SECOND DIVISIONIN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THEG.R. No. 169144PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILLOF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITHPRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENTOF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS andBENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,Petitioners,Present:CARPIO,J., Chairperson,- versus -NACHURA,ABAD,MENDOZA, andSERENO,*JJ.ERNESTO PALAGANAS,Respondent.Promulgated:January 26, 2011x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONABAD,J.:This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.The Facts and the CaseOn November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless.In the last will and testament she executed inCalifornia, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in thePhilippinesand in theU.S.On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), anotherbrother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.[1]On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in thePhilippinesbut in theU.S.where she executed it.Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in thePhilippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act.Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in thePhilippinesfor a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted.On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not RupertasU.S.will may be probated in and allowed by a court in thePhilippines.On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2](a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),[3]arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in theU.S.cannot be probated for the first time in thePhilippines.On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4]affirming the assailed order of the RTC,[5]holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond.The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in thePhilippines.The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad.Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.The Issue PresentedThe key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in thePhilippinesalthough it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.The Courts RulingPetitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here.This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution.They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alienwho is abroad produces effect in thePhilippinesif made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.[6]In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.Jurisdictional factsrefer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.[7]The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for thereprobateof will before admitting it here.But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court.Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case.In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically.If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.[8]Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate.The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will,i.e.the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws ofCalifornia.This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.WHEREFORE, the CourtDENIESthe petition andAFFIRMSthe Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 124371.November 23, 2000]PAULA T. LLORENTE,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,respondents.D E C I S I O NPARDO,J.:The CaseThe case raises a conflict of laws issue.What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals[1]modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2]declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.The FactsThe deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzowas granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.[7]He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother.The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorcewiththeSuperior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13]Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.[15]Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament.The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.[18]On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.[20]On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition[22]for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor.Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.[24]On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied.Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.SO ORDERED.[27]In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.[29]Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.SO ORDERED.[32]On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34]denied the motion for lack of merit.Hence, this petition.[35]The IssueStripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,[36]the issue is simple.Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals.We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.The Applicable LawThe fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.The Civil Code clearly provides:Art. 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons arebinding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.Art. 16.Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore therenvoidoctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]First, there is no such thing as one American law.The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law.There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States.Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State.It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.[39]Second, there is no showing that the application of therenvoidoctrine is called for or required by New York State law.The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mereparamour.The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will.It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.Validity of the Foreign DivorceInVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40]we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.In the same case, the Court ruled thataliensmay obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.Citing this landmark case, the Court held inQuita v. Court of Appeals,[41]that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling inVan Dornwould become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.InPilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42]we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43]We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.Validity of the WillThe Civil Code provides:Art. 17.Theforms and solemnitiesof contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws ofthe country in which they are executed.When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law.In fact, the will was duly probated.As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.The FalloWHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ,petitioner,vs.HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan,respondent.Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.QUIASON,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.We grant the petition.IIDr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states:If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administration.As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion.Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father,Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanans executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogates Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records,p. 302).On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, citingBenigno v.De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.IIPetitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" "G-6");(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and"I-10");(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of each others signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Courts Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984.The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir ofDr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.SO ORDERED.

EN BANCG.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY,executor.MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,oppositors-appellants,vs.EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL.,heirs-appellees.Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.BENGZON, J.P.,J.:This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.tThe facts of the case are as follows:Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.tSubsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported,inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court inAznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congressdeletedthe phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave,inter alia, theamountof successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled inMiciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmedin toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.