Jared O’Connor

Prof. Hopkins

Political Science

4 April 2015

Challenging Converse

The most accurate way to classify the modern American Government is as a federal

republic. Under this system, voters elect officials to represent their interests in the day to day

operations of the government and therefore voters are the most fundamental aspect of our

governmental system. Because the desires of the people are translated through the election of

representatives, the ability of voters to ensure their desires are accurately represented through

their vote is the most essential component of American politics. An electorate that is unable to

reconcile their political desires with their vote has serious, negative implications for a

representative form of government. Unfortunately, it is commonly held that Americans do not

hold coherent, consistent political beliefs or have a clear understanding of what ideology is

(Converse). In his work “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”, Philip E. Converse

maintains that not only does the public fail to reflect the ideology of the elites, but also that most

people do not have an underlying belief structure and instead have an assortment of random

opinions. Converse believes that inconsistent answers to open ended political questions indicate

no true belief structure. While Converse’s theory is still widely applicable, a growing portion of

the electorate is developing coherent ideologies, or belief systems, as a result of prolonged elite

polarization. Converse’s theory is in danger of becoming increasingly archaic as the electorate

begins to exhibit more coherent political beliefs.

In recent years our political system has been defined by extreme polarization as the two

major parties continuously shift to opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. Not only has the

intensity of polarization increased in recent years but the scope of polarizing issues also

continues to expand. Polarization is no longer constrained to extremely salient issues and almost

every current political issue produces partisan polarization. Political elites initiated the recent

polarization and as a result, polarization has now permeated into the general electorate.

The trend of increasing polarization between the two major parties can be attributed to

the polarization of political elites. Before discussing polarization in relation to political elites, the

term political elite must be defined. Political elites are individuals who have influence on and

participate in forming the ideological platforms for the two major parties. In layman’s terms,

political elites can be reduced to public officials, which citizens elect to represent them. These

political elites are instrumental in providing cues to the mass electorate in order to help navigate

a complex political world. (Zaller) One of the most effective ways to measure polarization, at the

elite level, is to evaluate Congressional voting records. Evaluation of voting records indicates

that polarization among elites is both usually high and likely to continue in the future. (Hare,

Poole, Rosenthal)

In their work “Polarization in Congress has risen sharply. Where is it going next?”

Christopher Hair, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal evaluate Congressional polarization and

whether future polarization is probable. In order to evaluate polarization between the two major

parties, each member of Congress is given a DW-NOMINATE score. DW-NOMINATE scores

“measure legislators’ liberal-conservative positions using their roll call voting records” (Hare,

Poole, Rosenthal), and in total can be used to measure polarization between the two parties over

time. Evaluation of DW-NOMINATE scores from 1879 to 2013 allows for the evaluation of

current polarization in a greater context. Party elites began to polarize in the 1970’s, after a

period of depolarization, and have continued to polarize reaching record highs in 2013. (Hare,

Poole, Rosenthal) Additional methods of measuring polarization also indicate that the parties

have moved toward ideological extremes as moderates have disappeared in both parties. An

additional method to measure polarization used by Hare, Poole, and Rosenthal “is to show the

distribution of Democratic and Republican legislators on the liberal-conservative dimension

across multiple years.” By using this method to compare the 97th Congress, from 1981-1983, to

the 113th Congress, from 2013 to 2015, we can examine polarization in Congress over time. The

results of this examination are similar to the results of measuring voting records. There is a

virtual elimination of ideological moderates in the polarized 113th Congress. Additionally, this

data shows a dramatic shift to the right by Republican’s in the 113th Congress compared to the

97th Congress. It is clear that polarization among political elites has not only become a regular

trend in recent years but also the extent of the polarization is extreme.

In concurrence with political elites, the general electorate has experienced similar

polarization. In their report entitled “Political Polarization in the American Public” the Pew

Research Center examines the effects of electorate polarization on various aspects of life.

Through various surveys and analytical tools the Pew Research Center was able to conclude that

“Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines – and partisan antipathy is

deeper and more extensive – than at any point in the last two decades.” This research validates

claims made my many political scholars that the modern electorate is characterized by intense

polarization.

While voting records can be used to measure elite level polarization, measuring

polarization in the mass public requires different means. An additional way to view polarization

is to examine the status of ideological overlap among the two parties at any given time. Overlap

between parties signifies the extent to which each party is similar in regard to any given issue.

Times of low polarization are characterized by significant ideological overlap and the existence

of many moderate beliefs. In the past decade the electorate has experienced a dramatic decrease

in the overlap between parties, as a result of a general partisan shift toward ideological extremes.

(Pew Research Center) As party elites push both parties toward opposite ends of the ideological

spectrum, the amount of overlap in party ideology is greatly reduced. “Today, 92% of

Republicans are to the right of the median Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the

median Republican.” (Pew Research Center) In the contemporary electorate, virtually all

Republicans are more conservative than the median Democrat, and virtually all Democrats are

more liberal than the median Republican. This signifies an essential disappearance of party

overlap and drastic reduction of moderates in each party. Just ten years ago, there was

significantly more ideological overlap and the median Republican and Democrat remained

significantly closer on the ideological scale.(Pew Research Center) By charting the responses to

ten political value questions over the last twenty years the Pew Research Center is able to chart

the progression of ideological thinking among voters over time. From 2004 to 2014 the percent

of the electorate who held a mix of conservative and liberal views declined from 49% to 39%

(Pew Research Center) This provides additional evidence for polarization in the mass public as

the 10% decrease of mixed partisan views represents the polarization of previously moderate

voters to ideological extremes and more partisan consistency. It is obvious that within the last ten

years the electorate has become more sharply ideologically divided than the past. If this trend of

polarization continues in the future the ramifications on the American political system could be

severe.

Elite level polarization has occurred at various times throughout American history. The

modern elite polarization began in the 1970’s and has continued to intensify. Elite level

polarization extends to nearly every political issue in our modern society. Polarization, at the

elite level, occurred prior to widespread polarization among the mass public. In recent years,

however, the public has continued to polarize in conjunction with the elites and the mass public

is beginning to represent the extreme polarization modeled at the elite level. While this could be

mere casual correlation, an increasing amount of evidence suggests that the general electorate

polarized with the emergence of increasingly coherent political ideology, as a result of elite level

polarization. Had elite level polarization not occurred, it would be highly unlikely that the

modern electorate would be in a state of intense polarization.

The American electorate has long been a subject of controversy among political scholars

and pundits. Participation, polarization, and voter knowledge are among the most discussed

topics by political scholars today. While the polarization of the American electorate is a widely

debated topic, most debates occur in regards to the extent of the polarization or its ramifications.

Most political pundits accept the basic assertion that our current electorate has become

increasingly polarized in recent decades. Voter knowledge is another interrelated and hotly

debated topic in political science. Some scholars present the American voter as uninformed and

uninterested in politics while others believe the American electorate is more politically aware

than commonly thought. The way voter’s receive and process political information is a widely

researched topic among political scholars. One of the most influential works in the area of study

was conducted by the renowned political scholar, John Zaller, in his “The Nature and Origins of

Mass Opinion (1992)”. In the extremely influential work Zaller’s general assertion is that voter’s

rely on the political elite to make sense of a complex political world. (Zaller) Zaller’s theory on

the formation of voter opinion is vital when considering the potential ramifications of the current

level of extreme elite polarization. Zaller’s theory of mass opinion can be extrapolated to support

the assertion that an increase in the ideological consistency of voter’s, in recent years, can be

attributed to the environment of intense elite polarization.

In “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion” Zaller presents the average voter as lacking

a single preference and hosting a series of conflicting views on any given issue. Zaller asserts

that voters rely on elite level cues for guidance in a complex political world. Differences in

ideological consistency stem from the ability of voters to accurately receive elite level cues. The

most politically knowledgeable and involved portions of the electorate are able to accurately

receive elite level cues and therefore exhibit steadily consistent political ideologies. The large

majority of the electorate, however, lacks the ability to accurately receive elite level cues and

exhibits largely inconsistent views. Zaller’s assertion is based on his Receive-Accept-Sample

(RAS) model of political cognition. According to this model opinion statements “are the

outcome of a process in which people receive new information, decide whether to accept it, and

then sample from their store of considerations at the moment answering questions”. (Markus,

634) In forming political opinions, voters sample considerations which exist from previously

receiving and accepting political information and use these considerations to dynamically form

their opinions when prompted. Under the RAS model, opinions are formed in response to

political questions and are not motivated by previous, coherent preferences. The implications of

highly polarized elite are evident when considering this model. Levels of extreme elite

polarizations have tremendous impacts in the formation of political opinions when considering

the RAS model. Both the way voters receive and accept political information changes in a highly

polarized environment could result in changes in the electorate. As a result of elite level

polarization, the cue taking process among the electorate has been altered to produce

increasingly ideologically consistent voters, which challenges Converse’s theory of voters

lacking ideological consistency.

In his “Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization” Mathew

Levendusky examines the impact of elite level polarization on the modern electorate. Levendusly

utilizes an original experiment to establish “a small but significant causal link between elite

polarization and voter consistency.” (Abstract) This assertion supports the claim that

polarization, dictated at the elite level, has resulted in a general increase in the number of voters

that exhibit a consistent ideology.

Intense polarization at the elite level “impacts the cue-taking process because it changes

the clarity of the cues elites send to voters in two ways: it increases the ideological distance

between the parties, and it also increases the ideological homogeneity within each party.”

(Levendusky 4) Contrary to most scholarly work on political polarization, Levendusky is

identifying a benefit of polarization in the form of voter consistency. Levendusky asserts that

polarization actually benefits the average voter, via the cue taking process, by first increasing the

ideological distance between the parties and prompting parties to adopt more uniform positions

on issues. Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample model of political cognition serves to further the

theory that elite polarization could result in ideological changes at the mass level. According to

Levendusky, one of the positive results of elite polarization is that the parties become further

separated in regards to ideology. This has significant implications on the receiving aspect of

Zaller’s RAS model. It is well known among political pundits that voters tend to consume

political information that reinforces their political beliefs; political information can be viewed as

elite level messages being presented through the use of media. Partisan media has existed in

various forms throughout history but has reached an unprecedented status within the last two

decades. As voters consume political cues from increasingly polarized elites, they are receiving

only highly polarized, consistent cues. As a result of internalizing extremely polarized elite level

cues, the electorate has mimicked the elite but moving away from the center of the ideological

spectrum. The Pew Research Center’s data, referenced earlier in this paper, supports this claim

by demonstrating a dramatic reduction in voters holding moderate views in both parties. There is

virtually no overlap between parties on the ideological scale as almost every Democrat is more

liberal than the median conservative and vice versa. In addition to increasing the ideological

distance between the parties, Levendusky also maintains that polarization has also increased “the

ideological homogeneity within each party.” This has obvious ramifications for the second step

of Zaller’s RAS model, which entails choosing to accept or reject new political information.

Voters tend to accept political knowledge that is consistent with their previously held “beliefs”.

As a result of elite level polarization, the parties have been demonstrating more uniform political

messages, which voters interact with as cues. As the parties offer more uniformly consistent cues

to voters, as a result of polarization, the electorate will begin to mimic political elites and adopt

more consistent political beliefs. The Pew Research Center provides data to validate these

claims. Not only have voters echoed elite polarization moving to the extremes of the ideological

spectrum, but the number of voter’s exhibiting consistent ideologies has also dramatically

increased, in recent years. Data from the Pew Research Center’s “Growing Minority Holds

Consistent Ideological Views” graphic indicates that “Over the past twenty years, the number of

Americans in the “tails” of this ideological distribution has doubled from 10% to 21%.” In other

words, the percentage of voters who exhibit a consistent political ideology, as measured in

response to ten research questions, has more than doubled from 1994 to 2014. This data provides

strong evidence correlating the polarization of political elites with a statistically dramatic

increase in the number of voter’s exhibiting consistent ideologies. While critics could dismiss

this data as showing nothing more than mere correlation, and in no way establishing a concrete

connection between elite polarization and an increase voter consistency, Levendusky designed an

original experiment to validate his claims.

Proving more than a correlational relationship between polarization at the elite level and

an increase in voter consistency can be difficult. By only evaluating over-time data is it

impossible to correctly attribute any increase in voter consistency to elite level polarization, and

not some other, unaccounted for variable. To prove a cause-and-effect relationship between elite

level polarization and an increase in voter consistency requires the use of an experiment which

can control for other variables and isolate elite level polarization, to observe its effects on voter

consistency. In his experiment, Levendusky seeks to manipulate the cue taking process of the

experiment groups and compare his findings across groups. He says “If I can manipulate these

perceptions, and this in turn changes their level of consistency, then this will provide me with

cause-and-effect evidence that elite polarization increases voter consistency. (6) The experiment

is designed with subjects divided into three different condition groups and subjects are asked for

their opinions on a series of policy issues. Each subject in all three conditions is given a small,

uniform paragraph providing basic information in relation to the policy they are offering

opinions on. The control group, or control condition, is given no other information other than the

small paragraph before being asked for their opinions. The two experiment groups are given a

chart, (Figure 1) allegedly from a scientific study of Congress by a government agency, showing

the distribution of support or opposition of unnamed members of Congress on the issue.

Levendusky makes the assumption that members of Congress represent the positions of the

national parties, on the issues being tested, which is a tactic used by previous political scholars.

The two experiment groups were given a chart indicating distribution of Congress members that

strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, and strongly oppose. The only

identification given about the members of Congress is which party they belong to. One of the

experiment groups was given a chart representing polarized elite, symbolic of Congressmen of

the 1990s and 2000s. This chart featured elites that were heavily polarized towards the end of the

ideological spectrum with most Congress members either strongly supporting or strongly

opposing the policy. Consistent with the modern polarization of Congress this chart shows

partisan consistency on the policy and heavy partisan polarization. By contrast the other

experiment group was given a chart representing a moderate elite, reminiscent of the 1960’s and

70s. This chart features the majority of Congressmen in the ideological middle, suggesting

overlap between the parties, and even some party members voting across party lines. The only

difference between the two charts is the degree of polarization among the political elite, or

Congress members. Importantly, Levendusky notes “One important aspect to note about these

manipulations is that they are purposefully designed to be rather weak” (8) Levendusky

intentionally makes the manipulations weak to avoid skewing his findings as a result of

unrealistically strong manipulation of the experiment groups. The intentionally weak

manipulation of the experiment groups has an important implication; due to the weak cues given

to the experiment group, voters across all three conditions should only exhibit small, group level

differences. Levendusky addresses this saying “the setup in my experiments makes it likely

(though not certain) that any real-world effects will be larger than those I detect here.” (8)

The first assertion Levendusky seeks to prove is that elite polarization causes an increase

in cue taking among voters. For this to occur, Levendusky’s results must show that subject in the

polarized elite condition, indicated by the chart they were given, should follow their parties cues

to a greater extent than the other two conditions. A key component in evaluating this

experimental data is defining what constitutes cue taking in the experiment; Levendusky opts to

restrict his definition of cue taking. Levendusky states “a respondent follows his party cues if he

strongly favors/opposes the policy (depending upon his partisanship).” (11) The location of the

model elite is of paramount importance to the experiment; the polarized elite condition features

elites at the extremes of the spectrum as mostly strongly supporting or opposing the policy, while

the moderate elite condition features elites only favoring or opposing the policy. As a result, cue

taking cannot be reduced to simply subjects being on the right partisan side of the issue, in the

form of favoring or opposing the policy. Instead, “The right test here is the one that mimics the

difference between the elite cues, which is whether subjects select the ‘‘strongly favor/oppose’’

options.” (11) In order to validate that elite level polarization results in an increasing in cue

taking, Levendusky must find more respondents strongly approving or strongly opposing the

policy in the polarized elite condition.

Evaluation of the experimental data validates the claim that elite level polarization causes

an increase in cue taking. A comparative evaluation of the data from the polarized condition to

the moderate condition reveals, “voters are four to five percent more likely to follow party cues

in the polarized elite condition relative to the moderate elites baseline”. (Levendusky 12) This

statistically significant finding exists in a context of weak cues, as acknowledged by

Levendusky, and it is likely that the real world effect could be larger. Regardless the implications

are obvious as elite polarization clearly impacts the cue taking process of voters.

After providing evidence that elite polarization does in fact increase cue taking; the next

step is to examine if an increase in cue taking results in increased consistency in political beliefs.

Levendusky evaluates this assumption by examining individual’s ideological consistency across

pairs of issues. A respondent is labeled as consistent if they adopt their party’s position on both

issues, using the same definition of taking your party’s position as previously employed in the

experiment. Levendusky writes “So, for example, consider the coastal drilling-job training issue

pair. A Democrat (Republican) takes consistent positions on this pair of issues if he ‘‘strongly

favors’’ (strongly opposes) maintaining the ban on coastal drilling and ‘‘strongly opposes’’

(strongly favors) giving state government primary control of job training programs.” (12)

Levendusky’s analysis of the experimental data supports the claim that an increase in cue taking

leads to an increase in consistency of views among voters. Those in the polarized elite condition

have the highest levels of consistency and the difference is statistically significant. “Relative to

the moderate elites condition, subjects assigned to the polarized elites treatment have a 31

percent (relative) gain in consistency.” (Levendusky 12) This data provides strong evidence that

an increase in cue taking does in fact lead to voters exhibiting more consistent ideology across

issues. Evaluating this experiment in conjunction with the extreme levels of polarization among

the political elites in recent decades, provides evidence that voter consistency is increasing as a

result of elite polarization.

While polarization remains a largely contested topic among political scholars, the

potential impact of prolonged elite level polarization is clear. Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample

model provides the mechanism by which elite level polarization could affect the electorate.

Evidence showing that polarization occurred first at the elite level, and then filtered into the mass

public provides evidence of Zaller’s cue taking assertion. If average voters do rely on elite level

cues for political information, and party cues have become more ideologically separate and more

consistent, then prolonged polarization could have dramatic effects on the electorate. While

Converse’s portrayal of the average voter as inconsistent, lacking a true ideology may be

applicable to portions of the electorate it is becoming increasingly archaic. Whether or not

voters’ exhibiting consistent views is the result of a true, underlying political ideology, or not, is

still up for debate. At a minimum, Converse’s criticism of voter’s as exhibiting inconsistent

views is in danger of becoming unfounded in the modern context of intense polarization. While

an increase in consistency across issues does not necessarily indicate an underlying ideology,

supplemental evidence exists, such as increasing partisan antipathy, to support the claim that

American voters are increasingly adhering to a uniform political ideology. Converse’s work,

“The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” remains a seminal piece of political scholarship.

The current environment of intense polarization may result in an electorate that disproves, or

more likely partially disproves, Converse’s theory as increasingly archaic in the modern era.

Works Cited

Hare, Christopher, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. "Polarization in Congress Has Risen Sharply. Where Is It Going Next?" Washington Post. The Washington Post, 14 Feb. 2014. Web. 5 Apr. 2015. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/>.

Pew Research Center, June, 2014, “Political Polarization in the American Public”

Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Converse, Philip. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." Ideology and Discontent. 1st ed. Free of Glencoe; 1st Edition, 1964. 206-261. Print.

Levendusky, Mathew. “Clear Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization” Original Paper. 2009