peace in colombia reality myth and wishful thinking

7/30/2019 Peace in Colombia Reality Myth and Wishful Thinking

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Peace in Colombia: Reality, Myth and Wishful Thinking

Lara Montesinos Coleman and Gearid Loingsigh1

Brighton and Bogot, April 2013

The peace process in Colombia has aroused interest in the country once again. Aid agencies, governmentbodies and academics are reengaging with the internal armed conflict and with the prospects for an end to theinsurgencies of the FARCEP and the ELN. Much of the commentary and analysis is a mixture of old mythsabout the nature of the conflict and wishful, if not woolly, thinking. One such example of this is the recentpolicy briefing by Matt Ince and Andrei GmezSuarez Ending Colombias Internal Conflict: Prospects for Peacewith the FARC and Beyond.

The paper sounds a cautious note at the beginning stating that The SantosFARC peace talks therefore remaina dynamic highly uncertain process and despite cautious optimism, the establishment of a meaningful peaceagreement is still by no means guaranteed. It then proceeds to throw caution to the wind, outlining a series ofreasons for optimism that either ignore or distort the nature of the conflict. This is perhaps to be expected.International experience of peace processes indicates that in the name of peace which is never defined, butis presumed to be a lack of armed activity by anyone other than state agents critical faculties are abandonedand reality is twisted to meet a political agenda. Academics or activists who point out the shortcomings of theprocess are accused of being in favour of further violence. It is, however, necessary to address the reality of theconflict and of the interests involved. No amount of wishful thinking can overcome the reality of a murderousregime or the game of smoke and mirrors at play in the peace process.

In this article, we consider the various points raised by Ince and GmezSuarez. We begin by addressing sixreasons they set out for optimism (optimism for a demobilisation, not for an meaningful agrarian reform or anend to the countrys appalling poverty and inequality). We go on to comment upon the challenges to peacethat Ince and GmezSuarez identify, alongside the recommendations they make for balancing these.

Six reasons for optimism: between myth and wishfulthinking

The FARCs willingness to seek social change through negotiation

Ince and GmezSuarez contend that the involvement of the FARC in negotiations is a sign of their realisationthat their agenda for social change cannot be achieved by armed struggle alone (our emphasis). The FARChave actually engaged in repeated negotiations and contacts with governments since the 1980s, even havingsome contact with the Uribe regime. The current initiative, however, is a result of the FARC having been by

1Lara Montesinos Coleman is lecturer in the department of International Relations at the University of Sussex. Herresearch focuses on social and political theories of dissent and resistance; the politics of knowledge and the politicalsociology of development and violence. She has been involved in human rights work relating to Colombia since 2000and previously worked in Colombia providing international accompaniment to grassroots peasant and trade unionorganisations. She is coauthor ofPor Dentro E'Soga: Un Anlisis de los Impactos de la BP en Casanare (EdicionesDesde Abajo, 2010), coeditor ofSituating Global Resistance: Between Discipline and Dissent (Routledge, 2012) and

author of several academic articles. She was previously a lecturer at Durham University and holds a PhD and MScfrom the University of Bristol and a BA from the University of Oxford.Gearid Loingsigh, M.A. in International Relations (DCU) is an Irish journalist who works on the ground inColombia in close collaboration with a number of grassroots peasant and indigenous organizations. He is the authorof numerous articles on Colombia as well as books on the struggles in different regions of the country. His latestbook La Reconquista del Pacifico: Invasin, Inversin, Impunidaddeals with the invasions by mining companies andafrican palm companies of the collective lands of the black communities on the pacific coast as well the government'splans to expel en masse large sections of the population of the city of Buenaventura to make way for the expansion ofthe port. His first book La Estrategia Integral del Paramilitarismo en el Magdalena Medio (2003) raised greatcontroversy due to his criticisms of the role of NGOs in promoting African palm plantations and a corporativistmodel for the communities in the region.


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their own measure of success defeated on a number of levels.2 The difference is subtle but important.Militarily, as Ince and GmezSuarez recognize, the FARC have lost key areas and been reduced from 20,000 to8,000 members. However, the significance of this lies in the Stalinist and militarist nature of the organisation.It is far from insignificant that he FARC declared themselves to be the People's Army when they added theinitials EP (Army of the People) to their name in 1982: there was one people and one army that represented it,whether the people wanted it or not. This, in turn, led to the conflict with the smaller guerrilla grouping of theELN in 2007, a bloody battle that the FARC lost very dramatically in the department of Arauca, where FARC

members from other parts refused to go to replace their dead comrades. After their dramatic expansion duringthe 1990s the FARC had considered themselves militarily invincible. Yet the politics of that expansion whichwas based on access to money from the taxes levied on coca production had mattered little. The aim was tofall on Bogot and by the year 2000 they had fronts surrounding the capital alongside a strong front in the cityitself. Given their emphasis on militarily defeating the Colombian State and neglecting political work, it isunsurprising that now, having suffered major defeats, they have decided to negotiate. They are the biggerguerrilla grouping because of a military expansion that took place at the expense of any political work. Thismust inspire caution with regard to the role of the FARCs agenda for social change in the current process.

The international climateThe authors also argue that the current international climate is more conducive to peace talks. This tells usnothing about the nature or relevance of this conjuncture. In the early 1990s the Colombian guerrilla group M19 demobilised, shortly before the demobilization of El Salvadors FMLN. This was followed by

demobilisations in Colombia by the EPL, PRT, Quintin Lame and the Current for Socialist Renovation (adissident faction of the ELN) as well as the subsequent demobilisation of the URNG in Guatemala. Why did theFARC not demobilise then? The difference now is that the FARC are isolated internationally. The revolutions inGuatemala and El Salvador have been defeated, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua was also defeated in theearly 90s (with the Sandinistas later returned on a weaker programme, under the leadership of Daniel Ortega turned into a corrupt social democrat). The pink tide that has swept Latin America has shown itself to beprogressive on certain issues, but retrograde on others such as the extractive industries. There are notriumphant revolutions, but rather a series of governments that do not share the Colombian insurgencies goalof breaking with capitalism and which engage in Real Politikall the time, particularly on Colombia. That is onepart of the international climate that is conducive to surrender.

Secondly, it is impossible to comprehend the international climate at this juncture without addressing the

economic interests and historical record of those states now supporting President Santos in his desire to reacha negotiated settlement. Let us not forget that it was the US who, in 1928 long before the formation ofColombias left wing insurgencies threatened invasion if the Colombian government did not take action toprotect the interests of the United Fruit Company during a strike of Colombian banana workers. The result wasthe massacre of at least 1,000 workers and their families. The guerrilla organisations that formed in the mid1960s did so in the context of a genocidal anticommunism, as the US went on to back a dirtywar that gavestate forces the green light to exterminate social workers, trade unionists and those who [were] notsupportive of the establishment.3 From the early 1960s, just prior to the formation of the FARC and ELN, theUS implemented a brutal counterinsurgency policy, Plan Lazo, with an emphasis upon "paramilitary, sabotageand/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents".4 In line with this, a dirty war strategysubsequently afforded state forces the right to exterminate social workers, trade unionists and those whoare not supportive of the establishment.5 Armed civilians were incorporated into these counterinsurgencyefforts from the start. Much larger paramilitary forces were later formed and trained by army battalions, tobecome the perpetrators of more than twelve thousand political killings during the 1980s (by conservativeestimates). The 1991 military intelligence reorganisation plan, Order 20005/91 was written by the Colombian

2 This is the primary reason for this peace initiative, although a full discussion of the FARCs motives is beyond thescope of this article.3 Giraldo, J, Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy(Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1996), p.10.4 Visit to Colombia, South America, by a Team from Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina,Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 26 February 1962, Kennedy Library, Box 319, National SecurityFiles, Special Group; Fort Bragg Team; Visit to Colombia; 3/62, "Secret Supplement, Colombian Survey Report."5 Giraldo, The Genocidal Democracy, p.10.


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military in conjunction with a US Defense Department and CIA team. This further integrated paramilitariesinto the armys intelligence mechanisms under the direct orders of the militaryhigh command. The result wasthe creation of killer networks that identified and killed civilians suspected of supporting guerrillas.6

US Foreign Policy objectives remained largely unaltered in the postCold War period, remaining thepreservation and defence of a (neo)liberal international order and the destruction of social forces or statesconsidered inimical to this order.7 Using declassified information, documentation from US government

agencies and human rights reports, Doug Stokes has shown how the US continued to fund and supportcounterinsurgency in Colombia, with the only significant differences being been the shift in rhetoric from anticommunism to counterdrugs and counterterrorism.8 Numerous multinational corporations operatingin many cases in conjunction with US or British private security companies have also been complicit in thearmed repression of social forces representing a threat to a neoliberal economic order. Welldocumentedallegations have been made against BP; CocaCola; Drummond; Occidental Petroleum, Chiquita Brands andmany other companies.9 Chiquita has even admitted to paying $1.7 million to paramilitaries between 1997 and2004, as well as to supplying paramilitaries with weapons. According to the Colombian Attorney General, thesepayments led to the murder of 4000 civilians.10

Why, then, the current support for peace? This should be understood not only in the context of the militarydefeat of the FARC but also very importantly as the consolidation of the political and economic projectpursued through armed counterinsurgency in Colombia. In the 1990s, paramilitarism was to become central

to the imposition of a neoliberal economic model across Colombia. By the second half of the 1990s, they beganto take over entire regions of the country, carrying out massacres and selective killings of those groups andindividuals deemed an obstacle to a neoliberal model of development. Statements of paramilitaries involved inexecuting this strategy have been explicit about the logic of this. For example, in the resourcerich MagdalenaMedio region, one of the first regions to be subject to paramilitary takeover, paramilitaries broke up theequipment of smallscale miners, saying that they were going to hand over the mines to those who wouldmake more rational use of them and stated that they had come in the name of development and to look afterthe investment made by the State and the multinationals.11 Carlos Castao, one of the commanders of whatwas then Colombias largest paramilitary group, described a threestage strategy along these lines.12 Firstcame the forced displacement of peasants and the confiscation of territory from those deemed to be supportersof the insurgency, a concentration of landholdings, and the prevention of any social initiative that was outsideof paramilitary control. A second phase involved development initiatives aimed at bringing wealth to the

region, now carried out with the more explicit backing of state institutions such as the Colombian Institute forAgrarian Reform (renamed Colombian Institute for Rural Development). Paramilitaries have even set up NGOs

6 Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, Colombias Killer Networks: The MilitaryParamilitary Partnership and the United States(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996). Online at www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killertoc.htm [16 Aug 2005].7 Stokes, D,Americas Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (London: Zed, 2005), p. 47.8 See Stokes, D, Why the end of the Cold War doesnt matter: the US war of terror in Colombia in Review ofInternational Studies 29 (2003), pp. 569585; Stokes,Americas Other War, pp. 84121.9 E.g. Amnesty International (2004). A Laboratory of War: Repression and Violence in Arauca. (2004) Online athttp://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR230042004 [30 April 2004], p.6; Ayala, M., Coleman, L; Montesinos,J; Loingsigh, G., Pedraza, O, Vega, M. and Vega, M., Por dentro esoga: un anlisis de los impactos de la BP en Casanare(Bogot: Cospacc and Ediciones Desde Abajo, 2010). Coleman, L., The making of docile dissent: neoliberalisation andresistance in Colombia and beyond, International Political Sociology7:2 (2013); Gill, L., Right there with you: Coca

Cola, labor restructuring and political violence in Colombia, Critique of Anthropology, 27:3 (2007), p. 235260;Ramirez Cuellar, F. The Profits of Extermination: How US Corporate Power is Destroying Colombia (Monroe: CommonCourage Press), 7380.10 Kovalik, D. 2008. Lawyer for Chiquita in Colombian death squad case may be next US Attorney General, in TheHuffington Post 6 November 2008. Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dankovalik/lawyerforchiquitainco_b_141919.html [9 April 2009]; Brodzinsky, S. Terrorism and bananas in Colombia, in Time, 2 September 2007.Online at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1616991,00.html [15 September 2007].11 Loingsigh, G. La Estrategia Integral Del Paramilitarismo en el Magdalena Mediode Colombia (Bogot, 2003), pp.689 (our translation).12 See Sarmiento, L., El Magdalena Medio: un modelo piloto de modernizacin authoritaria en Colombia (CREDHOS:Barrancabermeja, 1996), p. 33; Loingsigh, La Estrategia Integral, p.1124.


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to oversee these development projects, many of which have ended up managing funds from internationaldevelopment cooperation, even as the killings continued.13 The final phase was legitimation andconsolidation of the paramilitary model. As Colombian economist Libardo Sarmiento puts it, once potentiallysubversive elements of the population have been eliminated and their support bases destroyed, theparamilitaries believe they will cease to be a loose cannon of the State. There they will have put in place thenecessary structures for the victorious expansion of national and multinational capitalism and themodernising State will be able to install itself with the cooperation of the private sector, nongovernmental

organisations and the organised communities14

International support for peace in Colombia has to be understood in this context: as the consolidation of themodel imposed by these means. This is particularly evident in ongoing European Union efforts towardpeacebuilding in Colombia. Significant here have been the regional Peace Laboratories, a joint project betweenthe Colombian government and the European Union (in association with the World Bank and national andmultinational corporations), established to explore the paths which Colombian society must go down inorder to reach peace and generate sustainable development.15 Chris Pattern, as EU Commissioner for ExternalRelations, announced the first Peace Laboratory in the Magdalena Medio as paramilitaries were consolidatingtheir stronghold in the region. In the same communiqu he noted the EUs economic interest in a countrywhere FDI amounted to 880 million euros in 1999, declaring that large amounts of capital would only enter thecountry if there was stability.16 Unsurprisingly, the model of development promoted in the Peace Laboratoryis very much in continuity with the emphasis upon competitive social capital and exportoriented agricultural

production promoted by NGOs that flourished in the wake of the paramilitary takeover. A key focus, forexample, has been the production of African Palm, with farmers pushed in the direction of strategic allianceswith corporations, where they alone are responsible for the costs of production and exposed to the risk offalling prices.17

Indeed, the logic of the Peace Laboratories is very much in line with the international peacebuilding orthodoxythat emerged from the late 1990s, focused onthe promotion of the orthodoxy of neoliberalism, good governance reforms, and the use of aid conditionalityor selectivity to encourage conformity18, while minimising the destabilising effects of neoliberalisation. Ratherthan being a source of optimism, then, international support for the peace process should raise furtherquestions about what sort of peace is at stake in these negotiations. A peace that is predatory upon whathas been achieved through years of state and parastate repression of the population would provide little cause

for celebration.

The internal economic outlook

The authors then proceed to look at more internal factors favouring the peace process, claiming that thecurrent economic outlook puts Colombia in a position to fund agreements reached with the FARC. We maketwo observations on this. First, the current outlook is based on an agroexporting model of cash crops and thecurrent wholesale plunder of the mineral wealth of the country. Both of these are short term, particularly themining boom, and both have serious consequences for the Colombian people, including land concentration andforced displacement through paramilitary violence and the dispossession of peasant farmers.19 The effects ofthe mining boom also include some of the highest rates of poverty in the country in mining regions, deleteriousconsequences for the health of populations living around the mines, widespread environmental damage and

13 Loingsigh, La Estrategia Integral, p. 22.14 Sarmiento, El Magdalena Medio., p. 33 (our translation).15 Rudqvusts, A. and van Sluys, F., Informe Final de Evaluacin de Medio Trmino Laboratorio de Paz del MagdalenaMedio (Brussels: ECO, 2005), p.2.16 Loingsigh, G. Peace Laboratories: Europes Plan Colombia, Frontline Latin America 2: 3 (2006), p.4, 20.17 Ibid; Coleman, L. The Gendered Violence of Development: Imaginative Geographies of Exclusion in the Impositionof NeoLiberal Capitalism, in British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9:2 (2007)p.213618 Mac Ginty, R. and Williams, A, Conflict and Development(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p.18.19 For a discussion of this in relation to the agrarian model, see Thomson, F., The Agrarian Question and Violence inColombia,Journal of Agrarian Change 11:3 (2011).


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huge financial losses for the government in favour of multinationals holding the mining licences20. If thecurrent economic situation is viewed as a positive, this negates any demands on agrarian reform or on thethousands of mining licences currently held by multinationals.21

Secondly, however, there is another more worrying political aspect to what is implied by Ince and GmezSuarez: that the reason for not coming through on past agreements was a lack of money. Here we refer notonly to peace agreements with guerrilla groups but also to the more than five hundred agreements signed with

peasant organisations in the 1990s and in the early part of this century. These were either completely ignored,as with the agreement signed in 1998 with the peasants in southern Bolivar, or partially met, as with theagreement with peasants in Cauca and Nario in 1999.22 The politics of the Colombian States routine failure toadhere to the terms of previous agreements can be seen most clearly with the demobilisation of M19. Themuchcelebrated gain of this peace process was the formation of a Constituent Assembly, resulting in the 1991National Constitution (famed for the array of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights affordedcitizens). The ink was hardly dry on the parchment, however, and the Colombian oligarchy were already tryingto change or undermine the new Constitution. One example is Transitory Article 55, which gave rise to Law 70of 1993. The purpose of the law was to give legal protection to the cultural rights of the black communities andto recognise their control over and right to their collective territories. While they were given land on thepacific coast, all attempts to gain control over lands they had lived on, or had been forced off, in the InterAndean valleys were rejected. These lands were in the hands of families belonging to Colombia's oligarchy,many of them with family members in the Congress. On the pacific coast, even today, the communities are still

fighting to gain control over their collective lands.23 None of this is economic in the sense that it resultedfrom a lack of government funds. Rather, it must be attributed to other economic factors, namely the desireto uphold existing structures of power, wealth and privilege. In addition, collective land titles that have beenrecognised have been undermined by other legislation. For example, the communities own the land, but theyhave little or no say in stopping the mining multinationals coming in. Not even the right to be consulted incompliance with Convention 169 of the ILO has any effect. The government maintains that the right ofconsultation does not mean the communities can veto or stop a mining project from going ahead. Likewise,while the new Constitution recognized numerous labour rights (including those to collective organisation,stable employment, adequate rest and social security) and committed the government to redacting a newLabour Statute that would give weight to Colombias ratification of ILO Conventions, the State failed to fulfill itscommitments, instead passing legislation that only served to further undermine the rights enshrined within theConstitution.24 There are numerous other examples, but the point is that the experience of past agreements

would indicate that the current economic conjuncture has no bearing upon the nature or outcome of thediscussions, nor upon the willingness of the government to live up to any agreement the reach.

In addition to these points, we must note a remarkable distortion of the facts in Ince and GmezSuarezsstatement that The recent Victims and Land Restitution Law have also provided a good basis for a meaningfulnegotiating process, as, in contrast to previous peace negotiations, the government now has 3 million hectares ofland in its possession to implement agrarian reform. (emphasis added). This is quite patently false. The landreferred to by the Land Restitution Law is emphatically notfor agrarian reform. It is land that was stolen fromthe peasants and which the law theoretically seeks to return to its rightful owners.

The authors not only misrepresent the return of stolen property as agrarian reform, they also evadediscussion of the problematic nature of the Land Restitution Law itself. The government does not simply handland back. There is a lengthy legal process to go through, where the burden of proof is placed on the peasantreclaiming the land. Having proved their case the peasants, in order to access the land, have to agree to plant

20 Ramirez, The Profits of Extermination, p.817.21 It should also be borne in mind that cancelling the mining licences would leave Colombia open to being sued forthe losses incurred and future lost earnings. Any change on this would require breaking with international norms aswell as Colombian legislation. It thus requires a great deal more than an administrative decision.22 For further information on agreements with communities in the South West of the country, see Loingsigh, G.,Una mirada desde el sur: Huellas de lucha y resistencia, (Bogot: CNA, 2011).23 See Loingsigh, G., La reconquista del pacfico: Invasin, Inversin, Impunidad. (Bogot: CNA & PCN, 2013).24 The main laws regulating these reforms were Law 10 of 1989, Law 50 of 1990 and Law 189 of 2002.


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cash crops, such as African Palm, sugar cane, rubber, cocoa, and even certain vegetables for the Europeanmarket such as asparagus, which do not form part of the Colombian diet. In order to grow these cash crops thepeasants must take out a loan from a state body such as FINAGRO. So, the land is not given to them, it ishanded over subject to a series of conditions which include assuming a debt in order to meet the governmentsagroexporting plans.

However, this is not the only difficulty. Article 99 of Law 1448 of 2011 (the Land Restitution Law) is very clear

about the circumstances under which the land can be handed back. It states in no uncertain terms that wherethe new occupier acted in good faith and has implemented an agroindustrial project (palm or rubber forexample) then the occupier may continue to exploit the land upon signing an agreement with the peasant. Thepeasant will receive economic compensation and will continue to be recognised as the lawful owner but not thelegal usufructuary. It must be remembered that it is up to the peasant to prove that the occupier acted in badfaith.

In cases where there is an agroindustrial project on the land and the peasant has proved the occupier's badfaith, this still does not mean that land is automatically returned. The same Article 99 states that themagistrate who is dealing with the case may hand the land over to the Special Adminstrative Unit for theManagement and Restitution of Stolen Lands in order that it exploit the land through a third party and setaside the produce of the project for collective reparations programs for victims in the neighbourhood of theplot of land. So peasants do not get their land back even when bad faith on the part of the occupier is proven.

In the next line of Article 99, the law states that the magistrate will ensure the protection of the rights of theparties and that they obtain an adequate economic retribution. To be clear about this, the parties in thiscontext are the thief and the victim. They will both receive adequate economic compensation. Why would athief be compensated through a law that seeks to hand back land to the victims? Because, as is always the casein Colombia, it is the economic model that counts, not the individual citizen, and no uppity peasant will beallowed to get in the way of the agroexporting model (the very model that Ince and GmezSuarez appear tothink will allow the government pay for the peace agreement).

Common ground on rural development and drugs

Ince and GmezSuarezs fourth reason for optimism is that [m]any positive reports from both the FARC andthe Colombian government negotiators highlight the fact that the two parties have found common ground inrelation to rural development and illegal narcotics. We must exercise caution here. The negotiations take place

behind closed doors and, beyond bland statements on the points on the agenda in Havana, only the FARCEPand governmental delegates are fully aware of what is actually being discussed. It wasn't until Friday, March1st that Humberto de la Calle, the chief negotiator for the State announced to the media that they had madeadvances on the land issue. The details were sketchy. Much of what we know is from reporters talking to theircontacts, who feed them what they want them to know. Until such time as there is a final agreement, we willnot know the details and we will never know how the deal was reached. It is in the State's interest that therebe no debate at this stage. Tactically it suits them to present a fait acompli rather than discuss things as theyproceed. The secrecy also suits the FARC, as they may claim that it was all they could get.

Nonetheless, following on from their previous positive assessment of the prospects for agrarian reform, theauthors hail as an advance that whereas the FARC previously opposed the existence of all large rural estates,known as latifundios, now they appear to be more focused on estates that are unproductive or unused. If thisis the case, then it means that the FARC have given up on agrarian reform, their principal raison d'trefor the last fifty years. De la Calles announcement on March 1st referred to progress on programmes torecover lands illegally held by individuals and groups and would thus seem to confirm the authors contention.However, far from being a cause for optimism, this is only further cause for concern. Colombia has one of themost unequal distributions of land in the world. The problem, however, is not the land held by illegal groups,but the vast stretches of land in the hands of the countrys leading families, amongst them the legislators.Confiscating land held illegally by paramilitaries or drug barons has been on the Statute books for some time. While it is welcome, it is not the solution to inequality in land distribution. Furthermore, due to a lack ofpolitical will, even this timid measure has never been properly implemented and nothing indicates that thismight change.


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There is little or no consolation in a focus upon unproductive farms as much of the land owned by Colombiasoligarchy is likely to be good agricultural land and productive to some degree, even if only through extensivecattle ranching. To get a sense of what is at stake here, it is necessary to look at inequality in land distributionin more depth. Very different figures are frequently quoted, most of them correct. The difference does not lie inthe figures, but rather in how they are used. If you look at farms bigger than 100 or 200 hectares you get a verydifferent figure than if you only look at farms that are bigger than 2,000 hectares. Many academics use lowerrange figures and therefore they come up with a greater number of individuals who might be asked to give up

their land as part of an agrarian reform. The cut off point is key, as illustrated by a study carried out for theColombian Sociedad Geogrfica, using data from 2001. If we count farms of over one 100 hectares we find that107,593 people own 49,427,991 hectares i.e. 459 hectares each, which does not seem that excessive. If wecount farms of over 200 hectares we find that the number of owners falls to 48,218 controlling 44,260,929hectares, almost a thousand hectares each. However, if we just look at the farms over and above 2,000 hectareswe see that just 3,639 people own 31,631,308 hectares, an area of land equivalent to the size of Britain andIreland put together and representing 47% of all rural lands, excluding natural parks, indigenous and blackcollective lands.25 These figures were compiled for the Sociedad Geogrfica by the Subdirector of the Cadastre(Property Register) of the Instituto Geografico Agustn Codazzi which, like the Sociedad Geogrfica, is an officialstate body, not some leftwing think tank that could be accused ofexaggerating the situation. According to arecent study commissioned by the Instituto Geografico Agustn Codazzi, land concentration has increased in theperiod between 2000 and 2010. Whereas in 2000, 75.7% of land was in the hands of just 13.6% of landowners,by 2010 these figures increased to 77.6% in the hands of 13.7%. 26 Given such a panorama, the fact that FARC

have abandoned their opposition to the large estates is not a cause for optimism, but one of the mostdepressing aspects of the process. A substantive agrarian reform could be achieved affecting the situation ofjust 3,639 oligarchs. Meanwhile more then two million peasants live on less than 1.3 million hectares. Thisinjustice is central to the conflict in Colombia 27 and no amount of tinkering with confiscation of illegally held orunproductive land will resolve it

Everything would indicate a lack of political will to deal with inequality of land distribution. With regard toillegal narcotics, however, presumed common ground is of limited political significance because theColombian government is not the final arbiter in the matter. It may seek to allow some coca growing formedicinal use as the authors say. However, it is the International Narcotics Control Board at the UN whichdecides where legal opium and coca growing for medicinal purposes may take place. Countries then apply tothe INCB stating their requirements and permission to buy that legal opium and coca. The Single Convention of

1961 binds Colombia on the drugs issue. Noncompliance would have the following consequences:

1) the suppression of 50% of bilateral aid, with the exception of some humanitarian and drug controlaid; 2) a negative vote for loans in six international financial bodies, including the IDB and the WorldBank; and 3) denial to US exporters of access to ExportImport Bank credits to finance sales to thecountry in question and refusal to investors of access to Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)credit.28

To be blunt about it, it is not in the Colombian State's gift to offer anything in the way of drug reform. Thatdepends on the INCB and ultimately the United States.

Unity within the FARCThe authors' fifth reason for optimism is that the FARC seem to be a unified organisation with the Secretariatbeing able to exercise real control over the different guerrilla fronts. This is not that relevant to the politics of

25 Martnez, Y., La Tenecia de la Tierra en Colombia (Bogot: Sociedad Geogrphica, 2003). Online athttp://www.sogeocol.edu.co/documentos/09late.pdf[12 March 2013].26 Albez, A.M. and Muoz, J.C., La persistencia de la concentracin de la tierra en Colombia: Qu pas entre 2000y 2010?, Notas de la Poltica 9 (Bogot: Universidad de los Andes, CEDE, 2011).27 E.g. Thomson, The Agrarian Question.28 Joyce, E., Conclusions, in Joyce, E. and Malamud, C. (eds) Latin America and the Multinational Drug Trade(London: MacMillan 1998), p.208


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the peace process that they espouse. It simply means that they may be able to deliver most of theircombatants quietly and, if necessary, betray the remaining elements by giving information to the State.

Anticorruption measures: obscuring State complicity

Ince and GmezSuarezs sixth reason for optimism, however, is even more alarming and depressing than theirespousal of limited or no agrarian reform. They state that:

Despite evidence that some organised crime elements remain within the Colombian security sector andthat there are still links between illegal criminal actors and security forces, recent government efforts toimplement anticorruption mechanisms suggest that it is now more likely to track members of the armedforces who give backing to neoparamilitary groups or divert resources to private groups who take thelaw into their own hands.

Their statement flies in the face of everything human rights groups have said about the nature of the State'srelationship with paramilitary groupings. It is not just a case of some organised crime elements and, in the faceof recent history, it would be quite absurd to suggest that the State is suddenly concerned at the murder of itsown citizens. We shall deal with this latter point first as the False Positives scandal is still fresh in the mind ofmost people and it is noteworthy that President Santos was Minster for Defence at the time. The socalled FalsePositives referred to the extrajudicial killings of civilians, who were often subsequently dressed in guerrilla

uniform and who were declared evidence of success in the States war against the insurgency. Thephenomenon was best described by Phillip Alston the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings as thepremeditated murder of civilians for profit. Alston, as is wont of a diplomat, said that he had not foundevidence that this was part of a strategy on the part of the Colombian State. He stated that [a]lthough itappears that these socalled falsos positivos (false positives) were not carried out as a matter of State policy,they were also not isolated occurrences. The killings were committed around the country and by alarge number of military units.29 (our emphasis). However, even the UN Special Rapporteur was explicitthat he did not accept the few bad apples theory promulgated by many in government. In his press statementgiven on his last day in Colombia he stated that The sheer number of cases, their geographic spread, andthe diversity of military units implicated, indicate that these killings were carried out in a more or lesssystematic fashion by significant elements within the military (our emphasis).30 Again, we are not talkingabouta few criminal elements. For example, the logistics involved in transporting a large number of youths

from Soacha to El Catatumbo near the Venezuelan border, where they were subsequently killed, requirespermits and assistance going right up through the ranks. It cannot be ignored that it was official policy to paysoldiers premiums according to their body count (the Rapporteur references the legislation in the area). It istrue that the premiums also applied to captures of insurgents, but it is more complicated to hand in an innocentperson alive. The dead however, do not proclaim their innocence. These premiums were sanctioned andawarded by the current President, Juan Manuel Santos, in his capacity as Minister for Defence. By the year2009, the Prosecutor's Office acknowledged that there were at least 2,077 False Positives, amongst them 59minors.31 All of these murders generated a payment from the State. At the time, neither Santos nor thenpresident Uribe, acknowledged any such problem, nor has the State prosecuted even a significant number ofthe cases.

The idea that the State is actively pursuing the numerous perpetrators of gross human rights violations withinthe ranks of the armed forces is contradicted, for example, by the recent case taken to the InterAmerican Courtof Human Rights in which the Colombian State has declared that there are no disappeared people from the1985 siege of the Palace of Justice after its occupation by members of the M19 guerrilla,32 as well as by recent

29 Alston P., Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston,A/HRC/14/24/Add.2 (2010), pp.1230 Alston, P. Comunicado de Prensa del Relator Especial sobre Ejecuciones Extrajudiciales, June 2009www.extrajudicialexecutions.org31 El Tiempo (17/10/2009) Ms de dos mil colombianos haban sido asesinados en falsos positivos, segn informede la Fiscala, www.eltiempo.com32 Semana (23/02/2013) Palacio de justicia: La peor defensa, www.semana.com


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legislative measures discussed below that risk further deepening the climate of impunity for perpetratorswithin the armed forces. It is also contradicted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, whoseJanuary 2013 report stated, in relation to the False Positives that [g]iven the scope of the false positives crisis,too few of those responsible have been removed from service or prosecuted. High ranking officials linked tothese human rights crimes remain in active service and continue to be promoted.33 (our emphasis). Thereport went further to state that:

75.

The Attorney Generals Office has accumulated complaints, including 4,716 victims of homicidepresumably perpetrated by members of the security forces, many of these false positivetype executions.Of all homicide investigations, only 30 per cent report procedural activity. Of these active cases, the greatmajority have not passed the preliminary criminal investigation stage: over 60 per cent (about 1,000) ofthe active cases are in the preliminary exploration phase (which precedes the formal investigationstage); and 294 cases had reached the trial/sentencing phase by August 2012. Given the nature of thesecrimes by State actors, as time passes, the capacity to establish criminal responsibility in these casesfades and impunity becomes systemic.34

The UN is a most cautious organisation in the language it uses to criticise governments. But there is nodoubting the actual situation. There is no reason to presume that the Colombian State has any interest inprosecuting what Ince and GmezSuarez term those criminal elements within the Army and, even by theevidence of the UN, there is no reason to believe that the State is now more likely to track members of the

armed forces who give backing to neoparamilitary groups or divert resources to private groups who take thelaw into their own hands, as we discuss in more depth below in relation to the problem of impunity.

There are serious implications to Ince and GmezSuarezs contentions on this issue. Most peace processesengage in a rewriting of history. It is considered necessary to blur or erase any responsibility of the State in theconflict as, once the agreement is signed, the State is deemed not only to be legitimate but to always have beenso and to have always acted accordingly. Ince and GmezSuarez have lent their hand to this exercise. Implicitin their statement is that the State is not responsible, but rather that the problem lieswith individual criminalelements within the Armed Forces. This flies in the face of the arguments of Human Rights groups going backover four decades and ignores every report filed by them, every killing, every promotion of officers linked tothese killings.

In addition, while our previous discussion of dirty war tactics in Colombia focused on the role of the US, it mustalso be underscored that the Colombian State itself was central to the promotion of paramilitarism and gave alegal basis for the formation of paramilitary groups. In this regard, it is worth quoting at length the renownedhuman rights defender, Jesuit priest Javier Giraldo:

Up to 1989, the legal substantiation for the proliferation of paramilitary civilian armed groupscoordinated by the Army was found in paragraph 3 of Article 33 of Decree 3398 of 1965. This wasconverted into permanent legislation by Law 48 of 1968. This principle authorized the Ministry ofNational Defense by conduct of authorized commanders to support, when it considers convenient, as ifprivate property, arms which are considered as being of a private use of the Armed Forces.35

Giraldo goes on the explain the purpose of such actions.

Paramilitarism becomes, then, the keystone of a strategy of Dirty War, where the dirty actions cannotbe attributed to persons on behalf of the State because they have been delegated, passed along orprojected upon confused bodies of armed civilians. Those committing the crimes are anonymous andeasily definable as common delinquents who act and thereafter disappear into the fog. This covers up

33 UNHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rightsin Colombia A/HRC/22/17/Add.3 (2013), p. 1534 Ibd.35 Giraldo, J. Paramilitarism A Criminal Policy of the State Which Devours the Country (2005),www.javiergiraldo.org


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responsibility for acts which have no legal justification or legitimacy, not even during times of warlikeconfrontations. The result is that they confound and complement two types of events: actions of militaryofficers camouflaged as civilians and military action of civilians protected in a clandestine way bymilitary personnel. Both types of procedures have the same objective: to provide impunity through coverups.36

Law 48 was eventually declared unconstitutional in 1989. However, the State did not give up. Csar Gaviria of

the Liberal Party who came to power in 1990 issued a decree in his final year of government creating the RuralSecurity Cooperatives, Las Convivir, giving yet another legal facade to the paramilitaries, a policy which wassubsequently implemented by President Samper and his then underling, Alvaro Uribe, as Governor of thedepartment of Antioquia. These were in turn eventually found to be unconstitutional and, during his own termas President, Uribe replaced them with the shortlived experiment of Peasant Soldiers. Even the UN HighCommissioner Mary Robinson has had to state quite clearly that

... the Colombian State bears undeniable historical responsibility for the origin and development ofparamilitarism, which was protected by law from 1965 to 1989. Although the socalled selfdefencegroups were then declared unconstitutional, 10 years have passed and they have not been dismantled.In the same historical context, the military forces bear special responsibility because they were in chargeof promoting, selecting, organizing, training, arming and providing logistical support to the selfdefencegroups during the long period they were protected by law in the general framework of support for the

security forces in their struggle against the guerrillas.37

It is to be noted that the highranking military officers involved in paramilitary groups such as the then MajorHarold Bedoya were promoted.38 Bedoya would eventually become the commander of the Armed Forces. Itshould be pointed out that promotion to the rank of Colonel and above requires approval by Congress, so thelong list of military officers that have made it to that rank did so with the consent and approval of theColombian Congress. We could go on at length here, but suffice to say that the paramilitary phenomenon is notreducible to some criminal elements. The role of the State in the murder of its own citizens cannot beignored, though it is the first demand made on the victims, that they accept the bonafides of the State. WhereInce and GmezSuarez get their optimism from we do not know.

Challenges and proposals

Ince and GmezSuarez proceed to enumerate four potential stumbling blocks to the peace process and a seriesof related proposals. Here too we find some remarkably wooly thinking alongside a recurrent tendency toobscure the record of the Colombian state

The challenge of the bandas criminalsOne recommendation is that the government ensure that efforts to reach a political settlement with the FARCare complemented by a more integrated approach to combating the BACRIMs, a generic term used by theColombian government to refer to bandas criminals organized crime groups, some of whom, as Ince andGmezSuarez recognize, comprise illegal criminal actors that have regrouped in the wake of the paramilitarydemobilisation in 2006. These, Ince and GmezSuarez note, are now considered the countrys primary

drivers of insecurity. The way that this recommendation is framed involves yet another sleight of hand withregard to the States responsibility for conflict and insecurity in Colombia. Reference to demobilisedparamilitaries must be understood not only in historical context, with the State having been deeply implicatedin the paramilitary phenomenon at many levels, but also in the context of more recent history. This supposeddemobilisation occurred under the presidency of Santos predecessor, Alvaro Uribe, whose election had been

36 Ibd37 Robinson, M. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Office in Colombia(2000) E/CN.4/2000/11 p.2438 E.g. Human Rights Watch, Colombias Killer Networks.


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welcomed by paramilitary leaders on the basis that he was the man closest to our philosophy.39 Uribes socalled peace process with the paramilitaries was widely decried by human rights bodies as a game of smokeand mirrors that guaranteed virtual impunity for the paramilitaries crimes and that did nothing to dismantlethe structures of paramilitary organisations.40 Their work done, the many of the paramilitary groups who tookcontrol of regions of Colombia from the late 1990s onwards were thus disbanded, although they maintainedcontrol of their resources and were effectively recycled in the form of urban militia who continue to monitor,threaten and kill social activists.

It is notable, given this context, that Ince and GmezSuarez uncritically accept the Colombian governmentsterm BACRIMs. In a blog post issued shortly after their report was released Grace Livingstone rightlychallenges academics acceptance of this term when the evidence shows that these armed groups are largelymade up of former paramilitaries, that they target the same people and that they frequently collude with thestate?.41 The January 2013 report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia states thatdemobilized paramilitaries comprise 53% of the BACRIMs and that they continue to target leaders of socialorganisations, in many cases in collusion with local authorities and State forces. 42 As Livingstone notes,[t]here is a danger in using the term BACRIM that we let the Colombian authorities local and national offthe hook and give the impression that tackling them will be a simple matter of arresting a few crooks. In fact itwill be far more complex because these armed groups control territory, are economically powerful and havestrong ties to local political elites.

Transitional justiceThis tendency to let the Colombian authorities off the hook is evident once again in Ince and GmezSuarezsrecommendations regarding transitional justice. Their discussion here is nuanced. It recognizes thecomplexities surrounding amnesties and the problem of impunity for past crimes and insists that the adoptionof an appropriate mechanism for transitional justice should not be a blank cheque for impunity in Colombia.However, what is notable is that that much of this discussion seems to be directed at the FARC. The notion ofaccountability measures aimed at any military personnel who have committed human rights violations istacked on at the end, with such measures described as something that would also need strengthening in orderto ensure that justice policies adopted are fair, equitable and aim towards accountability for all. What Ince andGmezSuarez do not make clear is that the bulk of the pressure from local and global civilsocietyorganisations regarding impunity, to which they refer, has not been focused upon the problem of impunity forthe insurgency (however real and complex an issue this may be) but upon the longstanding, ongoing and

routine impunity afforded to State and parastate actors for gross violations of human rights over manydecades. While a few very limited measures have been taken over recent years to bring a few perpetrators ofthese abuses to justice, impunity remains the norm while witnesses and lawyers in these cases continue to bethreatened and killed.43 The bland reference toward strengthening accountability measures for militaryviolators of human rights drastically understates the problem of impunity in Colombia.

Even after the 1991 Constitution, the product of a previous peace process with guerrilla groups, impunity waseven more deeply entrenched within the Colombian justice system, partly because the Constitution itself

39 Hylton, F. An Evil Hour: Uribes Colombia in Historical Perspective, New Left Review23 (2003), 5193. See alsoLivingstone, G. Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War(London: Latin America Bureau, 2003), p.57.40 Human Rights Watch. Smoke and Mirrors: Colombias Demobilization of Paramilitary Groups (New York: Human

Rights Watch, 2005). Online at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia0805/ [16 Aug 2005]; AmnestyInternational. 2005. Los paramilitares en Medelln: desmobilizacon o legalizacin?. Online at:http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ESLAMR230192005 [5 September 2005]; Isaacson, Adam. 2005. Peace orParamilitarisation? Why a weak peace agreement with Colombian paramilitary groups may be worse than noagreement at all, in International Policy Report, July 2005, pp. 111 Online athttp://www.ciponline.org/colombia/cipanal.htm [7 July 2005].41 Livingstone, G. Is BACRIM just a new name for paramilitaries, post on the British Academics for a ColombiaUnder Peace blog http://bacupblog.wordpress.com, 6 March 2013.42 UN High Commissioner (2013), paragraphs 3743.43 Amnesty International, Colombia: Impunity perpetuates ongoing human rights violations, submission to the UNUniversal Periodic Review, 16th Session of the UPR Working Group, AprilMay 2013, p.4.


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awarded the executive a large amount of influence over key appointments such as that of the AttorneyGeneral.44 Meanwhile, numerous military officers who had collaborated with paramilitarism were promoted asparamilitary groups themselves were integrated more formally into military operations. Theinstitutionalisation of impunity has been a decidedly oneway phenomenon, however. It has not applied tothose engaged in political opposition, who have been pursued persistently by the justice system even wherethere is little evidence that they have been involved in any crime. Functionaries responsible for public order,rather than seeing it as a limit on their actions, tend to use criminal law instrumentally as a tool of war to

repress groups and individuals deemed to be a threat.45

There is not space here to discuss the broader sociolegal context that has facilitated the institutionalization ofimpunity in Colombia. It is, however, notable that Ince and GmezSuarez make no reference to this broadercontext. Their contention that incorporating measures to strengthen accountability into a mechanism oftransitional justice gives the impression that the permissive legal context for Statelinked perpetrators ofhuman rights violations is a technical, rather than a political matter.

Particularly striking in this regard is Ince and GmezSuarezs omission of any reference to constitutionalreform approved by Congress in December 2012, and whose concurrence with the peace process should notbe considered coincidental given the historical record. This reform will bolster the military justice system inColombia and has been heavily criticized by Amnesty International, the InterAmerican Commission on HumanRights, the Colombian Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, various UN experts and numerous

Colombian human rights groups. As Amnesty Internationals Americas programme director has commented,approval of this reform would fly in the face of Colombias international human rights obligations and is adangerous step toward further entrenching impunity for the armed forces and the police.46 Existing militaryjustice in Colombia especially military jurisdiction over cases involving human rights violations has beenheavily criticized for years by national and international human rights bodies. The proposed reform wouldreinforce the control already enjoyed by the military over the initial stages of criminal investigation, bycreating a Tribunal of Criminal Guarantees in which military representatives would sit alongside criminalrepresentatives to decide the jurisdiction of cases. While the reform appears to exclude some of the mostserious human rights violations from military review the proposed Tribunal would actual give the militarygreater influence over outcomes and make it easier to define human rights violations as legitimate acts ofconflict subject to military jurisdiction (which they have routinely done in the past, including bymanipulating crime scenes, for example by dressing up victims in military clothing). Moreover, war crimes

which, as Amnesty International note may include enforced disappearance, torture, rape and other crimes ofsexual violence continue under the provisions of the reform to be subject to review by the military justicesystem, while military courts could also continue to prosecute cases of collaboration and collusion withparamilitary groups.47

Ince and GmezSuarez likewise fail to mention other recent legislative measures that also cast into seriousdoubt any supposed commitment to ending impunity on the part of the Colombian State. 48 In particular, theirdiscussion of conditional amnesties should be understood in the context of the socalled legal framework for

44 Giraldo, The Genocidal Democracy, pp. 612; Human Rights Watch. A Wrong Turn: The Record of the ColombianAttorney Generals Office (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002). Online athttp://hrw.org/reports/2002/colombia/ [16 Aug 2005].45 Santos, B. and Garca Villegas, M. Colombia: El revs del contrato social de la modernidad, in Santos, B. and GarcaVillegas, M. eds., El Caleidoscopio de las Justicias en Colombia (Bogot: Siglo de Hombres Editores, 2001), p.7980,Giraldo, The Genocidal Democracy, p.612, 48, 79.46 Amnesty International Press Release, Colombia: Reform will boost impunity for military and police human rightsabusers, released 6 December 2012.47 Ibid.48 There is not space for a full discussion of this but for more details see, e.g. the December 2012 Report on thehuman rights situation in Colombia 200813 by various international platforms and organisations for the UN 2013Periodic Review. Online at:http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20on%20the%20Human%20Rights%20situation%20in%20Colombia.pdf [4 April 2013], p. 68.


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peace, a constitutional reform on transitional justice approved by Congress in June 2012 that will enableCongress to suspend the prison sentences of parties to the conflict, including those of the Colombian securityforces. The reform also permits the Attorney General to prioritise some investigations over others, with theimplication that some of the most serious cases of human rights abuses may not be investigated (despite theobligation to investigate all such cases under international law). This measure, like the proposed reform of themilitary justice system, has been considered such a serious risk with regard to impunity, that AmnestyInternational in their recent submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review (AprilMay 2013), recommend

the repeal of both constitutional reforms.49

None of this is mentioned by Ince and GmezSuarez.

Political guarantees and protection for demobilized FARC members

Ince and GmezSuarezs concern that political guarantees and protection are provided for demobilized FARCmembers continues in the vein of erasing the historical record of the Colombian state, in this case leading themto recommendations that could easily prove lethal for former insurgents wishing to enter civilian politics. Theystate, not incorrectly, that one of the obstacles to an agreement with the FARC is the State's ability to safeguardpolitical guarantees for demobilised FARC members wishing to enter into the political process. This refersprimarily to the right and guarantee of exercising political opposition for the political groups that already existand for similar groups that could be created in the future. In this they are not entirely wrong, the State willneed to convince the FARC that they will not be massacred. The authors refer here to the genocide during thelate 1980s of members of the leftist electoral coalition, the Unin Patritica, that had been formed to represent

both demobilised guerrillas and Colombians who were not members of traditional political parties. Between3,000 and 5,000 members of the UP were killed by the state forces and paramilitaries, who went on to killmany militants of the M19 guerrilla who subsequently demobilised.50 However, convincing the FARC that theywill not meet with the same fate is not the same as actually fulfilling that promise. Only time will tell howinterested and successful they will be, and by that time the peace deal will be history. What is most worrying,in this regard, is the absurd proposal that

One way to avoid a repeat of previous experiences could involve the creation of a specialised protectionunit that comprises members of the armed forces, the police, members of the intelligence services, andformer FARC combatants to ensure that the violence that targeted the Unin Patritica, and other sectorsassociated with the peace process and FARC in the 1980s, is not replicated should a peace agreement bereached.

A simple question should be posed: who murdered the UP? There was some paramilitary involvement but, ashuman rights groups have pointed out repeatedly, the shift in in the burden of repression from military toparamilitary murders was not really consolidated until the early 1990s. Much of what happened in the 1980swas the direct responsibility of the army. In 1988, in the town of Segovia, in the north east of theadministrative department of Antioquia, the military and police murdered 43 people, most of them openly inthe towns main square, because they had voted for the UP and not for the Liberal Party (this has beendocumented widely, including by the Nunca Ms project51). The helicopters from which threatening flyers hadbeen dropped were military helicopters. The message on the fliers was clear: the town would be punished forhaving voted the wrong way. The UP had not just won the municipal elections in Segovia, it had wiped theboard. Forty three people paid the price, all of them murdered by the XIV Brigade of the Colombian Army andbythe Police. It should be pointed out that this brigade is the same one that set up and trained paramilitariesin Puerto Boyac, where Carlos Castao, developed his taste for blood. This is all public and commonknowledge. It is impossible that the authors are unaware of the role of the Army in wiping out the UP.

Ince and GmezSuarezs trust in the intelligence services is also quite extraordinary in the light of thehistorical record. The government was forced to disband the civilian intelligence service Departamento

49 Amnesty International, submission to the UN periodic review, p.56, 8.50 E.g. Hylton, Evil hour, p. 82.51 The Nunca Ms Project (Never Again) was a project first carried out in the Northeast of Antioquia which attemptedto record the systematic violations of human rights in given areas of the country. It produced reports on otherregions as well, such as El Catatumbo, Meta and the South West of the Country.


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Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) on 31 October 2011 in the wake of a public scandal about the role of theDAS in threats, killings, illegal surveillance and wiretapping, targeting human rights activists politicians,judges and journalists.52 During the government of Santos predecessor Alvaro Uribe in particular, the DAS,which operated under the Presidents authority, systematically spied on people, gathering information whichby its nature could only be used for murder, blackmail or framing the individuals that came to their attention.Much of this information, according to media reports, was garnered using the DAS bodyguards assigned by theState to protect the human rights defenders concerned. The DAS has also been involved in the murder of trade

unionists and two of its former directors are subject to criminal proceedings for their links with paramilitaries.Did any or all of this pass the authors by? Did they not also notice that many human rights defenders havebeen subjected to criminal charges were the key witness was the bodyguard assigned to them?

The military intelligence services have an equally checkered record. One infamous case is that of the Navy's 07Intelligence Network in Barrancabermeja. This little body carried out a number of murders in the city, hiringsicarios (hitmen) to do the dirty work. The Chief Prosecutors' Office proffered accusations in relation to 68killings. However, the Human Rights groups in the city put the figure at over 430.53 Those involved wereabsolved in 1998 by General Tapias, who served under that other great man of peace, President Pastrana, whodecided to let them off in the middle of his peace negotiations with the FARC. It may also have escaped theirattention that the XX Brigade, whose main task was intelligence gathering, had to be dissolved as its activitiesbecame too unpalatable even for the US government, which was under pressure not to finance units that wereimplicated in human rights violations.

Why it is that Ince and GmezSuarez think the FARC should trust the military, police and intelligence servicesthis time around quite simply defies explanation. Perhaps their hopes for change lie with the disbanding of theDAS and the establishment of a new National Protection Programme (NPP) to replace previous programmesfor the protection of human rights defenders and political activists run by the Interior Ministry. However, thistoo would appear to be misplaced optimism given the concerns of international human rights bodies thatmany NPP staff, some of whom have been engaged in protective duties, are former DAS members.54 This,alongside the continued climate of impunity for Statelinked perpetrators of human rights violations, wouldindicate that Ince and GmezSuarezs proposal is dangerously misguided.

The States ability to deliver meaningful land reforms

A further challenge that Ince and GmezSuarez address concerns the States ability to deliver meaningfulland reform. In the light of our previous discussion, we cannot but agree with Ince and GmezSuarez thata significant amount remains to be done with regard to rural development and the rights of victims, and inthat ensuring that efforts toward land reform are as inclusive and farreaching as possible. However,having failed to grasp that a meaningful land reform is not even on the table in a peace process between adefeated guerrilla force and a government with no interest in any such reform, the authors mislocate theobstacles to land reform, assuming such them to lie primarily with regional elites and large landowners:

...if the government were to propose substantial change, for example in the way land is used or someother kind of change to life in the countryside, there are likely to be many people especially on the right,who may object. While the Santos government and the political elite in Bogota may well understand theneed for reform, hard line regional elites particularly large land owners who believe that the conflictcan still be won militarily, may be less forthcoming. Thus, the issue is whether Santos is able to convinceenough of those regional elites to accept some degree of reform and to not take the law into their ownhands (i.e. by sponsoring paramilitarism).

The problem that Ince and GmezSuarez identify is by no means insignificant. As discussed, regional eliteshave indeed in the past made recourse to paramilitarism to protect their interests and there is no reason to

52 Amnesty International. Colombia Annual Report 2012. Online at:http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/colombia/report2012#section29853 Interview Credhos 2002.54 Amnesty International (2013), submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, p. 4.


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assume that this practice should not continue without effective measures being taken to prevent it. However,we cannot forget the political context that has enabled this, in the form of the legal basis provided forparamilitarism; the active complicity of State forces in the promotion and training of paramilitary groups, andthe institutionalized impunity that has provided a permissive context for gross violations of human rights.These groups went on to facilitate a further concentration of landholdings, that would go on to be legitimizedand consolidated with by the State alongside the private sector and NGOs in the interests of development.

We have already shown in our criticism of the Land Restitution Law that Santos and the political elite are notinterested in substantial change in the countryside. Responsibility for a lack of agrarian reform rests not onlywith regional elites but also, more substantively, with the elites in Bogot, many of whom are also largelandowners. Why did the governments in which Santos has participated (under Gaviria, Pastrana, and Uribe)introduce reforms to undermine the peasantry? To take the Uribe regime for example, we have had a wholeseries of laws that sought to undermine peasant production, from banning the use of seeds that are not boughtfrom a multinational, to effectively ban the production of panela55 and free range chickens by forcing farmers toproduce it in laboratory conditions.56 Why did these governments sign free trade agreements with the USA andthe European Union, which undermine peasant production and place a greater emphasis on agroindustrialproduction?

Civil society participation

At face value, Ince and GmezSuarezs call for meaningful civil society participation appears laudable. In thepeace process as it stands, the participation of the people is reduced to that of bystanders who can approve orreject the final deal. Despite noises made at the beginning about participation in the process, this has inpractice meant little or nothing. Two fora were convened by the National University and the UNDP whichinvited individuals and organisations to a discussion. The forum on the agrarian situation was particularlypathetic. Just over 1200 delegates attended it. Of these, 200 were from business groups, who came wellprepared. The methodology was to divide the 1200 into different groups which would discuss in an ad hoc andoften in a confusing manner all sorts of ideas with very little structure. These were then taken back to theplenary and, from there, to Havana. It is hardly participation by any normal understanding of the term. Thepeasant groups have no direct input into the process as they have clear demands namely land which mightupset the deal. The forum on the agrarian situation was closed by three people: former senator PiedadCrdoba, the president of the Society of Colombian Agriculture (SAC) and Francisco de Roux former leader of

the Colombian NGO administering the Magdalena Medio Peace Laboratoriesand current head of the Jesuits. DeRoux rounded off the forum by advocating the promotion of more of what he termed permanent tropicalcrops (palm, rubber cocoa), in accordance with an agroindustrial model that is completely at odds with thedemand for land.57

Yet we have to ask what meaningful participation might mean in practice. Again, historical context isimportant. It is not just that Ince and GmezSuarezs reference to a passive citizenry, without anyacknowledgement of the widespread extermination of numerous peasant, worker, indigenous and humanrights associations over the past decades is disingenuous. We must also consider the recent history of apositive promotion of participation in Colombia. Since the implementation of neoliberal policies and the1991 Constitution, successive governments have emphasised the importance of the populationsparticipation within state activities and underlined the need for open and decentralizedinstitutions in orderto provide the conditions for both peace and market competitiveness.58. The citizen participation envisaged is,

55 Panela is a type sugar based extract similiar to Jaggery from India. It is dissolved in hot water and consumed withmeals. It is a basic staple of the Colombian diet, particularly amongst the poor.56 See Resolution 4287/2007 of Ministerio de Proteccin Social and Decree 1500 of 2007 in relation to freerange poultry and Resolution 779 of March 2006 and 3462 of 2008.57 The information in this paragraph is based on verbal reports made to one of the authors as well as recordings byjournalists of the closing speeches, which we were given copies of.58 Departamento Nacional de Planeacin (DNP). 1991. La Revolucin Pacfica: Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social19901994 (Bogot: Presidencia de la Republica and Departamento Nacional de Planeacin). ;Departamento Nacionalde Planeacin (DNP). 1995. El Salto Social: Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, Ley de Inversiones 19941998 (Bogot:


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however, a participation within the boundaries of predefined, neoliberal policies which are not open tonegotiation, as a means to strengthen the effectiveness of state actions and develop a competitiveenvironment.59 The focus on a participative state has gone alongside a drive to incarnate a population ofentrepreneurial and loyal citizens, who will participate accordingly. By the mid1990s, Ernesto Sampersgovernment had begun to make explicit reference to creation of an ideal type of citizen along these lines, andthis has continued to be a focus of successor governments.60

This discourse has been repeated in interventions for development and peace geared toward ruralpopulations. For example, Asocipaz, an NGO founded by the paramilitaries the Magdalena Medio region hasstated that peasants should become employees in agroindustry in order to gain real possibilities of activeparticipation, in the capacity of shareholders or coowners.61 In striking synergy with this, the NGOresponsible for managing funds of the EUsponsored Peace Laboratory in the Magdalena Medio regionexplicitly includes among its aims the inculcation of a more competitive, entrepreneurial identity, defining oneof its roles as being to facilitate the population perceiving themselves as owners and as actors in their owndestiny.62 The promotion of this sort civil society participation has been a means actively containingstruggles for territory and against the dispossession and ecological destruction wrought through a neoliberalmodel. We mentioned before the wellfounded allegations against a number of multinational companies,including BP, for their complicity in State and parastate violence against social organisations. In the areaaround BPs oilfields, in the administrative department of Casanare, the oil companies NGO, Fundacin

Amanecer openly seeks to foster similar forms of selfidentification among the peasantry but has sent

representatives along to community human rights meetings to encourage peasants to participate in itsproductive projects as opposed to engaging in the risky business of organizing against ongoing extrajudicialexecutions by the Colombian army,63

What sort of participation do Ince and GmezSuarez advocate? The mode of participation within predefinedparameters favoured by the State and promoted by NGOs linked to paramilitarism, the private sector andinternational interests? Or do they mean a form of participation that opens space for genuine disagreement,conflict and struggle over the nature of the deal on offer? A first step toward such a possibility would be for theState to take decisive steps to put a stop to the ongoing repression of grassroots processes of socialorganisation. This would imply (amongst other things) an end to the impunity enjoyed by State and parastateagents. Yet by repeatedly glossing over the role of the State in the Colombian conflict, Ince and GmezSuarezonly serve to reinforce a culture of impunity that gives carte blanche to the continued repression of social

organisations.

Limiting expectations

Much of Ince and GmezSuarez's trouble is that they unreservedly accept the legitimacy of the ColombianState, and look at the peace process through the lenses of the government, where all problems are technical innature and, hardly any are political. This is evident in their final piece of advice to the government, on how todeal with disappointment:

To avoid disappointment and a potential backlash, should talks fail to reach an agreement beforeNovember 2013, Santos will need to keep the expectations of the electorate in check throughout theremainder of the negotiations. This could be achieved through the design of a more effectivecommunication strategy centred around disseminating public information in a manner that helps

Presidencia de la Republica and Departamento Nacional de Planeacin); Departamento Nacional de Planeacin(DNP). 1999. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 19982002: Cambio para Construir la Paz(Bogot: Departamento Nacionalde Planeacin); Departamento Nacional de Planeacin (DNP) (2003), Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 20022006: Haciaun Estado Comunitario (Bogot: Departamento Nacional de Planeacin).59 Ibid., p. 68 (our translation).60 DNP. 1995., El Salto Social; DNP.1999, Cambio para Construir la Paz1461 Quoted in O Loingsigh 2004, p. 83 (our translation).62 Quoted in Rudqvusts, A. and van Sluys, F. (2005), Informe Final de Evaluacin de Medio Trmino Laboratorio de Pazdel Magdalena Medio (Brussels: ECO), p. 5.63 Coleman, The making of docile dissent. Forthcoming.


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manage high expectations and enables negotiating teams to deliver concise, frank and transparent publicstatements regarding the progress being made.

The authors concern for the electorate seems a strange priority, given that the majority of the populationdoes not vote, and of those who do, a significant number sell their votes.64 More significantly, however what theauthors outline here is the need for a technical strategy to dampen political and social expectations, not astrategy for the participation of people in the process, for a Constitutent Assembly or other such mechanism,

where due expression may be given to the demands of the Colombian people (which may, and almost certainlydo, differ from the demands of the FARC).

Exactly what type of expectations would have to dampened down? Agrarian reform might be one of them. Whydo Ince and GmezSuarez recommend that the State come up with a strategy to dampen such an expectation?Is it because they believe that the peasants must cede on this issue in the name of peace? Maybe some peoplehave expectations that military officers will be prosecuted for past crimes. Is this one of the expectations thatshould be dampened? With this final recommendation at the end of their text, they give the game away. Thisprocess in not about justice and neither is their proposal: it is about making the country stable for capital andsafe for the elites.

Concluding remarks

Dampening down expectations is just one aspect of the States overall approach to eliminating and pacifyingopposition, and to obscuring its own role in the armed aspect of this repression. Those academics whouncritically throw their weight behind the current negotiations only add to this. The experience of peaceprocesses around the world from Ireland, to South Africa to Latin America would indicate that suchprocesses are first and foremost about stability for the State and for capital, not about reducing levels ofviolence per se, particularly amongst the poor. A clear example of this is the peace process in El Salvador.During the insurgency, around 70,000 people lost their lives as a result of the conflict. Lots of people ralliedaround that process promulgating the liberal viewpoint that what was important was the end of conflict per seand saving lives. Between 2000 and 2011 (a similar timeframe to the conflict) there were 38,660 intentionalhomicides in El Salvador65, not as many as died in the conflict, but it is still a very high figure. El Salvador'smurder rate has been consistently the second highest in Latin America with the rate for 2011 being 69.2 (per

100,000).66 If we look at the murder rate amongst young people between the age of 15 and 24, that ratejumped to 105.6 in 2008 (last year of available figures). 67 Where is the international concern, the cashdonations, the round tables, the honest broker roles of countries? There is none, because reducing deaths isnot what it was about, it was about removing an armed threat to capitalism.

If the issue were just the role of academics in glossing over the defeat of an armed insurgency that had little orno chance in winning, the issues would be grave but not as serious for wider society. However, peaceprocesses do not just concern themselves with demobilising armed organisations but also with demobilisingwider society, making sure that no one upsets the apple cart, that the deal struck leaves the powers that beintact, with their wealth untouched and unchallenged. Here the role of NGOs and academics is crucial. Papersare written, conferences given, books published on the importance of the deal and why everyone shouldsupport it. We are told that those who do not support the deal want war, regardless of whether the critics eversupported the war in the first place.

The very model of development that was imposed by blood and fire is now sets the parameters for a path topeace, provided that it can be implemented in a way that is sensitive to the potential for conflict. Commentsare thrown out about the importance of conflict resolution, a term borrowed from family therapy, as if this was

64 In the last presidential elections, almost a million dollars was spent buying votes just in Bogot.65 OAS, Report on Citizen Security in the Americas 2012: Official Statistical Information on Citizen Security

provided by the OAS Member States (Washington DC: OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, 2012) p.1766 Ibd p.1867 Ibd p.25


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about two lovers who no longer know how to live together. The interests at stake and the social forces at playare ignored. The victory is claimed and those in opposition, such as peasants who continue to demand land, areaccused of turning their backs on history, on progress and ultimately on peace. The politics of it are ignored. Inconflict there are winners and losers. There are no draws. You win in the conflict or you win at the negotiatingtable: one way or another someone wins and someone loses. The failure to acknowledge this has given rise to agreat deal of verbal, political and social acrobatics being performed to distract from the ongoing reality of socialconflict. Pressure is brought to bear on people not to provoke a return to war by demanding justice, truth,

reparations, land, education, health or housing. Nothing should be demanded that upsets the deal or thepowers that be. After the demobilisation of the M19 guerrillas, the leading members of the organisation wenton to take up diplomatic posts, representing the Colombian State in embassies around the world while militaryparamilitary repression burgeoned. This also happened with demobilised EPL guerrillas. This will happenagain: people will be asked to defend the indefensible and they will do so, all in the name of the peace process.

This is the technocratic ideal. Everything is reduced to the needs of the State, convincing the insurgents todemobilise and everyone else to jump through hoops, whilst attempts are made to giving an academic andpolitical veneer to a squalid deal (which is the very most that can be expected from this process). Einstein oncesaid that madness was repeating the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. When itcomes to peace processes we tend to ignore all past experience. In the case of Colombia, Ince and GmezSuarez have engaged in a dire misrepresentation of the reality of the country and ignored the deadly past whenit comes to making recommendations. They have given themselves over to the argument of peace at any price,

regardless of the consequences for everyone but capital and the State.

peace in colombia reality myth and wishful thinking

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