radicalisation and subcultures: a theoretical analysis

ARTICLE Elisa Impara

1

Youth Voice Journal http://youthvoicejournal.com/

Radicalisation and Subcultures: a Theoretical Analysis

by Elisa Impara

Youth Voice Journal 2016 Online

Published by:

The IARS International Institute

Hard copies of Youth Voice Journal are available to purchase at

http://iars.org.uk/content/youthvoicejournal

Each year, IARS members will receive a collection of articles and book reviews from the Youth Voice

Journal in a glossy printed format for free as part of their membership. Join us today as an IARS member.

Full membership package and details at http://www.iars.org.uk/content/join-us-member. For more

information: [email protected]

2015 THE IARS INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE


2

Radicalisation and Subcultures: a Theoretical Analysis

Published in the Youth Voice Journal, January 2016 http://youthvoicejournal.com/

IARS 2016

ISSN (online): 2056 2969

Elisa Impara

Abstract

This article will ask whether we could talk about radicalised subcultures in relation to recent cases of

young people deliberately flee to Syria. To achieve this it will: 1. Overview the concept of

subcultures and identify which elements can be linked to the experience of young people engaging

with extremis; 2. Suggest how the philosophical concept of transgression can cast a different

perspective on the reasons why young people engage with radical practices.

Keywords: subcultures, radicalisation, transgression, excitement, tribe.

Corresponding Author: Elisa Impara, Kingston University, email: [email protected]


3

Introduction

Increasingly politicians, scholars and the media in general have all been focused on the triple

issues of extremism, terrorism and threat. Indeed, the past few years have witnessed a series of

events that have shaken the world. The credit crunch in 2007/8 brought to the surface and exposed

the fragile instability of the Western economic model. Poverty has become part of our social reality,

with the accompanying unemployment rates rising to record heights in various parts of Europe. In

addition, Greeces economic plan has crumbled and its citizens face an uncertain future.

Furthermore, Europe has suffered many terrorist attacks in the last decade. The situation in Syria,

Iraq, Libya and Yemen also does not produce a reassuring picture. In this fragile context, the Islamic

State has flourished, securing financial means that consolidate the strength of its attacks on Western

and non-Western nations alike. In this unprecedented scenario, domestic and international news

agencies have increasingly reported of Western-born young people engaging with a radicalised

rhetoric (Buchanan, 2015; Cobain and Ramesh, 2015; The Economist, 2014; Mendick, Verkaik and

Ross, 2014; Norfolk and Sweriling, 2015; Simpson, 2014; Wood, 2014).

Although the combination of the particular political/economic situation in the West today with

this increase in European jihad may be a coincidence, this interaction should be nonetheless

acknowledged. In relation to this, links between economic conditions, political instability and

terrorism have received attention and produced conflicting results (Kavanagh, 2011): Abadie (2006)

failed to find a significant association between terrorism and economic variables; Bravo and Dias

(2006) found that illiteracy, democracy and access to natural resources were some main determinants

in international terrorism. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that domestic political instability

has an impact on on terrorism (Campos and Gassebner, 2009) and that the emergence of radical

attitudes comes forth as secondary consequences of important historic changes (Botsch, 2012).

According to data gathered by Cable News Network (CNN) in February 2015 (Berlinger,

2015), approximately 3,400 people have left Western countries to join the Islamic State in Syria and

Iraq. Among these, 600 are believed to be British nationals. Aqsa Mahmood from Scotland went

missing in November 2013; she had been promoting terrorist values via social media prior to her

disappearance (BBC, 2014). As recent as June 2015 she has been reported praising the shooting of

British nationals in Tunisia (BBC, 2015). In a similar vein, in February 2015 three teenage

schoolgirls from Bethnal Green, London, left their families to travel to Syria. It is believed that two

of them are now married to Islamic State men in Syria (Dodd and Khomami, 2015).

But why do young people find radical discourses so compelling? Why do they feel the need to

embrace radicalisation and extremism? These questions are complex and require a deep empirical


4

investigation; however, the aim of this work is to tackle the problem from a more theoretical

perspective. The main research question is:

To what extent can we associate the experience of young people joining the Syrian

front and the Islamic State to the notion of subcultures?

This paper will look at some of the elements of subcultural theory that can be used to discuss

young peoples fascination with radicalisation (eg. sense of otherness, excitement). In particular, the

essay will focus on Muslim youth. Drawing on Hamms notion of terrorist subculture (2004), it will

explore whether the way young people embrace radicalisation is similar to the experience connected

to subcultural affiliation. For the purpose of this work, this subcultural connection will be defined as

radicalised tribe. This article will ask whether there is a deviant element in this fascination.

Following this, the paper will argue how the philosophical notion of transgression can help us bring

to the surface certain elements that are not considered by the sociological concept of deviance. In the

conclusion, I hope to cast some more light on the reasons why Western-born young people may

engage with what is understood with terrorist practices.

Young people and radicalisation

Since the New York attacks in 2001, a good portion of scholarly research has been dedicated

to the analysis of terrorist practices (e.g. Rapoport, 2004; Silke, 2004; Ranstorp, 2006; Abrahms,

2008). Due to the nature of the topic, most research focused on secondary data (Bakker, 2006) and/or

small case studies (Nesser, 2006). When facing the question of why people engage with violent

practices, the first tendency is to seek answers within the fields of psychiatry and psychology.

Psychological abnormality is perhaps an aspect that most people can easily engage with and

comprehend. In this respect, Furedi (2004) highlights how social and cultural issues are frequently

understood and analysed in connection with peoples emotions. Furedi suggests that in the past few

years every single aspect of our life has been subject to a new emotional culture. This favours the

rise of a new conformity, monitored through the management of peoples feelings. Furedis approach

encouraged me to reflect upon whether this emotional culture partially influences the way terrorist

behaviour is regarded. The psychological response is, in fact, the first approach that is presented

when crime is discussed outside the academic ring of criminology and sociology.

Silke (2008) points out that most terrorists do not present with any affliction of the mind.

Their radicalisation process is, on the contrary, a gradual process. The author argues that most

radicalised individuals become entwined with a small group of like-minded people. This means that


5

social networks and personal attitudes can play a central role. In the course of this section, I will

present different lines of investigation to radicalisation (historical, political, multicultural) that will

favour a discussion on whether psychology and social networks are sufficient to explain and

understand young radicalisation.

The first approach to the issue of violent radicalisation should be historical. Writing about

rites of passage, Van Gennep (1909/2011) emphasised how rites and ceremonies are not only

important in marking transitions of individuals or groups, but they also resolve life crises and

negotiate an individuals management of important life occasions (e.g. puberty, marriage, death).

Throughout history, violent discourses have captured the imagination of young people where

violence has frequently been regarded as a rite of passage, an expression of camaraderie among

young males. For example, Muchembled (2012) provides us with an overview of different violent

festivities and brutal games that constituted the making of young people in the Middle Ages. An

example of this is the Feast of Fools (in France, Spain and Germanic countries) or the Festival of the

Boy Bishop (in England) on the 28th December; this was a parodic celebration performed by young

clerics who went around the streets and beat up any women they met. This rite was supposed to be

a good omen of fertility for both women and fields.

Painful or violent rites of passage are still practised today. For example, the ritualistic

envenomation among Sater-Maw peoples in Brazil is a ritual that initiates young males into

adulthood (Bosnia, et al., 2015). The ritual subjects young men to the poisonous stings of

Paraponera Clavata, a very venomous ant. Ants are woven in a glove that each participant has to

wear for about 10 minutes and repeat the ritual 20 times. The stings effectively make a person sick.

What these practices demonstrate is how violence can be a culturally legitimate act of identity

demarcation. Furthermore, examples above show that youth participation in actions that are deemed

radical seems to be a constant history.

A second approach to radicalisation should be political. Feeling part of a bigger plan or

actively contributing to a cause seems to be an important aspect in young peoples lives. In a

contemporary Western world, where young people seem interested in protesting but not so much in

exercising their right to vote, Soler-I-Marti (2015) identified an increase in young peoples direct

interest in political issues and causes, proving that young people are fundamentally political and

interested in various issues like immigration, inequality, rights of homosexuals, the environment and

social policies. The author investigated the psychological dimension of young peoples political

involvement: this research demonstrates a correlation between activism and both cause-oriented and

institutional political interest. It is extremely useful in showing that young people are active in their

engagement with causes.


6

In terms of Islamic radicalisation, a political aspect cannot be excluded: that young peoples

interests in political change may be partly reflected in their appreciation of the Islamic States

political discourses. In an interview with BBC Radio 1, Omar, a British Muslim who is currently in

Syria, claims that unjust Western foreign policy partly motivated his involvement with the Islamic

State (BBC Newsbeat, 2015). Furthermore, a document obtained by the Guardian recently reveals

the Islamic States plans for building a state comprising a treasury, various government departments

(including health and education), and an economic programme for self-sufficiency (Shiv, 2015). This

confirms that the Islamic State project goes beyond religious fanaticism and, for the purpose of the

ideas presented in this theoretical essay, this constitutes an element that should be considered.

When reflecting upon the political side of youth radicalisation, reference to the current global

landscape cannot be omitted: high unemployment levels, a general Euroscepticism, civic dissent in

various geographical areas (eg. riots in London in 2010/11; tumults and violence in Greece, Brazil,

Turkey and Syria), rise of populist political discourses and far-right attitudes, like neo-fascist Golden

Dawn in Greece and those enounced by the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West

(Pegida) (Dolstal, 2015) are all contributing to the makeup of a fragile social/political tapestry.

Krugman (2011) alerts that a revival of far-right parties may push Europe to interstate conflict and

breakdown. At the same time, frictions in the West may impact on recruitment by the Islamic State.

Former Islamic State hostage Nicolas Hnin suggested how central to radical views of the Islamic

State is the belief that Muslims and non-Muslims cannot live together (Hnin, 2015): thriving on

division, radicalisation can blossom, attracting more Western-born youth.

The third line of discussion I want to propose relates to the notions of identity,

multiculturalism and sense of belonging. Ryan (2014) explores the Islamic narratives of young

people in London and writes how religion may contribute to the formation of young people and how

Islamic identity functions between the host society and parental authority. Young Muslims

prioritise their Islamic identity over the traditional cultural identification of the older generations

(Ryan, 2014: 446). In Ryans work, religion emerges as a primary marker of identity, stronger than

ethnicity. This is an extremely interesting point because if religion constitutes a fundamental aspect

of youth identity, what happens to this identity when it is located in a secular state? Roy (2008)

discusses the British multicultural approach (Muslims are defined by their distinctive ethno-cultural

identity) and the French assimilation approach (Muslims perceived as having a different religion,

rather than a distinctive identity) and notes how radicalisation has little to do with national policies.

Coppock and McGovern (2014) suggest that current counter-radicalisation strategies aimed at

protecting young people from extremism only contribute to a racially informed construction of

childhood vulnerability. It is possible to argue that perhaps this excessive need to pin down the


7

ethno-cultural background of young people may result in alienation from the society they live in.

Excessive use of multicultural narratives and normalisation may have a counter-productive effect in

that by emphasising inclusion, young people may perceive themselves as outsiders and in need of an

identity.

Youth identity and subcultures

Subcultural theory has traditionally explained the opposition between young people and

society in terms of conflict. The combination of young people and eccentric styles has traditionally

raised suspicion in society which has led to ideas linking youth to both danger and crime (Goodlad

and Bibby, 2007). Society seems to associate large gatherings of youth with boredom and,

eventually, trouble making (Hodkinson and Deicke, 2007). Academia has always attempted to

investigate the characteristics of subcultures and their location within society (Cohen, 1955;

Hebdige, 1979; McRobbie, 1994).

Central to the understanding of subcultural discourses has been the work of the Birmingham

Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). Traditional CCCS subcultural approaches,

similar to previous post-war approaches on juvenile deviance, regarded the notion of subculture as

affiliated to some cardinal social factors such as class status, geographic environment, ethnic

background or religious influence (Gordon, 1947 in Gelder and Thornton, 1997: 40-41). Everything

individuals do can be located and discussed within the spectrum of those social frameworks. These

elements are used to explain the deviant behaviour of youth cultures and how these become a tool of

collective resistance and a response to social and economic conflicts between classes (Hall and

Jefferson, 1976).

In this context, we can assume that excessive focus on inclusion of ethnic minorities may

have a double-edged effect: by focusing on inclusion, we paradoxically compose a narrative of

exclusion and alienation. Identity is a problematic matter, especially in our contemporary society:

people are born in one country and raised in another; children have nationalities different from their

parents and parents may come from different backgrounds. In a post postmodern world that

constantly asks us to define ourselves, definitions have become more and more problematic. In our

society, both institutions and people may experience some pressures that lead to alienation and to

peoples inability to describe themselves (Drmnescu, 2013). The class resistance that Hall and

Jefferson discuss has become an identity resistance. In this context, we can assume that radical

discourses can be appealing for those who struggle to fit in. The identification of a common enemy

reinforces the sense of belonging.


8

Mainly a youth subculture is considered as a subculture (Thornton, 1995), where taste, style

and aesthetics are central to an understanding of the dynamics of the group. Recently, media

attention has been paid to Muslim womens re-appropriation of the hijab as a fashion item and a

symbol of elegance (Naib, 2015). A Hennes and Mauritz (H&M) television advertisement, featuring

a veiled young woman, received both positive and negative reactions, instigating a debate on

Islamophobia. Swedish-born fashion designer Iman Aldebe has regarded the veil not only as an

important part of Islamist culture, but also as a fashion item that Muslim women can enjoy (Naib,

2015). Looked at from this perspective, the veil goes beyond its usual valence, and it also becomes a

form of resistance to dominant culture and a re-appropriation of an identity that society has distorted.

According to CCCS, the group becomes a social world with its own life, characteristics,

meanings and styles, a world that is parallel to and independent from the world of outsiders,

untouched by the parent culture (Clarke, et al, 1975). In the case of young Muslims, this could be

translated into a conflict between family culture/traditions and the culture of the country they live in:

their Muslim identity and values along with the countrys focus on multiculturalism and inclusion

may paradoxically result in alienation (as previously seen). Hypothesising that radicalisation may

be triggered by the desire to belong to a group (independent of its nature, be it peaceful or violent)

may not be as daring. When I suggest a group, I imply a group that is not attached to parental or

community values.

Cohen (1955) discussed the concept of subculture as the interaction of individuals who share

the same problems of adjustment. Their stylistic and cultural choices are a response to a determined

condition. The need to aggregate and interact with others becomes a phenomenon of cultural growth

in which identities can be affirmed by withdrawing from a society that rejects the diverse. In Cohens

view, the relationship of the group with outsiders is one of necessity and demands: members of the

subculture establish relations with others in order to preserve their identity. At the same time,

belonging to a group emphasises the necessity to break free from the way dominant society sees the

individual: the Self can happily survive surrounded by those who share its need to go beyond the

limits of the parent culture.

In this regard, Tajfel (1981) argued that the central element in the definition of a group is an

individuals knowledge that he or she belongs to that specific group. As social animals, we humans

need to aggregate with our peers in order to develop what Aristotle defined as the rational capability

of thinking (Aristotle, td. Mazzarelli, 2000). We want to legitimate emotions and the way we act

upon them: humankind needs the Other to validate our desires, love, perception, pride, hatred, anger,

judgement, needs, understanding and choices. The feeling of sharing habits, values and views within

a group makes an individual more at ease and allows peoples natural instincts to be explored more


9

freely: individuals will lower their guard, feel less inhibited and even less rational. This can be

particularly applicable in the case of a youth subculture where the young age of the members means

they may not be confident enough to express divergent views. In the case of young people engaging

with radicalisation, the sense of belonging to a religious structure, which welcomes them without

making them feel different, may be an appealing prospect. It could also be suggested that radical

discourses may be perceived as a re-appropriation of religious symbols and identity.

Radicalised subcultures: common traits between radicalised groups and youth subculture

This discussion on youth identity and subculture may raise the question of how and how far

young peoples radicalisation can constitute subcultural behaviour. A traditional understanding of

subcultures may prevent the association of this concept to terrorism. Gang, network and organisation

are usually the preferred terms to indicate the dynamics of a group of people engaging in

international crime. However, known information regarding Western-born terrorists induced me to

reflect upon the possibility that their involvement in radical rhetoric shares some common traits with

involvement in a subculture.

Adopting the style of the chosen subculture is the first aspect that allowed me to connect

more traditional subcultures to radicalised youth. The relationship between subcultural affiliation,

sartorial styles, rituals and identity construction has received much scholarly attention (Borgerson,

2013; Newholm and Hopkinson, 2009). Chaney and Goulding (2016) explored the role of dressing as

a form of collective disguise and a ritual experience: the sartorial transformation reinforces the sense

of belonging to the community. This is also visible in radicalised subcultures: Hasna At

Boulahcen, a suspect of terrorism who died during police operations in St Denis following the Paris

massacre in November 2015, abruptly changed her way of dressing, going from a Western style to a

traditional Islamic style (Willsher, 2015).

In the aftermath of the November 2015 attacks in Paris, details on the identity of each

attacker emerged. All the perpetrators displayed a behavioural change accompanied by a sudden

embrace of radical Islamic views (BBC, 2015a; Vaudano, 2015). As the previously-discussed

subcultural theories debate, individuals entering a group will also adopt affine behaviours. In this,

they are similar to young people engaging with radical ideas.

Results of mathematical models, used to assess communities and social groups (including

terrorists), elaborated by Camacho (2013), highlight how building a critical mass of individuals

committed to a fanatic ideology is fundamental for the success of the group. The study suggests the

more efforts a group invests in recruiting and keeping its members, the more successfully the groups


10

ideology will be passed on vulnerable individuals (which, in turn, will become believers). Members

identification with and commitment to the groups values fortifies the group: absence of competitive

ability, defined by Camacho (2013) as being able to share prospective members, results in the

survival of an extreme ideology. Looking at longevity among terrorist organisations, Phillips (2014)

shows how terrorist groups seem to acquire durability by interaction and confrontation with other

groups, resulting at times in violent rivalries (Phillips, 2015).

Mathematical approaches have also been adopted to understand how subcultures develop.

Holme and Grnlund (2005) explore the forces behind youth subcultures by employing a dynamical

model: the study demonstrates subcultural groups have a growth stage, a quasi-stationary stage and a

final decline; subcultures with a long life are those whose members do not share any values from

other subcultures. This sense of exclusivity is a common feature between the manner by which both

terrorist organisations and subcultures operate. All this seem to indicate that people involved with

distinctive groups experience a sense of othering, a contraposition between insiders and outsider,

authentic and unauthentic.

Radicalised tribes?

The life that is created within the subculture can be varied. This is what Irwin (1970) defines

as subcultural pluralism and relativism. Individuals identities and sense of belonging can be

reflected in different social worlds that enrich their existential experience by choosing to adopt

various meanings and styles and different ideologies. Those elements become core benchmarks that

delineate the sense of belonging to a specific cultural sphere. Comparisons could be drawn between

this subcultural approach and Lacans concept of manque tre, lack of being (1966). This lack of

being articulates, in Lacans words, the metonymy of human desire (Siboni, 2006). In other words,

belonging to a group alleviates the individuals fragmented identity. The fact of being in a group

makes its members more prepared to approach life in a non-standardised way. This discussion can be

related to the concept of entitativity(Campbell, 1958). With this term, Campbell (1958) identified the

process by which people recognise group members as a homogeneous entity. With this recognition,

the group achieves credibility and legitimacy.

From the prehistoric age to contemporary society, aggregation has been essential for the

individuals survival. When we are born, we are not socially complete. In order to develop as

thinking human beings and to establish profitable relations within society, we need to be part of a

community. For young people, this aggregation can be perceived in terms of exclusivity: I am part of

a non-dominant group, so, paradoxically, I feel I belong more. In this respect, Elias (1986) suggested

that groups can be understood in terms of social development. Being part of a subculture, in fact,


11

encourages experimentation with new ideas and strengthens identities. For instance, Ryan (2014)

suggests that new generations of Western-born Muslims seem to have stronger beliefs than their

parents.

T his brief overview of subcultural aggregation and its application to the problem of youth

radicalisation must now mention some of the issues relating to the term subculture. In recent years,

the study of subcultures has highlighted a certain degree of disagreement in the meanings given to

the term:

the term subculture survives in such counter-analytical discourse. Indeed, such is the variety of

analytical perspectives in which subculture is now used as a theoretical underpinning, that it has

arguably become little more than a convenient catch-all term for any aspect of social life in which young people, style and music intersect. (Bennett, 1999: 59)

Criticisms have been made about the semantic use of the term subculture. Implementing

Maffesolis notion of tribus (tribes) (Maffesoli, 1996), Bennett (1999) suggests the expression neo-

tribes in order to better explain the idea of youth subculture. According to Maffesoli the tribe is

without the rigidity of the forms of organization with which we are familiar, it refers more to a

certain ambience, a state of mind, and is preferably to be expressed through lifestyles that favour

appearance and form (1996: 98). Unlike traditional studies of youth, Bennett considers aggregations

of young people to be unstable, with shifting cultural affiliations (Bennett, 1999: 65).

A traditional sociological approach to the study of youth subculture would metaphorically

amputate the very essence of subculture; its human fluidity is an essence made of transgression,

pleasure and taste. In this respect, the term tribes or neo-tribes would overcome the limitations

imposed by subcultural theory, allowing the very nature of subculture to be better expressed in terms

of cultural identity. Recently, Nwalozie (2015) argued for a rethink of the concept of subculture and

subcultural theory, suggesting that as it was too much dictated by Anglo-American cultural

identities, subcultural theory should explore more deeply the dynamics of opposition to mainstream

culture or, as in the case of young Muslims, to the country they were born in.

The cultural development of a youth group goes through what Clarke, et al. (1975) define as

an appropriation of the territory, the conquering of the social space. Thornton (1995) highlights how,

in their spare time, young people like hanging out together. Today, hanging out has moved from a

physical space to the virtual space via social media. In recent years, the rise in the use of social

networks like Facebook, YouTube or Twitter has increased the aggregation of young people coming

from different localities. Berger and Morgan (2015) suggest how the Islamic State has heavily

exploited Twitter in order to divulge its propaganda and attract vulnerable people to radicalisation

narratives. They found out that between September and December 2014, approximately 46,000


12

Twitter accounts were used by supporters of the Islamic State (not all active at the same time); each

account had an average of 1000 followers. As social media represents a way to construct a

glamorised identity par excellence (see the proliferation of social media celebrities), it is easy to

imagine the attractiveness that radicalised Twitter accounts may instigate. Every single piece of

information on sites like Twitter, Instagram and Facebook is carefully selected and crafted to project

successful constructions of the Self.

Hamm (2004) explores the notion of terrorist subcultures and their seduction. In his analysis

of the social histories of 40 neo-Nazi males, Hamm discusses the subcultural elements that make

terrorism possible. Hamm locates social deprivation as a possible starting point for the formulation

of terrorist subcultures. In his work, he identifies the pathway to terrorism as a series of tiles,

engraved in exclusion, that lead young people to a specific ideology (in the case of neo-Nazi, a

white supremacy) and a specific style (e.g. shaved hair). Each component of this subculture

becomes part of a collective practice: understanding terrorism requires more than an appreciation

of individuals bound together by a common hatred of social out-groups. It requires, instead, a

nuanced understanding of the network of symbols, language and knowledge that gives meaning to

terrorist subcultures (Hamm, 2004: 327).

In his Seductions of Crime, Katz (1988) discusses the thrills and sensuality that criminality

may cause in certain individuals. Some may have an emotional investment in the deviant act, which

may be regarded as a source of excitement. The criminal is almost perceived as a glamour entity, a celebrity. For example, in an interview with the journalist Enzo Biagi, Roberto Saviano (the author

of Gomorrah, a book that portrays a candid image of the Mafia in Italy) discusses the glamorisation

of a boss Mafioso (Rotocalco Televisivo, 22nd April 2007). Saviano points out that a boss

Mafioso is like a Hollywood star, a divo. He takes Cosimo Di Lauro1 as an example: when arrested,

Di Lauro posed in front of cameras and photographers, looking at each of them like he was a

celebrity. His posture was the posture of a winner and a divo, rather than a criminal. He was dressed

like Brandon Lee in the film The Crow. Local children who witnessed the arrest were shouting The

Crow! The Crow! Shortly after his arrest, his image was passed around via mobile phones and

many local teenagers used it as screensaver for their phones. Saviano suggests that the boss

Mafioso must have the appearance of a winner and this comes from cinema and TV (Rotocalco

Televisivo, 22nd April 2007).

1 Cosimo Di Lauro is one of the youngest heads of Mafia organisations in Italy. He was arrested in 2005 and was

accused of a massacre in Secondigliano (near Naples): about 80 dead people were found within a few days. The

Di Lauro family is fighting against other local criminal families in order to control the drug market.


13

The way extremists are perceived in their communities may not be too different from the way

Di Lauro was perceived: he had money and the looks appealing to youth culture in Naples.

Extremists have weapons, perceived power and followers. Images from Syria and Northern Iraq

show us children and teenagers being indoctrinated/trained to become militants by the Islamic State

(Karam and Janssen, 2015). Interviews conducted by the Associated Press reveal that children are

given a sword and trained in the arts of warfare (Ibid). Much has been written about the role of

video games, films and television series in glamorising violence, but it could be suggested that

images coming from conflict zones can appeal to Western-born youths, who have never had direct

contact with real violence. Violence is divulged by the Islamic State as a product to be consumed, a

form of propaganda that appeals to estranged young people. A general desensitisation of violence

means that violence can be perceived as something exciting.

Radicalised tribes and transgressive excitement

The phenomenon of othering is a way to explore the other side of experiences, but also the

process by which people become insiders or outsiders, normal or deviant. I regard this contraposition

as extremely important when discussing radicalised tribes. Deviance has always been entwined with

the phenomenon of othering: the other side of experience, what we do not see because, as George

Bataille (2005) shows, the human eye selects what it wants to see. Young (2007) defines this process

as marking the difference between the deviant them and the obedient us. Historically, othering

has fed the process of social exclusion as the boundaries between obedience and disobedience,

insider and outsider are constructed. Becker argues that social groups create deviance by making

the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and

labelling them as outsiders (Becker, 1963: 9). He regards deviance not as a quality to be attributed

to the perpetrator of an action, but the consequence of a sanctioning process. For example, Islamic

State militants give children dolls so they can practise killing the infidels. In this way, they create a

villain other, the infidel, the enemy, the oppressor who should be destroyed and punished. Radical

values become culturalised: they are an integral part of the culture of the group.

As a possible cultural artefact, radicalisation should be explored from a cultural

criminological perspective. Cultural criminology investigates criminal behaviour and the bodies

involved with the criminal justice system in terms of culture (Ferrell, 1995; Presdee, 2000). Violent

practices can be culturalised and culture can be criminalised. A violent narrative can be perceived as

a necessary tool to deliver a cultural or religious message. Traditional criminological discourses

would look at this in terms of personal and economic histories, with young radicalised youth coming

from particular family or social backgrounds. Whereas this could be true for some of them, a more


14

cultural or emotional element could also cast some light on young peoples involvement. Summer

(1994) discusses how sociology has dropped the element of culture in the analysis of deviant

behaviours. In doing so, it has effectively forgotten the experience of othering. Cultural criminology

steps in and tackles this problem by trying to introduce a different perspective on deviance. The

physical excitement that breaking norms may trigger in an individual should also be taken into

account.

Consideration of transgressive excitement is what I propose in order to explore the complex

problem of Muslim radicalisation. In the course of police interviews, Mohammed Rehman, who

plotted an Islamic State-inspired attack in London for the 7/7 anniversary, made frequent references

to excitement as a trigger for his engagement with radicalisation and terrorist practices: [..] I just

wanted a bit of excitement in my life. (Cockfort and Gardham, 2015). On following Islamic state

videos on YouTube and Twitter, he added:

[it] seemed like an exciting life you know and that's all I could really see. (Ibid)

The idea of having all this, you know, weaponry and being able to make all these explosives and causing a big

stir around the world, this is the only thing that really excited me, to be honest with you, because of that I was

inspired, but not inspired to the point where I actually wanted to go out and do something for their cause. (Ibid)

Interestingly, Rehmans last comment emphasises how the Islamic cause is not an inspiration

for his action, but the thrill of having guns and committing violence is. Exploring reasons for

skinheads to be attracted to racist ideologies, Coolseat (2013: 282) suggested that attraction to these

emerges from the need to fulfil a series of social and psychological needs among which excitement.

Alexander (2001) suggests how social sciences have not sufficiently tackled the emotional

connotation of doing evil, but have relied on reporting good and evil according to a general common

sense. Similarly, deviance has been confined to what Alexander (2001) calls an it-goes-without-

saying explanation: we have our notion of what deviant and proper are and we do not feel the urge

to explore them any further.

As the deviant is medicalised, we attempt to demarcate and scientise the breach of taboos, a

process eventually completed by the creation of a science of crime (criminology). In this respect, we

could suggest that the attraction to the transgressions of radical narratives has been suppressed by a

criminological analysis that, perhaps, does not focus sufficiently on important aspects like passion,

emotion, culture and, ultimately, excitement. Behaviours that deviate from norms have been reduced

to no more than an aborted relationship between penal codes and psychological problems.


15

Transgression and violence may be perceived as an exciting and glamorised experience. So may

radicalisation. Radicalised tribes, in this respect, can be strictly associated to transgression.

Conclusion

Assessing whether every single young person becoming radicalised enters the same

subcultural process is a complex task: mathematical models and qualitative research can only

identify certain patterns of social aggregation and function as a starting point for discussion on these

matters. Traditional subcultural theories provide a wide background where to further our exploration

of radicalised rhetoric and youths involvement: from subcultures as the product of collective

resistance (Clarcke et al., 1975) to the notion of boredom (Hodkinson and Deike, 2007); from

Cohens problems of adjustment (Cohen, 1955) to Katzs thrill crime (Katz, 1988) and Hamms

terrorist subcultres (Hamm, 2004), this robust body of research can favour the development of the

notion of a radicalised tribe, a group of youth who flirt with radical rhetoric, not only as a

consequence of religious or political attitudes, but also as the product of what I refer to as

transgressive excitement.

History tells us that rules and laws get re-affirmed in festive periods through excess and the

transgression of what is forbidden (Caillois, 1959). During the period of a festivity, people are

allowed to infringe social conventions and rules. For example, the exuberance of carnival and Mardi

Gras comes before the restraints of Lent. From a philosophical perspective, transgression is a concept

that encapsulates not only the infringement of norms, but also the thrill that comes with it. Bataille

(1957/2001) and Foucault (1994) regard transgression as a necessary experience that allows

individuals to engage with everything that has been imposed as a ban. The philosophical concept of

transgression can help us to understand radicalisation. Transgression brings to the surface a variety

of experiences that do not conform to social order. For radicalised tribes, violent discourses or

extreme dogmas may represent a form of excitement.

Certain events and activities are labelled as transgressive and criminal. The search for

excitement symbolises the seduction of transgression. Transgression embodies an othering: those

emotions that are socially challenging but pleasant for those who experience them. Thus, the

consideration of the other is relevant to criminological discourses regarding subcultures. Hanging

around together in the virtual space may also contribute to the growth of an othering that

transgresses the parameters of social order and religion.

Bataille (1957/2001), Caillois (1959) and Foucault (1994) suggest the inner Self rebels

against limits and restrictions created to preserve social order. In the act of breaching those limits, the

Self rediscovers its totality. Totality indicates that state of wildness and nature that has been


16

repressed. The Self desperately seeks that physical, almost visceral, sense of happiness that only the

violation of the conventional can give rise to (Bataille, 2001). Kristeva (1982) associates the idea of

the body expelling waste with the need for human beings to detox from societys impositions. We

are forced into sacredness of order where our freedom is controlled by regulations imposed by

society; this produces a sense of frustration that some of us challenge by fighting and desecrating

rules. In the case of young people being fascinated by radical narratives, entering the structured

world of radicalisation where they can set free from the constructed identities their society attempts

to give them may represent this detoxification..

Talking about radicalisation and violent acts in terms of excitement is extremely problematic.

First of all, the fear is that we may disrespect the victims and survivors of these acts; discussing the

excitement component in violence from a neutral, emotionless perspective may prove a difficult task.

Furthermore, testing radicalisation excitement in a scientific manner constitutes a challenge . We

can use that tools social sciences and humanities offer us in order to elaborate on informed,

intellectual ideas, but unless we speak to those involved with radicalisation (or we measure their

adrenaline levels), then our assumptions may not have the same level of confidence. Furthermore,

clean data regarding both subcultures and terrorist organisations are difficult to assemble: for

example, the information relating to attackers I could access was what media have decided to

divulge; consequently, information comes with a degree of filtered manipulation.

Finally, suggesting exploring youth radicalisation in terms of excitement may encourage

deeper investigation. Acknowledging that young people may be infatuated by radical discourses

because they represent a way to rebel or because they regard extreme practices as exciting may

encourage scholars and policy makers to better tackle the problem.

Ultimately, this work is a work of synthesis, where I reviewed studies conducted by other

scholars. With it, I aim to trigger a discussion about some of the reasons that encourage young

people to join violent militant groups in the name of violence. A collection of empirical data is

strongly recommended in order to consolidate the ideas discussed in this essay.


17

References:

Abadie, A. (2006) Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism. American Economic Review, 96(2), pp. 50-56.

Abrahms Max (2008) What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy. International Security 32(4): 78105

Alexander, J.C. (2001) Towards a Sociology of Evil? in Pia Lara, M. (2001) Re-thinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives. Berkely: University of California Press.

Aristotle (2000) Etica Nicomachea. Translated in Italian by Mazzarelli, C. Bompiani Editore.

Bakker, E. (2006) Repression, political violence and terrorism. The case of Uzbekistn. Helsinki Monitor, 17(2), pp. 108-118.

Bataille, G. (2001) Eroticism. London: Penguin.

Bataille, G. (2005) Lhistoire de loeil. Paris : Guildmard.

BBC (2014) Glasgow woman Aqsa Mahmood promoting terrorism on Twitter. Accessed: 26th December 2015. Posted at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-29029954

BBC (2015) Family of Aqsa Mahmood sickened by Tunisia blog post. Accessed 30th June 2015. Posted at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-33316076

BBC (2015a) Paris attacks: who were the attackers?. Accessed: 29th December 2015. Posted at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34832512

BBC Newsbeat (2015) Young, British and radicalized: why people want to join Islamic State.

17th

November 2015. Accessed: 28th

December 2015. Posted at:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34851049/young-british-and-radicalised-why-people-

want-to-join-islamic-state

Becker, H.S. (1963) Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press.

Bennett, A. (1999) Subcultures or neo-tribes? Rethinking the Relationship between Youth, Style and Musical Taste. Sociology Vol. 33 No. 3: 599617.

Berger, J.M. and Morgan, J. (2015) The ISIS Twitter Census. The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, No. 20.

Berlinger, J. (2015) The names: who has been recruited to ISIS from the West. Accessed: 25th May 2015. Posted at: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/25/world/isis-western-recruits

Borgerson, J. (2013) The flickering consumer: new materialities and consumer research. Research in Consumer Behaviour, 15, pp. 125-144


18

Bosnia, A.N. Griessenauer, C.J. Haddad, V. and Shane, T.R. (2015) Ritualistic Envenomation by Bullet Ants among the Sater-Maw Indians in the Brazilian Amazon. Wilderness and Environmental Medicine, 26(2), pp.271-273.

Botsch, G. (2012) From skinhead-subculture to radical right movement: the development of a national opposition in east Germany. Contemporary European History, 21(4), pp. 553-573. Bravo, A. and Dias, C. (2006) An empirical analysis of terrorism: deprivation, Islamism and geopolitical factors. Defence and Peace Economics, 17(4), pp. 329-341.

Buchanan, R.T. (2015) Missing schoolrgirls: first teenager who fled from east London names as Sharmeena Begum as father says he told police to warn trios families. The Independent, 14th March 2014. Accessed: 2

nd January 2016. Posted at:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/sharmeena-begum-fourth-isis-schoolgirl-named-

as-father-claims-he-told-police-to-warn-families-10108507.html

Caillois, R. (1959) Man and the Sacred. Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe.

Camacho, E.T (2013) The development and interaction of terrorist and fanatic groups.

Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 18(11), pp. 3086-3097.

Campbell, D.T. (1958) Common Fate, Similarity, and other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of persons as Social Entities. Behavioural Sciences, 3, 14-25.

Campos, N.F. and Gassebner, M. (2009) International terrorism, political instability and the escaliation effect. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 4061.

Chaney, D. and Goulding, C. (2016) Dress, transformation, and conformity in the heavy rock

subculture. Journal of Business Research, 69(1), pp.155-165.

Clarke, J. Hall, S. Jefferson, T. and Roberts, B. (1975) Subcultures, cultures and class in Gelder, K. and Thornton, S. (1997) The Subcultures Reader. London: Routledge.

Cobain, I. and Ramesh, R. (2015) Emwazi and the London schoolmates who became militant jihadis. The Guardian, 27th February 2015. Accessed: 2nd January 2016. Posted at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/27/emwazi-and-the-london-schoolmates-who-

became-militant-jihadis

Cockfort, S. and Gardham, D. (2015) I was in an abusive and controlling relationship: Westfield

bomb-makers wife tried to blame her husband in begging letter to judge but she gets 25

minimum, while he gets 27 years. The Daily Mail, 30th December 2015. Accessed: 1st January

2016. Posted at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3378859/Bomb-maker-sentenced-27-

years-bars-plotting-terror-attack-wife-mark-anniversary-7-7-attacks.html

Cohen, A.K. (1955) a General Theory of Subcultures in Gelder, K. and Thornton, S. (1997) The Subcultures Reader. London: Routledge.


19

Coolsaet, R. (2013) Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge: European and American

experiences. Ashgate Publishing,

Coppock, V., & McGovern, M. (2014) Dangerous Minds? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the Psychological Vulnerabilityof Muslim Children and Young People in Britain. Children & Society, 28(3), 242-256.

Drmnescu, M. (2013) Postmodern Society and Individual Alienation. Journal of Experimental Psychotherapy, 16(3), pp. 55-58.

Dodd, V. and Khomami, N. (2015) Two Bethnal Green schoolgirls now married to Isis men in Syria. The Guardian, accessed: 9th July 2015. Posted at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/two-bethnal-green-schoolgirls-now-married-isis-

men-syria

Dolstal, J.M. (2015) The Pegida movement and German political culture: is right-wing populism here to stay?. The Political Quarterly, 86(4), pp. 523-531.

Economist (2014) It aint half hot here, mum. The Economist, 30th August 2014 (Printed Version).

Elias, N. (1986) Introduction in Elias, N. and Dunning, E. (1986) Quest for Excitement. Sport and Leisure in the Civilising Process. Oxford: Balckwell.

Ferrell, J. (1995) Culture, crime, and cultural criminology. Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture, 3(2), pp. 25-42.

Foucault, M. (1994) Dits et Ecrits 1954-1988. Paris: Gallimard

Furedi, F. (2004) Therapy culture: Cultivating vulnerability in an uncertain age. Psychology

Press.

Goodlad, L.M.E. and Bibby, M. (2007) Goth: Undead Subculture. Duke University Press.

Gordon, M. M. (1947) The concept of the sub-culture and its application in Gelder, K. and Thornton, S. (1997) The Subcultures Reader. London: Routledge.

Hall, S. and Jefferson, T. (1976) Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War.

London: Hutchinson.

Hamm, M. (2004) Apocalyptic violence: the seduction of terrorist subcultures. Theoretical Criminology, 8(3), pp.323-339.

Hebdige, D. (1979) Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London: Routledge.

Hnin, N. (2015) Jai t otage de ltat Islamique. Daesh craint plus notre unite que nos frappes ariennes. The Guardian, 19th November, 2015. Accessed: 28th December 2015. Posted at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/19/etat-islamique-daesh-syrie


20

Hodkinson, P. and Deicke, W. (2007) Youth Cultures: Scenes, Subcultures and Tribes. London:

Routledge.

Holme, P. and Grnlund, A. (2005) Modelling the dynamics of youth subcultures. Journal of

Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3.

Irwin, J. (1970) Notes on the status of the concept of subculture in Gelder, K. and Thornton, S. (1997) The Subcultures Reader. London: Routledge.

Karam, Z. and Janssen, B. (2015) In an IS training camp children told: behead the doll. The Associated Press, accessed: 19

th July 2015. Posted at:

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/f852b2d021254f06b9a002dfe25c7538/training-camp-children-told-

behead-doll

Katz, J. (1988) Seductions of crime: Moral and sensual attractions in doing evil. Basic Books.

Kavanagh, J. (2011) Selection, availability and opportunity: the conditional effect of poverty on terrorist group participation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(1), pp. 106-132.

Kristeva, J. (1982) The Powers of Horror: an Essay on Abjection. New York: Columbia

University Press.

Krugman, P. (2011) Depression and Democracy. The New York Times, 11th December 2011. Accessed: 2

nd January 2015. Posted at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/opinion/krugman-

depression-and-democracy.html?_r=0

Lacan, J. (1966) crits. Paris: Le Seuil.

Maffesoli, M. (1996) The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society.

London: Sage.

Mendick, R. Verkaik, R. and Ross, T. (2014) Muslim MP: 2,000 Britons fighting for Islamic State. The Telegraph, 23rd November 2014. Accessed: 1st January 2016. Posted at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11248114/Muslim-MP-2000-Britons-fighting-for-Islamic-State.html

McRobbie, A. (1994) Postmodernism and Popular Culture. London Routledge.

Muchembled, R. (2012) A history of violence: From the end of the Middle Ages to the present.

Polity.

Naib, F. (2015) Swedens hijabista: selling Muslim fashion. Aljazeera, accessed: 22nd October 2015. Posted at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/sweden-hijabista-selling-

muslim-fashion-151022111549949.html

Nesser, P. (2006) Jihadism in Western Europe after the invasion of Iraq: Tracing motivational influences from the Iraq war on jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(4), pp. 323-342.


21

Newholm, T. and Hopkinson, G.C. (2009) I just tend to wear what I like: contemporary

consumption and the paradoxical construction of individuality. Marketing Theory, 9(4), pp. 439-

462.

Norfolk, A. and Swerling, G. (2015) Yorkshire teens slip net to reach Syria. Th Times, 7th April, 2015. Accessed: 2

nd January 2016. Posted at:

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4403878.ece

Nwalozie, C. J. (2015) Rethinking Subculture and Subcultural Theory in the Study of Youth Crime-A Theoretical Discourse. Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology, 7(1), 1.

Phillips, B.J. (2015) Enemies with benefits? Violent rivalry and terrorist group longevity.

Journal of Peace Research, 52(1), pp. 62-75.

Phillips, B.J. (2014) Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity. International Studies

Quarterly, 58(2), pp.336-347.

Presdee, M. (2000). Cultural criminology and the carnival of crime. Routledge

Siboni, J. (2006) Le Dsir est la Mtonymie du Manque tre. See: jacsib.lutecium.org

Silke, A. (2004). Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures. London: Routledge.

Silke, A. (2008) Research on terrorism. In Terrorism informatics (pp. 27-50). Springer US.

Ranstorp, M. (2006). Mapping Terrorism Research. London: Routledge.

Rapoport David C (2004) Modern terror: The four waves. In: Cronin Audrey K, Ludes James M

(eds) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Georgetown

University Press, 4673.

Rotocalco Televisivo (22nd

April 2007). Posted at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=znnEtgoQQ8s

Roy, O. (2008). Islamic terrorist radicalisation in Europe. European Islam. Challenges for public

policy and society, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

Ryan, L. (2014) Islam does not change: young people narrating negotiations of religion and identity Journal of Youth Studies, Vol.17(4), pp.446-460

Shiv, M. (2015) The ISIS papers: leaked documents show how ISIS is building its State. The Guardian, 7

th December 2015. Accessed: 29

th December 2015. Posted at:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/leaked-isis-document-reveals-plan-building-

state-syria

Simpson, J. (2014) Syria: man who claims to be British jihadist Nasser Muthana posts pictures of more than a dozen homemade bombs. The Independent, 3rd July 2014. Posted at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/syria-man-who-claims-to-be-british-jihadist-


22

nasser-muthana-posts-pictures-of-more-than-a-dozen-9582510.html

Soler-i-Mart, R. (2015) Youth political involvement update: measuring the role of cause-oriented political interest in young people's activism. Journal of Youth Studies, 18(3).

Sumner, C. (1994) The Sociology of Deviance: an Obituary. Buckingman: OUP.

Tajfel, H. (1981) Human Groups and Social Categories. Studies in Social Psychology.

Cambridge: University Press.

Thornton, S. (1995) Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital. Cambridge : Polity

Press in association with Blackwell.

Van Gennep, A. (1909/2011) Les Rites de Passage. Editions A&J Picard.

Vaudano, M. (2015) Attentats du 13 novembre: que sait-on des terroristes impliqus. Le Monde, 15

th November 2015. Printed Version.

Willsher, K. (2015) Hasna At Boulahcen: party girl killed in Paris terror siege. The Guardian, 20

th November 2015. Accessed: 1

st January 2016. Posted at:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/hasna-ait-boulahcen-party-girl-who-became-

paris-suicide-bomber

Wood, P. (2014) Its jihad, innit, bruv: meet the British Muslims going to fight in Syria. The Spectator, 26

th July 2014. Accessed: 1

st January 2016. Posted at:

http://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/07/its-jihad-innit-bruv-meet-the-british-muslims-going-to-fight-

in-syria/

Young, J. (2007) The Vertigo of Late Modernity. London: Sage.

radicalisation and subcultures: a theoretical analysis

Documents