Playing the Possession Game: Development through Hosting the FIFA World Cup

Joseph Wenner University Honors in International Studies

Advisor: Professor Christine Chin (SIS) Honors Capstone, Spring 2012

May 8, 2012

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Abstract

The benefits of hosting the FIFA World Cup are unclear. Existing case studies have restricted their analysis to immediate revenue flows, demonstrating only that host-nations lose money in the short run. Yet despite the World Cup's apparent financial detriment, countries continue to compete to host it. Can hosts use the event to foster development? And if so, how? To answer these questions, this paper utilizes a comprehensive framework which divides the analysis into ex ante and ex post sections. First, this paper develops the six-question Preparation Synchronicity Scale in order to succinctly rate and analyze the inclusion of the host's local and national policy communities in the World Cup's planning process. Next, the impact of the event itself is divided and analyzed through three dimensions: 1) economic; 2) social; and 3) national image. By applying this framework to three World Cup cases—United States 1994; South Korea and Japan 2002; South Africa 2010—this analysis provides a more accurate understanding of the World Cup's development potential. Findings indicate that nations which prepare for the event with focused objectives while including local and national policymakers in the decision-making process are more likely to experience positive social and national image impacts. However, even for countries that host the games with such goals—like South Africa—the top-down governance of FIFA can prove to be a detriment to local development and inflict heavy financial costs. Ultimately, if FIFA World Cup hosts are to reap the full benefits of the event in the future, they must utilize grassroots control over the event's planning and branding efforts. This implication is relevant to the operations of all international nongovernmental organizations within international sport tourism.

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Introduction

Like many mega-sporting events, the FIFA World Cup is often heralded by political

figures as a watershed moment for its host, an event whose tourists supposedly are harbingers

both of increased economic development and an improved national reputation. Regarding the

most recent tournament in South Africa, former South African President Thabo Mbeki declared

that it was “a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of

poverty and conflict” (Runciman 2010). Yet empirical evidence has raised questions concerning

this conventional wisdom. In South Africa alone, poor planning led to exorbitant cost overruns

and uneven returns for the hosts. A $225 million budget for stadium renovations ballooned to

$2.13 billion. Moreover, the benefits of an “international reputation” remain unclear to many,

and how one acquires them is equally enigmatic. Therefore, this paper attempts to clarify the

potential benefits hosts of the FIFA World Cup Finals can realize, and the methods that lead to

their realization.

Justification

What are the expected benefits of hosting the World Cup? And how can hosts achieve

them to their fullest extent? Previous analyses of mega-events—including the World Cup—have

established that economic benefits are few and far between. However, the opportunity to hold the

world's undivided attention for two months—nearly three billion people watched the 2006 World

Cup Final match—should not be ignored. Scholars like Anholt believe that focused branding

efforts coordinated with such mega-events can offer nations the opportunity “for countries, cities

and regions to earn a better and stronger reputation,” possibly leading to tangible economic and

social benefits (Anholt 2009 25). But these hints at development lead to further questions. Do

branding efforts guide the impact of the event? What kind of international cooperation is needed

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between the host, its citizens, NGOs and supranational bodies to attain these benefits?

While these questions go unanswered, the FIFA and host countries continue to prepare for

future World Cups. But these supposed economic and reputational benefits are still often touted

as the justifications for hosting the tournaments. After awarding the 2022 FIFA World Cup to

Qatar, FIFA President Sepp Blatter spoke of the $3 billion of investment the tournament would

bring to the small Arab country (Carlson 2010). Moreover, Qatar has already debuted an ad

featuring the legendary midfielder Zinedine Zidane that portrays the World Cup uniting the Arab

world. Yet the accuracy of such claims remains unclear, and host nations have little guidance to

avoid past mistakes. Thus, further research is needed to clarify the feasibility of attaining

multidimensional development benefits through the World Cup.

Literature Review

An analysis of previous scholarship concerning the World Cup, sports tourism and its

sustainable development potential reveals several key points. First, most FIFA World Cup

specific analyses focus on its direct economic impact, using data solely on the revenue received

during the event and expenditures made during preparation. The large majority of these studies

indicate that World Cups are financial failures, victims of cost-overruns and limited tourism

boosts. Unfortunately, these are primarily short term statistics, and few analyze extended effects.

Yet regardless of the apparent financial detriment of mega-sporting events like the World Cup,

countries continually compete to host them. This suggests that studies that focus exclusively on

financials do not demonstrate accurately whether the event is a vehicle for long term

development because their limited scope neglects key elements of the event's impact.

In analyses of other mega-sporting events, however, researchers have included other

dimensions to better capture these events' effects. Scherly and Breiter have analyzed other mega-

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sporting events in terms of social, ecological and image effects, as a supplement to economic

analysis. Others such as Anholt have emphasized the role of mega-sporting sporting events in

defining a nation's reputation in the international community, insisting that national image

branding can have a significant effect on these multidimensional impacts. Moreover, Weed has

added an equally important dimension to sport tourism impact by demonstrating the importance

of the event's political context, and the coherence of the policy communities involved in

organizing the event. These added dimensions create a clearer depiction of a mega-sporting

event's impact and the impact's origins. While this collective scholarship has demonstrated its

analytical capabilities through studies of Olympic host cities, their principles have yet to be

applied to the FIFA World Cup. This paper seeks to examine this applicability.

Skepticism of Economic Gains

The skepticism of World Cups and their economic benefit has evolved from short term

economic studies of other mega-sporting events. Many economists have provided convincing

hard data consisting of consistent cost-overruns and increased national and municipal debt

directly connected to mega-sporting events. Zimbalist (2010) examines the 2004 Olympic Games

in Athens, noting that its $40 billion price tag was more the 30 times over its originally estimated

cost of $1.6 billion. Similar fiscal sob stories abound. Porter (1999) highlights Barcelona in

1992, which added $4 billion to Spain's national debt and put the city itself $2.1 billion further

into the red. Similarly, Nagano in 1998 drained the Japanese treasury of $11 billion. It appears

that not only does the prestige of international sporting events come with an extortionate price

tag, but one that grows following its original purchase.

Still, the economist might content that this shocking cost could pay-off in the long run if

the tourism it encourages is large enough. Here, the verdict is mixed. To many economists, one

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of the World Cup's strengths arises from increased tourists and tourism revenue within the host

nation. Vanhove (2005) argues that in the current age of globalization, the economic potential of

international events has risen drastically as a result of rising ease of travel and expendable

income. Nevertheless, there are those like Coates (2010) who suggest that even with increased

tourism revenues, the long run outcome of hosting a World Cup would still be negative. While

the United States was still bidding to host the 2022 World Cup (which would eventually be

awarded to Qatar), Coates contended that regardless of number of soccer tourists, “the World

Cup would likely cost the United States billions of dollars of lost economic impact.” Specifically,

he argued that the needed infrastructure, security and logistical investments—which make up the

bulk of expenditures—have routinely surpassed original budget estimates and have limited long

term return to society. Thus, he predicts a net $5 billion loss in taxpayer funds.

A More Holistic Approach

However, tallying inflows and outflows of cash is not the only method of analyzing the

impact of mega-sporting events. In fact, these case studies have typically focused exclusively on

comparisons between expenditures and revenue to come to a conclusion on the event's economic

merit to its hosts. Yet a deeper exploration into the literature reveals analytical frameworks that

have taken a much more multidimensional approach to assessing the impact of a mega-sporting

event.

Examining these events in even greater detail, Scherly and Breiter (2002) have developed

an analytical scheme that encompasses a wide range of possible effects. They divide the impact

of a sporting event into four parts: 1) economic; 2) ecological (transport, landscape, waste); 3)

social; and 4) image. Introducing these new dimensions of analysis seems to suggest that by

focusing an analysis solely on economic data may eschew important information more relevant

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to the World Cup's long term legacy.

Similarly, Anholt's work (2010; 2007) in competitive branding and national identity has

particular relevancy when examining the extended effects of hosting the FIFA World Cup. Anholt

introduces the concept of competitive identity by first explaining that in the age of globalization,

every country must compete with every other for its share of the world's consumers, tourists,

investors, attention and respect. He writes that “the reputation of a country has a direct and

measurable impact on just about every aspect of its engagement with other countries, and plays a

critical pole in its economic, social, political and cultural progress” (Anholt 2007 99).

Essentially, Anholt contends that increasing one nation's reputation within another potential

trading partner, influential nation, or ally can yield extended returns for the country now held in

high regard. The possibility of increasing national reputation through the World Cup fits in

directly with Scherly and Breiter's image component of a sporting event's impact. Could a

sporting event offer such an increase in national reputation?

According to both Anholt and others, the answer is yes, although a tentative one. Anholt

cautions that “simply managing to win the right to host a major sporting or cultural event isn't in

itself a way of creating Competitive Identity, or even a lasting international profile” (Anholt 23).

Instead, nations must know beforehand exactly what they want to communicate and prove about

themselves while they are hosting a mega-sporting event. As Anholt explains, “the event gives

the country permission to make one single, clear, striking point about itself,” but the host must a

have a focused plan if this point is to be communicated effectively.

If the host does implement an effective communication plan, mega-sporting events can

significantly influence image and reputation. Through his City Brands Index, Anholt has

constructed a method of measuring the international association of an event with its host nation

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or city.1 He points to the 2000 Sydney Olympics as an example of successful branding. With an

international awareness rating of 87 out of 100, the Sydney games portrayed the Australian city

as a sleek, contemporary and energetic destination. Anholt goes as far to say that “it is no

exaggeration that the modern image of Sydney was built on the Olympic Games” (Anholt 2007).

Indeed, the Sydney Olympic Bid specifically elucidated their image objective as early as 1993 in

their internal report “The Sydney Olympic Games” (Blaser 22). Anholt contends that this

coherent branding plan guided the actions of the Sydney Olympic Committee in ways that

matched that nation's desired image. In turn, this branded image can be directly linked towards

the ecological and social impacts that followed. For example, much of that Olympics' needed

infrastructure was built on formerly polluted land. The Olympic village was constructed on a 425

hectare post-industrial landfill. Moreover, the park is still used by Sydney's citizens and tourists

today, providing societal benefits more than 12 years after the event itself (Blaser 51). These

tangible results emphasize the importance of a focused branding plan, as “one of the key reasons

that the Sydney Olympics has been an environmental success is that a long-term, strategic

approach was taken from the outset.” When included in Scherly and Breiter's framework,

Anholt's concept of competitive identity clearly demonstrates the importance of including

national image in any measurement of an event's impact on development. Economic data alone

seems to leave on incomplete picture.

Indeed, case studies that examine mega-sporting events through this more holistic lens

have identified several elements that can lead to a positive outcome for the host nation. Weed

(2005) suggests that hosts who have focused growth strategies when entering the games, guide

1 Through regular surveys, the City Brands Index measures six different variables: presence, place, potential,

pulse, people, and prerequisites. The index take into account the events, organizations or people that the global public associates with that city, and distills out the proportional impact each has on the specific city's image.

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these strategies according to the area's normal growth patterns, and market themselves both

before and after the events can expect to see positive results. These results are optimally

observed through Scherly and Breiter's framework. For example, Ritchie and Smith (1991) have

examined the effect of the 1988 Winter Games in Calgary, noting that “the number of non-

Canadian visitors to the wider state of Alberta has never dropped below pre-Olympic numbers,”

in large part due to the continued use of the game's infrastructure. Scherly and Breiter would say

this is a clear societal benefit. In addition, Sanahuja (2002) calls the Barcelona games—the same

denounced as a fiscal failure by Porter—as “the best example of the positive effects of the

Olympics on long-term trade and development,” due to its enhanced reputation as a tourism

destination which remains to this day. This can be characterized an economic benefit spurred on

by a direct change in the city's image, if analyzed via Scherly and Breiter. These

multidimensional Olympic studies suggest that long term benefits may be earned through mega-

sporting events. Unfortunately, their frameworks have yet to be applied to an examination of the

World Cup.

Importance of Politics in Sport Tourism

Clearly, Scherly and Breiter offer an inclusive conceptual framework for the analysis of

mega-sporting events and their developmental impact on their hosts. Separating the event's total

effects into economic, ecological, social and national image adds some of the needed holistic

element to the analysis. However, many scholars would say a key component is missing, one that

would add greater understanding and comprehension to these individual impacts: analysis of the

political context and policy coherence.

Weed writes that any analytical framework for sports tourism must “provide an

understanding of the international and regional level policy contexts within which local

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destination planning and development takes place” (Weed 2005 123). His scholarship has

focused on the operation of “policy communities for sport tourism, which he defines as “groups

sharing an interest in a policy sector that interact with each other on a regular basis to maximize

benefits of their relationships with each other” (Weed 2002 123). However, Higham has

cautioned that forming these planning communities is complex, and that all too often top-down

planning prevents a lack of meaningful input from destination communities (Higham 2002 97).

Consistently, he has emphasized that national governments and international bodies can have

unintended consequences if their policies are not conducive to development in the host nation.

This concept of synchronized political communities has been applied to past analyses of

the Olympics. Many have noticed the key role that the International Olympic Committee plays in

the games' impact on its host. Thompsen has called the IOC “not only the protector of the

Olympic ideal, but also the world's greatest tour operator” (Thompsen 2003). Recognizing the

importance of the IOC, Higham's analysis of the 2000 Sydney Olympics reveals that national

governments must be able to actively assert their logistical requests within the larger policy

community if they wish to meet their development goals through a mega-sporting event.

Otherwise, the international non-governmental organizations can direct the expenditure of the

event in a way that has a negligible or even negative impact on local host communities. Higham

concluded the IOC has channels in place that allow for significant host input. Power over the

event's agenda and implementation is not disproportionally distributed between the IOC,

potential host nations, local governments and other relevant actors. But can the same be said for

soccer?

This work suggests that the political context surrounding the World Cup should greatly

affect the event's impact on the host. Coherence of the policy communities is vital. Applying the

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logic of both Weed and Higham, FIFA's role in international soccer and its interaction with

potential hosts and local communities may play a significant role in the World Cup's potential

benefits or detriments to its host. Thus, this paper will add an analysis of the political context to

form a comprehensive approach to assessing the World Cup's development potential.

After reviewing the literature examining development through mega-sporting events,

several things are clear. First, economic data which focuses solely on the revenue received and

expenditures made during preparation does not demonstrate accurately whether the event was a

vehicle for long term development. Unfortunately, most of the treatments of past World Cups

focus on these short term statistics, and few analyze the extended effects. The several case

studies of past Olympics, the work of Anholt and the work of Scherly and Breiter, however,

demonstrate that mega-sporting events can provide long term benefits. Moreover, in order to

cover all influences that affect a mega-sporting event's impact, Weed demonstrates that

frameworks must acknowledge the importance of the surrounding political context. While this

scholarship has demonstrated its analytical capabilities through studies of Olympic host cities,

whether their principles can be applied to World Cup host nations remains unexamined by

scholarship.

Therefore, this paper seeks to fill this gap in scholarship by employing a

multidimensional analysis of the planning and execution of past World Cups and clarifying their

development implications. Transcending traditional economic analysis, this paper will first

examine the event's political context and intended branding efforts before offering a

comprehensive framework which divides an event's possible impacts in to three clear

dimensions: 1) economic; 2) social (which in order to streamline the analysis and presentation

includes environmental and ecological); and 4) image. Through this multifaceted approach, this

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framework will allow the reader to attain a more accurate and coherent understanding of the

World Cup's development potential.

Research Design

Inspired by the research on mega-events reviewed above, this paper constructs a research

design that transcends the traditional economic approach of analyzing a World Cup Final's

impact on its host. Essentially, the analysis will be divided into ex ante and ex post sections.

First, we will examine the political context of the event and its intended branding effect. This

section will analyze the interaction of the various parties involved in the organization of a World

Cup. The following section will analyze the World Cup's ultimate impact on its host in terms of

economic, societal and image dimensions. In this way, one may satisfactorily answer how host-

nations of the FIFA World Cup can use the two month event to foster extended, multidimensional

development benefits.

We will analyze three specific World Cups in this paper: United States 1994; South Korea

and Japan 2002 (jointly-hosted); South Africa 2010. These cases were chosen specifically

because they represent a wide variance in contexts and results, and therefore their dissimilarity

should serve as ample protection against any selection bias. Moreover these regions consist of

diverse governments, political contexts and levels of economic development, which should make

the resulting research as applicable as possible to any future World Cup Finals. Before

undertaking the complete analysis, this paper suggests that nations which prepare for the World

with focused objectives and branding—within a synchronized political community—are more

likely to experience positive economic, social and image impacts.

In order to understand this framework, we must define its various dimensions while

delineating how their respective data will be collected and evaluated, beginning with the ex ante

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section. The political context portion will examine the interaction of the state, international

NGOs, local NGOs, and city actors in the buildup of each respective World Cup. Included in this

will be the operating methods of FIFA, the politics of the tournament's bidding process, the

makeup of each country's organizing committee and the levels of communication between these

parties throughout the process. This analysis will be used to determine the coherence and

synchronicity of policy communities, as explained by Weed. The data will be gathered through

contemporary news reports gathered through Lexis Nexus, the Local Organizing Committee's

bidding documents, and academic articles. The second section within the ex ante half of each

case's analysis will examine the attempts to brand the respective World Cups. Drawing from

Anholt, an event brand will be defined as the central themes or messages that the host-nations (or

other political bodies) attempt to convey to the international community. This will be determined

by analyzing original FIFA World Cup documents, official organizing committee releases,

reports on World Cup preparations, and previous academic papers.

In order to better present the information gathered for each World Cup's political context

and branding efforts, this first section of each case will answer six questions developed by the

author specifically for this study. This framework will be called the Preparation Synchronicity

Scale (PPS). It includes three questions for the political context:

• Were local, regional, city and federal governments consulted and included in the bid process?

• Was the host (or co-hosts) the favored option of FIFA officials?

• Was the bid process without significant controversy?

And three for the branding efforts:

• Was the branding effort consistently espoused by the local organizing committee?

• Was the brand supported by local, regional, city and federal governments?

• Was the brand reciprocated and supported by FIFA?

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From the data collected, these questions will be answered either “yes,” “no,” or “inconsistent.”

To streamline the data, these answers will be quantified: a “yes” answer will equal 1, “no” will

be 0 and “inconsistent” will be .5. Adding these numbers up will give each case a PPS score from

0-6, 0 being the most unfavorable political context and branding conditions and 6 being the most

favorable. If the work of Anholt and Weed is accurate and applicable to the World Cup, the

higher the score, the more likely the event's multidimensional impacts will be favorable towards

its host.

The ex post analysis of the World Cups' impact on their hosts will follow. This section

will pay special attention to how much of this impact relates to the intended branding of the

respective tournament. First, the paper will examine the economic impact, determined by the

amount of revenue spent and received by the host nation, cities and FIFA. There is ample

economic data available through public FIFA budgets and previous analyses of World Cups. The

next dimension this paper will investigate is the tournament's societal impact, focusing on how

the tournament's infrastructure and planning investments have improved the host citizen's quality

of life. While quality of life has the potential to be a nondescript term, this paper will assess it

through the continued use of infrastructure, political changes, and lifestyle changes that

originated from the World Cup. These figures will be obtained through host nation government

reports, contemporary and current news reports, and additional academic analyses. Societal

impact will also include environmental effects, such as respective national greenhouse gas

emissions, environmental effects resulting from construction, travel, and/or area clean ups. This

will be measured through local news accounts, greenhouse gas measurements from the UNFCCC

and reports from the host countries' national environmental regulatory bodies. Finally, we will

analyze the tournament's effect on its host's international image, specifically regarding the

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intended branding image. As another intangible effect, measuring this dimension also poses

challenges. However, this paper will consult Anholt's Nation's Branding Index (when available),

the Reputation Institute's database (when available), surveys, and official statements from

various international governments in order to gain an accurate perspective to the World Cup's

effect on its host's image.

For each of these dimensions, impacts will vary between the actors involved in the

hosting process: states, localities, organizers, FIFA, etc. Because this paper aims to identify the

benefits received by the host nation, its research will focus on actors operating inside the host

nation. However, the actions of and the rewards being accrued by FIFA and other outside actors

will also analyzed, in order to place the national impact into context.

Finally, this paper will compare the preparation synchronicity scale rating of each case

with its overall impact. If the preparation efforts play a role in shaping the World Cup's impact,

than the economic, social and image changes should not only be more positive, but also directly

related to the intended branding and policy objectives identified in the preparation stages. Again,

if the work of Anholt and Weed proves to be applicable to the World Cup, the higher a case's

preparation score, the more likely the event's multidimensional impacts will be favorable towards

its host.

Data

Before we start analyzing each of our respective World Cup cases, it would be helpful to

briefly explain the basics of the World Cup and the organization of FIFA. In this way, the

importance of select details will be clearer to the reader. The FIFA World Cup is a 32 team

tournament that occurs every four years. It can be hosted by one nation or two nations at once.

The participating teams typically play their games in eight to twelve stadiums across the host

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nation, which take place over the course of two months.

The rights to host the event are controlled by FIFA, which is the international governing

body of soccer. It operates with the goal of facilitating international soccer contests and the

“worldwide growth and development of the game” itself (FIFA 2006). Six to eight years before

each tournament is scheduled to begin, the FIFA Executive Committee selects the host from

prospective nations bidding to host the event. This Executive Committee a 23 member group

with a rotating membership, consisting of eight vice presidents and 15 members of the

regional/continental soccer authorities. After establishing these basics, this paper can now begin

the analysis of its three cases.

United States 1994

Political Context

The first case this paper analyzes is the 1994 World Cup, which was hosted by the Unites

States. When analyzing the level of policy synchronization between FIFA, the organizing

committee and various levels of the United States government, it is clear that there was notably

little government involvement in the United States’ bid and organizing effort for the 1994 World

Cup. As a result, the process was largely controlled by the United States Soccer Federation

(USSF). This left cities, states and even the U.S. national government outside of the World Cup's

policy community.

Newspaper reports on the organizing process make it clear that not only were American

elected officials not involved in the process, they had little interest in it. Reporting from FIFA

Headquarters in Zurich during the bid vote, Himmelberg notes the “unlike the other countries'

bids, World Cup USA receives no direct government support” (Himmelberg 1988). This was not

necessarily a result of the USSF not trying to include government entities. As the Chicago

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Tribune reported, “US Soccer tried to talk about the project with city and state officials and

tourism agencies and couldn't get a response” (Hersh 1990). Consequently, city governments

were not included in planning efforts until they were chosen to host a game, which occurred

more than two years after the tournament's planning efforts started.

With minimal government influence on the bid process, the USSF was left as the sole

domestic influence on America's World Cup. Throughout the planning process, it often chose to

simply placate the demands of FIFA, as these were often in tune with its own priorities. An

analysis of the United States’ bid presentation to FIFA officials makes this clear. The US

shrewdly framed its bid as a lucrative opportunity for international soccer (Roberts 58). USSF

President Werner Fricker emphasized the potential for marketing and international television

rights (Himmelberg 1993). Moreover, everyone recognized that the existing world-class stadiums

gave American a profitable head start for organizers. Finally, the USSF went as far as to

guarantee FIFA that they would start an American professional soccer league should they receive

the tournament (Himmelberg 1993). Clearly, FIFA was presented with few negatives. An

American World Cup gave them the most potential for profit and the least number of obstacles to

achieve it.

With their similar objectives, FIFA and the USSF formed a tight and coherent policy

community for the 1994 World Cup, with FIFA controlling the reins. For example, soon after

being awarded the World Cup, Fricker began to backtrack on the promise of delivering FIFA a

professional soccer league. In response, FIFA began to actively campaign against Fricker's

reelection campaign, throwing their support behind the eventual successor Alan Rothenberg

(Sudgen and Tomlinson 249). Rothenberg pledged to “establish a new professional league at a

premiere level” (Sinha 1996). This episode demonstrated that the USSF and FIFA were often

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very coordinated while planning the World Cup. And when they were not, FIFA was intent on

guiding the USSF back to the right page.

While there was some limited contention about giving the World Cup to the United

States, FIFA wanted to see an American World Cup. Analyzing the bidding process reveals that

FIFA desired to expand soccer to larger, unexplored and more profitable markets. While the

competing bids of Brazil, Morocco and Switzerland attracted some support, the United States'

bid ultimately received more votes than Brazil and Morocco together (Sugden and Tomlinson

248). It is important to note that through the 16 month process, FIFA President Joao Havelange

remained noticeably silent despite the pleas for support from his native Brazil. Most interpreted

this as a “diplomatic nod to the United States” (Harvey LA Times 1988). Sugden notes that

Havelange was unhappy with the infrastructure in the three alternative bids. Essentially, the

previous World Cup in Mexico had set the expectation for higher profits (Sugden 110) (Harvey).

In terms of population, infrastructure and marketing potential, the United States was most poised

to offer the windfall results the FIFA sought.

Initially, the selection of the US was met with “a combination of disbelief, hoots of

derision and skepticism” from the media and world soccer fans (Sugden and Tomlinson 248).

Indeed the United States was a nation with little soccer history. The American national team had

not even qualified for a World Cup since 1950. Clearly, there was some minor contention in the

choice.

However, FIFA’s officials were set on the United States. They were intent on increasing

the awareness of the world's sport in an area they considered to be “the final frontier”

(Himmelberg 1993). As Matheson writes, “FIFA's strategy to use the World Cup to open or

expand markets for the sport explains the selection of the United States, arguably the world's

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most affluent country but without notable soccer traditions” (Matheson 3). This clarifies FIFA's

clear political and business motivation for selecting the United States to host the 1994 World

Cup.

Branding Efforts

As the previous section demonstrates, the USSF and FIFA controlled the majority

decisions made within the organization process. This included the branding efforts. In

accordance with their objectives, they chose to use the competition to portray America as a

soccer-friendly nation. As the new president of USSF Alan Rothenberg stated, the tournament

would “establish a legacy for US soccer to flourish at every level of play” (Sugden and

Tomlinson 249). Essentially, the legacy of the event would be the sport itself.

At the most basic level, the USSF (and by extension of their control, the local organizing

committee) desired an American culture with soccer in a more prominent role. The World Cup

offered them a tool to achieve it. Upon receiving the tournament, USSF Treasurer and president

of the bid committee Paul Stiehl stated that “the World Cup will give us the kick start that we've

needed for so long to popularize the sport in the United States” (Harvey 1988). His sentiments

were echoed by Rothenberg two years later: “We've been at a limbo-like stage. It would have

taken generations for the sport to reach the level where we believe it should be in the United

States. The World Cup will enable that to happen much faster” (Lief 1990). Members of the local

organizing committee consistently stated that the ultimate goal was to make American soccer

competitive at an international level (Harvey 1988). A new professional league and a successful

World Cup were all part of this objective.

As made clear in the political context section, a huge motivation for giving the World

Cup to the United States was to expand soccer's market. As a result, FIFA fully cooperated and

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coordinated with the USSF in attempting to popularize soccer in the United States. FIFA

recognized that while the main branding effort was demonstrating that American could embrace

the game of soccer, an integral element of this was showing how the game of soccer could

embrace its American hosts. Concerned that the game would be considered too slow, FIFA

changed several minor rules. They altered the offside rule to favor attacking play, developed a

strict procedure to escort injured players on and off the field, eliminated passing back to the goal

keeper's hands, and would award teams 3 points for a win instead of 2 (FIFA Rule Changes

1992). Essentially, “these innovations matched the image of soccer in the USA that sponsors

were keen to promote—a free-flowing, creative game with few of the trappings of over

aggression and violence characteristic of other top-level professional sports teams” (Sugden and

Tomlinson 250) This was all an element of the coordinated branding effort to ingrain soccer into

American culture.

City and local governments were not included until the planning process' later stages, and

as a result the local organizing committee was able to control the flow of its resources in a way

that protected its intended brand to the fullest extent. Specifically, the USSF held the stadiums

that were bidding to host various games to strict criteria. Organizers listed eight particular

priorities: stadium capabilities, government desire and support, local interest, population,

geography, city services, and special facilities (FIFA Bid Requirements 1994). These reflected

FIFA and USSF's chosen tactics to achieve their strategic brand: through spectacle and world-

class surroundings. US Bid Official Sebastian LeTellier stated that “only cities with remarkable

bids would be allowed to host the World Cup” (Lieff 1990). Essentially, only cities willing to

work with FIFA and the USSF's brand would be included in the process.

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Pre-event Planning Summary

• Were local, regional, city and federal governments consulted and included in the bid process?: No

• Was the host (or co-hosts) the favored option of FIFA officials? Yes

• Was the bid process without significant controversy? Inconsistent

• Was the branding effort consistently espoused by the local organizing committee? Yes

• Was the brand supported by local, regional, city and federal governments? No

• Was the brand reciprocated and supported by FIFA? Yes

• Total Score: 3.5

Based on the questions of the preparation synchronicity scale, the 1994 World Cup scored

a middle-of-the-road 3.5 out of a possible 6. The United States was clearly FIFA's favored option

from the start of the bid process, and the choice to brand America as a soccer friendly nation was

consistently embraced by host and FIFA organizing officials. However, it is important to note

that there was virtually no government involvement in the organizing process. Elected officials

took little active interest in the six year-long planning process. It was not until the final 18

months that the cities that would host the games were incorporated into the planning discussions.

And even when they were, their input was largely restricted to logistics. FIFA and the USSF had

a firm hold on the majority of preparations for the 1994 World Cup, and they had similar ideas

for the event. Essentially, the American World Cup had a very synchronized policy community,

but the policy community itself excluded the host's government officials, separating the effort

from the majority of American society. This limited control over the event's organization can be

seen in the following section's analysis of the 1994 World Cup's the impact, where the benefits

themselves are also limited.

Economic Impact

For both FIFA and its United States organizers, the 1994 World Cup was an immediate

financial success. Coates writes that “the clear economic beneficiaries of the American World

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Cup have been FIFA and the U.S. Soccer Federation, which were leading and represented on the

bid committee” (Coates 2009). This was reflected in the basic statistics. In total, over 3.6 million

people attended games, selling out all but two games and generating over $210 million in tickets

sales, all of which went to the organizing committee (duke.edu). In fact, the 1994 World Cup still

holds the record of the most well-attended World Cup tournament (FIFA.com). Propelled by this

excellent attendance, the USSF made approximately $49 million in profits (NY Times 1996).

While the USSF benefited greatly from the astounding attendance, FIFA benefited from

extensive sponsorship deals and high television ratings. Initiative Media Analytics estimates that

more than 30 billion cumulative viewers worldwide watched the 1994 World Cup on TV (Horne

1236). For the final match alone, 1.4 billion viewers tuned in (Wood 1992). For some

perspective, this is three times larger than the television audience of 1969 moon landing. With

television ratings 30 percent higher than expected, networks reaped the benefits. For example,

the Spanish language channel Univision generated twice as much advertising revenue than the

preceding World Cup (Wood 1992).

All of this reflected well on FIFA, which had earned its own $400 million in sponsorship

deals from the tournament. Sugden and Tomlinson note these official sponsors including “Canon,

Coca Cola, Energizer, Fuji Film, General Motors, Gillette, JVC, Master Card, McDonald's,

Philips and Snickers all had undoubted value for their money” (Sugden and Tomlinson 251). It

seems that for FIFA and its American organizers, it would be impossible to describe the 1994

World Cup as anything other than a financial success.

Unfortunately, the impact on the cities and localities that hosted the 1994 World Cup is

much less clear, and can convincingly be portrayed as negative. Before the tournament was

underway, FIFA has estimated that the event would have a $4 billion economic impact on the

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United States (Blaade 352). However, the evidence suggests that this boost probably did not

materialize.

Fortunately, as a result of its extensive existing infrastructure, the United States faced

construction costs much lower that past or future World Cups. Matheson accurately points out

that “the U.S. could have easily provided nine existing facilities that met FIFA standards for

hosting the games and at least twenty preexisting stadiums would have also been adequate”

(Matheson 14). As a result, host cities collectively spent less that $30 million on minor

infrastructure improvements, such as a minor facelift for the Cotton Bowl and the installation of

grass inside the Pontiac Silverdome (Wood 1992). Nevertheless, there were other costs that host

cities needed to bear, such as increased security, road repair and other miscellaneous

expenditures. Added together, host cities spent a collective $370 million through their efforts to

host the World Cup (Matheson 17).

Some may assume that increased tourism revenues would have assuaged these costs.

However, Blaade's extensive examination of the U.S. post-tournament suggests otherwise. By

analyzing changes in revenue and economic growth, his model estimates that “the average host

city experienced a reduction of income of $712 million relative to predicted growth” (Blaade

348). While some cities like Chicago did indeed seem to experience positive income growth

through the World Cup, nine of the thirteen host cities experienced income declines (Blaade

345). Blaade attributes most of these declines to a “crowding out effect relating to perceptions of

limited hotel rooms, high hotel prices and peak use of public goods, causing regular consumers

to reduce their consumption” (Blaade 354). Collectively, Blaade concluded that the World Cup

had an overall negative impact on American host city economies of $9.8 billion (Blaade 346).

This number has been supported by others, including Coates (Coates 2).

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Ultimately, with its high attendance, lucrative sponsorships and astronomical TV ratings,

the 1994 World Cup left organizers with large profits and was a popular success. However, the

economic success of the tournament for its host cities is far from clear. Numerous case studies

suggest that “the $4 billion economic impact projected by Cup boosters probably did not

materialize” (Blaade 352). Following this analysis, it appears that the same parties that exerted

the most political control over the branding and planning objectives of the World Cup reaped

most of the economic benefits.

Societal Impact

Just as the economic benefits of American's World Cup were largely concentrated among

its organizers, its societal benefits occurred in a similar fashion. The 1994 World Cup had little

lasting impact on the quality of life among American citizens. While the potential was apparent,

the soccer focused organizers narrowed the event's effect in order to achieve their soccer focused

goals.

The size of and interest in the 1994 World Cup did give the event an inherent potential for

long-term impact on the nation. While the objectives of the USSF were certainly focused on the

future of soccer in America, it nevertheless wanted to the event to be as successful as possible. In

the words of Bid Official Sebastian LeTellier, “[the USSF] will fill more stadiums than ever

before, sell more tickets, make more money, and everyone involved will benefit” (Oberjuerge

1990).

By 1992, city governments began to believe this as well. Six cities—Dallas, Los Angeles,

Kansas City, Miami, Seattle and Washington, DC—were viciously competing to host the final,

while others were positioning themselves as hosts for the lower round games (Lieff 1992). For

example, Tampa Bay attempted to portray itself as a city that had a legacy of soccer and they

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would benefit from the tournament's legacy in the long run. As Tampa Bay's World Cup Task

Force chairman Cecil Edge argued, “This is a very rich area for soccer, we expect a lot of tourists

from Latin America...we have the complete package for a big sports event” (Oberjuerge 1990).

Clearly, there were many cities that sought long lasting and integrated impacts.

However, a number of cities and small market venues were excluded from hosting the

World Cup due to FIFA sponsor demands. For example, Coca Cola, one of the USSF's and

FIFA's 17 corporate sponsors, insisted that games play only in stadiums where Coke was served

(Himmelberg 1993). If the venue was under a different beverage contract, and that company

refused to sign a waiver, the host city would be unable to host the World Cup. Indeed, Stanford

Stadium was almost eliminated as a host site until Pepsi signed a last minute waiver (Kim 2004

702). Other stadiums like Sun Devil Stadium in Tucson, Arizona and Titan Stadium in Fullerton,

California were completely excluded for sponsorship reasons (Himmelberg 1993). This strict

protection of sponsorship deals solidified FIFA's corporate obligations, but in the process

excluded a number of small market cities from taking part in the World Cup. The organizer's

demanding attitude and abrasive interaction was not lost on local officials. Tampa Bay's Cecil

Edge was quoted after the tournament (and after Tampa Bay was deemed too small a market for

sponsors) stating, “[FIFA and the USSF] have burned local bridges beyond recognition” (Cart

1994).

Moreover, FIFA's infrastructure requirements also forced host cities to make

infrastructure improvements that offered benefits for only the duration of the tournament. For

example, Giants Stadium was one of FIFA's favored venue sites. FIFA General Secretary even

called playing in New York “a necessity” (Associated Press 1991). However, the original field

layout left “no room for corner kicks, benches, or the large contingent of photographers required

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at field level” (Shain 1990). The City of East Rutherford opted to cave to FIFA demands and pay

$5 million to raise the field platform and remove 5,000 seats in order to meet the dimensional

requirements, instead of losing the opportunity to host the World Cup (Shain 1990). Most of the

infrastructure upgrades prompted by the World Cup—like the added seating for the Cotton Bowl

and installing grass fields in indoor domes—were of this nature: temporary and only of added

benefit to the tournament itself.

Granted, there were limited successes. On a positive note, the Los Angeles area did

benefit from becoming the long term base for the US National Soccer Team. The training sites

set up to host a number of the visiting teams continue to be used by the men's and women's teams

(USSoccer.com). Nevertheless, the 1994 World Cup had little lasting impact on the quality of life

among American citizens. While the potential was apparent, the soccer-focused organizers

narrowed the event's effect to achieve their limited goals.

National Image Impact

Analyzing the perception of US soccer after the 1994 World Cup demonstrates that FIFA

and the USSF's attempt to brand America as a soccer-friendly nation was a success. The 1994

World Cup still holds the record as FIFA's highest collectively attended World Cup (FIFA.com).

While the previous sections have cast doubt on the event's positive impact on American society

as a whole (both societal and economic), the impressive organization of the soccer games

themselves presented an impressive visual spectacle which reflected well upon its host among

the international soccer community.

Even beyond the two-month span of the tournament, an increase in soccer popularity in

American was tangible. In 1990, less than 7.2 million children played in an organized soccer

league within the United States. However, only two years after the World Cup that number had

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increased to 17.5 million (CNN.com). Such a shift in recreational activities could also be

witnessed through language. The now-ubiquitous term “soccer mom” was first introduced into

the national lexicon during the 1996 presidential race, and there is no public record of its use

before 1995 (Weisberg 1996). While it’s difficult to draw a direct causation line between this

increased popularity of soccer and the World Cup, the relationship between the two should be

noted, as these were the exact effects intended by FIFA and the USSF's branding efforts.

Moreover, the United States' new domestic soccer league (the MLS) continued to build

upon the United States' soccer legacy. Started as a result of FIFA's prerequisites for hosting the

World Cup, the MLS now has the third highest attendance among professional American sports

leagues, higher that both the NBA and the NHL (Dreier 2011). Its attendance numbers are also

respectable worldwide, being the 12th most attended soccer league in the World (Gaines 2011).

Its high quality of play has drawn world-class international players like David Beckham and

Thierry Henry to the league. Back in 1993, Rothenberg and USSF could have only imagined

such success.

As a result of its prosperous World Cup and domestic league, America's international

soccer reputation greatly improved. Members of the German soccer federation, who had been

notoriously critical of past World Cups, were impressed with the American effort. Its president,

Egidius Braun had only words of praise, saying that the 1994 World Cup “was a sensation. It will

be very difficult for any other country in the world to do it the same way in the future. It can't be

better” (Cart, 1994). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the outside perspective of America's

skill, interest and involvement in soccer was greatly improved.

Synthesis

This case offers convincing evidence that the parties controlling the World Cup's

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preparation and branding efforts are the parties most likely to benefit from hosting the

tournament. Moreover, the results seemed in line with what was expected from the PSS score of

3.5, which demonstrated low government involvement through the process but high policy and

brand cohesion between FIFA and the USSF. When viewed through an Anholt-like perspective,

the 1994 World Cup appears to have been a successful branding effort by both FIFA and the

USSF, who capitalized on their control over the planning process. Without government officials

in the bid effort, the organizing committee and FIFA were free to select host cities and stadiums

that conformed to FIFA's desire for spectacle and sponsor demands. As Weed would likely point

out, there were no representatives to advocate for the cities' needs or for provisions that would

benefit American society as a whole. As a result, the positive impacts—in the economic, societal

and national image dimensions—were very soccer-focused, while benefits for the host cities and

the nation itself were far from apparent.

South Korea and Japan 2002

Political Context

In direct contrast with the United States' lack of government involvement, it is clear that

both South Korea and Japan included government officials of all levels in their initial bids to host

the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Japan in particular was very inclusive and marked a dramatic contrast

with the 1994 World Cup. In 1995, before the bid process had officially started, Japan was

already soliciting cities for their interest in hosting World Cup matches (Manzenreiter 7). By the

time FIFA started the official consideration a year later, 15 cities were already coordinating with

Japanese Football Association, each with representatives on the organizing committee

(McLauchlan 485). However, this did come at a price. The Japanese Football Association

required that all 15 cities wishing to be host locations contribute $1.8 million each to the bid

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effort (McLauchlan 485). While this was quite the price, all 15 cities anted up to ensure their

inclusion through the bid and organization process, increasing the political synchronization of the

effort to host the 2002 World Cup.

South Korean localities were similarly involved through their own country's bidding

process. While the bid committee had the usual cohort of business interests, potential host cities

were also included (Kim 239). Governments from Seoul, Daegu, Jeonju, Suwon, Buson, and

Incheon were all official represented within the South Korean Football Association's bid

committee, while others cities frequently sent delegates to meetings (McLauchlan 487). The

decision to include South Korean cities in the decision making process was also supported on a

popular level. When polled in January 1996, 82 percent of Koreans believed that a World Cup

would provide a significant boost to their local economies (Manzenreiter 9). As a result, local

officials made a concentrated effort to stay involved through the process, raising the potential for

synchronized policies throughout the tournament.

According to Manzenreiter, it was a well-known fact that FIFA wanted an Asia World

Cup (Manzenreiter 7). Similar to the motivation for the 1994 World Cup, Havelange and FIFA

wished to “expand the game to the people of the peripheral world” (Vecsey 1996). Having never

hosted a World Cup, Asia was the next logical locale for an organization wishing to spread

soccer across the globe.

Both South Korea and Japan knew this. However, neither of these nations intended to

cohost the tournament. Instead, they each had organized their bids with the intent of individually

hosting the 2002 World Cup. And as a result, the stakes of the bidding process rose dramatically.

In a process “laden with bitterness, barbed innuendo, claims and counter-claims,” both nations

poured resources into lobbying the FIFA Executive Committee (McLauchlan 484). The Japanese

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Committee spent over $70 million throughout the bid process, while South Korea nearly matched

it with $60 million (Torgler 290).

This conflict over the World Cup stoked larger geopolitical tensions as well. As Horne

notes, the incident “tested the fragile alliance between two East Asian states and their people,

whose relationship was still deeply tainted by memories of the Japanese annexation of the

Korean peninsula in 1920 and the colonial oppression during great parts of the first half of the

20th century” (Horne 1236). When South Korean officials publicly accused Japan of using the

promise of foreign aid to Brazil to secure another vote for their World Cup bid, one could almost

see the political ties unravel (Sugden and Tomlinson 1996).

The possibility of an acrimonious fallout alarmed FIFA. Officials from both the European

Football Association (UEFA) and the Asian Football Association, pressed FIFA to avoid any

situation that resulted in one country winning and one country losing (Sugden and Tomlinson

1996). An anonymous FIFA Vice President agreed, predicting that the consequences would be

“disastrous and devastating” (Longman 1996). As a result, FIFA changed the rules to specifically

allow for co-hosts (FIFA). Havelange then told the Japanese and Korean committees that instead

of a single host, the two would host the tournament together (Vecsey 1996). Neither nation was

pleased. Both Korea and Japan voiced concerns about the anticipated diplomatic complications

in addition to the sure decrease in revenue the tournament would provide (Manzenreiter 11).

Nevertheless, FIFA would not alter its decision.

The acrimonious nature of the bidding war for the 2002 FIFA World Cup set the tone for

the remaining six years of organizing the tournament. Disagreements between the South Korean

and Japanese governments and soccer associations were both frequent and bitter. This is most

clearly demonstrated in the following section, when we examine the attempted branding efforts

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made by South Korea, Japan and FIFA.

Branding Efforts

Continuing the theme of contention between the two hosts and the policy community,

both South Korea and Japan had different messages they wished to communicate through hosting

the 2002 tournament. In addition, FIFA had its own brand of a modernizing and powerful global

entity that it wanted to proliferate, which was difficult amidst the contentious atmosphere

between the two hosts. As a result, there was no singular branding effort for the 2002 FIFA World

Cup.

First, the joint organizing committee could not espouse a consistent brand for the event

because each nation wished to use the event to different ends. South Korean officials made it

clear that they wanted to use the event to advance national pride. As stated above, more than 80

percent of Koreans believed the World Cup would be a positive effect on their lives

(Manzenreiter 9). As a result, politicians had a clear political motivation for being associated

with the tournament. Aim's analysis indicates that the Korean government consequently planned

to use the 2002 World Cup as “a catalyst to create popular harmony, system stability and to

promote a neo-liberal hegemony in Korea” (Aim 8) As such, officials frequently played up the

event as a harbinger of national pride. In 2001, President Kim claimed the opening ceremonies

would open “a new path to national prosperity” (Kim and Petrick 2005). This goal of Korean

national pride failed to even acknowledge Japan's existence as cohost.

On the other hand, the Japanese officials were intent on using the 2002 World Cup to

portray Japan as a developed nation, specifically in terms of sports infrastructure. After Japan

was selected as a cohost, its Minister of Industry of Trade declared that sport was a major growth

machine of the 21st century, and that the World Cup would prove monumental in this regard

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(Manzenreiter 11). This idea of using construction as a major proponent of economic growth is

accepted as political truth in Japan. McCormack has described an “Iron Triangle” of construction

industry chiefs, senior bureaucrats and politicians that have often focused Japan's economy

around construction and public works (McCormack 2004). Unfortunately, there was no such

driving force in Korea. Therefore, while Korea sought to unite its nations through soccer,

Japanese national politicians looked for growth through infrastructure.

Beyond the national incoherence of the event's branding efforts, differing regional intents

also hampered the formation of a clear brand. While Japan and Korea's provincial governments

were included in the organization process, they ultimately had different objectives than national

politicians and soccer officials (Horne 1238). For example, local governments in Japan saw the

tournament as much more of a cultural boon than an economic one (McLauchlan 489). Regions

without popular tourist attractions, like the rural Oita district, thought the event could be used to

shift the region's image (Vanhove 113). On the other hand, “regions with more soft assets tended

to attach less value to the event, since they envisioned less need to enhance their regional image

by exploiting the cultural appear of the World Cup” (McLauchlan 489). Depending on whom one

asked within Korea and Japan, the World Cup said different things about their hosts. This

prevented any brand coherence.

The lack of any brand or political synchronization between Japan and Korea led to much

bickering and contention between the cohosts, stifling many organizing efforts. Printing tickets

were delayed due to a disagreement over the order the of nation's names on official material

(Whitson and Horne 2006). Other questions dogged the organizers. Who would host the opening

ceremonies? The final match? Where would teams be based during the tournament? According to

the Associated Press reporter covering the Cup's organization, negotiations between the two

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nations were always characterized by “historic stubbornness” (Associated Press 1999).

It was only after FIFA pressured the two nations that organizers agreed to host the

opening ceremony in Seoul and the final in Yokohama (McLauchlan 490). In fact, FIFA needed

to step into the process and resolve the majority of these issues. With no coherent policy or brand

coming from the cohosts—only arguments—FIFA took a strong hand towards protecting its own

brand as the world's competent and premiere soccer organization. As a result, FIFA imposed

several strict requirements on organizers. A large part of this was protecting corporate sponsors.

FIFA required both South Korea and Japan to overturn laws banning alcohol at stadiums so that

official sponsors Budweiser could be served and advertised (Manzenreiter 7). However, other

demands seemed to be simply aimed at conveying FIFA's “modern” image. Officials demanded

that tobacco advertisements and smoking be banned from stadiums (Manzenreiter 7). FIFA also

forbade Japan from including whale (a Japanese delicacy) on any official event menus, while

asking Korean officials to enforce existing bans against eating dogs (Manzenreiter 7). Clearly,

FIFA had its own brand to maintain. And with Japan and Korea attempting to espouse different

messages, there was no other strong force guiding the tournament's organization.

Pre-event Planning Summary

• Were local, regional, city and federal governments consulted and included in the bid process?: Yes

• Was the host (or co-hosts) the favored option of FIFA officials? Yes

• Was the bid process without significant controversy? No

• Was the branding effort consistently espoused by the local organizing committee? No

• Was the brand supported by local, regional, city and federal governments? No

• Was the brand reciprocated and supported by FIFA? No

• PPS Score: 2

Following this analysis, the 2002 World Cup earns a PPS Score of 2. While regional

governments were certainly included in the planning process, and hope of a synchronized policy

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community seemed to be dashed by FIFA's cohosting conundrum. Each nation entered the

planning stages with deep-seated tension, scarred not only by a bitter bidding process but also

historic animosity. Therefore it should not be surprising that there was not coherent brand for the

event. Moreover, it was clear that even amongst the regions and cities, there were disagreements

as to what the event should be used to communicate to the international community. Thus, with

little to no policy coherence and no consistent branding effort, the 2002 World Cup has a

predictably low PSS score. Moving forward, it is important to note that the little constructive

communication between the cohosts created a virtual power vacuum to be occupied by FIFA.

Economic Impact

Analysis indicates that the economic impact of the 2002 World Cup Tournament on its

hosts was mixed. However, like in the 1994 tournament, FIFA and the organizing committees

made large profits. FIFA's financial windfall is particularly clear. On television rights alone,

FIFA made $800 million from selling the broadcasting rights to a private sports-marketing group

(Manzenreiter 4). This was approximately seven times as much as it had earned from previous

television deals. FIFA's sponsorship deals reached into the hundreds of millions of dollars as

well.

Both the Korean and Japanese organizing committees also ended with a profit at the

tournament's end. At the close of the final, Japan's committee ended with a $45 million surplus,

which it used to construct a brand new headquarters and museum in Tokyo (Nogawa 2005).

Korea's committee experienced similar results, earning a $31 million dollar profit through ticket

sales and distributing its earnings to local soccer organizations (Kim 2003).

For the nations and cities that hosted the tournament, however, the results were much

more mixed. The Korea National Tourism Organization reported after the tournament that

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230,000 foreign soccer fans visited Korea for the World Cup, spending an average of $2,242 per

person (Korea National Tourism Organization 2002). While these tourists did represent a direct

impact of $307 million in income, South Korea actually received fewer tourists during the two

months of the World Cup than its typical averages in those months (Kim 598). Japanese tourists

typically account for 40 percent of Korean tourism. However, during the World Cup they

declined by 44.6 percent (Lee 601). Clearly, a large number of potential Japanese tourists

decided to stay in Japan and watch the event in their home country. Accordingly, the number of

international arrivals for South Korea in the month of June decreased by 12 percent in 2002

compared to the previous year (Kim 93). There are other examples of the economic impact being

diffused over the two cohosts. Only nine of the 32 World Cup teams were based in South Korea,

while the remaining 21 teams were all based in Japan. As a result, less team, travel and tourist

money were spent in South Korea. Despite this, the South Korean government still spent $1.5

billion on transportation and sports infrastructure, producing eight brand new stadiums and

upgrading rural train and tram systems (Kim 233). Losses were apparent on a macro level as

well, as South Korea's annual GDP growth fell from 6.3 percent in 2001 to 2.6 percent in 2002

(Manzenreiter 12). Certainly, there were economic positives from the World Cup for Korea.

However, the significant negatives almost completely overshadowed them.

Japan's economic conditions after hosting the 2002 World Cup were similar to their

Korean cohosts, with serious negative impacts outweighing the positives. Moreover, the

Japanese organizing committee proved to be a large burden on the localities hosting the event,

despite their continual inclusion in the planning and branding process. In accordance with FIFA's

requirements, Japan invested over $3 billion to support transportation infrastructure (Lakshman

188). On top of that, localities and the national government spent $4.7 billion in taxpayer money

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to construct 10 new stadiums throughout Japan (Manzenreiter 8). Japan also needed to spend $20

million alone on extra event security (Kim 15). Beyond financing the entire tournament's

infrastructure required by FIFA, the Japanese government also funded a significant portion of the

Japanese organizing committee's operating budget. Typically, a committee's funding comes from

both FIFA and corporate sponsors. However, the Japanese committee's sponsorships yielded less

than 20 percent of what they had previously been expected to provide (Manzenreiter 9). Facing a

dire financial situation, the committee persuaded the 10 host cities to provide $12 million in

additional funding (Naikaku 2003). Yet despite ending the tournament in a surplus, the Japanese

committee never repaid the host cities for these additional funds.

Taking the collective economic impact on both hosts, it is evident that the 2002 World

Cup provided neither Japan nor Korea with clear, consistent gains. Both nations spent billions of

dollars building required infrastructure to host the tournament. However, only FIFA and each of

the nation’s organizing committees made a clear profit. National and local governments on the

other hand, were left with the tab. The next section will demonstrate how even the items that the

government paid for left little societal benefits for the host nations.

Societal Impact

Analysis demonstrates that the societal impact of the 2002 World Cup has been largely

negative. Few of the infrastructure items build in preparation for the tournament received

continued use in the long term, while they continue to be a financial burden on Japanese and

Korean taxpayers.

Admittedly, South Korea did see a swift spike in national pride during and immediately

following the tournament. The South Korean National Team made an impressive performance in

the tournament, beating traditional European powerhouses Portugal and Spain on their way to a

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fourth place finish. This marked the first time that an Asian nation had ever finished in the top

four. Predictably, South Koreans united in support of their team. The Korean National Police

Agency estimated that a combined 22 million Koreans gathered on the streets nationwide to

support their national team (Samsung Research Institute 2002). Lee notes that “the success of the

South Korean Football team provided the country with a sense of national pride and

cohesiveness that no economic impact assessment could ever put a dollar value on” (Lee 602).

Indeed, the sight of 7 million citizens collectively gathered on the streets of the capital alone is

an impressive visual for any nation.

Unfortunately, any noticeable metric of national pride had largely dissipated within a

year. Replacing it was the feeling among a majority of Koreans that the tournament was an

economic burden on their local communities (The Samsung Research Institute 2004). Moreover,

most of the eight stadiums the Korean government constructed for the 2002 World Cup remain

significantly under-utilized (Kim 433). All of them are soccer-specific stadiums, which largely

prevents them from being used for any other sports. However, there is little continued demand

for large scale soccer games in Korea. Their domestic league (known as the K-League) averages

an attendance of 11,000 spectators per game (ESPN.com). While five teams do use World Cup

stadiums as their home stadiums, they each average between 20,000-30,000 vacant seats per

game (Kavetos 166). The city of Gwangju perfectly illustrates this disparity between public

funds spent and societal utility received. The city spent $105.6 million to finance the Gwangju

World Cup Stadium, which holds 48,213 (Tong-Hyung 2008). However, it only functions now as

the home of Gwangju FC in the K-League, averaging an attendance of only 8,000, and its use in

other mega-sporting event is minimal (Jennings 2006). Clearly, the sports infrastructure FIFA

required Korea to build came with minimal long term benefits for the cities that paid for them.

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Across the Korea Strait, the Japanese national government's main objective through

hosting this World Cup was to build sports infrastructure. And it succeeded in constructing 10

brand new stadiums. However, like Korea, their value to the host cities remains questionable.

Granted, Japan spent so much money on new stadiums because it believed “that a modern

and enlarged sports infrastructure would have a positive impact on enhancing the quality of life

of the local provincial inhabitants” (Horne 1234). As a result of the localities' inclusion in the

organizing committee's decisions, the tournament's impact was fairly spread out amongst the

regions. Indeed, each of Japan's five regional zones received proportional amounts of venues and

spending, taking into account existing infrastructure and other scheduled sport tournaments

(Horne 1238).

Despite this planning, much of the spending has resulted in a long term financial burden

for Japanese citizens. Seventy percent of the total construction costs for Japan's stadiums were

paid through public bond issues, which continue to be paid off today (Jennings 32). For example,

82.5 percent of the Niigata Big Swan Stadium was financed through regional government bonds,

while the remaining 17.5 percent came directly from the city budget (Manzenreiter 12).

Similarly, $125 million of the $210 million it cost to build the Oita Stadium was financed

through Oita Prefecture Bonds (Horne 1240). Neither of regions will fully pay off their World

Cup induced debt until 2050.

Further analysis of the current use of Japan's World Cup stadiums indicates that beyond

fulfilling an immediate need during the tournament, their societal impact has been negligible

besides this negative financial legacy. For example, the Sapporo Dome costs $20 million per year

to maintain, and only during 2002 did the stadium host enough events to break even (Nogawa

2004). In fact, few of the stadiums have developed sound management systems, suffering from

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too little sporting demand. Even the smallest capacity stadium (Kobe Wing Stadium with 42,000)

is 200 percent larger than the average attendance of Japan's Soccer league (Kinohara 2002). Only

stadiums built in areas with the demand for sports infrastructure have continued to be of service

to the community, such as the Tokyo stadiums. In provincial areas however, where most of the

stadiums were built, they continue to only be a tax burden. As a result, “the World Cup has not

been successful in achieving regional development.” (Horne 1242).

National Image Impact

When assessing the reputational change of the 2002 World Cup cohosts, it is important to

remember that Japan and Korea had two different branding efforts for the event. Korea's was

focused on effusing national pride, while Japan concentrated on infrastructure development.

First, it appears that Korea's appears to have been slightly more successful. And while the

intended benefits from infrastructure have not developed in Japan, it did experience noticeable

cultural benefits similar to those of Korea. However, these changes were only most noticeable up

to 2 years after the tournament.

The Korean government worked very closely with the 10 host cities to plan and schedule

cultural events around the country while the tournament was taking place. Working with FIFA,

officials established “World Cup Plazas” in eight of the 10 host cities, which “were arranged to

present the essence of the traditional cultures of Korea and the other countries participating in the

World Cup” (Kim 235). Coupled with Korea's display of national unity in support of their soccer

team, South Korea presented an impressive visual display of culture for visitors.

After the tournament, South Korea experienced a measurable increase in international

reputation. Questionnaires filled out by tourists before and after the World Cup from China,

Japan and the United States indicated that there was a great positive change in these tourists'

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image of South Korea (Kim 214). Indeed, visitors from all three countries had more positive

images after than before the tournament, which suggests that the 2002 World Cup improved the

image of Korea as a tourism destination (Kim 424). Much of these gains may have been related

to the performance of the soccer team itself. Indeed, the Samsung Economic Research institute

reported that “South Korea's landmark victories against strong European teams, including Italy,

Spain, Portugal and Poland would create enhanced brand images for Korea” (Samsung

Economic Research Institute 2002). Regardless of the source, it was clear that Korea experienced

an improvement in its national image following the World Cup. Still, critics point out that this

reputation was a one-time event, leading to no long term gains. Indeed, memories of Korea's

successful World Cup did not help its bid to host the 2022 tournament, which received the least

amount of votes during the selection process in 2010 (Fifa.com).

On the other hand, Japan's desire to be seen as a sports development powerhouse has seen

mixed results. After the games, surveys revealed that Japanese residents realized that the cost of

building World Cup facilities for visitors and public facilities for visitors was much greater than

expected (Hagn 3). As more and more citizens and international observers realized that most of

these stadiums were simply white elephants, few gave much thought to Japan's insistence that

these sites would deliver long term gains.

Interestingly, Japan did experience some the more intangible benefits that South Korea

also received. Manzenreiter's polling of Japanese provincial bureaucrats and politicians revealed

that “there was a general consent that the event had fostered identification with the region among

the locals, creating a sense of unity and local pride” (Manzenreiter 215). Specifically, the

Shizuoka region's governors insisted that “visitors' appraisal of the successfully managed event

reinforced awareness of traditional Japanese virtues among the Japanese themselves” (Whitson

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76). Ultimately, while economic and societal gains fell short for the Japanese, it appeared that

the World Cup was successful in promoting national pride and developing civil society, at least in

the short term.

Synthesis

This case did pose some challenges, as all of the impacts—and therefore data—was

spread across two nations acting as cohosts. Nevertheless, following this analysis, it is clear that

the mixed impacts of the 2002 World Cup on both South Korea and Japan were in line with the

event's sub-par preparation process. The constant friction between the two cohosts, allowed FIFA

to direct funding and resources to where it thought it was needed most—such as stadium

infrastructure and sponsorships. This undermined the inclusion of cities and localities in the

preparation process, reducing their influence in decisions to allocate resources across the hosts.

As a result, Korea and Japanese cities continue to be burdened with the multimillion dollar

stadiums that are more often than not under-utilized. And as usual, the economic impacts were

negative for the hosts, while FIFA turned a healthy profit. Indeed, data for both South Korea and

Japan seem to indicate that the 2002 World Cup created more cultural and image benefits for

both host nations than either societal or economic. These cultural benefits should be

acknowledged, as Korea did attain its intended goal of national unity, while Japan saw similar,

yet intended effects. However, it is important to note that these intangible image changes were

short-term shifts, did not translate into long term developments, and came with a significant

economic cost. It appears that without a brand to guide the planning process, the World Cup

provides inconsistent and superficial benefits hardly worth the significant economic and societal

costs—even if all levels of government are included in the planning process.

South Africa 2010

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Political Context

The previous two cases offer some examples of the perils of hosting the World Cup. With

either little government involvement or unorganized preparation efforts, the possible

development benefits seem minimal or at best sporadic. However, South Africa offers a

significant contrast in its preparation process. Analysis shows that the 2010 World Cup was

typified by very coherent and synchronized policy communities. Admittedly, FIFA still held most

of the power in the arrangement, and often coerced its host government into actions that would

primarily benefit the soccer community. However, the South African national government and its

localities were able to make synchronized and coherent plans throughout the bidding and

organization process, much more so than previous cases.

It helps to understand that from the beginning of the 2010 bid process, FIFA was adamant

on hosting a World Cup in South Africa. The 2006 World Cup bid process had ended in

controversy, after the New Zealand representative abstained from the final round, allowing

Germany to beat South Africa's bid by one vote (Farqhuar 2000). Several delegates issued calls

for a revote, and it was well known that new FIFA President Sepp Blatter had pledged his

support for a South African World Cup in a January 2000 speech before the Confederation of

Africa's Football Conference (South African Press Association 2000). While Germany went on to

host the 2006 tournament, the 2010 host was essentially a moot point from then on.

Allowing the World Cup to be hosted in South Africa also allowed FIFA to continue the

inspirational narrative that the tournament had come to hold. As Cornelisson argues, FIFA

favored portraying the World Cup as “an event that transcended social cleavages or unhappy

histories” (Cornelisson 252). Like the 1994 and 2002 tournaments before it, the 2010 tournament

also represented FIFA's journey into the “sporting frontier,” spreading the virtues of soccer along

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the way.

Despite FIFA's insistence on South Africa as host, its 2002 experience in South Korea and

Japan had led to the conclusion that “it could not afford to leave host countries loosely in charge

of the preparations and running of future events” (Davies 35). As such, it required that the South

African government sign an organogram in 2004, which obligated South Africa to provide a

number of items FIFA felt were necessary for a successful tournament (Ndlovu 147). These

included: the needed telecoms infrastructure for the media, the needed transportation and sports

infrastructure for teams and tourists, the protection intellectual property rights of FIFA and its

sponsors, priority visas for FIFA personnel (FIFA 2004). By explicitly requiring these elements,

FIFA expressly demonstrated that its needs were a priority in the preparation process.

In order to facilitate these guarantees, the South African government needed to pass

multiple pieces of new legislation. In 2002, the legislature passed the Merchandise Marks Act,

which aimed specifically at preventing anyone not associated with FIFA or their official sponsors

from using the World Cup in advertising materials (Davies 39). Joining this new law was the

Revenue Laws Amendment Act. This altered South Africa's customs and trade policy so that

FIFA would be exempt from taxes and levies (on sporting events and merchandise, for example)

that could interfere with their operations (Davies 39).

While these were clearly a placation to FIFA's demands, they can also be interpreted as

political cooperation between FIFA and its hosts. Obviously both the RLAA and the MMA were

passed for the benefit of FIFA. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that on other issues,

South Africa, its cities and localities successfully integrated the demands of FIFA within their

own government institutions. As a result, South Africa's objectives for the tournament were also

acknowledged and pursued.

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For example, both South Africa's bid committee and the local organizing committee

included five regional government representatives and a deputy cabinet member (Department of

Sport and Recreation South Africa 2007). Moreover, additional government bodies were formed

to tackle various levels of the preparation process, which frequently included host city

representatives (Pillay 2005). The Technical Coordinating Committee oversaw much of the

infrastructure planning from the national level. Working in tandem with the South African

national government, the Host Cities Forum consisted of FIFA members, city officials and

national bureaucrats, offering the hosts cities themselves an avenue to express their needs in a

way that would be heard by the tournament organizers (Davies 42). While FIFA still remained in

control of the bidding and planning process, these bodies clearly represent a level of inclusion

and policy synchronicity that was not event in either the 2002 or 1994 World Cups.

Branding Efforts

Besides the relatively high level of political communication between FIFA, the South

African government and its localities, all of the parties were equally communicative regarding

use of the 2010 World Cup's branding efforts. South African entered into the 2010 World Cup

organizing process wishing to use the event to communicate that that nation was—in the words

of former president Thabo Mbeki—“a contemporary, reinvigorated destination.” This matched

FIFA's desire to be identified as a modernizing force, and therefore received full support from the

event's organizing officials.

Tomlinson notes that from 2000 onward, South African officials realized that “they could

use the World Cup to project a contemporary, reinvigorated image of Africa” (Tomlinson 3). As

such, their branding efforts displayed two prominent features. First was the strong developmental

undercurrent. South Africa had independently started the Expanded Public Works Program in

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2002 as a way to combat unemployment and rebuild national infrastructure. As a result,

politicians frequently referenced that the required infrastructure for the World Cup could be

channeled through this institution (South African Tourism 2010). Indeed, South Africa

formulated a comprehensive development agenda to bring sports programs, medical services and

community centers to deprived neighborhoods (Newton 95). However, South African officials

often used this term development in terms of image, rather than physical or economic

development. For example, South Africa's Minister of Sport stated that “there is much potential

to destabilize notions of South African pessimism through demonstrating that Africans can

successfully manage the World Cup” (Cornelisson 113). As a result, South Africa invited the

German organizers of the 2006 World Cup multiple times to oversee several planning stages as

advisers (Tomlinson 5).

The next feature of the South Africa's World Cup brand was the promotion of a “pan-

African Renaissance” (Cornelisson 114). At the 2004 farewell banquet for the bid committee,

then Deputy-President Jacob Zuma stated that the World Cup “will fit in with our objectives of

working for the sustainable development of our continent. Thus, our victory is therefore the

victory of our sister countries as well” (Desai 155). These two features complemented each other

through the World Cup to promote South Africa as a modern, world-class destination.

The idea of developing South Africa into a reinvigorated nation was more than welcomed

by FIFA. As stated earlier, FIFA officials were keen on being viewed as a modernizing force.

Therefore, South Africa's plan to use the World Cup to recharge its development and

international reputation were ideal. FIFA joined in the efforts to ensure the tournament's

“transformative” legacy, committing to build 20 “Football for Hope Centers” across Africa.

These would provide impoverished youth with access to counseling, health, educational services

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and recreational sports (Davies 35). FIFA clearly wished to be viewed as a proponent and

supporter of African development.

Moreover, South Africa's desire for infrastructure development made FIFA's stadium

requirements not only more politically palatable, but brand appropriate. As stated in South

Africa's bid documents, “the sporting ground upgrade program formed a crucial part of the

overall strategy to leave a lasting legacy. Therefore, the South African Football Association is

firmly resolved to provide facilities that meet every FIFA requirement” (South Africa 2010 Bid

Book, 2003, 10). While FIFA and the South African national government both wished to use

infrastructure as part of the event's branding campaign, their efforts did encounter occasional

moments of local opposition. In Cape Town, the Cape Environmental Protection Association

filed a lawsuit against city in 2007 which momentarily ceased the construction of the Green

Point Stadium (Detlinger 2007). Similarly, a number of public officials in Nelspruit led public

demonstrations calling for the use of public funds to improve local education instead of the

multimillion dollar stadium (Smith 2010). Yet besides such set backs were momentary, and none

proved to be a significant stumbling block for the branding efforts. Indeed, both FIFA and its

hosts were on the same branding page, intending to deliver not only the World Cup experience,

but the envisaged infrastructure, transport and image legacy for a “modern” South Africa.

Pre-event Planning Summary

• Were local, regional, city and federal governments consulted and included in the bid process?: Yes

• Was the host (or co-hosts) the favored option of FIFA officials? Yes

• Was the bid process without significant controversy? Yes

• Was the branding effort consistently espoused by the local organizing committee? Yes

• Was the brand supported by local, regional, city and federal governments? Inconsistent

• Was the brand reciprocated and supported by FIFA? Yes

• PPS Score: 5.5

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Davies summarizes the preparation surrounding the South African World Cup perfectly,

stating that “the 2010 World Cup created extraordinary conditions which unified leadership and

management around a vision, and provided the context needed to drive resources to its

achievement” (Davies 49) Indeed, all of the questions relating to political context can be

answered in the affirmative, reflecting the highly coordinated and inclusive planning of the 2010

World Cup. South Africa formed specific government institutions to ensure that host cities and

localities were included in the conversation. Moreover, the branding effort was consistent on

most levels of the policy community. Unfortunately, FIFA still seemed to have the final word on

many of the decisions concerning resource allocation, and its approval on the branding effort was

needed before the campaign got into full swing. Nevertheless, the 2010 World Cup's

synchronized policy community and coherent branding efforts earned in a very high 5.5 out of 6

on the PPS scale.

Economic Impact

Despite the clear plan and very synchronized nature of the 2010 World Cup's policy

community, the costs of the event were still very significant for its hosts. However, FIFA made

the highest profits in its history on this tournament, displaying again a disparity in the economic

gains between FIFA and its hosts.

As in the previous two cases, the actual number of tourists that visited South Africa and

their economic impact differed greatly from pre-tournament predictions. While FIFA had

originally estimated that the number of visitors would top 500,000, the Office of South African

Tourism calculated that the true number fell below 309,000 (Fifa.com; South African Tourism

2010). Ultimately, the total amount of tourism expenditure was calculated to be $472 million

over the course of the tournament's two months (Cornelisson 312). While this is a sizable impact,

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it is over 40 percent less than the $1.15 billion impact predicted by FIFA (Fifa.com).

While the economic influx was clearly overestimated, the cost of hosting the event was

drastically underestimated. Throughout the tournament, public funding was the major source of

finance for tourism related investment (du Plessis 5). Unfortunately, cost overruns on stadium

infrastructure quickly inflated the budget. In 2003, original bid documents estimated that it

would cost only $223 million to improve five existing stadiums in Johannesburg, Rustenberg,

Pretoria and Bloemfontein, and build five new stadiums in Cape Town Durban, Nelspruit,

Polokwane and Port Elizabeth (du Plessis 6). However, by 2010, the South African Government

had spent approximately $2.13 billion on stadium infrastructure alone (Runciman 2010). This

was separate from the additional billions spent on transportation infrastructure. Granted, this

spending was part of the Expanded Public Works Program, and therefore not all of it was solely

motivated by the World Cup. Still, the stadium cost-overruns clearly represent an economic

burden brought on by the World Cup.

This data may surprise some, considering the extensive cooperation between FIFA and

South Africa before the World Cup. However, it proved difficult to translate these synchronized

policies into tangible economic profits in the short run. Darkey's study on the MATCH system

(an electronic interface established by FIFA to allow foreign tourists to book their rooms in

South African hotels and bed & breakfasts) illustrates this perfectly. The system essentially acted

as an interface, aimed at connecting tourists with needed lodging. However, these lodges needed

to be accredited by FIFA in order to be listed in the MATCH system. Coordination was lackluster

and 63 percent of bed and breakfast operators surveyed by Darkey were unaware of either the

systems existence or accreditation requirements (Darkey 86). Predictably, only 33 percent of

South African hospitality operators reported an increase in income during the World Cup (South

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African Tourist Organization 2010). This suggests that an economic impact, when it existed was

only concentrated amongst a select few. Clearly, the 2010 World Cup's economic impact on

South Africa as a whole was mixed.

Contrasting these lukewarm results for South Africa, FIFA made a total of $3.655 billion

from the 2010 World Cup (FIFA Financial Report 36). $2.5 billion came from the sale of

television rights to international media companies, while the remaining $1.15 billion was earned

through sponsorship deals and marketing. After reading these statistics, FIFA's insistence that

South Africa pass multiple laws to protect FIFA's sponsors from ambush marketing becomes

even clearer. Yet despite these profits, FIFA spent less than $350 million on World Cup related

expenditures (FIFA Financial Report 36). Through a direct comparison, the disparity between

FIFA's return on investment and that of South Africa is all too evident.

Societal Impact

While the World Cup's economic impact remained mixed for South Africa, its societal

impact was noticeably more positive than the two previously examined cases. These apparent

benefits can be directly traced back to the notable policy coherence between FIFA, South Africa

and its localities through the preparation process.

Indeed, taking into account the distinction between stadium construction and associated

infrastructure, the World Cup helped to expedite already planned infrastructure investments that

stood to benefit society as a whole. For example, in 2002, the South African Road Federation

estimated that the terrible condition of roads was costing South Africa $25.5 billion a year from

vehicle damage and traffic jams, leading to higher fuel consumption and higher transport costs

(Desai 157). Seeing this need, South African officials used the upcoming World Cup as a reason

to speed up investment in several projects, including a new harbor in Nelson Mandela Bay, a

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rapid rail system in Gauteng, repairs on national road systems and a revamped public

transportation system in Johannesburg (Tomlinson 15). Each of these projects was undertaken

through the existing Expanded Public Works Program, and the Gauteng train system received an

additional $20 million investment so that it would be completed prior to the World Cup

(Engineering News 2008). But more importantly, they continue to benefit South African society

more than two years after the tournament's end. For example, the Gauteng train system continues

to average a higher-than estimated 230,000 passengers a week, accessing areas of northern

Johannesburg that were without train access prior to the World Cup (Engineering News 2011). In

this way, the 2010 World Cup served as the political motivation to encourage investment into

South Africa's existing infrastructure needs.

There were several setbacks that resulted from expediting elements of the Expanded

Public Works Program. The projects deemed vital to the World Cup effort used most of the

available construction materials, resulting in both a shortage of materials for other projects in

addition to increased costs (Tomlinson 6). Economist Stephen Gelb argued that funds allocated to

stadiums would have built up to 90,000 new houses per year between 2006 and 2010, addressing

South Africa's chronic housing shortage (Gelb 2011). Whether these housing would have been

built if the World Cup had not occurred is a separate issue. Nevertheless, it is important to

recognize these negative effects of the increased number of infrastructure projects.

Like the previous cases, the long term utility of the new sports-specific infrastructure is

suspect. Admittedly, Johannesburg and Pretoria have large soccer and rugby teams that continue

to use the stadiums regularly, frequently filling them to full capacity (du Plesiss 12). However,

new stadiums in Cape Town, Durban, Polokwane and Nelspruit continue to look for regular

tenants (NPR 2011). Fortunately, because their expenditures were incorporated into the

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Expanded Public Works Program, the financial legacy of these stadiums is neither as significant

nor as negative as was seen in Japan (Desai 108). Nevertheless, the lack of prospects for their

long term use suggests that their societal benefits were minimal.

Beyond new stadiums, South African officials also took additional measures specifically

geared towards its image. Some of these efforts, like the extra security measures that the

government took, also provided long term benefits for South Africa. The South African Police

Service expanded its numbers by 40,000 in the run up to the tournament (Cornelisson 3229).

While this did cost the South African government an additional $12 million, these additional

officers stayed on the force after the tournament ended, continuing to patrol the streets of South

Africa. This has also coincided with a 20 percent decline in the national homicide rate between

2006 and 2012 (saps.gov.za).

However, some of these brand-inspired changes have harmed poorer South African

citizens, as demonstrated by the Breaking New Ground project (BNG) along the N2 gateway

near Cape Town. Essentially, the government built 22,000 rental housing units along this stretch

of highway. However, the effort required a massive slum clearing effort which displaced over

15,000 families (Newton 103) (Rust 2006). While similar projects were stopped by the South

African Constitutional Court, many like the BNG were allowed to continue (Dailybeast.com).

Slum clearing was only part of the concentrated effort of the event organizers to ensure the

cameras caught South Africa's good side. Indeed, the majority of World Cup sites were far away

from the less affluent areas of cities (Allmers 213). It seems that some of the World Cup inspired

activity did harm certain members of South African society. However, it is important to note that

domestic politicians faced little political backlash from clearing these slums (Newton 106). This

suggests that no matter what the communication amongst an event's policy communities, groups

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not traditionally represented in a nation's political system are unlikely to benefit from the event.

In line with its desire to be viewed as a modern nation, South Africa also demonstrated an

active concern for limiting the World Cup's environmental footprint—something that was

virtually nonexistent in the previous cases. Cornelisson has noted that for most of the

infrastructure projects, the South African government produced environmental impact reports to

guide construction choices (Cornelisson 315). From the outset, FIFA expressed support for these

types of environments programs, highlighted by their presence in the bid and preparation

documents (RSA 2010).

However, despite the preparation, when it came to environmental results, the impact itself

was mostly negative. South Africa's 2010 World Cup had the largest carbon footprint in the

history of the FIFA tournament, even exceeding that of the Beijing Olympics by a factor of two

(Pellegrino 2010). This was mostly due to factors outside of the bid committee's control,

including South African's geographical distance from the central World Cup spectator markets

and the country's dependence on coal for about 90 percent of its energy resources (Cornelisson

317). Still, the fact that preparation efforts were so ineffective suggests that preparation efforts

did not go far enough to deliver concrete environmental benefits.

National Image Impact

The preparation section demonstrated that South Africa had launched an unprecedented

effort to use the World Cup to shift its national reputation. Analysis demonstrates that a

corresponding increase in South Africa's international reputation can be witnessed through both

tourism surveys and national brand indexes.

Amongst South African citizens there continues to be strong support and pride in the

event. Even regarding stadium construction, which previous sections have shown to be of

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questionable societal benefit, South Africans remain positive with 90 percent saying they were

glad to live near a World Cup site (Bobb 54). Some suggest that this is linked to the continued

popularity of soccer in South Africa (Rogerson 350). Still, the event's positive perception

amongst its host citizens—in the face of its very real negative effects—suggests that the national

pride gained can be a significant effect.

More than just providing improved image changes inside South Africa, the World Cup's

branding campaign has caused the international community to look South Africa in a very

different light. These changes have been documented through multiple reputational indexes. To

be sure, there was room for improvement before the 2010 World Cup. In the first Travel and

Tourism Competitiveness Index published in 2007 by the World Economic Forum, “South

Africa's tourism industry was ranked 68th out of 124 countries, with safety and security concerns

among the negatives” (Donaldson 356). Recognizing this mediocre ranking, the Minister of

Environmental Affairs and Tourism reaffirmed the branding effort this paper identified earlier,

stating that “by the time that the FIFA World Cup kicks off, it is our vision to progress our

ranking into the top safe global destinations” (Cole 2007). A year after the World Cup, South

Africa's safety reputation has greatly improved, as demonstrated in Donaldson's work. Surveying

tourists before and after they visited the South Africa for the World Cup, he notes that while

nearly 40 percent of visitors were worried about safety and security, 88 percent would definitely

recommend returning (Donaldson 367). Moreover, 52 percent of these visitors rate the country's

safety and security as excellent after visiting (Donaldson 369). In addition, South Africa ranked

62nd in the 2010 edition of the Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index, a six spot

improvement from its 2007 ranking (World Economic Forum 2010).

More specifically, South Africa's reputation has also increased among citizens of G8

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nations, according to a survey conducted by the Reputation Institute. Ranking ahead of countries

like China, Puerto Rico and Israel, South Africa increased its score from 44.21 in 2009 to 46.7 in

2011 (Reputation Institute). This score takes into account perceptions of the nation's beauty,

safety, government effectiveness, and business environment. Managing Director of the

Reputation Institute, Dominik Heil, directly linked this increase to the World Cup, stating that the

event created an emotional connection between these developed nations and South Africa.

Importantly, he claims that South Africa has the opportunity to build off this favor, as “a solid

emotional connection needs to be built on the sound reputation fundamentals” (Reputation

Institute). Overall, these data seem to indicate that South Africa's use of the World Cup as a

branding tool did have significant positive effects towards its image.

Synthesis

Ultimately, the analysis demonstrates that South Africa experienced noticeably more

positive social and cultural impacts to go along with its highly coordinated preparation efforts.

With a near-perfect PPS score of 5.5, South Africa demonstrated clear branding objectives from

the beginning, with coordination among all levels of the political spectrum. As a result of this

constant communication between parties—through the organizing committee, but also

governmental bodies such as the Host Cities Forum—South Africa was able to expedite the

building of much needed infrastructure projects. Moreover, reputational surveys made it evident

that the international community had changed its perception of the hosts, much in the way that

South African officials had intended. Certainly, not all of the impacts were positive, as the

stadiums went significantly over budget and are unlikely to receive consistent use in the future.

Moreover, many make a convincing argument that poorer South Africans were marginalized in

pursuit of this desire brand. Still, it is clear that South Africa—with its coordinated preparation

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efforts experienced more widespread positive gains from the World Cup that the other two cases.

Conclusions

This paper set out to answer two questions: What benefits should be expected from

hosting the World Cup? And how can host nations attain them to the fullest extent? Following a

complete analysis of the preparation efforts and multidimensional impacts of the U.S. 1994

World Cup, the South Korea/Japan 2002 World Cup, and the South African 2010 World Cup, one

can reach several conclusions.

Policy Implications

First, with the clear relationship between a high PPS score and positive impacts on the

host, this paper offers evidence that suggests that branding efforts have a significant influence on

a mega-event's social and national image impacts. Essentially, they guide the preparation efforts

with focused objectives. Therefore, it is vital to note that whichever actors have controlled the

branding efforts seem to have experienced the majority of the benefits. This is most clearly

witnessed through the comparison between the two cases analyzed with clear and coherent

branding efforts: the United States and South Africa.

The 1994 United States World Cup had a straight forward brand for its host: “America is

a soccer-friendly nation.” However, this message had not been derived from the input of the

national government or the many host cities that would entertain the visiting soccer teams. As the

analysis demonstrated, the brand originated solely from FIFA and the United States Soccer

Federation. Consequently, the resources needed to host the event were driven to promote

objectives that primarily benefited the future of U.S. Soccer and FIFA: forming Major League

Soccer; attaining the largest stadiums for the biggest spectacle possible; allowing sponsors to

have a significant role in venue selection. As a result, the benefits were skewed toward these

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objectives, while the host cities were left with minimal long term infrastructure changes, little

change in their image, and a net economic loss post-event (Blaade 312).

On the other hand, South Africa included its cities, localities and national government in

the preparation process. More importantly, all wanted to use the event to brand South Africa as a

modern nation. As a result, they were often able to guide the distribution of resources to existing

infrastructure needs, take into account the desires of various localities, and organize a successful

event. As the analysis has demonstrated, South Africa's improved national image and societal

gains were much more widespread throughout society than the other World Cup cases. Clearly,

the analysis indicates that nations considering hosting the World Cup should include all relevant

levels of government in the preparation process if they want the positive impacts to be as far

reaching as possible.

It is important to note that the interests of poorer districts and slums not traditionally

included in the political process were not represented in World Cup preparations, and therefore

were often ignored in efforts to improve South Africa's image. This supports the idea that only

those included in the preparation process will experience the benefits of mega-events.

But as the policy communities of international soccer are currently oriented, host nations

can only influence a World Cup's preparation process so far. It is clear that FIFA still exerts a

large amount of control over the World Cup's preparation process, which disrupts the event's

policy community's synchronization—a direct contrast to the IOC, according to Weed (Weed

2006 144). As a result, the financial costs of hosting the World Cup are frequently exacerbated

for the hosts. Even in South Africa, where there was a cohesive brand and a relatively

synchronized policy community, FIFA required strict stadium infrastructure, intellectual property

for sponsors protection, and accommodations for the large media presence. Even though the

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South African government was able to incorporate the majority of these requirements into

existing programs, they still represented a significant financial burden. Moreover, in the US and

South Korea/Japan, where national interests were not effectively represented, FIFA exerted even

stricter control. From the stadium construction costs and other requirements, the analysis

indicates that this degree of control contributes to the short term financial lost FIFA World Cup

hosts experience.

Ultimately, this paper indicates that nations which host the FIFA World Cup have the

potential to reap significant societal benefits—like improved transportation infrastructure,

national unity and strengthened civil society—and an increased international reputation.

However, in order to attain these benefits to their fullest extent, it appears that national, city and

local governments must be included and active in the preparation and branding process.

Moreover, hosts should recognize that they almost certainly will experience an economic loss in

the short term, and should therefore decide whether these intangible benefits they stand to gain

are worth the required investment.

Theoretical Implications and Suggestions for Further Research

Beyond these policy implications, this paper also offers several observations and

inferences on the theory surrounding the study of mega-events. First, it offers significant support

to Scherly and Breiter's argument that impact cannot be measured by economics alone. Indeed,

by analyzing both the societal and national image impacts, one recognizes possible benefits of

hosting the World Cup that would otherwise go unnoticed. On the flip side, one can also

recognize the full extent of the event's possible negatives. Thus, this paper would suggest that

future analyses of a mega-sporting event continue to include some measurements of an event's

impact beyond the traditional and tired economic dimension.

Wenner 58

Moving forward, the conclusions of this paper can guide opportunities to perform future

research on the preparation surrounding mega-sporting events and their effects on the event's

impact. As the policy implications section indicates, there appears to be a link between the

preparation efforts analyzed by Anholt and Weed, and an event's impact on its host. The

Preparation Synchronicity Scale offered a method of identifying whether certain elements of the

branding or political context were present in the preparation process of a particular World Cup.

However, the large scale focus of this paper admittedly limited its ability to make strict

causational links between specific elements of the process—like a single host city's enthusiasm

for a brand, for example—and specific impacts—that same city's public transportation system.

This paper has demonstrated the overarching link between the two. However, many of these

intangible societal and image changes need to be isolated and evaluated in the long term in order

to focus the ultimate conclusions. Therefore, future research should single out specific elements

of the process to analyze in order to develop stronger causational links.

Fortunately, a number of World Cups in the near future present the opportunity to

continue this research. In 2014, the World Cup will be hosted in Brazil, a nation on similar

economic and international standing as South Africa. However, as the opening kick-off date

draws nearer, there appears to be significant delays in Brazil's intended preparation efforts (BBC

2012). Moreover, some observers have also noted there does not seem to be a clear branding

effort for the event (Phillips 2012). After the 2014 World Cup, a comparison between Brazil and

South Africa's experiences would seem to offer a great opportunity to compare and contrast the

specific planning efforts made by two countries with similar development levels hosting the

same mega-sporting event.

In addition, the 2022 World Cup in Qatar will open serious opportunities for research,

Wenner 59

particularly for nation branding. A small nation previously unknown for its involvement in

international sports, Qatar is now in the process of hosting a number of mega-sporting events in

an attempt to brand itself as an international sports destination (Schoenfeld 2012). However, like

past World Cup hosts, it faces a serious lack of infrastructure and therefore significant costs.

Nevertheless, its policymakers are fully committing their “virtually unlimited” treasury to the

goal of branding this small Arab state as a premiere sporting destination (Schoenfeld 2012). With

its significant oil reserves and resulting revenues, Qatar has extensive financial resources to

invest in such a project. Thus, Qatar could potentially be an exceptional case study to examine

the merits of investing large amounts of financial capital in pursuit of a sporting brand.

Future mega-sporting events aside, researchers should also look back at past World Cups

in order to continue to monitor their long term effects. All too often, research for this paper

revealed a wealth of information in the two years immediately before and after a particular World

Cup. However, once the public's attention span has run its course, research dries up. As a result,

it is difficult for analyses to draw long term conclusions on a nation's sport development

strategies. Moreover, it is equally difficult for policy makers to form effective long term

objectives if previous research does not elucidate what is and is not effective. Therefore, future

research should continue to revisit mega-sporting events long after the closing ceremonies have

concluded.

In the end, this paper has demonstrated that World Cups indeed have the potential to

bring significant societal and national image gains to their hosts through well-coordinated

preparation and branding efforts. Perhaps Thabo Mbeki was not completely far-fetched when he

said that South Africa's World Cup would be “a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely

turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict” (Runciman 2010). However, it is clear that

Wenner 60

this statement, and the impacts of all World Cups, should be examined through a long term,

multidimensional lens. Therefore, armed with the conclusions of this paper, nations looking to

host the World Cup should first consider the long term changes they want to implement via the

event, and then weigh whether they are worth the economic cost.

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