report on the population affected by armed conflict in syria · 2020-05-01 · htau july 2015...
TRANSCRIPT
Report on the
Population
Affected by
Armed Conflict
in Syria
NGO Forum - Humanitarian
Trends Analysis Unit
July 2015 Report
This report is intended for organizations working on the humanitarian response to the Syrian
crisis. This report should not be distributed outside of your organization or posted on the Internet.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 2
For more information on this report contact:
NGO Forum HTAU Coordinator
Email: [email protected]
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 3 Summary of findings .......................................................................................................... 3
About the NGO Forum and Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit ......................................... 5 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 5
General Findings .................................................................................................................... 7 Syrian armed conflict dynamics for July 2015 .................................................................. 7
Urgent humanitarian needs .............................................................................................. 11 Population movements and demographics ....................................................................... 12
Sectoral Findings .................................................................................................................. 13 Protection and threats to physical safety .......................................................................... 13
Most vulnerable groups .................................................................................................... 13 IDP Camp issues .............................................................................................................. 16
Shelter and non-food items .............................................................................................. 17 Fuel and electricity ........................................................................................................... 18 Food security and livelihoods .......................................................................................... 19
Nutrition ........................................................................................................................... 21
Health ............................................................................................................................... 21
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene ........................................................................................ 23 Education.......................................................................................................................... 24
Affected Population Issues ................................................................................................... 25 Affected population coping mechanisms ......................................................................... 25 Affected population satisfaction ...................................................................................... 26
Relations between groups ................................................................................................ 26 Cultural and social issues ................................................................................................. 27
Discussion and Summary ..................................................................................................... 29 Appendix A: HTAU interview questionnaire .................................................................. 32 Appendix B: Acronyms ................................................................................................... 33
Appendix C: secondary sources on Syria......................................................................... 34
Appendix D: Areas of control in Syria ............................................................................ 35 Appendix E: Damage assessments for select cities in Syria ............................................ 37
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 3
Executive Summary
While the armed conflict in Syria continues to have a devastating impact on the civilian
population in Syria, information on the needs, problems and coping mechanisms of the
affected population in Syria continues to be difficult to obtain. With a pre-conflict
population of about 22 million people,1 of whom about 2.5 million were refugees from
Iraq, Palestine and Armenia, current numbers of people affected by the armed conflict are
astounding: 4 million refugees, 7.6 million internally displaced persons, 12.2 people in
need of assistance, 4.8 million people living in besieged or hard to reach areas, 220,000
people killed, 1 million people injured, and 2 million children out of school.2 While the
numbers are shocking, it is important to remember that each one is a person with specific
needs, interests and rights.
This report summarizes the needs of and problems facing the affected population in
Aleppo and Idleb Syria Governorates during the month of July 2015. Due to restrictions
on data collection in ISIS and Government of Syria controlled areas, the findings in this
report are relevant for only opposition armed group (OAG) controlled areas of Aleppo and
Idleb Governorates. More details about the executive summary can be found in the body
of the document.
The Methodology section describes the qualitative research methods used in this report.
The Findings section summarizes the findings produced from the data analysis. The
Discussion and Summary section addresses broader issues arising from this report. The
interview questionnaire is found in Appendix A in English (Arabic version available on
request). Appendix B contains Acronyms. Appendix C has additional, useful information
sources on the Syrian conflict. Appendices D and E has maps on recent Syrian population
displacements, areas of control by armed groups, and major offensives. Appendix F has
recent damage assessments for the cities of Homs, Aleppo, Hama, Deir e Zor, Ar Raqqa,
and Daraa.
Summary of findings3
There are an estimated 85 deaths per day or 2,550 deaths per month, and 15,300 to
20,400 injuries per month, in Syria from the armed conflict.
Protection and water are possibly the most important humanitarian needs for the
Syrian population in July. Protection needs existed due to the variety of attacks on
civilians, residential areas, hospitals, and schools, and other threats against
civilians. The hot weather made water a pressing need, with water shortages due to
higher demand from the heat and increased displacement, damaged water systems,
and lack of electricity and fuel for pumping water. Other urgent needs include
shelter, food, healthcare, sanitation, education, fuel and electricity.
There were continued reports of the need for shelter, non-food items, fuel and
electricity in Idleb and Aleppo Governorates. People are in need of tents, blankets,
clothes, mosquito nets and mattresses, latrines, and summer and winter clothes.
While heavy fighting continues in many parts of Syria between over 100 different
1 For recent demographic data see http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population/. 2 Source: OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Syria Issue 2: June 2015. 3 Summary of findings produced in this report, mainly from primary data sources.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 4
armed groups, front lines changed very little in July 2015 throughout Syria.
Pertinent to this report, some territorial changes occurred in the Mare, Aleppo and
southern Idleb (Kafr Nobol) areas.
Population movements in July were much less that June, but the threat of major
displacements is worrying, as well as the continued impact on Syrians who have
been displaced multiple times or for lengthy periods of time. The recent offensive
by ISIS in the Mare and Azaz, Aleppo area threatens to create a very large
population displacement, which has very little place to go. Similarly, the intense
GOS and OAG fighting near the al-Ghab plain has the potential for a large
population displacement. In both cases, the heavy fighting may cause large
numbers of civilians to be killed or injured, and high demand for humanitarian
assistance with food, water, shelter, health, and other urgent needs.
Some of the groups of people who were identified as being most at risk include
besieged populations, children, women, and disabled persons.
Rental prices rose considerably in July. Due to the high rental prices, IDPs try to
stay with relatives or in schools, or just rent one room in a house. As a last resort
they go to IDP camps. Only the poorest people or people with few relatives or
friends in safe areas stay in the camps.
A summary of damage assessments in major Syrian cities shows extensive damage
to residential areas in most cities. Rebuilding will take both considerable time and
money.
In July the transfer of fuel resumed from ISIS-controlled areas to opposition-
controlled areas in Aleppo and Idleb, in exchange for food, after blockages in June
that caused considerable harm to the affected population and humanitarian
response. The amount of fuel being imported is not clear, although prices appear to
be much higher than the past.
Various responses by the affected population to the armed conflict were identified.
These include population movements, searching for and sharing shelter, tents and
houses, actions to find and obtain food, water and other essential items, and
responses to larger problems like the lack of electricity, fuel, sewage, and
sanitation.
It appears most of the affected population is satisfied with the NGO efforts in the
humanitarian response. They are generally pleased to receive assistance with food,
water, shelter, healthcare and the other basic needs. However, there are many
people in need who are not receiving any assistance, and have not received any
assistance for months. Many beneficiaries who receive assistance state that they
would like more or better food, water or assistance.
Relations between the various groups are generally good. IDPs and host
communities generally are cooperating with each, with some exceptions. Sources
of conflict include high rental and market prices, extended stays by IDPs in host
family homes, separate space for men and women, and cultural norms and
traditions. Some conflicts exist between IDPs and host communities with local
councils over perceived fairness in the provision of assistance.
The extended conflict has forced many people to use all their savings. The few
jobs that exist in agriculture or construction do not pay very much. Some market
owners, traders and landowners who are renting homes or space are making large
amounts of money.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 5
Socio-economic problems exist with poor people being unable to afford increased
rental prices and feeling wealthy people are charging too much.
Populations in camp settings are reported to be demoralized and frustrated by
encampment which has become untenable.
Continuing barriers to girls’ access to education in IDP camps resulting from
poverty, social customs, and changes brought about by the conflict. Women in
some areas have increased restrictions on movement, clothing, work and
interactions with non-family men. Divorced women also are discriminated against
due to conservative social customs, by being blamed for the divorce.
About the NGO Forum and Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
The NGO Forum is a coordination platform for international and Syrian NGOs providing
humanitarian assistance to populations affected by the Syria conflict in predominantly
northern Syria. Member organizations are mainly based in Gaziantep and Antakya, Turkey.
The Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit (HTAU) is a research unit of the NGO Forum for
NGOs Operating in Northern Syria.
The HTAU is a pilot initiative that is a continuous monitor or research project on the
affected population in Syria. The HTAU goals are 1) To inform humanitarian
programming in order to develop more effective humanitarian and protection responses;
and 2) To provide evidence for advocacy activities of the humanitarian community
operating throughout the region. As a continuous monitor, data collection, analysis and
reporting is a continual research process leading to monthly reports. HTAU data collection
started in June 2015. The HTAU is supported by the HTAU Advisory Group, comprised
of technical staff from five NGOs.
The HTAU is intended to meet a gap in the information needs of humanitarian
organizations working in Syria. There are currently about five standardized assessment
processes taking place on the affected population in Syria, but these highly-structured
assessments have various limitations. Unlike those assessments, the HTAU uses a
qualitative, semi-structured interviewing methodology that is both exploratory and
explanatory. The HTAU aims to complement, and not duplicate, the work of other Syrian
assessments.
The HTAU is designed as a pilot project to continually assess the methodology, and
quality and usefulness of the information being provided to humanitarian organizations.
One of the advantages of the qualitative methodology is its ability to respond to rapidly
changing contexts in Syria and information needs of humanitarian organizations.
Methodology
The HTAU follows systematic qualitative data collection, analysis and reporting protocols
to ensure the credibility of findings, and confidentiality and protection of information
sources. The methodology is available upon request. This report primarily covers Aleppo
and Idleb Governorates during the period of August 2015. The primary sources of
information are NGO staff and key informants working inside Syria in opposition-
controlled areas, due to lack of access to areas controlled by ISIS and the GOS. It was
based on 29 interviews of NGO staff and key informants in July 2015, averaging 43
minutes each. Data from interviews is supported by and triangulated with reports from
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 6
security organizations, cluster working group data, regional needs assessments, and
conflict analysis reports on Syria.
By its nature, the HTAU research focuses on the needs and problems of the affected Syrian
population, and not the humanitarian response: there is a tremendous amount of
humanitarian assistance work being done to meet their needs, but which is not documented
here. The HTAU analysis focuses on the affected population inside Syria, not on Syrian
refugees elsewhere. The affected population in Syria is defined as anyone who is impacted
by the armed conflict inside Syria: women, men, children, adolescents, elderly; people
killed, injured, displaced; people who had family members affected; besieged
communities; minority groups; host communities that are assisting people in need; and any
other group of people affected by the conflict in Syria.
The HTAU uses semi-structured interviews for most of its data collection due to the fact
the primary source of information is NGO staff and key informants in Syria. The semi-
structured interview methodology poses several questions to the interview subject (we used
the word source to describe interview subjects) and allows the source space to answer each
question as she or he sees best. Each source was asked the same general questions (see
Appendix A). However, responses often differ across sources. The open-ended question
format and space for divergent answers enables the exploratory nature of the HTAU
methodology: any possible issue for the affected population can be identified by sources.
The interviewer guides the general conversation and when the source describes issues that
are deemed important for the humanitarian response or advocacy, the interviewer asks
probing questions (who, what, when, where, how and why) to further clarify the issue.
This probing and clarification process enables the explanatory nature of the HTAU: the
detailed descriptions of how or why the affected population in Syria does what it is doing
support qualitative causal explanations of what is taking place.
The HTAU interview questions were developed after lengthy discussions with NGO
Forum stakeholders and guidance from the HTAU Advisory Group. All questions focus
on recent issues, within the last month, for the affected population. Questions explore the
most important problems, emerging issues and major changes for the affected population
inside Syria; their coping mechanisms; recent population movements; urgent humanitarian
needs; which groups are the most vulnerable; relationships between key groups; and
affected population satisfaction. Over time these interview questions change as the HTAU
clarifies certain patterns and trends for the affected population, and modifies its scope of
inquiry.
The actual data analysis for this report involved 29 interviews conducted in July 2015.
Sources include NGO staff and key informants who work inside Syria in Idleb and Aleppo
Governorates. Demographically, 5 interviews were with female sources and 24 were with
male sources; 13 sources work primarily in Idleb Governorate, 13 work primarily in
Aleppo Governorate, and 3 sources work in multiple governorates. These sources work in
the following sectors: monitoring and evaluation, protection, project management, non-
food items, and food security and livelihoods. The average time per interview was 42.4
minutes and average word count 2,124 words. Interviews are conducted in Arabic by
Syrian interviewers and transcribed to English. The text data from interviews is analyzed
using NVIVO data analysis software. NVIVO enables the data analyst to systematically
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 7
code the text from different sources
and identify patterns in the data.4
For confidentiality and anonymity
reasons, no citations are provided
from interview data. Primary source
data from interviews is supported by
secondary source data.
Figure 1: Proposed safe zone5
Public sources used to support and
triangulate interview data are cited.
Additional data and findings on the
Syrian affected population were
obtained from cluster working group
documents, local security reports,
recent needs and protection reports by NGOs, academic and research organizations such as
Institute for the Study of War, Carter Center, Brookings Institute, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Janes.com, and joshualandis.com/blog (see Appendix C). Secondary
sources are usually used only if they have been published in the last month.
As a pilot project using qualitative methods, its credibility is high (credibility reflects the
extent to which the findings would be believable from the perspective of the affected
population in Syria - see Lincoln and Guba 1985), given the detailed accounts of issues
facing the affected population. However, the methodology limits making generalizations
to larger populations and is susceptible to researcher and informant bias.
General Findings
Syrian armed conflict dynamics for July 2015
For most of Syria, there has been little change in the front lines between June and July, and
historically since early 2014. See Appendix D for publically available maps of the current
areas of control by armed groups in Syria and recent offensives. Areas that recently
changed control by armed groups include southern Idleb governorate and northern Aleppo
governorate. There is heavy fighting however in almost every governorate in Syria,
leading to large numbers of civilians killed or injured, and extensive population
displacements. According to a security source, GOS-initiated incidents rose from about
3,200 in June to 4,000 in July, while OAGs and ISIS started 1,000 to 1,100 actions during
the same period.
As we document in various sections of this report, the heavy fighting has a number of
consequences for the civilian population. For example, one health source estimates that
4 Due to space limitations, we cannot fully describe NVIVO coding and data analysis here. For a brief
summary see https://youtu.be/4crQbeHKhtk and https://youtu.be/z9RRAd70kuA. 5 Source: http://iswsyria.blogspot.com.tr/2015/07/turkey-expands-campaign-against-isis.html; See also
http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/07/30/no-turkish-safe-zone-in-syria/ie3u.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 8
there are 85 deaths per day or 2,550 deaths per month, and 15,300 to 20,400 injuries per
month, in Syria from the armed conflict. The fighting and GOS air attacks also impact
population displacement, emergency health services, and food, water, and shelter needs for
the affected population. Psychological trauma increases as well due to the heavy fighting.
One notable regional event was the attack by ISIS on Kurdish youth in Suruc, Turkey,
which led to widespread protests and violence in Turkey between the Turkish Government
and various Kurdish and leftist groups, with attacks spilling over into northern Syria as
well. Also, an international coalition and the Government of Turkey discussed the
potential establishment of a “safe zone” in Northern Syria (see Figure 1), which has
increased Turkish and coalition air attacks in northern Syria. Significant questions arise as
to what this “safe zone” entails and how it will be implemented. Regardless, the impact,
positive or negative, on humanitarian action and the protection of civilians will need to be
carefully monitored.
Figure 2: ISIS Gains and Losses, January to June 20156
For Idleb and
Aleppo
Governorates
there was heavy
fighting in July
2015 in southern
Idleb (Ariha area)
and northern
Aleppo (both
Azaz and
Khobane areas),
as well as combat
in northern Hama
governorate that
pushed IDPs
north into Idleb
Governorate and in other directions. See Appendix E for maps showing the recent areas of
control by armed groups.7 The GOS lost 16% of its territory in the first six months of
2015. ISIS lost 9.4% of its territory in Syria and Iraq in the first six months of 2015, but
losses in Aleppo and Ar Raqqa were offset by gains in Hama and Homs governorates (see
Figure 2). During July there was little change in the makeup of armed groups in Idleb and
Aleppo governorates.
According to an OCHA report (no date) on besieged and hard to reach areas, there are 137
areas that are besieged and hard to reach. Of these, 14 are besieged with an estimated total
people in need (PIN) of 440,000, and 123 are hard to reach with a total estimated PIN of
4,820,510. Per the OCHA report, there were 2 besieged areas in Aleppo Governorate with
6 Source: http://www.janes.com/article/53239/islamic-state-territory-shrinks-by-9-4-in-first-six-months-of-
2015?utm_campaign=PC6110_E15%20DF%20NL%20Security%2008_04_15&utm_medium=email&utm_s
ource=Eloqua
7 For more information on the conflict dynamics in Syria see http://iswsyria.blogspot.com.tr/.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 9
a PIN of 26,500 and 23 hard to reach areas with a PIN of 1,480,150. The two Shia villages
of Nubol and Al-Zahraa, Aleppo have been held by the GOS and besieged by OAGs for
two and a half years. Other sources note that the GOS-held towns of Kafrayya and Al-Fua,
Idleb are also populated by Shia minorities and besieged by OAGs.
Figure 3: Recent fighting in Idleb8
In July fighting continued in the
Furaykah (Frikeh), Idleb area between
OAGs and GOS forces creating
additional IDPs (see Figure 3). There
were 152,378 IDPs in Idleb governorate
as of June 30, and 181,078 IDPs
(32,148 households) as of July 30,9
most of whom fled north and west to
Lattakia and Idleb governorates. The
heavy fighting and humanitarian crisis
in Madiq Castle, Hama area has created
additional population movements, and
is mentioned here since many IDPs
moved north to Idleb Governorate.
Hama Governorate had 34,198 new
IDPs (6,403 households) as of July 22,
2015, but 21,100 of these IDPs went to
Idleb Governorate.10
The fighting around Azaz, Aleppo
between ISIS and OAGs lessened in
July after heavy fighting in June which
had created about 29,000 IDPs11 (see
Figure 4). The fighting that is
continuing in the Mare, Aleppo area is
localized, with ISIS and OAGs gaining
and losing limited territory. ISIS
reportedly launched over 100 missiles
at OAG positions in the Mare, Aleppo
area, which are inaccurate and
significantly affected the local population. Conflict between Jabhat Al Nusra and Kurdish
units at the end of July led to the obstruction of movement from Azaz district to Afrin
district, in Aleppo Governorate. On the eastern side of Aleppo Governorate in Ain Al-
Arab District, OAGs and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) continued pushing
ISIS forces west and south, creating more civilian displacement in that area.
8 Source: http://iswresearch.blogspot.com.tr/2015/06/control-in-syria-june-19-2015.html 9 Source: CCCM Cluster Syria – Idleb Governorate IDP tracking 30/07/2015 10 Source: CCCM Cluster Syria – Hama displacement draft 11 Source: CCCM Cluster Syria – Aleppo Governorate IDP Locations 19/06/2015
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 10
Figure 4: Map of front lines northern Aleppo Gov., August 15, 201512
While Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad has
denied the use of barrel
bombs by the GOS,13 a
July 12, 2015 interview
with a Syrian air force
pilot described in detail
how the Syria government
uses helicopters to drop
barrel bombs in Syria.14
According to a security
source, in July there was a
total of 947 barrel bomb
attacks nationwide, with
268 in Daraa, 170 in
Rural Damascus, 143 in
Idleb, 137 in Hama, and
110 in Aleppo
Governorate. Each barrel
bomb attack is one sortie
by a GOS air force
helicopter and comprises from 1 to 10 barrel bombs dropped on one location within one
hour. Ariha, Idleb was reportedly under air attacks every day. The June 2015 HTAU
report examined the human impact of barrel bomb attacks in more detail.
There was a detailed report alleging of the use indiscriminate cluster munitions - a new
type of bomb by the GOS air force in the fighting in the Madiq Castle, Hama area.15 The
bomb was described as a naval mine, but delivered cluster bomb munitions causing
considerable destruction and casualties in a wide area around the impact. The attack
supposedly caused 25 deaths and 80 injuries, mainly of women and children.
Interviews from July support the findings from June on areas that are safe from GOS air
attacks. Areas close to the Turkish border are generally safe from Syrian air attacks.
However, GOS air attacks increased in Darkoush, Harem, and Salquin areas in July,
rendering these areas hugely insecure for civilian populations and aid actors providing
assistance.16 IDPs seek out these secure areas when they have to move, and trade and
commerce are much more active. As described by various sources, people living closer to
the Turkish border are generally thinking more about housing, work, markets, development
12 The accuracy of front lines cannot be independently confirmed. Source
https://twitter.com/PetoLucem/status/632612311174377472/photo/1 13 Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327152 14 Source http://www.janes.com/article/52910/syrian-pilot-details-helicopter-operations 15 While current sources state they have not seen these naval mines before, the GOS used naval mines in
December 2012, although it is not clear if they are the same type of mine. See http://brown-
moses.blogspot.com.tr/2012/12/new-images-show-naval-mines-dropped-on.html 16 Exact number of air attacks are not available by district over time. But specific incident reports identify
more attacks occurring along the border areas.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 11
projects, schools, and normal life. People living closer to front lines, like Ariha, Jisr Al
Shughur and Aleppo City, are generally more concerned about air attacks, besiegement,
water, food, underground shelter, or emergency healthcare. People working in high risk
sectors which are targeted by GOS air attacks, like health care, are concerned about
surviving each day. While these general trends exist on the different concerns of people
living closer to frontlines or the border, in some cases people are reportedly moving away
from border areas due to increased GOS and coalition air attacks.
According to a reliable security source, noteworthy attacks in civilians and humanitarian
locations in July in Aleppo and Idleb governorates include:
On July 8, an explosion occurred near the Azaz City, Aleppo hospital, possibly
from an unmanned vehicle borne IED.
July 17 offensive by OAGs against the besieged, GOS-held towns of Kafrayya and
Al-Fua, Idleb.
On July 19 GOS air strike hit the Menbij City, Aleppo hospital, damaging the
Emergency Room and radiology departments, killing three people and leading to
cancelling of services.
July 26 start of an offensive by OAGs on the besieged, GOS-held towns of Nabul
and Zahraa, Aleppo. This offensive is in response to the GOS offensive against the
opposition-held Al-Zabadani, Rural Damascus area.
Offensives by opposition armed groups usually involve artillery, mortar and surface to
surface missile attacks on localized areas. The GOS response is usually artillery, missile
attacks, and air attacks by fixed wing aircraft and barrel bomb attacks using helicopters,
often against towns and public places in a wide area around the area of actual fighting.
ISIS regularly uses surface to surface missiles, body borne IEDs, and suicide vehicle IEDs.
All groups use various small arms.
Urgent humanitarian needs
Similar to the most urgent needs identified in the June HTAU report, the July HTAU
research found that protection and security needs - safety from direct violence by armed
groups - were as important as food, water, shelter, health care and other subsistence needs.
The lack of protection and security for the affected population leads to increased survival
needs, such as emergency health care, shelter and food, and the deprivation of services.
One of the interview questions asked the respondents to describe what they thought were
the most urgent humanitarian needs17 for the local affected population where they were
working. Based on their responses, the most urgent needs for the affected Syrian
population include (approximate priority of responses):
Protection and security from the various direct and indirect fire weapons, whether
air attacks, barrel bombs, artillery, surface to surface missiles, mortars, and small
arms fire.
Food aid. Large scale bread production was sporadic in some areas. Disrupted
harvests in Aleppo and Idleb governorates compound local food supply problems.
17 We define humanitarian needs in lay person’s terms: any protection, food, water, shelter, health and other
things needed by the local affected population to survive the armed conflict and humanitarian crisis.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 12
Potable water. Many people are in need of water given the hot weather and
difficulty accessing clean water.
Shelter: whether in buildings or tents.
Improved health services: both emergency services when casualties occur and care
for preventive and chronic illnesses.
Key non-food items (NFIs) in some camps, such as tents, mosquito nets, mattresses
and blankets.
Electricity and fuel. For all services, especially hospitals and pumping water.
Sanitation and sewage management.
Education for children: more classes, better curriculum, dedicated teachers.
The range of needs whilst extensive demonstrates the high levels of deprivation being
caused by adverse security conditions, and repeated violations against civilian populations.
Further information on these humanitarian needs can be found in the relevant sections of
this report.
Population movements and demographics
While some population movements took place in July, they were much less than during
June. According to the Turkey-based CCCM cluster, there were 469,586 IDPS in in
Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates in July. Of these, 197,303 were in Idleb, 34,198 in
Hama, and 28,645 in Aleppo. About 256,160 of these IDPS were displaced in June and
July 2015, with 197,303 of those IDPs coming from Idleb City and Jisr al Shughur.
The southern Idleb area, around Jisr Al-Shughur, and northern Lattakia Governorate, were
noted as being unstable, with some people moving out of their homes, while other sources
say that about 70-75% of population is returning to Jisr Al-Shughur. One source said local
councils in Madiq Castle, Hama reported 50,000 IDPs from that area and another 50,000
IDPs from Al Ghab area, with most of those IDPs moving in one night due to the lack of
warning of GOS bombing. Civilians were also reported as moving out of Darkoush,
Maaret Tamsrin, Ram Hamdan, and Benj, Idleb and Suran, El-Hosh, Kafra, Jareh, and
Sheikh Reeh, Aleppo. Some of the return movements in the Jisr Al-Shughur area may be
due to the frequent GOS bombing recently in border areas such as Darkoush; some IDPs
state that since it is not safe in the areas that they had moved to, they might as well go back
home. It is important to note that these are second or third movements for some IDPS, in
some cases to their home areas and in other cases to other unfamiliar areas. Also, one
source noted that many host families in the northern Hama and southern Idleb area are
poor farmers who are unable to provide much assistance.
A number of towns and villages have been completely or mostly evacuated due to fighting
between armed groups and bombing by the GOS. Sources described the following
demographics for various Aleppo and Idleb areas (note that this information was as of the
debriefing date, and the situation may have changed since then): Maaret Tamsrin was
almost empty; the Madiq Castle area was 75-80% empty; and Darkoush was almost empty,
with inhabitants moving to nearby villages of Hamama, Kila and Hazan.
A number of tools are used by local populations to stay informed about upcoming attacks,
including social media and local watchers. Some villages and towns reportedly empty out
as often as twice a week due to these threats, such as in Jisr-Al-Shugur and Kafr Takharim,
Idleb. There appear to be two types of targets away from front lines in Idleb and Aleppo
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 13
Governorate: JAN headquarters is being targeted by coalition forces and public spaces are
being targeted by GOS. Local populations sometimes move away from JAN positions and
GOS targets when warned.
Some of the population movements in Aleppo governorate are due to OAGs moving
civilians away from areas of expected fighting. There is continuing concern of a large
population movement from Aleppo City due to intensifying conflict between ISIS, GOS
and OAGs. One concern with a large scale Aleppo City besiegement is that the terrain in
the area is very rocky, so no tunnels could be built to provide food and fuel. More
population movements are expected in southern Idleb and Hama Governorates due to
expected heavy fighting between OAGs, GOS and ISIS, with as many as 600,000 families
(90% of the local population) moving north soon, although this estimate is not confirmed
by other sources.
Several sources mentioned that the most of the affected population believe that travel to
Turkey is not possible, due to people being shot while crossing the border. Many IDPs
appear to be moving to villages close to their home towns, because recent attacks are such
that they can often return home within a few days. The desire to return home as soon as
possible is also due to the fear of being robbed while gone.
Sectoral Findings
Protection and threats to physical safety
Supporting the findings from the June 2015 HTAU report, the need for more protection
and security for the affected population was frequently noted by sources, about as
often as other sectoral needs like food, shelter, water and health. In response to interview
questions about the most important issues for the affected population and most important
humanitarian needs, security concerns as a threat to access to services, movement, and
physical safety arose throughout the interviews.
As mentioned previously in the summary on the armed conflict, many civilians have been
affected by fighting between the armed groups and GOS air attacks. Some towns and
villages have been evacuated due to the fighting or threats of GOS air attacks. Some local
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks occurred in public places such as Azaz, Idleb,
which normally do not have such violence. This has reduced population movements on
local streets and at markets.
On local issues, in Idleb Governorate, Jisr Al Shughur, Janudiyeh, and Darkoush were
cited as being under attack and a threat to civilian safety. For example, the barrel bombing
in Jisr Al Shughur was described as random and continuous. In the recent ISIS attack on
Khobane, Aleppo, ISIS fighters barricaded themselves in a NGO hospital and then killed a
number of civilians using snipers and IEDs. In both Aleppo and Idleb Governorates some
people have expressed concern about the reckless behavior of younger fighters, whether
carrying their weapons or driving fast.
Sources note that weapons are much more prevalent in Syria, even in the IDP camps like
Qah, and disputes sometimes end in shootings and killings.
Most vulnerable groups
Some of the groups of people who were identified by sources as being most at risk include
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 14
besieged populations, children, women, disabled persons, and some men. Some NGOs are
conducting household and community level surveys on protection issues, but no recent
protection reports have been published.
One group at extreme risk are the people who live in besieged or hard to access areas, such
as parts of Aleppo City. According to one source, these people do not move because it is
an act of defiance to show they have some control over their lives yet, or because they lack
the resources to move. In some cases poor, besieged families will send part of the family
north to safety and then they send money back to the rest of the family to help them move
to safety. Many of these people are being killed or injured by air strikes, artillery or
missiles.
Children are at risk for various reasons. Some children, usually boys over age 12, but
some as young as 8 to 11, are working to support their families in commercial markets, on
farms, in metal shops, welding, collecting trash and selling candy. Child labor supposedly
is more prevalent in rural Hama and Lattakia Governorates, because children age 12 are
often treated as adults. It is uncertain as to whether children age 12-13, especially boys,
traditionally start working at such ages, and if so, in what types of work; as well as what
impact the armed conflict and increasing poverty has on child labor.
In some Idleb areas parents are taking their children out of school due to the threat of air
attacks. Some young children are extremely traumatized, running to hide whenever they
hear an airplane. There was a report of armed groups indoctrinating youth ages 15 to 16,
teaching them that the armed group was more important than anyone else, even their own
family. Corporal punishment of children is supposedly a traditional and common method
for parents to discipline their children, but one source said it is occurring more frequently
now. Children may be beaten with hands or sticks.
There is conflicting information on orphans. Some sources say they are usually taken care
of by their extended family, due to a strong social customs. Other sources state that
orphans are being taken to Turkey and separated from their families. Supposedly there are
no NGOs in Syria working with orphans. One source said that 60,000 children have lost
their fathers, meaning that there are 20,000 female headed households18.
Women are at risk for several reasons. Some women are reportedly demoralized and
traumatized by the conflict, due to the violence and increased pressures on women –
women headed households, lack of access to education for children, etc. Female headed
households exist for several reasons – widowed or divorced, or their husbands are
detained, fighting with an armed group, or looking for work in Turkey. These female
headed households are more at risk due to increased difficulties in movement, gaining
income and accessing basic resources. In some cases women who lost their husbands or
the husband was missing were unable to confirm the deaths of their husbands, and
therefore were not able to get humanitarian aid. A source expressed concern that women
leading female headed households have become accustomed to begging for aid, lack
psychosocial support, and have few options within the traditional Syrian society. Also,
second marriages are not widely accepted in the Syria culture, so when they do occur the
18 It is unclear as to the original source for this estimate, which geographical area is covered, and if the ratio
of children to households is accurate. In recent population movements in Idleb the average household size is
about 5.6 persons, and some of these IDP households are missing one parent.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 15
new husbands often reject the woman’s children from the previous marriage. The mother
than sometimes abandons the children or sends them to live with her parents. This practice
significantly affects the emotional stability of the children, and, since the grandparents
often have few resources themselves, the children are more likely to have to work or join
armed groups to survive, according to the source
In Aleppo Governorate it is difficult for women to file complaints due to social customs,
according to one source. Women are afraid of relatives or neighbors seeing them complain
and then causing problems. Sources noted that Syrian women area sometimes harassed by
men, such as during population displacements or walking on the streets, although the
harassment appears to be more social and less sexual. Such harassment appears to occur
more often from armed groups and less from civilians. Sources stated that a few cases of
men and women who committed adultery were taken to sharia court and ended with death
by stoning for the woman.
The issue of marriage for single, divorced or widowed women is complicated and
problematic. Many sources have mentioned that widowed or divorced women often have
to remarry to have someone help her meet her needs and those of her children. In some
cases, men ask poor or IDP women to marry them. In some cases, girls from poor families
are being asked to marry by older men. The women and girls sometimes accept the
marriage proposals, because they don’t know of any other option to meet their needs.
Sources differ on whether these marriages are helping the women or taking advantage of
them. Culturally, Syrian men may believe that marriage may provide assistance and
protection for the woman. However, concerns exist about the problem of women being
dependent on men for support and the inability for women to find sustainable, independent
employment and living conditions.
Female NGO staff are at risk from conservative OAGs. One female NGO staff person was
questioned on a recent trip through a border crossing point, even though she was wearing a
head scarf and long coat, because her face was still visible and she did not have a muhram
with her. The female NGO worker had previously had a worse experience with the same
OAG. To respond to these problems female staff may put on more conservative clothing.
Men working in transportation, especially those moving across front lines, are at risk.
Several drivers were killed transporting fuel across the ISIS-OAG front line.
Several sources noted the risks for disabled people, who often need extra assistance during
movements, in IDP camps, and with healthcare and daily living. Injured people are at risk,
since they are unable to do many basic tasks, such as requesting or picking up aid in the
IDP camps.
Ethnic or religious minority groups are at risk and concerned about their future, according
to one source. In Aleppo City, most of the Christians fled to Lebanon, but a few are still in
the city. Similarly, about 15% of the Aleppo City population is Kurdish, many of whom
have moved to Kurdish areas of Aleppo. There are also some Armenian communities in
Aleppo. The source noted that most of the minorities groups are living in GOS-controlled
areas. There are a few (about seven) Druze villages in rural Idleb, who have not been
discriminated against, according to the source.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 16
IDP Camp issues
In July sources reported a variety of issues for people living in IDP camps in Idleb and
Aleppo Governorates. According to the Turkey-based CCCM cluster, there were 246
camps or settlements in Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates with a total population of
209,440. Of these IDPs, about 20,000 are living in 110 collective shelters, which are
usually mosques or schools. Most of the IDPs are receiving some form of humanitarian
assistance from NGOs: 81% of their NFI, water and waste removal needs are covered, 80%
of sanitation, 75% of food, 46% of shelter, 9% of health and 4% of education. The CCCM
cluster has a mechanism in place to verify new IDP camps are actually housing IDPs and
to start services to those camps, if resources are available: about 5 new camps were
confirmed in Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates in July 2015. Additional information
related to IDP camps can be found in the Shelter section of this report. Most notably, IDP
camps appear to be the last option for families, and only the poorest people or people with
few relatives or friends in safe areas stay in the camps. People are in need of tents,
blankets, clothes, mosquito nets, water, non-food items and latrines.
Sources noted that due to the large number of IDPs from June and newly arrived IDPs
from July, some IDPs still need tents and shelter in the camps. In some cases there are two
or three families in one tent. When the tents are crowded, sometimes the men will sleep
outside and the women and children inside the tents. There were reports of some IDPs
being turned away from camps that were full, such as Al-Salam camp. It appears as
though more IDP camps in Idleb Governorate are full, while Aleppo Governorate camps
have some capacity yet, according to sources. In special cases, like with widowed women,
camp managers make exceptions and find space, even when the camp is full. One source
noted that when camps are full new arrivals may be given tents outside the camp until
space is available for additional IDPs inside the camp.
In some camps water is being supplied by tanker trucks. IDPs pay camp staff who
purchase a tank of water which will be shared by about 50 families. One tank lasts about
one week.
In some cases in Idleb Governorate where the local councils do not distribute aid fairly,
NGOs work with independent local associations to deliver aid. These associations are
made up of volunteers trusted by the affected population. There were a few reports of
corruption by camp managers, although other reports exist of camp managers being fair
and providing a wide range of services to needy families. One source stated that NGO
staff were asked to pay 15% of their salary to one camp manager to cover camp costs.
Another source noted that there is a common belief that most positions in the camps are
held by relatives of the camp manager.
Due to the recent fighting near camps in the Azaz, Aleppo area, some IDPs temporarily left
the IDP camps until it was safe to return. Some IDPs left camps in Idleb Governorate to
return home due to security issues or feeling humiliated. It is unclear as to what extent
these movements are taking place.
One source noted that informal camps exist in the Salquin, Idleb area with about 500
families.19 These camps have not received much humanitarian assistance. There were two
19 In some cases NGOs may not be providing assistance to IDP camps due to issues with security or
manipulation by armed groups.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 17
reports that the camps in Atmeh, Al-Karama, and other Idleb areas receive more resources
than IDP camps in Lattakia. Reasons for the lack of aid to the Lattakia Governorate camps
included the fact that they were smaller, bad roads in the mountains, higher fuel costs, lack
of NGOs working in the area, and NGO skepticism about some IDP camps, since some
camps were supposedly falsified to get aid (just tents with no IDPs).
Shelter and non-food items
There were continued reports of the need for shelter, non-food items, fuel and electricity in
Idleb and Aleppo Governorates. People are in need of tents, blankets, clothes, mosquito
nets and mattresses, latrines, and summer and winter clothes. Several sources mentioned
that most of the IDP camps are full, so IDPs have to look for shelter elsewhere. A variety
of people, including host families, local councils and NGOs, are providing shelter to IDPs
and other people in need.
In Idleb Governate there were a number of reports of IDPs who are staying in tents along
the road between Dana and Sarmada. IDPs are sleeping in their cars or trucks, in caves or
under trees. There were reports of problems with snakes and spiders for people sleeping
outside or in caves. In some villages near Harem, Idleb, people have built rooms or shelter
in the fields and when attacks are forecasted, they quickly go to these shelters outside the
villages.
Due to the high rental prices, IDPs try to stay with relatives or in schools, or just rent one
room in a house. As a last resort they go to IDP camps. For IDPs in Salquin, Idleb, the
large number of IDPs has increased demand for rentals, with apartment rentals costing as
much as US$200, or SP40,000-50,000 per month.20 In the Al-Dana, Idleb area apartment
rentals cost from SP25,000-75,000 per month. The cheapest apartments in Azaz, Aleppo
cost SP10,000-15,000 per month according to one source. Some sources believe the prices
landlords are charging for rental units are excessive.
For some IDPs who lived in cities such as Idleb City, the adjustment to living in tents or
camps is very difficult, driving some to return to their homes early, even when not
completely safe, according to one source. Many houses in Idleb City are reportedly
destroyed. These IDPs simply were not used to living without electricity, water, and other
basic comforts. Some IDPs even rejected fully equipped camps, instead choosing to live
with relatives in other places.
In July 2015 the United Nations UNITAR UNOSAT program published damage
assessments for Idleb City, Aleppo City, Deir e Zor City, Daraa City, and Ar Raqqa City,
based on analysis by REACH. A summary is below. While not done for this report, and
analysis and overlay of front lines showing GOS and OAG–held areas, and impacts from
GOS aerial bombing and OAG artillery strikes would be valuable to determine which
armed groups are causing most of the damage, and the associated deaths, injuries and
displacement to civilian populations.
20 While the official exchange rate of Syrian pound to the US dollar was 241 at report time, the black market
rate was about 300.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 18
Table 1: Number of damaged structures for selected cities21
City Last assessment
date
Structures
completely
destroyed
Structures
severely
damaged
Structures
moderately
damaged
Total structures
damaged
Aleppo City, May 1, 2015 2,878 6,879 4,277 14,034
Deir e Zor City, May 10, 2015 534 1,144 1,738 3,416
Khobane Jan. 22, 2015 1,206 1,169 872 3,247
Ar Raqqa City, May 29, 2015 842 251 508 1,601
Daraa City, June 4, 2015 133 365 468 966
Idleb City, April 6, 2015 176 179 189 544
A map of damage intensity for the cities of Homs, Aleppo, Hama, Deir e Zor, Ar Raqqa,
and Daraa can be found in the Appendix F. The intensity of the damage in Homs, Aleppo,
Hama, and Deir e Zor is notable.
NGOs continue to provide non-food items to many people in need. According to sources,
non-food items that are needed include tents, blankets, mattresses, bed nets, and summer
and winter clothes. There were reports about confusion over which NGOs would deliver
which non-food items in some areas in Idleb Governorate. This led to some eligible
beneficiaries not receiving their food baskets or vouchers. The problem may be due to the
quick distribution and lack of advance warning by NGOs for local beneficiaries, leading
some beneficiaries to be unaware of the pending distribution and missing their allotment,
according to sources.
Fuel and electricity
In July the transfer of fuel resumed from ISIS-controlled areas to opposition-controlled
areas in Aleppo and Idleb, in exchange for food, after blockages in June that caused
considerable harm to the affected population and humanitarian response. The amount of
fuel being imported and its effect on fuel prices are not clear, although fuel prices appear to
be much higher than before June 2015.
In some areas fuel prices are four times higher than they were before the June fuel shortage
started, according to a source that tracks local market prices. In Tell Rifaat, Aleppo
partially refined fuel prices have risen from SP10,000 to SP100,000 per barrel, when
available. Natural gas prices in Khobane, Aleppo have dropped from SP7,000 to SP2,000
per tank since Khobane residents have stopped getting natural gas from Turkish suppliers
and started getting it from Syrian suppliers.
The availability and cost of fuel significantly affects a wide range of goods and services,
including electricity, water, food production and storage, education, health care, as well as
the general quality of life in the hot, 35 degree Celsius weather in Syria. Poorer people are
especially impacted by rising fuel prices. Some people have resorted to kerosene or wood
for cooking.
The availability of electricity appears to be reducing. Some locations, such as Idleb City,
have not had electricity for six months according to one source. Many sources noted
reduced hours of electricity service, usually from gas or diesel generators. Electricity is
21 Sources: all maps can be found at http://www.unitar.org/unosat/maps/SYR
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 19
now limited to 7 to 11 pm in some areas of Idleb governorate, which has led to more
human suffering from the heat and more food spoilage. Meat, dairy products, fruits and
vegetables are spoiling fast due to the lack of electricity for refrigeration. The cost of
electricity has increased due to fuel shortages, rising from SP2,000 to SP8,000 per ampere,
according to one source. Each family may buy from 2 to 5 amperes; one ampere will turn
the lights one; two amperes will run the lights, refrigerator, and car battery charger. Some
residents charge car batteries to use for running lights when there is no electricity.
Food security and livelihoods
FAO-WFP produced the 2015 Syria Crop and Food Security Assessment, which
summarizes the current agriculture situation in Syria. In general, rainfall this year has been
higher than average throughout Syria. However, the armed conflict has reduced the area of
planting and harvesting; fuel prices increased significantly; shortages exist of seed,
fertilizers, and labor; irrigation canals, pumps and farm machinery are damaged; and some
crops have been intentionally burned. Current cereal availability is 2,945,000 tons for
wheat and 968,000 tons for barley; total demand for wheat is 4,854,000 tons for wheat and
2,502,000 tons for barley; shortfalls for wheat are 1,909,000 tons and for barley 1,534,000
tons. The GOS is expected to import some of these shortfalls in wheat and barley.
Table x: Syria agriculture production in 201522
Crop/item 10 year average 2015 yield
Wheat and barley production area (million hectares) 3.0 2.17
Total wheat production (million tons) 4.1 2.4
Wheat yield per hectare 2.4 2.2
Total barley production (1,000 tons) 773 968
Barley yields per hectare 0.9 0.59
Food production is generally down and market prices are up, according to FAO-WFP data.
Sugar beet production is down to 29,000 tons from 1,700,000 tons in 2007. Olive
production is down by 60%. Since 2011 poultry stocks are down by 50%, sheep and goats
by 40% and cattle by 30%, due to premature slaughter and slaughter of breeding stock.
There is 500,000 tons of grain in stock, mostly in Al Hasakeh Governorate. Most food
prices have risen considerably from 2014 to 2015: wheat by 12%, rice by 32%, public
bread by 87%, bread shops by 66%, lentils by 47%, sugar by 39%, and cooking oil by
14%. Also diesel has increased by 108% and butane gas by 61%. The people who are
most vulnerable to food security are people in besieged areas, IDPs, poor people, and
unemployed people, according to FAO-WFP.
According to various sources, humanitarian food distribution varies considerably, from
twice a month to once every 3 to 6 months. The contents of food baskets varies, but
usually includes nonperishable items such as rice, wheat, sugar, pasta, and cooking oil.
Some beneficiaries have requested less pasta and rice, but food security guidelines require
specific amounts of those products. Some NGOs conduct surveys of the affected
population to see which items they would like to have in the food baskets, and attempt to
provide the desired foods, unless limited by donor rules. Whenever the local markets are
functioning sufficiently, NGOs attempt to provide vouchers so beneficiaries can purchase
22 Source FAO-WFP http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp276608.pdf
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 20
what they need most. One source noted that food was available in local markets, but it was
getting more expensive.
In some places in Idleb Governorate, bread, a key staple in the Syrian diet, was difficult to
obtain. In Atmeh, Idleb bread was hard to get and cost SP200, due to the local bakery
being closed. Some people in that area are trying to make their own bread. Population
increases in Azaz, Aleppo has increased the demand for bread, putting more pressure on
bakeries. There is concern about being besieged in Aleppo City, with just a one month
supply of flour and few other sources of food locally, although some people are planting
gardens on their roof tops.
There were many reports of people being unemployed and unable to find work. This has
led to a reliance on humanitarian assistance. Several sources expressed concern about the
affected population becoming accustomed to begging for assistance. Several reports
commented on the high levels of poverty among the affected population, including both
IDP and local families. Even with the high unemployment, it is difficult to fill many civil
and NGO positions with qualified employees, since most qualified workers have left Syria
already, according to some sources.
In general there was limited information on women and livelihoods in the July data
collection. One source noted that some Bedouin women from Hama are going to Qah,
Idleb area markets to work or sell goods. One informed respondent noted that women
respond differently in different areas. In the northern Idleb Governorate area women who
were poor, widowed, divorced or had missing husbands were sometimes forced into
working, often in farm fields, sometimes with their teenage daughters. The practice
generally goes against social customs but is necessitated now to shore up household
incomes. Additionally, female heads of households and mothers are frequently required to
leave children for significant periods of time to tend to fields and trade goods. In other
areas, it may be more common for the woman to remarry to get her basic needs met, or for
poor families to offer their daughters for marriage to wealthier men.
Some sources mentioned that men and boys over age 13 or 14 are trying to go to Turkey to
find work to support their families. However, with the border being closed, it is unclear
how many are able to cross to Turkey. A number of reports said that older children, ages
14 to 17, are more likely to be working.
In some areas near the Asi (Orontes) River in Idleb Governorate agriculture is working
well, including irrigation systems. Local farmers in the Qah, Idleb area are paying about
SP50 per hour to IDPs to work their lands, but the pay is so low that most IDPs refuse to
work for that amount, according to one source. In the Mare, Aleppo area many of the
factories are closed, reducing reemployment opportunities.
There is considerable construction work available in safer parts of Idleb Governorate, as
new residential buildings increase. Some men are working in informal oil refineries in
Aleppo Governorate as well. Trade and commerce is active in some areas of Idleb and
Aleppo Governorates. In Salquin, Idleb shops are open and people are selling goods in the
streets. Sources noted that those shops that are open are often making a lot of money due
to the increased demand from IDPs. Reportedly businessmen must align with an armed
group to continue to work or flee the country. Even with the higher level of trade in these
areas, one source noted that only 10% of the population was working in trade, 30%
working as farmers, and 60% were unemployed.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 21
The lack of security from GOS air attack in the Azaz, Aleppo area creates significant
problems for building employment and access to markets: any populated center or bazaar
is subject to targeting by the GOS. One proposed solution is building a small market near
some IDP camps which will be relatively safer and more accessible for IDPs. Local IDPs
could occasionally find work as porters at the Bab Al Salam border crossing.
Some sources noted the need for more livelihood projects, so as to increase employment
and income generation so the affected population would be more self-sufficient. For this
reason the affected population would like to have local micro-enterprise projects, such as
bakeries, metal working, carpentry, sewing, poultry farms, potato farms, and other
agriculture projects, and waste management. Some construction and reconstruction
projects help support livelihoods, but there are not enough for the people who are looking
for work. For example, one project requested by the affected population along the Asi
River was to build irrigation canals so the people could produce their own food. Some
sources noted that employment would also increase self-esteem for IDPs and reduce
domestic conflict by easing the burden on women. One source noted the need for good
safety studies prior to implementing any projects, to ensure the project is feasible and safe
for the affected population.
Nutrition
Several sources mentioned cases of mothers and children with anemia, due to the lack of
protein and fresh fruits and vegetables in the diet. IDPs are sometimes selling part of their
food basket to purchase more meat and fruit.
One source noted that the affected population is often asking for infant formula, but that
some NGOs refuse to provide it. One reason was that infant formula goes bad quickly in
the hot weather. Instead, some NGOs reinforce the importance of breast feeding and try to
provide cultural appropriate foods for breastfeeding women, like groats and other enriched
foods. Infant formula is available in some markets, but is very expensive. As an
alternative, some mothers who are unable to breastfeed are giving their babies rice water
with yeast, according to a source.
Health
As mentioned in the June HTAU report and the section on the Armed Conflict Dynamics,
GOS air attacks on hospitals, clinics and ambulances have had a major impact on the
availability and safety of medical services. Such attacks especially impact hospital
personnel. One informed health source estimates that there are 85 civilian deaths per day
or 2,550 deaths per month, and using a co-efficient of 6 to 8 to determine injuries,23
estimate that there are 15,300 to 20,400 injuries per month in Syria. It is unclear if these
death and injury estimates are increasing, decreasing or staying the same over time.
Medical treatment depends on the severity of the injury, as in the case of Madiq Castle,
Hama fighting. Minor injuries may be treated at local medical centers (sometimes called
cold case hospitals) and then transferred to safer places close by. More serious injuries,
like amputations, may also be done at the local medical center, and then the victim would
23 Normally a co-efficient of 4-5 is used to determine injuries in armed conflicts (4 to 5 injuries for each
death). However, due to the unique armed conflict dynamics and intentional targeting of civilians, the injury
rate is higher in the Syrian conflict.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 22
be transported to a small, convalescent center in Maarat Al Numan District, Idleb that has
special resources for more serious injuries. Other sources mentioned that serious cases
usually have to be transferred to Turkish hospitals, due to the lack of specialists and
equipment in Syria to deal with major trauma. One source noted that in some cases
patients don’t die from the injury caused by the bombing or fighting, but instead die from
poor treatment and lack of trained staff.
During the rapid evacuations by IDPs, people who have asthma and diabetes have been at
risk, with some asthmatics suffocating during the hectic evacuations and diabetics having
problems storing their medicines in cool places. Other medicines, like eye drops and baby
suppositories, which require refrigeration are also going bad quickly due to the hot
weather, and lack of electricity and cool storage. The health needs of disabled persons
was identified as being a major challenge. In addition to special medicine and equipment,
like prosthetics, that may be needed, the person may need frequent extra care with
bandages. Both population movements and living in temporary shelters are difficult for
disabled people. Their families are also stressed by these responsibilities.
Chronic diseases are another problem for the affected population in Syria. Some people
ages 30 to 50 are suffering from chronic diseases like diabetes, ulcers, and high blood
pressure, partly due to stress and depression caused by the armed conflict, according to one
medical source. One source in Aleppo Governorate noted the widespread lack of medicine
to treat chronic diseases like cancer, heart disease, and eye and kidney problems. Pain
medicine is difficult to get as well. Many patients with chronic illnesses are also unable to
cross onto Turkey to get medical treatment. Some people with chronic diseases have
difficulty accessing needed services at hospitals near Bab Al-Hawa or Bab Al-Salam.
According to one source, in the Idleb and Aleppo areas there is no specialized equipment
for dealing with neurological problems, and limited optometry and ophthalmological
services in Hama, Aleppo and Lattakia. In the Azaz, Aleppo area, the most common
problems are Leishmaniosis in the summer, due to the polluted water, and asthma in the
winter, due to smoke from stoves.
One hospital manager in the Azaz, Aleppo area mentioned that he is not being asked what
medicine or medical equipment he needs. Instead, the NGOs send whatever medicine they
think the hospital needs. Then local hospitals have to search for the correct medicine at
other local hospitals to treat specific illnesses. Another medical provider noted that in
some cases Syrian medical providers are using second and third generation antibiotics for
initial infection cases, which can have harmful effects for antibiotic-resistant diseases.
Supposedly hospitals received some fuel supplies in July.
One of the most serious medical needs is for qualified doctors and nurses. Most of the
Syrian doctors have been killed or left the country. There was just one female
gynecologist for a population of 60,000 near Azaz, Aleppo. According to one source, there
are many deaths from problems during child birth and the lack of specialists to deal with
those problems.
Many sources, including one in the mental health field, noted that there is a general
psychological depression, helplessness, fatigue and lack of concentration in the Syrian
affected population. Many people are exhibiting signs of post-traumatic stress disorder
and acute discontent, including young children. Some children are also exhibiting learning
disabilities and irritability. Women and children are more focused on helicopter or missile
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 23
attacks than their own needs and families.
Some camps have medical clinics in or near the camps – usually there is one medical clinic
for a cluster of camps. These clinics provide basic first aid and medicine. However, one
informed source working with camp clinics near Azaz, Aleppo criticized the camp clinics
for not providing even basic services to IDPs. Instead, many simple cases are taken to
other larger clinics. Urgent cases in IDP camps must go to nearby hospitals. Camp
managers usually provide transportation to hospitals when needed.
A number of sources mentioned that there are strong biases against using Turkish
medicines by many Syrians, who believe the Turkish medicines are not effective. One
source from the health sector said the biases were started by pro-GOS groups to create
conflict within the civilian community.
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Water has been in high demand due to the heat in July and lack of electricity for water
pumps. Water costs have risen due to increased demand, the lack of electricity for
pumping water, and the increased price of fuel. Most sources said that water is supplied by
tanker trucks, but it is unclear where the trucks are getting the water from or if the normal
water systems are working in some of the larger or safer towns. One source noted that
water is being pumped from existing wells to small reservoirs, but this appears to be a local
solution for one IDP camp.
There were many reports of civilians getting sick from untreated water. The lack of
potable water has also led to hygiene and other health problems. The water quality in
Aleppo City was noted as being very bad, with 50% of the people drinking non-potable
water. While many beneficiaries are receiving chlorine tablets, some are not using the
tablets. One source said there were no laboratories available in northern Syria for water
testing.
As noted earlier, about 81% of IDP camps receive free water from NGOs. One source said
that the price for a tank of water rose from SP1,500 to SP5,000 recently. In Salquin, Idleb
a family may pay as much as SP10,000 for water per month. In one Idleb camp, camp
staff collect SP2,000 each from 50 families and then purchase a tank of water; when
empty, they repeat the process. In Maarat Misrin, Idleb, 10 barrels of water cost SP1,800.
The high price of water led to protests in the Al-Karama IDP camp.
The lack of water appears to be more of a problem in urban than rural areas, since the rural
population is more likely to have a local well. One Idleb Governorate source noted that
water is usually the responsibility of the local council, but they have little money for
digging wells, providing equipment or electricity for pumping water, or paying salaries of
municipal workers. Each area has its own unique water needs. Some local councils and
NGOs are working to dig more wells throughout Aleppo and Idleb governorates, according
to the Turkey-based WASH cluster.
The town of Salquin, Idleb, is having problems with garbage disposal, since the previous
landfill in a nearby village has been closed because it is full. In one Idleb camp cluster
sanitation problems have increased as garbage removal has been reduced from twice a day
to once every two or three days. Some camps have open sewage ditches running through
the camps. The increased garbage and sewage problems have led to more flies and
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 24
mosquitos. There were a number of reports of the deteriorating water and sanitation
situation in some camps due to one NGO that recently stopped working in the area because
of access issues with local OAGs. Access to water, sewage management and waste
management problems have all increased significantly during this shutdown by the NGO.
In some areas, the large amount of building construction is creating considerable dust and
debris. At the same time, some of the towns that have new residential construction lack
the road, water and sewage infrastructure to support more residences.
Education
Various problems exist in the education sector in Idleb and Aleppo Governorates.
Problems include teachers quitting or changing positions, schools not having supplies and
equipment, students changing locations, and IDPs using schools for shelters. More
elementary schools are functioning than high schools, with high schools functioning more
in the larger cities than rural areas. One problem is the lack of specialized teachers and
resources for middle and high schools, and universities, with many schools relying on
volunteers to function. Various sources noted children may be behind three grade levels in
their learning, for various reasons.
It was reported that many children in the Sarmada, Idleb area are not attending school
because families are afraid of GOS air attacks. Supposedly most children just stay at
home, but about 5% of the children, mainly young boys ages 11 to 12, are working. In
Harem and Darkoush, Idleb about 70% of the children are reportedly attending school.
Some schools in these areas are being used to house IDPs. In one case, the IDPs were
moved to a local IDP camp so the school could be used for learning. In another case, one
floor of the school is used for housing IDPs and the other floor for teaching children.
According to the CCCM cluster data for July, only about 4% of the education needs were
being met in the camps. While many sources stated that schools were not functioning or
that those that were functioning were just providing entertainment activities (songs) for the
children, one source said that 85-90% of children in the IDP camps are in school. Schools
in the Atmeh and Al-Karama (Idleb) camp clusters are running normally, although details
are limited. Only two or three schools remain functional in the Khobane, Aleppo area,
with the rest damaged by the heavy fighting. In the Atarib, Aleppo area only about 30% of
children are attending school, according one source. Due to the risk of GOS air attacks, in
Aleppo City some schools have been moved to traditional Arabic houses.
Girls are sometimes kept out of school since parents are concerned about daughters
attending school with strangers; in their home villages the parents knew everyone, so it
was not a problem there. Girls reportedly want to go to school, but are prevented by these
social customs. In smaller IDP camps, this problem is less of an issue, because parents
know more of the local residents. One reason children are not attending school is due to
the fear of diseases.
Many sources expressed significant concern about the lack of educational opportunities
and poor quality of education for Syrian children and youth. Some concerns exist about
the quality of the education – sometimes classroom activities are more like entertainment
than education. Many adults believe there will be a lost generation. This concern reflects
the high value placed on education in the Syrian culture.
Generally schools have no civil government supervision, since most local councils in
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 25
opposition-held areas lack the resources to supervise schools. Curriculum differs in each
town or IDP camp, depending on the teachers, administrators, local councils, NGO and
armed groups. The local council in Azaz, Aleppo has implemented a strong administrative
structure for education, including positive curriculum changes, according to one source.
There are several issues with teachers, including not showing up for work and the skill
level of volunteer teachers. Some sources expressed concern about educators avoiding
their duties, attending school only one day per week. Since teachers are not regularly in
school, some parents keep the children home all the time. Some teachers in southern Idleb
governorate quit their jobs after the recent fighting there. Many teachers also lost their
income because the GOS lost control of the area where their school was located, and now
they cannot collect their salaries without crossing frontlines. Some teachers are going to
GOS-held areas in Hama and Aleppo to get paid. NGOs are working to establish a
coordinated pay scale for educators, with one NGO paying teachers US$25 per month.
Affected Population Issues
Affected population coping mechanisms
In the previous sections we have identified a number of responses by the affected
population to the armed conflict. These include population movements, searching for and
sharing shelter, tents and houses, actions to find and obtain food, water and other essential
items, and responses to larger problems like the lack of electricity, fuel, sewage, and
sanitation. Some coping mechanisms are more positive than others for long term
development and empowerment of the Syrian affected population. The varied responses of
women and adolescent girls to meeting their needs, adjusting to social customs and staying
safe are noted throughout this report.
Various actions appear to be occurring to support protection of civilians. There is a social
media network that appears to provide warnings of air or ground attacks in certain areas.
Unfortunately, there were no social media warnings for the heavy bombing in Madiq
Castle and Muhradah, Hama on July 8, according to local sources. One set of responses is
continually watching of the sky for airplanes and helicopters, and then fleeing to safe
places when they are seen or heard.
The affected population is also making accommodations for other needs. They are
growing and making their own food, such as grinding wheat and making their own bread.
Several sources noted that some food basket recipients are responding to their immediate
needs buy selling some food items so they can purchase other needed goods like medicine.
While not documented much in this report, the affected population is also managing health
care to the best of their abilities, whether taking care of people who are injured, disabled or
treating diarrhea, lice, scabies, and local diseases. It is unclear how the affected population
is dealing with the psychological trauma from the violence and stress. Many people in the
affected population are also looking for work, including adolescents and children in some
cases. The interest in micro-enterprise projects noted in the livelihoods sections is another
coping mechanism for employment. Also, many Syrians are working to support education
programs, whether traditional classrooms, informal classes, or learning in mosques.
The affected population is also responding to armed groups in various ways; sometimes
moving away from OAG positions, and sometimes protesting OAG locations and asking
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 26
them to move outside urban areas (see cultural issues). Locals are moving away from JAN
positions, due to their increased likelihood of attack. In some cases local councils are able
to negotiate with armed groups to get them to move out of city boundaries and reduce the
risk of GOS air attack.
Another series of actions relates to finding safer places to live, whether moving closer to
the Turkish border or building temporary shelter in fields or caves outside of towns and
villages. Sources note that since most GOS air attacks occur during the day, some IDPs
return to their homes in the evening to get belongings. Some communities in the
Darkoush, Idleb area have closed bazaars and local markets, and changed Friday prayers,
due to GOS air attacks. Hospitals have also been moved to protect them from air attacks.
While there is limited data so far on the topic, one major response is the development of
governance structures by the affected population. See the June HTAU report for more
information about local councils in Aleppo City. In some cases in Idleb Governorate
where the affected population is not satisfied with the local council, they have formed local
associations made up of volunteers trusted and respected by the local population.
Affected population satisfaction
It appears most of the affected population is satisfied with the NGO efforts in the
humanitarian response. They are generally pleased to receive assistance with food, water,
shelter, healthcare and the other basic needs provided by humanitarian organizations.
However, affected population complaints exists on various topics. Many people in need
are still demanding more or better shelter, water, food and other basic services like
electricity, sewage and sanitation. The scarcity and quality of water have been key topics
of dissatisfaction. Protests occurred at one Idleb IDP camp over the increased price for
water. Small issues exist like food baskets with too much pasta or food that is not
culturally appropriate in Syria. Some local communities and host families are unhappy
with what they perceive as preferential treatment for IDPs and other beneficiaries. Some
affected population dissatisfaction exists over unfair distribution and assistance by local
councils and camp managers.
Several sources mentioned that most people in need are aware of where to go to get
assistance and what assistance is available, from NGO media campaigns or local councils.
Relations between groups
Relations between the various groups is generally good, according to sources, with little
additional information beyond the June HTAU report. IDPs and host communities
generally are cooperating with each, with some exceptions. The problem of separate space
for men and women sometimes creates tensions between IDP and host families, or IDP
camp residents.
As documented in the June HTAU report, often local families will host IDPs who need
shelter, however, conflict often arises after a short period of time between the host and IDP
families. Host families are more likely to host relatives than strangers. Following social
customs, local people often feel hospitable and offer space to many families. After a short
period of time, the lack of money for the host family, space limitations, need for private
space for women, and conflict between children can lead to conflict between the host and
IDP families. In some cases the host families asked for rent money from the IDPs after
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 27
two months. At some point, some IDPs often look for shelter somewhere else, while
others become members of the local community.
Some comments were made about host community perceptions of preferential treatment
for beneficiaries. In one case in Idleb, IDPs were asked to move out of the village area by
the local population. The IDPs set up a camp just outside the village. In one case in Idleb
Governorate, the local council requested specific people be added to the beneficiary list
and the NGO refused to add the people, the local council stopped the NGO from
distributing assistance for several days, until the NGO and local council could resolve the
issue.
While some sources mention the influence that armed groups have over local councils and
the local population, other sources mention that in some areas the armed groups have no
such influence.
Cultural and social issues
A variety of cultural and social issues arose in the July HTAU interviews. Some of the
issues include socio-economic factors, IDPs feeling humiliated, and girls in schools in IDP
camps. A number of the issues deal with women: in IDP camps, in divorces, and
following conservative social customs. Ethnically, most of the population in Idleb and
Aleppo Governorates are Sunni Arab or Kurdish. Reportedly, the two Aleppo villages of
Nobol and Al-Zahraa are Shia, along with Kafria and Al-Foua, Idleb.24
Several sources noted that some beneficiaries feel humiliated receiving humanitarian
assistance or asking to stay with a host family. This feeling of humiliation arises from the
cultural norms about working hard and being self-sufficient. These norms also reinforce
the need for local micro-enterprise projects.
Various social or cultural issues exist women. Due to cultural norms, some women in IDP
camps may not ask for humanitarian assistance. One source said that it is common for
Syrian women to get married before age 18. However, the armed conflict and economic
instability has made marriages for women under age 18 even more common. Also, women
who are victims of domestic violence usually do not leave their husbands, because there
are not many alternatives for abused women in the Syrian culture: women are dependent
economically on husbands or fathers and it is difficult for a woman to live independently.
In Idleb, supposedly some women who had been raped were either killed by their families
(honor killings) or left behind.
Also, divorce is stigmatized, with divorced women seen by some Syrians as being stubborn
or not subordinated to their husbands.. In some areas that are more conservative, divorced
women may try to remarry as soon as possible to have someone provide for them, but the
new husbands may not accept the children from the first marriage, according to one source.
In other areas, like northern Idleb governorate, divorced or widowed women may be able
to find work, such as in agriculture, to be able to live on their own, and this independence
is more socially accepted. Generally children under the age of 11 for boys and 13 for girls
live with the mother if divorced, and after that age with the father. One source noted that
divorced women are receiving less aid that widowed women, due to the belief that
24 Source: http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/07/losses-in-ndf-around-kafria-and-al-foua-and-more-shells-on-
nobol-and-al-zahraa/
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 28
widowed women are more deserving of aid than divorced women.
As a response to social customs, one IDP camp has been set up specifically near Dana,
Idleb for women who are heads of households, such as widowed or divorced women, and
orphans and other IDPs with special needs. This camp provides special assistance and
protection to these families, although few details were provided on this assistance. One of
the benefits of the camp are modified social norms, such as on clothing and movement.
Due to social customs, in larger IDP camps in Idleb Governorate some parents are not
sending their daughters to school because they do not want their daughters attending mixed
gender schools with strangers, even though the girls want to go to school. In their home
villages, the parents knew the other children in the school, so mixed gender classes were
possible, but some parents do not want their daughters attending mixed gender classes with
people they don't know. This issue appears to be less of a problem in smaller IDP camps
were people may know each other better. Also, some children who are not in school are
going to the mosque to learn and memorize Qur’anic verses, following local cultural
traditions. Some sources criticized this learning as being too narrow of a curriculum for
students. One source noted that orphan children are usually taken in by a male relative,
following social customs, and putting children up for adoption is forbidden by local
customs.
For cultural reasons IDPs are sometimes separated by gender, for example with men
sleeping in one classroom and women in another, or women and children sleeping in the
tent and men sleeping outside the tent.
One source noted that the people from the eastern Idleb governorate area are more socially
conservative, so when many of the recent IDPs from Idleb governorate moved to other
areas they encountered host communities that were more liberal. They then had to adjust
or respond to the different social norms. The armed groups in eastern Idleb Governorate,
such as JAN, are also more conservative socially, and enforced rules that sometimes
conflict with social norms and values in host communities. Initially JAN posted posters
and sent other messages to the people stating the various restrictions they required,
especially for women, such as the full hijab and gloves. However, some communities
protested those restrictions and JAN had to reduce some of the restrictions. One source
noted the differing interpretations of Islam on the issue of restrictions on women, such as
clothing, going out of the house without the appropriate male escort (mahram), and
working. In Jisr Al-Shughur, JAN members reprimand any woman who is dressed
inappropriately. When a woman is breaking social norms on clothing, usually the
woman’s mahram is punished, not the woman. In the Atmeh area, no such restrictions
exist. In the Azaz, Aleppo area, one local council leader told NGO workers they could not
distribute humanitarian aid to any woman who did not have a mahram with her: the local
women beat the male council leader who gave that order with their shoes until he gave up
trying to impose that order.
As noted earlier, there may be an increasing socio-economic gap between poor people and
the middle class in Idleb and Aleppo Governorates. Several sources noted that traders,
shop owners and people with space to rent are charging high prices and making a lot of
money. While shop owners and traders may have higher operating costs which reduce
their profit margins, there is a perception that some may be making significant profits. For
example, for building owners who are renting at double the pre-conflict rates, operating
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 29
costs have not changed, so any extra income is all profit. Similarly, middle and upper class
IDPs have money to rent apartments, but lower class and poor people are unable to pay for
rental space
Discussion and Summary
The limits of the HTAU methodology must be briefly mentioned. Since it is qualitative
research based on the perceptions of a small number of sources who are working in a
volatile, rapidly-changing armed conflict, biases and inaccurate information are possible.
Also, it is important to not make generalizations from these findings: what may be true in
one area or with one Syrian community may not be the same with others.
One the most problematic issues in Syria is protection and security for the civilian
population. As documented here and noted by OCHA,25 the protection of civilians is of
paramount concern because their safeguarding would prevent harm and trauma to such a
large population, and mitigate the need for assistance with displacement, shelter, food,
water, and the other basic survival needs. Simply put, a small reduction in harm to
civilians in Syria would significantly reduce the scope of the humanitarian response that is
needed. Such safeguarding of civilians is required under international humanitarian and
human rights law, and United Nations Security Council resolutions.
However, a number of armed groups, including the GOS, continue to use military tactics
that directly target and harm civilians. Some examples include: air attacks and barrel
bombing; artillery, mortar and missiles attacks; arrest, detention, torture and killing of
civilians and prisoners of war; and widespread coercion and intimidation of civilians as a
means of social control. Some armed groups commit these actions more than others – and
should be called out for their human rights violations. About 85 civilians are killed and
600 injured every day in country with only 22 million people.
More significantly, it appears some groups have intentional policies to harm or terrorize
civilian populations. While it may appear a minor issue, many reports of air or missile
attacks state that they are “random.” While it is very difficult to prove the intentionality of
an armed group’s actions, documentation of systematic patterns of behavior, such as air
attacks on public spaces or intimidation of local communities, makes a common sense
argument that such armed group actions are indeed intentional. And, if they are
intentional, then they can and should be stopped. For example, look at the damage
assessments in various Syrian cities in Appendix F: it is clear that damage patterns are
systematic, with more damage in some areas than other areas. Such widespread damage
could only be done using systematic, intentional targeting of such areas. Further data
analysis, such as overlaying frontlines and documenting strikes from aerial and barrel
bombs, missiles and artillery can also prove such intentionality and responsibility.
As a corollary issue, the armed groups that cause the most harm to civilians should be held
the most responsible. While the data is questioned by some groups, it appears the
preponderance of physical harm to civilians is caused by GOS air strikes and barrel
bombing. Hence, proposals by Syrian civilians for a no-fly zone make sense. The lack of
information from ISIS-held areas, with 2.7 million civilians, is very concerning. The few
reports that do exist document social controls that are both extensive, covering the whole
25 Source: OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Syria Issue 2: June 2015.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 30
population, and intensive, covering many types of human behavior, including clothing,
food, prayer, movement, work and interactions with the opposite sex.
Meanwhile, the NGO community continues to balance between neutrality and impartiality,
and documenting human rights abuses and advocating for civilian protection. Like Syrian
civilians, NGO staff working in Syria are at risk every day for air attacks, barrel bombs and
other overt violence. Like civilians, NGO staff are also at risk for the coercion and harm
from the armed groups controlling the areas where they work. While some Syrian armed
groups are tolerant and supportive of NGO workers, others attempt to control their
movements and humanitarian work. In some cases NGO staff working in Syria are
arrested, taken before local or sharia courts, and jailed. This high risk environment is also
the context for data collection for these HTAU reports. While the HTAU research
concentrates on the humanitarian needs and problems of the affected population, many
NGO staff are rightly hesitant to provide information on events in Syria. More advocacy is
needed on the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers in Syria.
On the issue of population movements, further research would help to examine
movement patterns and longer term trends, such as second and third displacements for
some families. Various issues would be valuable to study: what risks and threats are the
most important for influencing the decision to move; what factors, such as relatives or
humanitarian assistance, influence decisions as to where they move; what factors push or
pull IDPs to make secondary movements; how do they decide when it is time to go home;
and how do the multiple displacements affect their mental health and resiliency. Of key
importance are IDP perceptions of what should be done to prevent population movements
in the first place.
The efforts in this HTAU report to identify the most vulnerable groups in Syria are only
partially successful. One the one hand, any Syria who is affected by the conflict deserves
assistance, but there should also be recognition that some groups are more vulnerable or at
risk. Determining how to decide which groups are the most vulnerable is subject to
criticism from many angles. The subjective responses from NGO staff and key informants
provide one lens for determining which groups are most vulnerable, but it is not the only
lens that could or should be used. Other means are necessary to attempt to identify which
Syrians are most at risk physically, mentally, or otherwise.
The cultural and social issues noted in HTAU reports attempt to document how culture
affects humanitarian issues from the perspective of the Syrian people (cultural relativism).
As such, it explores how social customs, norms and relationships, help or hurt the efforts
of the Syrian people to cope with the armed conflict and be self-sustaining. One positive
example is the Muslim custom of supporting people in need. Whenever possible, we try to
document the consequences of cultural issues from the perspectives of the Syrian people.
However, in some cases, such as the rights and empowerment of women, a more universal
standard guides this research: the ability of each person to be independent and self-
sustaining. Since traditional Syrian culture sometimes limits the capacity of women to
earn income, work outside the house, interact with other people, and otherwise be self-
sustaining, this report seeks to document how Syrian culture limits the ability of Syrian
women to be independent and self-sufficient. We ask the reader to reflect on whether a
culturally relative stance or a more universal stance is appropriate in HTAU’s work and in
the Syrian humanitarian response.
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 31
Since the humanitarian situation for the affected population, and the humanitarian
response, depends considerably on changes in the ongoing armed conflict, predictions of
what may happen in the near future are helpful, although they are always uncertain. Please
see one prediction by the Institute for the Study of War (http://iswsyria.blogspot.com.tr/,
June 12, 2015).
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 32
Appendix A: HTAU interview questionnaire
Hello. My name is __________. I work with the NGO Forum in Antakya. We are
conducting interviews of NGO staff to get better information about the current situation for
the affected population in Syria. We want to know more about what problems they are
facing and how they are dealing with these problems, as well as good things that are
happening. These NGO staff interviews will be analyzed to make monthly reports that will
be shared with NGO and UN staff coordinating the humanitarian response and advocacy.
These reports will help NGOs to better understand the humanitarian situation for the
affected population in Syria and provide more effective humanitarian assistance.
Please answer the questions based on what you know, or have seen or heard about the
affected population in Syria from your most recent trip. There are no right or wrong
answers. You can stop the interview at any time or refuse to answer any questions. You
only have to give as much information as you feel comfortable giving. If you had a
dangerous trip, you don’t have to provide too much detail. Your responses will be
anonymous and confidential. Do you have any questions before we start?
1. Can you please tell me about your most recent trip to Syria? Where and when did
you go? What were you doing there? Please explain.
2. What are the most important problems or issues for the local affected population
where you were working? How many people are impacted by each of these issues?
How are these issues affecting the local population? What caused these issues to
begin now? Please explain.
3. How is the affected population responding to existing problems? What are their
coping mechanisms? What consequences do you think will happen from their
responses to the problems? Please explain.
4. Have there been any major changes recently for the local affected population? Are
any changes expected in the near future? Why are they taking place? Please
explain these changes.
5. Have there been any recent population movements? In or out? Who is moving?
Why?
6. What are the most urgent humanitarian needs for the local affected population?
Why?
7. Who are the most vulnerable groups among the local populations? Why? What
information exists on women, children, orphans, minorities, elderly and disabled
persons? Please explain.
8. How are relationships between the various local groups where you were working in
Syria, such as IDPs, host communities, besieged communities, camp managers,
local councils, and assistance providers? Is there conflict or cooperation between
these groups?
9. What does the affected population think about the humanitarian aid and services?
Are they satisfied? What are they doing with the aid? Please explain.
10. Is there any other information about the affected population that you think is
important to tell us?
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND INFORMATION!!!
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 33
Appendix B: Acronyms
CCCM: Camp Coordination and Camp Management
GOS: Government of Syria
HTAU: Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
IDP: Internally Displaced Person
ISIS: Islamic State
JAN: Jabhat Al Nusra
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NFI: Non-Food Item
PIN; People in Need
OAG: Opposition Armed Group
SP: Syrian Pound
US: United States Dollar
WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
YPG: Kurdish People’s Protection Units
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 34
Appendix C: secondary sources on Syria
1. Institute for the Study of War Syria Updates. http://iswsyria.blogspot.com.tr/
2. Syria Comment. Joshua Landis. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/
3. BBC. Syria’s War. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17258397
4. Al Jazeera. Syria. http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/syria.html
5. CNN. Syria. http://edition.cnn.com/specials/middleeast/syria
6. Brookings Institute. Syria. http://www.brookings.edu/research/topics/syria
7. RAND Corporation. Syria. http://www.rand.org/topics/syria.html
8. Assistance Coordination Unit. http://www.acu-sy.org/en/information-management/
9. The Carter Center. Southern Syria Conflict Update. July 10, 2015.
http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html
10. The Islamic State in Southern Syria. May 15, 2015. The Carter Center.
http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html
11. The Carter Center. The Syria Countrywide Conflict Report #5. Feb. 28, 2015.
12. http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html
13. Syria Needs Analysis Project. SNAP: summary of work Dec. 2012 – June 2015.
14. http://acaps.org/img/documents/s-snap-summary-of-work-dec-2012-june-2015.pdf
15. SNAP: Conflict Dashboard May 2015. http://acaps.org/img/documents/i-snap-
conflict-dashboard-may-2015.pdf
16. SNAP regional Analysis Syria. Jan. 2015. http://www.acaps.org/img/reports/p-
regional-analysis-for-syria---part-a-overview-and-sectoral-analysis-oct-dec-
2014.pdf
17. Kheder Khaddour. The Assad Regime’s Hold on the Syrian State. July 2015.
Carnegie Middle East Center. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/syrian_state1.pdf
18. The Islamic State’s Strategy: Lasting and Expanding. Lina Khatib. June 29, 2015.
Carnegie Middle East Center. http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/06/29/islamic-state-s-
strategy-lasting-and-expanding/ib5x
Appendix D: Areas of control in Syria
Source: http://iswresearch.blogspot.com.tr/2015/06/control-in-syria-june-19-2015.html
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 36
Source: http://iswsyria.blogspot.com.tr/, July 9, 2015
HTAU July 2015 Report Page 37
Appendix E: Damage assessments for select cities in Syria
Source: http://unosat-maps.web.cern.ch/unosat-maps/SY/CE20130604SYR/UNOSAT_A3_Cities_Damage_Density_20150710.pdf