report no. 5 - egypt at the crossroad

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Egypt at the crossroad A new “Spring” or a deeper Fall. The Muslim Brotherhood's

challenges and transformations in Foreign Policy

Written By Valentina Cantori e Anita Nappo

May 2016

Report No

05

Copyright© 2016 by Mediterranean Affairs

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Updated at May 5, 2016

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Summary

Abstract ......................................................................................4

Between Repression and Violence: The Transformation of the

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Future of Egypt ........8

Introduction ................................................................................8

From Palace to Prison: Old Stories and New Twists. .............10

The Dynamics of Repression and Violence ..............................21

Conclusions ..............................................................................31

Is Egypt still a necessary evil? Egyptian regional stance and

its external projection ................................................................35

Introduction ..............................................................................36

Gulf buddies and political advisors .........................................39

Money talks, EU conditionality walks .....................................47

Saudi shuffle and French connection: final remarks ...............57

References (part 1) .....................................................................60

References (part 2) .....................................................................63

About the Authors ......................................................................65

Egypt at the crossroad

4


A new “Spring” or a deeper Fall. The Muslim

Brotherhood's challenges and transformations in

Foreign Policy

Abstract

Over the past two months, the major newspapers of the world have

devoted particular attention to one of the cornerstones on which

General al-Sisi’s regime in Egypt is founded: the repression of civil

society. Following Giulio Regeni’s death, denunciations have been

raised against the regime’s crackdown on human rights activists,

journalists, and civil society members who are considered a threat to

the stability of the country’s political order. Arbitrary arrests,

marginalization of the opposition, limits to personal liberties, mass

trials, unjustified imprisonments are everyday life experiences for

everyone living on the Egyptian soil. Although much international

attention is being paid to the liberal spectrum of the oppressed

Egyptian society, the Muslim Brotherhood has largely been the group

that has suffered the most from the regime’s crackdown on

oppositions after the coup of July 2013. In the present analysis, the

complex relations between regime’s repression and opposition’s

violence will be investigated, trying to shed light on both Muslim

Brotherhood’s organizational and ideological transformations, and on

the role played by institutionalized regime repression in the name of

security at domestic level and its consequences in shaping Islamist

May 2016

5

flexible ideology. Drawing from the theoretical contributions provided

by Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2013) and

starting from the well-established assumption of the extreme flexibility

by which Islamist ideology seems to be characterized, we will argue in

favor of a psychosocial analysis of Islamist violence, focusing on the

socio-economic and political dynamics that are molding MB’s

organizational changes, providing a theoretical framework that will

enable us to make some predictions over the future developments of

Egyptian domestic policy.

This paper will be divided into two main sections. The first one will

offer an historical overview on the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly

focusing on two main issues. On the one hand, attention will be paid

to the organizational characteristics of the group in order to provide

solid bases for a full understanding of the dynamics of internal change

taking place in these days. On the other, stress will be put on the

ideology of the MB and the foundational texts, showing how

contextual factors have determined profound ideological shifts in the

organization’s political stance, thus arguing in favor of a non-

essentialist and deterministic approach to the study of Islamist

religious ideologies. The second part will thoroughly investigate the

complex dynamics between repression and violence, making reference

to Hafez and Wiktorowicz’ model on political violence as contention

in order to predict future possible developments of the organization.

In addition, following el-Sherif’s predictions on the future of the

Muslim Botherhood in Egypt in a changed “political opportunity


6

structure” (2014), we will evaluate the plausibility of its predictions to

better understand the unfolding of the political scenario with dramatic

consequences within and outside the organization. The report will also

go through an analysis of Egyptian role in the region and the elements

featuring the policy-making process in foreign affairs.

The label of “necessary evil” has been stuck on Egyptian

establishment as of the wake of the second revolutionary wave which

upturned the Brotherhood regime in 2013 and led to the power

General and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and his entourage through

what under the political lens could be defined a coup. Many scholars

and analysts assumed that Egypt operated a comeback on the regional

stage in 2014 due to the regional constant upheaval, especially after the

critical collapse on the Country’s Eastern border. Although, its

domestic policy seems to be facing more setback, expressly in the

socio-economic sector.

According to the “doingbusiness” and economic analysis sheets of

the World Bank, besides any remark from the international institutions

and institutes working in the field, Egypt does not score high in the

indicators valuing the environment where to start business and

investments, as to make them thrive. The main claim points out the

insufficiency of the efforts taken so far by the government to put in

place the needed reforms in the deteriorating social and economic

sector.

May 2016

7

Being that said, it may be interesting to investigate the roots of the

Saudi and French interest manifestly shown in the last months in

investing in Egypt.

“Why necessary, why evil?” Aimed to answer to these questions, the

analysis will take the stock of the economic and political features of

Egyptian relations with the Gulf Countries, first. Further, the EU-

Egyptian relations will be investigated under two different lenses.

From a side the EU will be presented as a single actor endowed with

innovative instruments deployed to pursue European external action

objectives. Nevertheless, this unique EU guise will be depicted as the

complex product of the decisions taken at national level by the

member states. It will be noted how the member states increasingly

tend to take divergent decisions from the EU common policy in the

last five-year period, especially with the Egypt lead by general al-Sisi

within the post-revolutionary Middle East. This work should provide

the reader with the tools to understand how these international

economic and political relations are the key to read the liquid regional

alliance system.


8

Between Repression and Violence

The Transformation of the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood and the Future of Egypt

Valentina Cantori

Introduction

Over the past two months, the major newspapers of the world have

devoted particular attention to one of the founding cornerstones of

General al-Sisi’s regime in Egypt: the repression of civil society.

Following Giulio Regeni’s death, denunciations have been raised

against the regime’s crackdown on human rights activists, journalists,

and civil society members who are considered a threat to the stability

of the country’s political order. Arbitrary arrests, marginalization of

the opposition, limits to personal liberties, mass trials, unjustified

imprisonments are everyday life experiences for everyone living on

Egyptian soil. Although much international attention is being paid to

the liberal spectrum of the oppressed Egyptian society, the Muslim

Brotherhood has largely been the group that has suffered the most

from the regime’s crackdown on oppositions after the coup of July

2013.

May 2016

9

In the present analysis, the complex relations between the regime’s

repression and the opposition’s violence will be investigated, trying to

shed light on both Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB hereafter)

organizational and ideological transformations, and the role played by

institutionalized regime repression in the name of security at domestic

level and its consequences in shaping Islamist flexible ideology.

Drawing from the theoretical contributions provided by Mohammed

M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2013) and starting from the well-

established assumption of the extreme flexibility by which Islamist

ideology seems to be characterized, we will argue in favor of a

contextual analysis of Islamist violence, focusing on the socio-

economic and political dynamics that are molding the MB’s

organizational changes, providing a theoretical framework that will

enable us to make some predictions over the future developments of

Egyptian domestic policy.

This paper will be divided into two main sections. The first one will

offer an historical overview on the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly

focusing on two main issues. On the one hand, attention will be paid

to the organizational characteristics of the group in order to provide

solid bases for a full understanding of the dynamics of internal change

taking place in these days. On the other, stress will be put on the

ideology of the MB and the foundational texts, showing how

contextual factors have determined profound ideological shifts in the

organization’s political stance, thus arguing in favor of a non-

essentialist and deterministic approach to the study of Islamist


10

religious ideologies. The second part will concentrate on the analysis

of the complex intertwining of repression and violence, closely

investigating the recent generational split in the organization as a

consequence of regime’s harsh repression on the movement’s old

guard. Taking into account the “political opportunity structure” to

which the MB is exposed, we will analyze the two dimensions of the

accessibility to the institutional system and the nature of state

repression to predict the possible future role of the MB in Egyptian

domestic developments.

From Palace to Prison: Old Stories and New Twists.

The mission of the Muslim Brotherhood, as first outlined by the

founder of the group, Hasan al-Banna, in 1928, has traditionally been

centered on a gradual reformation of Egyptian society along religious

lines, which would naturally achieve the ultimate aim of creating a

“true” Islamic State. In Hasan al-Banna’s own words, the minhaj (path,

way) of the group is grounded in the idea that “Islam is an all-

embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating

on every one its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous

order.”1 The kind of religious ideology theorized by the father of the

most widespread Islamist organization in the Muslim world is still at

the heart of the MB’s course of action today. As a matter of fact, the

great degree of generalization of Hasan al-Banna’s statements is

1 Wendell, C. (1978), Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949). A Selection from the Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna, Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

May 2016

11

responsible for both the peculiar

ideological flexibility that seems to

characterize the movement and for its

long-lasting history, which is in itself a

consequence of its extreme ideological

adaptability.

As Wickham pointed out in her

recent work (2013),2 Islamist

organizations in general, and the MB

in particular, should not be analytically

considered as unitary actors, uniform in their ideological stance, but,

rather, as made up of different and diverging factions among which

only one has the upper hand at different historical moments. As

asserted by Ibrahim al-Hudaiby (2013), ideological differences have

always been present among MB’s cadres; on the one hand, Qutbists,

even if following a demilitarized approach, focused on the need to

empower the organization and create a vanguard that could bring

about revolutionary change. On the other hand, a more Salafi trend

developed, focusing on social issues rather that political ones, whose

name (Salafi) derived from the tendency of traditional Salafism to

refrain from taking active part in the country’s political life. Anyway, it

is hard to build analytically sound and close-bounded definitions in

which to classify the various ideological views inside the MB,

especially as a consequence the proliferation of ideological differences

Hasan Al-Banna

Source: wikipedia


12

after the 2011 revolution. Hence, rather than investigating the group

in essentialist terms, it is fundamental to look at it as a living organism

perpetually adapting to the political opportunity structure and to the

macro-historical frame in which it is required to act. These analytical

premises are crucial in investigating both MB’s history and in

forecasting their future role in the Egyptian domestic environment.

Starting from these assumptions, it is easy, then, to understand why

MB has been portrayed sometimes as a moderate and nonviolent

group while other times as a violent non-jihadi actor, in opposition to

violent jihadi organizations like Jihadi Salafism (Awad and Hashem,

2015). In the present analysis, we will avoid using misleading

categorizations that do not pay tribute to the complexity of the

movement itself, which, furthermore, is currently undergoing major

transformations due to an organizational and generational

restructuring whose causes will be deeply analyzed in the second

section hereafter. Looking at the MB as a dynamic and internally

differentiated movement, whose boundaries with other Islamist

groups are not as clear cut as is usually thought, helps us trace its

historical development from a highly structured movement in which

daily control on individual members’ life was exerted, to one where

the rigid hierarchical structure, much praised by al-Banna himself for

whom deep faith, precise organization and uninterrupted work were

the core elements of MB’s mission (Wendell, 1978: 33), is being

eroded by both endogenous and exogenous factors that will ultimately

May 2016

13

be decisive in determining the future of the organization itself in

Egypt.

In addition, it is worth noticing that it is not the first time in history

that the MB experiences a radical ideological shift which is a

consequence of the changed institutional environment in which they

are to operate, proving the fact that often ideological declarations are

more the effect of exogenous situation than the predictor of individual

or group behavior. As Mona El-Ghobashi asserted (2005), a huge

organizational transformation already involved the group starting from

the 1980s. In those years, the MB embraced electoral politicking, at

least initially ideologically so, even if not through the direct

establishment of an autonomous political party, given the law

preventing the formation of political parties based on religion. As

Caryle Murphy wrote, “The Egyptian government sent a message to

its moderate Islamist opposition: The ballot box is a narrow gate

though which you will not pass as long as we are in charge” (2002:

150). Indeed, the first appearance of MB-affiliated candidates was in

1984, when the group negotiated an alliance with al-Wafd party,

winning seats in parliament, even if the collaboration was later

thwarted by the restrictive nature of parliamentary rules. Nevertheless,

the 1984 elections “established the Ikhwan as a leading political

contestant, striking electoral alliances in both Parliament and the

professional unions and joining the opposition in extraparliamentary

coalitions for reform” (El-Ghobashi, 2005: 378).


14

The issue of participation in democratic elections has been highly

debated by scholars in the field due to both the seemingly radical

ideological shift from past positions and to the hoped benefits of

participation when “victory is not an option” in semi-authoritarian

states (to quote Nathan Brown’s famous book title). The kind of

society that al-Banna founded and that later thinkers helped (re-

)shaping, like Sayyid Qutb and Salman al-Farag, is a religious-based

organization that traditionally refused the implementation of a

coercive decision-making process as a viable path to the resurrection

of the umma, the righteous Muslim society of good believers, whose

establishment was deemed to be the conditio sine qua non for the

creation of an Islamic State following the Prophet’s model. This is the

reason why, since the beginning, Muslim Brothers focused on

reaching out directly to people, in the street, in the neighborhood, at

work, creating strong grassroots networks, first in the countryside and

then in urban areas, but not directly taking part in political life,

something that, in al-Banna’s view, should be postponed for when

society would have been re-Islamized (Kandil, 2015). Of a different

opinion were Saiyyd Qutb and Salman al-Farag who called for a kind

of revolutionary Islam directly challenging the institutional

organization of the (apostate) Egyptian state. Useless to say, they

belonged to a different generation from that of al-Banna and to a

different historical period during which the MB was being heavily

persecuted by Nasser’s regime (the former) and Anwar al-Sadat (the

latter), leading up to the key question of the relationship between

institutionalized repression and levels of organization’s violence.

May 2016

15

Without delving too much into the manifold and complex historical

developments of the MB as an organization, an important

consideration is worth citing here before approaching more recent

times that will be the main focus of our analysis. As we have seen,

exogenous factors play a pivotal role in determining Muslim Brothers’

either legal, political behavior, or absence thereof, or recourse, instead,

to various forms of violence (either jihadi or non-jihadi oriented). This

was the case, for example, in determining the radical shift in (a sector

of) the MB after the harsh repression of the 1960s or when younger

generations of Muslim Brothers turned to electoral politics as a means

to achieve their organizational goals, becoming “irrevocably

transformed into a flexible political party that is highly responsive to

the unforgiving calculus of electoral politics” (El-Ghobashi, 2005:

390). Without taking side on the much-debated and still unresolved

question concerning the extent to which ideology affects behavior or

behavior affects ideology, but arguing in favor of a comprehensive

Source: Ikhwanweb.com


16

approach that could grasp the dialogical nature of the relationship

between the two, an analysis of the political opportunity structure will

shed lights on the violent turn of MB’s cadres after the July 2013 coup

by the Egyptian army, after a two-year period in which violence had

been almost completely abandoned in favor of political participation

in a pseudo-democratic system in which they conquered parliamentary

majority in the first democratic election in the country.

Indeed, after Egypt’s 2011 Revolution and with the coming to

power of the newly formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), there

have been “numerous splits and internal conflicts within the group”

(El-Houdaiby, 2013: 1). This appeared to be an inevitable occurrence

due to the fact that the organization moved from the periphery to the

center of power and was no more able to postpone fundamental

intellectual discussions. Previously, thanks to its role as an opposition

movement with no possibility to participate in a truly democratic

environment that could grant alternation to power, the MB leadership

managed to hide internal differentiation by turning to the concept of

dharura, “necessity” (El-Houdaiby, 2013), in the name of

organizational unity. Its coming to power, instead, brought to the

surface the many souls of the MB, which the old guard of the

movement could not control or tap anymore due to the radical

restructuring of the MB’s political positioning. Even tough the old

guard, the official face of the organization, tried to keep on playing the

card of identity politics in order to maintain organizational unity which

was deemed to be the crucial issue to be addressed, the new fervent

May 2016

17

political environment in which it was acting pushed for intellectual and

pragmatic issues to be dealt with, instead.

Interestingly enough, already during the first days of the 2011

Revolution the different souls of the MB and the generational divide

within it were both clearly visible to a careful observer. As reported by

Charles Sennot (2011), the divide between an old guard detached from

the rank-and-files of the movement and a younger generation

physically present in the squares and streets of Cairo became apparent.

Specifically, the main divergent issue was the attitude towards the

protests, fully embraced by the youth wing of the movement since the

very beginning, but only gradually acknowledged through a series of

subsequent communiqués by an old guard (El-Houdaiby, 2013)

initially prone to accept a dialogue with Mubarak’s regime. The 2011

Egyptian revolution has been the revolution of the youth under many

aspects, yet, the highly hierarchical and pyramidal organization

structure of the MB, which the old guard has been careful to preserve

and protect, brought to power exponents of a generation that grew up

to maturity in a historical period that saw the increasing participation

of the MB into a legal, democratic framework which, nevertheless, did

not grant them the possibility to win, thus leaving them anchored to

issues of identity politics rather than actual policy matters. That

historical period was characterized by the gradual shift in MB’s

ideology from a complete refusal of democracy as an alien and

imported Western system, unsuitable to thrive in Islamic societies, to

one not only perfectly in tune with Islamic principles, but prescribed


18

and sanctioned by Islam itself (Wickham, 2013: 10), an idea fully

promoted in Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s theological position (Euben and

Zaman, 2009). The old guard, thus, conceived of their seizing of

power in much more gradual terms than the young cadres of the

group, which embraced more revolutionary ideas and, additionally,

were “better connected to the broader opposition movement and less

tied to identity politics” (El-Houdaiby, 2013: 5), as is clear from

Muhammad Abbas’ collaboration with the April 6th secular movement

in the organization of the January 25th revolt (Sennot, 2011).

The generational divide widening in the revolutionary days

remained problematic during the two years of presidency of

Muhammad Morsi, triggering a further diversion of attention to

identity politics by the part of the old leadership to preserve group

unity, instead of addressing fundamental political issues mainly

concerning the relationship between religion and state, the dialectic

2011 Revolution

Source: CNN

May 2016

19

between authenticity and modernity, and foreign policy matters (El-

Hudaiby, 2013), all issues the young cadres wanted to put under

intellectual scrutiny. Trying to figure out the possible future scenarios

of the MB’s government and the plausible organizational

transformations once the movement moved “from prison to palace” is

by now only a theoretical exercise, since the military coup of July 2013

that ousted president Muhammad Morsi forced the Muslim Brothers

again “from palace to prison.” In fact, it further exacerbated the

organization’s internal disputes, especially with regard to the most

suitable ways to counter the subsequent regime’s repression on

Islamist opponents promoted by General Abd al-Fattah Al-Sisi on the

wake of the military’s seizure of power. One episode in particular,

among the many, seems to have triggered the violent turn of the rank-

and-files of the organization, namely the Raba’a Massacre of August

2013. On that occasion, numerous opponents to the recent coup by

the military decided to occupy Midan Raba’a al-Adawiyya, in Eastern

Cairo, in sign of protest against what they perceived as an unlawful

action by the SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) (The

Washington Post, August 2015), which considers itself as “a guardian of

the nation”3 entitled to get rid of alleged illegitimate rulers or

government figures. In Midan Raba’a an imprecise number of people

were killed, with estimates ranging from 600 to 1,000 or even to 2,500

according to MB’s sources (al-Jazeera, Aug. 2015), fomenting hatred

for the newly established and repressive military order. And Raba’a

3 Brown, N., El-Shimy, Y. (Jan. 25, 2016), Did Sisi save Egypt. The Arab Spring at Five. Foreign Affairs, Retrievable from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-01-25/did-sisi-save-egypt


20

signaled just the beginning of a harsh crackdown on all oppositions,

and specifically MB’s members, that is becoming increasingly thorny

for Western countries allied with Egypt.

The Raba’a Massacre has

become a powerful symbol

of the regime’s misdeeds

and violent actions, and,

recalling Midan Raba’a,

violent actions carried out

by the MB are justified in

the light of a lawful

response to regime’s repression (El-Sherif, 2014). Even if a parallel

with Mubarak’s regime is easy to make, scholars and analysts have

underlined the far greater repressive system that General al-Sisi has

established, cracking down both Islamist and secular opposition in the

country at a level Mubarak never reached, “the repression is even

worse now, say many” (The Economist, May 2015).4 The repression is so

harsh that Nathan Brown and Yasser El-Shimy, in a recent article

(Foreign Affairs, Jan. 2016), compared al-Sisi’s regime with the Nasserist

period, characterized by a one-political-party system, the will to

complete annihilate the MB, the intolerance for any form of dissent,

and the establishment of a police state. It is, thus, legitimate to analyze

how the Muslim Brothers are responding and would respond to this

unprecedented wave of political repression and to investigate the

4 “Repression in Egypt. Worse than Mubarak”. (May 2, 2015), The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/21650160/print

Maidan Raba’a

Source: al-Jazeera

May 2016

21

degree to which regime’s repression can actually affect future internal

development of the organization, specifically in terms of increasing

the levels of violence from the group’s youngest cadres, as well as its

future domestic political role.

The Dynamics of Repression and Violence

Since the Midan Raba’a’s episode, a (prevalently) young sector

inside the MB started a low-profile insurgency against the repressive

regime of General al-Sisi, in an attempt to topple it and restore the

legitimacy of the MB’s government, advocating for the use of

revolutionary – and violent – tactics to achieve its political aims. As

Awad and Hashem report, “At least initially, most Islamist youth who

embraced violence did so as a means of exacting revenge against the

state for the deaths of Islamist protesters in Rabaa Square” (2015: 8).

One of the latest examples is the attack at the Bella Vista Hotel in

Hurgada in Januray 2016, when two young Cairene tried to spread

panic among the presents by threatening tourists with knifes and fake

suicide belts (Foreign Affairs, Feb. 2016). This episode constitutes just

one instance among the many currently taking place in Egypt, a signal

of the popping up of new strains of Islamist violence not linked to

Jihadi Salafism. Furthermore, in order to provide a religious

justification to this new wave of violence embraced by exponents of

the MB, the young wing of the group commissioned a 93-page book

titled The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup, in which the

ideology of the MB is adapted to the new needs of the post-Morsi


22

period, providing religious legitimacy and drawing an ideological

boundary with the more radical Salafi Jihadism trend. (Foreign Affairs,

Feb. 2016).

This violent turn of the young wing inside the MB is escalating the

Islamist insurgency in the country, especially after the MB’s internal

elections in February 2015 that were won by the revolutionary wing

inside the organization (Foreign Affairs, May 2015), with 90 percent of

the new elected leaders coming from the younger generation. The

present escalation of violence in Egypt paves the way for important

issues to be addressed. First of all, the question of authority and the

thin line between legitimate violence and terrorism, which, then,

trigger the fundamental analysis of the role of religion in the

legitimization process and the importance of the widening

generational gap within the MB. Second, the long-lasting problem in

the social sciences concerning the dialectic relationship between

repression and violence: why are Islamist youth recurring to violent

strategies to face the regime’s threat? Is there any relationship between

their violent turn and the degree of indiscriminate oppression of the

military government? In order to answer these questions, we will make

reference to the theoretical framework elaborated by Hafez and

Wiktorowicz (2013), critically applying it to the present political

dynamics in Egypt and using it to forecast the possible future

scenarios that might develop from the current increasing circles of

Islamist violence.

May 2016

23

As for the first point at stake, the Brotherhood’s youth leadership,

which is gaining momentum in the aftermath of July 2013 coup,

considers the use of violence against the regime as a legitimate

strategy, given the unlawful seizure of power by the military (Foreign

Affairs, May 2015). On the same note, General al-Sisi’s regime justifies

its crackdown on civil society as a reactive strategy to counter the

Islamists that were destroying the state apparatus while in power.

While young Muslim Brothers see themselves as legitimate

revolutionaries morally forced to perform their duty as “true”

believers acting in the name of the common good (maslaha), Sisi looks

at them as terrorists, exploiting religion for their own aims and

threatening domestic stability, while portraying himself, at the same

time, as the true keeper of Islam in order to bolster his own authority

(The New York Times, Jan. 2016).

Both these views, useless to say, are dictated by some sort of bias

and tarnish the complexity of the interplay between legitimization,

religion, and authority. In fact, the blurring boundary between

revolutionaries and terrorists ultimately rests on the capacity to define

owned by the ones in power at a particular historical moment and on

the legal framework of authority inside which these definitions are

elaborated. Moreover, religion, far from being the cause in itself of

violent acts (Sharma, 2016), is still instrumentally used to provide a

legitimate framework for the exercise of violence and, in addition, it

cannot be considered as the cause of Islamists’ violence given the

impossibility of explaining variation through a constant. Religion is,


24

thus, instrumentally used by MB’s young cadres to justify their

recourse to violence, but it does not constitute the cause of their

violent turn. As Hafez and Wiktorowicz noted (2013), Islamic

movements are “not ‘born’ violent” (63), and, as we have already

pointed out in the previous section, it is logically not sound to

consider ideology as a determinant of behavior, being it itself subject

to a dialogical restructuring in which behavior and ideology are

mutually affecting each other.

As a consequence, a second set of questions must be taken into

account: why do certain Islamist groups turn to violence? And why,

specifically, the MB’s young cadres are making recourse to violent

strategies to challenge the regime? And which is the relation between

repression and violence? As outlined above, regime repression plays a

crucial role in determining the political opportunity structure in which

the group is to operate, thus creating incentives and conditions where

recourse to violence may be preferred as a strategy by Islamist actors

over other alternative,

nonviolent paths. As

Awad and Hashem

point out, “The

Brotherhood and the

Egyptian government

have both adopted a

zero-sum approach,

offering no realistic

MB young cadres’ protest

Source: Reuters

May 2016

25

political way to end the impasse” (2015: 3), giving origin to

unprecedented levels of violence that are starting to catch the

attention of Western state actors with vested interests in the stability

of the country.

[IMAGE 5: MB Young Protesters]

One of the possible reasons that have been addressed to justify this

violent turn is the MB old leadership’s loss of control over the

revolutionary young wing, a loss of control further exacerbated by the

arrest of main senior leaders. The group had, then, to restructure in

order to face the heavy crackdown by decentralizing a usually highly

centralized decision-making process, thus opening up the possibility

for young members to have a voice in the organization’s political

strategy (Awad and Hashem, 2015: 7). Hence, regime repression can

be held accountable for the internal organizational restructuring of the

MB, which paved the way for the implementation of more violent

strategies in the attempt to destabilize the government. This divide is

made even more perspicuous by the creation of two different websites

now associated with the group. The youth maintained control over the

old website (ikhwanonline.com), whereas the old leadership had to

create a new one (ikhwan.site) (Foreign Affairs, Jan. 2016).

However, the complex dynamic between repression and violence

does not end here. Indeed, according to Hafez and Wiktorowicz’

model, even though we cannot suppose a direct relationship between

oppression and violent resistance since empirical historical analyses

have falsified this argument long ago (Scott, 1976), we cannot get rid


26

of the assumption that regime’s repression, as an exogenous factor,

does have consequences on the rational choices of Islamist groups. In

order to shed light on this topic, the model Hafez and Wiktorowicz

offer is based on the analysis of two variables, namely: a) the access to

institutionalized politics; and b) the nature of state repression. None

of the two is deterministic in predicting the turn to violence, but they

seem to be good probabilistic indicators of it.

As for the first variable, the access to alternative legal paths to have

a say in the system seems to diminish the probability of recourse to

violence, whereas inaccessibility to the formal institution of the state is

likely to increase it. In the case at stake, the harsh crackdown

following the coup, not only on MB’s members but on all oppositions

more in general, prevents opposition actors to exert formal influence

on the decision-making process at state level, thus increasing the

probability to rationally choose violent paths in the pursuit of the

group’s objectives. Nonetheless, system inaccessibility appears to be a

necessary but not sufficient trigger of violent reactions. Even though

Muslim Brothers have been prevented from participating in the legal

political framework, this has always been true, at different levels, until

the 2011 revolution when they were eventually allowed to form a

political party.

As a consequence, the second variable must also be taken into

consideration, i.e. the nature of state repression. Far from constituting

a constant, state repression changes over time along two different

continuums. On the one hand, state repression may be either

May 2016

27

preemptive or reactive (“timing” variable); on the other, it can be

either selective or indiscriminate (“targeting” variable) (Hafez and

Wiktorowicz, 2015: 67-68). Inaccessibility to the formal institutional

system and a form of reactive and indiscriminate state repression are

considered to be sufficient causes for a violent turn, in probabilistic

terms. Closely investigating the situation of MB’s youth on the

ground, it becomes apparent how General al-Sisi’s repression is

reactive, in the sense that it is a consequence of the two-year power by

the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, and it is indiscriminate insofar as a

mere suspicion of links and ties to the group may lead to

incarceration, torture, or, even more dramatically, death.

In addition to structural considerations that might have ignited a

violent Muslim Brothers’ reaction, Ashraf El-Sherif (2014) reported

how, in the group’s own vision, de-escalation was considered to be

counterproductive given the historical precedent of the “Abdel-Qader

Ouda complex,” during which the deputy supreme guide Abdel-Qader

Ouda opted for stopping the protests against Nasser’s government in

1954, a decision that was soon followed by one of the bloodiest

crackdowns on the MB since their foundation. Learning, then, from

this historical episode, the general assumption is that the only choice

left in order not to be erased is escalation of the opposition,

fomenting, thus, the inner circle of mutual violence.


28

At this point of the analysis, it is worth addressing the significant

question concerning the possible future of the Muslim Brothers in

Egypt. The unprecedented intensity of the confrontation between

regime’s forces and MB’s cadres is unlikely to abate any time soon.

However, external factors and external actors are coming into play and

may prove to be decisive in changing the course of events in the near

future. In particular, the death of the Italian researcher Giulio Regeni,

allegedly killed by the Egyptian Mukhabarat (intelligence forces) after

his disappearance on January 25th, 2016, has given rise to a wave of

international protests, bringing to light the misdeeds of General al-

Sisi’s regime (Vice, Feb. 2016). One possible scenario, then, is that

international pressure on the Egyptian regime may reduce the level of

repression on Islamists and civil society, possibly widening the

accessibility to the institutional frame and, consequently, causing a

May 2016

29

reduction in the level of violent insurgency carried out by the MB’s

young cadres. Nonetheless, this prediction presents two main

problems. First, doubts persist relating to the real commitment of

Western powers to put pressure on a regime that remains an

important player in the Middle Eastern region (al-Jazeera, April 2016),

as has been demonstrated by the silence on Giulio Regeni’s case and

the softening of previous accusations for the negligence in respecting

human rights during the visit of U.S. Secretary of State, John Jerry, in

Egypt on April 19th, 2016 (CNN, April 2016). Second, a decrease in

regime’s oppression may not result in a concomitant opening up of

the institutional system to oppositions, thus not providing incentives

to stop the escalation of violence on the part of Muslim Brothers.

In a detailed analysis on the future of political Islam in Egypt,

Ashraf el-Sherif (2014) tried to delineate five possible scenarios for the

future of the Muslim Brothers in the post-Morsi period: a) total

eradication; b) triumphant comeback; c) reconciliation with the

regime; d) fragmentation into various factions; e) reinvention of the

movement. The recent developments previously investigated seem to

point to the unlikeliness of both the total eradication of the movement

(a), given the high degree of adaptability to exogenous situations and

the resilience the group has historically demonstrated (al-Anani, 2013),

and of a triumphant comeback (b), since certain strata of Egyptian

society might withdraw their support to the Brothers as a consequence

of their recent turn to violent tactics that may further destabilize the

political and economic situation in the country.


30

As for the third hypothesis (c), namely a reconciliation with the

regime that would create a situation similar to that under Mubarak,

when the MB was guaranteed a limited and de facto political inclusion

in the semi-authoritarian system, el-Sherif presents it as a possible

development since “the current war of attrition between the regime

and the Brotherhood is unsustainable” (15), although not likely in the

short-run, given the mutual demonization efforts carried out by both

part. And, indeed, after one year and a half from the writing of El-

Sherif’s analysis, his predictions find confirmation since reconciliation

seems possible but still a remote prospect. Furthermore, any attempt

of possible reconciliation will be threatened by the widening

factionalism inside the organization of the Brothers itself. Indeed, with

the difficulties the Brothers are facing in maintain unity, a possible

reconciliation may interest just a sector or wing of the MB, without

engaging also the violent grassroots that are gaining the upper hand in

the leadership.

This observation leads us to the fourth hypothesis (d), the

fragmentation of the group into various factions and, consequently,

the integration of the moderates in the system with the exclusion of

the hardliners. A moderate line already exists inside the MB, namely a

wing of the group that recognizes the impossibility to restore Morsi’s

to presidency through the use of violence and is keener on

undertaking political rather than violent paths. Exponents of this

position are the leaders of the old guard, the Supreme Guide

Mahmoud Ezzat, the Deputy Supreme Guide Ibrahim Munir,

May 2016

31

currently in exile in London, and Secretary General Mahmoud

Hussein (Foreign Affairs, Feb. 2016), who, nonetheless, are being

increasingly ostracized by the decision-making process by the young

revolutionary wing. In addition to this, hardliners seem to have already

achieved hegemony inside the group, notwithstanding the generational

divide, but counting supporters across the age groups.

As for the last hypothesis (e), a reinvention on the part of the group

is desirable but not so likely in the short run, especially looking at the

empirical analysis of the group’s dynamics at the moment. A

reinvention might entail a retreat of the group from politics in order to

concentrate on more ideological issues that will foster ijtihad

(interpretative effort) and a reconsideration of the positioning of the

group in the new Islamist scenario that is unfolding at regional level.

But the political stakes are high and since now we do not have any

signal that the group is willing to stop the political struggle in order to

favor educational, social, and cultural reconsiderations (el-Sherif,

2014).

Conclusions

The Muslim Brothers have proved to be particularly resilient during

their long history, both in Egypt and elsewhere. They adapted to the

political opportunity structure, reframing their goals and ideological

positions according to contextual needs. This inherent characteristic of

the group has guaranteed the Brothers to survive to the rapid political


32

changes in the country, cautiously intertwining pragmatism and

ideology in a continuous dialectical relation that makes it hard for

political analysts to determine the process of causality between the

two. Nonetheless, the harsh regime repression of the post-Morsi

period, which is heavily cracking down on all oppositions and on the

Brothers in particular, is further challenging the future of the

organization and, even more importantly, its internal cohesion and

structure. The appeal to the concept of dharoura (“necessity”) to

maintain organizational unity is breaking down following the

decentralization process that both the renewed illegal status of the

group and the imprisonment of the old leadership are imposing. An

additional consequence of the decentralization process is the

proliferation of non-jihadi violent wings within the MB, comprised of

mainly young members, even though the violent discourse is

increasingly transcending age group barriers.

In this analysis we argued that the complex dynamics of repression

and violence are pivotal in determining the future of the Muslim

Brothers in Egypt, whose fate will highly affect the domestic policy of

the country as a whole. Applying Hafez and Wiktorowicz’ model, we

noticed how the indiscriminate and reactive use of violence carried out

by al-Sisi’s regime, together with the complete closure of alternative

institutional paths for expression of dissent, resulting in a high degree

of inaccessibility to the formal legal system, is likely to further ignite

the circle of violence, even though these elements do not seem

(empirically) to be the deterministic variables at play in causing the

May 2016

33

passage from ordinary forms of everyday resistance, to unordinary

forms of violence (namely, armed insurgency). Still, they can well

predict variation in the circle of violence once it has started.

The violent turn of the young cadres of the Brothers have many

underlying causes and among them, exogenous and structural factors

play a significant role. Both the imprisonment of the old leadership by

the new regime and the presence of different ideological positions

towards the use of violence to achieve political aims were determinant

in leading to a violent insurgency against al-Sisi’s rule. The logic of

violence is contextual in the sense that it cannot be investigated only

from the ideological point of view but needs be studied as framed in a

specific political context that transcends national boundaries. As a

consequence, the possible future developments of the role of the

organization in Egypt depend on a conspicuous number of factors.

Nevertheless, we argue, the attitude of the regime as far as repression

is concerned may be a key element to analyze the ideological

restructuring of the MB. What is sure is that the Muslim Brothers are

undergoing a crucial historical moment that may even lead to a

definitive split inside the organization with possible dire consequences

for the stability of the country, since the violent non-jihadi branch of

the group is gaining the upper-hand and this course of event is

unlikely to be counteracted in the short term, given the zero-sum

approach fostered by both parties. Only a reduction in the degree of

oppression perpetrated by the regime, thus, is likely to (possibly) allow

for a decrease in the levels of Islamist violence in the country, paving


34

the way for a repositioning of the Brothers in the domestic political

scenario. The alternatives delineated by El-Sherif concerning the

annihilation of one of the two actors, either al-Sisi’s regime or the MB,

is almost impossible to occur for a number of reasons. On the one

hand, the MB’s resilience and adaptability to new environments, as

well as their widespread support at grassroots level among the

population, especially at universities. On the other, as recent

international events have demonstrated, Egypt remains an important

player in the current geopolitical scenario and, consequently, Western

powers are unwilling to allow for a return of Islamists at government

level. In the meantime, the country is experiencing one of the most

dramatic waves of violence of the last decades, and journalists and

scholars have already started to talk about a possible return of the

Spring.

May 2016

35

Is Egypt still a necessary evil? Egyptian

regional stance and its external projection

Anita Nappo

The label of “necessary evil” has been stuck on Egyptian establishment as of

the wake of the second revolutionary wave which upturned the Brotherhood regime

in 2013 and led to the power General and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and

his entourage through what under the political lens could be defined a coup. Many

scholars and analysts assumed that Egypt operated a comeback on the regional

stage in 2014 due to the regional constant upheaval, especially after the critical

collapse on the Country’s Eastern border. Although, its domestic policy seems to be

facing more setback, expressly in the socio-economic sector.

According to the “doingbusiness” and economic analysis sheets of the World

Bank, besides any remark from the international institutions and institutes

working in the field, Egypt does not score high in the indicators valuing the

environment where to start business and investments, as to make them thrive. The

main claim points out the insufficiency of the efforts taken so far by the government

to put in place the needed reforms in the deteriorating social and economic sector.

Being that sketched, it may be interesting to investigate the roots of the Saudi

and French interest manifestly shown in the last months in investing in Egypt.

Why necessary, why evil? These may be the main points to be developed as the

words pop up violently at the first sight under the readers’ eyes. Although the focus

of this section is set on taking the stock of the economic and political features of


36

Egyptian relations with the brand-new actors of the Arab speaking region, the

Gulf Countries, both with the European Union, as a single actor as well as a

group of Countries taking divergent decisions even more often in the last five-year

period. This focus should provide the reader with the tools to understand how these

economic and political relations are the key to read the regional alliance system and

perspective “equilibrium”.

Introduction

Before the neat demonstration of its illiberal features which only

lately have gained the headers of international sheets, the definition of

the nature of the Egyptian government was an open secret. It was

unlike to hear the words compound “military regime” spoken out loud

in high-level meetings or official statements when it came to better

shape the essence of Egyptian government. Hardly possible to find an

outlet or a voice out of the choir, begging to differ and stating out that

the international community attitude was wrong. Closing an eye on the

illiberal restrictions imposed by the Egyptian military regime was

justified by the tall story told depicting al-Sisi government as the last

bastion, a fundamental ally in the as broad as vague European strategy

in the post-revolutionary Middle East. Nonetheless, its military nature

is manifest now as it has always been.

Briefly, its autocratic features perfectly fit the common definition

used in Political Science to categorize regimes and political formations.

This political outline usually thrives from a coup d’état and it is

May 2016

37

characterized by the lack of a grand ideology supporting the work of

the government. Although, on the other hand regimes’ actions are

highly drenched in dogmas and supported by rhetorical catchphrases

focusing on typical political themes likewise the national security,

order and prosperity. Personification of the power also generally

features this type of regimes with the instauration of an intimal

interconnection between the person and the role, so far that military

regimes may also assume the guise of kleptocracy. As pointed out by

Geddes [1999], a significant indicator may be the influence of military

hierarchies and officers on policy making structures. In a nutshell, this

influence may scale from a role of guardians the status quo to the role

of controlling the administration and the state structures by the

military officers. This latter is considered to be the apex of the shapes

a military regime may adopt [Nordlinger, 1979] under which no

opposition or dissent is allowed. This looks a lot like the situation

ruling out the existence of hostile movements in Egypt, or chiefly the

main idea driving the chase of the Muslim Brotherhood in the

aftermath of the al-Sisi presidency kickoff. Being that said, apparently

one day the world woke up and found out that the government sitting

in Cairo was rather neglecting the respect of human rights and

somewhat steering in a dangerous direction grasping to control with

its authoritarian punch on the Country. That day was last February,

when the body of the Italian researcher Regeni was found at the verge

of the dusty Desert road connecting Cairo with Alexandria, the

motorway which is one of the jewels of the crown of General al-Sisi’s

government in the field of infrastructures. Many may argue that this is


38

not the first either the last undemocratic regime taking up the power

in the region as well as in the world, according to the Western-

European features of the ideal-typical notion of democracy. This is

not the first either the last government of this kind which the

European Countries and the European Union itself entertains

relations with, despite of evident breach in the respect of human

rights chiefly. Apart from the requests connected to the case of the

death of the young Italian researcher and besides the demands on the

destiny of thousands and thousands of Egyptian nationals who

disappeared in mysterious situations in the last 3 years leaving in

despair their families, many readers may argue why Egypt is still so

important not to leave it go. What does it takes to get over relations

with Egypt after that the influent European public opinion, or at least

a part of it, has asked for accountability and transparence from Cairo.

But their governments are quite reluctant to find a way to give answers

to their people while not letting go the Egyptian government.

Geopolitics and economics are intimately intertwined in this affair

more than any other scenario at present. For those persuaded that

different politic domains can be secluded in watertight sealed

containers, they may be here reached by bad news discarding this

persuasion. Egypt’s domestic and foreign politics are becoming more

and more entangled as for the time from the establishment of the

General’s government has taken up. This may be the case ruling over

the extreme makeover of Egyptian political alliances and economic

ententes since 2013. As this paper will try to enlighten in the next

May 2016

39

paragraphs, Egyptian

foreign affairs have

been molded

according to its

domestic dimension

and so were its

relations with Gulf

Countries, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in pole position, as

well as with the European Union and its Members States. As

indicators will be used the treatment of political dissent as the

readiness to inject cash flows to revive the shattered Egyptian treasury.

The paper further will explain why despite of all these main fault lines,

everyone counts on Egypt both in a regional perspective seeking after

stabilization both in a countering angle against Iran and its comeback

on the world stage.

Gulf buddies and political advisors

At a glance, connections between Gulf Countries and lower middle

income countries5, as Egypt, may be simplistically labeled as mere

economic relations formed by the duo wealthy sheikhdom donor –

poor X country recipient. Yet, Egyptian relations mainly with the Saud

family as well as the UAE are rooted in last century history and outdo

5 The Arab Republic of Egypt is categorized by the World Bank as “Lower middle income” under the WB world development indicators and more than 5000 indicators from other collections such as Gender Statistics, African Development Indicators, and Education Statistics. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/G6jHXC.

Source: Stratfor

http://goo.gl/G6jHXC


40

the plain definition of financial exchange. It does not need to

throwback the memory till the dawn of history to track the ratio of

the current triangular relation. Besides, it gives ground to the claim

that Egyptian external relations are molded accordingly the internal

political and economic state of the play. In the aftermath of the

historical changes undergoing in Egypt during the 1950s many

members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled away to find shelter in the

Arab Gulf Countries from the political persecution they would have

encountered by staying in their homeland. In the direct upshot of the

Free Officials revolution, relations between the Brotherhood and the

junta were initially friendly although they quickly escalated as result of

Nasser’s choices to ban political parties and then to limit

organizations’ freedom of action, aiming to diminish as well any anti-

secular influence on the nation-building process. Consequently, the

member or supporters of the Brotherhood found a safe harbor in the

Gulf Countries societies where they were often employed as teachers

and treated with consideration as being educated individuals. Albeit,

even here the history tells of a short lived honey mood. In Saudi

Arabia as in the Emirates the connections between these Egyptian

nationals and the politics started being way too far intertwined and

thus no longer tolerated. Clearly, at stake were the political stability

and the permanence of the monarchies at the guide of the two Gulf

Countries. Then as now, Muslim Brothers’ increasingly political

behavior is seen as suspicious henceforth governments tend to

prohibit their activities being deemed to potentially incite those parts

of the population that had been influenced by ideology to rise up

May 2016

41

against the monarchies. Hereinafter, the hostile treatment of the

group may be a good indicator to understand the initial alignment in

foreign policy of al-Sisi-led Egypt and the two Gulf Countries in

object. After the ousting from the power of Mohammed Morsi in July

2013, Egyptian politics showed in a wider perspective a whole new

ballgame to the entire wobbling Middle East.

A completely renewing balance was required to settle the case

between so-called secularist forces heading towards the stabilization

of the country establishing a strong tie with the armed forces and

religious feelings. Nothing happening in Middle East stays in within its

own national borders but it tends to overwhelm them as to stress out

that borders are sometimes only a fictional imposition, a transplanted

organ which the body continuously rejects in countless expressions.

And sometimes it takes a bit for those externally sitting and watching

Middle-Eastern events to understand or at least try to.

In Middle East more than everywhere else the alliances takes and

changes in the twinkling of an eye, and sometimes countries find

themselves to fight against a faction supported by a state which stays

on the same side of the barricade in another war-torn scenario within

the region. This may be the case of Saudi Arabia and Egypt related to

the Syrian war, or Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Yemen, and so on. This

should help understand that there is no full reshuffle on the stage in

Middle East, no complete change of course after the new king Salman

took the power in Riyadh, but rather a symptomatic readjustment of

alliances in accordance with the events. It has been observed that


42

lurking in the background is a broader strategy employed by the Gulf

nations to shuffle regional power in the Middle East. As matter of

fact, Saudi Arabia is currently engaged in a regional competition

aiming for the hegemony against Iran, and they are both deploying all

the possible means to wage proxy wars, as in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Although influence may be grown up even through means other than

military interactions and this perfectly matches Egyptian needs.

President-General al-Sisi is endeavoring to find a way to keep the

Egyptian economy afloat and as well needs military aid after the

partial withdraw of the European counterpart due to his regime’s poor

human rights record. What Egypt needs, and apparently started to

Source: Stratfor

May 2016

43

obtain as of the beginning of the al-Sisi government was the

recognition of the Egyptian role in the shaking and shaken Middle

East, sustain and recognition under any circumstances.

Main economic issues in the post-2013 Egypt are chiefly the

increasing dependence on external energy suppliers, an unstable public

finances sector and a profile which turns out being almost unattractive

for external financer. If in the first period, Saudi Arabia and the UAE

were more than eager to supply Egypt with discounted fuel and to

represent the dominant sources of external financial support, a certain

degree of dissatisfaction and frustration has started emerging in the

last year. The lack of transparency from the Egyptian side on

accountability towards the Gulf donors on how the money generously

pledged in the Cairo treasury were spent caused the first wave of

dissatisfaction from Abu Dhabi and even more strongly from Riyadh.

In the sole first period, Saudi Arabia and allies Kuwait and the United

Arab Emirates pledged around $30 billion to bankroll the coup and to

shore up the first step of the baby born military govern in Cairo. The

cash flow from the Gulf to Cairo continued despite the realignment

of alliances tying up the three main centres of this political triangle,

namely the disaccording choices in the Syrian affair and the Yemeni

scenario separating the views of the Egyptian leader and his royal

counterpart, the Saudi King Salman. A clear example may be

embodied by the positions taken regarding Russian involvement in the

Syrian war. While Egyptian Foreign Affairs minister Shoukry has

welcomed it as a decisive step towards the fight against the terrorism,


44

the Saudi King defined the Russian air strikes as a crucial asset to

support Asad, who is considered by Riyadh as the longa manu of the

Shi’te Iran in the Arab-speaking Middle East.

It may be interesting to note that in this situation, the Emirati

position was ambiguous and less definite than the Saudi one, standing

the UAE opposition to the resurgent Iran. War-scarred Yemen may

serve as another example helping to outline the evolving, and maybe

worsening, relation between the two Gulf States and Egypt. The

puzzle of the alliances becomes way more intricate and the Saudi

position turns more subtle as in Yemen Riyadh supports the Islah

group, an affiliated group of the Muslim Brotherhood, which battles

against the Houti, allegedly Iranian proxies in Sanaa. At stake in

Yemen is, not only the regional predominance that Riyadh is

struggling to maintain after the return on the stage of Iran. Yemen is

strategically important for Egypt both for the Gulf monarchies as it

sits on the Bab al-Mandab strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf

of Aden, which sees the majority of the world's oil shipments

passages. Obviously, Egypt and Saudi Arabia fear that the

appropriation of the power by Houti group would threaten oil

shipment passage through the strait. But the Saudi Kingdom decided

that the minor evil in this scenario was to support the Islah, despite

being backed by the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar in order to

contrast Iran, falling in a discordant military position with the

Egyptian counterpart. With the change at the head of the Kingdom

occurred in January 2015, after that King Abdallah passed away, the

May 2016

45

Egyptian-Saudi relations started worsening, especially apropos of

which role, treatment and future should be envisaged for the Muslim

Brotherhood.

Despite these incongruences Saudi and Emirate will not stop

completely their support to Cairo as the side-effect of a cash-flow cut

may be the upheaval of Egypt besides it would call into question Gulf

countries influence there. On the other hand, despite of the

announcement of the support package signed under the Cairo

Declaration6 in 2015, it is expected a reduction of the financial

support especially from the oil-dependent Saudi Arabia as a result of

the low prices momentum. To the point, Riyadh has planned an

investment and loans plan covering the next three years and

discounted fuel provision for the forthcoming five, but no new

donations will be pledged. Also UAE treasury has lately decided to

downsize the tenor of the material support towards Egypt as a move

to display Abu Dhabi dissatisfaction with the steps undertook so far

by Cairo in implementing reforms in the socio-economic sector and in

the minor effects following Cairo’s effort to fight terrorism. While

Gulf Countries are struggling with differentiating their economies

from the highly dependence on the energy raw materials, Egypt strives

to discern extremists from non-violent rivals in domestic politics

domain which inevitably involves foreign affairs’ choices. Being that

6 Early 2015, Egypt and Saudi Arabia announced their intention to set a joint military force mainly financed by Riyadh and with the highest contribution in terms of human forces from Egypt. This intention may be read as part of a broader intention leading towards cooperation wrapped in the Cairo Declaration. Singed in August 2015, the document encompasses a range of areas of cooperation over common regional challenges.


46

one of the main reason why it is unlikely and ingenuous as well to

expect that the Gulf Countries may good counselors for Egypt in the

path towards socio-economic normalization and implementation of

the rule of law. Relations with Egypt cannot be simply neglected as

this may become source of a greater regional instability though the

role of the Gulf countries should become more concrete in their

political leadership. Saudi and Emirates economic and political

support to Egypt may help to restore investors’ confidence in the

country and to encourage the return in Egypt of the economic actors

and so ensure a macro-stability at least on the short term. These latter

conditions are lacking in Egypt since the revolution of January 2011

that took to end the long-lasting autocratic Mubarak regime.

Additionally, a series of terrorism-connected events as well as internal

instability discouraged tourists to visit Egypt, which turned out being a

mortal setback to al-Sisi’s attempts to independently keep Egyptian

economy afloat. The diminishing expenditure from the Gulf may

anyway be perceived as a new opportunity for Europe. As it will be

further discussed in the next section, Egypt will face a new

circumstance tied with the decreasing cash-flow from the Gulf

notwithstanding its engagement in the fight against terrorism, here

included those opponent groups which are perceived as terrorist

under the Egyptian establishment’s eyes. Looking for substitute or

complementary sources of liquidity to cover its expenditure after the

Gulf partial withdrawn, Cairo will potentially knock at the EU’s doors.

From a side, Cairo could afford not to abide to EU’s conditionality

May 2016

47

parameters as it had other cash income sources which paid without

setting any political either governance-related condition.

Ideally, it is shaping out a new condition bringing about the

opportunity for the EU to influence and use its conditional aid system

to prevent Egyptian internal situation to further deteriorate , which as

outlined above risks to jeopardize the already unstable region.

Although, EU funds will not leave al-Sisi’s free to move forward

keeping up with its internal reforms and stabilizing his rule as it is,

mainly because the two parts of this equation do not match.

Money talks, EU conditionality walks

The outlook from the North shore of the Mediterranean does not

appear less entangled. In an already knotted series of entities

interacting and throwing in turmoil the Middle East and its actors, it

must be noted the impact of the peculiar nature of the EU. Assuming

that foreign affairs are the series of activities undertaken by state both

non-state actors in the international arena, or better said the world

politics domain, aimed at the achievement of objectives, the EU still

lack to define these latter with the result of an hesitating and pale

performance on the international scenes. In 2014 the Commission

lead by Jean-Claude Juncker took office and following its appointment

the Italian double-hatted Vice-President and High Representative of

the European Union for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini took on

her first official visit abroad, in occupied Gaza. This was way far more


48

than symbolic and the analyst embarked on pleasing comments on her

choice as they foresaw a renewed energy and spirit flowing into the

veins of the EU external action body toward the Middle East. A more

comprehensive approach to build a unique external projection of the

EU was also pleaded by foreign affairs operators and commentators.

The post-

revolutionary Middle

Eastern scenario

seemed to be the

right test-bed to

benchmark new

external policies

trends in the area and

to surpass the idea

that the EU is not able to speak just with one voice. Unfortunately

though, the evergreen sentence allegedly spoken out by Kissinger

stands still and the world leaders still lack of a number to call when in

need to speak to the EU as a whole. Without broadening the scope of

the debate excessively, it may be useful to point out some of the

features characterizing the external action of the EU in order to take

the pulse of the current status of its relations, with Egypt specifically

for the purpose of this analysis. Bearing in mind that the EU is an in-

between actor and its construction is still ongoing, its international

legal status waves from supranational organization to group of States

acting under the purpose of saving their national interests using the

Source: European Commision

May 2016

49

EU as loudhailer, there again, the broader the group, the bigger the

clout. Reporting Wojciechowski’s scheme [2015], EU foreign policy

can be analyzed by discerning three different aspects featuring

individual national interests, environmental at EU level and systemic

factors, which involves the different activities carried out by the EU in

the area of foreign affairs. Especially true for the first two level of

analysis, the interests may be referred as identical, contradictory or

mutually complementary. From this kind of analysis it may result that

decision makers’ initiatives give prominence to national interests and

sometimes do not correspond to the principles and the guide-lines of

the EU as a whole. Hence, while trying to harmonically sum up the

components of external affairs interactions (goals, values, challenges,

strategies, instruments) the member states also try to abide to national

interests and security purposes. The EU at the moment is perceived

and tends to present itself as a brand-new actor of the post-nations

global arena, thus it is required to act accordingly with the states asked

to operate in a coordinated way.

This latter does not seem to be applicable to the current political

tendency towards Egypt within the European Continent, especially in

the wake of the tragic assassination and the connected answerless

issues recalled in the introductory session of this work. The EU,

especially through the Parliament, has raised some points against the

military regime in office in Egypt and asked for more accountability

and respect of the human rights as condition to continue the long-

established relation between the continental organization and the Arab


50

Republic of Egypt. While on the institutional level resolutions and

initiatives have been promulgated, some among the single member

states have shown a disinterested attitude towards the guidelines and

conditions marked by the EU and kept on carrying on a business as

usual attitude. The French particular case will be further investigated.

The text of the resolution7 adopted in Strasbourg on March 10th

2016 by the plenary assembly of the European Parliament uses strong

words of condemn. It underlines with concern that the murder and

torture and disappearances are not isolated cases and treated with

impunity in Egypt and calls upon serious measures to be realistically

applied by the EU. In this context, clause 118 of the abovementioned

resolution reads “[The European Parliament] Underlines the

importance that the European Union attaches to cooperation with

Egypt as an important neighbor and partner, and Egypt’s role in

ensuring stability in the region; shares the concerns of the Egyptian

people about the economic, political and security challenges facing

their country and the region; condemns the terrorists’ attacks on

Egyptian civilians and military”. These quoted lines confirm that

Egypt is and remain a partner of the EU, too important to let it go.

According to supporting evidences, Egypt is largest country as regards

population covered by the European Neighborhood Policy under the

legal foundation of cooperation stipulated in 2004. Not only mere

7 European Union Parliament resolution, text adopted on Thursday 10th March 2016 on Egypt, notably the case of Giulio Regeni. Series P8_TA(2016)0084. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/1eeDuq.

8 ibidem.

http://goo.gl/1eeDuq

May 2016

51

digits on the constantly growing Egyptian population, Egypt is

fundamental for European strategy in the neighborhood under its

geopolitical endowment at the crossroads of two crucial regions,

North Africa and the Middle East. To better understand the

proclaimed importance of the EU-Egypt relation it is suitable to

quote the formula offered by the official website of the EEAS

delegation to Egypt:

“The EU stands by the Egyptian people in their ongoing search for

democracy, respect for human rights, dignity, social justice, and

security. The EU has supported the country's roadmap to democracy.

After the endorsement of a new Constitution in January 2014,

presidential elections in May 2014 and parliamentary elections

concluded in December 2015, the convening of the Egyptian

Parliament in January 2016 was an important step in the country's

political transition. Temporarily on hold in the wake of the January

2011 revolution, the institutional dialogue meetings foreseen by the

Association Agreement have resumed. Already in 2001 and in order to

put their relationship on a firm legal footing, the EU and Egypt

concluded negotiations on an Association Agreement. Since its entry

into force in 2004, it has provided the framework for regular political

dialogue between the two partners and enhanced cooperation in a

number of key sectors, ranging from trade and investment to energy


52

and education, and also for sustained and substantial EU assistance to

Egypt's reform efforts”9.

Since 2004, Egypt is beneficiary of aids and grants funneled by the

EU through the ENP framework, it is accounted that in the period

2007-2013 after the first revision of the ENP instrument, the EU has

channeled around € 1bln in the quasi totality accounted for budgetary

help to Egyptian government. Lately, in compliance with the new

policies and trends seeking after an answer to the Arab Springs, the

ENP itself and any other EU external policy instrument have

undergone a revision, as the remolding of the conditionality

parameter. It may be useful to briefly remind what EU conditionality

refers to. Chiefly the parameter refers to a composite set of actions

enabling the EU to bridge political demands to economic incentives to

third parts. This instruments need to be implemented co-coordinately

wise by the EU and its member states in order to establish credible

relations and to make the make conditionality work. The more for

more approach largely exemplifies the conditionality instrument and

the EU tendency to reshape its relations rather than rethinking the

nature of the relations between the two shores [Balfour, 2012].

Conflicts and persistence of authoritarianism have spoilt the EU

relations with the Countries of the southern-Mediterranean flank as

through the conditionality and leading values of the institution it was

not possible to neither act nor cooperate with these actors. Conversely,

9 Official European External Action Service website related to the European Mission to Egypt. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/hspqrN.

http://goo.gl/hspqrN

May 2016

53

the EU Lisbon treaty and its articles ruling on the external action

created a complex legal environment which allows the single member

states to anyway carry out actions in the field of trade or international

cooperation whatever the respect of the conditionality parameters in

the third country is. This is the core of the issue on the existence of

divergent objectives pursued by member states which limits the

credibility as the role of the EU if compared to other actors such as

the US, the single EU member states, and additionally the non-

Western actors

lately stepping up

at international

level – namely, the

geographically

dwarf Countries of

the Gulf, the

People’s Republic

of China, Russian

Federation. Being

the conditionality a leverage of the EU, this would be useful as tool

serving to rethink interdependence and relations as a whole between

the EU and the Middle-Eastern region, by identifying common

interests and mutual areas of cooperation to work together in future.

EU policies in the post-revolutionary Middle East have suffered of a

failing approach catalyzing the attention on a given territory only when

it faces a serious crisis and outlining the same standard solution for all

the third-part partners – the so-called “from one crisis to another”

Saudi King Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.

Bilateral agreements in Cairo

Source: Wall Street Journal


54

approach. As of now, this results being a well-done diplomatic

exercise on the paper though it does not exceed its paper-based stance.

The limit of the external dimension of the EU is now as it has always

been the persistence of national interests not toeing the collective

European line. Moreover, in the specific case of Egypt, the

conditionality after the coup d’état has not had a huge impact on the

military establishment, not only for the continuous support provided

by the single European states, Italy and France foremost.

From the Egyptian perspective, the mentioned in the previous

section, the oil-rich Gulf economies have pledged generously grants

and assured investments during all the period following the January

revolution in 2015. Recalling this latter period and the exogenous

elements connected, both Egypt and the EU find themselves in a

situation that requires reshuffling cards on the table, to inject a breath

of fresh air in their deteriorating relation. For the EU, it is vital to call

to order its member states and to bid them to stay in line with the EU

decisions, if the final aim of stabilize the region is truly a shared

objective. Not only the EU credibility is at stake, but also the national

sovereign security so jealously cuddled and protected by each single

member state and which is hindering the EU institution process as of

now. Identically, Egypt finds itself a bit neglected by its generous Arab

brothers after the worsening of the situation in Libya, Syria and

Yemen and the remake of the Saudi countering strategy against Iran.

Provided with this new situation, the EU may find in the Egypt and in

May 2016

55

the other non-war-torn countries of the region a good opportunity to

operate an evaluation and review of its external action tools.

The EU conditional stances may serve to better governance in

Egypt, to upgrade the status of the respect of human rights and to

lead to a greater inclusion of oppressed internal opposition forces, not

automatically connected to the transnational terrorism. Nevertheless

this risks to be the umpteenth lost momentum of the EU failing to

impose itself as a credible international relations actor. The visit of

President Hollande to Cairo in April is symptomatic of this

foreseeably failure. Soon after the retreat of the Italian ambassador

from Cairo, recalled to Rome for further researches and mainly in

protest at the lack of progress in the investigation by Egyptian

authorities on the “Regeni affairs”, many other EU members have

shown their disapproval to Egypt impudent disregard of political

liberties and civil rights as well as the failure of the democratic process

embedment. While publically deploring the barbaric act of torture and

the discouraging poor record concerning the respect of human rights

in Egypt, France has continued its relations with Cairo as normal, as

nothing had changed. As mentioned above, on April 2016 President

Holland has been received by its Egyptian counterpart in grand style

in the Downtown area fully decorated with huge pictures of the

French president shaking vigorously the hand of al-Sisi and contoured

by waving French and Egyptian flags. Too much fanfare in Cairo to

enfold the umpteenth arm deal between regardless of EU prohibition

to trade weaponries with third-parts targeted by such bans due to the


56

lack of respect of democratic criteria or in case of civil unrest.

Especially true for Egypt, where “a couple of dozen Rafales are

unlikely to make much of a difference in the campaigns Egypt is

fighting against land-based insurgencies at home and in Libya”10. Al-

jazeera reported that as part of its deal with France, Egypt will receive

fighter aircraft and navy vessels in line with Egyptian military

shopping spree which lead the government spending billions of

dollars on French weapons and other hardware. The visit was meant

as the seal on a renewed partnership between Paris and Cairo which

aims to boost ties in every field, from the political to the economic,

from the cultural to the touristic. Nevertheless this common entente

was sealed under a weapon deal which apparently has nothing to do

with the listed domains of cooperation.

Already in 2015

Egypt has signed a

$5.9 billion arms deal

that finalizes the

purchase of Rafale

fighter jets. An as

though as

straightforward

reminder sent by

Cairo to both the US and the EU showing that Egypt can acquire

10 Brophy Zak, (Feb. 16, 2016). Needed quote of Zak Brophy article “Egypt deal shores up French arms industry”. The New Arab. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/sLTu7b.

Francois Hollande and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi

Source: Reuters

http://goo.gl/sLTu7b

May 2016

57

elsewhere its military hardware, that also served to keep the Rafale

production alive.

Saudi shuffle and French connection: final remarks

The analysis tried to provide the reader with the elements to

understand the current situation connecting the mayor centres of

power and Egypt in the post-coup d’état that lead to power the

military junta headed by al-Sisi in 2013. As suggested by the title,

Egypt has been considered a necessary evil as everyone is aware of its

illiberal nature though it serves as a standing point in the transforming

Middle Eastern environment. The risk of a war-torn Egypt cannot be

computed by the EU as well as the Gulf Countries. The analysis

focused on some features of Egyptian internal politic to explain the

undergoing Saudi shuffle, followed in a minor tone by the UAE,

towards Cairo. For al-Sisi and his entourage, the worst evil is

embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood which is compared to the

terroristic groups threatening the world stability. Saudi Arabia used to

share this view and consequently, pledged billions of dollars of aids in

the almost-empty Egyptian reserves. So did the UAE in the direct

aftermath of the removal from power of the Muslim Brotherhood

affiliated government in Cairo in 2013. As reflex of the liquid alliances

system, much more volatile in Middle East than elsewhere, the

triangular relation binding Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE together

changed accordingly to the worsening of the Yemeni crisis, the

Russian military involvement in the Syrian civil war and the partial


58

resurgence of Iran. Especially true for the Yemeni scenario, Saudi

Arabia has powerfully steered away from the Egyptian views as Riyadh

started supporting the Islah group, which is connected with the

Brotherhood. This was a reflection of the new foreign strategy of

Riyadh which needs to counter the Iranian influence in the area more

than fighting the Muslim Brotherhood, whose dangerousness has been

recently downgraded by the Saudi. This discrepancy of views has

partially enfeebled Egyptian relations with the Gulf allies which were

already showing signs of frustration towards the poor records of

economic performances in Egypt after the humongous flow of

capitals poured into Egyptian assets in the last 3 years. Under a precise

analysis provided by the World Bank, Egyptian economy is on the

brink of collapse and it cannot afford to see the aids and investment

cut from day to another. On the other side of the Mediterranean sea,

the Brussels-based institutions are monitoring with concern the

evolution of the Egyptian socio-economic situation peered by the

strengthen of the grip of the military junta at the power in Cairo. The

EU finds itself in a bad situation as it is persuaded that Egypt is too

important in its grand regional neighborhood policy to let it go.

Although the EU-Egyptian relations need to be rethought and

updated, to get over the conditionality parameter. This is the first time

since the instauration of the al-Sisi government that the EU holds the

whip hand. Despite of all the regional upheaval and the threats to

national security, not to mention the migratory crisis, the EU has a

unique opportunity to normalize its relations with e Arab Country

while backing the path towards the desirable establishment of

May 2016

59

democratic institutions in Cairo. Until 2015, al-Sisi could afford to

keep Egyptian afloat without the EU conditional support, oo

demanding in terms of political concessions under the Egyptian eyes.

It was possible indeed because, as above mentioned, the Gulf States

were eager to donate cash intakes without posing any conditions.

However, their generosity has now decreased, even due to the crush

of the oil price on the financial markets. This new situation put the

EU in the profitable position to stimulate Egypt’s development using

conditional aid, the first time since al-Sisi took office that the EU has

the chance to push for a change in Egypt.

Egypt still remains central for both European and Gulf Countries’

strategies in the region, as from one side, the regional polarization and

volatile alliance structure have hindered any attempt to resolve crisis

and establish reliable governments in the post-revolutionary Middle-

East. On the other hand, the EU still struggles to establish itself as a

credible brand-new actor able to offer innovative governance solution

mainly because of its ongoing institutional construction process and

the selfish member states’ attitude to jealously preserve their national

sovereignty. Certainly, the rough attitude from Cairo does not help

Brussels to reformulate a new pact towards the Mediterranean and the

South neighborhood; although al-Sisi has skillfully played his aces as

he is still at the lead of his Country despite of all the dissent and

opponent forces.


60

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About the Authors

Valentina Cantori

Graduated with honors in the MA Culture and Languages for

Communication and International Cooperation at the University of

Milan in 2014, where she obtained also her BA degree in Linguistic

and Cultural Mediation, with a specialization in Arabic and Islamic

Studies. After a working period spent in Egypt, she is now Teaching

Assistant at Scripps College in Claremont, CA, a member of The

Claremont Colleges Consortium. She is currently researching at Pitzer

College on Religion and Conflict-related issues in Syria and Iraq.

Anita Nappo

Anita graduated in International Studies with honors at the

University l'Orientale in Naples focusing her work on the European

Union external relations with the broader Middle East, in particular

towards the Gulf Countries. After spending a period in Egypt as

freelance researcher and Arabic language student in 2015 she is

currently working in Brussels as junior consultant for EU affairs and

MENA region.


66

Ed. Mediterranean Affairs©

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

Cover image source: Egypt State Information Service

http://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/

May 2016

67

report no. 5 - egypt at the crossroad

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