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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBA YAN

QUEZON CITY

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386For: Violation of Section 3 (e), of

Republic Act No. 3019

EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, et al.,Accused.

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, S.J., J.1

For resolution is accused Erika C. Orcasitas' ((Motion forReconsideration (on the Resolution dated November 3, 201 7)"dated November 29,2017.2

Accused-movant Orcasitas prays that the Court'sResolution promulgated on November 3,2017,3 be reconsider~

1 Sitting as a special member of the 3'd Division pursuant to Administrative Order No. 316-2017 datettdSeptember 13, 2017.2 pp. 858-871, Record

'pp. 807-815, Rew,d A

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et al.

set aside and/ or the Information against her be quashed on theground that the said Information fails to charge an offense andthat the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over herperson and the offense charged against her. 4

She asserts that it would be grossly unfair and prejudicialto her constitutional right to be informed of the nature of theaccusations against her if the present Information wereamended because the disquisitions of the Office of theOmbudsman in its Resolutions dated January 8, 2015, andJune 27, 2016, failed to pass upon the issue of her allegedminority.s According to the accused-movant, the Information inthis case cannot be cured at this stage of the proceedings byamendment without violating Sections 32 and 33 of RepublicAct (R.A.)No. 9344 which reads:6

SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office.-There shall be a specially trained prosecutor to conductinquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution ofcases involving a child in conflict with the law. If thereis an allegation of torture or ill-treatment of a child inconflict with the law during arrest or detention, it shallbe the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same.

SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filingof Information. - The prosecutor shall conduct apreliminary investigation in the following instances: (a)when the child in conflict with the law does not qualifyfor diversion: (b) when the child, his/her parents orguardian does not agree to diversion as specified inSections 27 and 28; and (c) when considering theassessment and recommendation of the social worker,the prosecutor determines that diversion is notappropriate for the child in conflict with the law.

Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of___ c_o_m_p_IaJ._·n_t_,_t_h_e_prosecutor shall notify the Pu/?4 pp. 868-869, Record5 p. 858, Record6 pp. 864-865, Record

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et at.

Attorney's Officeof such service, as well as the personalinformation, and place of detention of the child inconflict with the law.

Upon determination of probable cause by theprosecutor, the information against the child shall befiled before the Family Court within forty-five (45) daysfrom the start of the preliminary investigation.

She reiterates that a child in conflict of the law enjoys thepresumption of minority and that the prosecution has theburden to prove the she acted with discernment in order for herto be held liable of the crime herein charged.7

In her further bid to dismiss the case against her,accused-movant Orcasitas likewise insists on the applicabilityof R.A. No. 8369, otherwise known as the ((Family Courts Act of1997," to the present case. 8 She maintains that jurisdiction overthe present case against her rests with the Family Courts andnot with the Sandiganbayan. Invoking the case of SenatorLeila De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero,9 the accused-movant argues that just like dangerous drugs cases, whereexclusive jurisdiction vests in Regional Trial Courts designatedas ((Drugs Courts," criminal cases involving minors are governedby R.A. No. 8369, as amended by R.A. No. 9344; hence, it is theRegional Trial Court designated as a ((Family Court" that hasexclusive original jurisdiction to try and hear the present caseagainst her. 10

ResolutionCriminal Case No. 8B-17 -CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et al.

informed of the nature of the accusation against her and shemay fully prepare her defenses.12 The prosecution also notesthat the accused-movant is yet to be arraigned; hence,pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure, the amendment of the Information is amatter of right for the prosecution whether in form or insubstance. 13

Furthermore, the prosecution points out that theallegations of the accused-movant in her present motion aremere reiterations of the arguments she raised in her ((Motion toQuash Information for the Accused Minor" dated July 26, 2017;hence, the prosecution likewise repleaded its arguments in itsOpposition dated August 8, 2017.14

As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, the argumentsraised by the accused-movant in her present motion are merereiterations of the grounds she raised in her ((Motion to QuashInformation for the Accused Minor" dated July 26,2017.15 To besure, these arguments were squarely passed upon by the Courtin its Resolution sought to be reconsidered.

On the accused-movant's assertion that theSandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present caseagainst her, the Court held in its assailed Resolutionpromulgated on November 3, 2017, Viz~

12 pp. 917-918, Record13 p. 917, Record14 p. 918, Record15 pp. 445-456, Record

ResolutionCriminal Case No. 8B-17 -CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et al.

II. The Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction overthe present caseagainst accused-movant Orcasitas.

On the issue of jurisdiction, accused-movantOrcasitas invokes Section 5 of R.A. No. 8369, otherwiseknown as (The Family Courts Act of 1997." Thisprovision declares that Family Courts shall haveexclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decidecriminal cases where one or more of the accused isbelow eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine(9) years of age or where one or more of the victims is aminor at the time of the commission of the offense.16She argues that because she was only sixteen (16) yearsold at the time of the approval of Resolution No. 007-2008, exclusive original jurisdiction over the presentcase against her is vested on the Family Courts and notthe Sandiganbayan.17

Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-1-18, promulgated by theSupreme Court on November 24, 2009, provides:

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - ThisRule shall apply to all criminal cases involvingchildren in conflict with law.

A child in conflict with the law is a personwho at the time of the commission of theoffense is below eighteen (18) years old but notless than fifteen (15)years and one (1) day old.

This Rule shall not apply to a personwho at the time of the initial contact asdefined in Sec. 4 (q) of this Rule shall have

______ re_a_c_h_ed__ th_e age of eighteen (IB) in W/"716 p. 450, Record17 p. 450, Record


case, the regular rules on criminalprocedure shall apply without prejudice tothe rights granted under Sees. 53, 54, 55and 56 of this Rule.18

The term ((initial contact" is defined under Section4 (q) of the same rule, to wit:

(q) Initial contact refers to apprehension ortaking into custody of a child in conflict with thelaw by law enforcement officers or privatecitizens. It includes the time the child allegedto be in conflict with the law receives asubpoena under Section 3 (b)of Rule 112 ofthe Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure orsummons under Section 6 (a) or Section 9(b) ofthe same Rule in cases that do not requirepreliminary investigation, or where there is nonecessity to place the child alleged to be inconflict with the law under immediate custody.19

A review of the factual antecedents of thiscase reveals that accused-movant Orcasitasreceived a copy of the order of the Office of theOmbudsman requiring her to file her counter-affidavit on December 23, 2013.20 Thereafter, sheexecuted her counter-affidavit on January 13,2014.21 Applying the afore-cited rules, the Courtholds that the "initial contact" with accused-movant Orcasitas occurred on December 23, 2013,or upon her receipt of the copy of the order of theOffice of the Ombudsman; hence, the provisions ofthe Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 areinapplicable to her because at that time, she wasalready twenty-one (21) years old. Therefore, theregular rules of criminal procedure should beapplied.22 /I

18 Emphasis supplied19 Emphasis supplied20 p. 466, Record21 pp. 184-189, Record22 Emphasis supplied

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17 -CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et al.

Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. No. 10660 providesthat the Sandiganbayan has exclusive originaljurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 3019, where oneor more of the accused are those officials enumeratedtherein, whether acting in a permanent, acting orinterim capacity, at the time of the commission of theoffense.

A plain reading of the Information in this caseshows that accused-movant Orcasitas is charged tohave acted in conspiracy with certain governmentofficials falling under the exclusive original jurisdictionof the Sandiganbayan to commit a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thus, these allegations are enoughto vest jurisdiction on this Court over the case againstaccused-movant Orcasitas.

Neither does the case of De Lima v. Guerrer023 supportthe claim of the accused-movant. In De Lima, the SupremeCourt ratiocinated that due to the technical aspect of drug-related cases; i.e. the unique characteristics of narcoticsubstances, judges presiding over designated drugs courts areequipped with "the proper tools to appreciate pharmacologicalevidence and give an analytical insight upon this esotericsubject. "24

In this case, the accused-movant's sole basis for insistingthat the Family Courts have jurisdiction to try the criminalcharge against her is the fact that she was a minor at the timethe alleged criminal act imputed to her was committed. Shecompletely overlooks the one material fact that she was alreadytwenty-one (21) years old when the ('initial contact" with herrespecting the case took place. In fact, she is now twenty-five(25) years old for which reason, the regular rules of criminalprocedure should be applied to her.

23 G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 201724 De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017

The present charge involves a violation of Section 3 (e) ofR.A. No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree/?

J1


(P.D.)No. 1606, Section 4 ofR.A.No. 8249 and Section 2 ofR.A.No. 10660, the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction totry a violation of the said law. Thus, this Court unquestionablyhas the jurisdiction to try the accused -movant and her co-accused.

Accused-movant Orcasitas further submits that theamendment of the present Information will violate herconstitutional rights to due process and to be informed of thenature of the accusations against her because the issue of heralleged minority was not passed upon by Office of theOmbudsman in its Resolutions dated January 8,2015 and June27,2016.25

To begin with, it is jurisprudentially settled that theessence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.26In the consolidated cases of Ocampo v. Abando, Echanis v.Medina, Baylosis v. Medina, and Ladlad v. Medina,27 theSupreme Court en banc ruled that in the context of apreliminary investigation, the right to due process of law simplyentails the opportunity to be heard.28 It requires that therespondent be given reasonable opportunity to be heard andsubmit his/her defenses.29 What is proscribed is the absoluteopportunity to be heard. 30 Thus, one who has been afforded achance to present one's own side of the story cannot claimdenial of due process.31

The record of this case shows that the accused-movant wasgiven the opportunity to present her side through her counter-affidavit and motion for reconsideration which were filedwith theOffice of the Ombudsman. Moreover, her defense of mino~

25 p. 858, Record f26 Shu v. Dee, 723 SCRA 512 (2014); See also Vivo v. PAGCOR, 707 SCRA 276 (2013), Republic v. Caguioa,691 SCRA306 (2013), Demaala v. Sandiganbayan, 771 SCRA 1 (2014), and Ynot v. lAC, 148 SCRA659 (1987)27 715 SCRA673 (2014)28 p. 695, Ocampo v. Abando, 715 SCRA673 (2014)291d30,d31 pp. 695-696, Ocampo v. Abando,715 SCRA673 (2014)


was passed upon by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Orderdated June 27, 2016, thus:

Respondent Orcasitas rehashed her defense ofminority, stressing that she was only 16 years old at thetime of the signing of SB Resolution No. 007-2008.Without any concrete evidence to show that she did notact with discernment, there is no legal basis to exempther from criminal prosecution and liability. As to thequestion of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayanover her person, such matter must be left to the sounddetermination of the Sandiganbayan.32

Notably, the accused-movant asserts that the allegations inthe present Information do not constitute an offense due to itsapparent defect. It must be stressed, however, thatjurisprudence and Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure teach that if the ground relied upon by theaccused-movant in his motion to quash is that ((the factscharged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution shall begiven by the court an opportunity to correct the defect byamendment.33 Also, in People v. Sandiganbayan (FourthDivision),34 the Supreme Court ruled, thus:

When a motion to quash is filed challenging thevalidity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defectmay be cured by amendment, courts must deny themotion to quash and order the prosecution to file anamended Information.35 Generally, a defect pertainingto the failure of an Information to charge factsconstituting an offense is one that may be correctedby an amendment.36 In such instances, courts aremandated not to automatically quash theInformation; rather, it should grant the prosecut~

32 p. 15, Order dated June 27, 2016; p. 48, Record / /33 See People v. Andrade, 741 SCRA460 (2014) )()34 770 SCRA162 (2015)35 Footnote omitted36 Footnote omitted

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17 -CRM-1386People vs. Javier, et ai.

the opportunity to cure the defect through anamendment.37 This rule allows a case to proceedwithout undue delay. By allowing the defect to becured by simple amendment, unnecessary appealsbased on technical grounds, which only result toprolonging the proceedings, are avoided.38

More tHan this practical consideration, however, isthe due process underpinnings of this rule. As explainedby this Court in People v. Andrade,39the State, just likeany other litigant, is entitled to its day in court.

Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution theopportunity to amend an Information, where such rightis expressly granted under the Rules of Court andaffirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Courtdecisions, effectively curtails the State's right to dueprocess.

Hence, even assuming that the Information wasdefective, the Sandiganbayan should have first orderedits amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would havesaved the parties from resorting to an appeal to thisCourt and this case from remaining in the docket of theSandiganbayan for a long period.

In the same veIn, the Court is of the view that theaccused-movant cannot validly claim that the impendingamendment to the present Information would be grossly unfairand/ or prejudicial to her interest because her defense ofminority would still be available to her even after the saidamendment. In Mendez v. People,40 the Supreme Court, citingthe case of People v. Casey,41 held that the jurisprudential teston whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of anInformation pertains to the availability of the same defense ~

37 Footnote omitted / '38 Emphasis supplied

39 Footnote omitted f'40 726 SCRA203 (2014)41103 SCRA21 (1981)

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-l386People vs. Javier, et al.

evidence that the accused previously had under the originalInformation.

In this case, the impending amendment to the presentInformation pursuant to the disquisition of the Court in itsassailed Resolution promulgated on November 3, 2017, does notchange the nature of the crime charged, does not expose theaccused-movant to a charge which could call for a higherpenalty, nor does it affect the essence of the offense or causesurprise or deprive the accused an opportunity to meet the newaverment.42

Also, as correctly pointed out by the prosecution, since theaccused-movant has not been arraigned, the Information may beamended in form or substance pursuant to Section 14, Rule110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In sum, the accused-movant failed to raise any new orsubstantial matter that would warrant a reconsideration of theCourt's Resolution promulgated on November 3,2017.

WHEREFORE, accused Erika C. Orcasitas' ((Motion forReconsideration (on the Resolution dated November 3, 2017)"dated November 29, 2017,43 is DENIED for being pro formaand/or lack of merit.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

~O~E-TANPresiding JusticeChairperson

42 See People v. Casey, 103 SeRA 21 (1981)43 pp. 858-871, Record


JANET. FERNAssociate Justice

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