spain economic outlook€¦ · spain economic outlook, third quarter 2011 page 4 global growth...

Spain Economic OutlookThird Quarter 2011

Madrid, 4 August 2011

Spain Economic Outlook, Third Quarter 2011

Key themes1

2

3

5

Economic policies and outlook: prospects dictated by delays in decisions on how to tackle budget problems in Europe and the US

Europe: the July summit brought positive surprises regarding liquidity support measures, but Greece's solvency issues have yet to be cleared up. Economies with high risk premiums have already seen growth undermined as a result

Spain: GDP growth in the second quarter of around 0.3% qoq (0.8% yoy), still too weak for sustained job creation. The Spanish economy is still stuck in a pattern of low activity and employment, with forecasts pointing towards 1% growth for 2011

The higher contribution to growth by net trade is still one of the positive aspects of the ongoing adjustment

There has been no change in the pace of adjustment and reform which offset rising uncertainty on international financial markets

4


Section 1

International environment: politics takes centre stage in the economic debateSection 2

Outlook for the Spanish economy in 2011-2012: the gradual recovery continues

Section 3

The challenges of the Spanish economy in the face of contagion

Contents


Global growth still driven by emerging economies• The global economy slowed slightly in the first half of 2011 • Global growth should remain robust, driven by emerging economies, as the slowdown was caused by

short-lived factors (e.g. high oil prices, disruption to the Japanese supply chain caused by the earthquake)

Contribution to global growth (%)Source: BBVA Research

Growth in Asia and Latin America (% yoy)Source: BBVA Research

5.0

4.2 4.4

-0.7

2.8

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

2008 2009 2010 2011 (p) 2012 (p)

Rest of the world Emerging marketsOther adv. Economies EurozoneUSA World growth

10.39.4 9.1

6.2

4.15.2 5.4

3.8

5.25.8

4.7

8.3

7.0 6.9

4.1

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

China Asia(Exc.China)

Mexico Latam5 Eagles

Jul-11 Apr-11


• The recovery has lost steam in 2011, mainly due to one-off factors, although the US economy remains structurally weak after the financial crisis: struggling real estate market, deleveraging and tough lending conditions

• Inflationary pressures remain benign. The Fed still needs clear signs before changing its tightening policy

Commodity prices

Bad weather

Weak growth in H1 2011 US: GDP growth (%)Source: BBVA Research

Cuts to budget spending

Supply chain (Japan)

Delay in real estate sector rebound

Temporary

Existing

No major changes in expectations of recovery, but risks tilted towards the downside

Risks

US: a temporary blip

2.9 3.02.7

3.0

2.1

2.6

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

2010 2011 2012

Forecasts April 2011 Forecasts Jul 2011


US: more than a debt ceiling is needed: long-term consolidation

The agreement to raise the US debt ceiling prevented technical default by the country. Nevertheless, it does not clear up all doubts surrounding a long-term solution to curb the deficit and stabilise debt

US: budget deficit (% of GDP)Source: BBVA Research, CBO and Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

US: public debt (% of GDP)*Source: BBVA Research, CBO and Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform

-10

-9

-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

CBO baseline forecast

Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

CBO baseline forecast

Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and


Financial stress in Europe will affect the periphery more than the core• In Europe, healthy growth in Q1 and Q2 led to a slight upward revision to the 2011 growth forecast• The decoupling between European core and peripheral countries should continue in 2011 and 2012.

Wider bond spreads will undermine growth of countries with high risk premiums

Sovereign bond spreads (vs. the German 10-year bond)Source: BBVA Research

EMU: GDP growthSource: BBVA Research

1,7

3,5

1,9

-0,2

1,31,9

-1,6

0,6

-0,9

0,8

-3,8-4,1

3,3

1,81,5 1,5

1,10,7 0,9 0,6

-1,1

2,0

1,3 1,4

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

2010

2011

2012

EMU GER FRA ITA SPA IRL POR GRE

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Mar 10 Jun 10 Sep 10 Dec 10 Mar 11 Jun 11

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

IR BE SP IT PT GR


111127

143166 172 170 160

146 143 140 138

30507090110

130150170

2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

4053 60 64 67 63

6465656767

30507090110

130150170

2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Insolvent countries must be separated from liquidity-strapped countries to prevent contagionTo solve financial stress in Europe, a distinction must be made between countries faced with solvency issues and those with liquidity problems. For the first group, solvency must be restored by slashing debt. For the second group, a strong mechanism for providing liquidity is needed

Inso

lven

cyIll

iqu

idit

y

Greece

Ireland

Portugal

Spain

Italy

Liquidity provision: expanded and improved EFSF

Sustainability restitution: reduce

the NPV of debt

Public debt (% of GDP)Source: BBVA Research

Spain

Sust

ain

abili

ty

anal

ysis

Greece


What are the key features of each pillar?Strict conditionality is required to achieve debt reduction. To provide liquidity, the EFSF must be expanded and improved, with a certain degree of conditionality. Both pillars should steer Europe not only towards monetary union, but to some extent, fiscal union

Larger and more flexible EFSF

Bond purchases on secondary markets

Lending not only to governments

Pre-emptive lending (FCL)

Co

nd

itio

nal

ity

End result: mini fiscal union

• Eurobonds

• Fiscal rulesOfficial bailout or private haircuts

Avoid collapse of the banking system

Ext

rem

ely

con

dit

ion

alit

y

Liquidity provision: expanded and improved EFSF

Sustainability restitution: reduce the NPV of debt


July summit: EU authorities make surprise liquidity support announcementThe 21 July summit did not address all solvency concerns, but attempted to isolate peripheral countries from Greece

Expanded EFSF, pre-emptive lending (e.g. FCL) and bond purchases on secondary markets

All of this, but……the size of the EFSF was unchanged

Rescheduling and debt repurchases, but limited reduction in debt

What the summit needed What was agreed on 21 JulyAchieved?

Decision on a public bailout or reach agreement on substantial write-down of NPV of debt

No agreement on EurobondsCreation of Eurobonds to cover debt up to 50% of GDP and imposition of conditionality


What's left to do after the summit?In addition to executing the agreements and clarifying significant details (EFSF, private sector involvement), the EU authorities must devise a powerful mechanism to provide liquidity, lend credibility to the continuation of reforms and proceed towards greater fiscal unity

3 pillars for progress Work to be done

Provide sufficient support to liquidity to ward off speculators

• Achieve a broad core-periphery agreement

Proceed with economic reforms• Implement ongoing programmes

• Design a timetable for more reforms

Achieve a tighter fiscal union

• Announce the creation of Eurobonds quickly, with fiscal rules and strict control. Imple-mentationwith the ESM in 2013


Section 1

International environment: politics takes centre stage in the economic debate

Section 2

Outlook for the Spanish economy in 2011-2012: the gradual recovery continuesSection 3


Contents


2011: 0.9%2012: 1.3%

Structural reforms 2011: ≈2012: ≈

Financial stress 2011: (-)2012: (-)

• As expected: limited reform to collective bargaining, which does not solve the problems.

• Increase in forecast risk premiums (+50bp on average in 2011 and 2012)

Foreign demand 2011: (+)2012: (-)

Data for 1Q 2011 2011: (+)2012: (+)

• Slightly higher-than-expected GDP growth

Fiscal consolidation • Higher-than-expected public consumption in Q1 2011, signalling sharper cutbacks in H2 2011

Current forecast

• Slowdown in global growth and a strong euro vs. the dollar, but higher growth in the EMU in 2011

2011: ≈2012: ≈

Monetary policy 2011: (-)2012: (-)

• The ECB would bring forward interest-rate hikes from 2012 to the end of 2011

Impact on GDPFACTOR

New

fact

ors

Determining factors of the macroeconomic scenarioSource: BBVA Research

Spain: growth still weak


Growth in Q1 2011 topped expectations, but Q2 2011 numbers were broadly the same as Q1 2011 and in line with forecasts of three months ago

The main characteristics of the short-term outlook for the Spanish economy are still:

• Lack of job creation

• Weak domestic demand

• Negative contribution to growth by domestic demand

• Sharp growth in foreign demand

Spain: actual GDP growth and MICA-BBVA model forecasts (% qoq) Current forecast: 3 August 2011Source: BBVA Research


-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2Q0

9

3Q0

9

4Q0

9

1Q10

2Q10

3Q10

4Q10

1Q11

2Q11

3Q11

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

CI at 20% CI at 40% CI at 60%

Point estimates First Release


0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Apr-11 Jul-11

The ECB could bring forward the start of its tightening campaign to the last quarter of 2011, raising key rates to 1.75% by year-end and 2.0% in Q1 2012, provided the European sovereign debt crisis is cleared up

• The interest rate scenario is not that different, so the impact of raising rates earlier would be limited

• In general, higher interest rates than expected three months ago would only detract marginally from growth in 2012


ECB. Interest rate forecastsSource: BBVA Research


Heightened pressure in sovereign debt markets (larger risk premiums: +50bp in 2011 and 2012, but short-lived) would dampen GDP growth

The cumulative effect of this factor alone would be a decrease in GDP growth of 5 tenths in 2012 from forecasts three months ago


Spain: sovereign risk premium (vs. German 10Y bond)

50.6

50.8

15.0

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Explain by fundamentals Apr11 Jul11

Source: BBVA Reserach


More upbeat prospects for the EMU in 2011 than before could be offset by the slowdown in global economic growth and a slightly stronger euro

Goods and services exports:

• Above pre-financial crisis levels

• Performance in line with similar crisis periods despite the absence of currency depreciation as in the past

• Diversified growth


100

105

110

115

120

125

130

t

t+1

t+2

t+3

t+4

t+5

t+6

t+7

Spain (4Q 1992=100) Spain (Q2 2009=100)

Note: t is the quarter that recorded the local cyclical low

Qoq change in goods and services exports during the end-phase of two periods of crisis (in real terms)Source: BBVA Research based on INE


Foreign demandStronger growth in the EMU in 2011 could be offset by the slowdown in global economic growth and a slightly stronger euro

A rebound in tourism is particularly important for employment


-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

Mar

-08

Jun

-08

Sep

-08

Dec

-08

Mar

-09

Jun

-09

Sep

-09

Dec

-09

Mar

-10

Jun

-10

Sep

-10

Dec

-10

Mar

-11

Jun

-11

Foreign tourist arrivals (qoq, % SWDA)Source: INE and BBVA Research



Spain EMU Spain EMU Spain EMUHousehold consumption 1.3 0.8 0.3 1.2 0.6 1.3Public Administration's consumpt -0.7 0.3 -0.2 0.6 -1.3 0.1GFCF -7.5 -1.0 -4.9 3.3 -0.4 2.7

Capital goods and other prod -2.1 3.1 0.6 6.1 3.0 4.0Construction -11.1 -3.9 -9.1 0.0 -2.9 0.8Housing -16.5 -2.9 -7.5 0.6 0.9 1.0

Domestic demand (*) -1.1 0.9 -1.0 1.5 0.0 1.2

Exports 10.3 11.1 11.0 6.4 6.0 3.2Imports 5.5 9.3 3.7 5.6 1.0 3.2

Net trade balance (*) 1.0 0.8 1.8 0.5 1.3 0.1

GDP at mp (yoy %) -0.1 1.7 0.9 2.0 1.3 1.3Pro-memoriaGDP w/o housing investment 0.9 1.9 1.3 2.1 1.3 1.3GDP w/o construction 1.7 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.4Employment (LFS) -2.3 -0.4 -1.1 0.5 0.4 0.7Unemployment rate (% active pop 20.1 10.2 21.0 9.8 20.9 9.5Current account balance (% of GD -4.5 -0.4 -4.0 -0.2 -1.6 -0.1Public sector balance (% of GDP) -9.2 -6.0 -6.0 -4.4 -4.4 -3.6Annual average CPI 1.8 1.6 3.0 2.7 1.4 1.8(*) contribution to growth

2012

Economic forecastsSource: INE, Bank of Spain, Eurostat and BBVA Research

(yoy %)2010 2011


Section 1

International environment: politics takes centre stage in the economic debate

Section 2

Outlook for the Spanish economy in 2011-2012: the gradual recovery continues

Section 3


Contents


Sovereign CDS: actual and equilibrium Greece, Portugal and Ireland Source: BBVA Research

Spain must proceed to make sweeping reforms• Fundamentals indicate that the countries which have been bailed out effectively suffered from solvency

problems, whereas Spain and Italy are undergoing a liquidity crunch• For this situation to continue, more ambitious reforms must be carried out

Sovereign CDS: actual and equilibrium Spain, Italy, BelgiumSource: BBVA Research

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Jan-

04

May

-04

Sep-

04

Jan-

05

May

-05

Sep-

05

Jan-

06

May

-06

Sep-

06

Jan-

07

May

-07

Sep-

07

Jan-

08

May

-08

Sep-

08

Jan-

09

May

-09

Sep-

09

Jan-

10M

ay-1

0Se

p-10

Jan-

11M

ay-1

1

Actual Forecast

0

50

100

150

200

250

Jan

-04

May

-04

Sep

-04

Jan

-05

May

-05

Sep

-05

Jan

-06

May

-06

Sep

-06

Jan

-07

May

-07

Sep

-07

Jan

-08

May

-08

Sep

-08

Jan

-09

May

-09

Sep

-09

Jan

-10

May

-10

Sep

-10

Jan

-11

May

-11

Actual Forecast


-32.4

23,0

6.75.0 5.1

-2.7 -2.9 -3.2

-9.2

-5.1-3.9 -3.1-3.1 -4.2

-5.6-3.9

-1.6

-11.4-9.7

-8.5

-14.9

-10.1-12.9

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

200

8

200

9

2010

200

8

200

9

2010

200

8

200

9

2010

200

8

200

9

2010

200

8

200

9

2010

200

8

200

9

2010

200

8

200

9

2010

GERMANY FRANCE SPAIN ITALY IRELAND (*) PORTUGAL GREECE

Financial institutions Government Households Companies Total

• Spain has already made some progress by lowering its financing requirement relative to other countries via sharp cuts to investment and an increase in the household saving rate

• However, public sector saving has declined.

Concerns stem from the Spanish economy's hefty financing requirement

EMU: Financing capacity (+)/requirements (-) by agent (% GDP)Source: BBVA Research based on AMECO data

(*) Irish data series for government and Companies are truncated


Spain has managed to differentiate itself: the government can still tap markets

Unlike other countries in the periphery, which have been forced to turn to the ECB for liquidity, the Spanish government has been able to meet its financing requirement abroad, albeit at a higher price

EMU: net capital inflows 2010 (% GDP)Source: BBVA Research from Haver data

Note: a net rise in financial liabilities or fall in financial assets results in net capital inflows, while opposite movements give rise to net capital outflows.

4.3

-0.3

0.9

7.79.0

5.8

9.1

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

Spain France Ireland Portugal

Central bank Govt. MFI ORS Total

Net capital inflows (+)

Net capital outflows (-)


Spain must be pro-active to keep contagion from spreading

Greece

Portugal

• High deficits and debt

• Doubts surrounding public accounts

• High foreign deficit

• Scant growth and productivity

• Rigid public deficit

• Stubborn foreign deficit

Spain shares many of the concerns of the three other peripheral countries, and efforts should be made to distance itself

Regional government deficits

Incomplete reforms (e.g. labor market)

1

3

Ireland• Oversized banking industry

• Private indebtedness

• Real estate bubble

Bank restructuring2

Problems in the periphery Risks linked to Spain


Maximum fiscal rigourMeeting budget targets would bring down the risk premium significantly• The target is ambitious: a reduction in the regional government deficit of 6pp of GDP to 3% in 2013• In 2011, the bulk falls on the regional governments: they must lower the deficit by 1.5pp, making

nearly 90% of the required adjustment in 2011 to guarantee that the 2013 target will be met

Contribution to fiscal adjustment * (pp of GDP)Source: BBVA Research, using finance ministry data

Proposals

• Transparency and multi-year budgets for all public administrations

• Fiscal rules limiting spending to trend nominal GDP growth

• Fiscal Policy Advisory Council reporting to legislative bodies

(*) Excluding impact of regional deficit financing

-3,2

-1,6 -1,4-0,9

-1,9

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

2010 (a) 2011 (e) 2012 (e) 2013 (e) 2014 (e)

Central government Regional governments

Local governments Social Security

Total

Increase in deficit (+)

Decrease in deficit (+)


• The state will comply, with revenue potentially exceeding forecasts by a few tenths• The question mark lies with the Social Security and especially in the out-turn of regional government

spending

Maximum fiscal rigour

Central government: non-financial balance (cumulative annual, % of GDP)Source: BBVA Research, using finance ministry data

Tax revenues(% like-for-like yoy change in 12m centred moving average)Source: BBVA Research based on AEAT data( p j )

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May Ju

n

Jul

Aug Se

p

Oct

Nov

Dec

2008 2009 2010 2011

2011 target: -4,8

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

Jun-

07

Sep-

07

Dec

-07

Mar

-08

Jun-

08

Sep-

08

Dec

-08

Mar

-09

Jun-

09

Sep-

09

Dec

-09

Mar

-10

Jun-

10

Sep-

10

Dec

-10

Mar

-11

Jun-

11

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

VAT (lhs) Corporate tax (lhs)Personal income tax (rhs) Excise duties (rhs)


Maximum fiscal rigour

• The regional governments must reimburse the state for slightly over 20% of their total financing for 2009• In view of the sharp fall in the Sufficiency Fund, those regions that relied more heavily on it have to return

larger amounts.

Theoretical finance on comparable responsibilities per adjusted pop, 2007 vs. 2009Source: Spain Economic Outlook, Third Quarter 2011

Balance owed in 2009 as a percentage of total regional financing vs. the weighting of Sufficiency Fund in 2007 theoretical financingSource: Spain Economic Outlook, Third Quarter 2011

80

85

90

95

100

105

110

115

120

125

Ba

Va

Ma

Cat Mu

Can

a

C-M A

n

Ga

C&

L Ar

As

Ex Ri

Cnt

2007 2009

Cat

GaAn

AsCnt Ri

Mu

Va

Ar

C-M

Cana Ex

Ba

Ma

CyL

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

0% 5% 10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Weighting of SF in 2007 financing

200

9 B

alan

ce/t

otal

fina

ncin

g


Bank restructuring

Broader coverage: 90% of the Spanish system, compared to the EU average of 60%

Larger shock to GDP growth Sharp (absolute and relative) fall in

housing prices

Stress tests: cumulative decline in GDP after two years, deviation from baseline scenarioSource: BBVA Research and EBA

Stress tests: cumulative decline in real estate pricesSource: BBVA Research and EBA

Stress tests: a more transparent and rigorous exercise in Spain

-4.5

-4.0

-3.5

-3.0

-2.5

-2.0

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

EMU EU27 Spain

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

UK GER FRA ITA SP POR IE GRE

Commercial Residential


Stress tests: institutions with a Core Tier 1 capital ratio below 5%Source: BBVA Research and EBA

Factoring in general and anti-cyclical provisions, and convertible bond issues, no Spanish bank would require an extraordinary capital injection

• In the more adverse scenario, the Core Tier 1 capital ratio would decline from 7.4% to 7.3%. However, considering other elements that absorb losses (e.g. general allowances, convertible bonds) the ratio would stand at 8.6%

Bank restructuring

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

SPA GRC AUT IRL DEU PRT CHI ITA SVK

Based on data at year-end 2010Including capital increases in 2011


Insufficient labour market reform

Considerations

• Tenuous progress in signing of corporate collective bargaining agreements

• Arbitration does not eliminate "ultra-activity"

• Proposal still restrictive in terms of internal flexibility

• The possibility of removing wage-related clauses from collective agreements is still complicated

• The effectiveness of the reform will depend on the goodwill of the parties

Breakdown of the fall in employment during the recession (% contribution to change in total number of hours worked between 2007 and 2009)Source: BBVA Research

-14

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

Irl

Spa

Jap

USA Grc Ita

Fin

EMU

12

Prt

EU15

Gb

r

Dn

k

Au

s

Deu

Swe

Can Nld

Fra

Bel

No

r

Employment Hours worked per workerTotal hours worked


Driving an improvement in productivity• In Spain, aggregate exports of goods show a positive correlation to company size, a key factor in

international expansion • Initiative to boost the growth of small businesses is crucial to exploit economies of scale.

Value of exports as a share of total sales by company size (average 1990-2009, %)Source: BBVA Research based on BSS data (SEPI foundation)

Percentage of exporting firms by company size (average 1990-2009)Source: BBVA Research based on BSS data (SEPI foundation)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

n≤20

21≤ n≤ 5

0

51≤ n≤ 1

00

101≤

n≤20

0

201≤

n≤50

0

n≥50

0

tota

l 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

n≤20

21≤ n≤ 5

0

51≤ n≤ 1

00

101≤

n≤20

0

201≤

n≤50

0

n≥50

0

tota

l

Note: n is the number of employees Note: n is the number of employees


• In addition to their larger size, exporters have greater experience, better productivity and, particularly, higher physical capital per employee, and they are more willing to invest in R&D than non-exporters, making them more competitive abroad.

Differentiating features of exporters versus non-exporters, average 1990-2009 (ratio of medians)Source: BBVA Research based on BSS data (SEPI foundation)

Note: Size refers to number of employees; experience is measured as the difference between the year the company was founded and the average foundation date for all companies in the sample; productivity (VA per employee), physical capital and external spending on training are expressed in thousands of euros per employee; R&D spending is in thousands of euros; foreign-owned capital as a share of the company's total capital; access to equity capital is equity capital/equity and liabilities; * figure is the average; experience, R&D spending and spending on training show the absolute difference between the medians of the distribution.

Driving an improvement in productivity

8 9

1.62.7

6.7

21.7

1.9 1.6 0.9 1.3 0.9

8.3

1.1 0.71.8

0

5

10

15

20

25

Size

Expe

rien

ce

Labo

urpr

oduc

tivity

Phys

ical

capi

tal p

erem

ploy

ee

Tota

l R&

Dsp

endi

ng

Spen

ding

on

trai

ng p

erem

ploy

ee

Engi

neer

s an

dba

chel

ors*

(%)

Tech

nici

ans*

(%)

No

qual

ifica

tions

*(%

)

Whi

te c

olla

rst

aff (

%)

Blu

e co

llar

staf

f (%

)

Fore

ign

inve

stm

ent i

nca

pita

l* (%

)

Acc

ess

toeq

uity

cap

ital

(%)

Tem

pora

ryra

te (%

)

Shar

e of

mai

nm

arke

t* (%

)


Spain needs to step up reforms

• The risk premium is higher than the country's fundamentals and would decrease if the solvency issues in Europe are cleared up and other internal reforms are pushed through:

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

3.5%

1997-2008 2009-2020

EMU Spain

Spain vs. EMU: potential GDP (% yoy)Source: BBVA Research

Spain Economic OutlookThird Quarter 2011

Madrid, 4 August 2011

spain economic outlook€¦ · spain economic outlook, third quarter 2011 page 4 global growth...

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