Comparison with the similar arguments put forward by the laws in the Crito showshow closely considerations of patriotism intertwine with those of abstract justice; thecitizen must regard his city as his parents, and in virtue of that relationship he mustacknowledge an abstract obligation to obey it. This diversity of opinion amplyconμrms Morrison’s shrewd observation that ‘the great messy hairball of the issuethat is the philosopher’s return to the cave has no clear resolution without importing agreat deal that is not explicit in the text, so any answer that is put forward by itsadvocates is speculative’ (pp. 242–3).

In addition to the value of its bibliography, a volume of this kind provides asnapshot of the scholarly work being done on its subject (primarily in theAnglophone world) at the time of its publication. Its longer-term utility depends onthe value of its individual contributions, some of which are likely to enter the canonof the literature on the dialogue, while others sink without trace. I am prepared tohazard the prediction that among the contributions to this volume which will still beregularly read in twenty years’ time are those by Sedley, Nicholas Denyer on the Sunand Line (a model of lucidity, which makes illuminating use of the mathematicalbackground) and Jessica Moss on the critique of imitative poetry; the clarity andfreshness of this piece make it, in my view, one of the best discussions of this hoarytopic, and it should be on everyone’s reading list.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford C.C.W. TAYLORchristopher.taylor@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

THE SOPHIST

Ambuel (D.) Image and Paradigm in Plato’s Sophist. Pp. xviii + 279.Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2007. Cased, US$32. ISBN:978-1-930972-04-9.doi:10.1017/S0009840X08001868

A.’s book treats Plato’s Sophist in three parts. It μrst presents an analysis of the wholedialogue, although the μnal deμnition (264b–268a) is visited brie·y. Then a newtranslation is provided, followed by an appendix which examines some scholarlydiscussions (the main target is G.E.L.Owen, Plato on Not-being [1971]). Thetranslation is generally good, and its readable English will lessen the stress for readerswho μnd the dialogue full of unusual expressions and complex arguments. While it isbased on the new OCT (D. Robinson, 1995), it has the good sense, for example, toadopt the manuscripts’ reading against the emendation at 251a (p. 224, n. 211).

The whole strategy for reading the Sophist is presented at the outset (pp. xiv–xv). A.aims to establish three main points in the book: (1) the dialogue as a whole is‘aporetic’, creating a reductio ad absurdum, for its apparent conclusion derives from‘assumptions that are shown in the middle section to be untenable’; (2) the dialogue ismeant to cricitise Parmenides, whose incomplete thought leads to sophistry; (3) thedialogue indirectly argues for ‘the necessity of the ontological distinction betweenparadigm and image, the basis for the theory of participation as an account of realityand meaning’. The meaning of these claims gradually emerges as the author proceedsto analyse each argument.

However, a reader may feel ambivalent about a combination of the step-by-stepanalysis of Plato’s argument and the proposed line of reading, repeated throughoutthe book. On the one hand, the analysis seems to pay due attention to the details of

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the argument from the μrst part of the dialogue, which is often neglected by analyticphilosophers. It provides a good guide for readers, and helps them to follow thedi¸cult arguments. It also introduces relevant texts from Plato and Aristotle.However, the references to and comparisons with other works are not neutral butdeeply embedded in the whole strategy of reading the Sophist as an intended failure.For example, the survey of Plato’s method of division (pp. 10–33) tries to show howthe Sophist, in contrast with the others, fails. While the point that the Sophist concerns‘negative deμnition’ (pp. 28, 41, 47, 50, etc.) is philosophically interesting, it is simplytaken as a mark of failure. Moreover, A. even suggests that ‘the demarcation betweensophistry and philosophy is made more clearly here [i.e. Phlb. 15b–c] than in theSophist’ (p. 25). It is unlikely that a full discussion of dissociation between the sophistand the philosopher in the Sophist does not match a single passage, howeversigniμcant, of the Philebus, where no single example of sophistês or sophistikosappears.

A. identiμes the starting point of ‘failure’ as the initial agreement that locates thesophistry in art (221c–d; cf. pp. 41–5, 52, etc.). That agreement is indeed problematic,but it does not follow that the whole attempt is destined to fail completely. Sophistry isnot nothing, but something like an art, so it is reasonable to pursue its essence withinthe μeld of art as far as possible. If it eventually emerges how sophistry di¶ers fromgenuine art, this conclusion does not necessarily come from a reductio.

Commentators generally agree that the initial attempts at deμnition of the sophist(up to 236c) are stuck so that the μrst half of the middle section (up to 251a) isaporetic, even though it contains many hints of philosophical importance. Thedeparture of A.’s reading from the traditional one is his assumption that the aporeticcharacter continues through the middle section and up to the end; in other words, hesees that the initial misleading position governs the whole dialogue, to which Platonever provides (nor intends) any solution or analysis through a long discussion.However, whereas one might follow A.’s continual indications of problems andfailures in Plato’s argument up to 251a, it will be di¸cult to accept that the latter half(usually called the ‘solution’ part concerning dialectic, the combination of megistagenê, and the explication of falsehood) goes on committing the same error (pp. 141–3,157–8); the treatment of this crux (Part 3, about 50 pages) is comparatively short andsimple if we consider the ordinary treatment of it.

Some Platonic dialogues are normally called aporetic because they end in aporiawithout any positive conclusion (e.g. Charmides, Euthyphro, Theaetetus). In theSophist, however, while the interlocutors explicitly conclude the μrst inquiry intobeing and not-being as ‘aporiai’ (250d–251a), from there they turn to solving theseaporiai, eventually to declare that the inquiry has been successful (258c–260b,264b–265b, 268b–d). Therefore, when A. calls Soph. aporetic, his appellation divergesfrom the ordinary use and Plato’s use of that word. Plato himself gives us noindication in the Sophist that the whole inquiry, especially the μnal conclusion, is afailure.

Apart from the strategic implausibility, the role of the main speaker, the EleaticVisitor, remains unexamined. A. never discusses who this person is, but seems to takeit for granted that the Eleatic Visitor reproduces the failure of Parmenides and‘Eleatic’ dichotomy (pp. 86, 92, cf. Point 2). The μrst introduction of this guest (216a)indicates that he has some connection with Parmenides and the Eleatic circle, but itdoes not specify what (for an extreme possibility, see N.-L. Cordero’s reading of thetext in his French and Spanish editions). At least the Eleatic Visitor clearly announcesthat he will cross-examine and refute his father’s (sc. Parmenides’) logos (241d–242a).

66 the classical review

However, A. takes it that the Eleatic Visitor keeps the mistaken premises ofParmenides till the end of the dialogue. I wonder, for example, how we understand hisrole in the subsequent dialogue, the Politicus, which has little to do with Eleaticism. Itwould be more reasonable to suppose, as most commentators do, that, at least in thelatter half of the middle section, the Eleatic Visitor corrects, through good dialecticaldiscussion, some insu¸cient ideas of Parmenides, so that Plato presents positivearguments there.

Although the preceding works that A. mainly considers, namely those of Owen andR.E. Allen, are important, the recent literature both in English and in other languagespays more attention to the dialogue as a whole and sheds new light on it. It isunfortunate that A. misses these new arguments to balance against his own. If A.’sattempt to prove Points 1 and 3 fails, as I feel it does, it should be concluded that‘participation’ as discussed in the middle dialogues is irrelevant, and that the issue of‘image and reality’ is di¶erently treated here. According to the hermeneutic principle,wherever Plato appears to fail in argument, we should reconsider our own readingand ask whether we are missing something important. Plato’s dialogues, especially theSophist, challenge us as a mirror of our own philosophy.

Keio University NOBURU NOTOMInotomi@z8.keio.jp

THE SEVENTH LETTER

Knab (R.) (ed., trans.) Platons Siebter Brief. Einleitung, Text,Übersetzung, Kommentar. (Spudasmata 110.) Pp. viii + 337.Hildesheim, Zurich and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006. Paper,€48. ISBN: 978-3-487-13168-9.doi:10.1017/S0009840X0800187X

The Seventh Letter, addressed to the followers of Dio of Syracuse, is without doubt acentral document for the study of Plato’s biography, political philosophy andconceptions of orality and literacy. This is true whether it is a genuine work of Platoor a forgery by an Academic philosopher writing some years after Plato’s death. Anew study of such an important text is always welcome, and K.’s edition with Germantranslation, commentary and introduction raises high expectations. It originates inthe author’s dissertation submitted at the University of Tübingen in 2005.

The Introduction starts with a chapter on the uexata quaestio of authenticity. K.lists some of the major arguments that have been used in the past to contest Plato’sauthorship. Without going into details, he rejects them all by following the argumentsof previous scholars. He states that authenticity has become a communis opinio today;but this conclusion seems to be somewhat exaggerated, since scholars as distinguishedas Mansfeld, Tarrant and Schoμeld deny authenticity of the whole or parts of theletter.1

A chapter follows on the events in Sicily between 413 and 344. Such a discussion iscrucial for the problems of chronology and for the motives of the people involved.

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1J. Mansfeld, ‘Greek Philolosophy in the “Geschichte des Altertums” ’, Elenchos 10 (1989),23–60; H. Tarrant, ‘Middle Platonism and the Seventh Epistle’, Phronesis 28 (1983), 75–103;M. Schoμeld, Plato. Political Philosophy (Oxford, 2006), pp. 13–19.