roger claessens* ideje i inicĲative od kada se dogodio ...bankarstvo 7 - rezime prva reakcĳa na...

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RezimePrva reakcĳa na finansĳsku krizu decenĳe jeste da se pojačaju

pravila supervizĳe, regulativa i zakoni. Neke ideju su dobrodošle, druge su diskutabilnĳe. Neka su pitanja pokrenule vlade, druga institucĳe poput BIS, Banke za međunarodna poravnanja u Bazelu, neka od centralnih banaka, ili od svetskih organizacĳa, a da i ne pominjemo brojne organe supervizĳe. Ovaj članak ima za cilj da uvede nešto reda u sve ovo za potrebe nekih budućih studĳa.

Smatram da sve dok investitori budu zahtevali dvocifrenu zaradu na svoje investicĳe, taj izazov će zahtevati i nepotrebno ulaženje u rizik. Regulativa neće to korigovati. Samo će sprečavati ponovno događanje istog u bliskoj budućnosti.

Ključne reči: bankrotstvo, investiciona banka, likvidnost, solventnost, garancĳa, kapitalizacĳa, merdžeri, razdvajanja, kratka prodaja, derivati, stresno testiranje, kamatna stopa, oporezivanje, monetarni fond, supervizĳa, finansĳski centri, trezor, računovodstvena pravila, agencĳe za kreditni rejting.

aktuelno

IDEJE I INICĲATIVE OD KADA SE DOGODIO KOLAPS LEHMAN BROTHERS KOMPANĲE

Roger Claessens*

* Profesor UBI - United Business Institutes, Brussels

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state of the art

Summary The first reaction to the financial crises of the decade is to strengthen

supervision, rules, regulations and laws. Some ideas are welcome, others more debateable. Some issues have been brought forward by governments, others by institutions such as the BIS, Bank for International Se�lements in Basle, some Central Banks, some world organisations, not to mention the numerous supervisory authorities. The article aims at pu�ing some order in all this for eventual further study.

I feel that as long as investors will demand double digit earnings on investments, that challenge will require undue risk taking. The regulations are not going to correct this. They will only prevent the reoccurrence in the near future of more of the same.

Key words: bankruptcy, investment bank, liquidity, solvency, guaranty, capitalisation, mergers, spli�ing up, short selling, derivatives, stress test, interest rate, taxation, monetary fund, supervision, financial centres, treasury, accounting rules, credit rating agencies.

IDEAS AND INITIATIVES

SINCE THE COLLAPSE

OF LEHMAN BROTHERS

Roger Claessens*

* Prof. UBI - United Business Institutes, Brussels

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Primetili ste, svakako, kolika je bila količina loših vesti krajem 2008. i početkom 2009. godine, naročito nakon

spektakularne propasti Investicione banke Lehman Brothers u septembru 2008. godine. Ovaj najveći potres u najnovĳoj krizi bankrotstvo Banke Lehman, jasno je pokazalo cenu kada se dopusti kolaps velike finansĳske institucĳe. Poverenje je isparilo a krediti presušili. Toga jutra, u ponedeljak 15. septembra, bili smo svedoci kako službenici kompanĳe Lehman sklanjaju dosĳea, sve što nosi logo kompanĳe, kao i sve drugo što pripada svetskom sedištu ove kompanĳe na adresi 745 Sedma avenĳa u Njujorku. Neverovatan događaj: banka sa prvoklasnim rejtingom otišla u bankrotstvo, ništa manje!

Što se toga tiče, ustvari i sama reč bankrotstvo sadrži reč “banka”. Izraz bankrotstvo je formiran na osnovu stare latinske reči bancus (što označava klupu ili sto) i reči ruptus (ili polomljen). Reč “banka” je prvobitno označavala klupu, koju su prvi bankari koristili na javnim mestima, na pĳacama i vašarima, na kojoj su izlagali svoj novac, ispisivali svoje menice itd. Od tada, uvek kada neki bankar propadne, on slomi klupu, da bi se obavestila javnost da osoba kojoj je pripadala klupa više nĳe u mogućnosti da nastavi sa svojim poslovanjem. Kako je ova praksa bila veoma učestala u Italĳi, kaže se da je izraz bankrotstvo nastao iz italĳanskog jezika, banco ro�o, trula klupa, propala banka.

Kao što svi dobro znamo, ne padaju u bankrotstvo samo pravna ili fizička lica, već takođe i države. Španĳa, najmoćnĳa država u drugoj polovini šesnaestog veka, postala je prva suverena država u istorĳi koja je proglasila bankrotstvo.

Karakteristično, oslobađanje od dugova bilo je uvedeno Anglo-američkim zakonom o bankrotstvu iz 1705. godine, kada je oslobađanje od nenaplativih dugovaa bilo ponuđeno kao nagrada za one koji su bankrotirali, a bili voljni da sarađuju u sakupljanju aktive, sredstava, da bi platili što se platiti može.

Međutim, bankrotstvo kompanĳe Lehman Brothers poslalo je drugačĳe šokove na tržišta, ne samo zato što je banka bila sa “A” rejtingom, već i zato što su se i mnoge druge institucĳe suočavale sa ozbiljnim problemom solventnosti,1 a neke druge istovremeno sa problemom solventnosti i likvidnosti.2 Bili smo svedoci masivnih intervencĳa centralne banke

1 Koeficĳent solventnosti pokazuje proporcĳu akcionarskih sredstava u ukupnoj aktivi. U slučaju bankrotstva i potom likvidacĳe entiteta: sva aktiva se prodaje, kreditori su isplaćeni (socĳalno osiguranje, porezi i tako dalje, veoma je dugačka lista), a ono što je preostalo, ako ga uopšte bude, pripada akcionarima.

2 Koeficĳent likvidnosti pokazuje proporcĳu između kratkoročne aktive i kratkoročne pasive. Upravljanje GAP-ovima je upravljanje tokovima sredstava dobĳenih od otplate kredita od klĳenata i isplate depozita klĳentima.

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You will have noticed the amount of bad news end 2008 and early 2009, especially a�er the spectacular failure

of the Investment Bank, Lehman Brothers in September 2008. This most seismic event of the last crisis, the bankruptcy of Lehman, clearly demonstrated the cost of le�ing a big financial institution collapse. Trust evaporated and credit dried up. The morning of Monday, September 15 witnessed scenes of Lehman employees removing files, items with the company logo, and other belongings from the world headquarters at 745 Seventh Avenue. An incredible event: a prime rated bank, going bankrupt, just like that!

As a ma�er of fact the word bankruptcy contains the le�ers "bank". The word bankruptcy is formed from the ancient Latin bancus (a bench or table), and ruptus (broken). "Bank" originally referred to a bench, which the first bankers had in the public places, in markets or fairs on which they tolled their money, wrote their bills of exchange, etc. Hence, when a banker failed, he broke his bank, to advertise to the public that the person to whom the bank belonged was no longer in a condition to continue his business. As this practice was very frequent in Italy, it is said the term bankrupt is derived from the Italian, banco ro�o, broken bank.

As we all know not only moral or physical persons go bankrupt but also states. Spain the most powerful nation in the second half of the sixteenth century became the first sovereign nation in history to declare bankruptcy.

The characteristic discharge of debts was introduced to Anglo-American bankruptcy act in 1705, where the discharge of un-payable debts was offered as a reward to bankrupts who cooperated in the gathering of assets to pay what could be paid.

However, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers sent different shocks into the markets not only because the bank had an "A" rating but also because a lot of other institutions were

facing serious solvency1 problems and some others liquidity2 and solvency problems at the same time. We witnessed massive central bank and state interventions in numerous countries mainly to protect jobs but even more so protect their citizens from a global meltdown.

Why are we talking about a global meltdown? The banking sector failed!3 "Banks are meant to allocate capital to businesses and consumers efficiently; instead, they lent credit to anyone who wanted it. Banks are supposed to make money by skilfully managing risk of transforming short-term debt into long-term loans; instead they were undone by it. They are supposed to expedite the flow of credit through economies; instead, they ended up blocking it." It is a harsh statement, in my view. Quite a lot of banks were not in that situation. The most visible and well known banks were. Even then, in that group there were exceptions. Whatever happened, it did long term damage to the financial system and to public finances.

An amazing amount of measures were taken or are under discussion. It is worth reviewing them. Undoubtedly, you have the required background for what follows. The measures described below were taken or are under discussion in a variety of countries. The list of measures is interesting and should help you in understanding our economic environment and the potential new regulations that lie ahead!

Measures related to the banks’ balance sheet & cash flow.

Bank deposit guaranteeBefore the crises, few depositors in the G7

countries thought about to the fact that a bank could go bankrupt and moneys deposited with it could get lost. Suddenly the deposit guaranty schemes came back to the forefront. A deposit guarantee scheme functions like an insurance. In case of disaster, the insurance company pays. Some of us realised that, amazingly so, certain

1 A solvency ratio shows the proportion of shareholders’ funds to total assets. In case of bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation of an entity: all assets are sold, creditors repaid (social security, taxes and so on, a very long list) and what is le� over, if any, belongs to the shareholders.

2 A liquidity ratio shows the proportion between short term assets and short term liabilities. GAP management is the management of flows of funds from the repayment of loans by customers and the repayment of deposits to customers.

3 Source The Economist May 16th 2009

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i države u mnogobrojnim zemljama, uglavnom da bi se zaštitila radna mesta, ali čak više da bi se zaštitili njihovi građani od globalnog propadanja.

Zašto govorimo o globalnom propadanju? Bankarski sektor je otkazao!3 “Banke su tu da efikasno alociraju kapital biznisima i potrošačima, umesto toga, one su odobravale kredite svakome ko ih je tražio. Banke treba da prave novac veštim upravljanjem rizikom transformacĳe kratkoročnog duga u dugoročne kredite; umesto toga, to je bio izvor njihove propasti. One treba da ubrzaju kreditne tokove kroz ekonomĳu; umesto toga, one su završile njihovim blokiranjem.” Teške su ovo reči, po mom mišljenju. Znatan broj banaka nĳe bio u toj situacĳi. Ali one najeksponiranĳe i najpoznatĳe banke jesu. Čak i tada, u toj grupi bilo je izuzetaka. Bez obzira šta se desilo, nanelo je dugoročnu štetu finansĳskom sistemu i javnim finansĳama.

Zapanjujuća količina mera je preduzeta ili su one sada na razmatranju. Vredno je pažnje da ih razmotrimo. Nesumnjivo, imate neophodnu osnovu za ono što sledi. Mere koje opisujemo u daljem tekstu bile su preduzete ili se sada razmatraju u raznim zemljama. Lista mera je zanimljiva i trebalo bi da vam pomogne u razumevanju našeg ekonomskog okruženja i potencĳalno nove regulative koja nam predstoji!

Mere koje se odnose na bilans stanja banaka i gotovinske tokove

Garancĳe bankarskih depozitaPre krize, malo je bilo deponenata u

zemljama G7 koji su razmišljali o činjenici da njihova banka može da bankrotira i da njihov novac, kod nje deponovan, mogu da izgube. Iznenada su se šeme za garantovanje depozita vratile u prvi plan. Šema garantovanja depozita funkcioninše kao osiguranje. U slučaju nesreće, osiguravajuće društvo plaća. Neki od nas su shvatili, na svoje čuđenje, da izvesne zemlje

imaju mnogo darežljivĳe šeme od nekih drugih zemalja. Rezultat toga bila je neka vrsta opšteg svrstavanja u garantovanju depozita građana kod banaka do iznosa od 100.000 EUR. Razne zemlje su morale da prilagode svoje limite naviše!

Rekapitalizacĳa banakaRizik solventnosti, ima značajnu ulogu u

relevatnoj regulativi Banke za međunarodno saldiranje (Bank of International Se�lement)4 koja ima sedište u Bazelu, u Švajcarskoj. Prvi set pravila vezanih za solventnost naziva se Bazel 1 pravilima, zajedno sa opšte poznatim koeficĳentom Cook (Cook ratio). 5 Ova formula je poboljšana i postala mnogo sofisticiranĳa uvođenjem regulative Bazel 2. Međutim, zahtev za minimumom kapitala pokazao se kao suviše nizak čak i po ovoj novoj formuli. Pokazalo se da, u uslovima stresa, događaji uglavnom izvan kontrole menadžmenta, zahtevaju više kapitala. Znatan broj velikih međunarodnih banaka se našao u toj situacĳi i one su morale da mobilišu kapital i traže nove akcionare. Banke koje su bile u najgoroj situacĳi, jednostavno su morale da mole za novac od svojih nacionalnih vlada. Neke su banke sada praktično u vlasništvu države. Mogli bismo da evoluiramo ka fiksiranom plafonu ukupnog iznosa aktive koju banka može da drži u odnosu na svoj kapital.

Banka za međunarodna poravnanja (BIS) potvrdila je 13. jula ove godine da je Bazelski komitet za bankarsku supervizĳu odobrio nove standarde za unapređenje izgradnje kapitalnih amortizera, koji se mogu koristiti u vremenima stresa, da bi se ojačala pravila Bazela 2.6

Kupovina aktive lošeg kvaliteta (toksična aktiva / TARP)

TARP je skraćenica za Troubled Asset Relief Programme (Program za rešavanje problema problematične aktive).

Ne treba naglašavati da je glavni uzrok nestabilnosti na tržištu izazvan kolapsom tržišta nekretnina u SAD i povezanim finansiranjem

3 Izvor: The Economist, 16. maj 2009. godine.4 Vidi www. bis. org.5 Ovaj koeficĳent je sada otišao u istorĳu, kao rezultat uvođenja regulative Bazela 2 pre nekoliko godina. Cook koeficĳent

je određivao da banka treba da ima 8% svoje rizikom ponderisane aktive u vlasničkom kapitalu.6 The Economist, 18. jul 2009. godine

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countries had much more generous schemes than others. The result was a sort of general realignment guaranteeing deposits of private citizens with banks up to 100.000 Euro. Various countries had to adjust that limit upwards!

Bank re-capitalisationThe solvency risk has a prominent role

with the relevant regulations of the Bank of International Se�lements,4 located in Basel, Switzerland. The first set of rules in relation to solvency are referred to as the Basel 1 rules with the generally well known Cook ratio5. This formula was improved and got much more sophisticated with the Basel II regulations. However the minimum capital requirement proved to be too low even under the new formula. It showed that under stress, events mainly beyond management’s control, more capital was needed. Quite a lot of major international banks were in that situation and had to raise capital and seek new shareholders. The banks with the worst situation just had to beg for money from their national governments. Some banks are now virtually state owned banks. We could evolve towards a fixed ceiling on the total amount of assets that a bank can hold relative to its capital.

The Bank for International Se�lements confirmed on July 13th that the Basel Commi�ee on Banking Supervision had approved new standards to promote the building up of capital buffers that can be drawn down in times of stress, to strengthen the Basel 2 rules.6

Purchase of poor quality assets (toxic assets / TARP) TARP stands for the Troubled Asset Relief Programme.

Needless to underline that a major cause of the market upheavals was due to the collapse of the US housing market and its related financing by means of sub-prime loans, i.e. loans to borrowers with a low credit rating, which means a low repayment capability. The FED came up with a scheme to purchase the assets from the banks in order to restructure

the banks’ balance sheet and manage the poor assets in a separate entity.

Liquidity guaranteeThe first interventions came from the central

banks’ corner, predominantly the FED, the ECB (the European Central Bank), the central bank of Japan and the Bank of England. They pumped billions in the money market which virtually came to a stand still. The open market policy allowed for further injection of liquidity in the markets.

Lending guaranteeDue to the reluctance of banks to continue

to lend to each other, guarantees of repayment were extended by authorities in order to keep the lending facilities open. In some cases, this meant that corporate risk virtually became government risk.

Measures related to the sector

MergersSome banks were not in a situation to

continue operating on a free-standing basis and had to seek a stronger financial partner and merge in order to survive. Others might have to split up in order to become more transparent and have a clearer limit between the various financial professions.

Bringing investment banks under bank regulations

Most investment banks either merged or requested the "bank holding" status and declared to follow henceforth the rules and regulations applicable to commercial banks. This means amongst others raising more equity and adjusting key balance sheet ratios. The sale of assets and re-capitalisation was a fast lane approach to the structural issue. According to The Economist this has been the most dramatic u-turn of the surviving Investment Banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

4 See www.bis.org5 This ratio is now history as a result of the introduction of Basel II regulations a few years ago. The Cook ratio stipulated

that a bank should have 8% of its risk weighted assets in equity.6 The Economist July 18th 2009

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putem subprime kredita, tj. onih kredita korisnicima sa nižim kreditnim rejtingom, što znači nisku sposobnost otplate kredita. FED su izradile šemu za kupovinu aktive od banaka da bi mogle da restrukturiraju bilans stanja banaka i upravljaju lošom aktivom u posebnom entitetu.

Garancĳe za likvidnostPrve intervencĳe usledile su iz ugla

centralnih banaka, predominantno FEDa, Evropske centralne banke (ECB), Centralne banke Japana i Bank of England. One su upumpale milĳarde novčano tržište, koje je bukvalno bilo prestalo da funkcioniše. Politika otvorenog tržišta omogućila je dalje injekcĳe likvidnosti u tržišta.

Garancĳe za kreditiranjeUsled nevoljnosti banaka da nastave sa

kreditiranjem jedne drugih, garancĳe za otplatu dale su vlasti da bi se kreditne olakšice i dalje održale na raspolaganju. U nekim slučajevima, to je značilo da je korporativni rizik bukvalno postao državni rizik.

Mere koje se odnose na sektor

MerdžeriNeke banke više nisu bile u mogućnosti

da nastave sa poslovanjem samostalno, pa su morale da potraže jačeg finansĳskog partnera i da se merdžuju da bi preživele. Neke druge će morati da se razdvajaju da bi postale transparentnĳe i da dobĳu jasnĳa razgraničenja između raznih finansĳskih profesĳa.

Dovođenje investicionih banaka pod bankarsku regulativu

Većina investicionih banaka se merdžovala ili je zatražila “bank holding” status i izjavila da će od sada pa nadalje da sledi pravila i regulativu koja se primenuje na komercĳalne banke. To znači, između ostalog, mobilisanje više vlasničkog kapitala i prilagođavanje ključnih koeficĳenata bilansa stanja. Prodaja aktive i rekapitalizacĳa bio je pristup brze trake za strukturna pitanja. Prema pisanju časopisa The Economist, to je bio najdramatičnĳi totalni zaokret u preživljavanju investicionih banaka Goldman Sachs i Morgan Stanley.

Stres test za bankeKako postalo jasno da su neke od glavnih

međunarodnih finansĳskih institucĳa podkapitalizovane i da imaju suviše malu bazu kapitala da bi se oduprle jurišu na banke (masovnom povlačenju novca od strane deponenata), ili da bi se suočile sa neotplaćivanjem kredita velikog broja dužnika, Trezor SAD sačinio je stres test. Svrha ovog testa bila je da se vidi kako bi izgledao finansĳski koeficĳenat banaka čak i pod najgorim ekonomskim uslovima.

Hipoteza za ovu vežbu je nezaposlenost u SAD 10 procenata (u vreme pisanja ovog teksta ovaj ekonomski indikator je iznosio 6, 9%), činjenica da 9 procenata svih kredita može da uđe u neizvršenje, kao i da jedan od pet kredita po kreditnim karticama bude neplaćen. Na kraju, jedna od 10 hipoteka mogla bi da propadne.

Pod najgorim pretpostavkama regulatora, 19 najvećih banaka u SAD mogle bi da pretrpe gubitke od $600 milĳardi tokom 2010. godine, povrh stotina milĳardi dolara koje su već isparile u ovoj finansĳskoj krizi. Tih 19 banaka koje su testirali zvaničnici Departmenta trezora SAD i Federalnih rezervi, drže dve trećine ukupne aktive bankarskog sistema SAD i preko polovine ukupne sume kredita odobrenih privredi Sjedinjenih Američkih Država.

Međutim, globalno gledano, rezultati testa su nagovestili da je industrĳa bankarstva SAD u boljem stanju nego što su se mnogi plašili. Od 19 najvećih banaka u državi, koje sede na čitave dve trećine ukupnih depozita u zemlji, regulatori su dali za devet od njih zdravu otpusnu listu. Preostalih 10 banaka dobilo je naređenje da mobilišu kombinovanu sumu od $75 milĳardi vlasničkog kapitala, kao amortizer protiv potencĳalnih gubitaka, ukoliko se pogorša ekonomska situacĳa. Ova je suma mnogo manja od one koju su mnogi predviđali. Ali potencĳalni gubici koje projektuju federalni regulatori, čak i za najzdravĳe banke, zbilja su zapanjujući.

Mere vezane za tržišta akcĳa

Racĳa na kratku prodaju Bilo pravilno ili pogrešno, tek za pad

tržišta akcĳa i konkretnĳe rečeno, za pad akcĳa

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Stress test for banksAs it became clear that some major

international financial institutions were undercapitalised and had too small a capital base to resist either a bank run (the massive withdrawal of money by the depositors) or to face the non repayment of loans from a large amount of borrowers, the US treasury designed a stress test. The purpose of the test was to see how banks’ financial ratio’s would look like in even worst economic circumstances.

The hypothesis for this exercise is an unemployment rate in the USA of 10 percent (at time of writing this economic indicator stands at 6.9%), the fact that 9 percent of all loans might sour and one in five credit card loans could go unpaid. Finally, one in 10 mortgages could sour.

Under regulators’ worst-case assumptions, the 19 major US banks might suffer $600 billion in losses through 2010, on top of the hundreds of billions that have already vaporized in this financial crisis. The 19 banks that were tested by Treasury Department and Federal Reserve officials account for two-thirds of the total assets of the US banking system, and more than half of the total amount of credit in the US economy.

However, broadly speaking, the test results suggested that the banking industry in the United States was in be�er shape than many had feared. Of the nation’s 19 largest banks, which sit atop two-thirds of all deposits, regulators gave nine a clean bill of health. The remaining 10 were ordered to raise a combined $75 billion in equity capital as a buffer against potential losses should the economy deteriorate. That amount is far less than many had forecast. But the potential losses that federal regulators projected, even at the soundest banks, are eye-popping.

Measures related to the stock market

Short selling crack-down Rightly or wrongly, the sudden fall of the

stock market and more specifically the stocks of the financial institutions, was blamed on the short sellers. Short selling means selling something you do not have as yet and which is to be delivered in the future. The seller bets on the fact he or she will be able to purchase the asset before delivery date at a cheaper price than the negotiated price at the moment of the conclusion of the contract, making thus a profit. It may be considered as the beginning of a vicious circle pushing markets downwards. The rules were changed so that securities had to be held before they could be sold at a later date.

Derivatives and hedge fund regulations and or supervision

A hedge fund is a fund usually used by wealthy individuals and institutions, which is allowed to use aggressive strategies that are unavailable to mutual funds, including selling short, leverage, program trading, swaps, arbitrage, and derivatives. Hedge funds are exempt from many of the rules and regulations governing other mutual funds, which allows them to accomplish aggressive investing goals. They are restricted by law to no more than 100 investors per fund, and as a result most hedge funds set extremely high minimum investment amounts, ranging anywhere from $250,000 to over $1 million. As with traditional mutual funds, investors in hedge funds pay a management fee; however, hedge funds also collect a percentage of the profits (usually 20%).7

A very strong warning for the need of regulation came with the bankruptcy of LTCM,8 the once prestigious hedge fund, which went

7 h�p://www.investorwords.com/2296/hedge_fund.html8 Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a U.S. hedge fund which used trading strategies such as fixed income

arbitrage, statistical arbitrage, and pairs trading, combined with high leverage. It failed spectacularly in the late 1990s, leading to a massive bailout by other major banks and investment houses, which was supervised by the Federal Reserve.

LTCM was founded in 1994 by John Meriwether, the former vice-chairman and head of bond trading at Salomon Brothers. Board of directors members included Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton, who shared the 1997 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Initially enormously successful with annualized returns of over 40% (a�er fees) in its first years, in 1998 it lost $4.6 billion in less than four months following the Russian financial crisis and became a prominent example of the risk potential in the hedge fund industry. The fund folded in early 2000.

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finansĳskih institucĳa, bili su okrivljeni kratki prodavci. Kratka prodaja znači prodaju nečega što još uvek nemate, a što treba da vam bude isporučeno u budućnosti. Prodavac se kladi na osnovu činjenice da će biti u mogućnosti da kupi aktivu pre datuma isporuke po je�inĳoj ceni od dogovorene u momentu zaključenja ugovora, te da će tako da napravi profit. To se može smatrati početkom začaranog kruga kojim se tržišta guraju naniže. Pravila su promenjena tako da su hartĳe od vrednosti morale biti u posedu pre nego što bi mogle biti prodate na neki kasnĳi datum.

Regulativa i/ili supervizĳa derivata i hedž fondova

Hedž fond je fond koji obično koriste bogati pojedinci i institucĳe, kome je dopušteno da koristi agresivne strategĳe koje nisu na raspolaganju uzajamnim fondovima, uključujući i kratku prodaju, leveridž, programsku trgovinu, svopove, arbitražu i derivate. Hedž fondovi su izuzeti iz mnogih pravila i regulative koja uređuje druge uzajamne fondove, što im omogućava da postižu agresivne investicione ciljeve. Oni su ograničeni zakonom na najviše 100 investitora po fondu, i kao rezultat toga većina hedž fondova postavlja ekstremno visoki minimum sume za investiranje, u rasponu od $250.000 pa do preko $1 miliona. Kao i kod tradicionalnih uzajamnih fondova, investitori u hedž fondovima plaćaju naknadu za menadžment; međutim, hedž fondovi takođe naplaćuju procenat od profita (obično 20%).7

Veoma strogo upozorenje o potrebi za regulativom došlo je zajedno sa bankrotstvom LTCM,8 ovog nekada prestižnog hedž fonda, koji je otišao u bankrotstvo 1998. godine. Derivati su u suštini finansĳski ugovori koji su način da se omogući trgovcima da hedžiraju

svoje opklade. Oni mogu zaštititi kompanĳe i banke protiv neočekivanih razvoja, na primer, naglog pada ili rasta kurseva ili robe. Derivati se takođe koriste i za špekulacĳe, gde investitori mogu povećati svoj profit ukoliko vrednost osnovnog ugovora kreće na način koji su oni očekivali. Trezor SAD želi veću regulativu derivata - kompleksnih finansĳskih instrumenata koji su bili uzrok padu nekih od najvećih imena na Volstritu.

Predlozi koje će izneti Državni sekretar Trezora SAD, Timothy Geithner, zahtevaće elektronski sistem da monitoriše kupovine i prodaje na tržištu. Firmama koje trguju u derivatima biće potrebno dovoljno kapitala u slučaju da uđu u neizvršenje, a takođe će se suočiti i sa veoma strogim zahtevoma za izveštavanje. AIG osiguravajuća kuća i Lehman Brothers banka bile su među firmama koje su doživele propast zvog trgovanja derivatima. Možda je najozloglašenĳa forma derivata svop kreditnog neizvršenja. Gigantska osiguravajuća kuća AIG to je prodavala investitorima kao jedan oblik osiguranja u svrhu zaštite od neizvršenja po hartĳama od vrednosti podržanih hipotekom. Ali je firma morala da prihvati pozamašnu federalnu novčanu pomoć kada je došla u nemogućnost da ispoštuje svoje ugovore.

Mere koje utiču na monetarnu i budžetsku politiku

Prilagođavanje kamatnih stopa (na dole)Jedno od glavnih oruđa centralne banke

je prilagođavanje kratkoročnih kamatnih stopa. Da bi se sprečilo smanjenje obima kreditiranja privatnog sektora i olakšalo finansiranje banaka, kratkoročne kamatne stope bile su drastično smanjene. Kako su kratkoročne kamatne stope pale skoro do nule,

7 h�p: //www. investorwords. com/2296/hedge_fund. html8 Long-Term Capital Management - LTCM bio je hedž fond u Sjedinjenim Državama koji je koristio strategĳe trgovanja

kao što je arbitraža za fiksnim prihodom, statistička arbitraža, i trgovanje uparenim akcĳama, kombinovano sa visokim leveridžom. Doživeo je spektakularni pad krajem 1990-tih godina, što je dovelo do masivnog iskupa od strane drugih velikih banaka i investicionih kuća pod supervizĳom Federalnih rezervi.

LTCM je osnovao 1994. godine John Meriwether, bivši podpredsednik i šef odelenja za trgovinu obveznicama u firmi Solomon Brothers. Članovi upravnog odbora bili su Myron Scholes i Robert C. Merton, koji su delili Nobelovu memorĳalnu nagradu za ekonomske nauke za 1997. godinu. U početku enormno uspešan sa godišnjim prinosom od preko 40% (posle plaćanja naknada) u svojim početnim godinama, u 1998. godini fond je izgubio $4,6 milĳardi za manje od četiri meseca, nakon ruske finansĳske krize i postao eklatantan primer rizičnog potencĳala industrĳe hedž fondova. Fond je propao početkom 2000. godine.

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bankrupt in 1998. Derivatives are basically financial contracts which are a way of allowing traders to hedge their bets. They can protect companies and banks against unexpected developments, for example sudden falls or rises in the value of currencies or commodities. Derivatives are also used in speculation, whereby investors can increase profit if the value of the underlying contract moves in the way they expect. The US Treasury wants more regulation of derivatives - the complex financial instruments that brought down some of Wall Street’s biggest names.

Proposals to be set out by the US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner will call for an electronic system to monitor buying and selling in the market. Firms trading in derivatives will need enough capital in case they default and will face tough reporting requirements. AIG and Lehman Brothers were among the firms ruined by dealing in derivatives. Perhaps the most notorious form of derivative is the credit-default swap. Insurance giant AIG sold these to investors as a form of insurance to protect against defaults on mortgage-backed securities. But the firm had to accept a he�y federal bailout a�er it was unable to support the contracts.

Measures impacting on the monetary and budgetary policy

Interest rate adjustments (downwards)One of the main tools of the central bank

is the adjustment of the short term interest rates. In order to stem the decrease of lending to the private sector and facilitate funding by banks, short term interest rates were drastically reduced. As short term interest rates dropped to almost nil it encouraged investors to hold bonds rather than stay in cash or leave their money in saving accounts. As short term interest rates, inflation and long term interest rates are correlated it meant that ultimately this was also to the benefit of governments

as they started to borrow much more than usual. However as governments continued to borrowed extensively long term bond yields, at the time of writing this text, increased again reflecting the lack of appetite of investors of ever more government paper.

Help for municipalities and householdsIt surfaced that municipalities and

households held mortgage backed securities as an investment. Some of those investments had an excellent rating and were considered as "a house-farther" investment. As it turned out this was not the case, cash flows turned negative and once more mother the state was approached for help.

Corporate tax cutsIn certain countries with high salaries,

high taxes and high social security benefits, a decrease of taxation is a quick fix to help troubled companies. However, this is fine in the short term but not a means to solve the problems in the long run. Besides most developed nation have already a substantial indebtedness of which the magnitude was never reached in a period of peace.

Tax rebates for individualsTax rebates for individuals should, in theory,

have the effect to encourage consumption which decreased dramatically as bad news hit the media. At the other hand the savings ratio to GDP increased in quite a few countries demonstrating the concern of the consumers about their future.

Infrastructure improvement programs (budget deficits)

There are several key economists who marked our way of thinking on economics. One of them is the last century’s economist R. M. Keynes,9 who is known for arguing the case that in case of depression it was up to governments

9 John Maynard Keynes, (June 1883 - 21 April 1946) was a renowned economist from Britain whose many ideas on economic and political theories as well as on many governments’ monetary policies influenced America. He advocated a government that played an active role in the lives of people regarding business, economy, etc. In this role, the government would use fiscal measures to reduce the consequences of recessions and depressions, a heavy recession. His ideas are the basis for the school of thought known as Keynesian economics. Keynes was to spearhead a revolution in economic thinking overturning the older ideas which held that free markets would certainly allow full employment for all workers who agreed to lower their demands for higher wages.

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to je ohrabrilo investitore da drže obveznice umesto gotovinu ili ostavljaju novac na štednim računima. Kako su kratkoročne kamatne stope, inflacĳa i dugoročne kamatne stope u korelacĳi, to je značilo da će u krajnjoj instanci ovo biti od koristi za vlade jer su počele da se zadužuju mnogo više nego obično. Međutim, kako vlade nastavljaju da se ekstenzivno zadužuju, prinos na dugoročne obveznice ponovo se povećao reflektujući nedostatak apetita od strane investitora za još više državnih hartĳa od vrednosti.

Pomoć za opštine i stanovništvoIspostavilo se da opštine i stanovništvo

imaju u posedu hartĳe od vrednosti podržane hipotekom kao svoju investicĳu. Neke od ovih investicĳa imale su odličan rejting i smatrale se za “tatin imetak za budućnost” investicĳu. Kako se ispostavilo, to nĳe bio slučaj, gotovinski tokovi su postali negativni i još jedanput je od majke-države morala da se traži pomoć.

Smanjenje korporativnih porezaU nekim zemljama gde su visoka primanja,

visoki porezi i visoki benefiti socĳalnog osiguranja, smanjenje poreza smatra se za brzu meru pomoći kompanĳama u problemu. Međutim, kratkoročno gledano to je lepo ali nĳe način da se rešavaju problemi na dugi rok. Pored toga, većina razvĳenih nacĳa već ima znatnu zaduženost i to magnitude koja nikada nĳe bila ranĳe dostignuta u mirnodopskim vremenima.

Povraćaj poreza za privatna licaPovraćaj poreza za privatna lica, u teorĳi,

treba da ima efekat na pospešivanje potrošnje koja je dramatično opala kada su grunule loše vesti sa medĳa. S druge strane, koeficĳent štednje u odnosu na GDP (Bruto domaći proizvod - BDP) bio je povećan u znatnom broju zemalja prikazujući zabrinutost potrošača za svoju budućnost.

Programi poboljšanja infrastrukture (budžetski deficit)

Nekoliko ključnih ekonomista su zacrtali naš način razmišljanja o ekonomĳi. Jedan od njih je ekonomista iz prošlog veka R. M. Keynes9 koji je poznat po tome što je podržavao ideju da je, u slučaju depresĳe, na vladi odgovornost da održava potrošnju na dobrom nivou putem, na primer, javnih radova. Vlade su, generalno govoreći, bile više nego spremne da slede ovaj savet u svetlu nastalih deficita i eksplozĳe državne zaduženosti.

Mere prema međunarodnim organizacĳa

Jačanje međunarodnih institucĳa kao što je Međunarodni monetarni fond (International Monetary Fund - IMF)10

Iako je planina zakona, pravila i propisa impresivna, postoji osećanje da je neophodno više supervizĳe, kao i više novca da bi se finansirale nacionalne vlade. Tokom prvih meseci 2009. godine, MMF je odobrio zajmove u vrednosti od preko 50 milĳardi USD za podršku borbe za preživljavanje zemalja izgladnelih za kapitalom.

9 John Maynard Keynes (jun 1883. - 21. april 1946.) bio je čuveni ekonomista iz Britanĳe čĳe su mnoge ideje o ekonomskim i političkim teorĳama, kao i o vladinoj monetarnoj politici, uticale na Ameriku. On je zagovarao vladu koja ima aktivnu ulogu u životima ljudi u pogledu biznisa, ekonomĳe, itd. U ovoj ulozi, vlada bi primenjivala fiskalne mere za smanjenje posledica recesĳe i depresĳe, teške recesĳe. Njegove ideje su osnova škole mišljenja poznate pod nazivom Kejnezĳska ekonomĳa (Keynesian economics). Keynes je predvodio revolucĳu u ekonomskom mišljenju, obarajući starĳe ideje koje su tvrdile da će slobodno tržište zasigurno omogućiti punu zaposlenost za sve radnike koji pristanu da smanje svoje zahteve za većim nadnicama.

10 IMF (MMF), takođe poznat i kao Fond, osnovale su Ujedinjene Nacĳe, na konferencĳi Bre�on Woodsu, Nju Hempšir, SAD, jula 1944. godine. Tada je 45 predstavljenih vlada htelo da izgradi okvir za ekonomsku saradnju. Razvoj - Tokom 1990-tih godina i početkom 2000-tih, MMF je pomagao zemljama Azĳe i Latinske Amerike da se suočavaju sa finansĳskim padom, a takođe je pomogao u spasavanju Rusĳe. Kako je globalna ekonomĳa krenula početkom 2000-tih godina, opao je zahtev za zajmovima MMF-a, jer su bilateralna pomoć i grantovi počeli da rastu. Aktivnosti - Fond ima zadatak da unapređuje ekonomsku stabilnost, da pomaže u sprečavanju kriza i da pomaže u njihovom rešavanju kada se one dogode, pa time da promoviše razvoj i smanjenje siromaštva. Njegove glavne tri aktivnosti su nadzor, tehnička pomoć i kreditiranje. Nadzor uključuje monitoring ekonomskog i finansĳskog razvoja i pružanje saveta o merama politike, naročito u cilju sprečavanja izbĳanja kriza.

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to keep consumption going by means of, for instance, public works. Governments were, in general, all to keen to follow that advise with the resulting deficits and explosion of government indebtedness.

Measures related to international organisations

Strengthening International Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund10 (IMF)

Although the mountain of laws, rules and regulations is impressive it is felt more supervision is required as well as more money to finance national governments. During the first months of 2009 the IMF has lent more than 50 billion USD to shore up struggling, capital starved countries.

New supervisory institutions in the EUThe European commission announced a

plan to form two new institutions: a European Systemic Risk Council, which should provide early warning of possible risks, and a European System of Financial supervisors, which should be a super-commi�ee of regulators from across the European Union. Both institutions should correct a flaw in European bank regulation and supervision, namely that banks are free to operate across borders, they are only supervised by their home countries. Slack supervision by one country can easily affect an other country. A much cheaper option might be to strengthen the national supervisory bodies and be�er co-ordinate their functioning.

Proposed new rules for banks11 were outlined by the European Commission on July 13th. They included higher capital requirements

10 The IMF, also known as the fund, was conceived at a UN conference in Bre�on Woods, N.H., in July 1944. The 45 governments represented sought to build a framework for economic cooperation Developments - In the 1990s and early 2000s, the IMF helped countries in Asia and Latin America deal with financial meltdowns and assisted in rescuing Russia. As the global economy picked up in the early 2000s, demand for IMF loans fell as bilateral aid and grants picked up. Activities - The fund’s job is to promote economic stability, help prevent crises and help resolve them when they occur, thereby promoting growth and alleviating poverty. Its three main activities are: surveillance, technical assistance and lending. Surveillance involves monitoring economic and financial developments and the provision of policy advice, aimed especially at crisis prevention.

11 The Economist July 18th 2009

Sedište Evropske komisĳe u BriseluEuropean Commission headquarters in Brussels

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Nove supervizorske institucĳe u EUEvropska komisĳa najavila je plan da

formira dve nove institucĳe: Evropski savet za sistemski rizik, koji bi trebalo da pruža rano upozorenje na moguće rizike, kao i Evropski sistem finansĳskih supervizora, koji bi trebalo da bude super-komitet regulatora iz čitave Evropske Unĳe. Obe ove institucĳe trebalo bi da popravljaju nedostatak u evropskoj bankarskoj regulativi i supervizĳi, naime to da su banke slobodne da posluju prekogranično, a samo su pod supervizĳom svojih matičnih zemalja. Labava supervizĳa jedne zemlje mogla bi lako da ima uticaja na neku drugu zemlju. Mnogo je�inĳa opcĳa mogla bi biti da se ojačaju nacionalni organi supervizĳe i da se bolje koordinira njihovo funkcionisanje.

Predlog novih pravila za banke11 prezentovala je Evropska komisĳa 13. jula ove godine. Ta pravila uključuju zahtev za većim kapitalom potrebnim za re-sekjuritizacĳu. Od banaka će se zahtevati da uspostave “zdravu praksu nagrađivanja za rad” koja “ne ohrabruje niti nagrađuje preterani ulazak u rizik”.

Generalne regulatorne reforme, sugestĳe ili ideje koje su sada na razmatranju, kao što su:

Računovodstvena pravilaKao što već znate, imamo u suštini dva

računovodstvena standarda, GAAP i IFRS (GAAP - Opšte prihvaćena računovodstvena praksa nacionalne prirode i IFRS - Međunarodni standard finansĳskog izveštavanja - MSFI). Svet treba da krene ka jednom jednistvenom i univerzalnom standardu. To bi, ne samo poboljšalo transparentnost i finansĳsku analizu, već bi i drastično smanjilo troškove.

Na osnovu novih predloga Borda za međunarodne računovodstvene standarde (International Accounting Standards Board - IASB), postojale bi samo dve vrste kategorĳa aktive. Krediti i jednostavne dužničke hartĳe od vrednosti, koje su slične kreditima, vrednovale bi se po svojoj ceni koštanja, pod uslovom da

banke mogu da pokažu da ih drže dugoročno. Komplikovanĳe dužničke hartĳe od vrednosti, uključujući i većinu današnjih toksičkih produkata raspadanja, kao i derivate i akcĳski kapital, iskazivale bi se po tržišnim cenama. Ova kategorizacĳa je prilično proizvoljna, ali praktični rezultat bi trebalo da bude drastično pojednostavljivanje pravila i mnogo bolja uporedivost među firmama.12

Agencĳe za kreditni rejting (rangiranje, bonitet)

Deo krize koji je šokirao krajem 2008. godine, bilo je to da banka sa “A” rejtingom, Lehman Brothers, ode u bankrotstvo, jer “A” rejting ukazuje da je verovatnoća neizvršenja takve banke manja od 1% (ustvari 0,11%). Island je bankrotirao sa Baa1 rejtingom Moody’s agencĳe, kada je bio spušten u decembru 2008. godine sa A1 (što je investiciona odlična klasa). Moody’s je dala Islandu rejting od AAA u 2007. godini. U svakom slučaju, vlasti u Rejkjaviku13 nisu bile u stanju da spasavaju svoje domaće banke sa bilansnom sumom mnogo većom od svog GDP. Još jedan rezultat krize je da će banke biti još tešnje vezane za kreditni rejting zemalja u kojima imaju svoje centrale.

Postoji samo šačica agencĳa za kreditni rejting, ali su one moćne i uticajne. Međutim, postoji opšte osećanje da se njihova performansa može poboljšati. One ne bi trebalo da suviše zaostaju za činjenicama. U tom kontekstu, obratite pažnju da je sada osnovana nova agencĳa ove vrste u Brazilu koja smatra da je rejting SAD samo “AA”, a ne “AAA”!

Plate izvršnih direktoraSvet je znao za ogromne plate izvršnih

direktra, ali je bio šokiran što su kompanĳe koje su države pomogle nastavljale sa plaćanjem ogromnih plata i bonusa i to od para poreskih obveznika i uprkos neposredno predstojećem bankrotstvu.

Razlika između najniže plaćenog radnika u korporacĳi i najviše plaćenog radnika drastično je povećana tokom poslednje decenĳe. Skandal

11 The Economist, 18. jul 2009.12 The Economist, 18. jul 2009.13 Island nikako nĳe jedina zemlja koja je u ovakvoj situacĳi. Švajcarska je imala ukupnu štednju i investicĳe od 150% od svog

GDP (BDP) u iznosu od USD 440 milĳardi u 2007. godini.

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for re-securitisations. Banks would be required to have "sound remuneration practices" that do not "encourage or reward excess risk taking".

General regulatory reforms, suggestions or ideas on the table:

Accountancy rulesAs you may now we have basically two

accounting standards, the GAAP and the IFRS, the general accepted accounting practices of a national nature and the international financial reporting standards. The world should move towards one single universal standard. This would not only improve transparency and financial analysis but drastically reduce cost.

Under the new proposals of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), there would be only two types of asset categories. Loans, and simple debt securities that are similar to loans, would be valued at their cost, provided banks can show they are being held for the long term. More complicated debt securities, including most of today’s toxic detritus, as well as derivatives and equities, would be carried at market prices. This categorisation is pre�y arbitrary but the practical result should be a drastic simplification of the rules and far be�er comparability between firms.12

Credit rating agenciesA shocking part of the crisis, at the end

of 2008, was that an "A" rated bank, Lehman Brothers, went bankrupt, whereas an "A" rating indicates a default probability of less than 1% (0.11% actually). Iceland went bankrupt with a Baa1 rating by Moody’s, downgraded in December 2008 from A1 (investment grade). Moody’s had given Iceland a AAA rating in 2007. In any event, the authorities in Reykjavik13 were not in a position to bail out their nationals banks with much larger balance sheet totals than the GDP. A further result of the crises is that banks will be more closely tied to the credit worthiness of the countries in which they are headquartered.

There are only a handful of rating agencies, they are powerful and influential. However, there is a general sentiment that their performance might be improved. They should not be too much behind the facts. In this context, note that there is a new agency in Brazil which considers rating the USA as an "AA" instead of an "AAA"!

Executive payThe world new about the huge executive

pay out but got shocked that state helped companies continued to pay out huge salaries and bonuses with tax payer money and despite imminent bankruptcy.

The difference between the lowest paid worker in a corporation and the highest paid worker increased dramatically during the last decades. The ENRON scandal underlined this extensively. More shocking even were the bonuses of the bankrupt AIG, the state bailed out insurance company.

To quote The Economist14 "Faced with public outrage over what they consider to be unbridled executive greed, many governments are preparing new rules to rein in pay. Most of these measures will be aimed at companies that have been rescued at taxpayers’ expense". For instance, such rules will be part of the TARP programme mentioned earlier.

Private equityIn finance, private equity is an asset class

consisting of equity securities in operating companies that are not publicly traded on a stock exchange. Investments in private equity most o�en involve either an investment of capital into an operating company or the acquisition of an operating company. Capital for private equity is raised primarily from institutional investors. There is a wide array of types and styles of private equity and the term private equity has different connotations in different countries.

Among the most common investment strategies in private equity include leveraged

12 The Economist July 18th 200913 Iceland is by far not the only country in that situation. Switzerland total savings and investment represented 150 % if its

GDP (USD 440 billion) in 2007.14 May 30th, 2009

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kompanĳe ENRON to je uveliko podvukao. Čak su još više šokirali bonusi kompanĳe u bankrotstvu kao što je AIG, osiguravajuće kuće koju je spasila država.

Da citiramo časopis The Economis.14 “Suočene sa javnim gnevom zbog onoga što se smatra neobuzdanom pohlepom izvršnih direktora, mnoge vlade sada pripremaju nova pravila da bi se zauzdale plate. Većina tih mera usmerena je na kompanĳe koje su bile spasavane o trošku poreskih obveznika”, na primer, takva pravila će biti sastavni deo TARP programa.

Privatni kapitalU finansĳama, privatni vlasnički kapital je

klasa aktive koja se sastoji od hartĳa od vrednosti sa pravom učešća u dobiti (korporativni papiri, akcĳe) u operativnim kompanĳama kojima se javno ne trguje na berzama. Investicĳe u privatni kapital najčešće uključuju bilo investicĳu kapitala u neku operativnu kompanĳu, ili akvizicĳu operativne kompanĳe. Kapital za privatno vlasništvo prevashodno se mobiliše od institucionalnih investitora. Postoji široki asortiman vrsta i stilova privatnog vlasničkog kapitala, a izraz privatni vlasnički kapital ima različite konotacĳe u različitim zemljama.

Među najčešćim investicionim strategĳama u privatni vlasnički kapital nalaze se preuzimanje kompanĳe pozajmljenim sredstvima, venčer kapital, razvojni kapital, distressed investicĳe, kao i mezaninski kapital. U tipičnoj transakcĳi preuzimanja kompanĳe pozajmljenim sredstvima, privatna firma sa kapitalom kupuje većinsku kontrolu u nekoj postojećoj ili zreloj firmi. Ovo se razlikuje od venčer kapitala ili investicĳe u razvojni kapital, gde firma sa privatnim vlasničkim kapitalom tipično investira u mlade ili kompanĳe u nastajanju, gde retko dobĳa većinsku kontrolu.

I ovde će se više transparentnosti, bolje upravljanje i manje leveridža regulisati tokom vremena.

Regulativa u odnosu na kreditne karticeDecembra 2008. godine Federalne rezerve

su odobrile sveobuhvatna nova pravila za

kreditne kartice. Kongres SAD je rekao da to nĳe dovoljno i usvojio je sopstveni zakon koji će još ranĳe stupiti na snagu i koji će biti čak i restriktivnĳi. Neke odredbe ograničavaju stvarno groznu praksu, kao što je naplaćivanje kamate na već nagomilani saldo, ali druge sprečavaju banke od krojenja kamatnih stopa na osnovu promene rizičnosti klĳenta.

Transparentnost proizvodaČinjenica da nebankarske proizvode, kao

što su investicioni proizvodi, prodaju banke u svojim distributivnim mrežama, stvara mnogo konfuzĳe kod javnosti. Postoje pravne obaveze za obelodanivanje karakteristika proizvoda. Dokumentacĳa treba da naglasi da neki proizvodi nisu bankarski proizvodi i da investitori mogu izgubiti deo, ako ne i celokupni investirani kapital. Takođe, performanse u prošlosti ne garantuju performanse u budućnosti, i tako dalje. To je pitanje komplajansa kao i etike da se obezbedi da klĳenti budu potpuno informisani i upoznati sa proizvodom koji prodaju profesionalaci u finansĳskom sektoru. Ovde se može očekivati još više i još strožĳe regulative. Međutim, treba napomenuti da je EU Direktiva zvana MIFID (Direktiva o finansĳskim tržištima i finansĳskim instrumentima) već pokrila dobar deo ovog terena.

Off-shore centriPostoji mnogo konfuzĳe kod javnosti u

odnosu na ovu temu. Nemačka kompanĳa koja drži račun kod banke Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva u Londonu je off-shore račun. Finansĳski centri gde se nalazi najveći broj off-shore računa upravo su u Njujorku i Londonu, Singapuru i Tokĳu, zbog pogodnosti ovih velikih finansĳskih centara. Nĳe to ipak potpuno tačno, finansĳski off-shore centar (OFC), iako nĳe precizno definisan, obično je jurisdikcĳa sa labavom zakonskom regulativom i niskim porezima, koja je specĳalizovana za pružanje korporativne i komercĳalne infrastrukture za olakšavanje korišćenja te jurisdikcĳe za formiranje off-shore kompanĳa i za investiranje off-shore sredstava.

14 30. maj 2009. godine

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buyouts, venture capital, growth capital, distressed investments and mezzanine capital. In a typical leveraged buyout transaction, the private equity firm buys majority control of an existing or mature firm. This is distinct from a venture capital or growth capital investment, in which the private equity firm typically invests in young or emerging companies, and rarely obtain majority control.

Here too, more transparency, governance and less leverage will be regulated over time.

Credit card regulationsIn December 2008 the Federal Reserve

approved sweeping new rules on credit cards. Congress said it was not enough and passed its own law which takes effect sooner and is even more restrictive. Some provisions restrain genuinely odious practices, such as charging interest on already-pail balances, but others prevent banks from tailoring interest rates to customers’ changing risks.

Transparency on productsThe fact that non banking products, such as

investment products, are sold by banks in their distribution networks, creates a lot of confusion with the public. Legal obligations exist as to the disclosure of product characteristics. Documentation should underline that some products are non banking products and that investors can loose part if not the entire capital invested. Also, past performance is not a guarantee for future performance, and so on. It is a ma�er of compliance and ethics to ascertain customers are totally informed and familiar with the products sold by the professionals of the financial sector. Here too, we can expect even more stricter regulations. However, it should be pointed out that the EU Directive called the Mifid (directive on financial markets and the financial instruments) has already covered quite some ground.

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MMF smatra da su sledeće karakteristike off-shore finansĳskog centra:• Jurisdikcĳa koja ima relativno veliki

broj finansĳskih institucĳa angažovanih primarno u poslovanju sa nerezidentima;

• Finansĳski sistemi sa eksternom aktivom i pasivom neproporcionalno velikom u odnosu na domaću finansĳsku intermedĳacĳu koja ima za cilj da finansira domaću privredu i

• Centri koju pružaju neke ili sve sledeće usluge: nisko ili nulto oporezivanje; umerenu ili laku finansĳsku regulativu; bankarsku tajnost i anonimnost.Mišljenja o off-shore finansĳskim centrima

imaju tendencĳu da se polarizuju. Zagovornici sugeriraju da off-shore finansĳski centri sa dobrom reputacĳom imaju legitimnu i integralnu ulogu u međunarodnim finansĳama i trgovini, nudeći ogromne prednosti u izvesnim situacĳama za korporacĳe i za pojedince, omogućavajući legitimno upravljanje rizicima i finansĳsko planiranje. Kritičari15 tvrde da oni iscrpljuju poreze od bogatih (a i ne baš toliko bogatih) nacĳa, da nisu dovoljno regulisani, kao i da olakšavaju nelegalne aktivnosti kao što je izbegavanje poreza i pranje novca, dok izbegavaju pravni rizik pod korporativnim velom.

Neki komentatori su izrazili bojazan da će razlika u nivoima sofisticiranosti između offshore finansĳskih centara dovesti do “regulatorne arbitraže”, kao i da će pospešiti trku ka samom dnu, mada dokazi sa tržišta čini se da ukazuju da investitori više vole da koriste bolje regulisane offshore jurisdikcĳe nego one loše regulisane. Cilj je da se regulišu ti centri strožĳe, ali mislim da se više radi o borbi protiv izbegavanja poreza, što je sve jača glavobolja za vlade koje su lišene svojih para.

Konačno, jedan ponešto provokativni stav koji sam pročitao u mojoj omiljenoj publikacĳi, The Economist naglašava sledeće: “Što više finansĳski sistem zavisi od mudrosti regulatora,

to je verovatnĳe da će zbilja katastrofalno da propadne. Otud sveobuhvatno preovlađujuća važnost kapitala.”16 - a ja bih tu dodao i “profesionalnih bankara”. Kakvi god bili vaši lični zaključci, vreme je došlo “da se vratimo osnovnim postavkama”!

Ekvivalent Nacionalnom bordu za bezbednost saobraćaja

Nova ideja za buduće krize bilo bi stvaranje finansĳskog ekvivalenta Nacionalnom bordu za bezbednost saobraćaja, koji istražuje svaki slučaj pada aviona u civilnoj avĳacĳi u Americi. To bi trebalo da bude slično, nezavisno telo za istraživanje nakon događanja svakog finansĳskog kraha, da bi se videlo šta ga je prouzrokovalo i koje se lekcĳe mogu naučiti.17

Šta je to krenulo naopako?

Tržište je prihvatalo tokom mnogih godina, a isto tako izvršni direktori i akcionari, dvocifreni prinos bez ispitivanja izvora i održivosti takvih profita. To je ključno pitanje koje verovatno ima veću težinu od svih ostalih pitanja. Etika, upravljanje, sprečavanje pranja novca i toliko mnogo raznih drugih pitanja vezano je za stepen pohlepe koje su tržišta spremna da uzmu u obzir. Prema tome, nikada se nećemo otarasiti krize kao što je bila ova poslednja, a vladine intervencĳe to neće promeniti, naročito što većina vlada ima još daleki put da pređe. Da skratimo ovu argumentacĳu, samo treba da se pozovete na vebsajtove nekoliko dobro poznatih nevladinih organizacĳa, da pomenemo samo jednu od njih, Transparency International.

Na osnovu prethodnog saznanja, sada nam je jasno da bankari i kompanĳe nisu shvatili prirodu rizika. Štaviše, planovi za bonuse na bazi vlasničkog kapitala preterano se i suviše fokusiraju na profit, ali pohlepa nĳe samo karakteristika biznismena najvišeg ranga, već takođe i akcionara koji očekuju visoke

15 Dana 23. februara 2007. godine, The Economist je objavio pregled offshore finansĳskih centara; iako ovaj časopis već istorĳski ima veoma neprĳateljski stav prema OFC, izveštaj je prikazao pomeranje prema mnogo dobroćudnĳem gledanju na ulogu offshore finansĳa, i zaključio sledeće: “...iako su dobrodošle međunarodne inicĳative za smanjenje finansĳskog kriminala, šira zabrinutost u odnosu na OFC je prenaduvana. Dobro rukovođene jurisdikcĳe svih vrsta, bilo da su one nominalno on ili offshore, dobra su stvar za globalni finansĳski sistem.”

16 The Economist, 16. maj 2009.17 The Economist, 18. jul 2009.

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Off-shore centresThere is a lot of confusion with the public on

that subject. A German company that maintains an account with a UK bank in London is an offshore account. The financial centres where there are the most offshore accounts are precisely in New York and London, Singapore and Tokyo because of the proeiminence of these large financial centres. Not entirely correct, an offshore financial centre (or OFC), although not precisely defined, is usually a low-tax, lightly regulated jurisdiction which specializes in providing the corporate and commercial infrastructure to facilitate the use of that jurisdiction for the formation of offshore companies and for the investment of offshore funds.

The IMF considers the following to be characteristics of an offshore financial centre:• Jurisdictions that have relatively large

numbers of financial institutions engaged primarily in business with non-residents;

• Financial systems with external assets and liabilities out of proportion to domestic financial intermediation designed to finance domestic economies; and

• Centres which provide some or all of the following services: low or zero taxation; moderate or light financial regulation; banking secrecy and anonymity.Views of offshore financial centres tend to

be polarised. Proponents suggest that reputable offshore financial centres play a legitimate and integral role in international finance and trade, offering huge advantages in certain situations for both corporations and individuals, allowing legitimate risk management and financial planning. Critics15 argue that they drain tax from wealthy (and not so wealthy) nations, are insufficiently regulated, and facilitate illegal activities such as tax evasion and money laundering while avoiding legal risk under corporate veil.

Some commentators have expressed concern

that the differing levels of sophistication between offshore financial centres will lead to "regulatory arbitrage", and fuel a race to the bo�om, although evidence from the market seems to indicate the investors prefer to utilise be�er regulated offshore jurisdictions rather than more poorly regulated ones. The aim is to regulate those centres more tightly but I suspect predominantly to combat tax evasion, which is an increasing headache for government strapped money.

Finally, a somewhat provocative statement, read in my favourite publication, The Economist: underlines that: "The more a financial system depends on the wisdom of regulators, the more likely it is to fail catastrophically. Hence the overwhelming importance of capital"16 - and I might add of "professional bankers". Whatever your own conclusions are, it is time to go: "back to the basics"!

The equivalent of the National Transport Safety Board

A novel idea for future crises would be the creation of the financial equivalent of the National Transport Safety Board, which investigates every civil-aviation crash in America. It should be a similar independent, a�er-the-fact scrutiny of every financial failure, to see what caused it and what lessons could be learned.17

What went wrong?

The market has accepted for many years, executives as well as shareholders, double-digit returns without probing the sources and sustainability of those profits. This is a key issue which probably weights in much more than all other issues. Ethics, governance, prevention of money laundering and so many other issues are related to the degree of greed the markets are willing to consider. We will therefore never get rid of crisis such as the last one and government

15 On 23 February 2007 The Economist published a survey of offshore financial centres; although the magazine had historically been very hostile towards OFCs, the report represented a shi� towards a very much more benign view of the role of offshore finance, concluding: "...although international initiatives aimed at reducing financial crime are welcome, the broader concern over OFCs is overblown. Well-run jurisdictions of all sorts, whether nominally on- or offshore, are good for the global financial system."

16 The Economist, May 16th 200917 The Economist, July 18th 2009

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prinose i forsiraju izvršne direktore da ulaze u nepotrebne rizike. Štagod da se može napisati o ovoj temi, ostaje suštinska stvar da se ima na umu da je bogatstvo jedne nacĳe u njenom preduzetničkom duhu i da suviše birokratĳe treba, po svaku cenu, izbegavati.

Rezultat svega ovoga je da su vlade sada duboko ugrađene u bankarske sisteme. One garantuju daleko više depozite stanovništva nego što je to bio slučaj pre krize. One garantuju emitovanje novog duga. One drže u vlasništvu preferencĳalne akcĳe mnogih banaka, običan akcĳski kapital u nekim drugim, a stoje spremne da ubacuju kapital i u još neke od banaka.18

Da li je sadašnja kriza došla iznenada?

U suštini, i nĳe, bilo je to već zapisano u kartama... ali niko nĳe očekivao da će biti toliko

oštra i da će toliko dugo trajati. Sledeća kriza, mnogo gora od ove sadašnje, koja je isto tako zapisana u kartama, bila bi neizvršenje Vlade Sjedinjenih Država po nekoj od svojih hartĳa od vrednosti. Sadašnja zaduženost je reda veličina od USD 11.000.000.000.000, što predstavlja više od USD 80.000 po domaćinstvu. Neizvršenje bi značilo ponovno pisanje knjiga i udžbenika za investicĳe, koje kada govore o “bezrizičnim” investicĳama kazuju da su to investicĳe u državne hartĳe od vrednosti Sjedinjenih Država.

Nadajmo se da ćemo pronaći nešto mudrosti pre nego što nastane potreba da se ponovno pišu premise o modernoj finansĳskoj nauci i da će neke od mera koje su gore pomenute biti od pomoći. Uprkos svemu, ipak ćemo uvek imati ekonomske cikluse, uvek smo ih imali, jer je to usađeno u ljudskoj prirodi!

18 The Economist, 16. maj 2009.

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intervention will not change this, especially that most governments have still a long way to go. To keep this argument short, you just have to refer to the websites of a few well know NGO’s, to name one Transparency International.

With hindsight, it is clear that bankers and companies failed to understand the nature of the risks. Moreover, equity based bonus plans excessively focus on profits but greed is not just a feature of business executives but also of shareholders who expect high returns and force executives to take undue risks. Whatever can be wri�en on this subject, it remains essential to keep in mind that the wealth of a nation is its entrepreneurial spirit and too much red tape should, by all means, be avoided.

The result of it all is that governments are now deeply embedded in banking systems. They are guaranteeing far more retail deposits than before the crisis. They are guaranteeing the issuance of new debt. They own preferred shares in many banks, common equity in others and stand ready to inject capital in others still.18

Was the present crisis a surprise?

Not really, it was on the cards, but nobody expected it to be so severe and last that long. The next crisis, much worse than this one, which is on the cards as well, would be the default of the US Government on some of its securities. The present indebtedness is in the tune of 11.000.000.000.000 USD which represents more than 80.000 USD per household. A default would mean rewriting the books on investment, which refer to a "risk-free" investment as an investment in a US Treasury Bill.

Let us hope that we will have found some wisdom before there is a need to re-write the premises of modern financial science and that some of the measures mentioned above will be of help. Notwithstanding this we will always have economic cycles, we always had as it is inherent to human nature!

18 The Economist, May 16th 2009

roger claessens* ideje i inicĲative od kada se dogodio ...bankarstvo 7 - rezime prva reakcĳa na...

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