protests in the me and game theory march 16, 2011 swiss global economics
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Protests in The ME and Game Theory
March 16, 2011
Swiss Global Economics
Violent Protests and Game Theory
• Puzzle– Many people protest, but few protest violently– Violent protests are almost always costly– The fact that some people enjoy violence does not
explain the whole story• Game Theoretic Solution– Model 1: Violence as a Signal– Model 2: Screening– Model 3: Gambling for Salvation
Signaling: Intuition
• When institution is not sure about protesters’ commitment, violent protest may serve as a signal to convey their willingness to fight for their cause
• Institutions do not want to give in, but will do so if it expects that protesters are committed
• Examples: Egypt, Yemen
P 1-p
CU
F A
A
A
A F
F
F
(0,0) (0,0)
(0,-50)(800,-50)
(500,-100)
(-40,-50)
(-50,-100)
(0,-20)
(100,-50)
(500,-1000)(10,-25)
(200,-50)
(0,-50)(-40,-50)
(-50,-100)
(1000,-50)
ighl
Separating Equilibrium
• In this game there is a separating equilibrium where– C types always choose to protest violently – U types always choose to protest peacefully– The government • will give in after violent protest and not after peaceful
protest • believes that all low types protest peacefully, and all
high types protest violently
Implications• Communication fails (e.g. no democracy)• Costs/Benefits– Low costs of violence (e.g. weak legal system)– High expected benefits for the high types
E.g. if the institution is unstable, likely to give in or if the costs of violence are high for the institution
– “U shaped” relation between violence and repression
(Francisco, (1996), Moore, (1998), Rasler, (1996))
• Institution has an incentive to avoid precedents
The signaling model is useful, but many violent protests start peacefully
• Still an information asymmetry problem:– The government doesn’t know the type of
protesters: “committed” or “not committed.”– Before engaging in bargaining with the protesters,
the government would like to know if it has the “bargaining power.”
• The government uses its police force as a screening mechanism…
Screening Model of Violent Protests
• Players: Protesters and Government• Types: Committed and Uncommitted protesters.• Actions:
Gov’t
Bargaining
“ex-ante”
Send the Police
Same negotiation
approach for all groups.
Rioters
Go away
if not
committed
Respond with
violence if
committed
Gov’t has bargaining
power.
Gov’t has to give in to
the demands.
Egyptian anti-government protesters clash with riot police
Violent Protest to Raise Awareness
• Violence is a cheap way to get attention• But it is not necessarily good attention• A risky gamble for raising awareness about
your cause
LybiaYemen
Why Would Groups Take a Risky Gamble?
• Gambling For Salvation: When your back is against the wall, downside risks
don’t matter.
NONVIOLENTPROTEST
VIOLENTPROTEST
FavorableAttention
FavorableAttention
Where you are now
Where you need to be
Where you need to be
Common Theme?
Violence provides information