I.—a-——- •

ordered Reidy (who was sufferingfrom a badly infected foot) to takecharge of the sizable number ofsoldiers from various units—including a detachment of the185th Engineer Battalion—thathad now collected at Koto-ri.

Hagaru-ri on 1 December.

opined that he should be relieved.Almond later said that in addition

to general instructions on with-drawal of forces and a specificplan for the withdrawal of RCT-31,he also asked Smith for an explicitplan for the evacuation of bothArmy and Marine wounded byway of the airstrip being complet-ed at Hagaru-ri.

Almond told Barr that on hisflight up to Hagaru-ri he hadpassed over a column of truckshalted on the road a few milessouth of Koto-ri and recognized itas the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry,which was working its way upfrom Chinhung-ni. He suggestedto Barr that he relieve the slow-moving battalion commander,West Pointer Lieutenant ColonelRichard F. Reidy. Barr objected,saying he did not know the situa-tion confronting the battalion. Hemay also have reminded Almondthat all movements up to Koto-riwere being coordinated by XCorps. Almond telephoned (byradio link) his chief of staff, theable Major General Clark L.

Ruffner, and ordered him to expe-dite the movement north of the 2dBattalion, 31st Regiment, to joinPuller's forces at Koto-ri. Before

leaving, Almond told Barr andSmith that Soule's 3d InfantryDivision was doing a "magnifi-cent" job of covering the gap withthe Eighth Army.

After Almond had departed,Barr and Smith agreed that notmuch could be done for RCT-31until the 5th and 7th Marinesarrived at Hagam-ri from Yudam-ni.Smith did order Litzenberg andMurray to expedite their with-drawal, destroying any suppliesand equipment that had to beabandoned.

Ruffner sent Captain Joseph L.Gurfein, West Point 1944, to getReidy, a short, chunky man whoseface showed the marks of his box-ing days at the Academy, moving.Gurfein found Reidy and his bat-talion, which had only two riflecompanies, stalled about threemiles outside Puller's position.(The other rifle company had goneforward earlier, had been withTask Force Drysdale, and was nowin place, more or less intact, atKoto-ri.) Reidy's battalion, urgedon by Gurfein, made a falteringnight attack and eventually pushedits way into Koto-ri. Puller gavethe battalion a sector of Koto-ri'sdefensive perimeter. He also

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During the daylight hours of 30November, Don Faith worked outcounterattack plans to meet a pen-etration of his perimeter. TheChinese, not waiting for nightfall,began their attack in the after-noon. Task Force Faith's perimeterat Sinhung-ni was now isolatedand alone with no friendly forcesbetween it and Hagaru-ri. By mid-night the attack against Faith'sperimeter had built up to unprece-dented intensity. There were pen-etrations, but Faith sealed these offwith local counterattacks. At theaid station, medical supplies werecompletely exhausted. The dead,frozen stiff, were laid out in rowsstacked about four feet high.

Meanwhile, well to Faith's rear,headquarters elements of RCT-31and the 31st Tank Company atHudong-ni, with 1st Marine Di-vision approval, had fallen back toHagaru-ri. Two disabled tanks hadto be abandoned along the four-mile route, but otherwise themarch, about 325 soldiers alto-gether, was made without inci-dent. The regimental S-3,Lieutenant Colonel Berry K.

Anderson, the senior Army officerpresent, was in charge. A new 31stInfantry headquarters was beingformed at Hamhung, with ColonelJohn A. Gavin, USA, as its desig-nated commander, but it was notsent forward to Hagaru-ri.

By the end of November it wasincreasingly obvious that Rear

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-5C353607

6'ases of ammunition are sorted out and lashed toget her at Yonpo airfield on 29November before loading into C-4 7 transports of the Far East Air Force's CombatCargo Command. This ammo was intended for RCT-31, better known as Task ForceFaith, east of the reservoir. First airdrops directly from Japan would be to

Admiral James Doyle, who hadlanded the Marines at Inchon andagain at Wonsan, was now going tohave to lift them out of Hungnamas part of a massive amphibiouswithdrawal. Doyle, as Comman-der, Task Force 90, issued plans on28 November for a redeployment ofUnited Nations forces. Doyle'splans called for the division of hisTask Force 90 into two amphibioustask groups. Task Group Three,under Rear Admiral Lyman A.Thackrey, would provide foramphibious evacuation on thewest coast of Eighth Army units ifrequired. Task Group One, underDoyle's immediate command,would execute the amphibiousevacuation of east coast ports, pri-marily Hungnam. Task GroupThree, with two-thirds of theamphibious force, would go to thewest coast where the situation, atthat moment, seemed more criti-cal. There would not be nearlyenough amphibious ships forthese tasks; there had to he anenormous gathering of merchantshipping. Vice Admiral Joy'sdeputy chief of staff, newly pro-moted Rear Admiral ArleighBurke, largely ran this effort.

The carrier-based aircraftbrought together for the Inchonlanding and then the Wonsanlanding had by mid-Novemberbeen largely dispersed. Left withTask Force 77 were the fast carriersLeyte (CV 32) and Philippine Sea(CV 47). Also still on station was theescort carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE116)—"Bing-Ding" to the Marinesand sailors—but her sister shipSicily (CVE 118), having droppedoff VMF-214, the "Blacksheep"squadron, at Wonsan, was in port inJapan. Major Robert P. Keller hadcommanded the squadron until 20November when he was detachedto become the Marine air liaisonofficer with Eighth Army and FifthAir Force. In World War, Keller

served in the Pacific with MarineFighter Squadrons 212 and 223and was credited with at least oneaerial victory. Command of VMF-214 was taken over by MajorWilliam M. Lundin.

The big carrier Valley Forge (CV45), which on 3 July had been thefirst carrier to launch combat mis-sions against North Koreaninvaders, was on her way homefor a much-needed refit. Now theemergency caused her to turnabout and head for the Sea ofJapan. Also on the way was thePrinceton (CV 37), hurriedlyyanked Out of mothballs. But untilthese carriers could arrive, tacticalair operations, including all impor-tant close air support, would haveto be carried out by shore-basedMarine squadrons and Navy andMarine squadrons in the Leyte,Philippine Sea, and BadoengStrait.

On 1 December the Far East AirForces relinquished control of alltactical air support of X Corps to the1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which, inthe words of air historian Richard P.Hallion, "performed brilliantly."The Princeton arrived on stationon 5 December. By then TaskForce 77 was giving the Chosinexodus its full attention.

Carrier-based Vought F4U Cor-sairs and Douglas AD Skyraiderswere the workhorses of TaskForce 77. A typical ordnance loadfor the Corsair on a close air sup-port mission was 800 rounds forits 20mm guns, eight 5-inch rockets,and two 150-gallon napalmbombs. With this load the planehad an endurance of two-and-one-half hours. The Navy's Skyraider,much admired by the Marines,packed an ordnance load compa-rable to a World War II Boeing B-17 heavy bomber, commonly 400rounds of 20mm, three 150-gallonnapalm bombs, and either twelve 5-inch rockets or twelve 250-pound

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fragmentation bombs. The Sky-raider could stay in the air for fourhours with this load.

The Marines at Hagaru-ri hadanother bad night on 30November. The Chinese, the 58thDivision now augmented by the59th, assaulted Ridge's wearydefenders once again in an attackpattern that repeated that of thenight of the 28th. One regiment ormore came in against the south-west face of the perimeter andunfortunately for them hit ItemCompany's well-entrenched posi-tion. First Lieutenant Joseph Fisher,always optimistic in his countingof enemy casualties, guessed that hekilled as many as 500 to 750 ofthem. His own losses were twoMarines killed, 10 wounded.

Another Chinese regiment cameacross the contested ground onEast Hill hitting the reverse slopedefenses held chiefly by Sitter'sCompany G and 1st EngineerBattalion's Companies A and B.

General Smith watched the fightfrom the doorway of his commandpost, two-thirds of a mile away.Some ground was lost. Ridge sentup a portion of his preciousreserve, 41 Commando, to rein-force Company G, and the lostground was retaken by early morn-ing.

After the night's action, Ridge,the defense force commander,came to see Smith at about 0900."He was pretty low and almostincoherent," Smith wrote in his logfor 1 December. "The main troublewas loss of sleep. He was muchconcerned about another attack.He felt with the force available tohim he could not hold both theairstrip and the ridge [East Hill] eastof the bridge. I told him he wouldhave to hold both and would haveto do it with what we had."

Friday, 1 December—althoughno one thought of it that way at thetime—was the turning point of thecampaign.

Lieutenant Colonel John Part-ridge's 1st Engineer Battalion hadsucceeded in hacking out the sem-blance of an airstrip from thefrozen earth in 12 days of around-the-clock dangerous work, theengineers at times laying downtheir tools to take up rifles and

machine guns. Heroic though theengineering effort was, the airstripwas only 40 percent complete. Itsrough runway, 50-feet wide and2,900-feet long, fell considerablyshort of the length and conditionspecified by regulations for opera-tion of transport aircraft at thosealtitudes and temperatures. Smithdecided that the urgency of theevacuation problem was such thatthe uncompleted airfield must beused, ready or not.

Its impossible load of casualties

was overwhelming the divisionfield hospital—a collection of tentsand Korean houses. Navy CaptainEugene R. Hering, the division sur-geon, met with General Smith thatmorning. Two additional surgicalteams had been flown in by heli-copter from Hungnam. The twocompanies, Charlie and Easy, ofthe 1st Medical Battalion, alreadyhad some 600 patients. Heringexpected 500 more casualties fromYudam-ni and 400 from the Armybattalions east of the reservoir.Grim as his prediction of casualtieswas, these estimates would prove tobe much too low.

Until the airstrip was opera-tional, aerial evacuation of themost serious cases had been limit-ed to those that could be flownout by the nine helicopters and 10light aircraft of Major Gottschalk'sVMO-6, which also had manyother missions to perform. From27 November to 1 December,VMO-6, struggling to fly at thecold, thin altitudes, had lifted out152 casualties—109 from Yudam-ni,36 from Hagaru-ri, and 7 fromKoto-ri. One of Gottschalk's pilots,First Lieutenant Robert A. Long-staff, was killed on an evacuationflight to Toktong Pass.

At 1430 on Friday afternoon, thefirst Air Force C-47 transporttouched down on the frozensnow-covered runway. A half-hourlater the plane, loaded with 24casualties, bumped its way off therough strip into the air. Threemore planes came in that after-noon, taking out about 60 morecasualties. "It takes about a halfhour to load a plane with litterpatients," Smith noted in his log."Ambulatory patients go verymuch faster." The last plane in forthe day, arriving heavily loadedwith ammunition, collapsed itslanding gear and had to bedestroyed.

Because of Smith's foresight,

LtCol Murray, exact location and time unknown, but possibly mid-November atHagaru-ri briefs Maj Vincentf Gottschalk, commanding officer of VMO-6, onthe locations of units of his regiment. Between 27 November and 1 December, VMO-6's helicopters flew 152 medical evacuation missions in addition to many otherreconnaissance and liaison missions.

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A130916

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Hagaru-ri was already stockpiledwith six days of rations and twodays of ammunition. The first air-drop from Air Force C-i 19 "FlyingBox Cars" flying from Japan wason that same critical 1st ofDecember. The drops, called"Baldwins," delivered prearrangedquantities of ammunition, rations,and medical supplies. Some dropswere by parachute, some by freefall. The Combat Cargo Commandof the Far East Air Forces at first esti-mated that it could deliver only 70tons of supply a day, enough per-haps for a regimental combatteam, but not a division. By whatbecame a steady stream of trans-ports landing on the strip and airdrops elsewhere the Air Forcedrove its deliveries up to a 100tons a day.

Toward the end of the dayLieutenant Colonel William J.McCaffrey, West Point 1939 and

the X Corps' deputy chief of staff,visited Smith. McCaffrey, who hadbeen Almond's chief of staff in the92d Infantry Division in Italy, out-lined for Smith the plan for con-striction into a Hungnamperimeter and its subsequent de-fense. Soule's 3d Infantry Divisionwas to move elements to the foot ofFunchilin Pass and provide a cov-ering force through which the 1stMarine Division would withdraw.The 1st Marine Division wouldthen organize a defensive sectorwest and southwest of Hungam.The 7th Infantry Division wouldoccupy a sector northeast andnorth of Hungnam.

The consolidation of X Corps inthe Hamhung-Hungnam areaincluded the evacuation ofWonsan to the south. MajorGeneral Field Harris, commandingthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,ordered MAG-12—the Marine air-craft group had three tacticalsquadrons and a headquarters

Photo by Sgt William R. Keating, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5683

casualty evacuation from Hagaru-ri airstrp began on I Decembe although thecondition of the field fell far short of what saft'ty regulations required. Here, ona subsequent day, an ambulance discharges its cargo directly into an Air ForceC-4 7 or Marine Corps R-4D transport. Weapons qf other, walking wounded,casualties form a pile in the foreground.

Mountains of supplies were rigged at Yonpo Airfield by Capt Hersel D. C.Blasingame's 1st Air Delivery Platoon for parachute drop, .free airdrop, or sim-ply as cargo for the transports flying into Haga ru-ri. The 1st Marine Division need-ed 100 tons of resupply a day, delivered by one means or another.

Photo by SSgt Ed Barnum, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130436

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L. ,__.! L7t••

squadron—to move up fromWonsan to Yonpo. The groupcommander, Colonel Boeker C.Batterton, 46, Naval Academy1928, had spent most of World WarII with a naval aviation mission inPeru. MAG-12 completed themovement of its aircraft in oneday—that same busy 1 December.Some planes took off fromWonsan, flew a mission, and land-ed at Yonpo.

Total strength of RCT-31 hasbeen calculated at a precise 3,155,but of this number probably notmore than 2,500 fell under DonFaith's direct command in "TaskForce Faith" itself. On the morningof 1 December, Lieutenant ColonelFaith, on his own initiative, beganhis breakout from Sinhung-ni tothe south. He did not have a solidradio link to the 1st MarineDivision, and had nothing morethan a chancy relay throughMarine Captain Edward P.

Stamford's tactical air control net.Faith's own 1st Battalion, 32dInfantry, would lead off, followedby the 57th Field Artillery, with the3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, bringingup the rear. Trucks would beunloaded so as to carry thewounded. The howitzers werespiked. Most jeeps and all inoper-able trucks were to be destroyed, aswould be all supplies and equip-ment. In execution the destructionof the surplus was spotty. About 25to 30 vehicles—all that were still inoperating condition—formed upinto colunm. The overriding missionfor Task Force Faith was now toprotect the truck convoy with itshundreds of wounded. Muchreliance would be placed on theautomatic weapons fire of thetracked weapons carriers, down tothree in number, two quad SOsand one dual 40mm.

The column began to move outat about 1100. The soldiers couldsee the Chinese in plain sight on thesurrounding high ground. Progresswas slow. Mortar rounds contin-ued to fall, causing more casualties,and Chinese infantry began press-ing in on the column. The fightingfor the first half-mile was particu-larly intense. Officers and non-commissioned officers suffereddisproportionate losses. Controlbroke down.

Captain Stamford and his tacticalair control party tried to keepclose air support overhead as con-tinuously as possible. NavyCorsairs from the fast carrier Leytecame on station at about 1300.With Stamford calling them in, theCorsairs used napalm and rocketsand strafed with 20mm cannon.One napalm drop hit close toFaith's command group causingeight or ten casualties. This ghast-ly accident was demoralizing, butsurvivors agreed that without closeair support the column wouldnever have cleared the perimeter.

Some of the soldiers on thepoint began to fall back. Faithdrew his Colt .45 pistol and turnedthem around. Panicky KATUSAs—and some Americans—tried toclimb into the trucks with thewounded. Riflemen assigned tomove along the high ground onthe flanks started to drift back to theroad. The head of the columnreached a blown bridge just northof Hill 1221 at about 1500. Some ofthe trucks, trying to cross thefrozen stream, broke through theice and had to be abandoned.

The Chinese held the highground on both sides of a road-block that now stood in the wayand were in particular strength onHill 1221. Faith, .45 in hand, gath-ered together enough men toreduce the roadblock. Other smallgroups of men clawed their waycrossways along the slope of Hill

77

1221. This fight was almost the lastgasp of Task Force Faith. In thewords of one major, "[After Hill1221] there was no organizationleft."

Even so, by dusk the columnwas within four-and-one-half roadmiles of Hagaru-ri when a grenadefragment that penetrated his chestjust above his heart killed Faithhimself. His men propped up hisbody, with a blanket wrappedaround his shoulders, in the cab ofa truck—rather like a dead El Cidriding out to his last battle—hopingthat word of his death would notspread through the column causingmore demoralization. Just whathappened to his body after that isnot clear.

As the column struggled onsouthward the Chinese methodi-cally continued their destruction ofthe convoy, truck by truck.Individual soldiers and smallgroups began to break away fromthe column to attempt to cross thefrozen reservoir on foot. TaskForce Faith, as such, had ceased toexist.

During the fighting at Hagaru-rifrom 28 November through 1

December, Ridge's 3d Battalion,1st Marines, had suffered 43 killed,2 missing, and 270 wounded—atotal of 315 battle casualties and athird of its beginning strength. Thebits and pieces of Marine andArmy units that made up the rest ofthe Hagaru-ri defense force hadcasualties perhaps this high if nothigher. These casualties, however,did not come even close to thosesuffered by RCT-31 east of thereservoir.

Throughout the night of 1

December survivors of Task ForceFaith drifted into the north side ofthe perimeter at Hagaru-ri, most ofthem coming across the ice.

frozen surface of Pungnyuri Inlet. Thethroughout the night of 1 December.

During that last night all sem-blance of unit integrity dissolved. Atabout 0230 on the morning of 2December, Marine Captain Stam-ford appeared in front of CaptainRead's artillery battery position.Stamford had been briefly takenprisoner but escaped. By mid-morning, 670 soldier survivors,many of them wounded or badlyfrostbitten, had found their wayinto Hagaru-ri warming tents.They had a terrible tale to tell.

Dr. Hering, the division sur-geon, reported to Smith that 919casualties went out on 1

December, but that among themthere was a large number of maim-gerers. "Unfortunately," Smith en-tered in his log, "there are a goodmany Army men, not casualtieswho got on planes.. . . Men got onstretchers, pulled a blanket overthemselves and did a little groaning,posing as casualties. . . Tomorrowwe will get this situation undercontrol and will have MPs at theplanes. No man will he able toboard a plane without a [medical-ly issuedi ticket." Smith, who hadordered Army Lieutenant ColonelBerry K. Anderson to organizephysically fit soldier survivors intoa provisional battalion, now"talked" to Anderson again and

march across the ice would continue

told him to get his soldiers undercontrol.

X Corps had set up a clearing sta-tion at Yonpo. Triage determinedthose casualties who would recov-er in 30 days or less. They went tothe 1st Marine Division Hospital inHungnam, the Army's 121stEvacuation Hospital in Hamhung,

or the hospital ship Consolation inHungnam harbor. Casualtiesexpected to require more than 30days hospitalization were flownon to Japan.

Lieutenant Colonel Olin L.

Beall, 52, a quintessential salty oldmustang and a great favorite ofGeneral Smith, commanded the1st Motor Transport Battalion,which held a position on thenortheast quadrant of the Hagant-ri perimeter. Smith, not flamboyanthimself, liked colorful leaders suchas Beau and Puller. Murray, a verydifferent style of leader, said ofBeall: "We all agreed that hewould have had to lived a thousandyears to have done all the things heclaimed to have done. But whenpeople began checking up onsome of the things that he had saidhe had done, by God, he haddone them."

Beau had enlisted in the MarineCorps on 5 April 1917, the daybefore war was declared on

Photo courtesy of Sgt Norman L. Strickbine, USA

Moving toward the perceived safety of Hagaru-ri, soldiers of Task Force Faith marchin a well dispersed but terribly exposed single column across the snow-covered,

Marine wounded await evacuation at Yudam-ni. A total of 109 went out by heli-copter. The rest would go out by ambulance or truck once the 5th and 7thMarines broke their way through to Hagaru-ri. Fixed-wing aerial evacuation fromHagaru-ri began on 1 December.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4858

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r1

I

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impossible.

Germany. He served in Cuba andHaiti, gained a temporary commis-sion, and went to France just asthe war ended. He reenlisted in1920 and served as an officer—asdid many other Marine noncom-missioned officers—in the Gen-darmerie d'Haiti chasing bandits. In1935 he reached the much-respected warrant grade of Marinegunner. By the end of World War IIhe was a major and a veteran ofOkinawa.

On Saturday, 2 December 1950,Beau led a rescue column of jeeps,trucks, and sleds across the icelooking for other Task Force Faithsurvivors. Marine Corsairs coveredhis efforts, flying so low that hesaid, "I could have scratched amatch against their bellies." Hebrought in 319 soldiers, many ofthem in a state of shock. TheChinese did little to interfereexcept for long-range rifle fire.

There is no agreement on exactArmy casualty figures. Perhaps1,050 survivors reached Hagaru-ri.Of these only 385 were found to bephysically and mentally fit for

combat. These soldiers were givenMarine weapons and equipment.Not a single vehicle, artillerypiece, mortar, or machine gun ofTask Force Faith had been saved.When Almond visited Smith thatsame Saturday, he had, in Smith'swords, "very little to say about thetactical situation. He is no longerurging me to destroy equipment."

All day long on Thursday, 30November, at Yudam-ni theChinese harried the perimeter withlong-range small arms fire andminor probing attacks. As a step inthe regroupment of their batteredregiments, Litzenberg and Murrayorganized a provisional battalionmade up rather strangely of thecombined Companies D and E, 7thMarines; and sections of 81mmmortars from the weapons compa-nies of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7thMarines; and Companies A and G,5th Marines. Dog-Easy Company,under First Lieutenant Robert T.Bey, was really no more than two

79

under strength platoons—a DogCompany platoon and an EasyCompany platoon Litzenberg gaveoverall command of this oddassortment to Major MauriceRoach, former commander of the3d Battalion and now the regimen-tal S-3.

A good part of the reason forforming the battalion was to freeLieutenant Colonel Davis ofresponsibility for Dog-Easy Com-pany and other attachments. Thebattalion, which was given its ownsector in the perimeter, wasassigned the radio sign"Damnation" and that became theshort-lived battalion's title. Some-one tore up a green parachute tomake a neckerchief, the practicecaught on, and a green necker-chief became the battalion'sbadge.

The most difficult task in thedisengagement probably fell toRoise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,which held a long line stretchingfrom Hill 1426 to 1282. Covered byair and artillery, Roise fell backabout a mile from Hill 1426 to Hill1294. This and other movementsfreed up Harris' 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, to move to a positionastride the MSR about 4,000 yardssouth of Yudam-ni.

Litzenberg and Murray issuedtheir second joint operation orderon the morning of 1 December.Essentially it provided that the thMarines would move overland andthe 5th Marines would move alongthe axis of the MSR. Both regi-ments put what were widelyregarded as their best battalionsout in front. Davis' 1st Battalion,7th Marines, would take to thehills; Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, down to half-strength,would lead the way down theroad. They were to converge inthe general vicinity of FoxCompany on Toktong Pass. Pointfor the advance along the road

Photo by cpl Alex Klein, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-Sc353559

PFC Ralph C. Stephens, wounded at Koto-ri, receives whole blood at the 1stMarine Division hospital in Hamhung on 1 December. Administering the bloodare HM 2/C Emmett E. Houston and Lt(jg) Vernon L. Summers. Until the airstripsopened at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, evacuation of the wounded was virtually

.L• LV.

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Roach's "Damnation Battalion"was to have followed Davis acrosscountry, but Litzenberg reconsid-ered and broke up the battalionon 1 December returning its partsto their parent organizationsexcept for Dog-Easy Company,which only had about 100 effec-tives. Litzenberg passed theorphan company to Murray who, inturn, passed it to Taplett, hisadvance guard commander.

All available Marine aircraftwere to be in the air to cover thewithdrawal. They were to bejoined by carrier aircraft from TaskForce 77. On the ground only thedrivers and the critically woundedwould move by vehicle; the restwould walk. It was decided toleave the dead at Yudam-ni and afield burial was held for 85Marines.

would be the single Marine tankthat had reached Yudam-ni. StaffSergeant Russell A. Munsell andanother crewman were flown up byhelicopter from Hagaru-ri to driveit.

Major William McReynolds' 4thBattalion, 11th Marines, was ingeneral support of both regimentsbut under the command of nei-ther. The arrangement was made to

work with Lieutenant ColonelHarvey A. Feehan, commander ofthe 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, act-ing as coordinator of supportingartillery fire. McReynolds' battalionwas ordered to shoot up most of its155mm ammunition before pullingout. Excess gunners were thenorganized into nine rifle platoons.The guns themselves were tobring up the rear of the convoy.

80

The grand parade began at 0800on 1 December. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, came downfrom its positions north of Yudam-ni, followed an hour-and-a-halflater by Stevens' 1st Battalion.Company B of Stevens' battalionunder First Lieutenant John R.

Hancock made up the rear guardcoming out of the town.Meanwhile the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, under Harris proceededto clear both sides of the roadleading south, Company H goingup Hill 1419 east of the road whilethe rest of the battalion wentagainst Hill 1542 on the west side.Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,having cleared the town, relievedDavis' 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,on Hill 1276, freeing up Davis topursue his overland mission.Harris was slow in taking Hill1542. By mid-afternoon, an impa-tient Taplett was in positionbehind Harris, ready to attacksouth astride the road even withhis right flank somewhat exposed.

Company H, 7th Marines, com-manded by First Lieutenant

Photo by Cpl L. B. Snyder, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5667

Maj Maurice E. Roach, the 7th Marines jack-of-all-trades, and for the momentcommander of a provisional battalion, pauses for a photo with the regimentalcommander, Col Litzenberg, before leaving Yudam-ni on 1 December. Roach iswearing the Navy parka that was part of the winter unform, but Litzenberg findsan A rmy field jacket sufficient for the daytime cold.

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Howard H. Harris, met trouble onHill 1419. Harris' battalion com-mander, Lieutenant Colonel Harris,was fully occupied with problemson Hill 1542. Litzenberg, realizingthat Hill 1419 was too far from Hill1542 for a mutually supportingattack, detached How Companyfrom the 3d Battalion and assignedit to Davis' 1st Battalion. Davis,Hill 1419 now his responsibility,sent his Able Company to add itsweight to How Company's effort.

(Continued on page 84)

OVERLEAF: "Band of Brothers" byColonel Charles H. Waterhouse,USMCR (Ret), widely regarded bymany Marine veterans of the KoreanWar as Waterhouse's masterpiece,shows the column of Marines windingits way down Funchilin Pass.Courtesy of Col Waterhouse and theChosin Few Association.

Marines depart Yudam-ni on 1 December. The general planfor the breakout was that the 5th Marines would follow theaxis of the MSR and the 7th Marines would move overland.

Photo by sgt Frank c. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4862MajGen Smith did not formally designate an overall com-mande; but LtCol Murray deferred to Col Litzen bergbecause of seniority.

The 7th Marines command group breaks camp at Yudam-ni on 1 December inpreparation for the march back to Hagaru-ri. The jeep in the foreground carriesa radio. Note the long antenna. Below zero temperatures caused pro blems withbattery life. Extra five-gallon cans of gasoline are lashed to the front bumper.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5666

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Meanwhile, Lieutenant Harris hadbeen wounded and SecondLieutenant Minard P. Newton, Jr.,had taken over the company. AbleCompany, under Captain David W.Banks, passed through HowCompany and took the hill atabout 1930.

Davis now stripped his battaliondown for its cross-country trek.Everything needed for the marchwould have to be hand carried. Hedecided to go very light, takingonly two 81mm mortars and sixheavy machine guns (with doublecrews) as supporting weaponsfrom his Weapons Company. Hisvehicles, left behind with his sick,walking wounded, and frostbitecases as drivers, were to join theregimental train on the road.Baker Company, now command-ed by First Lieutenant Joseph R.Kurcaba, led off the line of march,followed by Davis and his com-mand group, then Able Company,Charlie Company, battalion head-quarters, and How Company, stillattached.

It was a very dark night. Theguide stars soon disappeared. Thesnow-covered rock masses alllooked alike. The point had tobreak trail, through snow knee-deep in places. The path, oncebeaten, became icy and treacher-ous. Marines stumbled and fell.

Radios would not work reliably.Davis, moving ahead and floun-dering in the snow, lost touch withthe forward elements of his battal-ion for a time. He continued for-ward until he reached the point.His map, hurriedly read by a flash-light held under a poncho, toldhim that they were climbing Hill1520, the slopes of which wereheld by the Chinese. Baker andCharlie Companies converged onthe Chinese who were about aplatoon in strength, taking themby surprise. Davis stopped on theeastern slope of Hill 1520 to reor-ganize. Enemy resistance hadslackened to small arms fire fromridges across the valley but Davis'men were numb with cold andexhausted. At 0300 he again haltedhis advance to give his Marines arest, sending out small patrols forsecurity. Now, for the first time, hegained radio contact with regi-ment.

Taplett, meanwhile, was march-ing southward astride the MSR, led

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A5670

The heaviest guns in the defense of Yudam-ni were the 155mm howitzers of the4th Battalion, 11th Marines, commanded by Ma] William McReynolds. Shown here,the big guns are preparing to leave the perimetei towed by their tra ctor primemovers. Excess gunners were reorganized into provisional rifle units.

Before leaving Yudam-ni, as a matter ofprofessionalpride, the 5th and 7th Marines'policed up the area." Trash, including remnants of rations, was collected into

piles and burned. Slim pickings were left for Chinese scavengers who, desperatefor food, clothing, and shelter, followed close behind the departing Marines.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4848

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5666

In coming back from Yudam-ni, the 1st Marine Division's large number ofroad-bound wheeled vehicles was both an advantage and a handicap. They car-ried the whercwithal to live and fight; they also slowed the march and were a temp-tation for attack by the Chinese. Here an 11th Marines howitzer can be seen in

firingposition to cover the column's rear.

by the solitary Pershing tank, fol-lowed by a platoon from his HowCompany and a platoon of ever-useful engineers. His radio callsign, "Darkhorse," suited his owndark visage. He advanced forabout a mile before being halted byheavy fire coming from both sidesof the road. He fanned out Howand Item Companies and theycleared the opposition by 1930.

Taplett gave his battalion a briefrest and then resumed theadvance. Item Company, led byCaptain Harold Schrier, ran intostiff resistance on the reverse slopeof still-troublesome Hill 1520 east ofthe road. Schrier received permis-sion to fall back to his jump-offposition so as to better protect theMSR. The Chinese hit with mortarsand an infantry attack. Schrier waswounded for a second time andSecond Lieutenant Willard S.

Peterson took over the company.Taplett moved George Companyand his attached engineers intodefensive positions behind ItemCompany. It was an all-night fight.In the morning, 2 December, 342

both down to two-platoonstrengths.

As a reserve Taplett had Dog-Easy Company, 7th Marines,detached from the now-dissolved"Damnation Battalion." Dog-EasyCompany moved onto the roadbetween How and GeorgeCompanies. By noon GeorgeCompany, commanded by CaptainChester R. Hermanson, had takenHill 1520 and Dog-Easy had runinto its own fight on the road.Second Lieutenant Edward H.Seeburger, lone surviving officerof Dog Company, was severelywounded while giving a fire com-mand to the solitary tank. Herefused evacuation. (Seeburgerfaced long hospitalization andafter a year was physically retired asa first lieutenant. In 1995 hereceived a belated Navy Cross.)

Corsairs reduced the roadblockthat held up Dog-Easy Company."Darkhorse" trudged on, How andGeorge Companies on both sides ofthe MSR and Dog-Easy movingdown the middle, followed by theengineers and the solitary tank.

enemy dead were counted in frontof Item Company. Peterson hadonly 20 Marines still on their feetwhen George Company passedthrough his position to continuethe attack against Hill 1520.George and How Company were

After leaving Yudam-ni, a unit of the 7th Marines, possibly a company of LtC'olDavis' 1st Battalion, leaves the road to climb into the hills. Davis' objective wasto come down on ToktongPassfrom higher ground so as to relieve Capt Barber'sembattled Fox Company.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4849

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East of the MSR at daybreak,Davis reoriented the direction ofhis march. The 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, passed over the eastslope of Hill 1520 and attackedtoward Hill 1653, a mountain amile-and-a-half north of ToktongPass. Davis' radios could not reachBarber on Fox Hill nor could he talkdirectly to the Corsairs circulatingoverhead. Fortunately oppositionwas light except for Chinese nib-bling against the rear of his col-umn where Company H, 3dBattalion, was bringing up thewounded on litters. Davis con-verged on Hill 1653 with his threeorganic rifle companies.

At last, radio contact was madewith Captain Barber on Fox Hill.Barber jauntily offered to send outa patrol to guide Davis into hisposition. Davis declined the offerhut did welcome the control ofVMF-312's Corsairs by Barber'sforward air controller. Just beforenoon, lead elements of Company Breached Barber's beleagueredposition.

Company A halted on the northside of Hill 1653 to provide man-power to evacuate casualties.Twenty-two wounded had to becarried by litter to safety. The reg-imental surgeon, Navy LieutenantPeter E. Arioli, was killed by aChinese sniper's bullet whilesupervising the task. Two Marines,who had cracked mentally andwho were restrained in improvisedstrait jackets, died of exposurebefore they could be evacuated.Marines of Kurcaba's Company Bcelebrated their arrival on Fox Hillwith a noontime meal of air-dropped rations. They then went onto take the high ground that dom-inated the loop in the road wherethe MSR passed through ToktongPass. First Lieutenant Eugenous M.Hovatter's Company A followed

them and the two companies set upa perimeter for the night.Meanwhile the balance of Davis'battalion had joined Barber on FoxHill. Barber's Company F had suf-fered 118 casualties—26 killed, 3missing, and 89 wounded—almostexactly half of his original comple-ment of 240. Six of the seven offi-cers, including Barber himself,were among the wounded.

At the rear of the column on theMSR, Lieutenant Colonel Roise's2d Battalion, 5th Marines, the des-ignated rear guard, had troubles ofits own on Hill 1276 during theearly morning hours of 2

December. Captain Uel D. Peters'Company F was hit hard. Nightfighters from VMF(N)-542 came onstation and were vectored to thetarget by white phosphorusrounds delivered by Company F's60mm mortars. Strafing and rocketsfrom the night fighters dampenedthe Chinese attack, but the fightcontinued on into mid-morningwith Fox Company trying to regainlost ground. By then it was timefor Roise to give up his positionon Hill 1276 and continue themarch south.

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Stevens'1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had itsfight that night of 1-2 Decembereast of the road, being hit by aChinese force that apparently hadcrossed the ice of the reservoir.Stevens guessed the number ofChinese killed at 200, at least 50 ofthem cut down in front of CharlieCompany by machine guns.

Lieutenant Colonel WilliamHarris' 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,meanwhile was continuing to havetrouble on Hill 1542. Litzenbergreinforced Harris with a compositeunit, called "Jig Company," madeup of about 100 cannoneers, head-quarters troops, and other individ-

86

uals. Command of this assortmentwas given to First LieutenantAlfred I. Thomas. Chinese recordscaptured later indicated that theythought they had killed 100Americans in this action; actualMarine losses were somethingbetween 30 and 40 killed andwounded.

At the head of the column,Taplett's Darkhorse battalion onthe morning of 2 December had tofight for nearly every foot of theway. George Company still hadHill 1520 to cross. Dog-EasyCompany was moving along theroad itself. South of Hill 1520 at asharp bend in the road a bridgeover a ravine had been blown, andthe Chinese covering the breakstopped Dog-Easy Company withmachine gun fire. Twelve Corsairscame overhead and ripped intothe ravine with strafing fire androckets. Dog-Easy Company,helped by How Company, re-sumed its advance. The attachedengineer platoon, now command-ed by Technical Sergeant Edwin L.Knox, patched up the bridge sovehicles could pass. The engineershad started out with 48 men; theywere now down to 17. Taplettcontinued his advance through thenight until by 0200, 3 December, hewas only 1,000 yards short of FoxHill. Taplett could only guesswhere Davis might be with the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines.

To the rear, the Chinese peckedaway at the Marines withdrawingfrom Hills 1276 and 1542. Stevens'1st Battalion, 5th Marines, continuedto provide close-in flank protec-tion. Marine air held off much of theharassment, but the column ofvehicles on the road moved slow-ly and the jeep and truck driversbecame targets for Chinese

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the way. As he remembered it afew months later: "That was thetime when there was no outfit,you was with nobody, you was aMarine, you were fighting witheverybody. There was no more5th or 7th; you were just one out-fit, just fighting to get the hell outof there, if you could."

road where they could be picked updetach ments.

snipers. That night the Chinese gotthrough to Lieutenant ColonelFeehan's 1st Battalion, 11thMarines, and the artillerymen had torepulse them with howitzer fireover open sights.

Six inches of new snow fell dur-ing the night. In the morning, 3December, Taplett combined theremnants of Dog-Easy Companywith George Company andreturned the command to FirstLieutenant Charles D. Mize, whohad had George Company until 17November. From up on Fox Hill,Davis made a converging attackagainst the Chinese still holding aspur blocking the way to Hagaru-ri.He pushed the Chinese into theguns of Taplett's battalion. An esti-mated battalion of Chinese wasslaughtered. By 1300, Davis'"Ridgerunners" had joined up withTaplett's "Darkhorses."

Davis and Taplett conferred.

The senior Davis now took thelead on the MSR with his battalion.The lone tank still provided thepoint. The truck column reachedToktong Pass. The criticallywounded were loaded onto thealready over-burdened vehicles.Less severely wounded wouldhave to walk. Stevens' 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, followedDavis' battalion, passing throughTaplett's battalion. Taplett stayedin Toktong Pass until after mid-night. Coming up from the rear onthe MSR was Roise's 2d Battalion,5th Marines, followed by Harris'3d Battalion, 7th Marines, now therear guard.

Sergeant Robert B. Gault, leaderof the 7th Marines GravesRegistration Section, came out ofYudam-ni in the column on theMSR with his five-man section anda truck with which to pick upMarine dead encountered along

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The six fighter-bomber squad-rons of Field Harris' 1st MarineAircraft Wing flew 145 sorties OflSunday, 3 December, most ofthem in close support of the 5th and7th Marines. Under this aerialumbrella, Davis' 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, marched along almostunimpeded. In the early evening,Ridge sent out Drysdale with 41Commando, supported by tanksfrom Drake's 31st Tank Company,to open the door to the Hagaru-riperimeter. At about 1900, a fewhundred yards out, Davis formedup his battalion into a route columnand they marched into the perime-ter, singing The Marines' Hymn.Hagaru's defenders greeted themarchers with a tumultuous wel-come. A field mess offered anunending supply of hot cakes,syrup, and coffee. Litzenberg's 7thMarines command group arrivedshortly after Davis' battalion andwas welcomed into the motortransport area by Litzenberg's oldfriend, Olin Beau.

In Tokyo that Sunday, Mac-Arthur sent a message to the JointChiefs of Staff that X Corps wasbeing withdrawn to Hungnarn asrapidly as possible. He stated thatthere was no possibility of unitingit with Eighth Army in a line acrossthe peninsula. Such a line, he said,would have to be 150 miles longand held alone by the sevenAmerican divisions, the combateffectiveness of the South Koreanarmy now being negligible.

Photo by sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4840

Dead Marines at a Yudam-ni aid station wait mutely on their stretchers for load-ing onto the truck that will take them to eventual burial. Once on the march, prac-tice was to carry those who died in the savage fighting in the hills down to the

by the regiments' Graves Registration

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The 5th and 7th Marines on arrival at Hagaru-ri combat basefound hot chow waiting for them. The mess tents, operatingon a 24-hour basis, provided an almost unvarying but

Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, IJSMCR

inexhaustible menu of hot cakes, syrup, and coffee. After afew days rest and reorganization, the march to the southresumed.

The Chinese made no seriousobjection to the last leg of themarch from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-riuntil about 0200 on Monday morn-ing, 4 December, when the primemovers hauling eight of Mc-Reynolds' 155mm howitzers at therear of the column ran out ofdiesel fuel. That halted the columnand brought on a Chinese attack.Taplett's battalion, unaware of thebreak, continued to advance. Theartillerymen—assisted by bits andpieces of the 1st and 2d Battalions,5th Marines, who were on the highground to the flanks—defendedthemselves until Taplett could facearound and come to their rescue.

It was a bad scene. The eightheavy howitzers had been pushedoff the road, perhaps prematurely,and would have to be destroyed thenext day by air strikes. A half-milefarther down the MSR was a cache

of air-delivered diesel fuel thatwould have fueled the primemovers. By 0830 the road wasagain open. Chinese losses wereguessed at 150 dead.

At 1400 on Monday, the rearguard, still provided by the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, marchedinto Hagaru-ri and the four-day,14-mile, breakout from Yudarn-niwas over. The Marines hadbrought in about 1,500 casualties,some 1,000 of them caused by theChinese, the rest by the cold.Smith observed in his log: "Themen of the regiments are. . . pret-ty well beaten down. We maderoom for them in tents where theycould get warm. Also they weregiven hot chow. However, in viewof their condition, the day aftertomorrow [6 December] appears tobe the earliest date we can startout for Koto-ri."

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Ridge's Marine defenders ofHagaru-ri breathed much moreeasily after the arrival in theirperimeter of the 5th and 7th RCTs.A sanguine corporal opined to hiscompany commander: "Now thatthe 5th and 7th Marines are here,we can be resupplied by air, holduntil spring, and then attack againto the north."

General Almond flew intoHagaru-ri on Monday afternoon tohe briefed on the breakout planand while there pinned ArmyDistinguished Service Crosses onthe parkas of Smith, Litzenberg,Murray, and Beall. Almond thenflew to Koto-ri where he decoratedPuller and Reidy (who had beenslow in getting his battalion toKoto-ri) with Distinguished ServiceCrosses. Nine others, including

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Gurfein, who had nudged Reidyinto moving, received Silver Stars.Reidy was relieved of his com-mand not much later.

For the breakout, Murray's RCT-5, with Ridge's 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, and 41 Commandoattached, would briefly take overthe defense of Hagaru-ri whileLitzenberg's RCT-7, beginning atfirst light on Wednesday, 6December, would march to thesouth. Puller's RCT-1 would con-tinue to hold Koto-ri andChinhung-ni. All personnel exceptdrivers, radio operators, and casu-alties were to move on foot.Specially detailed Marines were toprovide close-in security to theroad-bound vehicles. Any thatbroke down were to be pushed tothe side of the road and destroyed.Troops were to carry two-days of Crations and one unit of fire, whichtranslated for most into full car-tridge belts and an extra bandoleer

of ammunition for their M-1 rifles.Another unit of fire was to be car-ried on organic vehicles. The vehi-cles were divided into two divisiontrains. Lieutenant Colonel Banks,commanding officer of the 1stService Battalion, was put in com-mand of Train No. 1, subordinate toRCT-7. Train No. 2, subordinate toRCT-5, was given to LieutenantColonel Harry T. Mime, the com-mander of the 1st Tank Battalion.Although Smith had stated that hewould come out with all his sup-plies and equipment, more realisti-cally a destruction plan, decreeingthe disposal of any excess suppliesand equipment, was put into effecton 4 December. Bonfires werebuilt. Ironically, loose rounds andcanned foods in the fires exploded,causing some casualties to Marineswho crowded close to the fires forwarmth.

Air Force and Marine transportshad flown out over 900 casualties

on Saturday, 2 December, fromHagaru-ri, and more than 700 thenext day. To the south thatSunday, 47 casualties were takenout by light aircraft from the strip atKoto-ri. But casualties kept pilingup and by the morning ofTuesday, 5 December, some 1,400casualties—Army and Marine—stillremained at Hagaru-ri. In a mag-nificent effort, they were all flownout that day. Altogether, in the firstfive days of December, by bestcount, 4,312 men—3,150 Marines,1,137 soldiers, and 25 RoyalMarines—were air-evacuated.

Even a four-engine Navy R5Dventured a landing. Takeoff with aload of wounded in an R5D was sohairy that it was not tried again.An R4D—the Marine equivalent ofthe sturdy C-47—wiped out itslanding gear in landing. An AirForce C-47 lost power on take-offand crashed-landed outside theMarine lines. Marines rushed to

point and rear riflemen provide watchful cover. No wound-ed Marine need worly about being left behind.

Sketch by Sgt Ralph Schofield, USMCR

Members of this patrol, moving along the abandoned nar-row gauge railroad track that paralleled the main supplyroute, help along a wounded or exhausted comrade while the

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a.

the rescue. The plane had to beabandoned and destroyed, butthere were no personnel casualtiesduring the entire evacuationprocess.

During those same first fivedays of December, 537 replace-ments, the majority of them recov-ering wounded from hospitals inJapan, arrived by air at Hagaru-ri.Most rejoined their original units. Aplatoon sergeant in WeaponsCompany, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, wounded in the fighting inSeoul, assured his company com-mander that he was glad to beback.

Visitors who could wanglespaces on board the incomingtransports began arriving atHagaru-ri. Marguerite "Maggie"Higgins of the New York Herald-Tribune, well known to theMarines from both the PusanPerimeter and the Inchon-Seoulcampaigns, was among the gaggleof war correspondents that arrivedon Tuesday, 5 December, includingformer Marine combat correspon-dent Keyes Beach. Higgins an-nounced her intention to marchOut with the Marines. General

Smith disabused her of her intentionand ordered that she be out of theperimeter by air by nightfall.

A British reporter made theimpolite error of referring to thewithdrawal as a "retreat." Smithpatiently corrected him, pointingout that when surrounded therewas no retreat, only an attack in anew direction. The press improvedSmith's remark into: "Retreat, hell,we're just attacking in a new direc-tion." The new television technol-ogy was demonstrated by scenestaken of the aerial evacuation ofthe casualties and an interviewwith General Smith and LieutenantColonel Murray.

Major General William H.Tunner, USAF, commander of theCombat Cargo Combat and greatlyadmired by the Marines because ofthe sterling performance of hiscommand, was one of the visitors.Tunner had flown the Hump fromBurma into China during WorldWar II and later commanded muchof the Berlin Airlift. He solicitouslyoffered to evacuate the rest of thetroops now in Hagaru-ri. Smithstiffly told him that no man whowas able-bodied would be evacu-

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ated. "He seemed somewhat sur-prised," wrote Smith.

Almond met with Major GeneralSoule, commander of the 3d

Infantry Division, that Tuesday, 5December, and ordered him toform a task force under a generalofficer "to prepare the route ofwithdrawal [of the 1st MarineDivision] if obstructed by explo-sives or whatnot, especially at thebridge site." The site in questionlay in Funchilin Pass. Almondapparently did not know that thebridge had already been dc-stroyed. The downed span threat-ened to block the Marines'withdrawal. Soule gave commandof what was designated as "TaskForce Dog" to his assistant divisioncommander, Brigadier GeneralArmistead D. "Red" Mead, a hard-driving West Pointer who hadbeen G-3 of the Ninth Army in theEuropean Theater in World War II.

At noon on Tuesday, 5

December, Murray relieved Ridge ofhis responsibility as Haga ru-ridefense commander, and the bat-talions of the 5th Marines plumpedup the thin lines held by the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines. TheChinese did not choose to test thestrengthened defenses, hut atabout 2000 that evening an AirForce B-26 mistakenly dropped astick of six 500-pound bombsclose to Ridge's command tent.His forward air controller couldnot talk to the Air Force pilotbecause of crystal differences intheir radios, but an obligingMarine night-fighter from Lieuten-ant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr.'sVMF(N)-542 came overhead andpromised to shoot clown any AirForce bomber that might return torepeat the outrage.

The well-liked Max Volcansek,36, born in Minnesota, had come

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A4909

Aerial evacuation of wounded and severely frostbitten Marines and soldiersfrom Hagaru-ri saved many lives. During the first five days qfDecembei; 4,312men—3, 150 Marines; 1,137 soldiers, and 25 Royal Marines—were air evacuatedbyAirForce and Ma rine transports that also brought in supplies and replacements.

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59th, 60th, 76th, 79th, 80th, and89th. Two more divisions—the77th and 78th—were reported inthe area but not yet confirmed.

Later it would be learned thatthe 26th CCF Army—consisting ofthe 76th, 7 7th, and 78th Divisions,reinforced by the 88th Divisionfrom the 30th CF Army, hadmoved down from the north intopositions on the east side of theMSR between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. They had relieved the 60thDivision, which had moved intopositions south of Koto-ri.Elements of the 60th Divisionwere preparing for the defense ofFunchilin Pass including positionson the dominant terrain feature,Hill 1081. Even farther south the89th Division was positioningitself to move against the defendersof Chinhung-ni.

Murray has given a characteristi-cally laconic account of the attackby the 5th Marines against EastHill:

MacArthur's staff:

into the Marine Corps as an aviationcadet in 1936 after graduating fromMacalester College. During WorldWar II he had flown Corsairs whilecommanding VMF-222 in thePacific and had scored at least oneJapanese plane. During the battlefor Seoul he had been woundedand shot down but quickly recov-ered and continued in commandof VMF(N)-542.

The plan of attack forWednesday, 6 December, calledfor the 5th Marines to clean upEast Hill while the 7th Marinesmoved south along the MSR

toward Koto-ri. Close air support forthe attack against East Hill was to beon station at 0700. With a touch ofcondescension, Murray's Marinestold Ridge's Marines to stand backand watch for a demonstration ofhow a hill should be taken.

Smith wanted to march out withhis men, but Shepherd orderedhim to fly to Koto-ri. Death orwounding of Smith, or worse, hiscapture by the Chinese, could notbe risked. By this time the lurkingpresence of seven CCF divisionshad been identified by prisoner ofwar interrogations—the 58th,

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I had been ordered to takea little hill, and I had HalRoise do that job. When hegot over there, he foundabout 200 Chinese in a mass,and he captured the wholecrowd of them. So we hadabout 200 prisoners we hadto take care of. . . . A lot ofthem were in such had shapethat we left them there, leftsome medical supplies, andleft them there for theChinese to come along andtake care of them after weleft.

It was not quite that simple.Heavy air, artillery, and mortarpreparation began at 0700 onThursday, 6 December. CaptainSamuel S. Smith's Dog Companyjumped off in the assault at 0900,beginning a fight that would go onuntil daylight the next morning.

Photo by Cpl Arthur Curtis, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC354492

After her adventures at chosin, including her aborted e/jbrts to march out withthe Marines, Marguerite "Maggie" Higgins, wearing a Navy parka and shoe-pacs,arrived safely at Haneda Air Force Base, Tokyo, on 15 December. Her broadlysmiling traveling companion is Army MajGen William F Marquat qf

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right of Changjin River and theMSR; Anderson's provisional Armybattalion on the left of the road;and Harris' 3d Battalion on theroad as the rear guard.

for heroism at Chosin would come later.

All three rifle companies of Roise's2d Battalion and Charlie Companyof the 1st Battalion were drawninto it. Estimates of enemy killedran as high as 800 to 1,000. East Hillwas never completely taken, butthe Chinese were pushed back farenough to prevent them frominterfering with the exit of thedivision from Hagaru-ri.

General Smith planned to closehis command post at Hagaru-ri onWednesday morning, 6 December.Before he could leave GeneralBarr, commander of the 7thInfantry Division, who arrived tocheck on the status of his soldiers,visited him. The survivors of TaskForce Faith coupled with units that

had been at Hagaru-ri andHudong-ni added up to a provi-sional battalion of 490 able-bodiedmen under command of ArmyLieutenant Colonel Anderson. Asorganized by Anderson, the "bat-talion" actually was two very smallbattalions (3d Battalion, 31stInfantry, under Major Carl Witteand 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry,under Major Robert E. Jones) eachwith three very small rifle compa-nies. Smith attached Anderson'sforce to RCT-7 and it was some-times called "31/7."

Litzenberg had about 2,200men—about half his originalstrength—for the breakout toKoto-ri. His attack order putLockwood's 2d Battalion, withtanks, on the MSR as the advanceguard; Davis' 1st Battalion on the

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Lockwood, it will be recalled,had stayed at Hagaru-ri with hiscommand group and much of hisWeapons Company while Com-panies D and E went forward toYudam-ni and Company F heldToktong Pass. At 0630, tanks fromCompany D, 1st Tank Battalion,led Lockwood's reunited, but piti-fully shrunken battalion Out of theperimeter through the south road-block. Almost immediately it raninto trouble from Chinese on theleft side of the road. The morningfog burned off and air was called in.A showy air attack was deliveredagainst the tent camp south of theperimeter, abandoned days earlierby the Army engineers and nowperiodically infested with Chineseseeking warmth and supplies.Lockwood's two rifle companies—Fox Company and Dog-EasyCompany—pushed through andthe advance resumed at noon.Meanwhile, barely a mile out ofHagaru-ri, Captain John F. Morris'Company C, 1st Battalion, sur-prised an enemy platoon on thehigh ground to the southeast ofthe hamlet of Tonae-ri and killedmost of them.

At 1400 Smith received a reas-suring message from Litzenbergthat the march south was goingwell. Smith decided that it wastime to move his command post toKoto-ri. His aide, Major Martin J."Stormy" Sexton, World War IIraider, asked the commander ofWeapons Company, 3d Battalion,1st Marines, for the loan of a jeepto take his boss to the airstrip. A 10-minute helicopter ride took Smithand Sexton to Koto-ri where Pullerwas waiting. Smith began planningfor the next step in the withdraw-al.

Photo by Sgt Frank C. Kerr, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5520

In a ceremony at Masan on 21 December, LtCol Harold S. Roise, the stalwart com-mander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, receives a Silver Star for actions incidentto the seizure of Kimpo Airfield after the Inchon landing. Further awards for Roise

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