public diplomacy today and tomorrow

8/3/2019 Public Diplomacy Today and Tomorrow

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Public Diplomacy Today and Tomorrow

October 29, 2011: Please note we are updating and revising this page. The

new version should appear in November.

Below we define some of the special characteristics and powers of public diplomacy,

examine some of the missteps that have brought American public diplomacy into

disrepute and made it ineffectual, look at some demonstrably successful best practices

that may form the basis of a rehabilitated public diplomacy capacity and suggest

organizational reforms that would integrate public diplomacy insights into the foreign

policy process in ways that would enormously enhance U.S. interactions with the

world. We've divided our observations into five sections, which bear the following

titles:

1. Public Diplomacy: What Itis, WhyIt's Needed and HowIt Could WorkWell forAmerica Again

2. Public Diplomacy: AProfessionwithinaProfession3. Deconstructing the Interactive Shibboleth4. The Field: Where ForeignPolicySucceedsor Fails5. Public DiplomacyTomorrow: Howto Make It Work,if We Want Itto Work


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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TODAY AND TOMORROW

ByPatricia H. Kushlisand PatriciaLee Sharpe

PART ONE

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: WHAT IT IS, WHY IT'S NEEDED AND

HOW IT COULD WORK WELL FOR AMERICA AGAIN

Music, art, drama, literature---there are so many way of sharing culture across national

borders. Our lives are enormously broadened, deepened and enriched when we learn fromone another, and governments often make it possible, through subsidies and various

complex negotiations, for exhibits and performances to be mounted in distant countries.

To the extent that familiarity increases mutual respect and understanding, the world

benefits from a multiplicity of such interactions, and public diplomacy uses some of these

cultural and intellectual resources to good effect.

However, the purpose of public diplomacy, which employs other media as well as the

arts, and the reason it deserves strong support and generous funding by the American

people has little to do with idealism or purely benevolent inclinations, however much theauthors of this article are delighted to encourage and enjoy the arts as private citizens.

Public diplomacy is what America does when the U.S. needs popular support in other

countries for American policy, which is almost always the case. Public diplomacy, well

done, pressures governments to do what leaders might be less inclined to do behind the

closed doors of traditional diplomacy. In short, cultural and intellectual interaction for

public diplomacy purposes isnt chummy chitchat. Its a carefully articulated, infinitely

modulated, multi-media campaign for achieving essential national goals. Public

diplomacy, along with traditional diplomacy, works hard to avoid that hideous waste oflife and resources called war, which is seldom as cheap or conclusive as habitual hawks

would have us believe.

Government-to-government diplomacy is an ancient and essential function, but public

diplomacy is a newer tool that only governments with good things to share and relatively

little to hide can use effectively. As the diplomatic tool par excellence of democracy,


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public diplomacy operates by precept and example. Public diplomats disseminate

information that can stand up to critical or even hostile examinationand when truth

penetrates secretive or corrupt regimes the hold of tyranny erodes. Conversely, should

an exemplar of good governance fall into patterns of deceit, dishonesty, abuse of power,

corruption or hypocrisy, the way back is difficult. Credibility has been lost.

Psychological operations wont regenerate confidence in U.S. leadership. Smarter

policy and intellectually-respectable public diplomacy may.

The Shambles thats U.S. PD Today

The ramshackle public diplomacy architecture created in 1999, when the functionally-

coherent Unites States Information Agency (USIA), a world-respected advocate for

American values and policy, was married, shotgun-style, to the State Department, has

never performed as its cost-cutting designers promised. Bits and pieces of a once

coordinated whole were scattered dysfunctionally among the offices and bureaus of a

chronically underfunded State Department. Even the once authoritative VOA was

devalued and dismembered, its remains hardly differentiated from the proliferation of

voices aimed manipulatively at slivers of audience here and there.

Although the tried and true educational exchanges and international visitor programs

housed in the bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs may appear to have been

unaffected during this post-USIA decade, since they are funded and staffed through a

separate budget line, ECAs programs have been more or less privatized. They are

subject to the whims of competing sub-contractors, each intent on delivering less for

more. Many influential programs, such as university-to-university exchanges, therefore,

no longer exist. Even the enormouslypopular Sister City program is now under the gun.

Much worse lay in store for USIAs information function, which was protected by no

budgetary firewalls after consolidation. The problem? It seemed to have no lucrative

contracts on offer. Working unheralded for fifty years, thanks to the Smith-Mundt Acts

restrictions against propagandizing the American public, USIA information officers

funneled accurate, timely information to audiences abroad. These finely tuned

mechanisms for providing contextually-sophisticated materials to foreign media didnt

just languish under the new dispensation. Although the State Department now

ostentatiously revels in a quick adopter approach to new communications devices,

Americas ability to design and transmit policy imperatives to carefully picked foreign

audiences was allowed to atrophy by traditional diplomats who never appreciated the

immense value of open communications with foreign publics. After 9/11, the Pentagon


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leapt to fill this vacuum, throwing billions at untested contractors for strategic

communications programs, some intentionally deceptive, as war propaganda tends to be,

others merely inept, all tending to undermine the credibility of U.S. information

programs overall. According to an AP story on 2/5/09, the Pentagon planned to spend

$4.7 billionin one fiscal year!for its overt and covert information operations.

Budgeting ever more for propaganda masquerading as information, the Pentagon reaps

skeptics not friends. What thrifty little old USIA could have done with money like that!

Unfortunately, merely redirecting money from Defense to State wont improve the

quality and impact of American public information programs quickly, because many of

the experienced information officers who could pull things together are gone. As public

diplomacy under the State Department was downgraded, denatured and defunded, many

devoted and skilled officers retired early. Others just resigned out of misuse or disgust.

The recruitment, training and assignment process now in place has not replaced this lost

generation with a capable new cadre. Foreign service recruits arent dumb, and not

enough of them have seen a future in public diplomacy. In 1986 there were 1742 PD-

designated positions. Today there are 1332, a reduction of 24%. Worse yet, too many of

these slots are filled by generalists with little training and less experience in public

diplomacy. The Pentagon, by contrast, employs 27,000 for recruitment, advertising and

public relations almost as many as the total State Department workforce. And the

attrition of States public diplomacy specialists continues.

The State Departments organization chart tells all. There is no coherent well-integratedpublic diplomacy function with an attractive career ladder for specialists who may rise to

share in major foreign policy decision-making. Public diplomacy used to have a well-

organized, high morale home in an independent agency run by the likes of the legendary

Edward R. Murrow. Who of his national stature would be willing to assume the

powerless position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy these days? None that we

have seen. And when under-qualified people fill this critical position, Americas PD

capacity erodes that much more. No wonder the Obama Administration has set up a

White House Global Engagement Directorate to compensate for the skill and vision gap

within the State Department, although we are not entirely surprised. An in-house PR

capacity will always tempt a powerful executive.


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PART TWO

A PROFESSION WITHIN A PROFESSION

Smile. Chat. Seek friends. Some people think thats all there is to public diplomacy. So

why cant ordinary Americans do the job, on the cheap, especially those already working

abroad in business, academic or humanitarian capacities? Amiable, savvy tourists could

represent us, too, couldnt they?

No, they cant. None of them can.

The Citizen Diplomat Fallacy

Conflict of interest is one problem. Businessmen go abroad to make money. Though

corporations may, from time to time, back a ballet tour or sponsor a conference, the event

is usually selected to enhance the corporate image or to soften up or highlight some

official with the power to grant concessions or contracts at home or abroad. Academics

and humanitarians also have allegiances and values that trump what they often see as

crass or transient national interest. This is not to say that PD specialists should not

celebrate humanitarians as fine examples of American voluntarism. They should. But

their skills and commitments are different.

Academics do make impressive speakers for PD programs, not only because of their

subject matter expertise, but also because their outspokenness, in healthy doses, serves to

exemplify the American commitment to free speech and free-wheeling politics. But few

academics could happily, or in good conscience, devote themselves to the day-in day-out

business of supporting U.S. policies without regard to their own deeply held partisan or

philosophical inclinations. As for tourists, students and/or each decades version of the

swashbuckling adventurer, they represent only themselves, which is fine. Goodness

knows, when the authors travel, as private citizens now, we feel no need to mount a

defense of policies we dont agree with, although we sometimes, out of habit, slip into

PD mode.

Sosorry! Only presently-serving Foreign Service Officers have the skills, information,

experience, mandate andthis is very importantthesworn responsibility to represent

current official policy, with no competing professional imperative, but pure and never so

simply, which is why public diplomacy isnt for amateurs.


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However, it is also true that not all Foreign Service Officers are cut out to be public

diplomats.

Diplomatic Bedrock

Obviously any FSO needs an excellent education; many FSOs these days have more thanone degree, and previous experience in a host of professions or occupations doesnt

hurt. All diplomats, to be really useful, should be able to operate in one or more foreign

languages and cultures, on entry into the service or by means of in-service training, and

the Foreign Service should useand reward such competencies, making sure that officers

arrive well prepared at post. Naturally all FSO candidates should know a good bit about

foreign affairs and foreign policy, and they should also demonstrate a reasonably

sophisticated understanding of their own countryhistory, geography, politics,

economics, high and popular culture, etc., etc. Add top notch writing and analytical

skills. Add curiosity. Add idealism and loyalty to country. And dont forget excellent

health, since most officers dont spend more than a few years in the likes of Paris,

London or Tokyo, if that. Mostly, without complaint, they represent us in Bamako,

Baghdad, Bishkek.

Wow! Do such paragons exist? They doand why not, in a population of some 300

million. They can be found and recruited, too. Thats why the Foreign Service exam has

a well-earned reputation for difficulty.

But wait! Were not finished. In addition to demonstrating the background qualificationssketched out above, successful FSO candidates will discover that each diplomatic

specialty has its own tricks of the trade, some teachable to recruits, some that must be

acquired by progressive experiences in the field under well-seasoned mentors. Public

diplomacy alone draws on a vast reservoir of skills and tools, including media relations

and placement, information technology, exchanges administration, speech-writing and

public speaking, cultural center direction, seminar and conference organization, polling

and public opinion feedback, liaison with local notablesa list that is not

exhaustive. Nor does a laundry list even begin to suggest how tools, methods and skills

are combined, some working progressively over time, some ideal for quick reaction

situations, to support longstanding policy needs or to respond to sudden diplomatic

crises. Given such an array of tools, all of which must be at hand in order to meet

predictable (and, inevitably, unpredictable) demands in almost infinite variety, theres no

substitute for growing into PD competence under the guidance of senior public

diplomacy officers.


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Shortcuts That Seldom Work

The PD specialists job isnt made easier by the curious lack of PD literacy thats often

found among US ambassadors and chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission abroad. Some are

gems, well prepared for leadership at a given post. They have the experience and rank to

maintain fruitful contact with the host countrys highest echelons of power and

influence. They know how and when to use all their resources, including public

diplomacy, to achieve US foreign policy goals. Too many others, unfortunately, need

24/7 oversight when it comes to public relations. Political appointees tend to be the most

problematic from this point of view, although a happy few arrive already tempered by

experience with the country or region.

And yet, year after year, whether the White House is occupied by a Republican or a

Democrat, about 30 percent of American ambassadorships are distributed as political

plums or political payoffs. Rewarded for their campaign fund-raising abilities, not for

their knowledge of US foreign policy, not for their knowledge of the country theyll be

serving in, not for their proven ability to head an operation as complex as an American

Embassy, these political ambassadors often need enormous amounts of care and feeding.

Worse, instead of showing gratitude for the backup that prevents embarrassment all

around, these politicals too often expect from the professionals at post the bowing and

scraping they assume is automatically due to anyone with the supreme and exalted

position of Ambassador. Political appointees with deep pockets are considered to have

the ear of the President. In reality, they may or may not - but whats the use if they lackdiplomatic sense or the appropriate skills?

Similar drawbacks render the recurrent call for expanding the intake of lateral entry

specialists to fill Foreign Service positions (or, as its often put, to shake up the moribund

State Department) a counterproductive proposition. Diplomatic success in a complex,

ever-changing world wont be improved by bringing in hordes of people whove

succeeded in other fields of endeavor, however well-honed their skill sets may be for

non-diplomatic purposes. Ironically, special mi-level recruitment is also unnecessary. The

Foreign Service entrance exam is, in fact, biased toward giving higher marks to mid-career professionals in their thirties and forties. Recent college graduates dont do nearly

as well.

As for those who continue to argue for a transformative fantasy cadre brought in from the

outside and set to work well above the normal intake rungs (and pay levels) on the

diplomatic career ladder, perhaps we have gone some way toward demonstrating that any


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new recruit has much to learn before he or she reaches professional competence in the

Foreign Service. Whats more, the impact of queue-crashing, mid-level entries on post

morale is unlikely to be positiveand whatever the sweeteners, the uncommitted too

often dont like the life once its theirs.

Clichs notwithstanding, diplomacy in our world is no tea party. Read the ever-

lengthening roster of those whove given their lives in the line of duty. Their names are

engraved on the marble walls of the State Departments Diplomatic Entrance. The list

grows longer every year.

Many Talents, Many Temperaments

Meanwhile, as with all professions, diplomacys sub-specialties call for different skills

and different temperaments. Some FSOs excel at consular work. Others are terrific

administrators with an uncanny ability to make the embassy machine work efficientlyand happily. Others are superb at gathering, analyzing and reporting on a countrys

political events and/or economic trends while colleagues down the hall in USAID deeply

understand the whole gamut of responsibilities involved in overseeing US aid for

developmental and humanitarian purposes.

Public diplomacy is also a genuine specialty. Its for those who are comfortable with the

relatively unscripted give and take of public debate of live press conferences; for those

who revel in performing on a tightrope stretched between cultures; for those who can

adapt, translate, rephrase and improvise as the climate of opinion mutates; for those whocan get it right without relying on tired (and unconvincing) boilerplate; for those who can

smoothly handle an in-your-face challenge; for those whoat the drop of a hatcan

make the media side of a visit by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State

or a Senatorial delegation into a triumph for the USand, needless to say, for the VIPs

involved.

But all Foreign Service specialties share one quality: it takes training, commitment,

perseverance and years of experience on the job to master the job.

PART THREE

DECONSTRUCTING THE INTERACTIVESHIBBOLETH


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USIA, as a communications agency, was quick to understand the usefulness of the

computer, of the World Wide Web, of interactive press conferences and panel discussions

first via telephone and later via satellite TV. USIA showed 16 mm films in the jungle,

schlepped monitors and VCRs to provincial capitals where power often came from

generators, and sometimes for extra special 35 mm film occasions, rented whole

theaters. When annual inventory times came around, it took more than a few hours time

to account for all the communications equipment required to keep a USIA post

running. Meanwhile as radio technology improved, USIA kept urging that VOA signals

be ever upgraded, though the integrity of VOA news, so hard fought for over the years,

was eventually rather sadly compromised.

USIA wasnt an early adapter in the trendy way the term is currently used, but once a

new communications methodology looked as if it would perform reliably from Austria to

Zimbabwe, USIA was ready to put it into service. Whats more, to keep it in service,

USIA posts regularly employed highly competent, always available audio-visual

specialists and, later, sysops, too, since there is no end to the upgrading of computer

systems, once installed. Very seldom did a USIA program have to be delayed much less

canceled for technical reasons. When USIA was ingested by the State Department, one

of the glaring differences between the two cultures was USIAs pragmatic embrace of

communications technology and the State Departments technophobia. Lately, however,it often seems as if the State Department is trying to make up for lost time, positioning

itself precariously on the other extreme of the spectrum, as current public diplomacy

recruits fall all over themselves to prove they can out-Facebook, out-Tweet and out-text

the most desperate friend-seeker on the block. But State has failed to hire (or train staff

from within its thinning information specialist ranks) enough information technology

specialists to keep all these media running 24/7 while retaining its traditional knowledge

workers the reporters, writers, editors and reference specialists who cover the stories,

provide the texts, and ferret out information on the specialized topics valued by US

Embassies abroad.

The Aura of the Newest Gadget

We Americans are so in love with gadgetry that, like serial monogamists, we find

ourselves going gaga over each new electronic communications device, babbling on and

on about the wonders of blogging, texting, tweeting and who knows whats next on the


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horizon. Camera-equipped cell phones enabling twitter, the latter a recent State

Department infatuation, seemed to have come into their own as important electronic

media during the aftermath of the Iranian presidential elections. Nevertheless, contrary to

fonder expectations, there were some reliability problems. Reports from unknown

witnesses, however, fervent, can be hard to assess, and even pictures dont always tell the

whole truth.

For example, when TV news channels showed shocking footage of a young woman

bleeding to death on a street in Tehran, most everyone assumed shed been demonstrating

against a stolen election. Or maybe she wasn't a protester according to other reports, only

a young woman returning home from a music lesson. And then her mother was

interviewed, saying that she and her daughter had been involved in at least some of the

protesting. And so on. Who to believe? Thus, even as texting and instant photo

transmissions were keeping a secretive regime more or less honest, a caveat

emerged. Both pictures and eye-witness data usually need contexting, analysis and

information about the source who may or may not be well-informed or inclined to

objectivity.

Film, radio, TV, the internet, video cassettes, CVRs, CDs and DVD, cell phones, even the

land lines we grew up with each of these also arrived with the aura of glamorous

newness. Each breakthrough, Americans thought, would supplant all that had gone

before. So far this has never happened. Though print is looking a little wobbly these

days, especially here in the U.S., the demise of our major dailies is probably notimminent. No gadget, it seems, is the be-all and end-all its entranced early adopters

claimed it to be. That said, public diplomacy today is fortunate to have this vast array of

communications media at its disposal, some one-way, some interactive, each ready to

serve a specific communications need, each demanding verve, intelligence, field

knowledge and general good sense in its application.

Real People Still Matter

Meanwhile, plain old person-to-person interaction is still the gold standard for sharing

sensitive information, for explaining complicated issues to key players and for

hammering out agreement. This is the stuff of traditional diplomacy, of course, though

public diplomats can also be found at the receptions and cocktail parties where a telling

conversation may actually occur. Theyre also to be found chatting in an editors office

or sharing telling anecdotes over dinner with contacts they consider to be trustworthy

informants.


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Diplomacy, in fact, has always been about interaction. Its about linking people and

cultures, about talking, debating, mediating, explaining, persuading and yes, listening,

listening carefully, another somewhat obvious, but mindlessly-iterated mantra these

days.

Lets make it absolutely clear: geek monomania aside, the media are not the message;

the media are useful public diplomacy tools. Whats more, however the message is

conveyed, this computer age dictum always applies: garbage in, garbage out.

Talking to Whom about What?

Competent public diplomacy is always expressed in vocabularies and via media that are

natural to those its aimed at, but what transpires isnt chatter. Its purposeful. Its

selective. Choosing an audience (or audiences) within any country is a three stage

process. The first stage calls for identifying a countrys most important institutions, thesecond for knowing its most influential individuals; the third for establishing a tap into

public opinion. Networks are also noted: who talks to whom; who likes or opposes

whom; who influences whom and how. And ultimately this: who, in the end, makes what

decisions. And when the list is narrowing, even this information comes into play: who

likes music or books or movies or sports. Then decision-makers and opinion-shapers

can be invited to U.S.-sponsored cultural and social events that allow for serious talk

around the edges.

When USIA was an independent agency, public diplomacy strategies were informed byopinion surveys designed and analyzed by well-qualified in-house survey research

specialists, although the data was collected by locally-experienced professional polling

organizations. This critical who-thinks-what-and why function is now located in the State

Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research. A perhaps unintended result of this

bureaucratic decision is that survey design and results are divorced from the on-the-

ground knowledge and program needs of field officers, who must have timely, regular

feedback if their PD programs are to be relevant and effective. This needs to be

changed.

Meanwhile, public diplomats have always tried to assess the effectiveness of their

efforts. In the perhaps naive old days, the methods seemed obvious. An editorial

appeared in a newspaper. Legislation was passed. A parliamentarian returned from a trip

with a professedly deeper appreciation of the U.S. Soon policy changes. Feedback like

this is often dismissed as anecdotal today, but such verifiable outcomes should not be


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minimized. Moreover, on any given day, let along in the long run, there are so many

variables, including the political impact of natural calamities as well as spillover from

revolutions in neighboring countries, that any pretense to rigorous quantification of

public diplomacy outcomes must surely be undertaken with a considerable degree of

admittedly rare social science modesty. Public diplomacy isnt a profession for the

timid.

Antennae up 24/7

Good diplomats have always listened, attentively to people, to radio, to gossip, to

popular music. They keep their eyes open, too to graffiti, to TV programs and

commercials, to body language and facial expressions, to art, including the cultural

underground, to the life styles of all social strata. They read up on history and literature,

they understand religion and folk lore; they recognize recurrent myths and the symbols.

Above all, they speak the language. If they can cuss in it, so much the better, so long as

they also know when colloquialisms are appropriate and when they aren't.

Those in tune with the exuberances and nuances of a culture can design and deliver

messages that get through. The same alertness, seasoned with respect, makes every

personal contact count. A local leader talking with a diplomat whos sympathetic and too

impressively well-informed to swallow garbage or spin, aka lies and distortion, is more

likely to be candid and open to persuasion.

The Field Matters

Whatever the policy-related action or understanding needed, it must be articulated and

delivered somewhat differently for each public, each culture, each country, each

individual. The mass media may work well for starters, but close and personal closes the

deal. Policy is set in Washington; its success depends on calibration and modulation in

the field. And always the process works like a constant feedback loop, which is not the

same as a playback loop. Even a great song needs a new twist from time to time.

Otherwise the audience feels insulted, demeaned, undervalued, taken for granted. This is

not good. A good PD officer makes the people he or she is interacting with feel special,as if they are worth a personally-tailored message.

And, for that matter, they are.

PART FOUR

THE FIELD: WHERE FOREIGN POLICY


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SUCCEEDS ORFAILS

Foreignpolicyneedsand goalsare defined in Washington,but foreignpolicy

succeedsor failsinthe field. Attentionissought. Criticismismet. Competing

influencesare neutralized orco-opted. Friendsare made. Alliancesarebuilt. Goalsare achievedornot. It helps hugelywhenpolicyisintrinsically

attractive. Being militarilystrong helps,too,uptoapoint. Overwhelming

strength isoftenresented. Itbecomes,paradoxically,a disadvantage tobe

adroitlyovercome,since nocountrywantstoappearto havebeencoerced. But

rawpower flaunted orsheathed, eventhe U.S. cant goitalone intodays

world. Public diplomacysrole istomovegovernmentsbyinspiring theircitizens

tosee American goalsas good forthem,too.

The Trifecta: Information, Culture, Education

Public Diplomacy at post in the field works both directly and indirectly. It aims

simultaneously for immediate and longer term impact, the two time lines corresponding

roughly to the two branches of traditional PD work: information and culture. Sometimes

the information function is confused with the manipulations better known today as

propaganda, although PDs need for reliability and credibility makes it more akin to

journalism. Cultural programs are often dismissed as frills, expensive indulgences whose

impact is difficult to measure, which is true, but only because conventional polling is at

its weakest when assessing qualitative phenomena and complex interactions. Straddling

the two, though not customarily administered as such, are the educational programs

which involve knowledgeable Americans interacting with foreign audiences, short trips

to the U.S. for promising mid-career foreign citizens, youth exchanges, academic

exchanges like the Fulbright program and even, until recently, university linkages.

Informational, educational, culturalthese are the co-equal mutually-supportive

elements of an effective PD program. Properly orchestrated, they enhance the overall

American image, making the U.S. better understood and more attractive as an ally. They

create lasting links between individuals and institutions, links which keep doors open,

thus ensuring a hearing when tough or sensitive issues need support. They provide, via

all media platforms, relevant, accurate and timely information to foreign publics whose

mobilization is critical if American foreign policy goals are to be met.

Planning for Success


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Because every country is differenteven Canada and the United States differ in ways

that would call for modulated communications strategiesa Washington-dictated, one-

way, one-size-fits-all approach to public diplomacy, however tempting it might seem to

bean counters, doesnt work. Therefore, once Washington establishes policy priorities,

experienced, skilled, perceptive and imaginative field officers must be trusted to devise

ways to sell it.

In the past, USIA posts were required to submit an annual country plan assessing the state

of the bilateral relationship, describing (in cooperation with the entire mission) how the

post proposed to nourish the relationship while promoting, according to specified

strategies, Washingtons policy priorities and, last but not least, requesting the financial,

human and material resources to do so. Expectations for evaluation and feedback were

built in. Naturally big posts in big countries enjoyed more staff and bigger budgets. But

all posts in all countries were guaranteed sufficient resourcesPublic Affairs Officer

plus American and/or locally-hired personnel; a vast range of highly-responsive,

Washington-based backup services; firewalled budgetary authority; the wherewithal to

run a full service American Center; an appropriate inventory of up-to-date equipment;

and, last but not least, PD-controlled vehiclesto offer a high-quality, well-balanced,

year-round program that could and would put America in the best possible light.

The State Department has a habit of bemoaning the lack of administrative skills among

its high level officersand yet, at every post, there was, for decades, a whole cadre of

field-tested managers who were also Foreign Service Officers: the public diplomacy people. Even fairly junior officers had managerial responsibilities, and anyone who

wanted to be a Public Affairs Officer had to be an adroit CEO, a dollar-squeezing CFO, a

supervisor with a knack for delegating, a program coordinator, a cultural impresario, a

human resources geni, a master of media, a public relations whiz, a social psychologist, a

linguist, a self-confident performerand make it all look smooth and easy to the public,

which is why, perhaps, the typical State Department officer found it so difficult to

appreciate what those public diplomacy colleagues were doing. Even today there are

calls for outside hires to supply the State Department with managerial talent. Meanwhile,

the superb managers that State acquired when it absorbed USIA, were ignored or

devalued. Many, therefore, retired prematurely. Although a very few prospered and

even became Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission or Consuls General, most public

diplomacy operational skills are in a state of disuse bordering on atrophy and will soon be

lost, except as recorded in the memoirs of better times. Talk about squandering capital!


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The Information Imperative

Someone has to figure out how to make American policy goals accessible and

attractive. Someone has to counter the inevitable misinformation, disinformation and

plain old misunderstandings. Thats what information officers do every hour of every

day, when they arent feeding media reaction to Washington and the Embassys front

office. So IOs act and react, using deft combinations of all available media. On an easy

day, things work according to plan. As often or not, a government falls, a leader dies, an

earthquake flattens a city, another country throws a monkey wrench into the worksand

an IO needs to react quickly, reporting the latest developments and hoping for guidance

in time to stay ahead of the game. Sometimes there is no guidance. Improvisation is

necessary. An experienced IO usually makes the right guess. PAOs and IOs also advise

ambassadors and consuls on whether and how to meet the press. They create talking

points, they write speeches, they turn bad news into good press. They make the

Ambassador look good.

Educational Programs

Two flagship educational programs funded by the U.S. have been the least affected by the

shattering of a once coherent public diplomacy enterprise. The Fulbright program is a

two-way exchange of academic researchers, professors and students. The International

Visitor Program brings foreigners nearing career peak to the US for two to four weeks of

escort-led professional appointments interspersed with tourism. In very different but

complementary ways, each program fosters familiarity with America and Americans that

usually translates into useful long term good will. Yet Fulbright and International Visitors

programs hardly scratch the surface of what can and should be done. They lack the

multiplier effect of lasting institution-to-institution ties that typically result from multi-

year university-to-university linkages or even ongoing classroom to classroom exchanges

between high schools, both lost in the consolidation shuffle or thereafter. Institutional

relationships also have the advantage of increasing the number of Americans with a

deeper knowledge of our increasingly interconnected world.

Finally, it makes a certain sense to include under the educational rubric the recruiting of

academics and other experts who contribute their knowledge, in person or via interactive

media, to address issues or themes needing attention in a given country. Knowledgeable

Americans may also be asked to join seminars or conferences with local scholars or

government administrators or judges orwell, the range of counterparts is practically

infinite, depending on the knowledge gaps the field post deems it important to fill.


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Cultural programs

Cultural programs are the easiest to describe and the hardest perhaps to understand. Why

must the U.S. government spend good money to send writers, musicians, dancers or

exhibits of art and photography around the globe, especially when American pop culture

permeates the world? For one thing, pop culture is not universally admired. Its often

seen as violent and sex-obsessed. Arts programming counteracts that image and cements

relationships with cultural leaders, who have considerable influence in the many

countries where the arts are more highly valued than they generally in America. Whats

more, many a politically important relationship is rooted in a confidence-building mutual

appreciation of some poet or violinist or photographer.

Private Sector Dividends

The success of the international visitor program depends on private citizens in cities allacross the country. They volunteer to help foreigners understand what makes America

America . These are the people who draw up schedules, who accompany visitors and

their official escorts to local appointments, who show them the sights and invite them to

dinner. Theres been an attempt to try to dignify this function by coining the term

citizen diplomacy, but this is a mistake. The true value of these volunteers is the

volunteers themselves, not as diplomats, but as representative Americans whose friendly

helpfulness quickly dispels the negative stereotypes perpetuated by popular culture. The

most appreciated reward for volunteers: enjoyable stimulating encounters with

fascinating people. But a little more personal recognition for an important job well done

might also be in order.

With the big ticket cultural items, private support is also essential. Transporting and

housing a theatre company or an orchestra or a dance ensemble is very

expensive. Nobody finds it amiss if a corporation sponsors a performance with a few

discreetly placed banners or a display ad in the program. However, and this is very

important, even the most generous sponsor doesnt get to choose the performance or

control the invitation list. Public diplomacy is about activities orchestrated for the

primary benefit of furthering Americas interests abroad. Each recital, each lecture, each

press conference, whatever its intrinsic interest, plays a part in this larger purpose.

The Heart of Public Diplomacy

The heart of a public diplomacy program abroad has always been the American Center, a

welcoming full service information operation with a good collection of books and


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journals and banks of computers and a congenial professional staff to help each visitor,

whatever his or her rank, make the best possible use of them. To save money in recent

years, American Centers have been closed and materials have been transferred to an

American Corner in a local library. Studies indicate that usage suffers badly, which

should surprise no one. Other studies show that the use of American information

materials housed in fortress embassies falls by 85%. Either people cant get in at all - or

theyre unwilling to put up with elaborate security barriers that come across as insulting.

Without a center or a library, PD loses an important in house program venue for

conferences, films, exhibits, discussions, English teaching - and even holiday parties. No

local person says with a pleased smile, And theres the American Center! while

showing visitors around the city. Even when policy issues vex bilateral relations, the

U.S. reputation for intellectual achievement, for cultural vitality and for high quality

education, shines out from the American Center. When economically disadvantaged

students have free access to these facilities, the American Centersays something valuable

about American society. Above all, an American Center declares that America wants to

engage the world on an intellectual and cultural level, not just with missiles and Special

Forces. Yes, it costs money to run an American Center. But it was, and could be again,

money well spent, if the State Departments budget and regard for public diplomacy were

what it should beand if security experts were willing to cooperate.

PART FIVE

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOMORROW: HOW TOMAKE IT WORK, IF WE WANT IT TO WORK

For twenty years Americas leaders neglected public diplomacy. After the U.S. had won the Cold

War and the U.S.S.R. fell apart, people who should have known better crowed about the end of

history, the Secretary of State spoke of the U.S. as the indispensable nation in a unipolar

world, and USIA was absorbed and dismembered by the State Department.

Then history restarted. Russia got uppity, cheese-eating Old Europe rebelled, China and India

reinvented themselves, and the Muslim World bestirred itself. But the George W. Bush

administration had already decided, well before 9/11, that the U.S. didnt need diplomacy,

alliances or negotiation to work its will on the world. Raw unilateral power would do. By the end

of 2008, America was hated, its wars werent going well and its economy had crashed. The days

of go-it-alone were over. Even the Bush administration knew that diplomacy needed another

chance.


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Opportunity Still Beckons

Unfortunately, while the State Department puzzled over what to do with its public diplomacy

step-child, the Pentagon began to spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year on PD

simulacra. The resulting series of highly visible fiascos will undermine the credibility of the real

thing for years to come, assuming that the State Department can regain control over

communications with foreign publicsor seriously cares to. Unfortunately, nine months into the

Obama administration, there is no sign that the State Departments budget will be proportionate

to the need for savvy communications on a global scale. If State goes hungry, public diplomacy

will continue to subsist at starvation level. Budgets speak. It looks as if Americas foreign

policy will remain over-militarized.

Discouraging as this is, its important to remember that moving money from one department to

another isnt as easy as it should be. Heres the conundrum: the president proposes a budget and

Congress signs the checks, but the State and Defense Department budgets are processed through

separate Congressional committees, each subject to outside influence. When it comes to

lobbying Congress, the Pentagon and its generous contractors are far more adept than Foggy

Bottom, especially since States limpgoody bag attracts very few well-heeled lobbyists.

Yet, even if the merest fraction of Pentagon funds could be transferred to the State Departments

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to beef up PD staffing and enhance PD programming, that

pittance (from the Pentagon point of view) could make a vast differenceproviding, of course,

the money is protected from the departmental raiders who have made a habit of siphoning PD-

intended funds and staff slots into other State Department offices. Ever since consolidation in

1999, funds intended for educational exchanges and certain cultural programs have been

firewalled by law, which is to say, they can be put to no other use. Yet, as we have explained

elsewhere, a well-balanced public diplomacy program is not limited to those highly visible

educational exchanges and cultural events. All public diplomacy funding, including desperately

needed budget increases for beefed up information programs and the reestablishment of

American centers abroad, should be equally non-fungible. Otherwise, even if the Pentagon lets

more than a few dollars slip through its fingers, public diplomacys ability to influence events

will continue to be compromised.

But we can dream. Barack Obamas popularity remains fairly high abroad, his speech in Cairo

had resonance in the Islamic world, and his decision to work with the Europeans while also

engaging the Russians and Chinese shows signs of paying off. He may yet wake up to the power

of and need for a more securely institutionalized public diplomacy capacity. However, as time

goes on and hard choices are made, his popularity could slip, and his ability to massage budgets


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would lessen accordingly. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Clintons travels to India, the Far East,

Africa and Latin America have been well-planned and well-received. Hopefully, as the U.S.

withdraws from Iraq and finds a sensible and sustainable equilibrium in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, the Obama administration will realize that fluid situations create great opportunities for

public diplomacy, assuming the tool kit is kept well-stocked and at the ready. To the extent that

Obama strenuously reaffirms the values of the rule of law, due process, the separation of powers,

open government, the unacceptability of torture, and the inalienable civil rights of every citizen,

public diplomacy can help America to regain its dangerously diminished moral and intellectual

preeminence. But the tool kit isnt ready, because public diplomacy has been systematically

neglected for twenty years. At minimum, the State Departments organizational chart must be

revamped, the PD mission must be explicitly reaffirmed, the budget must be enhanced and

protected and leadership recruitment must be based on more rigorous qualifications.

Off-Target Leadership Choices

When the Obama administration nominated the very visible and internationally well liked Hillary

Clinton for Secretary State, we watched, with high hopes, to see who would be nominated to the

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy job. For the past twenty years, under both Bush and

Clinton administrations, the top PD position had been filled by otherwise brilliant people who

did not understand that public diplomacy is like nothing else in the communications world. Two

disappointing incumbents were stars in the advertising and public relations worlds. But

promoting America isnt the same as selling cars or colas. Then came a presidential crony who

may have understood Texas politics and American motherhood, but she ludicrously misread thementality of educated Muslim women and was equally out of her depth when attempting to

communicate on other global issues.

Unfortunately the Obama administration has followed the lead of its predecessors in nominating,

as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, a figure whose public pronouncements to date suggest

a shallow understanding of diplomacy and, worse, a superficial understanding of the wider

world. Judith McHale, late of the Discovery Channel, attempted to pad her largely irrelevant vita

by stressing, during her Congressional confirmation hearing that growing up as the child of a

Foreign Service Officer made her especially qualified for the job. Now the authors of this seriesare both mothers of Foreign Service brats, and over the years we have known many more.

Believe us; that experience alone does not translate into a credible qualification for leading this

countrys public diplomacy efforts. Indeed, McHale to date is proof that more, by far, is

needed. More seriously, we wonder how many more truly qualified candidates were offered the

job and turned it down.


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Why wouldnt they? Who of any major caliber would want to be Under Secretary of State for

Public Diplomacy as the position is presently constituted? Who would take a job that has

become powerless by design? There are only two ways to attract top talent to lead Americas

public diplomacy efforts again. (1) Recreate USIA as an independent agency with a clear

mandate, a seat on the National Security Council and an adequate budget. (2) Or, at minimum,

restructure the State Departments organizational chart to give the Under Secretary direct

supervisory control over public diplomacy staff, budget and programming within the Department

and at US missions abroad.

Confused and Neglected Mandates

Oddly enough, the two founding mandates for handling public diplomacy within the State

Department were sweeping enough to have attracted the most ambitious talents: (1) The Under

Secretary would be responsible for coordinating all US government public diplomacy

efforts. Notice that no exception was carved out to allow the military or any other agency to

conduct go-it-alone public diplomacy programs whether or not funds were available

internally. (2) Meanwhile, the Under Secretary would not only oversee the day-to-day

operations of public diplomacy within the Department of State, but also represent the US

government on the BBG (Broadcasting Board of Governors), a bipartisan board of directors that

oversees the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and an increasingly confused array of US

government supported foreign broadcasting spin-offs.

Whats getting in the way of accomplishing these mandates? Lack of clarity, focus and

bureaucratic infighting within the State Department, for one thing, plus constant turf battles with

the Pentagon, which has expanded its jurisdiction to development projects as well as public

diplomacy over the past decade. Moreover, when the new Secretary of State announces that her

departments mission is diplomacy, development and defense, its not clear which entity is

doing what and who is responsible to whom, a bad sign for the proper performance of any of

those functions. The result is bound to be confusion, gaps, duplication, those turf-battles and

unhappiness. Whats more, since the Pentagons wish list is always munificently fundedthe militarys

strategic communications operation alone receives more, by many multiples, than the entire State

Department, filling the step-child position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy cant help but be an

extremely challenging head hunting operation.

We say step-child because there are also enough internal organizational complications to make a

really qualified candidate hesitate to take the position. The Under Secretary for Public

Diplomacy, one of six Under Secretaries, has no control and not much influence over PD staffing

abroad or in Washington. This is the province of States human resources bureaucracy in


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cooperation with the geographic bureaus, who often fill PD slots at embassies and consulates

with unenthusiastic under-qualified or unqualified officerswhen the slots arent left vacant,

that is. Needless to say, the quality of public diplomacy programs suffers, and the Foreign

Service is diminished by the lack of a pipeline for training an experienced cadre of public

diplomacy experts.

Once again the Pentagon is there to fill the gap, using its bottomless resources to assign strategic

communications teams to US Embassies. The teams often incompatible activities and narrow

focus undermine the credibility of outspent, out-staffed public diplomacy efforts. Other agencies

show signs of doing the same. Just as there is no longer one VOA speaking clearly and proudly

for America, Americas public diplomacy voice is becoming a fragmented, incoherent,

cacophony, each strain speaking for some one agency or department, none speaking for the U.S.

as a whole.

Clearly, then, the Under Secretary for PD is fulfilling neither mandate. Tails dont wag dogs, so

the puny PD operation in the State Department certainly cant influence, let alone oversee PD-like

operations in the Pentagon, and the Under Secretary occupies an equally powerless slot within the

tradition-bound State Department itself. Lets face it. Even without a designated seat on the National

Security Council, the Director of the small, independent USIA was far more powerful and influential.

What to Do?

The studies and recommendations proffered (and ignored) since 9/11 are too numerous to list

here. The mere fact that they exist indicates that something is seriously wrong with Americaspublic diplomacy picture. Recommendations have ranged from simply establishing a permanent

seat on the National Security Council for the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy to creating a

non-governmental entity called USA-World Trust to be funded jointly by the US government

and the American private sector. In the latter case, of course, the resulting organization would be

one more addition to the ever proliferating ranks of non-governmental organizations receiving

federal funding. It would lack the clout and the strong claim to international attention thats

automatically accorded to an organization speaking as Americas official voice. Whats more,

the US would cease to have a coherent public diplomacy presence in the world at the very time

when public persuasion is increasingly essential to preserving Americas ability to influence

world affairs.

A more attractive and reasonably feasible option for reorganization is a modest reform proposal

originating with figures who know public diplomacy and the State Department well. If

implemented, it would by statute unify control of existing State Department public diplomacy


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staff, programs and funds both in Washington and in missions abroad under the Under Secretary

for Public Diplomacy. This proposal for well-defined PD consolidation is referred to in the final

document of a conference held at White Oak this past winter. Conference participants included American

public diplomacy specialists as well as prominent concerned citizens. In our view, the internal

restructuring proposed in the White Oak document represents the bare minimum of what needs to be

done. What it dramatically fails to do is to address the Under Secretarys current inability to coordinate

public diplomacy efforts government-wide. Furthermore, modest and sensible as this proposal may be,

experience to date suggests that States internal fiefdoms and vested interests will continue to obstruct the

emergence of an effective, unified, influential public diplomacy operation within the Department

itself. Bureaucratic politics can be deadly.

Others have suggested the creationofa hybrid newcivilianprogramagencythatwould

house developmentand humanitarianassistance aswellaspublic diplomacyoperations,

but the two functions, so destructively absorbed into the State Department tenyearsago, are simply too different to be jointly administered. Americas foreign policy

encompasses the entire world,which meansthat Americaspublic diplomacyprogram

mustalso have globalscope. Foreignaid programs,onthe other hand,are concentrated

inareaswith veryspecificneeds. Asifthisobviousmismatch were not disqualification

enough, it should be noted that, during the 1930s evidently, a similar marriage of

developmentand public diplomacywastried. It didntlast forlong.

All in all, then, its hard to resist the conclusion that public diplomacy and development support should

once again be housed in separate agencies, each with appropriate provisions for cooperation and

coordination with the State Department, of course. Weve done this before and very well. We can do it

again. As US economic power shrinks, not absolutely, but in comparison to rising economies like China,

India and Brazil, as the various regions of the world jockey for more respect and a bigger role within

global decision-making bodies, as restive or submerged ethnic groups challenge international borders and

internal governance, as religion reasserts itself as a world-changing force, as environmental and climate-

related issues claim ever greater attention and established political and economic doctrines fall

increasingly under challenge, as the world is bombarded by old media and new media churning out

entertainment, information and disinformation and as nuclear ambitions and capabilities proliferate,

the U.S. needs every communications skill and device it can muster simply to maintain let alone extend

its influence. Now more than ever public diplomacy matters. Isnt it time to reclaim the profession we

invented and that others, very cleverly, are copying? Why should we find ourselves beaten at our own

game?

public diplomacy today and tomorrow

Documents