ryan document one

8/14/2019 Ryan Document One

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No. 108184

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

GEORGE H. RYAN, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS,

REP. KURT M. GRANBERG, SEN.JAMES CLAYBORNE, SEN. DON

HARMON, REP. RICHARD T.

BRADLEY, SEN. WILLIAM BRADY,

REP. LEE DANIELS, and REP. PHILIP

COLLINS, in their official capacities,

Defendants-Appellants.

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On Appeal from the Appellate Court of

Illinois, First Judicial District

No. 1-07-1601

There on Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County, Illinois, County

Department, Chancery Division

No. 06 CH 28340

The Honorable

MARTIN S. AGRAN,

Judge Presiding.

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

LISA MADIGAN

Attorney General

State of Illinois

MICHAEL A. SCODRO

Solicitor General

100 W. Randolph St., 12th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 814-3312

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants

JAN E. HUGHES

Assistant Attorney General



(312) 814-2129


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ARGUMENT

The Board Of Trustees Correctly Concluded That Ryan Forfeited All Of His

Pension Benefits Because His Felony Convictions Related To, Arose Out Of,

And Were Connected With His Service To The State While A Member Of

The General Assembly Retirement System.

A. Introduction

Using the well-settled principle that clear statutory language should be

given effect without reading into it limitations not intended by the legislature, the

Board of Trustees terminated all of George Ryans pension benefits pursuant to

section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code, which pertains to the General Assembly

Retirement System (the System) and states that

[n]one of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid

to any person who is convicted of any felony relating

to or arising out of or in connection with his or her

service as a member.

40 ILCS 5/2-156 (2008). This provision is clear as written: Ryan, who was a

member of the System throughout his service as a member of the General

Assembly and as Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and Governor,

committed felonies that were related to, arose out of, or were in connection with

his service as a member. Therefore, pursuant to section 2-156, Ryan is entitled to

none of the pension benefits that he earned in any of the offices he held as a

System member.

Ryans argument focuses on section 2-105 of the Code, which defines

member as [m]embers of the General Assembly of this State including persons


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who enter the military service while a member of the General Assembly and any

person serving as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer,

Comptroller, or Attorney General for the period of service in such office. 40

ILCS 5/2-105 (2008). Based only on conjecture, Ryan claims the phrase for the

period of service in such office is an express limitation that narrows the scope

of the term Member to the period of service in a specific office. Appellee Brief

at 14. But the meaning of a statute cannot be based on supposition. See Petersen

v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 447 (2002) (a court cannot ignore plain language of

statute based on conjecture). After all, the purpose of rules of construction is to

arrive at a reasonable meaning of a statute consistent with the intent of the

legislature. Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 514 (2007). Conjecture does not

substitute for reasoned analysis.

The phrase on which Ryans entire argument rests does not in any way limit

the felony forfeiture provision to the office or offices he held when he committed

his crimes; on the contrary, it simply defines eligibility in the System based on the

length of the term of the particular elected office. Considering the language of the

phrase, its history, and its relationship to other provisions in the Code, it is clear,

based on established tools of statutory construction and without resort to

guesswork, that the phrase simply refers to a members eligibility and not to a

limitation on the felony forfeiture provision. As such, this Court is asked to reject

Ryans arguments and reverse the appellate courts decision.


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B. The phrase for the period of service in such office in the definition of

member refers to a members eligibility in the System and does not

limit the felony forfeiture provision.

Ryan was a member of the System when he committed his felonies, and, in

accordance with the plain language of the felony forfeiture provision, he must

forfeit all of his pension benefits, regardless of which specific office he held when

they accumulated. While it is true that a statute should be read as a whole to

determine legislative intent (Lacey v. Village of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 361

(2009)), the phrase for the period of service in such office in the definition of

member does not in any way limit the application of the felony forfeiture

provision to only those offices in which Ryan served when he committed his

crimes. Ryans approach would require this Court to read into the felony forfeiture

provision limitations that the legislature did not intend. See Sangamon County

Sheriffs Dept v. Ill. Human Rights Commn, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 138 (2009) (where

language is clear, court should not read into it limitations legislature did not

express); People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504, 516 (2009) (court does not depart

from statutes plain language by reading into it conditions that conflict with

expressed intent).

1. The plain language of the phrase for the period of service in

such office supports a finding that the phrase describes

eligibility in the System.

The phrase for the period of service in such office is a term of System

eligibility and not a limitation on the felony forfeiture provision. The legislature


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made clear by including the phrase in the definition of member that an

officeholder is eligible for membership only during the period of his or her elected

office. To illustrate, an individual who is a member of the General Assembly for

one term and some years later is elected Comptroller is eligible for membership in

the System during his or her terms in office, not during the intervening years.

Thus, section 2-105 simply provides that a person is a member of the System for

the period of service in office.

The Boards interpretation of the phrase for the period of service in such

office is further supported by the Codes definition of service. Section 2-

110(A) provides that [s]ervice means the period beginning on the day when a

person first became a member, and ending on the date under consideration,

excluding all intervening periods of nonmembership following resignation or

expiration of any term of office. 40 ILCS 5/2-110(A) (2008). This is consistent

with the meaning of the phrase in section 2-105 describing the period during which

an officeholder is eligible for membership in the System.

Ryan criticizes the Boards reliance on the definition of service, claiming

that the last two words in the phrase for the period of service in such office, and

not the word service is the operative language. Appellee Brief at 22-24. But

this position is contradicted by Ryans own arguments. For example, he contends

that: member is expressly limited in scope to the period of service in each

constitutional office (id. at 1); member is restricted to the period of service in


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such office (id. at 13); the phrase for the period of service in such office is an

express limitation (id. at 14); and the period of service in a specific office -

results in a significantly narrower forfeiture provision (id. at 18). Contrary to

Ryans assertion, these other statements show that he, like the Board, believes that

the meaning of the term service in the definition of member is relevant to the

interpretation of the statute. Ryans internally inconsistent argument regarding the

significance of the term service does nothing to rebut the Boards plain reading

of the statute the definition of service supports the conclusion that the phrase

for the period of service merely limits an elected officials eligibility for

membership in the System and nothing more.

Under Ryans theory, the phrase somehow treats the offices listed in section

2-105 as separate entities, meaning that the forfeiture applies only to those benefits

earned in the office or offices directly related to the felony conviction. Appellee

Brief at 14-15. But he reads too much into this simple phrase, which says nothing

about treating the various offices separately for purposes of the felony forfeiture

provision, and such a purpose cannot be implied.

More significantly, if the legislature intended to create separate entities for

purposes of the felony forfeiture provision, it knew how to do so, for that is

precisely what it did in the portion of the Code relating to the Illinois Municipal

Retirement Fund (IMRF). See Taddeo v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ill. Mun. Ret.

Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 598-600 (2005) (plaintiff allowed to keep pension from


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Proviso Township because he committed felonies as mayor of Melrose Park and

these were two separate participating municipalities under IMRF). In the IMRF

portion of the Code, the legislature mandated that each participating municipality

and its instrumentalities, and each participating instrumentality, shall be treated as

an independent unit within the fund[.] 40 ILCS 5/7-204 (2008). In contrast, the

System was created as one entity for the benefit of members of the General

Assembly and statewide elected officials, where its funds and property shall be a

trust separate from all other entities. 40 ILCS 5/2-101 (2008).

Unlike the IMRF, where the separate participating municipalities each make

contributions to the retirement fund on behalf of their participating employees

based on a separate municipality contribution rate (40 ILCS 5/7-172, 7-211(a)

(2008)), the State is obligated to make contributions and pay all administrative and

operational expenses for every member of the System (40 ILCS 5/2-125, 2-126.1

(2008)). Furthermore, under the IMRF, the separate liabilities and reserves of each

participating municipality or instrumentality are segregated (40 ILCS 5/7-203

(2008)), whereas the assets of the System shall be invested as one fund, and no

particular person, group of persons or entity shall have any right in any specific

security or property, or in any item of cash, other than an undivided interest in the

whole (40 ILCS 5/2-153 (2008)).

These examples of critical differences between the portions of the Code

governing the IMRF and the System show that when the legislature intends to


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create membership divisions for purposes of felony forfeiture, it knows how to do

so unambiguously. There is no language in the portion of the Code relating to the

System that can be read either explicitly or implicitly as the legislatures intent to

treat Ryans pension as divisible for purposes of the felony forfeiture provision.

The offices that comprise the System are treated as one undivided entity, and all of

the members of the System serve the citizens of the State, unlike the employees

covered by the IMRF who serve the various separate municipalities that employ

them. In contrast to the elaborate and explicit means by which the legislature

created separate divisions for purposes of the IMRF felony forfeiture provision,

the legislature surely did not intend to create the same sort of divisions for the

System when it added the phrase for the period of service in such office to the

definition of member.

2. The history of the phrase for the period of service in such

office shows that it is a term of eligibility and not of limitation

on the felony forfeiture provision.

Ryan suggests that the intent of the legislature to limit the felony forfeiture

provision by adding the phrase for the period of service in such office is evident

from the progression of the amendment that transferred the constitutional

officers from the State Employees Retirement System (SERS) to the System.

Appellee Brief at 16-17. Had Ryan considered the entire history of the definition

of member and not just a selected portion, he would have seen that the phrase

refers only to eligibility and has no bearing on the felony forfeiture provision.


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When the Pension Code was enacted in March 1963 (1963 Ill. Laws 161-

732), member was defined as [m]embers and presiding officers of the General

Assembly of this State, including persons who enter military service while a

member of the General Assembly. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 108 1/2, para. 2-105.

At that point, the constitutional officers were members of SERS. Ill. Rev. Stat.

1963, ch. 108 1/2, para. 14-143.

In 1969, the Systems definition of member was amended to add a

statement of eligibility:

Members and presiding officers of the General

Assembly of this State, including persons who enter

military service while a member of the General

Assembly provided that the President of the Senate in

office on the effective date of this amendatory Act, and

a member of the system,shall be eligible as a member

only until the expiration of his term of office.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 108 1/2, para. 2-105 (1969 Ill. Laws 1514, 1514; Public

Act 76-741) (emphasis added).

When the statewide elected officers were moved from SERS to the System

in 1975, a second paragraph was added to the foregoing definition of member in

section 2-105:

Any person elected by vote of the people of the whole

State to the Office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor,

Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller, or Attorney

General for the period of his service in such office.



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Act 79-959). Because the first paragraph of section 2-105 made clear that

membership would not continue beyond the expiration of a term of office, it is

reasonable to read the phrase for the period of service in such office in the

second paragraph as ensuring that the constitutional officers eligibility for

membership similarly would be tied to the term of office for which they were

elected.

In 1985, the definition of member was amended to read as it does today:

Members of the General Assembly of this State

including persons who enter military service while a

member of the General Assembly and any person

elected to the Office of Governor, Lieutenant

Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller,

or Attorney General for the period of his service in

such office.


Act 83-1440).

The history supports the view that the phrase on which Ryans argument is

based describes when a state legislator or any of the statewide elected officers are

eligible for membership, but does not constitute any sort of limitation on the

Systems felony forfeiture provision.

On a related note regarding the history of the amendment that transferred

the statewide elected officials from SERS to the System, the Board noted in its

opening brief (pp. 29-31) that during legislative debates reasons were given for

transferring the constitutional officers from SERS to the System, yet there was no


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mention that the transfer was done for the purposes of limiting the felony forfeiture

provision. The conclusion drawn from the debates is that the transfer occurred to

upgrade the constitutional officers pension and not to give them increased

protections under the felony forfeiture provision, as Ryan had claimed.

In response, Ryan states merely that the lack of discussion about the felony

forfeiture provision is inconsequential. Appellee Brief at 16-17. At the same time,

he continues to believe, albeit erroneously, that the purpose of the transfer of the

constitutional officers to the System was to give them a narrower felony forfeiture

provision. Id. at 15. But if, in fact, they were given more protection than they had

under the SERS statute, surely such a significant change would have been

mentioned during the legislative debates, but it was not.

C. Relevant case law supports the Boards decision.

In terminating Ryans pension, the Board analyzed Taddeo, Wells v. Bd. of

Trustees of the Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 361 Ill. App. 3d 716 (2nd Dist. 2005), appeal

denied, 217 Ill. 2d 627 (2006), and Grever v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ill. Mun. Ret.

Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 263 (2nd Dist. 2004), appeal denied, 217 Ill. 2d 561 (2005)

(see S.R. C. 225-31). The Board explained in its brief (pp. 16-20) that its decision

was in harmony with all three cases. In response (Appellee Brief at 17-20, 24-27),

Ryan claims that the Boards reliance on decisions involving the IMRF exposes

the fundamental flaw in the Boards argument (id. at 17). Given that he believes

that Taddeo provides the clearest guidance (id. at 24), that his situation is


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analogous to Grever (id. at 25), and that these decisions are informative (id. at

24), his argument that the Boards reliance on the decisions was somehow error is

hardly convincing.

In any event, the Boards decision was consistent with Taddeo or Grever.

Both cases involved the IMRF portion of the Code, which, as previously shown,

treats each participating municipality as an independent unit within the fund. In

Taddeo, this Court found that the plaintiffs felony related to his position as

Melrose Park mayor, but not to his Proviso Township supervisor position, and

determined that he forfeited only that portion of his pension that he earned from

Melrose Park. 216 Ill. 2d at 598-60. The Grever court concluded that a felony

conviction connected to the plaintiffs service as an Ela Township supervisor

resulted in the forfeiture of benefits earned only from that employment relationship

and not from his service with other municipalities participating in the IMRF. 353

Ill. App. 3d at 267.

Although Wells also involved the IMRF, unlike Taddeo and Grever, the

employee had worked for only one municipality the Village of Antioch and

held various positions during his employment with the Village. 361 Ill. App. 3d at

718. The court determined that he should forfeit his entire pension because the

IMRF portion of the Code d id not limit application of the felony forfeiture

provision to particular positions held in the course of an individuals service as an

employee for a single employer. Id. at 722.


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The facts of this case are similar to those in Wells, which involved the

employees service in various positions with one municipality. Ryan served one

entity, the State of Illinois, in various elected positions. As the Board correctly

concluded in accordance with Wells, the key factor rests on the singularness of

the employer (S.R. C. 290).

In all of these cases, forfeiture is tied to the identity of the entity for which

the public service was performed and to which the felonies were related: Taddeo

forfeited his benefits because the felony related only to his service to Melrose

Park; Grever lost his pension because his crimes were committed during his

service to Ela Township; Wells forfeited all of his benefits because his felony

conviction related to his employment with only one entity, the Village of Antioch;

and Ryan lost all of his benefits because his crimes were connected with his

membership in the System and his service to only one entity, the State of Illinois.

Under the reasoning of Taddeo and Grever, pension benefits are not

forfeited to the extent they are earned in the service of a governmental employer

different from the one to which the officers felony convictions relate. The

Taddeo and Grever decisions also rested on the explicit provisions in the IMRF

statute that treat municipalities as independent employers within the pension fund.

See 40 ILCS 5/7-203, 7-204 (2008). The Boards decision is consistent with these

cases because Ryan belonged to one retirement system in service to the State of

Illinois the sole employer participating in the System. Nothing in the portion of


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the Code governing the System either implicitly or explicitly treats the various

elected offices as separate entities for the purpose of pension credits or payments

or for forfeiture of benefits upon a service-related felony conviction.

Ryan claims that his situation cannot be compared to the cases involving the

IMRF because its felony forfeiture provision provides for the loss of benefits upon

any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with [the persons] service

as an employee (40 ILCS 5/7-219 (2008)), whereas the Systems forfeiture

provision uses the term member rather than employee. Appellee Brief at 17-

21. Again, his argument rests on the erroneous premise that the language in the

phrase for the period of service in such office in the definition of member limits

the felony forfeiture provision to the specific offices held. But, as has been shown,

the premise is unwarranted, and his argument fails. And as the Board explained in

its opening brief (pp. 35), it is irrelevant that the felony forfeiture provisions in the

various portions of the Code use different terms to best describe their members and

participants. See, e.g., 40 ILCS 5/16-199 (2008) (Teachers Retirement System

applies to service as a teacher); 40 ILCS 5/18-163 (2008) (Judges Retirement

System applies to service as a judge).

Also in the opening brief (pp. 22-23), the Board cited Shiomos v. State

Employees Ret. Bd. for the proposition that pension benefits that have

accumulated in one pension fund are subject to forfeiture by and through the

renewed agreement which is formed each time a person chooses to become a


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public official as defined by the pension statute. 626 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa. 1993).

Ryan claims that Shiomos is distinguishable because that statute, which mandates

the forfeiture of pension benefits if the public official is convicted of any crime

related to the public office or public employment, does not limit the forfeiture to

the period of service in a specific office.

Again, however, because the premise of Ryans argument is erroneous

regarding the meaning of for the period of service in such office, his attempt to

distinguish Shiomos fails. The Board recognized that the forfeiture provisions at

issue here and in Shiomos are not identical (see Opening Brief at p. 22, n.4 for the

wording of the Pennsylvania forfeiture provision), but both cases involve one

pension fund and individuals who continued to accumulate pension benefits

through service in various public offices. As such, it is relevant that the Shiomos

court concluded that it is not unconscionable or unreasonable to provide that at

every new term of employment a public official or employee renews and amends

his or her pension contract to include the new public service and to place at risk

that which may have already been earned. Such is the nature of the public

employment agreement. 626 A.2d at 163.

D. A Nexus Exists Between Ryans Crimes And His Service As A Member.

This Court in Devoney v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemens Annuity & Benefit

Fund for the City of Chicago, held that when applying a felony forfeiture

provision, the pivotal inquiry is whether a nexus exists between the employees


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criminal wrongdoing and the performance of his official duties. 199 Ill. 2d 414,

419 (2002). That forfeiture provision stated then, as it does today, that a

policeman is disqualified from receiving benefits if the felony is one relating to or

arising out of or in connection with his service as a policeman. See 40 ILCS 5/5-

227 (2008). The Devoney court concluded that [u]nder the plain and

unambiguous language of the statute, what triggers disqualification is the existence

of a connection between the actual felony conviction and the officers service as a

policeman. 199 Ill. 2d at 419.

Consistent with the Devoney holding, the Board correctly recognized that

[b]y using the phrase [n]one of the benefits in

conjunction with the phrase any felony relating to or

arising out of or in connection with his or her service

as a member[,] the plain language of Section 2-156

mandates the forfeiture of all [r]etirement [a]nnuity

provided for by the System where a nexus exists

between the felony conviction and the participants

official duties, regardless of whether the participant

held distinct offices or positions with the State.

(S.R. C. 287). Having found the necessary nexus, the Board terminated all of

Ryans benefits.

Ryan argues that the Boards decision ignores the nexus requirement

because his convictions related only to his service as Secretary of State and

Governor. Appellee Brief at 24-27. But this position is contrary to the plain

language of the felony forfeiture provision, which requires a nexus between the

crimes and the officials status as a member of the System. 40 ILCS 5/2-156


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(2008). Under the statute, all members are in service to the State, the contributions

are not segregated by the various offices held, the funding obligation rests on the

State and not on the individual offices, and divisions are not made between the

offices for purposes of loss of pension benefits due to a felony conviction. Where

there is a nexus between the felony conviction and any of the offices held by a

member of the System, none of the benefits . . . shall be paid[.] Id.

In support of his argument, Ryan relies on Taddeo and Grever and states

that his pension is derived from service in separate offices. Appellee Brief at 25.

On the contrary, his pension is derived from his service as a member of the

System. As stated previously, the IMRF portion of the Code creates clear

divisions among the participating municipal employers, but the System contains no

similar divisions, and Ryan owed a duty of conscientious service to all of the

citizens of the State. When he violated the public trust, all of his benefits were

tainted, the required nexus was established, and the forfeiture of all of his benefits

resulted in accordance with the plain language of the Code.

E. Because The Legislature Mandated That None of the Benefits Shall be

Paid, A Partial Forfeiture Cannot Satisfy The Felony Forfeiture

Provision.

Although Ryan is correct (Appellee Brief at 17) that pension statutes are

liberally construed in favor of the annuitant (see, e.g., Shields v. Judges Ret. Sys.,

204 Ill. 2d 488, 494 (2003)), he fails to acknowledge that this canon of

construction has its bounds (Mattis v. State Univ. Ret. Sys., 212 Ill. 2d 58, 76


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(2004)). While a pension statute should be liberally construed, if the intention of

the legislature is obvious from the language used, that intention must be made

effective, and the judiciary will not be warranted in giving the act a meaning not

expressed in it. Robbins v. Bd. of Trustees of the Carbondale Police Pension

Fund, 177 Ill. 2d 533, 545 (1997). Because section 2-156 of the Code requires a

total forfeiture of all pension benefits, Ryans contention that a partial forfeiture

satisfies the statute must be rejected.

Ryan argues that a partial forfeiture of his benefits representing those that

accrued during his service as Secretary of State and Governor strikes a proper

balance between the purpose of the felony forfeiture provision and the principle

that forfeitures are not favored. Appellee Brief at 27-30. And he claims that

forfeiture of the benefits that accrued when he was in the General Assembly and

Lieutenant Governor would constitute a substantial injustice. Id.

Putting aside that Ryans proposed partial forfeiture would defy the

statutes plain language and, even assuming for the sake of argument that a partial

forfeiture still might deter others (albeit less effectively), deterrence is not the only

purpose of the forfeiture provision. The provision is intended to protect the

publics right to conscientious service from government officials (Kerner, 72 Ill.

2d at 513), but it also protects public funds and preserves respect for government

service (see MacLean v. State Bd. of Ret., 733 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (Mass. 2000)).

Public monies were used to satisfy the States obligation to make


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contributions to the System to help fund members pensions. See 40 ILCS 5/2-124

(2008) (State appropriates funds to contribute to the System); 40 ILCS 5/2-125

(2008) (State has obligation to make required contributions)). Because Ryans

crimes constituted a fundamental breach of the public trust held by all of the

citizens of Illinois, a total forfeiture of Ryans benefits ensures both that no public

monies are used to fund his pension and that the purpose of the forfeiture provision

is accomplished.

A public official has an obligation to serve the public trust honorably and in

good faith. People v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191, 210 (1980). Section 2-156 was in effect

when Ryan became a member of the System in 1972 and throughout the remainder

of his public service and, thus, he knew each time he was elected and continued his

membership in the System that he would forfeit his pension if he were convicted of

a felony related to his service as a member. There surely is no unfairness in

applying that long-standing provision to him now where he failed to comply with

the condition that he perform his duties honorably at all times.

Ryan argues that the General Assembly is satisfied that a partial forfeiture

strikes a proper balance because it declined to enact legislation that would have

overruled Taddeo and Grever. Appellee Brief at 29-30. He refers to House Bill

159 (see Appellee App. at A50-A54), which was introduced in December of 2006

and would have moved all of the felony forfeiture provisions to a single provision

in Article 1 of the Pension Code. According to the Bill, a person who is


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convicted of a felony relating to, arising out of, or in connection with his or her

service as a participating member of any retirement system or pension fund may

not receive any benefits provided in the Code, including any benefit for service not

related to the felony conviction. Id. at A51. The Bill did not have a third reading

and on May 25, 2007, was [r]e-referred to Rules Committee[.] Id. at A54. No

further action was taken on the Bill. Id.

Ryan errs in attaching any significance to the facts that the Bill did not have

a third reading and a vote was not called. Even if the principle of legislative

acquiescence applies, based on the obvious differences between the sections of the

Code relating to the IMRF and the System, any acquiescence in the Taddeo and

Grever results would be irrelevant to the outcome in this case. In any event, a

presumption of legislative acquiescence is merely a jurisprudence principle and not

a rule of law. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 331 (2007).

The felony forfeiture provision clearly requires that Ryan receive none of

his pension benefits. Allowing him to keep a portion of his pension is not only

contrary to the plain language of the provision, but it destroys its purpose, which is

to protect the public by ensuring that the members of the System will honorably

perform the duties of the offices for which they were elected. A forfeiture of all of

Ryans benefits promotes the policies underlying the felony provision and makes

certain that the citizens of Illinois, whose trust Ryan betrayed, are not required to

pay for his retirement.


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CONCLUSION

For these reasons and those in the opening brief, the Defendants-

Appellants, the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System and

the individual Members of the Board, respectfully request that this Honorable

Court reverse the appellate courts decision and affirm the Boards decision

terminating all of Ryans pension benefits based on his felony convictions.

Respectfully submitted,

LISA MADIGAN

Attorney General

State of Illinois

MICHAEL A. SCODRO

Solicitor General

100 W. Randolph Street, 12th Floor


(312) 814-3312

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants

JAN E. HUGHES




(312) 814-2129


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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this reply brief conforms to the requirements of Rule 341(a)

and (b). The length of this reply brief, excluding the pages containing the Rule

341(d) cover, the Rule 341(h)(1) statement of points and authorities, the Rule

341(c) certificate of compliance, the certificate of service, and those matters to be

appended to the brief under Rule 342(a), is 20 pages.

JAN E. HUGHES



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STATE OF ILLINOIS )

) SS.

COUNTY OF COOK )

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that

three copies of the Reply Brief of the Defendants-Appellants were served upon the

below-named party by depositing such copies in the United States mail at 100

West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, in an envelope bearing sufficient first

class postage on September 3, 2009, before 5:00 p.m.

Kyle P. De Jong

Winston & Strawn LLP

35 West Wacker Drive

Chicago, IL 60601

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me

this 3rd day of September, 2009.

NOTARY PUBLIC


24/24

No. 108184

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

GEORGE H. RYAN, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT

SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS, REP. KURT M.

GRANBERG, SEN. JAMES

CLAYBORNE, SEN. DON HARMON,

REP. RICHARD T. BRADLEY, SEN.

WILLIAM BRADY, REP. LEE DANIELS,

and REP. PHILIP COLLINS, in their official

capacities,

Defendants-Appellants.

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On Appeal from the Appellate Court ofIllinois, First Judicial District

No. 1-07-1601

There on Appeal from the Circuit Court of

Cook County, Illinois, County Department,

Chancery Division

No. 06 CH 28340

The Honorable

MARTIN S. AGRAN,

Judge Presiding.

NOTICE OF FILING BY MAIL

TO: Kyle P. De Jong

Winston & Strawn LLP35 West Wacker Drive

Chicago, IL 60601

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that I filed the original and twenty copies of the Reply Brief of

the Defendants-Appellants with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 200 E.

Capitol Ave., Springfield, Illinois, 62701, by depositing the same in the U.S. mail at 100 West

Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, with proper postage prepaid, before 5:00 p.m. on September

3, 2009. Three copies of that Reply Brief are hereby served upon you.

LISA MADIGAN

Attorney GeneralState of Illinois

By:

JAN E. HUGHES




(312) 814 2129

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