STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAPTABll..ITY: TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND FREE TRADE

INDUR M. GOKLANY.Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Department of the Interiol; 1849 C Stnet,

N.~, Washington, D.C. 20240, U.S.A

Abstract. This article proposes three broad interrelated strategies -stimulating technological change,sustainable economic growth and free, unsubsidized trade -to enhance future adaptability to global(including climate) change and some principles for developing the social, legal and economic frame-works necessary to effect these strategies. The proposals are based upon an examination of the presentand potential contributions of the strategies to sustainability, adaptability, and mitigation (limitation)of environmental changes, and the various synergies between these strategies. The strategies andprinciples would meet criteria which recognize that climate change is inevitable, that any climatechange will occur in the context of already-occurring global change due to other agents of change,and that reducing vulnerability to these other changes will increase the future adaptability to climatechange. Specifically, the strategies should: (a) increase the ability to feed, clothe aOO sheltec theworld's expanding population regardless of the agent of change; (b) reduce vulnerability of forests,habitats and biological diversity to demographic and other environmental stresses; (c) be compatiblcwith mitigation measures; (d) be independent of results from more detailed and accurate site-specificimpacts assessments which will be unavailable for several years; (e) be implementablc today; and (f)have clear benefits now and in the future.

1. Introduction

Because it will probably be decades before impacts of climate (or global) changecan be modeled with sufficient geographical and temporal specificity to devisesite-specific adaptive resource management practices or strategies. conventionalwisdom is that it is premature to implement measures to adapt to the ,impacts ofclimate change on natural resources. (In this article, 'natural resources' includesland, water and biological resources as well as the human activities and systemsdependant on them, e.g., agriculture and forestry). Such reasoning is responsible,in part, for the general lack of attention to adaptation in both the Framework Con-vention on Climate Change and the Global Environmental Facility. Contributing tothis state-of-affairs is that, on one hand, some skeptics of human-induced climatechange view any response as premature; while on the other, some believers tendto focus on control of greenhouse gas emissions because they consider the issue asone of climate change per se rather than its potential impacts on natural resources.These impacts, which could be critical to human and natural systems, include thoseon national and global food security, on our ability to clothe and shelter ourselves,

.The author is Manager. Science & Engineering, Office of Policy Analysis. The views expressed inthis article are the author's rather than those of the Department of the Interior or the U.S. Govem~t.

Climatic Change 30: 427-449, 1995.@ 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

428 INDUR M. GOKLANY

on the abundance, distribution and health of species (i.e., on biodiversity), onland cover (e,g., forests and grasslands), on water supply and demand, and on theproductivity and uses of all lands from the coasts to the interior of continents.

This paper argues that it is not premature to implement strategies to adapt to cli-mate change. Noting that such change is inevitable, it draws upon past and presentlessons regarding adaptation and global change to formulate criteria for selectingor developing adaptation strategies and measures which can be implemented now,rather than postponing responses for several years until results of detailed, moreaccurate site specific impact assessments become available (Section 2). It thenexamines the role and importance of technological change (Section 3), sustainableeconomic growth (Section 4) and free, unsubsidized trade (Section 5) to adaptationand to the magnitude of global change. Section 5 also discusses the relationshipof trade to technological change and economic growth. Finally, based on thesediscussions and the fact that they could meet the previously formulated criteria,Section 6 proposes three broad strategies to enhance adaptability: Stimulating tech-nological change, sustainable economic growth and free trade. It also outlines somegeneral principles for effecting those strategies. The proposals include a numberof controversial elements. They are being offered so as to stimulate discussion onhow to make society more adaptable to future change, regardless of the agent of

change.

2. Criteria for Developing or Selecting Adaptation Strategies

2.1. SOME LESSONS REGARDING ADAPTATION AND GLOBAL CHANGE

Prior to developing criteria for selection or development of strategies, it is usefulto review some lessons learned over the past few years regarding adaptation andglobal (including climate) change. First, climate is going to change with or withoutman's help and such a change could affect natural resources -despite whateverheroic control measures are actually implemented or our inability to pinpoint anyparticular impacts at specific locations. Hence, there is no alternative to attempting

adaptation.Second, human beings, like other species, have always had to cope with climate,

its natural variability and its extremes. However, while other species' adaptationshave been mainly biological, human beings' adaptation has relied largely on tech-nology (or, as many call it 'culture'; see, e.g., McNeil, 1975; Dobzhansky et ai.,1983; Ehrlich, 1988). Sometimes adaptation has been driven by the dictum, 'adaptor perish', at other times, it has been to gain a competitive advantage, no matterhow minor, over other species or even other human beings, or merely to makelife a little more convenient. Examples of technologies for adapting to climateand its consequences are numerous. They include 'hardware', i.e., tangible objectssuch as tools and structures, and 'software', i.e., knowledge, management practices

429STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAPTABR..ITY

(including operating rules) and institutional arrangements (Ausubel, 1991). Twoof the earliest examples of hardware devised for adapting to climate are body cov-ering and shelters (McNeil, 1975), while knowledge of seasonal migration routesto reach either more abundant food or more hospitable climes (for themselves andtheir livestock) are an early form of a software adaptation. Adaptations includeusing fire for heating, air conditioning for cooling, irrigation for agriculture, damsfor flood control, as well as weather and climate forecasting to anticipate changesthat could otherwise cost lives and reduce productivity. In fact, it is a testamentto their adaptability that human beings (and species associated with them) are themost widely distributed species on this earth. They inhabit every climatic zoneand, it would seem, with increasing comfort. Extreme examples of that includethe year round habitation of research posts in the Antarctica and oil platforms inthe North Sea. though not necessarily by the same people.. Another example isthe increasing migration of populations to the U.S. 'sunbelt' aided by new tech-nologies that insulate people from the direct effects of the climate such as heat,or the indirect effects such as malaria spread by mosquitoes that thrive in wannerand wetter areas (Schelling, 1983; Ausubel, 1991). These technologies includeair conditioning, draining of swamps and medicines for combatting associateddiseases...

The broad range of experience with diverse climates provides human beingswith a ready fund of knowledge regarding adaptation in the event climate changes(IPCC, 1990; Goklany,1992). However, as noted below, our very success at adap-tation has also led to the present predicament whereby we have appropriated anever large share of natural resources for our survival and benefit (Vitousek et at.,1986; Headrick, 1990). Thus, one of the keys to coping with climate and globalchange is to draw upon our knowledge so that, as we adapt to one change, we donot compromise our ability to cope with the other. To cope with future climaticchange, we also need to learn from both the successes and failures of past adaptiveexperiences. An example of failed adaptation is the extinction of Norse settlementsin Greenland around A.D. 1500. If McGovern's (1981) suggestions are correct,then his account of the demise of these settlements serves as a powerful parableon the folly of inflexible social institutions, the importance of trade in supportinga marginal social and economic order, and the consequences of not being open to

technological change.Third, not all mitigation options are compatible with adaptation (or the goals of

adaptation). For example, mono-culture forests may be more efficient carbon sinksthan multi-species forests but they also provide less biodiversity, the conservationof which is one of the major reasons for the concern over climate change. There-

.The winter and summer time populations of the Antarctica have been estimated at 1,046 and4,100, respectively (Guthridge, 1994).

..NAS (1992, pp. 622-623), cites additional factors that aided the migration to the sunbellThis report also summarizes, with references, results of several studies on the responses of variouspopulations to climatic change.

430 INDUR M. GOKLANY

TABLE IGlobal population and land use, 1700-1989

World!

(in 106)Crupland2(106 ha.)

Year Forest &.

woodlan~(106 ha.)

Pasture &

grassland2(106 ha.)

1700

1850

190019201930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1989

6791,286

1,712

1,895

2,109

2,339

2,565

3,OSO

3,721

4,479

5,238

265

538773

913

999

1,085

1,169

1,278

1,4003

1.4543

1,4763

6,2155,9195,7495,6345,5535,4555,3455,2195,1035,007N/A

6,8606,3506,2866,2606,2556,2666,293

6,3106,3086,299N/A

1 1700 data from Demeny (1990), p. 42; remainder are from

Peggy Seybolt (1992).2 1700 data from Richards (1990), p. 164; unless indicated

in footnote 3, remainder are from World Resources institute(1987), p. 272.3 Food and Agricultural Organization (1991).

fore, care should be taken that mitigation and adaptation strategies are mutually

compatible.Fourth, od1er agents of global change are already affecting -and will continue

to affect -natural resources: Wimess continuing land conversion and land coverchange resulting in losses of forests, other habitats and biodiversity. Between 1700to 1989, as d1e global population increased from about 0.7 billion to 5.2 billion, theamount of cropland increased from 0.26 billion hectares (ha) to 1.48 billion ha; andbetween 1700 and 1980, forest and woodland declined from about 6.2 billion ha to5.0 billion ha and pasture and grassland from about 6.9 billion ha to 6.3 billion ha(see Table I).

Fifth, the impacts of climate change will be on top of the much larger impactson natural resources due to other agents of global change, e.g., population andeconomic growth.. ana global basis, over the next 50-100 years, the impact of theseother agents of global change on land, habitat and water could exceed that of climatechange by an order of magnitude or more because of the necessity of feeding,clothing, sheltering and meeting the other economic needs of a substantially largerand, possibly, more affluent population (Goklany, 1992; Goklany and Sprague,1992). Hence, coping with and mitigating the impacts of these other agents ofglobal change can not be delayed. Measures to reduce the vulnerability to these

431STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAPTABD..ITY

other changes will make coping with the effects of climate change that much easier,if and when that occurs. Moreover, climate change skeptics should take comfort inthe fact that such measures would be beneficial whether (or not) cliIliate changes

significantly.

2.2. mE CRn"ERIA

The foregoing discussion suggests the following criteria for selecting or developingadaptation strategies and measures, namely, they should: (a) increase the ability tofeed, clothe and shelter the world's expanding population regardless of the agentof change; (b) reduce vulnerability of forests, habitats and biological diversity, alsoregardless of the agent of change; (c) be compatible with strategies to limit climatechange; (d) be independent of results from site specific impacts assessments, whichare unlikely to be available with sufficient confidence at appropriate temporal andspatial resolutions for several years, for either their justification or implementation;(e) be implementable in short order; and (t) be beneficial now and in the future.

3. Technological Change and Adaptation

Despite the fact that the effects of human-induced climate change have so farbeen slight, at best, global change, as Doted above, has already had an enonno.usimpact on natural resources and the environment In fact, the current impacts ofthe other agents of global change would be much worse today, but for improvedproductivity and better utilization of natural resources, i.e., technological change.Increases in the productivity of agriculture and forestry over the last few decadeshave done more to slow land conversion, and preserve habitat and carbon sinksthan all the other protection measures put together, including establishment of fullyor partially protected areas. Analysis of the changes in global land use and landcover from 1950 to 1989 indicates that mainly because of increased productivity,while population doubled (from 2.6 to 5.2 billion), cropland increased only 26%(from 1.17 to 1.48 billion hectares). (See Table I and Figure 1). Cropland percapita declined from about 0.46 to 0.28 hectares even though per capita food andprotein consumption increased significantly over that period (FAD, 1991).* Whilean environmental price has been, and continues to be, paid for the increases inagricultural productivity, absent those increases, the demand for cropland wouldhave increased to at least 2.39 billion hectares, i.e., an additional 0.91 billionhectares would have been converted from forest, wood, pasture and grass lands -

an amount equivalent to the net global loss of forest and wood lands between 1850to 1980.** By contrast, globally there are 0.65 biUion hectares set aside as fuUy or

.Between 1961 and 1989, daily per capita calorie intake for the world rose from 2259 to 2649,and protein intake rose from 59.5 to 66.3 grams (FAO, 1991).

..The 0.91 billion ha figure is an underestimate because it ignores improvements in average calorieand protein intake.

432 INDUR M. GOKLANY

partially protected areas (excluding Antarctica) (World Resources Institute, 1992,p. 298).

U.S. experience from 1910 to the present (1988) is similar. Even though popu-lation increased two-and-a-halftimes and exports in 1988 accounted for about 40%of agricultural production, the amount of land harvested was virtually unchanged(300 million acres) because of technological change. Absent that, at least fourtimes as much land (about 1200 millon acres) would need to be harvested. That ismore than three times the total amount of reserved area in national parks, refugesand forests (Goklany and Sprague, 1992; Goklany et al.. 1992). It is also moreland than the sum of arable and forested lands, i.e.. absent such change virtuallyall productive land would be in agriculture. with drastic consequences for U.S.

biodiversity.Clearly, technological change while unable to halt land conversion. has so far

-arguably -averted catastrophe by substantially holding down losses of forests,habitats and biodiversity.* But the worst is yet to come. Over the next century, theglobal demand on land and other natural resources could triple or. possibly, increasesix-fold, if as is expected. the world's population doubles -.nd the average persongets wealthier (Goklany, 1992; Goklany and Sprague, 1992). But FAO estimatespotential global cropland to be 3.03 billion hectares (FAO, 1991a). That is. atpresent rates of productivity, there is enough land to accommodate only a doubling(see Table I), assuming that the 'new' cropland would be no less productive thancurrent croplands, and that there would be no diversions of potential and actualcropland to other uses. However. even if human needs are met, it will most likelymean further land conversion, loss of habitat, forests and biodiversity -and. ofcourse,'greater inputs for agricultural lands.

The situation for the U.S. is somewhat better. It harvests. on the average (1988-1990), about 312 million acres for crops, with 25% to 40% of that utilized forexports (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992; p. 660). Also, some portion of this landmay not have been harvested were it not for agricultural subsidies. Total arable landin the U.S. is estimated at 540 million acres (Batie and Healy, 1983).** Currentprojections estimate that U.S. population will increase by about 50% in the nextcentury (Seybolt, 1992). Hence, assuming average productivity per acre would notdrop. the U.S. should not be short of cropland for its own needs. However. whilethe U.S.'s food security would seem assured, if it is to do its share for global foodsecurity (via trade 1>r aid), that may require additional land conversion -unlessthere is an increase in productivity. Further land conversion may be necessary evenif all subsidies were removed. Therefore, just as improved worldwide productivitysince the Second World War has helped avert massive land conversion, future

.This is not to say that all technologies' consequences are beneficial, e.g., overuse of fertilizersand pesticides creates water quality problems which are detrimental to biological resources, withoutproviding commensurate agricultural benefits.

..Some portion of this land has by now been developed or, possibly, reserved for other purposes.

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434 INDUR M. GOKLANY

improvements in productivity are critical for the future conservation of habitats,forests and biodiversity.

There is yet another reason for assuring technological change. Populationgrowth rates are declining around the world. This ought to help dampen emis-sions of greenhouse gases and help relieve stresses on natural resources. However,this very success contains within it the seeds of another demographic challenge(see, e.g., Martin, 1991). It will force a situation where for several decades, feweryoung people will have to support larger aging populations. This will, among otherthings, increase pressures on changing the rules governing -and the generosity of-social security, thereby, undermining one of the factors that help reduce fertilityrates.. See Section 4.3. Decision makers in some developed countries and even theU.S., where the birth rate is higher than for other OECD countries, have alreadybegun to address these issues (see, e.g., Martin, 1991;'Rich, 1994). In Germany,for instance, this has led to the institution of various pronatalist policies, so far,with little effect (see, e.g., Atkinson, 1994). An alternative approach would beto foster conditions that would help boost productivity so that fewer workers can,indeed, support the many retired people without compromising social security ben-efits. Thus, stimulating technological change could help ensure social stability andinsure against a future resurgence in the population growth rates, thereby helpingreduce one of the factors contributing both to global change and future vulnerabilityto its impacts. "

But technological change is not pre-ordained. There is no guarantee it will nec-essarily come to our future rescue as it did in the past. Hence, it is essential toimplement measures that would increase the likelihood of maintaining the current,if not accelerating the future, pace of technological change in the use and man-agement of natural resources. Such technological change must also be consistentwith the principles of sustainable development. It should cover all facets of naturalresource production, delivery, utilization and consumption so that human needsare met using as little land and water as is practicable. With respect to land, asnoted, this will reduce conversion to human uses, preserve habitat, and conservebiodiversity as well as carbon sinks. Similarly, making water use more efficient willreduce the diversion of water from in-stream uses such as maintaining populationsof fish and other species, and recreation.

.In 1935, the year social security was enacted in the U.S., 6.1% of its population was over 65;by 1991, this had risen to 12.6%; and by 2025, this could rise to 18.7% (Bureau of the Census, 1975,

p. 15; 1992, p. 19; 1993, p. 24).

435STRATEGIES TO BNHANCE ADAPTABn..rrv

4. Economic Growth, Adaptability and Sustainability

4.1. AFFLUENCE AND VULNERABILITY TO DISRUPTIONS OF NAWRALRESOURCES

As the Brundtland Commission noted, poverty is a major barrier to sustainabledevelopment Vulnerability of a nation to climate change depends as much, if notmore, on its wealth than on merely the degree of clima~ change it would experience.The poorer developing nations and the erstwhile centrally planned economies aremore at risk from climate change, because lack of financial and technologicalresources makes adaptation harder (Goklany, 1992; IPCC, 1990; Ausubel, 1991a).Moreover, the economies of poorer nations are generally more dependent on naturalresource sectors which further increases their vulnerability to any adverse impactsof climate change on these sectors, and such dependence should decline if theireconomies grow. Consider, for instance, in 1991, agriculture contributed 37%,31 %and 28% of the GDPs of Bangladesh, India and China, respectively, and less than2.5% for Japan, U.S. and U.K. (World Resources Institute, 1994: data disk); also,between 1982 and 1992, while overall GDP increased, agriculture's share of GDPdeclined in each OECD nation (OECD, 1994, pp. 24-27). Thus, greater wealthshould translate to reduced vulnerability to climate change.

In particular, richer countries are more able to cope with declines in availabilityof food or other natural resource based products, as some fear may occur (at leastlocally) due to climate or global change (see, e.g., IPCC, 1990a). Sen (1981, 1993)and Dreze and Sen (1989) point out that many famines are the product as muchof political, legal and economic failures as they are of true food shortages. Theseinclude lack of purchasing power, i.e., insufficient wealth, for whatever reason, andlack of political accountability due to an insufficiently open society and the absenceof a free press. Thus, it is possible to have a 'boom' famine in the midst of (relative)plenty, and a 'slump' famine due to real food shortages. The Bengal (India) famineof 1943, with an approximate death toll of 3 million, is an example of a boomfamine. China's famine of 1958-61, in which about 25 to 30 million perished,was aggravated because of the lack of political accountability. These examplesclearly indicate the role of political, economic and legal institutions in coping withany food and other natural resource shortfalls, regardless of their cause. They alsoindicate that purchasing power is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition forhelping populations cope with future problems. No amount of purchasing power(wealth) will make up for a physical shortage of food. but with that power onecould help reduce vulnerability to changes in supply and/or prices by building thenecessary infrastructure, early warning systems and additional storage capacity,ensure transportation, and so on. Richer societies. are also more likely to be ableto make up for any loss in individuals' purchasing powers, whatever their cause,to help cope with either boom or slump famines not only because they are simply

INDUR M. GOKLANY

richer but also because their overall economy is less likely to be dependent on

agriculture.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSmON

Recent empirical analyses of air and water pollution indicators for several countries,by and large, confiml that wealthier societies generally have cleaner environments(Grossman and Krueger, 1991; World Bank, 1992; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay,1992). They show that som~ of these indicators improve almost immediately withGDP per capita (an approximate measure of affluence); others initially becomeworse with affluence, then go through -for lack of a better teml -an 'environ-mental transition', after which they improve with affluence; and yet others seem tocontinue deteriorating regardless of GDP per capita. According to these analyses,the first category of indicators includes fractions of population lacking safe drink-ing water and sanitation services, ambient sulfur dioxide and particulate matterconcentrations belong in the second category, and dissolved oxygen content inriver waters and carbon dioxide emissions in the third.

The concept of an environmental transition (as exhibited by the second categoryof indicators) is consistent with the notion that the wealthier the nation, the moreit tends to value -and the more it can afford -a cle.aner environment. One could

.view the indicators dealing with safe drinking water and sanitation services (i.e.,the first category) as instances where the environmental transition is at, or closeto, zero. This makes perfect sense since people and governments are aware of theterrible toll in death and disease associated with either dearth of safe drinking wateror sanitation services (Goklany, 1994). Lack of these services may be responsiblefor up to 3 to 5 million deaths each year, mainly in the developing world (WHO,1992; World Bank, 1992).

The third category is also not inconsistent with the notion of an environmenta;1transition, with the transition delayed because decision makers have only recentlyrealized the importance of these indicators and/or because the social and economicconsequences of improving them are very high (Goklany, 1992). Analysis of thetrends in dissolved oxygen levels in the U.S. and OECD countries would tendto confirm this interpretation (Goklany, 1994). That carbon intensities (carbonemissions per GDP) for the developed countries are declining could presage aneventual downturn in carbon emissions, at least from those countries. (One shouldnote that ten years ago chlorofluorocarbon emissions were on the ascendktg portionof the environmental transition, whereas today they are on the downward slope,and that it was U1e richer nations that were initially detemlined to reduce CFCemissions.) Thus, the evidence suggests that, ultimately, richer is cleaner.

While increasing the level of affluence would help both developed and devel-oping nations afford cleaner environments, it would be particularly beneficial fordeveloping countries because, as indicated above, greater affluence in those coun-tries would immediat~ly result in wider availability of sanitation services and safe

437STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAPTABILITY

drinking water -two of the most important environmental problems faced by theglobal population (Goklany, 1994)~ WHO, 1992; World Bank, 1992). Moreover,until such problems are substantially diminished, if not conquered, many develop-ing countries and their populace are unlikely to focus on longer term issues suchas climatic change.

4.3. AFFLUENCE AND THE RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH

Another critical point that needs to be made regarding economic growth is that,while in the short run it increases the rate of population growth due to reductionsin mortality rates, in the long run it helps moderate future population growth byhelping create conditions whereby many families would voluntarily choose to havefewer children, i.e., just as it enables a society to move through an environmentaltransition, it also enables society to move through a demographic transition.*Factors that help reduce fertility rates include: (a) greater participation by womenin the work place outside the home; (b) greater education for women; (c) lowerdependency of individuals upon their families for their social security needs becauseof the existence of broader based programs; (d) greater availability of technologiesand programs for birth control; (e) reduced infant and overall mortality rates; and(f) longer period of training before children begin participation in the work forcecoupled with the reduced need for children to be productive (e.g., in fanning)due to technologically-driven improvements in productivity (World Bank, 1984;Goklany, 1992, 1993; Livi-Bacci, 1992; Robey et aL, 1993; Roush, 1994).** Allof these factors are more easily obtained in richer societies, and, hence, there is arelatively good negative correlation between fertility rate and GDP per capita (see,e.g., World Bank, 1984; Livi-Bacci. 1992). This ties in directly to the mitigation(i.e., limitation) of global change. It has some times been pointed out by examiningthe case of Kerala in India, Sri Lanka and China, that affluence is not a necessarycondition for reducing fertility (World Bank, 1984; Livi-Bacci, 1992; Sen, 1993;Robey etal., 1993; Roush, 1994). That indeed may be true, but all things considered,it is a lot easier if the society is affluent, which is why there is a negative correlationbetween fertility rate and per capita GDP and~ as noted in Section 3, reducingpopulation growth rates ought to help limit global change and reduce vulnerabilityto any such change.

.Populations are always higher after such a demographic transition. Given today's situation, it isquite likely that additional affluence will reduce fertility levels more than it will mortality rates.

..Reduced mortality rates, in addition to initially boosting population growth rates, ultimatelycontribute to reduced fertility rates probably because, if sustained long enough, that engendersconfidence that infants will survive long enough to fulfill the emotional or economic needs that drivesfamilies to have children.

438 INDUR M. GOKLANY

4.4.

SUMMARY

Sustainable economic growth will make adaptation and mitigation measures moreaffordable and reduce vulnerability to global change, particularly in developingnations. It will increase the demand for environmental cleanup. It could also accel-erate the reduction in the rate of population growth which, in turn, would moderatefuture greenhouse gas emissions and demands on natural resources. Hence, sus-tainable economic growth and reducing poverty are a musL

S. Trade and Sustainable Development

The impact of trade on natural resources and the environment is a contentiousissue (see, e.g., Anonymous, 1993), as indicated by the recent debates on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tradeand Tariffs (GAlT) in which various environmental groups lined up on differentsides of the issue regarding the net environmental benefits of these Agreements.This section briefly summarizes the environmental arguments against trade (Section5.1) before presenting the several ways by which trade can enhance sustainabilityand adaptability (Sections 5.2 through 5.5). It then ties trade and economic growthtogether by addressing the potential gains in growth for developing countries dueto trade (Section 5.6). Section 5.7 summarizes the foregoing.

5.1. 11m ENVIRONMENTAL CASE AGAINST TRADE

A principal environmental argument against trade is that it enables developingcountries to despoil their forests and other resources to fulfill the excess consump-tion of developed countries (e.g.. French. 1993; Daly. 1993; Houghton. 1994).The demand in developed countries for timber products and beef, for instance,has been blamed for global deforestation of rain forests due to overlogging. andconversion to pasture for cattle... In essence this argument can be summed up bystating that trade enables importing countries to reduce environmental impacts onthemselves at the expense of aggravating the impacts on the exporters. Moreover,roads built to take products to market could further destroy or degrade forests byenabling easier access which, in turn, would lead to increased colonization andfurther opportunities for exploitation.

.Kummer and Throer (1994) ascribe much of the deforestation in the Philippines, Malaysia,Indonesia and Thailand mainly to clearing primary forests or timber exports 'as mediated by corruptpolitical structures', which is then followed by clearing of the subsequent secondary forests bysmallholder farmers.

..Hecht (1993) discounts the notion of the 'hamburger connection' explanation for deforestationof Amazonia. While noting that subsidies to cattle ranchers have been harmful, she attributes furtherdeforestation to a combination of social, legal and economic circumstances including risk of beingdispossessed of uncleared land, high inflation rates, and the low cost of entry for land in Amazonia.

STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAPTABll.1TY 439

Of course, the argument that trade exports environmental degradation cutsboth ways, because one's environmental gain is the other's environmental loss;moreover, with free, unsubsidized trade, the choices are made freely. Reducingtrade in tropical forest products would put greater pressures on temperate forests,and could increase the net acreage harvested (or cleared) even if demand were tobe dampened somewhat due to increased prices. Similarly, reducing harvests inthe Northwestern U.S. forests would, through trade, redistribute: the environmentalburden elsewhere within or outside the country (Koch, 1991; Lippke, 1992; Perez-Garcia, 1993; Sedjo et at., 1994). Reduced availability of forest products wouldalso stimulate substitution to other products made of, for instance, steel. cement,or plastics, whose production and disposal will cause other environmental impactsincluding traditional air and water pollution and Caz emissions (Koch, 1991;Lippke, 1992; Lippke and Oliver, 1993). It is also worth noting that the while thenet flow of tropical forest products is from developing to developed nations, the netflow for agricultural products goes in the opposite direction (see Section 5.2). Thus,whether restrictions on trade with specific areas will result in net environmentalbenefit depends upon the net quality and quantity of land cleared or affected tomeet demand and the impacts of producing, using and disposing substitutes. (See,also, Section 5.3 which addres~es in greater detail the effects of trade on marginallands.) One may speculate, though, that quite a few people in temperate climates,if pressed, would put a higher value on tropical rain forests rather than temperateforests, at least so long as the latter is not in their back yard -a concept that toohas expanded with transportation and communication technology.

There are other environmental arguments for being suspicious of trade (Daly,1993; French, 1993; Bhagwati, 1993). Developed countries could export theirpollution producing industries as well as wastes directly to developing countrieswho in turn would serve as 'pollution havens', and the quest for competitiveadvantage may drive countries to reduce environmental safeguards (a variation ofthe above argument). Also, it is argued, trade can mean greater economic growthand, hence, greater emissions (French, 1993). However, the discussion in Section4 indicates that, while some countries may in the short run be more polluted,ultimately richer is cleaner.

More trade would also increase transportation and related emissions, adding tothe local if not the global, environmental burden; and the institutions set up to mon-itor the essential fairness of international trade might view national environmentallaws as nontariff barriers to trade and, thereby, exert pressure to relax those laws.There is also the well-founded concern that trade in endangered species (or theirparts) would accelerate their demise. The flip side of this argument is that regulat-ed trade could provide local communities and countries that bost the endangeredspecies the necessary incentive to conserve them. The Convention on InternationalTrade of Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITF$) was established in1973 to deal with this issue (see, e.g., CEQ, 1990). Finally, trade has unwittinglyhelped transplant several non-native species (e.g., sea lampreys to the Great Lakes,

440 INDUR M. GOKLANY

and brown tree snakes to Guam) to new locales where they have out-competedor preyed on native species, to the latter's detriment (OTA, 1993). While thesearguments are valid to one degree or another, the negative environmental aspectsof trade should be considered within the broader context of the contribution oftrade to overall sustainability.

5.2. TRADE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF SUSTAlNABD..rrv

Trade, i.e., exchange of goods and services, is as old as humanity itself. Its benefits,which must be mutually realized for it to be sustained by any two parties, are basedupon the division of labor, specialization and access to resources and commodities.In fact, such exchange makes possible the family unit or the community itself.Without trade with its 'environs', an urban population would, inter alia, be unableto feed itself and, therefore, would be unsustainable. Most of today's urban centerswould, most likely, also be unable to clothe or house themselves adequately, becausethe necessary raw, semi-finished or finished materials that go into their manufactureare generally imported from elsewhere. It could be argued that the true extent of anurban area's 'environs' is the range over which essential goods are traded for it tosurvive and function. This has always been limited by the distance over which thosegoods could be moved profitably relative to the risk assumed, and without spoilage.Successive technological revolutions have expanded this distance, increased thevolume and weight of shipments and the speed of transportation by orders ofmagnitude with the advent of the cart, the ship, the locomotive, the truck andthe air plane, and with the supplanting of human beings as the motive force byanimal power, sails, steam and the internal combustion engine (Cooper, 1987;Ausubel, 1991). These changes in transportation technology were supplementedby the inventions of canned food, refrigerated transport and, now, the bioengineeredtomato. Software technologies, such as paper currency, letters of credit, insurance toreduce risk, and commodity brokerage, also helped boost trade within and outsideindividual political jurisdictions. Thus, today we have the global village with allparts sustaining one another. It is possible to go to a grocery store in Washington,D.C., for instance, and find products from India, China and Australia. Clearly,international trade in basic necessities is just one manifestation of an age oldpractice. Because of trade and technology, an individual family unit, community orcountry no longer has to be self sufficient in basic necessities, so long as it has theability to obtain them through either direct purchase or exchange for their goodsor services, or failing that, through assistance from others who have either accessto, or are wealthy enough to afford such assistance.

Trade is an important mechanism for reducing malnutrition, and helping ade-quately clothe and shelter people around the world: All major concerns in theevent of significant climate and global change. One of its contributions to globalsustainability can be gauged by the fact that in 1986-1988, net cereals imports todeveloping countries were estimated at 9% of the apparent consumption (12%, if

441STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAJ7TABD..ITY

China is excluded); the corresponding figure for the Near East and North Africawas 33% (UNDIESA, 1990). In 1989-1991, 114 out of 137 countries were netimporters of cereals.. Of the 23 countries that were net exporters (i.e.., self suf-ficient), the majority were members of the OECD. While some of these importswere, no doubt, the consequence of subsidies to the agriculture sector, particularlyin the OECD (see below). and detrimental to the overall economic well being ofboth developing and developed countries. these figures do indicate that trade cansignificantly reduce vulnerability to production shortfalls (whether caused by cli-matic or other agents of change) and. thereby, improve global sustainability. TheWorld Resources Insti~te (1994. Table 18.4) data also indicate that, excluding theex-Soviet Union. which had average annual net cereals imports of35 million tonnes(MT) in 1989-1991, Japan with 27 MT was the largest importer, outstripping netimports for Mrica (26 MT) and China (15 MT). Japan's importation of cerealsillustrates how. with trade and affluence, otherwise unsustainable entities becomemore sustainable, and less vulnerable to fluctuations in production, whatever theircause.

5.3. TRADE AND EXPLOITATION OF MARGINAL LANDS

Trade can also help reduce the exploitation of marginal lands for growing crops,grazing and timber provided neither trade nor the activities themselves are sub-sidized... This is most easily seen by considering the consequences of internaltrade in the U.S. which was responsible for shifting and internally redistributingagricultural production. A result of that was to reduce land used for crops andpastures in the Northeastern U.S. by 59% between 1949 and 1987, from 32.4to 13.3 million acres (Goklany and Sprague, 1992), even though the populationincreased 31 % for the Northeast (and 70% for the U.S.) over that period, andthe nationwide fraction of cropland acreage used for agriculture exports increasedfrom 13% to 35% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950, p. 32~ 1975, p. 510; 1990,p. 659). Reduction of the area of crop and pasture land in the Northeast occurreddespite agricultural subsidies which tend to increase usage of marginal lands,thereby depriving society of the full economic and environmental benefits of tradeand technology. Most of the land freed up in the Northeast was given back tonature and many species, fonnerly under stress, have now rebounded (Goklanyand Sprague, 1992). Of course, by the same token, other land elsewhere was putinto service to meet the food needs of the Northeast. While clearly this benefitedthe environment of the Northeast, it is an open question whether it was a net benefitto the global environment. However, one would expect that the net acreage devoted

.This tally was based upon data from World Resources Institute (1994, Table 18.4). The countriesmaking up the former Soviet Union were treated as one, as were the countries of former Yugoslavia.

..Subsidies, as used here, can include direct transfer payments, indirect investments or, for instance,non-internalization of the costs of pollution. Of course, objective and accurate estimation of the costsof pollution is a non-trivial task. These estimation problems are in addition to the political problemsthat must be surmounted whenever a subsidy is reduced or eliminated.

INDUR M. GOKLANY

to agriculture would be reduced because, ceteris paribus, the more productive landwould be the first to be put under the plough. This example also indicates how tradeand technology can convert a locally unsustainable system to one that is sustainablein a wider context

Free trade itself is an argument against subsidies which contribute to the useof marginal natural resources (or their overuse). Such subsidies have many timesbeen justified on the basis that a nation needs to be self sufficient in food or othercommodities. If people and nations are confident that free trade assures reliable andeconomic access to these commodities, as it should, then it undercuts this rationalefor subsidies. Such confidence, of course, is not established overnight; it can onlycome about after years of successful experience.

5.4. TRADE AND DISSEMINATION OF TECHNOLOGY

Most people recognize the environmental benefits to be obtained from trade innew and more efficient technologies, particularly 'hardware'. Technology transferis an important part of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. It was alsoprominent in the deliberations leading to the 1992 United Nations Conference onEnvironment and Development. Even in the absence of fonnalized agreements ontechnology transfer, throughout history, trade has helped disseminate both 'hard-ware' and 'software' technologies, i.e., knowledge, ideas and modes of thinkingaround ,the world, some of which have helped shape our political, legal and eco-nomic frameworks. Cooper (1987) notes that Rousseau and the. French naturalistsdrew inspiration for their political theories from the stories of traders who dealtwith tribes from around the world. He also attributed the collapse of Japan's feu-dal shogunate to extensive contacts with Western trade and technology. It can beargued, based upon the experience of the erstwhile 'eastern bloc', that impactsof trade through the transfer of software technologies, e.g., the organization ofsocieties and economies, can have a: more lasting and important impact on botheconomic growth and environmental quality than trade in hardware.

Finally, it is worth noting that just as the competition inherent to trade couldlower environmental standards, it could also lead to constant improvement ofprocesses and their efficiencies. For example, overseas competition, in part, speededup the introduction of automobile tailpipe controls and more fuel efficient cars inthe United States (see, e.g., Seskin, 1978; Barbour, 1980).

TRADE AND CONFLICTS

In addition to the shortcomings mentioned in Section 5.1, the history of trade hashad a few inglorious moments: Trade helped support slavery (see, e.g., Klein,1990), and spread diseases such as the bubonic plague and introduced measles,smallpox and other diseases to populations that had no built-in resistance to them(McNeil, 1975~ Cooper,1987~ Landes, 1989). Trade and, with it, the search for and

443STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAPTABll.1TY

control of trade routes, new markets and resources were also among the drivingforces behind colonization and numerous wars waged through the centuries, mostnotably from the sixteenth to the first half of the present century (see, e.g., Landes,

1989; Tracy, 1990; Smith, 1991).*As recent history illustrates, conflicts, within and across borders, by disrupting

commerce and movements of goods, among other things, are today among the majorcauses of famine and unsustainable resource use (see, e.g., Dreze, 1990; Kumar,1990). However, the contribution of trade to conflicts could be diminishing. Freetrade and war are antithetical. By creating mutual dependencies, increasing wealthand allowing access to natural resources that one group lacks but many need, tradereduces the incentives for people to garnish those resources by force and/or bymigration. With today's technology, education and new institutions, trade can be aforce for peace and prosperity rather than an excuse for war and oppression. Thecontrast between, for instance, Japan's quest for a greater co-prosperity spherebefore and after the Second World War is an argument for optimism on thisscore.** Thus, trade could help moderate the vicious circle in which natural resourcedepletio~ and physical conflict reinforce each other causing untold human misery,environmental degradation and increased vulnerability to global change.

5.6. TRADB AND BCONOMIC GROWTH

As noted in Section 4, richer nations often have cleaner environments than lessdeveloped countries. And free, but unsubsidized, trade would directly and indi-rectly result in greater affluence: Directly, by relying on everyone's comparativeadvantage and, indirectly, by eliminating costly subsidies, estimated for 1992 at$180 billion for the agricultural sector in the developed countries alone (OECD,1994, pp. 30-31). Benefits of reducing natural resource subsidies (whether indeveloped or developing countries) would be magnified for the developing nationsbecause their economies are generally smaller, much more dependent upon naturalresource sectors, and least able to afford any subsidies (Goklany, 1992). Becauseof trade, economic growth in the developed countries also translates into additionalincome for developing countries. In 1994, about 12.6% of the GDP of developingcountries was derived from exports (World Bank, 1994). A previous study (WorldBank, 1992a) estimated that a sustained 1 % expansion in the GDP of the OECD(developed) countries translates into greater prosperity to the developing countriesthrough an additional $60 billion in annual export sales.

An ancillary benefit of increasing economic growth in developing countriesis that by helping create jobs it would help reduce emigration to the developed

.Smith (1991) notes that the Portuguese and the Spanish went to the New World with colonizationin mind because 'peaceful trade did not appear to offer the possibilities of lucrative return'. The Dutchand the English were more commercially inclined. The English, in particular. established tradingcompanies (e.g., the East India Company) prior to venturing abroad on a significant scale.

..This is essentially the argument advanced by the U.S. Administration in continuing 'most favorednation' status for China, and to improve relations with Vietnam, for instance.

444 INDUR M. GOKLANY

countries resulting in a net reduction in global energy usage, all else being equal.Based on 1991 data, the average U.S. inhabitant emits 5 times as much C~ asthe average Mexican who in turn emits 36 times as much as the average Haitian(World Resources Institute, 1994, p. 363). Reducing such emigration could. alsomoderate the brain drain from developing countries. Such a brain drain could bedetrimental to their quest for technological change and economic growth.

5.7. SUMMARY

There are aspects of trade that would cause localized environmental degradation.However, on the whole, free and unsubsidized trade, which is not synonymouswith unfettered exploitation of resources or uncontrolled industrial growth,. shouldreduce vulnerability to global change. Trade would globalize sustainability, reduceexploitation of marginal land and resources, lower incentives for migration andwars as responses to natural resource shortages, and mediate and accelerate thetransfer of technology. Also, by contributing to overall economic growth, partic-ularly in developing countries, it would make mitigation and adaptation measuresmore affordable, contribute to a lower population growth rate and reduce emi-gration pressures which, in turn, would further help lower emissions and fostertechnological change. Finally, free trade, if it is successful, could undermine one ofthe justifications for subsidies, i.e., that a nation should be self-sufficient in naturalresources such as food or oil. Thus, the net long tenD effect of free trade and, inparticular, GATT and NAFrA, despite their flaws, should be positive in terms ofsustainability and adaptation.

6. Strategies for Enhancing Adaptation

The foregoing discussion suggests three interrelated strategies for enhancing adap-tation and generally promoting sustainable development that would meet the criteriaoutlined in Section 2. These are:

-Technological change to ensure greater productivity and efficiency in thesustainable production, use and development of natural resources;

-Sustainable economic growth while conserving fragile finite resources; and-Free, unsubsidized trade.While the past few centuries have seen dramatic technological change, sustained

economic growth in many parts of the world, and movement toward freer trade,continuation of these trends are not inevitable. It is, therefore, critical to imple-ment measures that would maintain and, where appropriate, develop and establishthe institutional, legal and economic frameworks necessary for assuring their con-tinuance. Fortunately, there is a remarkable congruence between the frameworksneeded to stimulate both technological change and economic growth, and freer

See second footnote on p. 441,

445STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE ADAPTABlLrrV

trade should be part of those frameworks. It is probably no accident that the mosteconomically advanced nations are also the major contributors to technologicalchange. Fagerberg (1988) showed that the number of patents awarded in a country(a crude measure of the rate of technological change) and the spending on researchand development generally increase with the GDP per capita.

It is proposed that these frameworks should be based upon the following general

principles:-The social, economic and legal ins~itutions shuld foster a free market system

which rewards Individuals and innovators for their endeavors;-Everyone involved in each aspect of the management and use of land and water

resources (i.e., production, distribution, processing, storage or consumption)should hav~ an economic incentive in developing, adopting or utilizing inno-vations;

-Local communities and individuals should be provided with economic stakesin the resources they manage and depend upon, including investing them, withclear property rights to those resources and/or long term tenure, and allowingvoluntary transfers of those rights;

-Decision-making on resource use and management should be decentralized,where practicable. However, because ecosystems may cross political andownership boundaries and because of the power of the not-in-my-backyardsyndrome, such decentralization should be tempered by mechanisms to coor-dinate activities in adjacent jurisdictions and ensure that the interests of thebroader society are considered;

-Research and development of new. more efficient and productive technologiesand practices should be increased;

-There should be no unnecessary or unfair barriers to research into, and devel-opment, dissemination and adoption of, new technologies. In general, lawsand institutions favor the status quo through devices such as 'grandfathering'existing practices and'requirements for more complicated and comprehensivereviews prior to allowing new practices. These discourage innovation, andincrease the life span of old and, sometimes, more polluting technologies.This is neither good economics nor good environmental policy;

-Subsidies for over-production and over-utilization of food, natural resourcesand other commodities should be eliminated. Subsidies deprive a nationfrom realizing the full economic and environmental benefits of technolog-ical change. Their elimination would reduce inappropriate exploitation ofmarginal lands and other resources, as well as their over-exploitation in other(non-marginal) areas. World-wide reduction in such subsidies would particu-larly benefit developing countries. The direct environmental benefits would beaccompanied by a strengthening of their economies which are heavilydepen-dent upon natural resources. In turn, stronger economies would make bothadaptation and sustainable development more affordable and further reduceenvironmental degradation;

446 INDUR M. GOKLANY

-Barriers to un subsidized trade should be eliminated. As noted, trade glob-alizes adaptation by spreading the risk of catastrophic and non-catastrophicunder-production of food or other commodities in smaller regions, regardlessof its cause. It also contributes to general economic growth, particularly indeveloping and other less wealthy nations.

Specific approaches and greater elaboration on the general p~ciples for suchframeworks are described in more detail in IPCC (1990), Goklany (1992), andGoklany and Sprague (1992).

Work on establishing these frameworks can not start soon enough. Each cultureand society needs to develop its own pa11icular framework. That can take decades-and considerable trial-and-error -to evolve and take hold. Moreover, the quickerthe framework is fashioned, the less will be the land conversion and losses ofhabitat, biodiversity and carbon sinks and reservoirs; the less the future growth ofpopulations and greenhouse gases; the less the vulnerability to climate change; andthe greater the future adaptability. In fact, even if the most ambitious greenhousegas control program were to be immediately effective, one could win the battle butlose the war -if greater efforts are not spent on enhancing adaptability by spurringtechnological change and sustainable economic growth, and ensuring open andeconomic access to food and other goods across political boundaries.

Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to two anonymous reviewers whose comments substan-tially improved the paper by sharpening its focus and some of its arguments, andmade the paper more readable. I also thank Mr. Craig Leff for his assistance indrawing Figure 1.

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