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SUERF WEBINARKey Takeaways From the ECB’s November 2020 Financial Stability Review
November 25, 2020
Discussant’s contribution on the
Key Vulnerabilities and Policy Trade-offs
Anna Ilyina
Monetary and Capital Markets Department
International Monetary Fund
The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF
Unprecedented policy support has:
➢ Kept markets functioning
➢Maintained the flow of credit
➢ Helped avoid adverse macro-financial feedback loops…
➢…and widespread bankruptcies
A Bridge to Recovery
This presentation will focus on:
➢ Key vulnerabilities
➢ The role of policy support
➢ Policy trade-offs going forward
Strong Policy Responses Have Helped Ease Financial Conditions
Global Financial Conditions Indices
(Standard deviations from mean)
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
April 2020
GFSR
TighteningUnitedStates
China
Euroarea
Other emergingmarket economies
Otheradvancedeconomies
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Dec
Mar
Jun
Sep Oct
Dec
Mar
Jun
Sep Oct
Dec
Mar
Jun
Sep Oct
Dec
Mar
Jun
Sep Oct
Dec
Mar
Jun
Sep Oct
Interest rates House prices Corporate valuations
EM external costs Index
UnitedStates
Euroarea
Otheradvanced
ChinaOther
emerging
Global Financial Conditions Indices
(Standard deviations from mean)
Source: IMF October 2020 Global Financial Stability Report, and IMF staff calculations.
Financial Stability Risks Are Contained, but Not Out of the Woods Yet
Near-Term Growth Forecast Densities
(Probability Densities)
Source: IMF October 2020 Global Financial Stability Report, and IMF staff calculations.
Many Countries Entered the Pandemic with Pre-existing Vulnerabilities
Proportion of Systemically Important Countries with Elevated Vulnerabilities, by Sector
(Percent of countries with high and medium-high vulnerabilities, by GDP [assets for banks, asset
managers, other financial institutions and insurers]; number of vulnerable countries in parentheses)
Source: IMF October 2020 Global Financial Stability Report, and IMF staff calculations.
Rising Public Debt and Fiscal Deficits May Limit Policy Space
Public Debt
(percent of GDP)
Fiscal Deficit
(percent of GDP)
Source: IMF October 2020 Fiscal Monitor and IMF staff calculations.
From
“whatever it
takes”…
…to
“as long as
needed”
Corporate Sector: Policy Trade-offs
Extraordinary policy support
➢ Allowed firms to offset cash shortfalls
via increased borrowing…
➢ …and delay debt service payments
Exit from extraordinary support
➢ Type 1 error: premature withdrawal
of support, incl. to viable firms
➢ Type 2 error: overextending
support, incl. to nonviable firms
➢ Lower liquidity risks
➢ Fewer bankruptcies
➢ Higher indebtedness
➢ Type 1 error:
A spike in bankruptcies
➢ Type 2 error:
Debt overhang;
zombification;
resource misallocation
Policy Support Led to A Decline in Corporate Bond Yields…
US and Euro Area Corporate Bond Yields and
US HY Default Rate
(Percent)
US Investment-Grade Corporate Bond Yields:
Decomposition of Changes since Jan. 2020
(Basis points, left scale;
percentage points, right scale)
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Feb.20 Apr.20 Jun.20 Aug.20 Oct.20
US HY EA HYUS IG, rhs EA IGUS HY 12m trailing default rate, rhs
Source: IMF October 2020 Global Financial Stability Report, and IMF staff calculations.
Intensity of Policy Measures
(Index)
… and Mitigated Liquidity and Solvency Pressures on Firms
Distribution of Firms by Liquidity and Solvency:
Firms that were solvent pre-COVID 19;
Conditional distribution post-COVID-19
(Percent)
Source: October 2020 IMF Regional Economic Outlook (Europe).
Note: The intensity of policy measures is the principal component of each policy
measure, taking into account information on the size of the budgetary envelope,
the duration of the measure, and the coverage of firms. The bar represents the
interquartile range, median (dash), mean (cross), and the minimum and
maximum values excluding outliers (whiskers).
Source: October 2020 IMF Regional Economic Outlook (Europe).
Note: the chart shows the ex-post (conditional) distribution of those firms
that were solvent pre-COVID-19. The original sample includes 4 million
firms in 17 advanced and 9 emerging market European economies; the
data are sourced from the Orbis database.
Defaults Are On the Rise, but Future Path of Defaults is Uncertain
US Speculative-Grade Default Rate: Actual and Forecasts
by Credit Rating Agencies
(Trailing 12-month rate, percent)
0
5
10
15
20
25
Jan-
08
Jan-
09
Jan-
10
Jan-
11
Jan-
12
Jan-
13
Jan-
14
Jan-
15
Jan-
16
Jan-
17
Jan-
18
Jan-
19
Jan-
20
All sectors
All sectors excluding energy and consumer services
Consumer services
Energy
Global Speculative Grade Corporate Default Rates
(12-Month Trailing, Percent)
Source: IMF October 2020 Global Financial Stability Report, and IMF staff calculations.
From
“whatever it
takes”…
…to
“as long as
needed”
Banks: Policy Trade-offs
Extraordinary policy support
➢ Borrower support policies
➢ Strong bank buffers and full use of
flexibility in regulatory framework
Exit from extraordinary support
➢ Type 1 error: premature withdrawal
of accommodation
➢ Type 2 error: overextending support
to nonviable or insolvent firms
➢ Lower bank credit losses
➢ Increased capital space
➢ Delayed loss recognition
➢ Type 1 error:
Higher bank losses;
credit crunch
➢ Type 2 error:
Debt overhang;
weak growth;
bank profitability pressures
Global Bank Solvency Scenario Analysis (October 2020 GFSR)
• Scenarios: October WEO, baseline and adverse
• ~350 banks in 29 jurisdictions (73% of global bank assets)
• Publicly available annual consolidated data (1995-2019)
• Stress test horizon: 2020-2022
100
94
97.8
100.8
93.294.6
98.3
85
90
95
100
105
2019 2020 2021 2022
Baseline Adverse
Source: IMF staff estimates, October 2020 GFSR Source: IMF staff estimates, October 2020 GFSR
Scenarios: Global GDP under the October WEO
Baseline and Adverse Scenarios
AU
S
BE
L
BR
A
CA
N
FIN
FR
A
DE
U
HK
G
IND
IDN
IRL
ITA
JP
N
KO
R
ME
X
NLD
NO
R
PR
T
SG
P
ZA
F
ES
P
SW
E
CH
E
GB
R
US
A
Borrower Support
New Loans 0 0 # 8 0 3 1 1 8 1 1 0 7 9 2 2 1 0 1 1 3 1 0 0 6
Loan Guarantees 1 3 1 3 2 3 9 4 0 1 1 5 2 1 0 4 2 2 1 1 6 1 1 5 3
Repayment Relief 4 2 4 0 5 3 7 2 # 6 # 7 2 9 6 4 1 # 7 6 # 6 0 # 5
Loss Recognition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IFRS/CECL Relaxation 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Recognition Deferral 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
Capital Adequacy
Lower Buffers 1 4 5 5 4 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 3 2 5 2 3 3
Lower RWA and Leverage Exposures 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 4
Lower Capital Deductions 2 1 4 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
Number of policy announcements: >25 6-10 2-5 1 011-25
Mitigation Policies Announced in Response to
COVID-19
(Number of Policy Announcements)
Policy Support Has Mitigated Potential Bank Losses
Bank Capital Shortfall under Adverse Scenario
(Billions of US dollars)
Source: IMF October 2020 Global Financial Stability Report and IMF staff estimates,
Note: Sample ~350 banks in 29 jurisdictions. The shortfall (RHS chart) is measured against bank-specific and fully loaded capital requirements, including a minimum CET1
of 4.5%, a GSIB buffer, a systemic risk buffer, a stress capital buffer, a conservation capital buffer, and a countercyclical capital buffer.
Distribution of Bank Assets by Capital Ratio under
Adverse Scenario, with Policy Mitigation:
(CET 1 ratio, percent)
From
“whatever it
takes”…
…to
“as long as
needed”
Non-Bank Financial Institutions: Policy Trade-offs
Extraordinary policy support
➢ Stabilized funding markets and
market liquidity conditions
➢ Put a floor under risk asset prices
Exit from extraordinary support
➢ Type 1 error: premature withdrawal
of the central bank support
➢ Type 2 error: maintaining support for
an extended period
➢ Outflows from investment
funds reversed &
stabilized
➢ Vulnerabilities remain
➢ Type 1 error:
abrupt market re-pricing
➢ Type 2 error:
rising liquidity & credit risks
excessive risk taking;
financial re-leveraging
Inflows Return to Investment Funds, but Vulnerabilities Remain Elevated
Cumulative Fund Flows
(Percent of assets under management)
Cumulative Returns and Bid-ask Spreads of Fixed-
Income funds
(Percent)
Source: IMF October 2020 Global Financial Stability Report, and IMF staff calculations.