roider, the perils of 18th c. peacemaking. austria and the treaty of belgrade, 1739

Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association

The Perils of Eighteenth-Century Peacemaking: Austria and the Treaty of Belgrade, 1739Author(s): Karl A. Roider, Jr.Source: Central European History, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 1972), pp. 195-207Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Conference Group for CentralEuropean History of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545635Accessed: 03/12/2008 15:38

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The Perils of Eighteenth-Century Peacemaking:

Austria and the Treaty of Belgrade, 1739

KARL A. ROIDER, JR.

THE

Treaty of Belgrade, concluded in 1739, ended over fifty

years of Austrian expansion at the expense ofthe Ottoman Em?

pire. From the siege of Vienna in 1683 to the Peace of Passaro-

witz in 1718, the Austrians enjoyed almost absolute supremacy on the

battlefield and at the peace table, forcing the Turks deep into the Balkan

peninsula and adding to the Habsburg possessions such cities as Buda,

Pest, Timijoara, Cluj, Debrecen, and finally Belgrade, guardian of the

confluence ofthe Danube and Sava rivers and bastion of Austrian might in southeastern Europe. Given these successes and the apparent decline

ofthe Ottoman state, in the 1720's and 173 o's Austria appeared capable of establishing its hegemony over most ofthe remaining Turkish pos? sessions in Europe.

Surprisingly, however, the Habsburgs did not continue their pene- tration into the Balkans; by the Treaty of Belgrade they returned that

fortress-city to the Turks and accepted the Danube-Sava river line as the

Ottoman-Habsburg frontier, a frontier that, on the Austrian side, did

not change until the collapse of the empire at the end of the First World

War. Indeed, aside from the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, after 1739 Vienna advanced no farther into the Balkans.

The fascination of this treaty, which established Austria's southeastern

boundary for almost two centuries, lies not only in its durability, but in

the curious circumstances leading to its conclusion, circumstances offer-

ing little hint that the settlement would be so long-lasting. In fact, the

conditions surrounding this settlement provide insights into what one

might call two perils of eighteenth-century peacemaking: the potential

waywardness of a country's negotiators and field officers, who, because

of eighteenth-century communications, enjoyed great independence of

judgment when far from their capitals, and the possibility that an un-

fortunate peace, concluded by such men, could not be undone in the

195

196 Austria and the Treaty ofBelgrade, 1739

near future owing to unforeseen circumstances. The Treaty of Belgrade illustrates both of these perils, and, by discussing the agreement from the

Austrian point of view, I wish to present the interesting events involved

in its signing and offer an explanation for its permanence. The treaty grew out ofthe Austro-Russian-Turkish war of 1736-39,

a conflict that Austria joined not primarily to conquer land, but to

prove its loyalty to its alliance with Russia. In the War of the Polish

Succession, 1732-35, Vienna had found itself deserted by all of its major allies except Russia and, when the Russians and Turks opened hostilities

in 1736, felt obligated to assist St. Petersburg if it hoped to retain its

friendship. Although the Austrian army had declined notably after the

last Turkish war and had proved generally ineffective against the French

and their allies in the Polish struggle, in 1736 it was certainly a match

for the Turks, who themselves had suffered serious defeats at the hands

ofthe Persians from 1733 to 1735.1 Placing a force of 56,700 men in the

field in 1737, Vienna hoped to secure some military advantages that

would force the Turks to sue for peace.2 Unfortunately, however, these

successes failed to materialize, largely because of misunderstandings,

personality clashes, and incompetence among the commanding officers.

In 1738 headquarters proved even more ineffective, for despite two sub?

stantial victories over the Ottomans at Cornea and Mehadia the com-

mander-in-chief, Count Lothair Joseph Konigsegg, could think of

nothing else but retreat.3 In both years the Russians likewise achieved

little success; after capturing an important Ottoman fortress in July

1737, they were unable to achieve any more gains for the next two years. Because ofthe ineffectiveness of their military operations and fear of

possible diplomatic complications with other European powers, by

1739 Austria and Russia both expressed a desire to each other and to the

i. For a general impression ofthe Habsburg army in the period from 1718 to 1736, perhaps the best work is Max Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, vols. iv and v (Vienna, 1965.)

2. Johann Graf Brown, "Tiirkenkrieg, welcher im Jahr 1737 angefangen und im Jahr 1739 mit dem Belgrader Frieden sich geendiget hat" (manuscript in Kriegsarchiv, Vienna), 1737, Appendix Q. This manuscript, although contained in five volumes, is divided not according to volume but to years ofthe war. The text for each year includes consecutive page numbers followed by many unnumbered appendices that do not cor-

respond to individual volumes. Consequently I have used years rather than volume num? bers in references to this work.

3. The best published account ofthe Austrian military effort in the war of 1736-39 is

Major Moriz von Angeli, "Der Krieg mit der Pforte, 1736 bis 1739," Mitteilungen des k.k. Kriegsarchivs (1881), pp. 147-298, 409-79.

Karl A. RoiAer.fr. 197

Ottoman Empire to reach a settlement. At the same time Constanti-

nople, suffering from food shortages and a threatened revolt in some of

its eastern provinces, voiced its own willingness to negotiate, and con-

sequently in the spring of 1739 preparations for peace talks began.4 De?

spite this collective agreement to discuss a conclusion to the war, how?

ever, the preliminaries to such negotiations came too late to prevent a

final summer's fighting, an effort that created the atmosphere in which

the articles of the treaty were formulated.

The Austrian campaign of 1739 was a bungled affair from the begin?

ning. In command was Field Marshal Count Oliver Wallis, an obstinate

man of great experience in war but reluctant to take the initiative. Fred?

erick the Great wrote that Wallis commented, upon learning of his ap-

pointment, "The Emperor has made me commander of his army: The

first who led it is in prison; the second has become a eunuch ofthe pal?

ace; all that is left for me is to have my head cut offat the end ofthe

campaign."5 Whether a genuine utterance or a figment of Frederick's

imagination, the pessimism reflected in this quotation certainly per- vaded the Field Marshal's decisions in 1739.

Beginning his operations in late June with an army 45,000 strong, Wallis considered it his primary objective to prevent the Turks from

investing the fortress of Belgrade.6 To achieve this end, he maneuvered

his forces east of the stronghold until July 4, when he encountered the

main Turkish army near the village of Grocka, some seventeen miles

down the Danube from Belgrade. A vigorous, day-long battle ensued,

at the conclusion of which the Ottomans withdrew, leaving the Aus?

trians in possession ofthe field. That evening a number of younger offi?

cers pressed Wallis to pursue his advantage, but the commander-in-

chief, who had personally engaged in the thickest fighting and appeared shaken by the bloodshed, ignored this advice and ordered his men to

retreat across the Danube to find refuge behind Belgrade.7 After this

withdrawal, the Turks took advantage of the field army's unexpected absence to besiege the now-exposed fortress.

In addition to his post as commander-in-chief, Wallis also held the

4- Lavender Cassels, Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717-1740 (London, 1966), pp. 156-70.

5. Frederic le grand, Memoires pour servir a Vhistoire de la maison de Brandenbourg (Berlin, 1846), p. 172.

6. Brown, "Tiirkenkrieg," 1739, pp. 165-85. For troop strength see ibid., Appendix DD.

7. Ibid., 1739, P- 227.

198 Austria and the Treaty of Belgrade, 1739

power to make peace in the field, subject, of course, to instructions

from Vienna. At this moment, such authority assumed major signifi?

cance, because accompanying the Turkish army were a Russian pleni-

potentiary, the Ottoman Grand Vizier, and the French ambassador to

Constantinople, the Marquis de Villeneuve, who had been accepted by all three powers as the official mediator. Each belligerent understood

that sometime during the campaign these three officials would meet

with an Austrian delegate at the Grand Vizier's headquarters to reach an

agreement ending the war. After Wallis's retreat northward following the clash at Grocka, the principal policy-making body ofthe Habsburg

Empire, the Privy Conference, expressed suspicion of his competence and decided to abolish his peacemaking powers lest he should abuse

them in some way, most obviously by ceding Belgrade to the Turks.8

To replace Wallis as plenipotentiary, Vienna chose one of his sub-

ordinate officers, Count Reinhard William Neipperg. A descendant of

a Swabian knightly family with a long tradition of Habsburg service,

Neipperg had entered the imperial army as one ofthe many proteges of

Prince Eugene of Savoy. As a negotiator he seemed an excellent choice,

not only because of his military record?by 1726 he had won regard as

"one ofthe most knowledgeable officers in the imperial command"?

but also because of his experience in dealing with the Turks.9 In 1718 he

had served as principal delegate in the negotiations to determine the per? manent boundaries between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.

Fully aware that Austria's fate would ultimately lie in Neipperg's

performance at the negotiating table, the Privy Conference undertook

on August 10 the weighty task of composing the instructions for him to

follow. Because distance prevented the count from referring frequently to Vienna, the statesmen had to provide him with alternative sugges-

8. Conference Protocol, July 31, 1739, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Staats- kanzlei (hereafter cited as HHSA, SK), Vortrage, 49. The Privy Conference, called at various times Geheimer Rat, Geheime Konferenz, and Konferenzrat, discussed the major problems of the realm, composed policies, and recommended them to the Emperor. During the war of 1737-39, members included the Austrian court chancellor, Count Louis Sinzendorf, the president ofthe war ministry, Count Lothair Joseph Konigsegg and after 1738 Count John Harrach, the president ofthe finance ministry Count Gundaker Thomas Starhemberg, and the conference minister of finances Count Aloysius Thomas Harrach. Secretary of the Privy Conference was the Emperor's favorite, John Chris-

topher Bartenstein. 9. Oskar Regele, "Die Schuld des Grafen Reinhard Wilhelm von Neippergs am Bel-

grader Frieden, 1739, und an der Niederlage bei Mollwitz, 1741," Mitteilungen des bster- reichischen Staatsarchivs, vn (1954), 374.

Karl A. Roider, Jr. 199

tions to cover various military contingencies. After long and heated de?

bate, the ministers concluded that, if the Austrian field army remained

near Belgrade and could prevent the Turks from taking the fortress,

Neipperg should offer to cede only a minor fortress down the Danube.

Should Belgrade appear likely to fall, he should agree to give it to the

Turks, but only with its fortifications razed. Finally, if the surrender of

Belgrade seemed inevitable, the count should consent to "allow the

Turks to possess Belgrade with its walls intact, so that the Danube and

the Sava become the borders."10

Such instructions depended, of course, upon Neipperg's thoroughly

understanding the military situation; Vienna therefore advised him to

inspect the field army and the garrison at Belgrade before departing for

the Grand Vizier's camp. After warning the plenipotentiary to beware

of Wallis's pessimistic accounts and to take care to examine the "true

state" of affairs, his instructions emphasized that, while on his inspection tour and at Turkish headquarters, the count should keep Vienna fully informed of all developments.11

These orders placed great responsibility upon Neipperg, not only as a

negotiator, but as a military analyst as well, for much rested upon his

ability to assess the strategic posture correctly. Essentially, his personal estimate would determine Austria's retention or loss of Belgrade?the command to remain in contact with the capital constituting the only check on his authority. With these orders in hand, Neipperg arrived in

Belgrade on August 16 to begin his inspection tour and two days later

passed through the Ottoman lines to meet with the Grand Vizier.

Having sent Neipperg into the Turkish camp, the Habsburg govern? ment turned its attention again to events in the field. By the third week

of August, despair had wholly gripped Wallis, who, after reiterating the

hopeless condition of his forces, implored the Emperor, Charles VI, to

abandon Belgrade and sue for an immediate armistice.12 Believing the

io. Conference Protocol, Aug. 10,1739, HHSA, SK, Vortrage, 49; Emperor to Neip? perg, Aug. ii, 1739, HHSA, SK, Tiirkei, 220.

11. Emperor to Neipperg, Aug. 11,1739, HHSA, SK, Tiirkei, 220. In a private letter written to Neipperg at the insistence of the Emperor, Francis Stephen of Lorraine, the Emperor's son-in-law, warned the count to say nothing to Wallis of his instructions and not to listen to Wallis's estimate ofthe military situation because "the [Field] Marshal depicts the state ofthe army as if he were discouraged and intimidated, completely un? able to view the enemy without fear of being defeated." Francis Stephen to Neipperg, Aug. 11, 1739, in Brown, "Tiirkenkrieg," 1739, pp. 374-75.

12. Brown, "Tiirkenkrieg,'* 1739, p. 556.


very existence of his army in danger, he then moved his troops from

their camp near the fortress to more secure positions up the Danube.

This time, however, the Privy Conference decided not to accept his ac-

counts at face value but to assign another officer to headquarters to in-

vestigate conditions at the front. To perform this task, the Emperor chose General Samuel Schmettau, an experienced officer of some skill,

and ordered him not only to examine the military situation, but to com?

mand Wallis to cease falling back and return to Belgrade. Upon receiv-

ing these instructions, Wallis protested vigorously that he could not

follow them, but after listening to Schmettau's arguments in their favor

he agreed to reverse his strategy and prepare to engage the Turks. Not-

withstanding his compliance, the Field Marshal felt personally insulted

by this forced change of plans, and, as revenge, appointed Schmettau

commander at Belgrade, replacing a close personal friend of John Chris-

topher Bartenstein, secretary of the Privy Conference and Charles's

most intimate adviser.13

Schmettau's appointment proved a blessing in disguise. Upon arriv-

ing at his new post, he found the garrison in surprisingly good condition

and concluded that the fortress's only weakness lay in his predecessor's

preparations for defense. By redistributing the men and utilizing all of

the available artillery, the new commander improved both the ability of

the fortress to resist and the morale ofthe troops.14 On August 29 a raid-

ing party under his personal leadership staged a successful assault on the

Borscha redoubt, a fortification directly across the Danube which had

fallen to the Turks in the wake of Wallis's retreat. Inspired by this victory, his chief officers the next day began formulating plans for repeating Prince

Eugene's astounding victory twenty-two years earlier over the Ottoman

troops encamped before Belgrade.15 Upon hearing ofthe reconquest of

Borscha and the evolving plans for a decisive engagement with the

main Turkish contingent, Wallis regained some of his nerve and sent

out the command to speed the field army's return to Belgrade.16

Accompanying the news of Schmettau's success and Wallis's new-

found courage, word reached Vienna that the Russians were about to

besiege the important Ottoman fortress of Khotin, the guardian of

13. Wallis to war ministry, Aug. 21, 1739, ibid., 1739, pp. 351-64. 14. Schmettau to Wallis, Aug. 27, 1739, ibid., 1739, pp. 412-18. 15. Angeli, "Krieg mit der Pforte," pp. 440-42. 16. Ibid., p. 252.

Karl A. Roider, fr. 201

Turkish Moldavia.17 Encouraged by these optimistic reports, the Aus?

trian ministers took heart that conditions had substantially improved since early August and agreed that, God willing, Schmettau and Wallis

would rout the Turks before Belgrade, the Russians conquer Khotin, and the allies at last impose an advantageous peace upon their foe. As a

reflection of this brightening outlook, the Emperor ordered Neipperg to continue following his instructions of early August, but not to pre? sent the optimum pessimum clause ceding Belgrade to the Turks.18

Curiously, however, at the time the Emperor dispatched this revision,

Vienna had received no word from Neipperg; in fact, it did not even

know whether he had arrived in the enemy camp safely. Although find?

ing this situation unusual, the ministers did not consider it alarming, for, as a plenipotentiary, the count enjoyed the protection of the French

mediator, who assumed responsibility for the safety of his person and

the inviolability of his correspondence. On September 3 the ministers finally chose to recall Neipperg and re-

move his authority to make peace. They did so not because they feared

he was in danger or disapproved of his conduct, but because the situa?

tion had changed so markedly that his instructions no longer applied.

Trusting that the allies would soon effect great victories, Vienna be?

lieved a satisfactory peace could better be reached at a formal peace con?

gress at a neutral site than in the war camp ofthe Grand Vizier.19

Then, into the midst of this newfound confidence came shattering news. On September 7 a messenger arrived in Vienna from southern

Hungary to inform the Emperor that Neipperg had formally surren-

dered mighty Belgrade and all of Austrian Serbia to the Ottoman Em?

pire.20

Why did Neipperg consent to such an unfortunate peace? What had

happened at Ottoman headquarters? The answers to these questions stern from the period preceding the count's reception of his peacemak-

ing powers and in many ways are rooted in his personal feelings at the

time. In early July, commanding a reinforcing corps of 15,000 men,

Neipperg had arrived at Grocka on the evening following the bat?

tle and expressed his enthusiasm about pursuing the Turks; but upon

17. Marquis Botha d'Adorno (Austrian ambassador to Russia) to Emperor, Aug. 4, 1739, HHSA, SK, Russland, 20.

18. Emperor to Neipperg, Aug. 31, 1739, HHSA, SK, Tiirkei, 220. 19. Conference Protocol, Sept. 3, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vortrage, 49; Emperor to Neip?

perg, Sept. 5, 1739, HHSA, SK, Tiirkei, 220. 20. Neipperg to Emperor, Sept. 2, 1739, HHSA, SK, Tiirkei, 219.


hearing Wallis's decision to retreat he became deeply discouraged and

despaired of any future success.21 From then on, his depression increased

until it seriously crippled his ability to view conditions objectively. When inspecting the army before entering the Turkish encampment, for example, his pessimism drew him to the conclusion that the Habs?

burg field forces were far weaker than they actually were, and that the

Belgrade garrison, already under heavy attack, lacked the means to re-

sist much longer.22 When the Austrian plenipotentiary reached the Grand Vizier's head-

quarters, his mood scarcely improved, for he discovered?to his com?

plete surprise?that since late July Wallis had been exchanging views

with the Turks through an executive officer, Colonel Anthony Charles

Gross, who, the Ottomans asserted, had offered to surrender Belgrade in the Field Marshal's own name.23 Whether or not the colonel had

actually proposed such a solution made little difference, because Neip?

perg found that his hosts refused to talk of any thing except the acquisi- tion of Belgrade. Disturbed by the Ottomans' apparent unwillingness to discuss a compromise, the count requested permission to leave the

camp immediately for further instructions, but, to his astonishment, the

Grand Vizier refused, even threatening to punish him for spying if he

delayed the negotiations longer.24 Although Neipperg could have de-

fied this threat and perhaps broken off the talks, he was reluctant to do

so and instead sought and received protection in the tent ofthe French

mediator, Villeneuve.25

21. Brown, "Tiirkenkrieg," 1739, p. 226. For Neipperg's estimate ofthe situation 011

Aug. 12, 1739, see ibid., Appendix WV. 22. Neipperg to Francis Stephen of Lorraine, Aug. 16, 1739, ibid., 1739, pp. 375-76. 23. In response to a request by the Grand Vizier, on July 26 Wallis sent Colonel Gross

and another officer to the Ottoman camp to discuss a possible armistice. Upon returning, Gross reported to Wallis that one ofthe Grand Vizier's advisers had suggested that the Austrians cede Belgrade and end the war immediately, but Gross replied that the Aus? trians would defend Belgrade to the utmost extremity. Report of Colonel Gross, July 27, 1739? ibid., 1739, Appendix RR. Gross returned to the Turkish camp on August 14 but did not offer to surrender Belgrade on that visit either. Ibid., 1739, p. 566, Appendix 40.

24. Neipperg to Wallis, Aug. 28, 1739, ibid., 1739, Appendix EEEE. 25. A common interpretation ofthe proceedings at Belgrade awards Villeneuve the

honor of formulatdng this treaty that so damaged Habsburg interests and strengthened French influence in Constantinople. In Neipperg's dispatches, however, Villeneuve

scarcely receives mention; without doubt Neipperg considered his chief adversary to be the Turkish Grand Vizier. Max Braubach declares that the primary reasons for Ville- neuve's prominence He in the popular reaction in Vienna, which blamed the Frenchman


Despite Neipperg's confidence that his person was secure, he still had

to face the formidable negotiating skill of the Ottoman Grand Vizier.

Appearing to sense his overwhelming psychological advantage, the Ot?

toman minister never overlooked an opportunity to impress upon the

count the huge number of men in the Turkish army?150,000 in camp and 25,000 on the opposite bank ofthe Danube?all of whom, he in-

sisted, burned with desire to storm Belgrade, and none of whom would

return home without witnessing its occupation. Day after day the Grand

Vizier and his subordinates repeated that peace depended upon Bel-

grade's surrender, and day after day the Austrian's despair increased.26

Vienna's reports of late August about the improved condition ofthe

army and the instructions not to sacrifice Belgrade should have im?

proved Niepperg's mood greatly, but they did not, because he never

received these messages. Upon passing through the Austrian lines,

Neipperg had warned Wallis to use care in sending him letters because

the Turks might read them or refuse to deliver them. The Field Mar-

shal, apparently still resenting the transfer of his peacemaking powers to

Neipperg, complied so willingly that he refused to pass on any corre?

spondence whatsoever, even letters from the Emperor himself, to the

plenipotentiary.27 Consequently, no new information came to Neip?

perg's attention, and he continued to act upon his instructions of Au?

gust 11 and his observations of August 16 and 17, unaware that neither

applied any longer.

largely because it found it inconceivable that a lowly Turk could have effected such a

diplomatic success; in the dispatches of Cardinal Fleury, the French king's chief minister, who praised his ambassador's mediation; and Villeneuve's own accounts. Max Braubach, Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952), p. 329. Chief proponents of the Villeneuve thesis include the venerable Albert Vandal, Une ambassade francaise en orient sous Louis XV: la mission du Marquis de Villeneuve, 1728-1741 (Paris, 1887), and the more recent Cassels, Struggle for the Ottoman Empire.

26. M. de Keralio, Histoire de la guerre des russes et des imperiaux contre les turcs (Paris, 1780), 11, 197-99.

27. Mr. le Comte de Schmettau, Memoires secrets de la guerre de Hongrie (pendant les cam-

pagnes de 1737,1738, et 1730) (Frankfurt, 1786), p. 256. On August 28 Neipperg repeated his warning, but by no means declared that Wallis should send him no news at all. Neip? perg to Wallis, Aug. 28, 1739, in Brown, "Tiirkenkrieg," 1739, Appendix EEEE. The next day Wallis reported to Vienna that the Turks would allow no mail to reach Neip? perg and suggested that Vienna send a French official to act as courier. Wallis to war

ministry, Aug. 29, 1739, in Brown, "Tiirkenkrieg," 1739, PP- 430-31- Had Wallis encountered difficulty in sending messages to Neipperg, he should have sent them through Villeneuve, for if the Turks had stopped mail going to the mediator they would have violated diplomatic procedure and voided any treaty.


For fourteen days Neipperg labored, presenting each of the steps in

his outline and hearing each rejected until he finally came to the last. At

the decisive meeting on August 29, he offered to surrender Belgrade, if

his government could destroy the fortifications built since 1718. These

terms the Grand Vizier accepted, but insisted that Turkish units occupy the gates immediately and the levelling ofthe ramparts begin within six

days ofthe signing ofthe agreement.28 Although this condition meant

that Neipperg would not have time to secure ratification ofthe articles

from Vienna?and thus would present the capital with zfait accompli? he consented to it anyway, probably assuming that it would make little

difference. After allowing the secretaries two days to compose the for?

mal provisions, the count and the Grand Vizier signed the document on

the morning of September 1 and gave it to Villeneuve, who affixed the

French seal as a guarantee.29 To Wallis, Neipperg wrote, "The peace is

concluded; stop all hostile action and cease firing; soon I will come to

Belgrade."30

Upon hearing the news, the members ofthe Privy Conference were

thunderstruck; the terms shattered all their hopes for salvaging a re-

spectable settlement. For the moment they thought of rejecting the

treaty, but the article allowing premature Turkish occupation of the

fortress gates virtually precluded military opposition, and the French

guarantee would make diplomatic resistance very difficult. Besides,

only a renewed recruitment effort and the extension of certain special taxes would provide the men and money for another year's fighting, and most ofthe ministers agreed that, given its uncertain outcome, an?

other campaign was not worth the sacrifice.31 Vienna was simply

trapped in an unfortunate situation from which it could not escape. When Neipperg returned to Belgrade, he read his revised instructions

of late August and realized his immense blunder. He vilified Wallis for

following too strictly his request to use caution in sending him letters

and thereby failing to inform him of the changed circumstances. To

Schmettau, he remarked, "See how the hatred of Wallis made him

vigorously exercise the order I had given him under different condi?

tions? He left me ignorant of information that the interests ofthe Em-

28. Constantine Dapontes, Ephemerides Daces ou chronique de la guerre de qiiatre ans, 1736- 1739 (Paris, 1881), n, 267.

29. Neipperg to Emperor, Sept. 2, 1739, HHSA, SK, Tiirkei, 219. 30. Neipperg to Wallis, Sept. 1, 1739, HHSA, SK, Tiirkei, 219. 31. Conference Protocol, Sept. 9, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vortrage, 49.


peror demanded I know. He wanted to prevent my receiving new or?

ders from His Majesty; he has irretrievably destroyed me."32 Nonethe-

less, Neipperg could only accept the results of his acts, justify them as

best he could, and endure whatever consequences might be forthcoming. In late September the government imprisoned both Neipperg and

Wallis and assigned Count John Harrach, the president ofthe war min?

istry, to head a commission to investigate their conduct. The commis?

sion formulated forty-nine different charges against Wallis, most of

which concerned his decision to retreat after Grocka and his refusal to

allow correspondence to reach Neipperg in the Turkish camp, and

composed thirty-one accusations against Neipperg, all related to his de?

cisions while inspecting the army and negotiating the peace.33 Despite the enormous amount of testimony accumulated by the board, it reached

no decision before November 1740, when, upon her ascension to the

throne, Maria Theresa abolished it and restored to both officers their

honors and property. After Neipperg's release, a rumor circulated that

in August 1739, while he was negotiating with the Turks, he had re?

ceived a secret letter from Maria Theresa imploring him to abandon

Belgrade so that she would not find herself at war with the Ottoman

Empire upon the death of her father. No such letter existed, however,

and indeed at that time Charles enjoyed such excellent health that his

daughter had no premonition of succeeding him in the near future.34

Essentially, the Treaty of Belgrade, which established the southeast-

ern frontier of the Habsburg Monarchy for so many decades, resulted

not from military or diplomatic necessity, but chiefly from the mistakes

of Wallis and Neipperg. The obvious question remains, given the al?

most accidental nature of its signing, why did the settlement endure so

long? The answer lies both in the orientation of Austrian foreign policy at that time and in the events that followed closely upon the end ofthe

war. As mentioned above, Vienna entered the war of 1736-39 not to

secure advantages in southeastern Europe, but to retain the Russian

32. Keralio, Histoire de la guerre, n, 247-48. 33. These articles can be found in Johann Graf Brown, "Untersuchungsakten iiber

General Doxat, FM Graf von Seckendorf, FM Graf Wallis, und FZM Graf Neipperg" (manuscript in Kriegsarchiv, Vienna). The charges against Wallis are contained in 1739, Beilage xi, and those against Neipperg in 1739, Beilage 36. An article by Theodor Tupetz entitled "Der Turkenfeldzug von 1739 und der Friede zu Belgrad," Historische Zeitschrift, xl (1878), 1-51, is based on the evidence presented at Wallis's hearings. For an excellent discussion of Neipperg's case, see Regele, "Schuld des Grafen Neippergs."

34. Regele, "Schuld des Grafen Neippergs," p. 390.


alliance, which had in 1732-35 proved so valuable in dealing with west?

ern European foes. Even upon receiving the news of the devastating concessions Neipperg allowed, the Habsburg statesmen concerned them?

selves foremost not with the loss of mighty Belgrade, but the effect the

signing would have on the Russian accord. Because Neipperg had nego- tiated virtually alone with the Grand Vizier and had ignored the Russian

representative, Vienna feared that St. Petersburg might repudiate the

alliance on the grounds that Austria had concluded a separate peace and

had thereby violated the terms of the accord.35 To emphasize to the

Russians Austria's continued good faith, the Emperor in September dis-

patched a personal letter to the Russian sovereign, Empress Anne, blam-

ing the misfortune on the incompetence of Wallis and Neipperg and

assuring her of Vienna's wish to retain the two countries' pact.36 After

anxiously awaiting a reply, the Habsburg ministers felt much relieved

when in mid-October they received a note from the Russian foreign minister expressing his monarch's willingness to honor the treaty and to

reaffirm the union with Austria.37 On December 28,1739, both powers manifested their continued cooperation by formally renewing their

"indissoluble alliance."38

Regarding Austrian policy toward the Ottoman Empire, Vienna did

not view the misfortunes ofthe war of 1736-39 as permanent setbacks,

nor did it regard the Danube-Sava line as the permanent boundary. Al?

though no plans existed at that time to conquer additional Turkish land,

the Austrian statesmen still regarded the Ottoman Empire as woefully weak and assumed that the losses suffered in that struggle could be re-

gained in the near future. Even in the winter of 1738-39, during the

darkest days of Austrian military misfortune, the court chancellor,

Count Louis Sinzendorf, remarked to the Emperor that any peace with

the Turks would be only temporary, and, as soon as the army and trea?

sury had recuperated, Vienna, if it wished, could resume its expansion to the southeast.39 This attitude persisted after the treaty was signed; no

one assumed Belgrade permanently lost or the Sava-Danube the in-

evitable boundary.

35- Conference Protocol, Sept. 9, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vortrage, 49. 36. Emperor to Empress Anne of Russia, Sept. 13,1739, HHSA, SK, Russland, n, 140. 37. Botha to Emperor, Oct. 3, 1739, HHSA, SK, Russland, II, 20. 38. For a published copy ofthe treaty of Dec. 28, 1739, see F. Martens, Recueil des

traites et conventions concluspar la Russe avec les puissances etrangeres, 1 (St. Petersburg, 1874), 126-27.

39. Conference Protocol, Feb. 4, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vortrage, 48.

Karl A. Roider, Jr. 207

The event that truly ended Austrian expansion in southeastern Eu?

rope for most of the remainder of the eighteenth century?and precluded the early recovery ofthe possessions lost in 1739?was not the

Treaty of Belgrade, but the Prussian invasion of Silesia in 1740. This act

so jolted Habsburg foreign policy that it became completely obsessed

with German affairs for the remainder ofthe century. Even in the last

Austro-Turkish war, that of 1787-91, Vienna's primary goal centered

upon preserving the Russian alliance in order to apply pressure on Prus?

sia. Indeed in this later struggle, the Austrians reconquered Belgrade, but willingly surrendered it again when trouble began brewing in the

west.

As early as 1737, therefore, the southeastern policy ofthe Habsburg

Empire depended largely on events in western Europe. The Ottoman

Empire no longer posed a serious threat to Austria's existence, and its

depopulated and plagueridden lands along the Danube did not at this

time appear worth great sacrifices to conquer and retain. To Vienna, the

Ottoman state already seemed essentially harmless and its Balkan prov? inces virtually open to conquest, but the Austrian government con?

sidered eastern expansion decidedly secondary to the challenges of

power politics in the west.

Louisiana State University

roider, the perils of 18th c. peacemaking. austria and the treaty of belgrade, 1739

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