peter nedergaard: Ømu og eurozonekrisen 20. august 201

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1 Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen 20. august 201 Dagsorden: 1) Hvad er eurozonekrisen? 2) Udslagene 3) Løsningsinitiativerne 4) Forklaringerne 4) Fremtidsperspektiverne

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Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen 20. august 201. Dagsorden: 1) Hvad er eurozonekrisen? 2) Udslagene 3) Løsningsinitiativerne 4) Forklaringerne 4) Fremtidsperspektiverne. Eurozonekrisen. En gælds- og underskudskrise i eurozonen Udløst af subprimekrisen / Lehman Brothers krak - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

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Peter Nedergaard:ØMU og eurozonekrisen

20. august 201Dagsorden:

1) Hvad er eurozonekrisen?2) Udslagene

3) Løsningsinitiativerne4) Forklaringerne

4) Fremtidsperspektiverne

Page 2: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Eurozonekrisen

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En gælds- og underskudskrise i eurozonen-Udløst af subprimekrisen/ Lehman Brothers krak-Men det var kun den udløsende faktor-Krisen var kommer senere alligevel

Market failures eller government failures?

Page 3: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Indholdet af eurozonekrisen

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- Store underskud I vise lande pga. offentligt overforbrug eller manglende skatteopkrævning

Tegn:

- Boligboble- Forbrugsfest

Konsekvenser:

- Massearbejdsløshed- Lav økonomisk vækst

Page 4: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

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Page 5: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

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Page 6: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Demonstrationer

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Page 7: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Økonomisk vækst i eurozonen 1995-2012

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Page 8: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

I begyndelsen stor forvirring

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Page 12: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Finanspagten

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1. Intergovernmental aftale – med institutionel EU-back up

2. Skærpelse af Vækst- og stabilitetspagten (QMV for sanktioner)

3. Finanspagten: ØMV for at hindre sanktioner

4. Max. 3 pct. konjunkturbetinget underskud

5. Max. 0,5 pct. strukturelt underskud (RAT.CHOICE)

6. Nationale budgetlove

Page 13: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

The EU Replies to the Euro Crisis

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Time at agreement

of the initiative at

the EU level

Initiative Purpose Fora of decision-

making

Form of initiative Obstacles

2010 European Financial

Standing Facility

(EFSF)

Loan to member

states

European Council Temporary facility No bail-out clause

in TFEU (Article

123)

2011 Euro Plus Pact Increase

competitiveness

European Council Intergovernmental

agreement

The UK, the

Czech Republic,

Sweden and

Hungary

abstained

2011 European Semester Monitor national

budgets

European

Commission

Supranational EU

law

 

2011 Six Pack Correction of

macro-economic

imbalances and

sanctions

European

Commission

Supranational EU

law

 

Page 14: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

The EU Replies to the Euro Crisis

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2011 Buy government

bonds

Lower interest rates

in euro crisis

countries

ECB Market intervention German

Constitutional

Court might

declare plans

illegal (cf. Article

123 in TFEU)

2012 European Stability

Mechanism (ESM)

Loan to member

states

European Council Intergovernmental

institution

The UK, the

Czech Republic,

Sweden and

Hungary

abstained

2012 Fiscal Compact Fiscal discipline European Council Intergovernmental

treaty

The UK and the

Czech Republic

abstained

2013 Two Pack Surveillance

mechanisms

European

Commission

Supranational EU

law

 

2013 Banking Union Banking supervisory

authority

European

Commission

ECB supervisory

body

Some non-euro

countries will

abstain (e.g. the

UK and Sweden)

Page 15: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Teoretiske forklaringer på eurozonekrisen

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Euro crisis

Theory

Cause of the political initiatives for the solution to the

euro crisis

Solution to the euro crisis

Neo-functionalism The proposals for closer economic integration and

coordination did not come until some time into the

crisis in 2011, when there was an urgent need to ease

the pressure on the interest rates in crisis countries.

The Fiscal Compact and further tightening of EMU

thereby complete the spill-over process and eliminate

the initial design flaw.

Intergovernmentalism As the leader of the EU Germany accepted the

establishment of EMU to ensure a stable EU, which is

a German interest. It has been an active leader from

2011 and onwards, when the euro crisis began to

affect important German economic and political

interests.

Euro crisis gives Germany an incentive to assume the

role of hegemon, but a solution requires other EU

member states to agree to Germany playing this role.

Ordo-liberalism Germany assesses the 2011 situation and concludes

that the EMU needs a dose of ordo-liberalism in the

form of monetary stability, zero-tolerance towards

public deficits and effective sanctions embedded in a

form of economic constitution.

The decision-makers of the euro countries adjust

institutions as well as their way of thinking in

accordance with the German model. Ordo-liberalism

assumes complete ideological hegemony and is

internalised at the decision-making level in the euro

area.

Page 16: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Prognoser angående en permanent løsning på

eurozonekrisen

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Prognoses

 

Theory

Prognosis regarding the solution to the euro crisis: positive or negative?

Neo-functionalism Positive: Once the EU has corrected the design flaws of the EMU through

tightened rules, the euro crisis will be solved.

Intergovernmentalis

m

Positive/ negative: The other euro countries have to accept the hegemon

role of Germany and the German population has to accept the costs of

playing the role of the leader.

Ordo-liberalism Negative: Ideology and institutions are not easily changed into an ordo-

liberal model.

Page 17: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Faldende tilslutning til det europæiske projekt

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Page 18: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Mistillid til nationale politske ledere (undtagen Merkel)

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Page 19: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Mistillid til hinanden?

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Page 20: Peter Nedergaard: ØMU og eurozonekrisen  20. august 201

Opsamling

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•EU har betalt en høj pris for ikke at centralisere den økonomisk-politiske beslutningstagen

1.I første omgang så der ikke ud til at være nogen pris at betale

2.Kommissionen var samtidig tøvende med at tilslutte sig den funktionalistiske argumentation

3.Kommissionen fra 2010: Gennemgang af finanslove om foråret, før de vedtages om efteråret + europagten i 2011: Offentlige lønninger, pensioner, produktivitet, konkurrenceevne.

4.Kommissionen styrer de factor finanspolitikken i Grækenland

5.Finanspagten