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Dutrénit, G. and Puchet,M. (2015), “Tensions of STI policy inMexico: analyticalmodels, institutional

evolution, national capabilities and governance”, in S. Kuhlmann and G. Ordóñez-Matamoros (eds),

InternationalResearchHandbookonScience,TechnologyandInnovationPolicyinDevelopingCountries:

RationalesandRelevance”,EdwardElgar(forthcoming).

Tensions of Science, Technology and Innovation policy in Mexico:

analytical models, institutional evolution, national capabilities and

governance

Gabriela Dutrénit (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana), gabrieladutrenit@gmail.com

Martín Puchet (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), anyul@unam.mx

Abstract

The analytical framework used for Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) public policy

design worldwide is largely based on a systemic/evolutionary approach and, empirically, it is

based on countries with specific initial conditions - the central economies and some successful

Asian economies. These countries have specific trajectories of institutional building, political

culture and STI capabilities, which shape their National Innovation Systems (NIS). A central

issue in understanding the trajectories and the chances of success or failure of policies

emanating from these models, and variants that aim to adapt to developing economies, is to

analytically conceive the role of the institutional framework, the rules of the game in operation

in the system, the governance at national, sectoral and regional levels, and some aspects of the

political economy in the recipients countries. These affect the STI practice and policy,

contribute to feeding tensions that militate against the building of a sustainable NIS, and are

country specific. The aim of this document is to discuss the experience of STI policymaking in

Mexico, considering the international model and the interaction between the trajectory of

institutional building, the process of construction of both the government and governance of the

NSI, and the political economy. This paper argues that a set of rules and actions are formed and

built from the STI practice; they allow or block actions in governance processes. The data that

will be used to inform our arguments is based on the STI laws and regulations, transcripts of

board meetings and interviews with key agents of the NSI.

1 Introduction

From a systemic/evolutionary approach, it is argued that science, technology and

innovation (STI) policy has to focus on the national system of innovation (NSI), the

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generation and absorption of knowledge as nonlinear dynamic models, and systemic

failures. For this approach, knowledge, accumulated capabilities and time are important,

institutions mediate between agents and there is a growing concern for the regional level

and governance of the NSI (Metcalfe, 1995; Teubal, 2002; Edler et al., 2003; Woolthuis

et al., 2005; Smits et al., 2010a).

In some ways, the models of STI policy associated with international

organizations (mainstream models) have drawn on this perspective, or adopted a

particular interpretation of it. These models have been successfully applied to so-called

newly industrialized countries (e.g. Korea, Singapore, Taiwan), which have displayed

good behavior in their economic indicators as well as in those related to their domestic

national STI capabilities. They have also been extended towards the BRICS countries

(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) with varying degrees of success

(Cassiolato and Vitorino, 2009).

The main features of this model are: a policy focus that stresses STI

infrastructure, human capital formation, joint development between academia and

businesses, start-ups based on knowledge, small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)

and innovative clusters, a policy mix centered on demand-side measures as well as

building capabilities and fostering linkages, and a policy governance based on

multilevel coordination and participation. Business innovation is at the center of these

policies (OECD, 2010a).

These models have been offered as recipes for the developing world, and for

some of the emerging economies within it. While many developing countries have

improved the performance of various STI indicators (the contribution of businesses to

research and development expenditure, the number of researchers per economically

active population and to a lesser extent other indicators such as patents), success has

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been limited when compared to the indicators observed in OECD countries, and even

more so considering that structural problems of these economies persist (levels of

inequality, poverty and social exclusion).

The OECD (2010a) argues that the objective of the innovation strategy this

organization promotes is to support a process of policy development, recognizing that

‘one size does not fit all’. However, recommendations are strongly tied to successful

experiences. Several authors claim that these models do not adapt to the prevailing

conditions in developing countries (Arocena and Sutz, 2002; Intarakumnerd and

Chaminade, 2007; Dutrénit and Ramos, 2012; Dutrénit, 2012). In other words, the

analytical framework used for STI policy design was conceived based on countries with

different initial conditions – the central economies. In addition, these countries have a

different trajectory of institutional building. All these contribute to feeding tensions that

militate against the building of a sustainable NSI.

A central issue in understanding the trajectories and the chances of success or

failure of policies emanating from both the mainstream models and variants that aim to

adapt to developing economies is to analytically conceive the role of the institutional

framework and governance at national, sectoral and regional levels.

Following Kuhlmann et al. (2010), if we distinguish between innovation practice

(I), innovation policy (P) and innovation theory (T), it is possible to envisage the image

of a ‘dance floor’ between three partners along an interactive learning space. This paper

argues that this dance floor is conformed by a set of rules and actions. A part of the

institutional framework integrates and encodes rules of the game concerning the

relations between entrepreneurs, technologists, scientific personnel and decision

makers. In turn, these rules of the game allow or block actions in governance processes.

Rules and actions are formed and built from the innovation practice. Additionally, laws,

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regulations and norms for STI activities are established, as well as governance

processes, which are designed in the political system and implemented by various

groups of policymakers. Thus, these legal systems also structure rules and actions but

now from the innovation policy. Questions of ‘how’, ‘how much’ and ‘how

harmoniously’ can rules and actions generated by innovation practice dance together

with those stemming from the innovation policy are challenges for innovation theory

relating to developing economies.

Drawing on a systemic/evolutionary approach and being aware of the difficulties

to interpret recommendations bearing in mind that ‘one size does not fit all’, the aim of

this document is to discuss the experience of STI policymaking in Mexico, considering

the interaction between the trajectory of institution building and the process of

construction of both the government and governance of the NSI.

After this introduction, second section describes the trajectory of institution

building in the arena of the STI policy in Mexico. Then, third section summarizes the

main arguments coming from the mainstream of the innovation policy framework. The

fourth section discusses the main features of the institutional framework and governance

in Mexico, including the evolution of the legislation in STI and the expression of the

stakeholders. The fifth section discusses the rules of the game of the innovation

processes and their impact on system governance, and the six section analyses tensions

that hamper the functioning of the system in a self-regulated manner, and the final

section concludes.

2 TheevolutionofSTIpolicyinMexico:atrajectoryofinstitutionbuilding

The process of institution building of the STI has its roots in the early twentieth century,

and combines periods where strong efforts were made to create and strengthen the basic

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actors (1970s and 2000s), with others where the sector was severely affected by

macroeconomic instability (1980s) (Corona et al., 2014). Box 1 lists the main facts of

this process.

Box 1. Main facts of the institutional milestones

1930 Academia Nacional de Ciencias [National Academy of Sciences]

1935 Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior y de la Investigación Científica

(CONESIC) [National council of higher education and scientific research]

1942 Comisión Impulsora y Coordinadora de la Investigación Científica (CICIC)

[Commission to foster and coordinate scientific research], which substitutes

CONESIC

1950 Instituto Nacional de la Investigación Científica (INIC) [National institute for

scientific research], which substitutes CICIC

1958 Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior

(ANUIES) [National assocciation of Universities and higher education

institucions]

1959 Academia de la Investigación Científica (AMC) [Academy of scientific

research]

1970 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) [Science and

Technology National Council], which substitutes INIC

1977 CONACyT develops the National Program of Science and Technology

(PRONACyT)

1985 Law to Coordinate and Promote Scientific and Technological Development

1999 Law for the Promotion of Scientific and Technological Research

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2002 Law of S&T, and a new Organic Law of CONACyT; CONACyT elaborates

the Science and Technology Special Program, 2002–2006 (PECyT) [Programa

Especial de Ciencia y Tecnología]; creation of the Scientific and

Technological Advisory Forum (FCCyT) [Foro Consultivo Científico y

Tecnológico]

2004 Modifications of the S&T law: addition of Article 9bis, which states that

Gross Expenditure on R&D as % of Gross Domestic Product must reach 1%

2008 CONACyT elaborates the Science, Technology and Innovation Special

Program, 2008–2012 (PECiTI) [Programa Especial de Ciencia, Tecnología e

Innovación]

2011 Modifications to the S&T law: addition of a long-term approach, the PECiTI

should be designed to 25 years, the approach to S&T is modified by a focus on

STI

2013 Coordination of STI in the Office of the President; Changes to the S&T law:

promoting and encouraging the same rights and opportunities for women and

men in the NSI

This evolution reflects a process of building up STI institutions, framework

conditions and policies. Three facts deserve more attention: the creation of CONACyT,

the approval of the Science and Technology (S&T) law of 2002 and the long-term

vision of the STI program.

The creation of CONACyT in 1970 was a key fact in the evolution of the STI

sector. The National Research Council was established as a new institution to fund

research, promote human capital formation and be in charge of the design of S&T

policies. The council was created under the predominant paradigm of linearity from

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supply to demand of knowledge, which governed Latin America’s S&T arena at that

time (Crespi and Dutrénit, 2014). Even though in its origin there was weak vertical and

horizontal coordination and little public-private interaction, the creation of CONACyT

laid the foundations for an institutional connection between scientific and technological

development.

The S&T law of 2002 provides a new legal framework for the sector; it

contributes to its restructuring under the guidance of CONACyT, but by a transversal

approach to S&T, a systemic view of S&T, a focus on regionalization through

institutions to articulate federal and local policies, a wide participation of stakeholders

and the leadership of the president. This law draws on the previous law for the

Promotion of Scientific and Technological Research of 1999, but it deepens and

broadens to include new dimensions that were not considered previously, such as

clearer mechanisms for coordination and participation of the wider agents and a

complete architecture for the government of STI activities. Even though the S&T law of

2002 only refers to S&T, in 2011 it explicitly incorporates the concept of innovation,

recognizing the relationship between S&T and innovation, and the need to build a

national system of STI. In the fifth section the S&T law of 2002 is analyzed in more

detail.

The modifications of 2011 also include a long-term vision for the Special

Program for STI (PECiTI for its Spanish acronym). The previous national programs of

STI (i.e. PECyT 2002-2006 and PECiTI 2008–12) were largely thought of as programs

for the administration itself, with some references to the long term. However, the law

made it clear that next PECiTI will have to include a long-term focus. This has brought

to the discussion a more strategic view of STI, which has stimulated the connection of

STI with long-term objectives of economic and social development. With this approach,

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the planning should include the period of the actual administration as part of a long-

term strategy. In this context, a new PECiTI 2014–18 was designed, which has, in some

way, a long-term view until 2037.

The financial effort to support the STI programs has not followed the

institutional trajectory. Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) increased from $780.9

million in 1990 to achieve a maximum of $5729 million in 2013, while federal

expenditure on S&T (FEST) increased from $717 million in 1990 to $5737 million in

the same period. These increases were certainly motivated by specific policies aimed to

foster S&T in the country. However, the economy has grown over the last three decades

to become the fourteenth largest market in the world, and the financial effort on STI has

just kept pace. Its evolution as a percentage of GDP shows no changes since 1980; both

GERD and FEST have stayed below 0.5 per cent of GDP. The figures for 2013 are 0.44

per cent for both indicators.

The new administration has expressed its commitment to increasing

FEST in order to increase the public share of the GDP and be able to reach 1 per cent of

the GDP by 2018. The first step was again an institutional movement, the creation of

the Coordination of STI at the Presidential Office in January 2013, as mentioned in Box

1. Evidence of this commitment is the increase of 19.5 per cent in the CONACyT

budget for 2014. However, this increase will not significantly change the percentage

that GERD represents on the GDP, which will probably reach a figure close to 0.5 per

cent, but at least there will be an inflection towards growth.

3 Themessagesemergingfromthemainstreammodel

Today, ‘mainstream model’ refers to innovation policy which synthetizes STI arenas.

The analytical framework behind this recognizes the connection between innovation

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policies and NSI, hence the importance of fostering links between actors. Innovation

policy objectives can be arranged into three groups: (1) support investment in research

and innovation, (2) enhance the innovation competences of firms and (3) strengthen

linkages within innovation systems.

This framework recognizes the transversality of STI policy (Kuhlmann, 2001;

Cooke, 2011) and the need for coordination among a wider range of actors from

different arenas (academia, business) and spaces (local, national, global), the

combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, the participation of stakeholders,

and the issue of multilevel governance in a context of many interacting authority

structures working at the domestic and international levels of authority (Smits et al.,

2010a).

The policy mix has evolved from a stress on supply-side measures (mostly R&D

tax incentives and grants), to a greater emphasis on demand-side measures (with a

strong emphasis on procurement policies), seeking a balance between both sides

(Flanagan et al., 2011; Edler, 2011).

However, country differences arise from the implementation of the policy mix.

Izsák et al. (2013) argue that differences in innovation systems and micro- and

macroeconomic conditions matter in explaining innovation performance. It is

particularly recognized that the framework conditions influence the performance of the

system. As argued by the OECD (2010b), finding an optimal policy mix is not a one-off

exercise but a continuous process that adjusts to the dynamics of innovation systems.

Moreover, Izsák et al. (2013) recognize the implications of applying the

mainstream model of innovation policies even in Europe, and they argue that the policy

mix in European countries has consisted of solutions simply transferred from elsewhere

rather than being an appropriate response to domestic challenges.

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It should be mentioned that innovation is at the center of the mainstream model,

and the focus is placed on innovation policy neglecting S&T. This gives the message

that while S&T are associated with innovation, they are less relevant. In countries with

small and even immature scientific systems, this emphasis on innovation may be

limited. Moreover, in countries where a significant portion of the population is

excluded, the single emphasis on business innovation may be limited, because it leaves

out other dimensions such as social or inclusive innovation, which also requires S&T

(Dutrénit and Sutz, 2014; Bortagaray and Gras, 2014).

This analytical framework was built keeping in mind the initial conditions of the

developed countries and some successful emerging countries. Unlike most of the

developing countries, the former are characterized by having quite a solid scientific

base, a broad base of companies performing R&D and in many cases what Guston

(2000) called a social S&T contract with society.

Latin American countries have designed their STI policies over time, under the

influence of the analytical framework existing at the international level, even more so in

the past decade. Mexico is no exception from this trajectory; in fact the changes in the

S&T laws in Mexico pick up the directive principles of this analytical framework. But

these changes do not necessarily adjust themselves to the institutional dynamics, social

norms and practices rooted in the country. This partially explains the difficulties of

constructing the governance for this system.

If anything distinguishes countries, it is the history of institutions through which

agents are conditioned and the rules of the game are generated, both within the

organizations as well as in establishing norms for the relationships between them

(Caballero, 2011).

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It is this that finally makes it possible for the trajectories that drive the states of

NSI to be efficient and effective for development. The central point is that STI policies

based on mainstream models do not recognize the variety in the institutional landscape

within these countries (Ostrom, 2005), and as a consequence, economic governance that

stems from the structure and functioning of both legal and social institutions is made

difficult (Dixit, 2009).

In terms of STI policy, Rodrik’s (2007) arguments in relation to development

appear to apply here: success usually requires following policies that are tailored to

local economic and political realities rather than obeying the dictates of the international

globalization establishment.

4 Institutionalframeworkandgovernance

This section describes the main features of the institutional framework and governance

of the NSI in Mexico, including the evolution of the legislation in STI, the

regionalization processes and the expression of the stakeholders.

4.1 Theevolutionofthelegislation

The S&T law of 2002 and its subsequent amendments, together with other related

reforms (e.g. the integrated budget for STI and a greater autonomy and self-financing of

the public research centers), introduced favorable institutional changes for the

structuring of the NSI. The main features of the law are the following:

• Systemic focus. Define the NSIi and recognize the need for articulation between

actors.

• Organizational restructuring of the S&T sector. STI is no longer just associated with

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CONACyT. Rather, a transversal focus on STI has been adopted, appropriate to its

new demands. The ministries became part of the governing board of CONACyT and

the new inter-ministerial committee for the STI budget, which also incorporates

programming activities.

• Presidential leadership. The president leads a coordinating body integrating STI

activities: the General Council for Scientific Investigation, Technological

Development, and Innovation. Nine cabinet ministers participate in this group,

representing sectors of federal public administration, with the general director of

CONACyT as the executive secretary.

• Concern for linking supply and demand of knowledge. The law sets out the

integration and linkage of inter-sectoral committees in which both representatives of

the ministries as well as from the science, technology and productive sectors

participate. These actors also belong to the General Council, the governing board of

CONACyT and other committees.

• Active participation of stakeholders. A formal space was created for stakeholders,

which reflects the priority of transiting from a governmental to a public policy. The

FCCyT provides such a space and participates in all STI government bodies.ii

• Regionalization/decentralization. The National Conference of S&T was created as a

space where representatives from all state governments can participate and discuss

topics of regional interest. A representative from the National Conference of S&T is

a member of the General Council; furthermore a representative of the National

Network of State Councils (REDNACECyT) is invited to meet with various

government bodies.

• Sectorial and mixed funds for management of resources. In order to identify the

demands of other actors and articulate these to the ministries and states with

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CONACyT, sectorial funds (by ministries) and regional funds (with governments of

federal and municipal bodies) were established. This allows resources from other

sources to be leveraged.

• Competitive funds. These were introduced as a tool for resource allocation of

funding programs for scientific research, technological development and innovation

managed by CONACyT.

From the point of view of the government, the principle bodies of the systems

are the General Council, which orients the planning of state STI activities, and the Inter-

Ministerial Budget Committee, which reviews the congruence of the programs with the

federal government budget and which is jointly coordinated by the vice minister of

expenses of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the executive secretary of the

General Council, who is the general director of CONACyT.

The General Council is a decision-making body made up of a wide group of

ministers for sectors, which have important STI activities, such as those for education,

health, energy, agriculture, the environment and the economy. It also includes

representatives from important associations in the scientific, technology, academic and

business communities, as well as members in a personal capacity invited by the

president as consultants. The Inter-Ministerial Budget Committee is made up of

officials at the vice minister level, each one of which coordinates and monitors the

functions of scientific investigation, technological development and innovation in the

respective sectors of federal public administration.

By virtue of their function as the executive secretary of the General Council, the

general director of CONACyT coordinates the actions of the federal public

administration in terms of STI, and this function also gives CONACyT its characteristic

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of being a coordinating body for STI policy at the national level. Together with the vice

minister of Expenses of the Finance and Public Credit ministry, they calculate the

annual STI budget, which encompasses all resources destined for STI by ministries and

CONACyT.

Article 8 of the S&T law stipulates the creation of inter-sectorial linkages

committees as support bodies for the General Council, for ‘the articulation of policies,

the proposal of priority programs and strategic areas’ and ‘the linking of investigation

with education, innovation and technological development with the productive and

service sectors’. These committees are made up of officials from the respective sectors

of federal public administration and by members of the STI communities.

Even if the legal framework is comprehensive, the process of maturity still has

not been completed. Since its creation in 2002, the General Council has scarcely met,

and has not carried out all of its assigned functions. In particular, it only formed the

inter-sectorial linkage committee with the Ministry of the Economy (Inter-sectorial

Innovation Committee). These committees are necessary in order to develop the

interaction between dependencies and government bodies, and of these with the STI

communities. They are necessary in order to carry out the programming and budgetary

design of STI. In absence of these committees, the Inter-Ministerial Budget Committee

has effectively taken on the role of decision maker and advisor for the general STI

policy, by means of the budget. In this way, an exhaustively prepared institutional

design, carried out with wide political support and with characteristics of participation,

integration and multiple counterweights, has been subjected to a failure of government

(Puchet, 2013).

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The still scarce functioning of the General Council and its support committees,

and the overloading of the general director of CONACyT limit the scope of the tasks for

planning, programming, design and application of the budget at the federal level.

4.2 Advancesintheprocessofregionalization

The territorial dimension of STI policies is advised by the National Conference of S&T

and by the REDNACECyT, which is the network that articulates the state S&T

councils. The National Conference of S&T is the space for institutional coordination

between the federal government and the federative entities. It gives opinions and makes

recommendations on the STI policies that affect the latter. It is made up of the general

director of CONACyT and the primary members of the state S&T councils; the

executive coordinator is the president of the REDNACECyT.

The organizational structure of the conference favors a distribution of power and

commitments assumed by the various federative bodies and state S&T councils so that

it is more horizontal and balanced. These characteristics make the conference sessions a

more favorable atmosphere to deal with and agree on subjects relevant to the

regionalization and decentralization of the NSI, particularly with respect to: (1) criteria

for distribution of the federal STI budget among bodies and regions, (2) mechanisms for

state S&T councils to participate in processes of approval, follow-up and evaluation of

projects financed by federal programs, (3) establishing joint strategies between the

bodies in order to manage the budget with the federal government to finance

instruments such as mixed funds and (4) formation of joint working commissions

between the entities in order to tackle regional issues in the system.

Despite the regularity of its bi-annual sessions, the conference has still not

developed from the discursive stage towards the constitution of bodies and operative

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commissions that orchestrate a set of concrete agreements on decentralization and

regionalization of STI policies and actions.

4.3 Theexpressionofthestakeholders

Article 36 of the S&T law describes the FCCyT as ‘an autonomous and permanent

consulting body of Executive Power, of the General Council of Scientific Investigation,

Technological Development and Innovation, and of the Governing Board of

CONACyT’. It states that ‘its primary objective is to promote the expression of the

scientific, academic, and technological community and of the private sector, for the

formulation of proposals in terms of policies and programs for scientific investigation,

technological development, and innovation’.

Its primary functions feature the following: (1) to be the permanent and

autonomous consulting and advisory body at the federal level of executive power, and,

at the request of the legislative authority, (2) to function as the body for the expression

and communication of proposals to the government by the NSI communities linked to

areas of action such as academia, business, government and social organizations and (3)

to participate in the communication and diffusion of STI activities.

According to the law, the board of directors is made up of incumbents from the

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), the Instituto Politécnico

Nacional (IPN), the Centro de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del IPN

(CINVESTAV), the Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de

Educación Superior (ANUIES), the Sistema Nacional de Centros Públicos de

CONACyT, made up of the several center directors the Academia Mexicana de

Ciencias, the Academia Nacional de Medicina, the Academia de Ingeniería, the

Academia Mexicana de Historia, the Academia Mexicana de la Lengua, the Consejo

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Mexicano de Ciencias Sociales, the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales, the Cámara

Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación, the Confederación Patronal de la

República Mexicana, the Consejo Nacional Agropecuario, Asociación Mexicana de

Directivos de la Investigación Aplicada y Desarrollo Tecnológico, the president of

REDNACECyT and three representatives elected by the members of the National

Researchers System.

In the advisory plan, the FCCyT has played an outstanding role in its specific

tasks with respect to the integration of opinions to formulate special programs for STI

from 2002–06, 2008–12 and 2014–37 and for other programs with a smaller scope. It

has also proposed, in concordance with the programs, the orientations for the federal

S&T budget. Furthermore, it has responded to a great number of specific requests from

the bodies it advises, and at the same time, has collected the initiatives,

recommendations and measures relative to various public policies covering the broad

spectrum of STI communities and brought them to the relevant decision makers (Casas

et al., 2013).

In terms of the legal systems relative to STI, it has maintained constant attention

towards the changes in the S&T law and the introduction of regulations within

institutions, and it is a consultant to whom STI commissions in both houses of congress

regularly refer. In budgetary terms, the FCCyT carries out its analysis and assessment

role in this respect, and coordinates the technical aspects relative to the demands made

annually by various members of its board of directors before the House of Deputies

during the time when the federal expense budget is received, discussed and approved.

An assessment of FCCyT activities from 2002–09 shows that the NSI still has

shortcomings in many mechanisms of intermediate participation where policies are

decided both at local and state levels, such as in certain sectors of the federal

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administration (Puchet, 2010). In particular, the shortcoming is greater where the

FCCyT has had less capacity for representation of communities. It is worth mentioning

the example of the entire broad subsector of technological education and research,

which is coordinated by different bodies of the Ministry of Public Education. In the

wide space of community representation, the processes of incorporating its members are

mediated by pre-established associations which do not always pay special attention to

STI issues, and which are not generally designed to process demands that can be

transformed into policy initiatives in this specific area.

As a broad body for the articulation of state and society on STI policies, the

FCCyT has the permanent challenge of producing public policy proposals that articulate

community demands and transform them into widely-supported legal, economical and

policy measures (Casas et al., 2013).

Designing the mechanisms for the effective design of public STI policy that

includes and integrates the entire process, from consulting the communities to the

responses provided by state decision-making bodies, is an important challenge with

requirements that are difficult to satisfy. The process of proposal formulation must

satisfy the terms of an equal and transparent dialogue between the participants, and

there must be effective accountability before the communities represented.

Very often, dialogues about the core issues of STI policies that need solutions

based on STI activities start and develop informally, with members of the community

who form an opinion, or with groups in power who act upon them. The fact that the

bodies representing the communities do not have formal structures, or depend on

associations or organizations which have much more general purposes than those

relative to STI, distorts the quality of the dialogue and presents difficulties in

accountability to the communities who are interested and involved in STI issues.

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In meeting its objective of promoting the expression of STI communities, the

FCCyT has a daily struggle with the fact that its consultant and advisory role for the

executive and legislative powers of the state and some of its constituencies cannot be

untied from this legal mandate. This means that the dialogue with the communities is an

exchange, which should lead to a consensuated position to be proposed to the

authorities.

Add to this the fact that the associations and individuals, which make up the

board of directors, generally have different objectives and agendas than those relative to

STI policies and do not always agree on plans emanating from its members, who are

part of the communities immersed in STI. Examples of such overlaps, which do not

always facilitate the process of consensus generation, are university associations or the

systems of research centers that struggle with budgetary demands different to those

relative to the budget for the S&T branch, or chambers of industry in which innovative

businesses are not the only ones, or even the majority of those, represented.

As this process implies a set of highly specialized tasks, many participative

mechanisms still need to be designed and put into practice, which not only show good

attributes in procedures, but are also representative, efficient and of technical quality.

The basis for perfecting the FCCyT’s central activities of expressing, representing and

communicating proposals from the communities lies in international practices of

participative negotiation of public budgets, conflict mediation in terms of environmental

issues and management of common resources that have developed criteria and manuals

to varying degrees (Shah, 2007; Barret, 2012; Rey-Valette et al., 2011).

One of the main challenges of FCCyT is to be identified as the independent

advisory body to the Mexican state in the field of STI public policies. For this, it has to

harmoniouslyorganize the two roles, advisor to the authorities and that concerning the

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expression and representation of the scientific, technological, academic and productive

sectors.

5 The rules of the game and governance

The set of modifications to the legal institutions that was made in 1999 and extended in

2002 was, to a great extent, inspired by the mainstream models of STI policies. The

evidence shows that these institutions that were completed and broadened in the last 15

years have had serious difficulties in their structure and in functioning effectively,

which has contributed to causing increasing failures for the economic governance of the

NSI. It is appropriate to specify some details about the origin of these failures.

The rules of the game, which form and make possible the processes of

innovation in different geographical or sectorial areas, establish institutional

frameworks and make possible the structure and functioning of the institutions that

constitute governance of each one. An institutional framework is required to anchor the

agreements on which the governance is based, but the behavior of the agents largely

overtakes this.

Institutional frameworks comprise countless informal rules that serve to allow

various groups of agents to carry out their daily interactions and receive their payments

and penalties; that is, the games are established with their respective payment structures.

Formal rules are added to the informal ones by different bodies of authority –

organizations of the agents themselves, firms, research centers, universities, various

levels of government agencies and constitutional powers. The institutional framework

configured over a certain sphere where innovations are produced always has tensions

arising from the compatibility and harmonious function of the rules. In particular,

changes in the formal rules coming from law – administrative regulations, laws,

21

constitutions – play a part in relation to the codes and norms of conduct, contracts,

practices and routines through which the agents interact. These rules may be both

formal and informal, and come from distinct bodies of authority such as associations,

corporations, firms and government. It is therefore important to understand how various

types of rules exist within an institutional framework, in order to assess the possibilities

and limitations of the governance and its changes.

Given the strength that legal and regulatory changes have had, in the case of the

institutionality of Mexican STI it is important to ask, what role does the law play? Are

the rules of the game that generate innovation changing? Is the way the agents behave

changing? Does this directly intervene in governance?

This is a polemical issue. Becker (1968) argued that the law acts on, and alters,

the rules of the game. Conversely, according to Basu (2011), the law does not act on the

rules of the game, rather, it acts on the expectations of the agents, and as such, on their

behavior. This position makes a distinction between the rules of the game that govern

activities – in our case, those that interact to produce innovation – and others that also

govern institutions, such as legal ones, but do not alter the basic structure that sustains

institutional frameworks. As a consequence, an institutional framework can have

problems with coherence, such as the aforementioned Mexico STI that probably had

and continues to have such problems. However, attacking this lack of coherence does

not remove the obstacles to a certain game.

According to Basu (2011), if the law, with its recompenses and penalties, does

not coincide with the equilibrium/comfortable situation resulting from the game, there is

not sufficient incentive to comply with the law, because the balance exists and this is

the case regardless of the law. In turn, if the policies are designed in accordance with

22

contexts in which the law does affect the rules of the game, the recommendations will

not be appropriate for a context where they do not change.

In the case of Mexico, it seems appropriate to conceive the changes in legal

institutions and many failures in the governance of NSI based on the following results:

(1) the equilibrium observed in the processes of innovation, in particular, low

investment and lack of effective links between agents, is outside of legal reforms to

boost increases in funds and horizontal forms of coordination that favor them, and (2)

among other functions, Mexican policymakers have been ascribed to the routine of

providing rules that should be incorporated into the legal institutions, according to their

version of the mainstream models.

In hindsight, it is possible to question the representation of the main rules of the

game of those that designed the S&T rules in 1999 and 2002. It was surely a vision that

favored those rules, which came from government organizations. It is from there that

the changes were conceived. Box 2 outlines the changes to the rules of the game.

Box 2. Proposal to change the rules of the game

Rules of the game valid in the 1990s Rules of the game proposed by the laws

Discretionary assignment of resources Competitive funds

Different policies for each agent Exchange and coordination between all agents

involved (inter-sectorial and inter-ministerial

committees, National Conference of S&T,

networks of research groups and centres)

Government STI policy Public STI policy

The evidence suggests that the intention was to fundamentally change the rules

of the game with changes to legislation. Said changes were reinforced with new

23

government programs, with which the set of incentives associated with the STI policy

was modified, but the types of behavior emanating from the rules of the game were not.

Different government incentives were introduced. The STI policymakers

designed and put into practice programs, which contrasted with specific incentives that

were rooted in the communities. For example, discretionary assignment of funds

assumed specific agreements between investigators and officials, or between businesses

and officials, which contributed to the reputations of those individuals who obtained

and conceived them in their respective communities. Many leaders came from or were

reinforced by means of approving conditions to obtain funds. As the assignment came

from negotiation, the funds conceived had objectives that not only covered individual

activities, but also the resources for infrastructure or the organization of actions that

incorporated various agents.

The transformation of the mechanisms for assigning funds to projects through

competition produced a distortion in the structure of incentives, inasmuch as it was

primarily concentrated in the financing of individual activities, and it has taken a long

time to restore the mechanisms for granting funds for the creation of long-term

capability building. Knowledge of the game is partial, to the extent that it tends to

identify with certain policies, and put the focus on the behavior of some agents, but not

the entire game. It is commonly observed that when considering processes of

innovation, directors of R&D activities and their departments or entrepreneurial

businesses are taken into account, but it is overlooked that firms, in organizing various

agents and their interests, play a game where profitability does not necessarily depend

on innovation, or at least on R&D.

Both Dixit’s definition (2009) as well as another more operative one on which the

institutional quality ranking of countries is based (World Bank, 2012) integrate both

24

legal and social institutions. As such, the structure and the function of the government

of STI also help or hinder governance. As we have seen, the evolution of Mexican STI

institutions has been characterized by the extension and deepening of the legal

components. At the same time, many of these components that determine the

coordination between levels of government and sectors of federal public administration,

programming, budget preparation, and decision making in relation to STI activities have

functioned partially or even defectively. This fact places an additional limitation on

governance; even more so when considering that structures of economic governance

function in states, markets and communities (Bowles, 2004), and that quite rightly,

deficiencies in meeting and orchestrating legal orders on the part of the government

reduces the very capacity for governance.

6 Tensions that hamper the functioning of the system in a self-regulated manner

Over the past 15 years, the NSI began to be delivered in a more decisive manner

(Corona et al., 2014). Advances have been noted in the following aspects:

1. Decision-making processes related to the consensus between participants in STI

activities, management of STI in organizations in the academic, productive and

governmental sectors, and linkage between organizations or agents to innovate

and establish relationships for the exchange of knowledge.

2. Mechanisms for inclusive participation of individuals and organizations that

carry out STI activities within bodies, and consultation for formulating STI

policy.

3. Long-term consulting and planning procedures according to the types of

articulation of actions between federal government, other levels of government

25

and agents participating in STI activities; specifically, planning according to

these cases is obligatory (at the federal government level), agreed upon (between

the federation and the state governments) or indicative (when it involves other

organizations or agents).

4. Formal bodies of orientation, implementation and evaluation of STI policies.

Aspects 1 and 2 are primarily based on reinforced social institutions, to some

extent by legal orders. In turn, aspects 3 and 4 are almost entirely regulated by legal

institutions and they take on the governing function as a requirement of governance.

It would appear that the S&T law and its subsequent amendments were designed

and approved bearing in mind that changes in the law would change the rules of the

game. But it is difficult for the law to change the rules of the game, such that it

constitutes a system with high levels of governance. As argued by Basu (2011), agents

tend to respond with what they know to do. This explains some of the tensions that have

arisen.

What follows is a discussion of three of the primary tensions that have been

generated in the NSI: (1) conflicts between the legal institutions adapted to the

mainstream models of STI policy and the informal rules of the game that stem from the

interaction of agents and organizations; (2) a strong intromission of politics into STI

decision making; and (3) an incipient process of constructing STI public policy due to

difficulties with the participation of communities.

Conflicts between the legal institutions adapted to the mainstream models

of STI policy and the informal rules of the game that stem from the interaction of

agents and organizations. The different visions of the agents about the role that STI

26

should play in the national development greatly determine the informal rules of the

game, and they conflict with manners of coordination, incentive structures and

conditioning established in the legal institutions. Policymakers drive a vision that they

suppose is in legal institutions. Other agents, particularly in the academic and

productive sectors, act in accordance with their own visions, where neither agrees with

each other, nor with the broad visions of the policymakers. In this way, games begin for

the assignment and obtaining of funds, in the linkage between the agents, and in its

coordination, which is governed by rules that are outside of legal institutions.

The legal changes represent an ongoing activity of regulatory design, which very

often leads to the imposition of formal regulations and the reduction of coherence

between the same. The multiplicity of rules hinders the enforcement that requires

compliance. Difficulties then arise to meet the system of the formal laws as a whole.

A strong intromission of politics into STI decision making. The legal

institutions have been designed outside the rules of the game followed by the agents and

organizations involved in the processes of innovation, or with a partial and imprecise

knowledge of these rules. Very often, the legal orders have an influence in modifying

the expectations of the agents that contradicts incentives stemming from the payments

and penalties established by the game. Two examples of this are as follows. The

configuration of clusters for innovation observed in various regions of the country is

based on the cooperation and transfer of knowledge between businesses and public

research centers. However, the rules of the National Researchers System favors

individual publication above other results,iii and the financial stimulation programs for

businesses which were valid from 2002 through 2009 did not enforce the costs of

investigation and experimental development that would be made with agreements

between business and research centers. With these contradictions in place, tensions have

27

arisen between agents and organizations. Conflict resolution happens in the political

arena and is achieved through parallel games where negotiations are made according to

political powers and incentives that distort the very processes of innovation that they

wish to favor.

Also, the fact that the government for STI activities shows failures due to non-

compliance with legal orders generates a wide space for intromission of politics. For

example, the detection of non-compliance by the Auditoría Superior de la Federación

(ASF, 2010), the body for the control and supervision of the House of Deputies,

introduced to the discussion the issue of the quality of the laws and their contribution to

putting STI policies into practice.

An incipient process of construction of STI public policy due to difficulties

with the participation of communities. An important part of the legal changes

introduced from 1999 was that the governmental STI policy turned into a public one.

For this change, the mechanisms for participation of the STI communities were

extended and deepened. At the same time, as analyzed in section fourth, a state body

was created: the FCCyT, whose primary mission was to listen to the different agents

and organizations in the communities and give them a voice before the decision-making

bodies of STI policy. However, the games of many associations and academies, which

include various sections of these communities, still face difficulties in being governed

by the aims and interests required for the development of STI activities and the

promotion of public policies to favor the participation and consensus of the active

communities.

This fact has generated some rules of the game around political negotiation

between STI policymakers and leaders of associations and academies that do not always

aim for the improvement of institutions and policies for the development of STI.

28

Because of this, the process of constructing public policy is subjected to difficulties that

come from the scarce participation of the communities or from limitations to the

adequate functioning of the legally established mechanisms for participation.

7 Conclusions

The aim of this paper is to discuss the experience of STI policymaking in Mexico,

considering the interaction between the trajectory of institution building and the process

of constructing the government and governance of the system.

There is no doubt that the NSI has been strengthened and advanced. STI policies

can contribute to generating change in the behavior of agents, articulate demand for and

offer knowledge, stimulate the development of strategic sectors and promote new areas

of competitiveness. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of the system’s

functioning depends primarily on extended governance.

This governance needs to act from the bottom-up, through the constitution of

agreements between agents, their associations and the organizations they form for

specific purposes, and at the same time, it must be based on the wide participation of

these same actors in the public policy of STI. In the case of Mexico, these processes are

still in the first phases of maturity.

In governing STI, the dominant strategy of the policymakers has been to change

laws and other formal regulations derived in accordance with their vision of

international experience, that is, the S&T law and many subsequent regulations. But

these changes did not achieve the transformation of many of the rules of the game

governing the processes of innovation. This appears to be due to thinking that said

change was a legal issue, when in fact it probably was not, or even because they

foresaw that the changes would modify expectations that led to new behaviors, without

29

a clear interpretation of neither how the agents were playing nor the local regulations on

which their actions were based.

Returning to the dancers image, the innovation policy is facing difficulties to

dance with the innovation practice without understanding that it is not possible to

change its music (the rules of your game) only with the creation of new legal rules,

particularly when it is unclear how actors play in the innovation practice.

For the changes in the laws to be effective, they had to have started from a more

precise analysis of the different rules of the game in operation in the system and its

subsystems, as well as the particularities of each agent’s strategy. The following are

examples of modifications to formal regulations and policies based on them which, in

turn, do not take into account an adequate interpretation of the rules of the game: (1) the

promotion of R&D incentives to firms that, in the majority, do not aim for profitability

based on innovation; (2) the design and orchestration of funds for linkage between

academia and productive sectors, when the primary public incentive to researchers is

based on ‘publish or perish’ and (3) pressure on those who implement policies to design

and make the budget without adequate safeguards that instruments should have if they

also wish to promote R&D and linkage.

As well as this continuous change in the legislation, there have been difficulties

in using the new legal regulations, including those that already had time to have been

approved to be thoroughly implemented. The fact that legal institutionality in many

parts of the system has not been put into practice is probably based on difficulties with

both the government and the communities to conceive their respective roles. In terms of

the government, the majority of policymakers have not managed to modify the

hierarchical logic of public administration. The lack of adaptation to the legal

framework that explicitly requires incorporating other actors into public policy

30

decisions leads to government agencies repeatedly acting through an inadequate top-

down and centralized focus, lacking openness towards the integration of opinions and

proposals from representatives of communities in the decision bodies. In order for the

communities, in turn, to contribute to transit from governmental to public policy, they

require participation in the debate and in the construction of proposals that make it

possible for their representatives to contribute technical designs for the formulation of

STI policy to the decision-making bodies, more so than the defense of the general

concepts and positions.

The governance needs the government itself to contribute through a more stable

and systematic action in terms of the participation of the communities in constructing

public policies, with greater levels of coordination at the federal level and with better

agreement between the different levels and powers. It also needs the communities and

their representatives to debate and discuss among themselves, with the explicit aim of

designing and formulating proposals with the necessary attributes to allow policymakers

to put them into practice. Both elements have conditioned and impeded the construction

of wide system governance.

International evidence suggests that the existence of a strategic level of STI

policy could contribute to greater efficiency in inducing changes to upgrading national

STI capabilities, which includes a dimension of learning about the policies themselves.

Policymakers can internalize the need to constantly adjust their actions to foment STI

capabilities while they develop. This requires a long-term policy vision (Avnimelech

and Teubal, 2008; Avnimelech et al., 2010). Difficulties in governance undermine this

focus of gradual accumulation of capabilities.

In order to advance in building the NSI in Mexico, where advances have already

been made in the legal institutional design and, to some extent, towards public policies,

31

policy change is needed at the strategic level of the design in at least two aspects. The

first is that policymakers must modify their vision to include an understanding of the

local rules of the game that govern processes of innovation, and as such, they should

move away from the temptation towards constantly changing legal orders, following the

dictates of mainstream models, as the unique way to improve the NSI and its

governance. The second is that based on this understanding of how agents and

organizations in the Mexican STI arena play the game, they must design and put into

practice policies that strictly comply with the basic legal institutional framework of STI,

and advance policies taking account of the initial conditions in which they are

operating, suggesting both new and fresh focuses as well as different combinations of

instruments.

In the dance floor of innovation practice, policy and theory (IPT matrix),

Kuhlmann et al. (2010) argue that ‘researchers use experience of policy makers as

empirical input’ to build theory. In this line, the authors of this paper are somehow

using such empirical input to obtain these preliminary thoughts on how to harmonize

the rules that are implicit in the innovation practice with the legal rules proposed by the

innovation policy. We need to understand the music that follow the dancers of

innovation practice to write the music the dancers of innovation policy have to dance to.

It is not enough to imitate the score playing by mainstream policy practitioners. In this

vein, this article is based on an analysis of detailed empirical evidence on the innovation

practices of the policymakers and it is intended to provide elements for strengthening

innovation theory to enhance a joint dance floor for the three actors.

The proposal of a strategic STI policy, which considers the three actors, the rules

of the game in operation in the system, the initial conditions, particularly the national

STI capabilities and the institutional fabric of Mexico seems to be the only one that will

32

give a clear message to the different actors, find agreement starting from its various

conceptions and focus long-term efforts towards economic development and social

inclusion.

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iThe S&T law defines the national STI system. In this document, we refer to it as NSI.iiIn the fourth section the main characteristics of the FCCyT are described.

iiiThis is one of the instruments of the STI policy with the longest tradition in the country; its main goals

include the promotion of the formation, development and consolidation of a critical mass of researchers at

the highest level, mostly within the public system of higher education and research. The program grants

both pecuniary (a monthly compensation) and non-pecuniary stimuli (status and recognition) to researchers based on the productivity and quality of their research. Researchers from universities and

research centers are beneficiaries of this stimulus.