revista seos 2010

8/9/2019 Revista SEOS 2010

1/48

Review of the OVIDIU SINCAIEuropean School 2009/2010


2/48

2

Ovidiu

incai European SchoolBucharest, Romania

Phone/Fax: +4021-2300301E-mail:[email protected]

Website:www.seos.ro


3/48

3

Summary

Foreword: The crisis of leadership in European democracies. Searching for new models

by Anne JUGNARU. 4

Activities of the 2009-2010 Edition. .. 6

Liberalisation of the EU energy sector side effects by Dan Marcel BRBU... 8

The Lisbon Treaty short analytical look by Adrian CONSTANTINESCU..... 12

Democracy in time of crisis by Veronica FRUMUZACHE.. 16

Uninominal vote from high expectations to disturbing consequences. The Romanian case

by Iulia HUIU . 20The myth of the providential leader in Romanian politics by Barbu MATEESCU 24

Romanian crisis serious and atypical by Alina Daniela MOISE. . 29

Voting on the Internet, future elections by Marinela RA. ... 31

The European Union and Kosovo: transforming, containing or losing it? by Roxana RIZEA. 34

Organizers of the Sixth Edition of the Ovidiu incai European School 2009-2010. ... 38

Lecturers. . 39

Participants. . 41


4/48

4

Foreword: The crisis of leadership in European democracies.Searching for new models

by Anne Jugnaru

During the last two decadesit was often discussed about a

general crisis of leadership inEuropean politics. After 1989 andthe fall of communism in Centraland Eastern Europe, democracyseems to have become an abstractnotion supported by a few

technocrats and experts without charisma or popular

exposure. Meanwhile, the extremist forces began tobring forth several strong personalities, oftencontroversial but ultimately perceived as authoritative.

This explains why, during the last years, traditionaldemocratic parties within the EU had modest andsometimes extremely bad results in the local, national orEuropean elections.

In theory, politicians should be models for theentire society. But especially the political leaders are theones who should be capable to cause such a dynamiceffort within the society that their personal behaviourand performance has an impact over ordinary people.

This type of influence is similar with the impact actors

from Hollywood movies have over large numbers ofviewers, who become their fans. At a different scale, the

political leader needs to represent a model that could beembraced by the society, both for his success and forleaving his mark over the country he leads. This canonly be done through a coherent rational projectaccompanied by an entire strategy of communicationand personal exceptional qualities: empathy andcharisma.

One can argue that traditional democratic parties,at least lately, did not perform well in terms ofcharismatic personalities. Instead, it was much easier forextremist to promote distinct, non-conformistpersonalities, who distinguished themselves by an anti-system behaviour and thus gained notoriety. If, at therhetoric level, a populist communication was also used,then the success in promoting leaders was extremelyhigh. One cannot draw an ideological line between rightand left concerning charisma, as this was more anaccidental development, or a specific trend in somesocieties rather than a conservative or social democraticfeature. At European level, the tradition that the right


5/48


6/48

6

Activities of the 2009-2010 EditionIn October 2009 a selection for the sixth

edition of the Ovidiu incai European School wasorganized. As a result, 35 people became participants inthis edition.

The first national seminar, having as main themeFacing Multiple Crises in Romania. Challenges andSolutions, was organized in the interval 4-7 February2010 in the mountain resort of Bran. The lectures werepresented by Ilie erbnescu, economic analyst,former Minister of Reform (December 1997 April

1998) The Impact of the Economic Crisis overRomania Solutions, Vladimir Pasti, Professor,State University for Political Studies and

Administration, BucharestThe Crisis of RomanianSociety Increasing Polarization, EmilConstantinescu, President of Romania (1996-2000) Is there a Political Crisis in Romania?, Anne

Jugnaru, Director of the Ovidiu incai EuropeanSchool, Member of the Board, Romanian Public

Television Service Romanian Mass Media Freedom and Responsibility and CristianPrvulescu, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science,State University for Political Studies and

Administration, Bucharest Challenges for the Ruleof Law in Romania.

The Second Seminar, having as main theme

Preparing the elites for communicating in thepublic space, was organized in the interval 22-25 April2010 at the Trnava Hotel from Odorheiu Secuiesc.

The lectures were presented byDoru Pop, Professor,Faculty of Theatre and Television, Babes-BolyaiUniversity, Cluj-Napoca Preparing the Contact

with Mass Media,Cristian Prvulescu, Dean of the

Faculty of Political Science, State University for PoliticalStudies and Administration, Bucharest Media andPower in Politics, Ioan Deac, Professor, Carol INational Defence University, Bucharest Communication in Crisis Situations, Anne

Jugnaru, Director of the Ovidiu incai EuropeanSchoolCommunication and Political Marketingand Aurora Liiceanu, Senior Researcher within thePsychology Institute of the Romanian Academy,Bucharest The Psychological Dimension ofCommunication in the Public Space.

The Third Seminar, having as main themePolitics and Society in a European Democracy, was


7/48

7

organized in the interval 11-14 June 2009 at the Mila 35Complex from the Danube Delta. The lectures werepresented byAlexandru Athanasiu, former Minister ofLabour and Social Protection (1996-1999) and ofEducation, Research and Youth (2003-2004) AProject for Romania, Alexandru Radu, Professor,Faculty of Political Science, Dimitrie CantemirChristian University, Bucharest Parliamentarianism, semi-presidentialism or

presidentialism?, Daniel Barbu, Professor, Facultyof Political Science, University of BucharestLimitsof Democracy, Anne Jugnaru, Director of the

Ovidiu Sincai European School The Crisis ofLeadership in European Democracies. Searchingfor new models and Teodor Melecanu, Senator,former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1992-1996) and ofDefence (2007-2008) A Project for Romania.

In the period 28 June 2nd July 2010, theRomanian participants of the 2009-2010 edition tookpart in the Fifth Summer University for Democracy,

which took place in Strasbourg, under the organizationof the Council of Europe, together with their fellowsfrom the other 15 schools in the Councils network.


8/48

8

Liberalisation of the EU energy sector side effects by Dan Marcel BRBU

Liberalisation of energy ispart of a broader trend ofliberalization and withdrawal of

Member States involvement ininfrastructure industries. Currently,the liberalization of Europeanenergy market is globally the mostextensive reform of energy sector.

This means an integration ofmarkets with different levels of involvement of nationalgovernments. Liberalisation of the energy sector still hasits ups and downs, with the risk of increasingdependence of European countries on Russia.

In the United States, after the energy crisis of the2000s, the restructuring process has slowed significantlyand many states have passed reform plans on the

waiting list. In addition, a small number of countries,leaders in the reform of the energy system such as Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Argentina, manyother countries worldwide, have made limited progresstowards a free energy market to ensure the strategiclines are followed. The electricity crisis in California

with those in New York and parts of Europe havediminished enthusiasm for political reform although itappeared that between the reform process and the crisis

there is virtually no connection.

EU a world engine to liberalization of the energysector

In the context of a slowing world energy reformprocess, the effort led by the European Commission

was the main force that kept the programme moving.Due to the strategic position of the power sector innational policies, in the absence of policies at EU level,the reform process in many Member States would havebeen very slow. Yet, even if there is relative progress inthe liberalization process, it does not mean that we havea successful integration of its European Electricity

Market. A key factor of implementation of directivesauthorizing the energy is emanating from the EU bodiesin Member States regulatory process. It is instrumentalin planning and control which implements the stepsdescribed in regulations issued for the energy sector. A


9/48

9

regulatory process is carried out at EU and national

level, through institutions specifically created.

An important component of European energy

policy is the promotion of green energy. The LisbonStrategy sets out several key objectives relating to theproduction of renewable energy and energy policy is thetool by which these objectives will be carried out.

Liberalizing the energy sector strategy in theory There is a lack of current studies regarding the

effects of energy market liberalization. It is true that thedrafting of the European Union has not ended butEuropean directives concerning the liberalizationprocess have already had a significant impact in MemberStates and at EU level. Most existing studies stop at

2005, not considering the effects less than expected

when the liberalization process began. There are nostudies to put the effects of energy market liberalizationin the context of EU energy security, a very importantissue in the foreign policy community. Several reportsand strategies undertaken by various local administrativebodies to reproduce content are limited to nationalenergy strategies so far without a single contribution tothe general process. Published works on Europeanenergy policy comes down more to explain short-termeffects of EU directives, without taking into account theeffects of these directives in the long term on energygiants especially active in Europe.

Short path from deregulation to addiction scenarioSide effects of European energy policy are

important because they give an indication of theMember States to what extent regulatory bodies andregulations imposed by central directives affect yourobjectives and create situations that can become

dangerous in the long term. I am referring to increasingEU energy dependence from third countries by allowingthese to operate directly on the European energymarket, where external players are competing with thosealready existing here. An example of a dangerousscenario, which shows that the laws governing the free


10/48

10

market can get energy and increase the vulnerability of

the single market, could be that Gazprom is able tocontrol the EU energy market under agreements withmajor companies in the European electricity sector such

as ENI, E-ON andENEL. GazpromsEuropean marketpresence, based onthese agreements,

will be directly orindirectly by theircompanies, as partof the ownership ofmajor players which

are alreadyintegrated into themarket. Given this situation and due to the same rulesof the market, the Russian company could very easily, intime, become a serious threat to companies that nowhold primacy in the European market. The reasons for

which Gazprom could become a concern for European

energy companies but also for energy regulatory bodiesare:

Gazprom is privatized at a rate of 49.99%,enjoying thus protection from the Russianstate;

Russian gas resources are above the EUsresources, which could be used inelectricity production especially after theconstruction of North Stream and SouthStream pipelines.

To the extent that no major European companyin the energy market (in addition to EDF) is not state

property, more than 50% of the competition issomewhat over European energy companies. Europeancompanies, such as E-ON and ENI have directcontracts with Gazprom for gas supplied to the EU. Inother words, they sell Russian gas to their customers;the same gas that Gazprom will sell to the samecustomers when, due to energy market liberalization, it

will be free to compete with European companies which also provide gas from Gazprom. Due to largequantities of energy resources, Gazprom will be able topractice very low prices on the European market, whichis a short-term benefit to the European customer and inagreement with the stated objectives of energy policy;but the long term effects on EU energy giants will be a

decrease of their market position. A decrease in themarket positions of companies that have at least 50,000employees each means a series of dissatisfaction amongthe population, these arising from attempts ofcompanies to cut costs to remain competitive.


11/48

11

On the other hand however there may be some

direct positive effect on EU energy market, due toGazprom. Thus the EU will no longer deal with crisessuch as during the last winter, when the Russians usedthe pretext that Ukraine steals of its pipes and froze thecontinent for 11 days.

Once present in the energy market in Europe,Gazprom will have to meet trade rules and thus will beforced to engage in competition with other big

European players. The winner of this confrontation

competitive on the short term will be the end userbecause the price of energy is likely to decline.However, the situation set out above is only onepossible scenario that has not considered the long-termeffect of an energy policy and all the other factors thatcould affect EU policies, directly or indirectly related toenergy policy.


12/48

12

The Lisbon Treaty short analytical lookby Adrian CONSTANTINESCU

The Lisbon Treaty (LT) wasdesired to be a revitalization of acommunitarian structure of

incertitude and crisis. Even if theEurope of separations remained inthe past, it is clear that the problemsto which the European communityis confronted havent disappeared,

on the contrary they are, from other perspectives andpoints of view, present.

Widely, this is the context for the ratification ofthe LT, treaty through which it is tried to reforminstitutions and to create intra-community cohesion.

The document represents the long time effort about thereforming of the legal framework of the Union. It is, inits essence, the document that we have been expecting

since 2002, when it was beyond any doubt that Nicehadnt resolved the problems to which the enlargedEurope was to confront, especially in the subsequentconditions of enlarging the community frame throughthe passing from 15 to 27 Member States, following thefifth wave of expansion. The reference and analyzing

theme in this context was an essential one: simplifyingthe treaties, a clearer delimitation of the competencesbetween the Member States and the European Union,

the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and thepart of the national parliaments.

As a reference or a historical chronology, the ideaof the LT is the result of a line of thinking with deeproots in the thinking of the 50s, through which it wastried to achieve what we can generically call the projectof political union between the Member States. So, afterthe Second World War, we speak about the resonantfailure of a cooperation attempt, when the Frenchparliamentary assembly rejected in 1954 a projectproposed by France, through which a EuropeanCommunity of Defence was to be instituted. After thismoment, the attempts of European cohesion regarded

less the political aspects, being oriented towardseconomical cooperation. This is why the fundamentalattributes of the sovereignty of the states, such asdefence and foreign policy, remained solely in theattribution of the states. After the mentioned episode,there were other two attempts, in 1960-1961, when the


13/48


14/48


15/48

15

workers on the work market in EU, and even the

adoption of Euro (the target 2014/ 2015).As is already showed by the specialized literature,

the LT, already seen as an historical landmark in the lifeof the Union, will offer the appropriate instruments andneeded means to face the challenges of contemporary

life, such as climate changes, energetic security,

sustainable development, the environment, organisedcrime, the breaking of fundamental rights and liberties,immigration. It is left for us to see who will triumph inthe eternal fighting of euro-optimism versus euro-scepticism.


16/48

16

Democracy in time of crisisby Veronica FRUMUZACHE

Democracy in the originalmeaning of peoples power canno longer be thought today

without a connection between thepolitical system and the economicone. And nothing can restoredemocracy in its true sense morelike the acute economic crisis that

affects the Western world at this time. What is freedom without the decency of living, and can the individualdecide a fate of his own in the absence of materialresources to ensure the respect of others?

The issue is precisely that if you attack themeaning of his wealth, even the free world citizen seemsrather willing to give up freedom and sovereignty of hisdecision, namely democracy, only to receive the comfort

that has been promised in the democratic electionprocess. That fact that a party with communist ideologyhas now about 20 percent popularity in Greece, hauntedby the riots and recession shows that democracy willnot survive without economic foundation for aminimum decency of living. The people throwing

Molotov cocktails at the banks of Greece care lessabout the budget deficit and foreign debt of theircountry. This issue has not concerned them until the

deficit reached into their pockets. This form of refusing the democracy which no

longer provides welfare paradise is not an innovation ofthe Greeks, as was the philosophy and polis more orless democratic about 2,000 years ago. Maybe its justfates irony that the signal of the downfall of democracyhas been given now from the pedestal where she wasborn, i.e. Athens. The temple on the Acropolis, recentlyrenovated, perhaps is the signal of a possible resignationat the end of a story that was born right there, at his feetin the days when the Greeks worshiped the gods. Onething is certain: democracy will not be the same afterthis crisis! And not because of low living standards in

many European countries, but many years will pass untilit will return to the point it reached in 2007-2008. There is no use for observers to wonder why

Ukraine turned her head to East, choosing the samepro-Russian president, the same president they tried toremove by sacrifices and orange revolutions several


17/48


18/48


19/48


20/48

20

Uninominal vote from high expectations to disturbingconsequences. The Romanian case

by Iulia HUIU

When

In 2008 the Romanianelectoral system was changed. Theproportional list system wasreplaced by direct voting inuninominal colleges, with aredistribution formula meant toensure proportional representation

in the final configuration of theParliament.

The introduction of the uninominal vote was theresult of a prolonged debate, with a significant politicaland electoral background. For several years, theuninominal vote had been used by different politicalparties as a rhetorical instrument for gaining popular

support. The opinion polls have constantly shown ahigh preference for this type of voting, as opposed tothe party list, considered less transparent and resultingfrom an internal selection process, based onquestionable criteria. It is hard to estimate to whatdegree the public opinion had a real interest in such a

political issue or the answers from the surveys just fitthe logical, conformist pattern. When asked whether

they prefer to choose a party list or a person, peopletend to opt for uninominal vote, irrespective of theirdegree of understanding the political process or theconsequences of such an option. However, the subtleaspects of the debate upon the electoral system eludedthe understanding of a large majority.

Before 2007, introducing uninominal system

rather remained at the rhetorical level. In spite of someparticular attempts to enact it through legislative means,there was no political consensus either on changing theelectoral system, or on the precise form of such achange. In 2007, under particular circumstances andunder different types of political pressure, the politicalclass agreed upon reforming the electoral system and

shifted from mere rhetoric to approving the necessarylegislation.

HowHowever, the process itself was neither a smooth

nor a simple one, as different political actors had


21/48


22/48


23/48

23

major consequences the uninominal vote had. In these

terms, basically, the electoral competition becomesprohibited to those who do not have the necessaryresources to support an electoral campaign. Or, if theydo enter the competition, their chances of success are

very poor. Third, the political parties experienced a shift

from national to local, in terms of power and influence.

The tendency of local leaders and local organization togain more power in the internal equation of the partiesand to be more demanding was not new. But it wassignificantly amplified. The centre of the decisionmaking process, within the parties, moved towards thelocal leaders, many of them becoming key characters inthe national leadership. This tendency, in itself, was notundesirable, unless it led to replacing the nationalperspective with a local, more limited one. Whiledecentralizing political decisions may be beneficial interms of local politics, the lack of a national vision maybe rather detrimental, especially when replaced with atoo biased local perspective.

Last, but not least, the uninominal vote did notbring the anticipated quality improvement, for tworeasons. One resides in the redistribution of seats,

which introduced a high degree of randomness andallowed candidates with very few votes to become MPs.

The other is a perverted effect of what supposed to be

more responsibility and more independence of the

directly elected MPs, when it comes to defend theinterests of their electorate. Unfortunately, for some ofthem, the uninominal vote became the perfectjustification of political migration. The phenomenon ofmigration from one party to another was not at all new,but it reached an unprecedented level during the lastone and a half years. Many of those who chose to

change their political identity used, at the rhetoricallevel, the uninominal system as the ultimate source oflegitimacy and explained their option in terms of bestinterest of their voters.

This article is a short analysis of the Romanianexperience regarding the uninominal vote. However, allthe unexpected consequences described above must beregarded in a larger context. These consequencesoccurred on a specific background, which includesshortcomings in the democratic consolidation and in theparticipative political culture.


24/48

24

The myth of the providential leader in Romanian politicsby Barbu MATEESCU

Democracy, if void ofcharismatic leadership, is a

meaningless tangle of bureaucraticinterests and social apathy. Ademocratic model which is positedon the excessive empowerment ofcharismatic individuals, on theother hand, is marred by

frustration, division and the excessive personalization of

the political arena; its electoral landscape is rocked bysudden bursts of hope and disappointment; the stateinstitutions are frail, or perceived as such sometimes athreat, often an object of reform but never a partner.

The Romanian electorate is highly vulnerable in thisrespect due its over-reliance on providential leaders;furthermore, if one analyzes the post-Communist

period this situation has worsened in time after briefperiods of recoil the Romanian political scene is moreover-personalized than at any time since 1990. Thefollowing items of hard data are the evidence for thestatements above:

- more Romanians voted in the second round ofthe presidential election in 2009 (57% of all registered

voters) than at the parliamentary elections of 2008 (less

than 40%);- recent opinion polls indicate that the

charismatic leaders of the main political parties havemore credibility than the parties they lead or support, inmany cases twice more;

- the institution of the president is several timesmore popular than that of the parliament (between 34%

and 43% as compared to between 9% and 12%);- when, in 2007, the Romanian Parliament

impeached the president by an overwhelming majority(322 votes to 108), the electorate overturned thedecision in a decisive fashion in the ensuing referendum(6 million votes were cast against the impeachmentprocedure, representing 75% of all the voters who took

part in the referendum);- the current President and winner of the last two

presidential elections has made a title of glory and adefining message of his public appearances that he isalone against the whole political class, against the


25/48


26/48

26

of those who govern by those who are

governed;- an emphasis on individual charisma rather

than on a rational social, political andeconomic program;

- a propensity for the use of violence in orderto eliminate political opposition and to silencethe more discontent sections of the

population;- the conversion of the state into a tool at the

service of the Illustrious Individual, asopposed to defining public institutions asserving the population.

There are numerous flaws of the providential

model as far as the evolution of Romanian politics isconcerned. The current study can only list the mostimportant while some are prevalent, others exact amore insidious influence on the political scene and arenot as visible to the naked eye:

- a constant and pervasive vulnerability todemagogic leaders and initiatives;

- a limited social conscience, unable to respondto political interference and overly reliant on amagical saviour, who will right all wrongs

without the need for civic involvement;

- distrust of institutions, political platforms andtechnical expertise (should the latter become

part of the political field). These organized

forms of political thinking are widelyconsidered to be fake, groundless andinefficient structures, by default inferior to anenlightened individuals will;

- the rejection of ideological discussions asuseless, since they imply an appeal torational values and not to confidence an

essentially emotional aspect of political beliefs;- excessive concentration of public attention on

presidential elections and the relative lack ofinterest in parliamentary elections, even ifaccording to the Constitution the latterinstitution plays a more important role in stategovernance.

Proposing a set of measures which would halt orharm the evolution of providentialism would be anidealistic endeavour. The actors and institutionsinvolved in such a process would be too numerous, andtheir agendas too different, for these measures to have apractical effect. It would be far more useful to see what

are the possible evolutions of this political model, as faras Romanias medium and long term future isconcerned.

Obviously, one of the possibilities that must betaken into consideration is the installation of a de factodictatorship, which would halt all democratic processes


27/48


28/48

28

he/she maintains a strong relationship with the

electorate by adhering to the values that have attracted voters in the first place. This ideological optionimplies shifting the emphasis from the individual to theidea; from the leader to the doctrine; and fromconfidence to rational belief.

Providentialism fails by definition; in an intricate world, it is next to impossible for an individual no

matter how charismatic or intelligent to control the

course of government as he or she wishes. Shifting awayfrom a charismatic model should be a priority both forthe Romanian political class and for society at large; thisfeature harms Romanias democratic processes andprincipals, confuses the electorate and has a detrimentaleffect on the countrys economic situation.


29/48

29

Romanian crisis serious and atypicalby Alina Daniela MOISE

Romanian society is in deepcrisis, generalized and not typical ofother European Union countries.

Romania is a country with amentality almost impossible toexplain, because over nationalpsychological dimension undefinedand difficult to understand, haveentailed communismsdisadvantages and a partially

successful implantation of capitalism and democracy.Former President of Romania Ion Iliescu explained thefacts of a plastic expression and very close to reality,crony capitalism and original democracy.

In Romania, the economic crisis cannot becontained by conventional weapons because it veryclosely entwined with a moral crisis, social and political

system crisis, that even the identity and authority ofstate institutions stagger increasingly dangerous.

It started in the communist period, when thisnation was crippled soul. Communism has actedsystematically and by the book, through destruction or

perversion of values directly, physically but especially inthe collective mind. The elites of this nation in all areashave been effectively decimated in prisons, in order to

compromise them directly or through their forcedcollaboration. Many were killed or had spent hard yearsin prison, and were later banned to show their skills.Opportunists have preferred their collaboration to savetheir lives and careers, but in this they were more or less

voluntary than the forced destruction or perversion ofvalues, hierarchy, morality and even of faith.

The atheist educational system, limited and highlyindoctrinated in the communist period formed thegeneration of new people. Beliefs and traditions weremost affected. And it is known that a man who does nottruly believe in something or even in someone has apredisposition to instability and psychologicaldiscomfort and cannot form a proper relationship with

the others, morally and spiritually. At this pre-existing background, the lifestyle of

the twenty years of post-communism had a devastatingeffect on the great majority of the population, totallyunprepared for dealing with socio-economic problems


30/48

30

of increasingly wild capitalism in our country. Thus

appeared serious psychological problems, mostlyuntreated due to lack of education, the materialpossibilities or the simply lack of confidence in so fewspecialists in this field.

But the biggest problem facing Romania at thistime is political. There are serious slips in democraticprinciples and the separation of powers that go almost

unnoticed by our partners in the European Union,because all the attention go to generalized economiccrisis in the Eurozone and the problems faced by eachmember state in private.

Why did we come to this dangerous point after20 years of original democracy? Firstly, because thedemocratic principles were introduced mechanically,

artificially, without a real process of awareness raisingand understanding among the vast majority of thepopulation. In Romania even civil society was createdartificially or with financial support from abroad, in veryfew cases or directly by political or businessenvironment from the country, and only in their owninterest. So, our citizens were not educated in a trulydemocratic spirit and we cannot talk about the pressureof public opinion in this area. And there has beendeterioration, even a partial destruction by under-funding of the education institutionalized system ofstate, by incompetence, carelessness or politicking.

We woke up in the year of grace 2010 that we

have not really related to nothing. Overturned hierarchyof values by the communist regime, promoting theincompetence on the principle of human resourcesrotation, continued after 1989 being achieved bypromoting non-values based on political partisanship inall post-communist governments. The phenomenon ofpurchasing degrees and scientific titles just blended

perfectly with preventing access of those with realpotential but no money or party membership cards topublic offices or sometimes even to education.

This Romanian atypical crisis becomes atrademark of the lack of moral compass, promotingnon-values and a deadly combination with increasinglyfrequent democratic drift generated by the Romanian

president Traian Basescu and the ruling DemocraticLiberal party.


31/48

31

Voting on the Internet, future electionsby Marinela RA

Electronic voting is,without mourning, one of themost anticipated applications of

new technologies, but perhapsthe most important democraticelections. Like other Europeancountries, Romania has takeninto account the possibility thatin the near future citizens could

vote on a virtual platform. I intend to underline the

benefits, but also the weaknesses of such a votingsystem, under which elections in recent years haveshown us every time allegations of fraud not fromthose who won elections but from the losers.

A most recent debate on this subject in Romaniatook place after the presidential elections of 2009. Afterthe second round, polls showed the winner was Social

Democratic president, Mircea Geoan, but aftercounting the votes, Democratic Liberal Traian Bsescu

was declared winner. It was even said that Bsescu wasmade president of the Diaspora, who decided tooverthrow the final score. Accusations from the Social

Democrats and the release of election fraud in pollingstations abroad followed. Moreover, the CentralElectoral Bureau showed a record number of votes

from the Romanians abroad: over 140,000. There weredoubts on how elections were held in France, wherethousands of voters put on the ballot every threeseconds. In this context, it was resumed in Romania totalk about electronic voting via the Internet.

But why would politicians want to introduce thisscheme? One possible reason is the dramatic decline of

voter turnout, especially among youth. So, politiciansargue that it will be convenient for voters, that it couldincrease participation among young people, that it couldresult in a cheap and effective counting and couldreduce the incidence of human error. Development ofelectronic voting technology is stimulated by nationalgovernments and in the context of Framework

Programmes EU15. Switching to Internet electionswould give voters a choice from home or at work. Themain difference between remote electronic voting (Ved)and traditional voting is that remote electronic votingcan be done in privacy and safety of their own home


32/48


33/48

33

carry a national identity card equipped with a computer-

readable microchip and it is these cards which they useto get access to the online ballot. All a voter needs is acomputer, an electronic card reader, their ID card andits PIN, and they can vote from anywhere in the world.

Thus, for any voting system citizens confidence

is the most important. Virtual vote seems inevitablefrom the perspective that it has low costs, but realchances to be put into practice will increase inproportion to peoples trust and internet access.


34/48

34

The European Union and Kosovo: transforming, containing or losing it?

by Roxana RIZEA

Western Balkans has been aconstant unease for the globalpowers, due to their strategicposition. The Kosovo issue isperhaps the bone of contention inthe repeated Balkan crises. As theunilateral independence claimed byKosovo and the principle ofterritorial integrity proclaimed bySerbia seem to be diametrically

opposed the only viable solution that appears to bemore and more promoted is that of resolution betweenthe two parties inside the European Union.

After the dissolution of the Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) into five independentstates in 1992 Slovenia, Macedonia (FYROM),Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the autonomousprovince of Kosovo also proclaimed its independence,bringing forward as arguments not only a de facto rightunder the former SFRY Constitution to proceed assuch, but also the constant infringement of itsautonomy by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

As its independence was recognized at that momentonly by Albania, a decade of conflict followed betweenKosovo, in its quest for self-determination, and theFRY, of which it was legally a part. The atrocities of theMilosevic regime determined the intervention of NATOforces against the FRY in 1999, followed by theadoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244(1999), setting up a transitional internationaladministration for Kosovo and aiming to find a solutionto the future status of Kosovo. However, in February

2008, Kosovo proclaimed again its independence,recognized so far by three out of five permanentmembers of the UNSC, and in total, by 68 out of 192members of the United Nations. The InternationalCourt of Justice is soon to give its advisory opinion, atthe request of the General Assembly of the UN, on theconformity of Kosovos unilateral declaration of

independence (UDI) with international law. The positions of the members of the

international community with regard to Kosovosrecognition of independence remain divergent, as noparty can convince the other of the validity of itsarguments. This deadlock dialogue can be overcome


35/48


36/48


37/48

37

maintain their position, while the 1/3 of UN States,

having already recognized the entity as a State based onthat declaration, would find it difficult to withdraw theirrecognition.

On the other hand, the ICJ may decide to extendthe matter under scrutiny beyond the analysis regardingthe conformity of the UDI with international law, insuch a way as to include its opinion on the right of

external self-determination of Kosovo and/or itsstatehood. In this situation, the alternative would beeither to deliver an ambiguous position, that wouldprovide both parties with the necessary arguments insupport of their interpretation, or to confirm Serbias

arguments. Both possibilities would not facilitate the

search for a sustainable political agreement: the firstoption would lead us back to the status quo ante, whilethe second one would preserve the status quo. Neitherthe status quo ante, nor the status quo could provide for areintegration of Kosovo into the international legalorder.

All in all, the advisory character of the opinion is

not expected to produce serious changes in the alreadyadopted positions of international community members

with respect to Kosovo. Nonetheless, as alreadymentioned above, a certain political significance couldbe attached to the opinion.


38/48

38

Organizers of the Sixth Edition of the Ovidiuincai European School2009-2010

Adrian SEVERIN, Anne JUGNARU,President of the Advisory Board Director of the Ovidiu incai European School

of the Ovidiu incai European School

Diana RISTA, George-Vadim TIUGEA,Project Assistant, Project Assistant,

Ovidiu incai European School Ovidiu incai European School


39/48

39

Lecturers of the Sixth Edition of the Ovidiuincai European School 2009-2010

Alexandru ATHANASIU,former Minister of Labourand Social Protection (1996-1999)and of Education, Research and Youth(2003-2004)

Alexandru RADU,Professor, Faculty of Political Science,

Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest

Anne JUGNARU,Director of the Ovidiu Sincai

European School

Aurora LIICEANU,Senior Researcher within the PsychologyInstitute of the Romanian Academy

Cristian PRVULESCU,

Dean of the Faculty of Political Science,State University for Political Studiesand Administration, Bucharest

Daniel BARBU,Professor, Faculty of Political Science,University of Bucharest


40/48

40

Doru POP,Professor, Faculty of Theatre

and Television, Babes-Bolyai University,Cluj-Napoca

Emil CONSTANTINESCU,President of Romania (1996-2000)

Ilie ERBNESCU,economic analyst,former Minister of Reform(December 1997 April 1998)

Ioan DEAC,Professor, Carol I National DefenceUniversity, Bucharest

Teodor MELECANU,

Senator, former Ministerof Foreign Affairs (1992-1996)and of Defence (2007-2008)

Vladimir PASTI,Professor, State University forPolitical Studies and Administration,Bucharest


41/48

41

Participants to the Sixth Edition of the Ovidiuincai European School2009-2010

Andrei ANCA,Social Inspector,

Territorial Labour Inspectorate, Timis County,Member of the Democratic Liberal Party

Anca Daniela ANTON, Advisor, National Commission forHospital Accreditation

Dan Marcel BRBU,State Inspector,Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure

Mihaela BOTIZAN,Legal Advisor, National Authorityfor Property Restitution

Eugen COJOCARIU,

Secretary General,Radio Romania International

Adrian CONSTANTINESCU ,Lawyer, Vrancea Bar


42/48

42

Mirela DINCU,English Language Teacher,Spiru Haret National College, Bucharest

Maria Mirela DRGSTAN,Director Coordinator, RomanianPost Company - Bacau branch

George Ionu DUMITRIC,Member of Parliament,National Liberal Party

Adriana ENACHE,Administrative Assistant,Embassy of Canada

Rucsandra FILLOREANU,Programme Assistant, QVORUM European Institute

for Participative Democracy

Veronica FRUMUZACHE,Chief-Economist, AgriteamExpert Company


43/48

43

Iulia HUIU,Head of Analysis and Strategy Direction,National Liberal Party

Dan Alexandru IONESCU,Expert, National Bankof Romania

Andrei Constantin IONI,Lawyer, Arad Bar

IUGA Tibor,Advisor, Executive Presidium,of the Hungarian Democratic Union

KEDVES Zalan,Advisor, Ministry of Regional Developmentand Tourism

Andrei KOSZTI,Lawyer, Bucharest Bar


44/48

44

Barbu MATEESCU,Researcher, "Ovidiu Sincai" Institute

MIKLOSI Ildiko,Media Advisor, Executive Presidiumof the Hungarian Democratic Union

Alina Daniela MOISE,Psychologist, Executive Secretary,Conservative Party, Bucharest branch

George Marius MOLDOVEANU,Local Councillor, 4th District,Bucharest, Conservative Party

Andrei ORBAN,Director of the Timis CountyPrefect Chancellery, Member ofthe Democratic Liberal Party

Emanuela PENDIUC,TV Moderator and Journalist,Romanian Public Television

G PETRE


45/48

45

George PETRE,Legal Advisor, Human Rights Department,Romani CRISS

Luiza-Maria PETRESCU,Legal Advisor, National

Authority for Property Restitution

Lucian Traian POENARU,Lawyer, Stoica & AssociatesLaw Firm,Bucharest

Andreea POPESCU-CREULESCU,Special Reporter and Moderator,

Realitatea TV channel

Marinela RA,

Editor, Political Section,Evenimentul zileidaily newspaper

Roxana RIZEA,Advisor, European Parliament

Vi t i STOICIU


46/48

46

Victoria STOICIU,Project Coordinator,Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Bucharest Office

Ionu-Marian STROE,Member of Parliament,National Liberal Party

Mugurel SURUPCEANU,Member of Parliament,Deputy Leader of theSocial Democratic Party Group

Cristian TABR,Director of the Movie Department,Romanian Public Television

Cristian Gabriel WINZER,Associate Lawyer,Dnil, Petre & Partnerslaw firm,Bucharest


47/48

47

MondoMedia Editorial GroupDirector: Anne Jugnaru

Edited by George-Vadim TiugeaBucharest, Romania

June 2010

ISSN 1844 6574


48/48

48

revista seos 2010

Documents