtheirlabourforceintotheparty’sservice.

TheonlynotableexceptiontothispatternisthePKS,which“hasprovidedIndo‐

nesia with an alternative model of grassroots party building centred around re‐

cruitment” (Fionna2008: para. 1). To startwith,members are required to attend

weeklypartymeetings,which take the formofQur’anic study sessions (tarbiyah),

covering the main topics of Islam: God, the prophet, and Islamic regulations.114

Moreover,whilethere isnofixedmembershipfee,partymembersareexpectedto

donatepartoftheirincometothepartythroughobligatoryinfaq–adonationbene‐ 112Golkarclaimstohaveabout14millioncadresandordinarymembers.Theeligibilitycriteria forordinarymembershipincludeage,literacy,acceptanceoftheparty’splatformetcetera,whilecadres,inaddition,havetopassapoliticaltrainingandeducationprogramme.113ThePANenvisionedregularmembershipfeeswhenitwasfoundedin1998,butthisrequirementwassoondroppedastheenforcementprovedverydifficult.114TheauthorgainedtheinformationcontainedinthisparagraphthroughpersonalcommunicationwiththePKSon9July2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–288–

ficialtoIslam,repeatedlymentionedthroughouttheQu’ran.Aswillbeshownlater,

thePKS reliesheavilyon the financial contributionsof itsmembers. It is thusnot

surprisingthatthepartyactivelyengagesintherecruitmentofnewmembers,such

asthrough“openhouses”–Qu’ranicstudysessionsopentonon‐members.Thesuc‐

cessofIslamasarecruitmenttoolreflectsintheparty’smembershipfigures:Asof

2008,thePKSclaimstohave2millionmembers,whichtranslatesinto24percentof

theparty’selectorateor1.4%ofthetotalelectorate.115This isarelatively impres‐

sive figure–particularly ifweconsiderthatothermajorpartiesdonotattachany

requirementstopartymembershipatall.

WecanthusconcludethatinmostofthemajorIndonesianpartiesapartyonthe

ground isnon‐existent, sincewhat thepartiesdescribeas “members”are indistin‐

guishable from ordinary voters. Rather, party “members” are recruited as clients

through the clientelistic networksof local notableswhohave taken control of the

partybranches.Hence,intheIndonesiancontext,therealstrengthofapartyisnot

measuredbythesheernumberofitsofficesandmembers,butratherinitsabilityto

accommodate informal localpowerholders into theparty’spatronagenetwork. In

contrast,thePKSdefinesitselftogreatextentthroughitsmassgrassrootsorganisa‐

tionwithideologicallycommittedmembers.However,aswillbeshowninthenext

section, this membership commitment does not equate a powerful party on the

ground–asinthetraditionalWestEuropeanmassparty–butalldecision‐making

powerishighlycentralisedinthepartyleadership.

115Thecalculationisbasedontheresultsofthe2004legislativeelections.


–289–

Candidateselection

AllpoliticalpartiesinIndonesiamakereferencetothenominationofcandidatesfor

publicelectionintheirofficialstatutes,buttheseproceduralguidelinesareusually

verygeneral,leavingampleroomforinterpretationbythepartyleadership.Infact,

theactualpracticeofcandidateselection in themajor Indonesianparties isavery

obscureprocess,with the finaldecisionmadeby thehighest strataofparty elites

behindcloseddoors(Haris2005).EveninthePKS,whichdiffersconsiderablyfrom

the other major parties regarding its grassroots organisation, the nomination of

candidatesforpublicelectionsishighlycentralisedatthetopoftheparty.116

DespitetheofcandidateselectioninthemajorpoliticalpartiesinIndonesia,ob‐

servers of Indonesian politics have identified a number of factors thatwill play a

roleinthenominationprocess.Themostimportantoftheseappearstobethecon‐

troloverfinancialresources.AsMietzner(2007:251)explains,

Politicalparties in Indonesia […]have inan increasingnumberof

cases sold the nominations for legislative and executive office to

wealthyindividualswhohadnoparticularconnectiontotheparty

or itsbeliefs,butwhocouldafford topay largesumsofmoney to

theparty.

116Foramoregeneralcritiqueoftheelitistdecision‐makingstructuresinthePKSandtheverylim‐itedopportunitiesforparticipationbytherank‐and‐fileseeWanandi(2007).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–290–

For national legislative elections the prices for nominations are usually staggered

according to therankingon theparty list,withhighrankings thatvirtuallysecure

election into parliament being significantly more expensive than lower positions

thatdonotcomewithasimilarguaranteeofsuccess.Forinstance, in2004,candi‐

dateswhowantedtobenominatedforthehighestlistplacesinGolkarwereasked

topayupto100millionIDR(about5,840GBP)(Tomsa2008:64).However,asthis

ispreciselytheamountofmoneyaprivateindividualislegallyallowedtodonateto

apoliticalparty,itcanbeassumedthatthepriceforaplaceonthepartylistwasin

factmuchhigher.

Moreover,candidatesarenotonlyrequiredtopaytheirrespectivepartyforthe

candidacy,but,inaddition,candidatesneedtoprovethattheywillbeabletoshoul‐

der the financial costs of their own personal election campaign (Ufen 2008: 27).

Giventheexplosionofcampaigncostssince1999,thissumismuchlargerthanthe

“donation”totheparty,resultinginagrowinginfluxofwealthybusinesspeopleinto

the political parties, as is best exemplified by JusufKalla and SutrisnoBachir, the

partyleadersofGolkarandPANrespectively.Conversely,lessaffluentpartypoliti‐

cianshavefoundthemselvesincreasinglymarginalised,sincethepartyitselfisusu‐

allynotasourceofcampaignfunding(Choi2004b:342).Ingeneral,partieswillfi‐

nancethenationalmediacampaign,whilecandidatesareexpectedtofundthecam‐

paign “on the ground”.117 The only exception to this rule is again the PKS,where

moneydoesnotseemtoinfluencethecandidateselectionprocessandthepartyal‐

117PersonalcommunicationwithMarcusMietzner,28June2008.


–291–

locates a large share of its budget for campaign purposes (Manikas and Emling

2003:123).

However,money isnottheonly factorthatwilldecidewhogetsnominatedfor

public election. Candidates will also have to demonstrate to the party leadership

that they are able to mobilise voters in their respective constituencies. Broadly

speaking,thisinvolvesprovingtwothings.First,thatoneiswell‐connectedtolocal

power brokers, such as religious leaders, key bureaucrats and traditional aristo‐

craticelites.Second,thatonehasthesupportoftheconstituency’slocalpartychap‐

ters,which–aswasdiscussedearlier–haveinmostcasesfallenpreytotheinter‐

estsoflocalbossesandenjoyahighdegreeofautonomyfromthepartycentral.118

Both of these informal norms require the candidate to span a dense clientelistic

networkacrosstheconstituencythatcanthenbeusedasavotemobilisingmachine.

Finally,inaddition,partyleadersalsotakeintoconsiderationthecandidate’spopu‐

laritywiththeelectorate,withpartiesmakingincreasinguseofpublicopinionpolls

inordertoidentifythecandidateswiththehighestpopularityrating(seeMietzner

2009a).

Asageneralrulecanbeformulatedthatthebettercandidatesscoreontheselat‐

terfactors,thelesstheywillhavetocontributeintermsoffinancialresources.119In

fact,partiesusuallyreservearoundtenpercentoftheplacesonthepartylistforbig

“vote‐getters”, such as popular artists and show‐biz celebrities, whose campaign

118PersonalcommunicationwithRainerHeufers,14July2008.119PersonalcommunicationwithBennySubianto,3July2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–292–

costswill be fully coveredby the respectivepolitical party.120 For instance, in the

2004electionthePDI‐PrecruitedtheactressesDesyRatnasari,MarissaHaqueand

Deddy Sutomo and singer Franky Sahilatua, while the PKB enlisted actors Rieke

Dyah Pitaloka and Ayu Azharia, and Golkar nominated actress Nurul Arifin. This

trend is interpretedbyUfen(2006:18)asone indicationofan increasing “Philip‐

pinisation”oftheIndonesianpartysystem.

Whilethisprocessisthushighlyundemocratic,thenominationofthepresiden‐

tialcandidatetendstobeevenmoreelitist:Usually,thepartyleaderwillbeselected

automatically without any serious opposition. Only in parties that are not domi‐

natedbyasingleleadercanthenominationprocessturnintoseriouscompetition.

The only significant example of such a case is Golkar,which – aswasmentioned

earlier–plungedintoapowervacuumaftertheoustingofSuharto,leavingseveral

strongcontenderscompetingfortheparty’spresidentialnominationin2004.How‐

ever,thisprocesswasonlydemocraticinaformalsense,astheracewasinfactde‐

cided bywhichever candidate “bought” the support of themajority of local party

chapters(Tomsa2008:88).

Tosumup,theselectionofcandidatesfornationalelections inthemajorIndo‐

nesianpoliticalparties isbothahighlycentralisedandhighly informalprocess.As

thereisnopartyontheground,candidatesarerecruitedfromoutsidetheparty.In

ordertobeadmittedasacandidate,politiciansneedtocontributefinanciallytothe

respective party’s electoral campaign, control an effective clientelistic network

120PersonalcommunicationwithMarcusMietzner,28June2008.


–293–

downtothegrassrootslevel,and–lessimportantly–scorehighinpopularityrat‐

ings.InthePKS,ontheotherhand,wherethemembershipwouldbelargeenoughto

serveasarecruitmentpool,partyleadersusetheirreligiousauthoritytolegitimise

acentralisationofdecision‐makingpower.


TheprevioussectionidentifiedanimportantsourceofincomeforIndonesianpoliti‐

cal parties: the “auctioning” of nominations for public elections.Once elected into

parliament, legislators will then be asked to make regular contributions to their

party–sometimesreachingupto40percentoftheirsalary.121 Moreover,cabinet

memberswillbeputunderintensepressuretousetheiraccesstostateresourcesto

syphonoffpublicmoneyintopartycoffers,mostlybyofferingprojectstobusinesses

andindividualscloselyassociatedwiththeparty.Twoexemplarycasesofthisprac‐

tice that became public were the Baligate scandal in 1999, when Golkar officials

managed toextort546billion IDR(about32.5millionGBP) fromthestate‐owned

BaliBankforquestionableconsultancyservices,andtheBuloggatescandalin2000,

in which then president Wahid was accused of diverting substantial amounts of

moneybelongingtothenationalfoodagency,Bulog,tofoundationsclosetothePKB.

121OnthisandtherestoftheparagraphseeMietzner(2007).

OLIVERHELLMANN

–294–

Finally, parties also rely heavily on external contributions, particularly frombusi‐

nesspeople.Thesedonationsareusuallyhandedtoseniorpartyleaders,whooften

keepthemoneyfor themselves.Onlyduringelectiontime,whenmostparty funds

are pooled in a number of central accounts to coordinate the financing of the

national campaign, do entrepreneurs use the official party treasury as theirmain

entrypointfordonations.Partyfinancinglaws–settingamaximumlimitfordona‐

tions–exist,butviolationsarehardlyeverpunished(Hadiwinata2006:106).

The financial survival of themajor political parties in Indonesia thus strongly

dependsontheparties’candidatesandrepresentativesinpublicoffice.Statesubsi‐

diesforparties,itshouldbenoted,areinsignificant.Money,astheexampleofexter‐

nal donations shows, is generallynot channelled through theparty as an abstract

organisation,butthroughindividualpartyleaders.Thisissupportedbytheobserva‐

tion that Indonesianpartiesareonlyweaklybureaucratised.EvenGolkar, the for‐

mer regime party, which had decades to establish a bureaucratic apparatus, only

employsabout100permanentmembersofstaffinitsheadquarters.122Rather,man‐

agerialandadministrativefunctionsarelargelyperformedbyexternalprofessionals

withoutpolitical links to theparties (Mietzner2007:255).As JohnsonTan(2006:

107)explains,

duetothestrongconcentrationofdecision‐makingauthorityatthe

partycentreandthemagneticroleofparty leaders,otherarmsof

122PersonalcommunicationwithGolkar,2July2008.


–295–

theorganizationdonotdevelop:thisisrationalinthatotherparts

oftheorganizationareneitherwantednorneeded.

TheonlypartythatdeviatesfromthispatternisonceagainthePKS.Although–like

otherIndonesianparties–thePKSwithholdspartsofthesalaryof itselectedoffi‐

cials(25percent),themajorityoffundingcomesfrompartymembercontributions

(Manikas and Emling 2003: 124). Furthermore, the PKS also receives funding

through infaq and shadaqh (voluntary charity for the cause of Allah) from non‐

members.Partypoliticianswho receive suchdonationsmust transfer them to the

officialpartytreasury.Finally,thepartyalsobenefitsfromwakaf–propertyorland

endowed for public use – a tradition highly encouraged through the teachings of

Muhammad.

The importance of theparty central office in administering financial resources

clearlyreflectsintheparty’sdecision‐makingstructures.Allmembersoftheparty’s

central executive council (referred to within all Indonesian parties as the dewan

pimpinanpusatorDPP)areselectedbytheconsultativecouncil(majelissyuro)–the

highestexecutiveauthoritywithin theparty, composedmainlyof Islamic teachers

and clerics. The consultative council also nominates the members of the sharia

council,whosemaindutyistoensurethattheparty’spoliciesandplatformconform

tobasicIslamiclawsandprinciples.123

123PersonalcommunicationwiththePKS,9July2008.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–296–

InallIndonesianpartiestheDPPhasmorepowerthanthepartyinpublicoffice.

Themostpowerfulmechanismofcontrolistherighttorecallparliamentarians–as

statedinArticle12ofthepoliticalpartylaw–i.e.towithdrawtheirpartymember‐

ship,throughwhichtheywillautomaticallybedismissedfromthelegislature,since

independentlawmakersarenotpermitted.Moreover,theDPPwillusuallyalsoap‐

pointtheleadershipoftheparliamentarypartygroup(fraksi),therebyseverelycur‐

tailingthelatter’sfreedomofdecision‐making.124

Wecanthusconcludethatinallmajorparties–withtheexceptionofthePKS–

thepartyincentralofficeisonlyweaklydeveloped.Resourcesarenotmobilisedby

the party as an abstract organisation, but the organisational survival largely de‐

pendsonfinancialcontributionsbycandidatesforpublicelections.Underthesecir‐

cumstances, the functionof thepartybureaucracy is largely reduced tomanaging

thefundsforthenationalelectioncampaign,leavingthepartyinpublicofficeasthe

dominant–andprobablyonly – faceof thepartyorganisation. In thePKS, incon‐

trast, theparty central office ismuchmorepowerful.Although theparty’s official

rulesdenybureaucratsavoteinpartyinternalmatters,alldecision‐makingpower

ismonopolisedintheconsultativecouncil–thepartyleadership.

124PersonalcommunicationwithFrankFeulner,28June2008.


–297–

Summary

Aswewouldexpectina“thirdwave”democracy,thesuddenarrivalofdemocracyin

Indonesia did not leave actorsmuch time to develop programmatic strategies for

votermobilisation.Asaresult,thewinnersinthecountry’sfirsttwoelectionswere

those political partieswith significant links to parties that dominated Indonesia’s

firstdemocraticpartysysteminthe1950s(Mietzner2008:439).WhilethePDI‐Pis

perceived as continuing Sukarno’s legacy of socialist secularism, several religious

partieshavestronghistoricalrootsindifferentgroupswithintheMuslimpopulation

–Wahid’s PKB representsNahdatul Ulama, Rais’ PAN is closely connected toMu

hammadiyahandthePPPclaimssuccessiontoMasyumi,thelargestmodernistMus‐

lim party in Indonesia’s post‐independence democracy. In addition to these four

“historical”parties,Golkarwasabletomaintainitssupportbasethroughthedemo‐

cratic transition, allowing the former regimeparty to finish first in the1999elec‐

tions.

However,votersdonotonlyvoteforthesepartiesonthebasisofhistoricallyin‐

formedpsychologicalattachments,butpoliticalpartiesneedtostrengthentheirtra‐

ditionallinkswiththerespectivecommunitiesbygainingtheendorsementoflocal

notables representing these communities. Accordingly, the context favours actors

who already control clientelistic networks that integrate a large number of local

powerholders,orwhopossessthenecessaryfinancialresourcestoestablishsucha

networkinashortperiodof time.That is tosay, thecontextualenvironmentstra‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–298–

tegicallyselectsclientelismasthedominantstrategyforvotermobilisation.Itmust

benoted,however, that thepatron‐clientrelationshipsrarelyreachdowntovoter

level,buttheyareprimarilyamechanismtoaccommodateelitesfromthenational

andlocallevel.

Nevertheless, verymuch like the classical cadre party in early democratic Eu‐

rope,politicalpartiesinIndonesiadonotinvestinaformalpartyorganisation.Party

leaderswantmaximum freedom in themanagement of their intra‐elite networks

andarethereforenotinterestedinaformalpartymembershipandapowerfulparty

bureaucracy.Rather,theformalpartyorganisationonlyservesasacloaktoconceal

theclientelisticdealings.Allfunctionsusuallyassociatedwithpoliticalparties,such

astherecruitmentofcandidates,themobilisationoffundingandtheorganisationof

electoralcampaigns,areperformedbytheinformalnetworkswithinthatcloak.Asa

result, the three formal facesofpartyorganisation– thepartyon theground, the

party central office and the party in public office – are indistinguishable. Instead,

thereisastrongpersonaloverlapbetweenthethreefaces,aspartymembershipis

restricted to actorswho have the necessary resources to run their own electoral

campaign,whilefunctionsusuallyassociatedwiththepartybureaucracyaremainly

performedbyexternalprofessionals.

However,whileclientelismistheoutcomestrategicallyselectedbythecontext,

agents have developed alternative strategic reactions to the environment around

them.Themostnotableexampleofsuchpoliticalparties isthePKS,whichtriesto

mobilisevotersthroughIslamistpolicyideas.Findingitselfinasimilarsituationas


–299–

socialist andcommunistmassparties in late19th centuryEurope– that is, having

been establishedexternal to government – thePKS combines theseprogrammatic

appealswithamassmembershiporganisation.Themassmembershipprovidesthe

PKSwith financialresourcesandconnects thepartytothesocialmilieuwhose in‐

terests itclaimstorepresent.However, incontrast to theclassicalmassparty, the

PKS is not democratically organised, but decision‐making is controlled by a small

group of religious preachers and scholars. The party central office therefore pos‐

sesses powerful means to enforce discipline among the members of the party in

publicofficeinordertopushforwardtheparty’sideologicalprogramme.

Despite the similarities to party systems in 19th century Europe, the case of

Indonesia shouldnotbeviewedasevidenceofpoliticalparties in the country fol‐

lowingthesamepathoforganisationaldevelopmentaspartiesinWesternEurope.

Rather,ashasbeenshown,partyorganisationsinIndonesiaaretheproductofstra‐

tegicdecisionstakenwithinacontextthatfavoursclientelismoverotherstrategies

for voter mobilisation. Unlike in South Korea or the Philippines, clientelistic net‐

works in Indonesiadogenerallynotprovidematerial incentives tovoters,but the

exchange relations tend to be limited to the intra‐party level. The connection be‐

tweenvotersandpoliticiansismadeastheestablishedpoliticalpartiesbenefitfrom

theirtraditionalimagesasrepresentativesofcertainsocialcommunities.

However,astheresultsforthe2009legislativeelectionssuggest,thispatternof

votermobilisation could slowlybe changing, since allmajorparties lost consider‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–300–

ablesupport.125Instead,thebigwinnerwaspresidentYudhyono’sPartaiDemokrat

(DemocraticParty,PD),whichgathered21percentofthevote–anincreaseofal‐

most14percentagepointsover2004.AsseveralobserversofIndonesianelectoral

politicshavepointedout,Yudhyono’ssuccesswaslargelyduetothegovernment’s

schemeofhandingoutmillionsincashtopoorcitizensshortlybeforetheelectionin

–whatwasclaimedas–acompensationforrising fuelprices(Sherlock2009;Mi‐

etzner2009b).Hence,asundertheNewOrderregime,votersarereceivingmaterial

incentives forelectoralsupport throughchannelsof thestateadministration.How

otherpartieswill react to thesechangingcircumstances remains tobe seen:They

couldextendtheirclientelisticnetworkstotheelectorateordevelopprogrammatic

appeals.WhileweshouldnotseeanychangesinthewayIndonesianpartiesareor‐

ganised if clientalistic networks are extended, organisational changeswill be dra‐

maticifactorsdecidetotaketheprogrammaticroute.

125Allfivepartiesthatemergedasthemajorplayersinthe1999electionssufferedsignificantlossescomparedtothe2004elections.TwoofthebiggestloserswereGolkarandthePDI‐P:Golkar’svotefellby7%to14.5%,whilethePDI‐Plost4.5%to14%.TheIslamicpartieswerealsohitbyamajordeclineinvoteshare:ThePKBonlywon5.0%ofthevote(‐5.6),thePPP5.3(‐2.9)andthePAN6.0(‐0.4).ThePKS,ontheotherhand,followingaprogrammaticstrategyofvotermobilisation,wasabletoslightlyincreaseitsvoteto7.9%(+0.6).


–301–

–8–

CONCLUSION

Towardsanewframeworkforpartyorganisationanalysis

Thestartingpointofthispieceofresearchwastheobservationthattheliteratureon

party organisational formation and change is divided along an agency‐structure

spectrum. Although several scholars of party politics have, in the past, implicitly

hinted at the division between theories stressing the explanatory power of struc‐

turesandthosearguingforamoreagent‐centredapproachtothestudyofpartyor‐

ganisation,nobodyhasfullyrecognisedyettheimplicationsoftheconflictbetween

these two theoretical strands for ourunderstandingof party organisation. In fact,

thefirstsectionofthispaperoffersthefirsteverreviewoftherelevantpartylitera‐

turebasedonhowmuchsignificanceauthorsattachtoeitherstructuralvariablesor

politicalactorsasautonomousandreflexiveagents.

Within the structural strandwe then distinguished between three further ap‐

proaches,dependingonwhethertheyputmoreemphasisoneither internalorex‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–302–

ternalfactors–orboth.Whilethe“life‐cycle”approachbelievesthateachpartyfol‐

lowsthesameevolutionarypatterninitsdevelopmentasaconsequenceofalargely

endogenous process ofmaturation and institutionalisation, the “period‐effect” ap‐

proachgivessoleattentiontotheexternalenvironment,arguingthatpartiesneedto

evolvewithchangingpoliticalandsocial circumstancesorotherwise theywillnot

surviveinthe“survivalofthefittest”.Finally,the“generationeffect”approachcom‐

binesthesetwoapproaches,maintainingthattheformationofapartywillbedriven

byexternalcircumstance,whereasthefurtherdevelopmentwillthenbedetermined

byinternaldynamics.

Subsequently,wearguedthatthehardenedstand‐offbetweenstructuralistand

voluntaristapproachesseriouslyweakensourcomprehensionofhowpoliticalpar‐

tiesestablishandchangetheirorganisations.Thisargumenthasbothanempirical

andameta‐theoreticaldimension.Usingexamplesfromestablisheddemocraciesin

WesternEurope,weshowedhowthestrengthofoneapproachistheweaknessof

another, andviceversa.Moreover,onamoreabstract level,weargued that there

existsadialecticalrelationshipbetweenstructuresandagents,ratherthanalinear

causal linkinonlyonedirection–dependingonwhetheronetakesastructuralor

an actor‐centred approach. Following the basic propositions of historical institu‐

tionalism,wearguedthatsocialactorsareknowledgeableandreflexive,whichgives

themtheabilitytodevelopdifferentstrategieswithinacontextthatfavourscertain

strategiesoverothers.Inotherwords,ifweonlyfocusonstructurestoexplaindif‐

ferent typesofpartyorganisationwe ignore theabilityof actors todevelop strat‐


–303–

egiesthatwillhelpthemovercometheproblemsposedbystructuresaroundthem.

On the flipside, only focussing on agents means neglecting the context as a con‐

touredterrainwhichselectsforcertainoutcomes.

Itisimportanttonotethatthisdoesnotmeanthatweneedtorefuseallexisting

theories of party organisation –we only need to revise the relationship between

them.Fortunately,historical institutionalismnotonlyoffersamediumforcritique

butalsoaframeworkforhowtointegrateexplanatoryfactorsfromdifferentlevels

of analysis into a single theoreticalmodel.More specifically, historical institution‐

alism helps us understand that,within a given context, there is not a single ideal

typeofpartyorganisation,butpoliticalactorscandevelopdifferentorganisational

strategiestodealwiththeproblemspresentedtothembytheenvironment.Atthe

sametime,however,theenvironmentisstrategicallyselective,meaningthatactors

arenottotallyfreeindesigningpartyorganisations.Instead,theywillhavetoorien‐

tate themselves towards theenvironment inwhich theirparty is to competewith

other parties. Moreover, historical institutionalism provides us with a convincing

mechanismtoexplainthereproductionofpartyorganisations,whichalsocarriesin

itselfanexplanationforthedisruptionofthisreproductiveprocess:thatis,thedis‐

tributionofpoweramongpartyinternalactors.Putbriefly,partyorganisationsre‐

produceovertimeasdifferentfactionsoftenpushfordifferenttypesoforganisation

andspaceforagencytochangetheorganisationalstructuresofthepartywillonly

openupiftheinter‐factionalpowerconfigurationissignificantlyaltered.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–304–

Asthedefiningfunctionofpoliticalpartiesistocompeteinpublicelections,or‐

ganisational strategies are inseparably linked to strategies of voter mobilisation.

Broadlyspeaking,wecandistinguishtwobasicelectoralstrategies:clientelisticex‐

change relationships and programmatic appeals. Politicianswho follow a clientel‐

isticstrategywillinvestthelargestshareoftheirresourcesintotheconstructionof

patron‐client networks, in which political support will be exchanged formaterial

goods,suchasmoney,jobsorservices.Thepoliticalpartywillthusonlyberudimen‐

tarilyorganised,merelyservingastheformalshellforthesenetworks.Verysimilar

totheclassicalcadrepartyin19thcenturyEurope,thethreefacesofpartyorganisa‐

tion–thepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpublicoffice

–willbeindistinguishable.Incontrast,aprogrammaticstrategyrequiresaninvest‐

mentintothepartyasanabstractorganisation,whichwillhavetobeopenforwider

popularparticipationandprovideformalmechanismsforconflictresolution.Parties

will thus be characterised by (1) a strong party central office, if politicians target

clearlyidentifiablesocialmilieus,or(2)bedominatedbythepartyinpublicoffice,if

theelectoralappealistargetedatthemedianvoter.

Newer democracies of the “thirdwave” are generally selective towards either

clientelismorcatch‐allstrategies,becausethetypicalabruptnessofthedemocratic

transitiondoesnot leave actors enough time to develop clearly focusedprogram‐

matic platforms.Moreover, unlike in the “firstwave” of democratisation, inmany

youngerdemocraciesprocessesofindustrialisationandnation‐buildingdidnotpre‐


–305–

cedethedemocratisationofthepoliticalsystem,meaningthatelectoralcleavageson

whichtomobilisevotersaroundideologicalprogrammeshavenotemerged.

Whethertheparticularcontextfavourseitherclientelisticorcatch‐allstrategies

willthendependonanumberofotherfactorsatthepolitylevel.Broadlyspeaking,

thestructuralenvironmentselects forclientelismundereither,orboth,of the fol‐

lowing two conditions: (1) The outgoing autocratic regime legitimised its non‐

democraticrulethroughtheclientelisticdistributionofgoodsandhadatleastpar‐

tial control of the democratisation process; or (2) the level of economic develop‐

mentissolowthatclientelismcanbesetupasanewgame,withoutahighriskof

eitherofthetwosidesdefecting.Conversely,catch‐allstrategiesarethestrategically

selected outcome if – under conditions of high economic development – (1) the

democratictransitionwascontrolled“frombelow”,completelyremovingtheregime

frompower,or(2)theautocraticregimedidnotuseclientelisticmechanismstole‐

gitimiseitsnon‐democraticpower.

However, thisdoesnotmean thatweshouldexpectonly two typesofpolitical

parties to emerge in new democracies (i.e. parties with no formal organisational

facesandpartiesdominatedbythepartyinpublicoffice).Infact,underconditions

ofhighenvironmentaluncertainty,actorsfollowingacatch‐allelectoralstrategywill

sufferdifficultiesinenforcingpartydiscipline,whichcouldforcethemtostrengthen

thepartycentralofficeoverthepartyinpublicoffice.Environmentaluncertainty,in

turn,islargelytheproductofpropertiesofthepartysystem,particularlyfragmenta‐

tion and volatility. That is to say, strengthening the party central office could be‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–306–

comenecessaryunderconditionsofhighpartysystemfragmentationandhighelec‐

toralvolatility.

Asiancontextsandactors’strategies

InmostnewerdemocraciesinEastAsia,thecontextualenvironmentishighlyselec‐

tive towardsclientelism.This isnotanewphenomenon–clientelismasamecha‐

nismtosecurepoliticalpowerhasdeephistoricalrootsinmanyEastAsiansocieties

andallautocraticregimesthatprecededthe“thirdwave”ofdemocratisationused,

in oneway or the other, clientelistic incentives to legitimise their dictatorial rule.

ThiswasmostobviousinthePhilippines,IndonesiaandSouthKorea:Althoughdif‐

feringwidelyintermsofpowerstructures–themoresultanisticregimesofMarcos

andSuhartoononeside,andthemilitary‐bureaucraticregimeinKoreaontheother

side – all three regimes used public money to “buy” voters in the regularly held

pseudo‐elections.InSouthKorea,eventhepro‐democraticoppositionreliedoncli‐

entelisticpracticestomobiliseelectoralsupport,whileinIndonesiaclientelisticin‐

centives were distributed through the state administration, not political parties.

Finally, inTaiwan, theKMTregime,afterretreatingtothe islandfromtheChinese

mainland,didnotdeveloppatron‐client linkageswith the localpopulation,but in‐

stead integrated society into an extensive network of party cells and branches.


–307–

However, after higher party ranks were opened to sub‐ethnic Taiwanese in the

1970s,theemergingMainstreamfactionofTaiwanesepoliticiansusedtheirconnec‐

tions to local factions to mobilise voters in local and supplementary elections

throughclientelisticmeans.ThiseventuallyallowedtheMainstreamtobecomethe

dominant forcewithin theKMT, sidelining themore traditional groupswithin the

party.

InthePhilippines,thedemocratictransitioncompletelyremovedMarcos’sultan‐

isticregime,whichalsoresultedinthedestructionofexistingpatron‐clientlinkages.

However,thelowlevelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentmeantthatclientelismcould

beestablishedasanewgamewithoutahighriskofeitherthepoliticianorthevoter

defecting.Moreover,Marcoshadleftinstitutionalstructuresveryfavourabletoset‐

tingupclientelisticnetworksbyintroducingthebarangayasthesmallestadminis‐

trativeunit. These conditions strongly benefit the country’s economic elite,which

canuseitsprivatewealthasclientelisticincentives,whiletheimpoverishedmassof

thepopulationseetheseincentivesasameansofimprovingtheireverydaylives.In

somecases, politicians combine clientelismwith charisma– either theirowncha‐

rismaorcharismabyassociation,bymarryingacelebrity.Somepoliticiansevenuse

violent coercion, particularly in Mindanao, where the Filipino state struggles to

maintainamonopolyontheuseofforce.

Incontrast,inIndonesia,SouthKoreaandTaiwan,theclientelisticnetworkses‐

tablished under autocratic rulewere largely left untouched by the process of de‐

mocratisation,meaningthatpoliticalactorscouldcontinueusingtheminelections

OLIVERHELLMANN

–308–

under the newly implemented democratic rules. In Indonesia, democracywas in‐

stalled throughapalace coupagainst Suharto,whichgave central elementsof the

regimetheopportunitytore‐positionthemselvesintheelectoralmarketbyhijack‐

ingexistingpartiesorestablishingtheirownpoliticalvehicles.Regardingthemobi‐

lisationofvoters,themajorpartiesinpost‐SuhartoIndonesiabenefitfromtheirhis‐

toricallinkageswiththespecificsocialmilieuswhoseintereststheyclaimtorepre‐

sent.However,thelinkagebetweenpoliticiansandvotersisnotmadethroughapol‐

icyplatformthataggregatestheinterestofthepolitician’sspecificconstituency.In‐

stead,politiciansprovide clientelistic incentives to localnotablesexercisingmoral

authority over their respective constituency in return for their endorsement in

nationalelections.Hence,clientelisminIndonesiaisbestdescribedasamechanism

toaccommodatepolitical elites from thenational and local level,withonlyavery

smallshareofmaterialgainstricklingdowntothevoter.

InSouthKorea,ontheotherhand,clientelismisadirectexchangerelationship

betweenthepoliticianandthevoter,inwhichmaterialgoodsandservicesarepro‐

vided in return for electoral support. Somewhat unusually, under the military‐

bureaucraticregime,theregimepartywasnottheonlypartytoemployclientelistic

strategies,butthepro‐democraticoppositionalsomobilisedvotersthroughclientel‐

istic incentives. It isthusnosurprisethattheseclientelisticnetworkssurvivedthe

negotiated transition todemocracyandcontinue tobeusedunder thenewdemo‐

craticrules.Whatismore,clientelismpersistsdespiteagrowinglevelofeconomic

development in South Korea, which shows that the prisoner’s dilemma does not


–309–

arise when clientelism is embedded in social structures. However, the nature of

electoralclientelism inSouthKoreahasrecentlybeenchanging,asyoungerpoliti‐

ciansarepushingintothemajorpoliticalparties.Thisyoungergenerationofpoliti‐

cians is not integrated into the existing clientelistic networks and has thus re‐

introducedpubliceconomicincentivesintotheregionalcleavage,ratherthandistri‐

butingprivategoods.Putinmoreabstractterms,thisisthereforeanexampleofhow

socialagentscandevelopalternativestrategicresponsestothesamestructuralter‐

rain.

Anevenstrongercasefortheargumentthatactorsarestrategicallyreflexivecan

bemadebylookingatpoliticalpartycompetitioninTaiwan.Evenbeforethearrival

ofdemocracy,theKMThadbeendividedoverthebestelectoralstrategy:Whilethe

Mainstreamfactionuseditslinkstolocalfactionstomobilisevotersthroughclien‐

telistic practices, the Non‐mainstream followed a strategy of party organisational

penetrationintosociety,basedonanideologyofChinesenationalism.AstheKMT–

orrathertheMainstreamfaction–remainedintightcontrolofthedemocratisation

process,theclientelisticnetworksestablishedbytheMainstreamunderauthoritar‐

ian rule were successfully transferred into the new democratic arena. The Non‐

mainstream, on the other hand, continued to campaign of programmatic appeals,

demandingreunificationwith theChinesemainland.Thereasons for thisstrategic

choicearebeyondthescopeofthisanalysis,buttwopossibleexplanationscouldbe

theNon‐mainstream’slackofrelationstolocalfactionsoritsdivergingunderstand‐

ingoftheenvironmentthroughaparticularsetofideas.Forsimilarreasons,actors

OLIVERHELLMANN

–310–

withinthe largestoppositionparty, theDPPalsodevelopedprogrammaticappeals

ratherthanpatron‐clientrelationships.WhereastheNewTidefactionbuiltapolicy

platformpromotingindependenceforTaiwan,theFormosafactionfollowedawider

electoralagenda,supportedbythepersonalcharismaofitsleaders.

BoththeKMT’sNon‐mainstreamandtheDPP’sNewTidefactionthusoptedfor

relatively narrow programmatic strategies, whichwe should theoretically not ex‐

pectinnewerdemocracies.Theyarethereforegoodexamplesofhowsocialactors

candevelop strategies that deviate from the outcome strategically selected for by

the structural context. Even clearer cases of politiciansmobilising clearly defined

socialgroupsthroughideologicalplatformscanbefoundinSouthKorea,thePhilip‐

pinesandIndonesia.Althoughinallthreecountriestheenvironmentishighlyselec‐

tivetowardsclientelism,politicalpartieshaveemergedthataggregatetheinterests

of certain constituencies in detailed policy agendas: The Korean DLP targets the

workingclass;theIndonesianPKSrepresentstheinterestsofconservativeMuslims;

and,inthePhilippines,AKBAYAN!servesasavoiceforthepoor.Again,themotivat‐

ing factorsbehind theseprogrammatic strategiesarenotpartof thisanalysis,but

actorscouldholdspecificsetsofvaluesthatdonotallowthemtorealisetheoppor‐

tunitiesforclientelismprovidedbythecontext–Marxistideasofsocialequalityin

theKDLPandAKBAYAN!,andIslamicvaluesofpietyandbelief inGod inthePKS.

Alternatively, these parties might have developed narrow programmatic appeals

because they do not control the necessary resources for a clientelistic strategy of

votermobilisation. Inorder tomakeup for the lackof resources, theparties’pro‐


–311–

grammatic platforms provide citizens with collective incentives to join the party,

andcontributemoneyand/orlabour.

Althoughtheelectoralsuccessofthesethreepartieshassofarbeenlimited,they

arenonethelessexcellent examplesof theabilityof agents tomake strategicdeci‐

sions in a strategically selective context.Moreover, factional conflict in themajor

partiesinKoreaandparticularlyinTaiwanshowsthatsocialactorswithdiverging

strategicresponsestothesameenvironmentcanalsoco‐existwithinthesamepo‐

liticalparty.Sinceelectoralstrategiesfeeddirectlyintopreferencesregardingparty

organisation, political parties are therefore best described as constellations of

powerbetweendifferentpartyinternalactors.Accordingly,partyorganisationsre‐

produceandchange,asactorswillpushforthoseorganisationalstructuresthatwill

bestallowtheimplementationoftheirelectoralstrategy.Thatistosay,byfavouring

certainelectoralstrategiesoverothers,theenvironmentalcontextwillstrategically

selectforacertaintypeofpartyorganisation.However,givenactors’abilitytode‐

velopdifferentelectoralstrategieswithinthesamecontext,thisoutcomeisnotin‐

evitable. Indeed, aswe have seen, thewide variety of electoral strategies used to

mobilisevoters in theyoungerdemocraciesofEastAsia translates intoanequally

largevarietyofpartyorganisationsinthepost‐autocraticpartysystems.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–312–

PartyorganisationinEastAsia

Asthepost‐autocraticenvironmentsinEastAsiaaregenerallyselectivetowardscli‐

entelism,mostpolitical parties are characterisedby their lackof formal organisa‐

tionalfaces.Instead,asintheclassicalcadreparty,thereisanalmostcompleteover‐

lapbetweenthepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandthepartyinpublic

office.However,sinceactorsareabletodevelopalternativeelectoralstrategies,we

canalsofindpartiesthathavetranslatedthedistributionbetweenpartyinternalac‐

tors into formal norms and regulations. Taiwanese parties, which have, since the

introductionofdemocracy,beendeeplyfragmentedwithfactionalconflictoverthe

best electoral strategy, are now dominated by actors following catch‐all electoral

strategies,resultinginthepartyinpublicofficeasthemostpowerfulorganisational

element. Moreover, party systems in South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines

containsinglepartiesthatmobilisevotersonnarrowlyfocusedprogrammaticstrat‐

egies,whichmeansactorswithinthesepartieshavedevelopedthepartycentralof‐

ficeas thedominant faceasameansto increasepartydisciplineamongthemem‐

bersinpublicoffice.


–313–

Partymembership

MostpoliticalpartiesinEastAsiaareveryvagueabouttheconditionstheyattachto

partymembership.TheconstitutionsofthedominantpartiesinSouthKorea,Indo‐

nesiaandthePhilippinesonlylistgeneralrequirements,suchasnationality,ageand

identificationwith the party’s principles. In addition to these basic criteria, party

membershipdoesusuallynotcarryanyotherobligations.Inparticular,partymem‐

bersarenotrequiredtoattendregularpartymeetingsorpayregularmembership

fees. Moreover, there is no formal procedure that needs to be followed to join a

party as amember: There is no application process, no ID cards are given out to

partymembersandnocentrallyadministeredmembershipregisterexistsbywhich

torecordthepersonaldetailsofmembers.Asaresult,itisimpossibletodistinguish

partymembersfromregularvoters,which,inturn,meansthatitisalsoimpossible

toprovidemeaningfulmembershipfiguresfortheseparties.

Theonlycriterion to identifypartymembers iswhether theyhavebeennomi‐

natedascandidates forapublicelectionby therespectiveparty–although in the

Philippineseventhiscriterion isnot free fromproblems,ascandidatesoftencam‐

paignunderthebannerofmorethanoneparty.Thereisthereforeastrongoverlap

between the party on the ground and the party in public office. Admittance as a

partymember/candidatewilldependonwhethertheindividualcancontributere‐

sourcestoundertakeasuccessfulelectoralcampaign.Giventhatthesepartiesfollow

clientelisticelectoral strategies, relevant resources tend to includemoney,patron‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

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clientnetworks,personalcharisma,and(inIndonesiaandthePhilippines)militant

organisations to intimidate candidates and supporters of other parties. Ordinary

members,ontheotherhand,havenovaluetotheseparties,aspartiesdonothaveto

rely on membership fees for their financial survival. Moreover, campaign‐related

functions traditionallyperformedbypartymembersonavoluntarybasis, suchas

canvassingorattendingrallies,arecarriedoutbyclientsofpowerfulpoliticiansin

returnformaterialincentives.Finally,membersarenotevenvaluedasmerestatist‐

ics:Sincevotersaremobilisedthroughclientelisticpractices,partiesdonotneedto

createtheimpressionthattheyarestronglyrootedinsociety.Inshort,theorganisa‐

tional strengthof theseparties should thereforenotbemeasuredasa functionof

their membership size, but on their ability to integrate resourceful politicians as

candidatesforpublicelections.

PartymembershipismoreexclusiveinTaiwaninthesensethatpartymembers

canbedistinguishedfromordinaryvoters.Mostnotably, inbothmajorTaiwanese

parties,theKMTandtheDPP,thereisanofficialmembershipregisterandmembers

areissuedwithmembershipcards.Currently,thetwopartiesenjoyamembership‐

electorateratioofroughlysevenandtwopercentrespectively,whichiscomparable

tomanyparties incontemporaryWesternEurope.However, inboth theKMTand

theDPPalargeshareofthepartymembershipareso‐called“pocketmembers”,who

donot jointhepartybecausetheyidentifywiththeparty’spolicyprogramme,but

because they have been recruited through the personal network of a local boss.

Thesepoliticianswillthenuse“their”memberstoinfluencepartyinternalvoting.In


–315–

theKMT,theNon‐mainstreamfaction,whichbecamethedominantfactionafterthe

disastrous 2000 presidential election, cracked down on the problem of “pocket

members” by enforcing stricter registration procedures and introducing a small

membershipfee.

IntheDPP,membershavehadtopayregularfeessincetheparty’sfounding,but

“pocketmembers”remainamoreseriousproblemthanintheKMT,becauseofthe

party’s smaller overall membership. However, the dominant New Tide faction –

whichhastraditionallybeencharacterisedbyastrongideologicalidentityandthus

strictlyopposes the recruitmentof “pocketmembers” –has so farbeenunable to

implementefficientmeasuresagainst“pocketmembers”,becausetheDPPishighly

dependentoncollectivemembership feespaidby localbosses.FortheDPP,mem‐

bers’ financial contributions are therefore an important reason formaintaining a

formalpartymembership. In theKMT,on theotherhand, financial considerations

were not an important motivating factor when introducing membership fees in

2000. Instead, thedecisiontomakepartymembershipmoreexclusivewas largely

drivenbyfactionalrivalriesandcalculationsbythedominantNon‐mainstreamthat

this would exclude large numbers of “pocket members” controlled by the Main‐

streamfaction.AsintheDPP,however,membersarevaluedfortheirfreelabour–

particularlyduringcampaign times–andas statistic, thusgiving thepartya sem‐

blanceofsocialrepresentation.

WhilepartymembershipinTaiwanisthusmoreexclusivethaninthedominant

parties in other newer democracies of East Asia, membership criteria are even

OLIVERHELLMANN

–316–

stricter in the Korean DLP, the Filipino AKBAYAN! and the Indonesian PKS.Most

notably,newmembersneedtoattendintroductoryseminars,wheretheyaretaught

about theparty’s goals andvalues.Moreover, partybranchesarehighly active in‐

betweenelectionsandattendanceofregularpartymeetingsisevencompulsoryin

thePKS(intheformofweeklyQu’ranicstudysessions)andAKBAYAN!,whereparty

members need to contribute labour to local party projects as a substitute for not

payingmembershipfees.Therefore,morethanTaiwaneseparties,thesethreepar‐

tiesconstantlyengagetheirmembersinpartyrelatedactivities,therebyindoctrinat‐

ingthemwiththeparty’sideology.Itisthussafetosaythat,inadditiontosourcesof

financialsupportandfreelabour,thesepartiesperceivetheirmembershipasapool

ofcandidatesforpublicelections,whoneedtobetrainedandeducatedinallaspects

ofpolitics.SincetheKLDP,AKBAYAN!andthePKSallfollownarrowlyfocusedelec‐

toral strategies, strict party discipline is an important condition for working to‐

wards the implementation of the party’s clearly defined goals. Educating and re‐

cruitingcandidatesfromwithinthepartyisaneffectivewayofcommittingtheparty

inpublicofficetotheparty’spolicyprogramme.

WecanthereforesummarisethatmostpartiesinthenewerdemocraciesinEast

Asiahavenotdevelopedaformalpartyontheground.Thisisbecausetheymobilise

votersthroughclientelisticincentives,whichmeansthatthepatron‐clientnetworks

employed in elections can also be used to recruit campaign supporters,while the

necessary financialresourcesareprovidedbytheelectoralcandidatesthemselves.

InTaiwan,ontheotherhand,partymemberscanclearlybedistinguishedfromthe


–317–

restoftheelectorate,largelybecausepartieswanttoaddsubstancetotheircatch‐

all strategies by giving the impression that they are strongly rooted in society.

Moreover, the DPP is also highly dependent onmembership fees for its financial

survival,whileintheKMTtheintroductionofregulardueswasdrivenbyfactional

rivalries. Finally, parties campaigning on a narrow programmatic platform – the

KDLP,AKBAYAN!andthePKS– featurethestrongestpartiesontheground,since

members arenot only seen as sourcesofmoneyand labour, but also aspotential

candidatesforpublicelections.

Candidateselection

Ashighlightedearlier,inthemajorpartiesinSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndo‐

nesia the only criterion to distinguish party members from ordinary citizens is

whethertheyhavebeennominatedascandidatesforpublicelections.Thereisthus

nopartyonthegroundthatcoulddemocraticallylegitimisethenominationofcan‐

didates by vote. Instead, candidate selection is a highly informal and centralised

process,controlledbytheclosestcircleofpartyleaders.Nominationusuallyhasto

be“bought”withmoneyorotherpoliticallyrelevantresources.InSouthKoreaand

Indonesia,whereclosedpartylistsystemsareusedtoelectnationallegislators,the

higheronewantstoberankedonthelist,thehigherthefinancialcontributionwill

OLIVERHELLMANN

–318–

havetobe.Evenpartyinternalelectionsthatseemsuperficiallydemocratic–exam‐

plesincludethenominationofcandidatesintheKoreanNKPin1998,partyconven‐

tionsheldbytheFilipinoLakasandtheraceforpresidentialcandidateinGolkarin

2004–arehighlycorruptedbymoneypolitics,astheoutcomeiseffectivelydecided

bywhocanbuythemostsupportfromlowerpartylevels.Ultimately,thispatternof

candidateselectionreflectsthelogicofclientelism–thatis,theactorswiththemost

resourceswillbepositionedatthetopoftheclientelisticnetwork,channellingpart

oftheseresourcesfurtherdownthepyramidinreturnforpoliticalsupport.

CandidateselectionisalsohighlycentralisedintheIndonesianPKS.Althoughthe

partywouldhavethenecessarypartyonthegroundtoconductademocraticnomi‐

nation process, party leaders use their religious authority to legitimise a decision

behindcloseddoors.However,unlikeinotherIndonesianparties,thisdecisiondoes

atleastnotseemtobeaffectedbymoneypolitics.Incontrast,otherpartieswitha

massmembershiporganisetheselectionofcandidatesinamuchmoredemocratic

way:While in the Filipino AKBAYAN! candidates for national elections get nomi‐

natedbythepartycongress,theKoreanDLPholdsclosedprimaries.Similartothe

classical mass party, both of these parties thus give their members participatory

rightsinreturnfortheirlabourandfinancialcontributions.InthePKS,ontheother

hand, the payment of regularmembership fees is justified through religious con‐

ceptsintheQu’ran,suchasinfaqandshadaqh–donationsforthecauseofAllah.

InthemajorTaiwaneseparties,theprocessofcandidateselectionhasinthepast

been a frequent target for party organisational reform, reflecting theongoing fac‐


–319–

tional conflictwithin the parties. Initially, both theKMTand theDPPused closed

primaries to select candidates for parliamentary elections. In the KMT, the then

dominantNon‐mainstreamfactionwashopingthatthiswouldlimittheinfluenceof

localfactionscloselylinkedwiththeopposingMainstreamfaction,whileintheDPP

the dominant Formosa faction calculated that the “one member, one vote” rule

wouldgiveitanumericaladvantageovertheNewTide.However,bothpartiesthen

graduallycurtailedmembershipparticipation:IntheKMT,theincreasinglypower‐

ful Mainstream centralised candidate selection in the central standing committee

because the faction’s clientelistic strategydemanded special allocationof nomina‐

tionstolocalfactionsinreturnfortheirpoliticalsupport,whileintheDPPtheNew

Tidesucceededinmovingdecision‐makingintothemiddletiersoftheparty,which

iswherethefactionhadmostofitssupporters.

However,morerecently,boththeKMTandtheDPPhaveagaindecentralisedthe

nominationprocedure. In theDPP,after thedisastrous1996presidential election,

theNewTidebegantobroadenitselectoralappeal,effectivelyreplacingitsnarrow

programmaticstrategywithacatch‐allstrategy.Inordertodothisthefactionhad

to free itself from ideologically radicalmembers in the intermediary party struc‐

tures,which,inturn,madeitnecessarytoincreasetheinclusivenessoftheselector‐

ate. The New Tide did this by introducing public opinion polls, because a closed

primarywouldhavetranslatedintoanumericaladvantagefortheFormosafaction.

Similarly, in theKMT, theNon‐mainstream faction,whichagainbecame thedomi‐

nant factionafterLeeTeng‐hui’s resignationas chairman in2000, adoptedavery

OLIVERHELLMANN

–320–

similarsystem.ThiswasbecausetheNon‐mainstreamanticipatedthatcandidatesof

theMainstreamfaction,whoaregenerallyassociatedwithcorruptionandotheril‐

legalactivities,woulddorelativelybadly inpublicopinion. Inotherwords, inTai‐

wan, the decision over the nomination of candidates for public elections is now

largelymadeoutsidethemajorpoliticalparties.

Inrecentyears,asimilartrendcanbeobservedinthemajorSouthKoreanpar‐

ties. As younger politicians, who are not integrated into existing clientelistic net‐

works,areenteringthetwolargestparties,theoldpatternofcandidateselection,in

whichnominationscanbebought throughclientelistic incentives,hascomeunder

attack.However,as in the twoTaiwaneseparties,democratisingtheprocedureby

extendingthevotetomembersandevennon‐membersisnotanoption,sincetheir

clientelistic networks would give the old guards a competitive advantage in any

election.Therefore,youngerpoliticianshavesuccessfullypushedfortheimplemen‐

tationofindependentscreeningcommittees,whichincluderespectedpersonalities

of Korean society. Before the 2008 elections, these committees refused to re‐

nominatemanyoftheguardsbecausetheyhadbeeninvolvedincorruptactivities.

However, this new procedure for candidate selection in Korea has not signifi‐

cantlyalteredthepartyinternaldistributionofpower.Asinthedominantpartiesin

thePhilippinesandIndonesia,thethreefacesofpartyorganisationremainindistin‐

guishable.Nevertheless,thefinaloutcomehasbecomemoreformalisedandlessde‐

pendentfrommoneypolitics.IntheTaiwaneseparties,ontheotherhand,wherewe

canclearlydistinguishbetweenthethreeformalelementsofpartyorganisation,the


–321–

systemofpublicopinionpollsstrengthensthepartyinpublicoffice.Thisisbecause

legislators and cabinetmembers are regularly in the news,which increases their

chancesofpeople recognising theirnames inpublicopinionpolls. In contrast, the

centralised procedure of candidate selection used in the PKS clearly benefits the

partycentraloffice,whilethehighlydemocraticproceduresemployedinAKBAYAN!

and the KDLP are a power asset for the party on the ground – more so in

AKABAYAN!,astheopenprimaryintheKDLPmeansthatthemembershipwillbe

atomised.


InmostEastAsianparties,thelargestshareofpoliticallyrelevantresourcesareheld

bypoliticiansas individuals,not thepoliticalpartyasanabstractorganisation.As

discussedabove,inordertobenominatedascandidates,politiciansusuallyneedto

contributesubstantialresourcesforelectoralcampaignpurposes.Thepartyitselfis

hardlyeverasourceoffinancialsupport.InIndonesia,partieswillfundthenational

mediacampaign,butcandidateswillhavetofinancethecampaign“ontheground”.

InFilipinoparties,thegeneralpatternisforcampaignexpensesataparticularad‐

ministrativeleveltobeshoulderedbythenexthigherpoliticaloffice,whileinKorea

candidates maintain their own political machines (sajojik) outside the political

OLIVERHELLMANN

–322–

party,which are used tomobilise both voters and donations. It follows from this

thatpartiesdonotdevelopastrongpartybureaucracy,asabureaucraticapparatus

isneitherwantednorneeded:Giventhattheyfollowclientelisticstrategiesofvoter

mobilisiation,politiciansarenotwillingtopooltheirresourcesunderthecontrolof

apartycentraloffice,while functionsusuallyperformedby thepartybureaucracy

canbecarriedoutbyexternallyhiredprofessionals.

In Taiwan, too, a large share of politically relevant resources is controlled by

politiciansandnot thepoliticalparties–particularly in theDPP.However, incon‐

trasttothedominantpartiesinSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndonesia,boththe

KMTandtheDPPhavedevelopedapartycentralofficeasadistinctivefaceofparty

organisation.Thisis,firstofall,duetothefactthatbothpartieshaveapartyonthe

ground,whichrequirespermanentbureaucraticmanagement,suchasmaintaining

the membership register and collecting membership fees. Secondly, both parties

haveopenedtheirownsourcesofincome,theadministrationofwhichagainneeds

permanentbureaucraticstructures.TheKMTinparticular,whichisoftenregarded

astherichestpartyintheworld,commandsahugecampaignwarchest.Initially,all

partyassetsweheldbyindividualpartyleaders.OnlyaftertheMainstreamhades‐

tablished itselfasthedominant faction intheearly1990swereparty financesput

undercentralsupervisioninordertofacilitateacentralallocationofresourcesfor

clientelisticpurposes.However,thesevitalfunctionsperformedbythepartycentral

officedonottranslateintodecision‐makingpower.AsintheDPP,thepartycentral

officedoesnotenjoyautomatic representation in theparty’skeyexecutivebodies


–323–

and the party in public office elects its own leadershipwithout interference from

outside.

In theKDLP,AKBAYAN!and thePKS, in contrast, theparty central controls all

politicallyrelevantresources.Notonlydotherespectivepartybureaucracieshave

their own sources of income, but, in addition, all financial resourcesmobilisedby

partypoliticiansneedtobetransferredtotheofficialpartytreasury.Asaresult,in

all three parties, the party in public office is completely dependent on the party

centralofficeforthefinancingofelectoralcampaigns.Thisputsthepartycentralof‐

fice inaverypowerfulposition,whichalsoreflects intheparties’ formaldecision‐

makingrules:While in theKDLPandAKBAYAN! thepartybureaucracyenjoysex‐

officio representation in all central executive bodies, in thePKS, theparty central

office is itself the highest authority in the party (in the form of the consultative

council), retainingtheright toappointallmembersof theparty’sdecision‐making

committees.

Tosumup,inthedominantpartiesofSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndonesia

wedonotwitness theemergenceofapartybureaucracyasanautonomousactor.

Thisisbecausethelargestshareofpoliticallyrelevantresourcesiscontrolledbyin‐

dividual politicians,who use these resources to feed their patron‐client networks

formobilising votes in bothparty andpublic elections. The twomajorTaiwanese

parties,ontheotherhand,featureaformalpartycentraloffice.Thisisbecause,most

importantly,permanentorganisational structuresbecomenecessary toadminister

thepartymembershipandmanagetheparty’sownsourcesofincome.However,as

OLIVERHELLMANN

–324–

in the other countries of East Asia, politicians in Taiwan also control their own

funds,whichiswhythepartycentralofficedoesnotenjoyautomaticrepresentation

in any of the executive bodies within either the KMT or the DPP. In the KDLP,

AKBAYAN! and the PKS, in contrast, all resources are controlled by the party bu‐

reaucracy, which ultimately translates into ex‐officio decision‐making powers for

thepartycentraloffice.

Summary

Since most contextual environments in the newer democracies of East Asia are

highlyselectivetowardsclientelism,mostpoliticalpartiesarenomorethanaformal

cloakaroundpatron‐clientnetworksusedtomobilisevotesinpublicelections.Asa

result,whendescribedaccordingtotheirformalproperties,thesepartiesarechar‐

acterised by the following organisational features: (1) there is no formal party

membership thatcouldbedistinguished fromthecommonelectoratebasedon its

rights and obligations towards the party; (2) the selection of candidates is highly

centralisedwithinthepartyleadership,withthepartyleadershipusuallynominat‐

ing themselves; and (3) politically relevant resources are held by the politicians

themselves,notbythepartycentralofficeasanabstractinstitution.Accordingly,as

intheclassicalcadrepartyof19thcenturyEurope,wecanobservealargepersonal


–325–

overlapbetweenthethreeelementsofpartyorganisation,making it impossible to

distinguishbetweenthepartyontheground,thepartycentralofficeandtheparty

inpublicoffice.

Theonlycontext thatdoesnot favourclientelisticoverprogrammaticelectoral

strategiescanbefoundinTaiwan.Instead,ascanbeexpectedinyoungerdemocra‐

ciesofthe“thirdwave”,theenvironmentisstrategicallyselectivetowardscatch‐all

strategies.As a result, the twomajorparties inTaiwan– theKMTand theDPP–

sharemany central characteristicswith thedominantparty type in contemporary

WesternEurope–thecartelparty:Requirementsforpartymembershiparenotvery

demanding,candidateselectionishighlyinclusive,andtheparliamentarypartycon‐

trolsitsownresourcesanddecision‐making.Allthisamountstothepartyinpublic

inofficebeingthedominantfaceofthepartyorganisation.Theresultingautonomy

for theparliamentarypartyhasallowedbothparties toworkclosely together ina

cartel toexcludeminorparties fromgovernmentparticipation,as isbestexempli‐

fiedbytheintroductionofasingle‐memberpluralityelectoralsystemforLegislative

Yuanelectionsin2008.

However,againstourtheoreticalexpectations,wecanalsofindpoliticalparties

whohavedevelopednarrowprogrammaticappeals.Themostnotableexamplesare

theKoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDPL),theFilipinoAKBAYAN!andtheIndo‐

nesianProsperousJusticeParty(PKS).Sincetheimplementationofclearlydefined

programmatic goals requires strong party discipline, all three parties have devel‐

oped the party central office as the dominant organisational element. The party

OLIVERHELLMANN

–326–

centralofficeperforms twocentral functions.Firstofall, aneffectivebureaucratic

apparatusisrequiredtoperformessentialfunctionsrelatedtoamassmembership.

Thesepartiesdonotonlyvaluemembersasasourceofincome(exceptAKBAYAN!)

andprovidersoffreelabour,buttheyalsoperceivethemasapoolofpotentialcan‐

didatesforpublicelection.Recruitingcandidatesfromwithinthepartyisaneffec‐

tivemechanism to increasepartydiscipline, and theparty central officeplays the

keyroleinsettinguptrainingprogrammesandkeepingthemembersengagedwith

the party’s ideology. Secondly, party discipline is also strengthenedby pooling all

resources in thepartybureaucracy,whichgives thepartycentralofficean instru‐

ment to imposeeffective sanctionsonnoncompliant legislators.Most importantly,

lawmakerswill bedependent on theparty central office for the financingof elec‐

toralcampaigns.

In short, ithasbecomeclear thatpoliticalparties in thenewerdemocraciesof

EastAsiaarenot followingthesamepathofdevelopmentasWesternEurope,nor

havetheytakenan“evolutionaryleap”towardsmorecontemporarytypesofparty

organisation.Instead,wefindverydifferenttypesofpartyorganisationwithinenvi‐

ronmental contexts that are very similar. The analysis has therefore shown that

partyorganisation is theproductof strategic choicesmadebyknowledgeableand

reflexive actors within a context that favours certain strategies over others. This

demonstrates again that the hardened stand‐off between structuralist and actor‐

centred approaches to the study of party organisation seriously limits our under‐

standing of party formation and change, as the strength of one approach is the


–327–

weakness of another and vice versa. This does notmean that existing theories of

partyorganisationneedtoberefusedalltogether,butweneedtorethinktherela‐

tionshipbetween them.Hopefully, the analytical frameworkofferedhere is a first

bigstepintothatdirection,offeringscholarsaroundtheworldanewperspectiveto

thinkaboutpartypoliticsintheirgeographicalareaofspecialisation.

Theimplicationsforthestudyofpartyorganisationin

WesternEurope

AsthedevelopmentofpartyorganisationsinWesternEuropeistheempiricalbasis

forthelargestshareofexistingtheoriesofpartyformationandchange,itseemsne‐

cessarytodiscusswhattheanalyticalframeworkdevelopedherewillmeanforthe

studyofpartypoliticsinWesternEurope.Firstofall, itmustbenotedthatthede‐

velopmentofpoliticalpartiesinWesternEuropeisneitheruniquenortheonlypos‐

siblepathoforganisationaldevelopment.Rather, itshouldbeunderstoodinterms

of strategic decisions and strategically selective contexts.While strategies can be

distinguished along a clientelistic‐programmatic spectrum, the context should be

describedaccordingtofactorsfavourabletoeitherofthesestrategies.

Infact,thecontextin19thcenturyEuropefeaturedmanycharacteristicswecan

alsoobserveintheyoungerdemocraciesofSouthKorea,thePhilippinesandIndo‐

OLIVERHELLMANN

–328–

nesia.Mostimportantly,asonlyasmallminoritywaseligibletovoteundertheelec‐

toralrulesof therégimecensitaire,voterscouldeasilybemobilisedthrough inter‐

personalnetworks,therebyeliminatingtheneedforastrongpartyorganisation.In‐

stead,politicalactorsinvestedthelargestshareoftheirresourcesintopatron‐client

relationships,whichresultedintheemergenceoftheclassicalcadreparty,charac‐

terisedbyanalmostcompleteoverlapofthepartyontheground,thepartycentral

officeandthepartyinpublicoffice.Meanwhile,politicalactorsexcludedfromgov‐

ernment and lacking the necessary resources to establish similar clientelistic net‐

worksdevelopedprogrammaticappealstargetedatclearlydefinedsocialgroups.By

providingcollectiveincentivesandopeningdecision‐makingtowiderparticipation,

these parties successfully recruited large groups of fee‐paying members, thereby

makinguptheirlackofresourcesthroughmassmemberships.Asthemanagement

ofthemembershipandtheenforcementofdisciplineintheparliamentarypartyre‐

quiredeffectiveparty internalcontrol, thesemasspartieswerecharacterisedbya

strongpartycentraloffice.

However, both cadre andmass partieswere soon forced to rethink their elec‐

toralstrategies:Whiletheliftingoftherégimecensitairemeantthatclientelismwas

far lessefficientnow,asagrowingnumberofvotershadtobe integrated intothe

patron‐clientnetworks, therising levelofsocio‐economicdevelopmentmeantthat

targeting specific social groups through narrow programmatic platforms had be‐

comemoredifficulttoo,sincelessandlessvoterswouldfeellikemembersofthese

groups.Hence,bothtypesofpartiesbegancampaigningonprogrammaticappeals,


–329–

aimed atwinning the vote of themedian voter. As a result, both types of parties

transformedintothesamepartytype:thecatch‐allparty.Thetrendbecametomake

partymembershipmoreinclusiveandextendparticipatoryrightstoawidergroup,

therebymakingthepartyinpublicofficemoreautonomousfromtherestoftheex‐

tra‐parliamentary party. This development has now reached its temporary peak

withtheemergenceofthecartelparty,inwhichthepartyinpublicofficeclearlyis

thedominantorganisationalelement.

However,aspoliticiansarebecomingmoreandmoreprofessionalised,theprob‐

lemwithcatch‐allelectoralstrategiesisthattheyfailtodifferentiatepoliticalparties

intheelectoralmarket:Ifallpartiespositionthemselvesasresponsiblemanagersof

the state, this will not set them apart from their competitors. In the future, we

shouldthereforeexpectpoliticalpartiesinWesternEuropetoincreasinglysupple‐

ment their catch‐all strategieswith secondary electoral strategies. One such com‐

plementarystrategythatwillhelppartiestodifferentiatethemselvesfromthecom‐

petitionischarisma.Althoughrecentempiricalevidencesuggeststhatpoliticalpar‐

tiesstillhaveamoresignificant influenceonvotingbehaviourthanleadershipap‐

peals,itisclearthat“inanageofincreasinglycompetitiveelections,electorallyap‐

pealing leadersmaymake all the difference” (Webb and Poguntke 2007: 346). A

secondstrategypoliticalpartiescanusetoseparatethemselves fromthecompeti‐

tionispatronage.However,unlikeinthenewerdemocraciesofEastAsia,patronage

willnotbedirectedattheelectorateasaclientelisticmechanismofvotermobilisi‐

ation (since thiswill be difficult to realise in the highly developed context that is

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WesternEurope),butitwillbeusedasaninstrumentofgovernance.Politicalpar‐

tieswillmake increasinguseofpatronage tobuildorganisationalnetworks in the

state (and semi‐state) sector that will combine political loyalty with technocratic

expertise. These networks will facilitate the implementation of public policies,

thereby helping parties to boost their image of efficient managers of the state

(KopeckýandMair2006).

Although not targeted at themass electorate, patronage in theWestern Euro‐

pean contextwill have a similar effect on party organisation as clientelistic strat‐

egiesofvotermobilisationinthenewerdemocraciesofEastAsia.Moreprecisely,it

willaccelerateaprocessthatisalreadyunderway.Firstofall,politicalpartieswill

bemoreinterestedinmembershipqualitythanquantity,withqualitymeasuredin

termsoftechnocraticexpertise.Secondly,thedecreasingsizeofpartymemberships

willmakeitnecessarytoopencandidateselectiontothewiderelectorate,thereby

making it evenmore difficult to distinguish between partymembers and normal

citizens.Thirdly, thiswill furtherweaken thepartycentralofficeas themediating

linkbetweenthepartyinpublicofficeandthepartyontheground,whiletheparty

inpublic officewill be strengthenedas the coordinatingbody in the growingpat‐

ronagenetwork.Inshort,thepartyinpublicofficewillfurtherconsolidateitsposi‐

tionas thedominantpartyorganisational face,until itmayeventuallybecome im‐

possibletodistinguishbetweenthethreeformalfacesoforganisation.Instead,the

functionofpoliticalpartiescouldbereducedtonomorethanthatofaformalcloak

aroundinter‐personalnetworksthatconnectthepartyleadershiptoappointedpar‐


–331–

tisansatdifferentlevelsofgovernance.Thegrowingfocusofelectoralcampaignson

the charismatic qualities of single political leaders – as already addressed by our

analyticalframework–willstimulatethisprocessevenfurther.

However, itmustbenoted thatpredictionsabout the futureofpartyorganisa‐

tion,suchasthisone,willalwaysbelimitedtostrategicallyselectedoutcomes.They

thereby deny actors the ability to develop organisational strategies that deviate

from the expected outcome. As our analysis of political parties in East Asia has

shown,thisisneitherempiricallyortheoreticallyafairassumption.Rather,wemust

acknowledgethefactthat–althoughthestrategicselectivityofacontextwillthrow

upregularitiesovertime–singleorganisationaldecisionsarealwaysunpredictable.

Infact,thepredictiondescribedaboverestsonthepremisethatpartieshaveaccess

tocertainresources(most importantly,governmentspoilsandcharisma).Political

partieslackingtheseresourceswillthereforebeforcedtotakealternativeroutesof

organisational development.Moreover,wehave certainly not reached “the end of

history” (Fukuyama1992)–andweprobablyneverwill–butpoliticalactorswill

always hold diverging sets of ideas through which to interpret the environment

aroundthem.Asintepretationsoftheopportunitiesprovidedbyacontextwilldiffer

betweenactors,sowillstrategicresponsestothissamecontext.

Similarly, althoughphrased in termsof strategicdecisionsandstrategically se‐

lective contexts, the brief historical summary of political party development in

WesternEuropeabovecutsoutthemanyhistoricalcasesofpoliticalpartiesthatdo

notfitintoageneralisednarrative.However,itispreciselythesecasesthatdeviate

OLIVERHELLMANN

–332–

from the general pattern of structured outcomes that can help us gain a better

understandingof therelationshipbetweenstructureandagency,andprocessesof

party formationand changemore specifically.Thereare, for instance,manyparty

systems in which the cartel party has not emerged as the dominant party type.

WhileseveralauthorshavemadethisobservationindemocraciesoutsideofWest‐

ernEurope(suchasYoung(1998)inCanadaorYishai(2001)inIsrael),Detterbeck

(2002;2005),studyingpoliticalpartiesinDenmark,Germany,BritainandSwitzer‐

land,claimsthattheemergenceofcartelpartiesdependsonanumberofcontextual

factors:(1)theinstitutionalsetting,(2)politicalcultureand(3)thelevelofpolitical

professionalisation.Thisheterogeneityacrosspolities,combinedwithhomogeneity

withinpolities,showsthatexternalstructuresmatter.Approachestopartyorgani‐

sation that focuseitheron thecausalpowerof internal structures (“life cycle”ap‐

proach)ortheroleofagencythereforestruggletoaccountforthesecases.

However, heterogeneity of party organisation cannot only be observed across

countriesbutalsowithincountries.AsdiscussedinChapter2,theItalianpartysys‐

temisagoodexample inthisregard,since,atanypoint intime,differenttypesof

partyorganisationhaveexistedsidebyside–catch‐allandmasspartiesupuntilthe

1990s,andmodernisedmassand“businessfirm”partiesmorerecently.Thus,theo‐

riesofpartyorganisationemphasising the importanceofexternal structures (“pe‐

riodeffect”approach)runintoseveredifficultieswhentryingtoaccountfordiffer‐

enttypesofpartyorganisationwithinthesamepolity,asthereareobviouslyfactors

belowthesystemiclevelwithastronginfluenceonhowpartiesorganise.Theonly


–333–

theorythatintegratesfactorsfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisisPanebianco’s“gen‐

erationeffect”approach,whicharguesthattheformationofapartywillbedriven

by external circumstances, while its further development will be severely con‐

strained by internal dynamics. However, this approach underestimates actors’

abilitytodrasticallyreformtheorganisationofapoliticalparty,ascanbeexempli‐

fiedbythe fact that the Italiancommunistandsocialistpartieshavegonethrough

considerableorganisationalchange.Evenclearerexamplesofpartychangearepar‐

tiesofthenewright.TheFrenchFNandtheAustrianFPÖ,forexample,haveboth

gonethroughacontinuousprocessofinstitutionalisation,makingthemselvesmuch

lessdependentontheirrespectivecharismaticleader.

Inotherwords,noexistingtheoryofpartyorganisationhasyetbeenabletoac‐

countforbothsystemicallystructuredoutcomesandthenumerouscasesdeviating

fromtheseregularities.Existingtheoreticalframeworkscanonlydosoonanad‐hoc

basis by borrowing from other approaches: While structuralist approaches need

help from voluntarist approaches to explain diversity, actor‐focused approaches

needtoturnforsupporttostructuralisttheorieswhenfacinghomogenouslydistri‐

butedoutcomes.Theanalyticalframeworkdevelopedhereisthereforethefirstat‐

tempttointegratefactorsfromdifferentlevelsofanalysisintoasinglemodelbyac‐

knowledging a dialectical relationship between structure and agency. Future re‐

searchmight showthat thecontextual factors included in this frameworkare less

meaningful in the context of established democracies, and actors might develop

strategiesneverobservedbefore,butthebasicrelationshipbetweenstructuresand

OLIVERHELLMANN

–334–

agentswillremainthesameacrossspaceandtime.Inotherwords,partyorganisa‐

tionwillalwaysbetheproductofstrategicdecisionsmadewithinastrategicallyse‐

lectivecontext.


–335–

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Interviews

Abaya,JosephE.A.(17June2008,MakatiCity,Philippines)MemberoftheHouseof

Representatives,LiberalParty(LP).

Azwar, Rully Chairul (2 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Secretary General, Party of

FunctionalGroups(Golkar).

Baswedan,Anies(17July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)PresidentofParamadinaUniver‐

sity.

Casiple,RamonC.(19June2008,QuezonCity,Philippines)ExecutiveDirectorofthe

InstituteforPoliticalandElectoralReform(IPER).

Cha, Young (24April 2008, Seoul, SouthKorea)Chief PressOfficer,UnitedDemo‐

craticParty(UDP).

Cho,Soo‐Yeon(15April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ExternalRelationsUnitDirector,

KoreanDemocraticLabourParty(KDLP).

Chung,Jin‐Min(16April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ProfessorattheDepartmentof

PoliticalScience,MyongjiUniversity.

Co,EdnaE.A.(23June2008,MakatiCity,Philippines)ProfessorattheNationalCol‐

legeofPublicAdministrationandGovernance,UniversityofthePhilippines.

Feulner, Frank (28 June 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Parliamentary Adviser, United

NationsDevelopmentProgramme.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–380–

Hawang,Shiow‐duan(15May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)ProfessorattheDepartmentof

PoliticalScience,SouchowUniversity.

Herberg,Mirko (18 June2008, PasigCity, Philippines)ResidentRepresentative of

theFriedrichEbertFoundation.

Hermanns, Heike (16 April 2008, Seoul, South Korea) Professor at the College of

SocialSciences,InhaUniversity.

Heufers, Rainer (14 July, Jakarta, Indonesia) Project Director, Friedrich Naumann

Foundation.

Ho,Szu‐yin (6May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)Professorat theDepartmentofPolitical

Science,NationalChengchiUniversity.

Im,Hyug‐Baeg (3April 2008, Seoul, SouthKorea) Professor at theDepartment of

PoliticalScience,KoreaUniversity.

Kamppeter,Werner(15April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ResidentRepresentativeof

theFriedrichEbertFoundation.

Kim,Wook(17April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)AssociateProfessorofPoliticalSci‐

enceatPaiChaiUniversity.

Kim,Yong‐Ho(12April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)DeanofGraduateSchoolofPublic

Administration,InhaUniversity.

Kim,YoungIn(17April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)HeadofCommunicationsOffice,

GrandNationalParty(GNP).

Kleden, Ignas (14 July2008, Jakarta, Indonesia)Chairmanof the IndonesianCom‐

munityforDemocracy(KID).


–381–

Kuo,Yun‐Kuang(12May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)DirectoroftheDepartmentofOver‐

seasAffairs,ChineseNationalistParty(KMT).

Kwon,HyeokYong(7April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)AssistantProfessorattheDe‐

partmentofPoliticalScience,KoreaUniversity.

Lai, I‐Chung (8May2008, Taipei, Taiwan)Director of theDepartment of Interna‐

tionalAffairs,DemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP).

Lee,Eun‐Jeung(15April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ProfessorattheDepartmentof

PoliticalScience,Martin‐LutherUniversityHalleWittenberg.

Lin,Jih‐wen(7May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)ResearchFellowattheInstituteofPoliti‐

calScience,AcademiaSinica.

Liu, I‐Chou (8May2008,Taipei, Taiwan)Professor at theDepartment of Political

Science,NationalChengchiUniversity.

Mandan,AriefMudatsir(10July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)DeputyChairman,United

DevelopmentParty(PPP).

Mangahas, Mahar (16 June 2008, Quezon City, Philippines) President of Social

WeatherStations.

Manglapus,FrancisXavier(13June2008,MandaluyongCity,Philippines)Secretary

General,LakasChristianMuslimDemocrats(Lakas‐CMD).

Mietzner,Marcus(28June2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)LecturerinIndonesianStudies

attheAustralianNationalUniversity.

Moon,ChungSang(11April2008,Seoul,SouthKorea)ProgramOfficeratTheAsia

Foundation.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–382–

Pranowo,Gandjar(9July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)MemberoftheHouseofRepre‐

sentatives,IndonesianDemocraticParty–Struggle(PDI‐P).

Refrizal(9July2008, Jakarta, Indonesia)MemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,

ProsperousJusticeParty(PKS).

Rocamora,Joel(26June2008,QuezonCity,Philippines)DirectoroftheInstitutefor

PopularDemocracy(IPD).

Rowland,W.Paul (2 July2008, Jakarta, Indonesia)ResidentRepresentativeof the

NationalDemocraticInstitute(NDI).

SanJuan,Chyn(12June2008,MakatiCity,Philippines)SeniorProjectCoordinator,

InternationalFoundationforElectoralSystems(IFES).

Santos,Arlene(23June2008,QuezonCity,Philippines)GeneralSecretary,Citizens’

ActionParty(AKBAYAN!).

Subianto,Benny(3July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)ConsultanttotheNetherlandsIn‐

stituteforMultipartyDemocracy(NIMD).

Sugiarto,BimaArya(8July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)LecturerattheDepartmentof

InternationalRelations,ParamadinaUniversity,andconsultanttotheNational

MandateParty(PAN).

Sukma, Rizal (15 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Deputy Executive Director of the

CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS).

Susanti,Bivitri(1July2008,Jakarta,Indonesia)ExecutiveDirectoroftheIndonesian

CentreforLawandPolicyStudies.


–383–

Wang, Yeh‐li (29 April 2008, Taichung, Taiwan) Professor of Political Science at

TunghaiUniversity.

Weck, Winfried (3 July 2008, Jakarta, Indonesia) Resident Representative of the

KonradAdenauerFoundation.

Wu,Chung‐li (1May2008,Taipei,Taiwan)AssociateResearchFellowat theInsti‐

tuteofPoliticalScience,AcademiaSinica.

OLIVERHELLMANN

–384–

–Appendix–

OliverHellmannUniversityofBirmingham

QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE ORGANISATION AND FACTIONALISATION OF

POLITICAL PARTIES NameofpoliticalpartyNameofintervieweeJobtitleDateofinterviewSECTION 1: General Information Q1 Dowrittenorganisationalrulesexisttoguidethefunctioningoftheparty?

Yes. No.Q2 Whatisthenameofthenationalexecutivebodyoftheparty?Q3 Howmanymembersdoesthisbodyhave,andhowarethesememberselectedor

appointed?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeach.

Partyleader(s). Parliamentaryparty. Localorregionalpartybranches. Delegatestoapartycongress. Partymembers. Other. Totalnumberofmembers: Q4 Whatisthenameofthehighestdecisionmakingbodyintheparty?Q5 Howmanymembersdoesthisbodyhave,andhowarethesememberselectedor

appointed?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeach.

Nationalexecutivebody(seeabove). Partyleader(s). Parliamentaryparty. Localorregionalpartybranches. Delegatestoapartycongress. Partymembers. Other. Totalnumberofmembers:

Q6 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?SECTION 2: Party Membership Q7a Isthereanofficialmembershipregister?

Yes. No.Q7b IfQ7a=yes,whomaintainstheregister?

Nationalparty. Regionalbranches. Localbranches Other(pleasespecify): Q8 Howmanymembersdoesthepartyhave,andhowhasthischangedsincetheparty’s

founding?Provideyearandindicateifrealfiguresorestimates.

Membershipsize Year Realfigure Estimate Q9 Whatistheparty’smembershipfee?

Fixedamount.Pleasespecify(inlocalcurrency): Voluntarycontribution. Nomembershipfee.Q10 Wherecancitizensregisteraspartymembers?

Nationalpartyoffice. Regionalbranch. Localbranch. Partywebsite. Other(pleasespecify): Q11 What,ifany,requirements/criteriaexisttobeeligibleformembership?Checkall

thatapplyandspecifyeachrequirement.

Belongingtoacertainethnicgroup. Comingfromacertaingeographicalarea. Age. Other. Q12 What,ifany,responsibilitiescomewithpartymembership?

Adherencetopartystatutes. Unpaidwork. Other(pleasespecify):

Q13 What,ifany,formalrightscomewithpartymembership?

Discountswithmerchants. Votingrightsatpartymeetings. Other(pleasespecify): Q14 How,ifatall,doesthepartyseektorecruitmembersbetweenelections?

Party‐organisedmassevents. Informationtablesinpublicplaces. Door‐to‐door. Advertising. Other(pleasespecify): Q15 Howoften,ifatall,doesthepartycommunicatewithitsmembers?Checkallthat

applyandspecifyeach.

Electronicnewsletter. Papernewsletter. Individualcorrespondence. Meetings. Website. Other. Q16 Towhomdoesthepartyprovidetraining?Checkallthatapplyanddescribetypeof

trainingandatwhatlevel.

Campaignvolunteers. Candidates. Electedmembers. Generalmembers. Partyofficials. Other. Notraining. Q17 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?

a) Parliamentary elections Q18 Whataretheeligibilityrequirementsestablishedbythepartyrulestobecome

s/electedasacandidate?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeachrequirement.

Membershipintheparty. Endorsementbypartybody. Certainpositionintheparty. Signatures. Age. Qualifications. Other.

SECTION 3: Selection of Candidates for National Elections

Q19 Whoisentitledtovoteintheselectionprocess/nominatesthecandidates?Checkallthatapplyandprovidemoredetailsforeach.

Allvoters. Partymembers. Electedpartyagency. Non‐electedpartyagency. Electedpartyleader. Non‐electedpartyleader. Other. Q20 Whatinformalpractices,ifany,underminethewrittenpartyrules?Q21 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?b) Presidential elections (if applicable) Q22 Whataretheeligibilityrequirementsestablishedbythepartyrulestobecome

s/electedasthepresidentialcandidate?Checkallthatapplyandspecifyeachrequirement.

Membershipintheparty. Endorsementbypartybody. Certainpositionintheparty. Signatures. Age. Qualifications. Other. Q23 Whoisentitledtovoteintheselectionprocess/nominatesthecandidate?Checkall

thatapplyandprovidemoredetailsforeach.

Allvoters. Partymembers. Electedpartyagency. Non‐electedpartyagency. Electedpartyleader. Non‐electedpartyleader. Other. Q24 Whatinformalpractices,ifany,underminethewrittenpartyrules?Q25 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?

SECTION 4: Internal Distribution of Resources Q26 Whataretheparty’smainsourcesofincome?Provideanestimateinpercentand

indicatethetotalamountinlocalcurrency.

Year Publicstatefunding

Membershipfees

Donations Party‐ownedbusinesses

Other:

Total

Q27 Howisthisincomedispersedwithintheparty?Q28 Whatamountoffundingdocandidatesreceivefromthepartyfortheirpersonal

electioncampaigns?Specifyamountinlocalcurrencyandprovideapercentageestimateoftheaverageshareinthecandidates’budgets.

Q29 Howmanyprofessionalstaffdoesthepartyemploy?Provideanestimateofthetotal

numberandindicatehowtheyareallocatedbetweenthecentralpartybureaucracyandthepartyinthenationalparliament.

Year Partybureaucracy Parliamentaryparty Total

Q30 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?SECTION 5: Status of Parliamentary Party Q31 Arethereproceduralrulestoselectthedecisionmakingbodyoftheparliamentary

party?Ifyes,describeinmoredetail.

Yes,formalrules. Yes,informalrules. No. Q32 Arethereformalrulesfordecisionmakingintheparliamentaryparty?Ifyes,

describehowtheserulesaremade.

Yes. No.

Q33 How,ifatall,canparliamentariansbeheldaccountablefornotfollowingpartypolicydecisions?

Exclusionfrompromotionwithinpartyranks. Demotionwithinpartyranks. Expulsionfromtheparty. Other(pleasespecify): Q34 Which,ifany,oftheabovehaschangedsincethepartywasfounded?

SECTION 6: Factionalisation Q35 Whatarethemainfactionswithintheparty?Foreachfactionpleaseindicatethe

mainfunctionsofthefaction(multipleanswersarepossible)andspecifythese,andratethefaction’sdegreeofinstitutionalisation.

NameoffactionFunction

Articulatespecificpolicyidea:

Allocatepostsandresources:

Representspecificsocialgroup:1

Institutionalisation

Noroutinised

procedures. Informallyroutinisedrules. Formally

routinisedrules.

Nameoffaction

Function





Noroutinisedprocedures.

Informallyroutinisedrules.

Formallyroutinisedrules.

Nameoffaction

Function








Nameoffaction

Function








Nameoffaction

Function








Q36 Outlinethedevelopmentoftheinterfactionalpowerrelations.Identifythe

dominantfaction,anddescribesignificantchangesinthedistributionofpoweramongfactions.