technologies for transparency and accountability: implications for ict policy and recommendations

8/3/2019 Technologies for Transparency and Accountability: Implications for ICT Policy and Recommendations

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Contents

1 ExecutiveSummary..................................................................................................... 5

2 Introduction................................................................................................................ 8

3 Theoriesoftransparency,accountabilityandparticipatoryinitiatives(TAIs)..........10

3.1 Transparencyinitiatives:DefinitionsandAssumptions.....................................10

3.2 Accountabilityinitiatives:DefinitionsandAssumptions....................................12

3.3

Participatoryinitiatives:

Definitions

and

Assumptions

......................................

13

3.4 Relationshipsamongtransparency,accountabilityandparticipation..............14

4 Traditional(non/preICT)transparencyandaccountabilityinitiatives...................20

4.1 Makinggovernmentinformationtransparent...................................................20

4.1.1 Righttoinformation.................................................................................... 20

4.1.2 Transparentbudgetinformation................................................................ 21

4.2 Auditinggovernmentinformationandservices................................................23

4.2.1

Complaintmechanisms

...............................................................................

23

4.2.2 Citizenreportcardsandcommunityscorecards........................................23

4.2.3 CommunityMonitoring.............................................................................. 27

4.2.4 Publichearingsandsocialaudits................................................................ 28

4.2.5 PublicExpenditureMonitoring................................................................... 28

4.3 Publicparticipationinbudget............................................................................ 29

4.3.1

Participatory

budgeting

..............................................................................

29

4.3.2 GenderBudgeting....................................................................................... 31

4.4 Dialogueandactivism........................................................................................ 32

5 Technologiesfortransparency,accountabilityandparticipation............................33

5.1 Websitesandwikis............................................................................................. 34

5.1.1 PublicInformationorTransparencyCampaigns......................................... 34


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5.1.2 Trackingvotingrecords/politicians............................................................. 35

5.1.3 Digitalbudgeting......................................................................................... 35

5.2 Socialmedia....................................................................................................... 39

5.2.1 PublicizingInformationandOrganizingCrowds.........................................39

5.2.2 DeepeningDemocracyandLongTermImpact..........................................40

5.3 Interactivemapping........................................................................................... 42

5.3.1 MappingElectionResults............................................................................ 42

5.3.2 CitizenReportingissues.............................................................................. 42

5.3.3

CrimeMapping

............................................................................................

44

5.3.4 BudgetsandFinancialTransactions............................................................ 44

5.3.5 TheCaseofSithi:MappingHumanRightsViolations.................................45

5.4 SMSandVoiceBasedReporting........................................................................ 46

5.4.1 CitizenReportingIssueswithServiceDelivery...........................................46

5.4.2 TheCaseofCGNetSwara:localizedcitizenjournalism..............................46

5.5 Hybridand"older"technologies........................................................................ 48

6 Findings,discussionandpolicyrecommendations..................................................49

6.1 ThevalueofICTs................................................................................................ 49

6.2 Researchandpolicyrecommendations............................................................. 52

6.2.1 Impactonthepoorandinformationcapabilities.......................................52

6.2.2 Onlineorofflineimpact/Measuringsocialimpact....................................53

6.2.3 ComparisonbetweenICTandnonICTenabledinitiatives........................54

6.2.4 Acomprehensivedatabase......................................................................... 54

6.2.5 Changingnatureofstate............................................................................ 55

6.2.6 Researchmethods...................................................................................... 55

6.2.7 Robustnessofdata..................................................................................... 56

6.2.8 Genderandparticipation............................................................................ 56

6.2.9 RegulationandEthics.................................................................................. 57


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7 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................... 59


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1 ExecutiveSummary

Inwakeof theeventsofArabSpring and increasinglyover the lastdecade, therehas

been attention and expectations on the role that Information and Communication

Technology(ICT)basedtechnologyplatformssuchaswebsitesandwikis,socialmedia,

interactive geomapping, and SMS and voice based reporting can play in increasing

accountability, participation and transparency in public administration (R. Avila et al.,

2010;Davis,2004;Pina,Torres,&Royo,2009).Publicbureaucraciesareunderpressure

to adapt and more openly improve the ways they interact with citizens through the

adoption of webbased technologies (Ibid.). Factors such as the gap between public

expectationandperceivedgovernmentalperformance,theroleofmassmedia,political

scandals,lackoftransparency,andcorruptioncontributedtoadeclineofpublictrustin

governmentin

the

last

two

decades

(Nye,

1997;

Sirker

&

Cosi,

2007).

The field of technology for transparency, accountability and participation is an

increasinglydynamicspacefor innovation. Whetheritisusingthepowerofcrowdsto

monitorelections,oreducatingcitizensabouthow thegovernmentspendsmoneyon

publicservice,ormonitoringlocalandnationalgovernmentbudgets,ICTsaretoolsthat

have been used to shift how accountability and transparency are incorporated into

publicservicedelivery.

ICTs,particularlyonlineandmobiletechnologytools,arechangingthetransparencyand

accountability field. Many of the initiatives including complaints mechanisms, public

information/transparencycampaigns,

and

public

expenditure

monitoring,

are

based

on

ICTplatforms(RAvila,Feigenblatt,&Heacock,2009).Anumberofwebsitesfunctionas

portals where citizens can list their complaints related to their governments

performance and administration. As a result, citizens may have better access to

informationthroughtechnologiesandcanfindnewwaystoparticipate(RAvila,etal.,

2009).Citizenjournalismandtheconceptofdigitaldemocracyarerapidlyemergingand

citizensaredemandingtheirrightsinpubliconlineforums.Therearealsoinitiativesthat

aimfortransparencybypublishingmore informationabouttheprivatesectorthatare

inthepublicsinterest.

This report focuses on analyzing the conditions under which new technologies can

enhance delivery of public services to the poor through improved accountability and

transparency. Itexaminesthe linkagesbetweentheuseof innovations intechnology,

increased accountability and the effects on the delivery of public services to poor

communities. Specifically,thepaperinvestigatestherolethatthecombinationofsocial

media,geomappingandvarioustechnologyplatformscanplayinthisprocess.

Section2ofthereportlaysdownthetheoriesbehindtransparency,accountabilityand

participatoryinitiatives,whilecritiquingtheassumptionsinherentwithinthese.


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Section3outlinestraditional(non/preICT)transparencyandaccountability initiatives,

making informationtransparent,theauditingofgovernmentservicesand information,

(including participatory budgeting), and the resultant potential for dialogue and

activism.

Section4movesontoreviewingcasesof technologies fortransparency.Forexample,

we examine cases of websites and wikis that are used in public information or

transparency campaigns, for tracking voting records and politicians, and for digital

budgeting.Casesfocusontheuseofsocialmedia,specificallyforpublicizinginformation

andorganizingcrowds,anddeepeningdemocracy.Wealso lookatcasesof interactive

mapping, specifically for mapping election results, citizen reporting issues, crime

mapping, budgets and financial transactions, and mapping human rights violations.

Finally, we look at platforms for citizen reporting with service delivery and localized

citizenjournalism.

These

cases

highlight

the

challenges

and

practical

implications

of

whattechnologiescandointhetransparencyandaccountabilityfield.

Section 5 enters into the discussion of the value of ICTs, as opposed to "offline"

attemptsattransparencyandaccountability.Italsooutlinesasetofresearchandpolicy

recommendations. There are several important factors influencing and limiting the

effectivenessoftechnologybasedtransparencyandaccountability initiatives:the level

of democratization or context within which demands can be made for accountability;

political will or support for accountability and transparency initiatives; political

economywithinwhichthe initiativesoperate is influential;enabling legalframeworks,

and incentivesandmechanisms forsanctionsonpublicofficials to influencebehavior.

Onthe

demand

side,

the

capabilities

of

citizens

and

civil

society

organizations

to

access

anduseinformationaswellasthecapacitytomobilizeareimportantfactorsinfluencing

the impacttechnologiesfortransparencycanhave. Wearguethat ICTssmoothenthe

transitionfromdata>information>actionbutalsoconflateeachofthesestages,sothat

itbecomesaseamless,iterativecycle.Wefindthattechnologiesenableaccountability,

transparencyandparticipationby:

reducing the distance between government service provider and user with moreaccesstodecisionmakers,informationandplatformstoraiseconcernsandissues

providing multiplatform opportunities for dissemination and interaction withinformation

providing visual and analytical tools for citizens to access government data andthereforesimplifyingtraditionallypresentedgovernment information (e.g.budgets

ortocompareyearonyear,orwithotherdepartments,orstates)

providingrealtimeopportunitiesforcitizeninteractionandfeedbackThe combination of a free media with ICTs being used for accountability and

transparency is powerful in the dissemination of information and attention to locally


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relevantissues.ThelevelatwhichICTscanbeusedasaneffectivetooldependsonthe

ICT infrastructure itself, levels of connectivity throughout a country, and broadband

penetration. The ubiquity of devices can also determine who is participating and

contributingtotheprocessofaccountabilityandtransparency.

InSection5,thereportconcludeswithasetofpolicy recommendations.Belowarea

fewofthekeyrecommendationareas.

Impactonthepoorandinformationcapabilities:accesstoICTsisimportantbutnotsufficient for meaningful impact in terms of enhancement of ICT capabilities and

sustainable change for the poor. Enhancing peoples informational capabilities

through digital literacy is critical in determining the impact of accountability and

transparencyinitiativesonpoorpeopleswellbeing.

Onlineorofflineimpact/Measuringsocialimpact:Itisstillunclearwhattheactualimpacts (social, political, economic) of these initiatives are for both governments

andcitizensandhowbesttomeasureit.Needtobetterunderstandthefactorsthat

enable or constrain replication of initiatives and how together they create an

enablingenvironmentfortransparencyandaccountability

Comparison between ICT and nonICT enabled initiatives: little empiricalcomparative data looking at ICT and nonICT enabled transparency and

accountability initiativesexist. Whendesigningand supportingnew initiatives that

are ICTbased,analysisoftheactualvalue ICTsmayhavevs.a lowtechsolution is

important.

Acomprehensivedatabase:Currentlythere isnocomprehensivecentraldatabaseof all transparency and accountability initiatives using ICTs worldwide as well as

NGOs working in this field. Recommend a collaborative undertaking to work

togethertobuildacomprehensivedatabasethatcanbearesourcetodevelopment

agencies,decisionmakers,governments,NGOs,andacademics.

Gender:Thetechnologiesfortransparency initiativeshave implicationsforgender,particularlyonitsimpactsforwomenandgirls.However,thisisalargelyuntapped

area

which

seems

to

hold

potential

for

women

to

use

technologies

as

a

tool

toenablebetterparticipationinpublicprocesses,demandingservices,andinteracting

withgovernments.Researchisneededtobetterunderstandhowthesetechnologies

mayhaveapositive(ornegative)impactinthelivesofgirlsandwomen.

RegulationandEthics:ThereareimplicationsforhowICTsareused,whatplatformsshould be used, and importantly how this is regulated. There is much work to be

done in defining a regulatory and legal framework under which transparency and

accountabilityinitiativescanoperate


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2 Introduction

Inwakeof theeventsofArabSpring and increasinglyover the lastdecade, therehas

been attention and expectations on the role that Information and Communication

Technology(ICT)basedtechnologyplatformssuchaswebsitesandwikis,socialmedia,

interactive geomapping, and SMS and voice based reporting can play in increasing

accountability, participation and transparency in public administration (R.Avila,et al.,

2010;Davis,2004;Pina,etal.,2009).Publicbureaucraciesareunderpressuretoadapt

andmoreopenlyimprovethewaysthey interactwithcitizensthroughtheadoptionof

webbasedtechnologies(Ibid.).Factorssuchasthegapbetweenpublicexpectationand

perceivedgovernmentalperformance,theroleofmassmedia,politicalscandals,lackof

transparency,andcorruptioncontributedtoadeclineofpublictrust ingovernment in

thelast

two

decades

(Nye,

1997;

Sirker

&

Cosi,

2007).

Innumerable

studies

indicate

that

public investments in services have resulted in inadequate returns. Additionally, the

failure in many countries to achieve substantial poverty reduction and much inequity

among marginalized people contributes to a lack of trust in government. Improved

governance processes and increased public trust in governments has been associated

with increased responsiveness to citizens through two way interactions between

governmentsandcitizens(R.Avila,etal.,2010;Joshi,2010;McGee&Gaventa,2010).

Moreaccessandtransparencyofinformationhasbeenperceivedasawaytoenhance

trust in governments by improving accountability of government services and

empowering citizens with egovernance (Demchak, Friis, & La Porte, 2000). E

governmentcan

be

interpreted

in

various

ways.

Definitions

of

egovernment

vary

from

the translation of private sector ecommerce experiences to the public sector to

issues of actual governance such as online engagement of stakeholders in shaping,

debating,andimplementingpublicpolicies(Pina,etal.,2009).

The field of technology for transparency, accountability and participation is an

increasinglydynamicspacefor innovation. Whetheritisusingthepowerofcrowdsto

monitorelections,oreducatingcitizensabouthowthegovernmentspendsmoneyon

publicservice, ormonitoring localand national governmentbudgets, information and

communication technologies (ICTs) are tools that have been used to shift how

accountabilityandtransparencyareincorporatedintopublicservicedelivery. Overthe

last

decade,

both

accountability

and

transparency

have

emerged

as

critical

ways

to

address both developmental failures and democratic shortfalls (Mc Gee & Gaventa,

2010).Thisisbasedontheargumentthatthroughgreateraccountability,leakypipes

ofcorruptionand inefficiencywill be repaired,aidwillbechanneledmoreeffectively,

and in turn development initiatives will produce greater and more visible results

(McGee et al, 2010, p. 3). In the context of democracy, there are increasing

expectations that democracy must lead to material outcomes through new forms of

democraticaccountability.Therehasbeenashiftinperceptionthattraditionalformsof

stateled accountability are increasingly seen to be inadequate. Instead, innumerable


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multistakeholder and citizenled approaches have increased in visibility and

importance. Such initiatives now supplement or supplant traditional state led ones

(Ibid).

Technology plays a unique and interesting role in the space of accountability and

transparency initiatives. Astudy by Avila (2010) indicates ICTs, particularly online and

mobiletechnologytools,arechangingthetransparencyandaccountabilityfield.Many

of the initiatives including complaints mechanisms, public information/transparency

campaigns,andpublicexpendituremonitoring,arebasedon ICTplatforms (RAvila,et

al., 2009). A number of websites function as portals where citizens can list their

complaintsrelatedtotheirgovernmentsperformanceandadministration.Citizenshave

betteraccesstoinformationthroughtechnologiesandnewwaystoparticipate(RAvila,

et al., 2009). Citizen journalism and the concept of digital democracy are rapidly

emergingand

citizens

are

demanding

their

rights

in

public

online

of

the

private

sector.

Manyoftheseeffortsarejustbeginning,buttheliteratureindicatesthatseveralcases

show that theyaremovingaheadof traditional transparencyorganizationsand their

models.(R. Avila, et al., 2010). Technology based transparency efforts are noted for

their speed in execution and stimulating change. These initiatives are developed by a

number of different types of stakeholders and include collaborative approaches

including governments and/or service providers. Technology for transparency efforts

areoftenclassifiedaspullorpushefforts.Specifically,pusheffortshavegoalsof

givingvoicetocivilsociety.Pulleffortsontheotherhandraiseawarenessonthepart

of the public. These pull efforts try to provide an accessible information pool from

which

the

public

can

pull

relevant

information

to

better

inform

their

demand

for

improvedgovernanceandservicedelivery.Forthepurposesofthispaper,wefocuson

technologiesfortransparency inrelationtopublicofficials,governmentprocesses,and

budgetsratherthanotheraspectsofgovernancesuchasthejudiciary.

This paper will focus on analyzing the conditions under which new technologies can

enhance delivery of public services to the poor through improved accountability and

transparency. It will examine the linkages between the use of innovations in

technology,increasedaccountabilityandtheeffectsonthedeliveryofpublicservicesto

poorcommunities. Specifically,thepaperwillinvestigatetherolethatthecombination

ofsocialmedia,geomappingandotherplatformscanplayinthisprocess,whilebearing

inmind

that

more

traditional

technologies,

such

as

community

radio

and

print

media

canalsobeeffectivechannels.Adoptingasociotechnicalapproachas itdoes, i.e.that

boththetechnicalandsocietalaspectsofICTsfortransparencyandaccountabilityneed

to be discussed, the paper targets a diverse range of stakeholders, from government

policymakers,ICTspecialists,academics,regulatoryagenciesto"ordinary"citizens.

Thepaper isstructured in the followingway.Thenextsection laysdown the theories

behind transparency, accountability and participatory initiatives, while critiquing the

assumptions inherent within these. Section 3 outlines traditional (non/preICT)


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transparency and accountability initiatives, in terms of firstly making information

transparent, the auditing of government services and information, including

participatorybudgeting,andtheresultantpotentialfordialogueandactivism.Section4

movesontotechnologiesfortransparency,reviewingtechnologiessuchaswebsitesandwikis, social media, interactive mapping, mobile phones, and arguing that other

technologiessuchascommunityradioshouldnotbeforgotten.Section5entersintothe

discussiononthevalueof ICTs,asopposedto"offline"attemptsattransparencyand

accountability,andresearchandpolicyrecommendations.

3 Theoriesoftransparency,accountabilityandparticipatoryinitiatives(TAIs)

3.1 Transparencyinitiatives:DefinitionsandAssumptionsIn the last decade, the capacity of government and civil society to undertake

transparency initiatives has substantially grown, increasingly aided by technology.

Literature indicates that demand side approaches can lead to enhanced governance

through participation (or citizens voice), accountability and responsiveness (Sirker &

Cosi, 2007). Participation, transparency and accountability are at the basis of debates

and literatureonservicedelivery(Joshi,2010).TheWorldDevelopmentReport(2004)

argued that the long route of accountability through public officials and elected

political figures to providers was failing to serve the poor. The WDR argued for an

alternative short route which created direct accountability between users and

providers

(World

Bank

2004).

Out

of

these

arguments

grew

a

body

of

literature

that

examined how to strengthen the short route by strengthening and providing a

platformforvoice,improvingtransparencyandenhancingaccountability(Sirker&Cosi,

2007).

Transparency initiatives have been defined as any attempts (by states or citizens) to

place information or processes that were previously opaque in the public domain,

accessibleforusebycitizengroups,providersorpolicymakers (Joshi,2010,p.2).For

example,morethan60countriesaroundtheworldhavelaunchedrighttoinformation

acts, fromSweden in1966,twomorerecentlyMexico in2002and India in2005.Civil

society

campaigners

have

welcomed

this

transparency,

in

the

hope

that

it

will

lead

to

accountabilityintheglareofthepubliceye(Fox,2007).

However, it could also be said that in comparison to accountability and participation,

transparencyhasreceivedmorepracticalandlessconceptualattention.Inotherwords,

itistakenforgrantedthatthereneedstobetransparency,butthereis lessdiscussion

onwhatexactly ismeantwhenwetalkoftransparency.There isadangerthatsucha

warmallencompassingterm,whichcanmeanallthingstoallpeople,canbeavictimof

its broad appeal, by a lack of definition and critique. Two broad approaches on

transparency can be found: firstly, the multiple ways in which transparency can be


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unpacked and critiqued, and secondly, the way in which it is both instigated either

throughpush/pullmechanisms,and how it is addressed in termsof directionality, for

example upwards and downwards transparency. These multiple interpretations of

transparency,push/pullmechanismsanddirectionalitywillbediscussedbelow.

Firstlythen,intermsofmultipledefinitions,onecanask,whoneedstobetransparent?

Towhom?Istheentitythatneedstobeaccountableanindividualoranorganization?Is

therecipientoftheaccountabilityanindividualoranorganization?Whydoestheentity

(individualororganization)needtobeaccountable?Isitonthebasisofahumanright,

is to tackle corruption, crime, or generally evaluate individual/institutional

performance?Fox2007arguesthateachofthesewouldrequiredifferentmechanisms

to tackle the accountability: corruption and crime would require more legalistic

measures, while performance more systematic interventions. He uses the example of

budgettransparency:

ifcorruption

is

in

question,

transparency

would

mean

revealing

the details of public sector contracts, whereas if performance assessment is the final

aim,itismoretheimpactofpublicspendingwhichneedstobemadetransparent how

theagencyusedthefunds,andtowhateffect.

It is therefore inevitable that transparency is linked to accountability, the assumption

beingthattransparencygeneratesaccountability,withphrasessuchas"information is

power" and "the truth shall set you free" (Fox, 2007). Once information is made

transparent, the entity that needs tobe transparentcan be held accountable. Yet, as

noted, empirical evidence does not illustrate a straightforward causal link between

transparency and accountability (Fox, 2007). Instead, further clarification is needed.

Under

what

conditions

can

transparency

leads

to

accountability?

What

types

of

transparencygenerateswhattypesofaccountability(Fox,2007).Foxarguesthatthere

is not just one type of transparency, but there can even be opaque and clear

transparency,wherethefirstinvolvessimplydisseminatingnominalinformation,which

may not even be reliable, needing the work of intermediaries such as civil society

organizations to translate it into more accessible language, and to analyze it. The

second, clear transparency, is reliable, concise transparency which reveals who is

accountable for what processes. The extent towhich transparency is opaque or clear

can result in whether accountability is soft (there is a need for institutional

"answerability")orhard(sanctionsorcompensationcanbeapplied).

Interms

of

push/pull,

transparency

can

either

be

proactive

(driven

by

the

government,

suchasrightto informationacts)ordemanddriven inpractice initiativesmaybean

iterative process of both. In terms of directionality, transparency can be both

downwards (that society requires governments to be transparent about how it

operates)butalsoupwards(thatthestatealsohastherighttomonitorwhethercitizens

are accountable to their behavior, for example social security checks to ensure that

citizensarelegallyentitledtotheservicestheyapplyfor).


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This then returns to the notion of the multiple ways in which transparency is

understood:transparencymaybeseenassurveillance(e.g.thegovernmentrequesting

socialsecuritychecks).UsingtheUSgovernment'sinvestmentinJordan'seGovernment

program,forexample,Ciborra(2005)arguesthatthedrivefor"transparency"israthersurveillance on a country which is geographically critical. Such interpretation unpacks

notonlythenotionoftransparency,butalsoaccountability,asdiscussednext(Ciborra,

2005).

3.2 Accountabilityinitiatives:DefinitionsandAssumptionsSchedler (1999)definespublicaccountabilityastherelationshipsbetweenthepower

holder (accountprovider) and delegator (accountdemander). There are four key

elements of an accountability relationship which include setting standards, acquiring

informationaboutactions,makingdecisionsaboutappropriatenessandidentifyingand

sanctioning

unsatisfactory

performance

(Joshi,

2010,

3).

As

with

the

transparency

literature, however, the accountability literature does not identify which of these

elementsareessentialforaparticularinitiativetobeconsideredrobust.Itisnotedthat

oftensome,butnotallofthesefourcomponentscanbefoundandhaveanimpacton

public services (Ibid). Also as with transparency literature, there is an element of

directionality,asaccountabilityiseitherconsideredhorizontal(e.g.stateorcivilsociety

organizationsmonitoringstateaccountability)orvertical (e.g.,electoralchoice)(Goetz

andJenkins,2001).

There are many stateled and citizenled initiatives that demand accountability in

servicedelivery.Multiplestakeholdersdemandaccountabilityofpoliticianswhoarenot

adoptingappropriatepolicies.Additionallyaccountabilityisdemandedofpublicofficialswho are not delivering services according to rules or entitlements or not monitoring

providers for appropriate service levels. Finally accountability is demanded directly of

providersfornotmaintainingservicelevelsintermsofaccessandquality(Davis,2004;

Joshi,2010).

However, as with transparency, the concept of accountability can be critiqued and

interpreted in several ways. Firstly, Goetz and Jenkins (2001) argue that horizontal

accountability is largelyunsuccessful,and more powers shouldbegiven tocitizens to

ensurepoliticalaccountability,aselectionshavetheirownshortcomings(anargument

closely

linked

to

the

value

of

technology,

which

will

be

returned

to

in

this

paper).

They

go on to argue that where citizen participation is incorporated into horizontal

accountability, more powerful hybrid forms of accountability emerge. Secondly, it is

arguedthatalthoughaccountabilitymaybeunderstood ininstrumentalterms,suchas

themonitoring andplanningof public service delivery,as identifiedabove, there also

needs to be greater consideration of what exactly accountability means. As with

transparency, accountability is a social construct, consisting of the attitudes,

relationships, power structures and norms of the organization being accounted for

(Roberts,1991;Mulgan,2000).Theselocalinterpretationsofaccountabilityarecriticalif


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wearetounderstandhowaccountabilitycanbeinstitutionalized.Ifaccountabilityisan

externalrequisite,not integratedwithanentiregovernmentprocessfrom initiationto

evaluation, it is unlikely to be more than superficial information gathering and

consultation(Paul,1992;VigodaandGolembiewski).

3.3 Participatoryinitiatives:DefinitionsandAssumptionsCitizenparticipation is the third inextricableelementofthetripartite fundamentalsof

efficient and effective government service delivery: accountability, transparency, and

participation. Although participation has been seen as a democratic principle (Held,

2006;Hickey&Mohan,2005),likeaccountability,itisadifficultconcepttocaptureand

define,broadlyseenaspossiblethroughdirect,representationalor informationbased

(when aggregate results lead to a decision in terms of planning) participation. In

addition to the differing views as to what participation is, there are also different

understandingsof

the

value

of

participation.

In

terms

of

the

definitions,

there

are

four

broadassumptions incapturingtheconceptofparticipation:that it isaprocessbased

ondialogueandnegotiation,thatitinvolvesthenecessarystakeholders/actors,thatthis

participation should be equitable and active, and that participation can be and

frequently is on a sliding scale from weak to strong. Participation is recommended

through the lifecycleof aproject, from requirementsanalysis toevaluation (Gavin &

Pinder, 1998; Gosling & Edwards, 2003). Estrella and Gaventa (1998) compare the

difference between conventional and participatory evaluation as below (Estrella &

Gaventa,1998)

Conventional Participatory

Who Externalexperts Communitymembers,projectstaff,facilitator

What Predeterminedindicatorsofsuccess,

Principallycostandproduction

outputs

Peopleidentifytheirownindicatorsof

success,whichmayincludeproduction

outputs

How Focuson"scientificobjectivity,"

distancingofevaluatorsfromother

participants;delayed,limitedaccessto

results

Selfevaluation,simplemethods

adaptedtolocalculture;open,

immediatesharingofresultsthrough

localinvolvementin evaluation

process

When Usuallyuponcompletionofproject,

sometimesalsomidterm

Morefrequent,smallscaleevaluations

Why Accountability,usuallysummative,to

determineiffundingcontinues

Toempowerlocalpeopletoinitiate,

control,andtakecorrectiveaction

However,onecanalreadyseeissuesarisingregardingtheassumptionsofparticipation:

whomanagesthedialogueandnegotiation?Whodefineswhichstakeholdersandactors

participate? How can this participation be equitable and active? Numerous critiques

havebeenraisedregardingboththedefinitionsandassumptionsofparticipation. It is

argued that those who participate are usually those who are already politically


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interested,motivated,articulateandwhocanaffordthetime toparticipate (Cooke&

Kothari,2001).IntheirresearchinparticipatoryenvironmentalpolicyinNepal,Agrawal

and Gupta (2005) found that the opportunity cost of participation was too high for

poorersegmentsofthepopulation,andtherefore itwastheeconomicallyandsociallybetter off participated in meetings. Women in particular may be sidelined, or

considered as a homogenous group (Gujit & Shah, 1998). This may create a vicious

circle,whereweakervoicesmaynotbeheardandtheymaynotbemotivatedenoughto

participate again. For these reasons, participation has been increasingly treated with

caution, with many arguing that it is no more than a "warmly persuasive" (Williams,

1976),"politicallyambivalentanddefinitionallyvague"term(AndreaCornwall&Brock,

2005)whichneedsgreaterconceptualclarity.

In theory, then, ICTs can lower barriers to participation, through the use of mobile

phones,

community

radio,

as

well

as

through

intermediaries

when

the

technologiesrequire higher levels of skill and literacy (e.g. online fora, contributing to wikis or

participatory budgeting). However, as will be discussed in this paper, this raises a

number of complexities which should not be underestimated: what is the broader

environment in which participation is encouraged? Who are the intermediaries and

whatvestedinterestsmaytheyhave?

3.4 Relationshipsamongtransparency,accountabilityandparticipation

Transparency and accountability initiatives are based on a set of assumptions and

aspirations of improving the quality of governance and supporting democratic

outcomes, improving the effectiveness of development initiatives, and leading to

stronger roles forcitizens ingovernmentprocesses (McGee&Gaventa,2010).These

initiativesarebasedongoalsofexpectedimpactsuchasincreasedstateorinstitutional

responsiveness, lowered levels of corruption, the development of new democratic

spaces for citizen engagement, increased participation or role for local voices, and

improvedutilizationofbudgetanddeliveryofservices(McGee&Gaventa,2010).Other

claims are based on the premise that transparency will lead to accountability. With

increased transparency in the decision making process of the state, greater

accountabilitycanresultforcitizens.

Thereis

an

interesting

and

dynamic

relationship

among

transparency,

participation

and

accountability. Does transparency lead to accountability? If citizens have more

information and participation, will this lead to public officials performing more

effectively?Theselinkagesaswellastheimpactandeffectivenessinservicedeliveryare

oftenassumed,ratherthanovertlystated(Joshi,2010).AsFigure1indicates,thereisa

claimthatthese initiativeswillcreateawarenessamongcitizensthroughtransparency

of information.Thiswill leadtoaprocessofempowermentandparticipationthrough

formal and informal institutions. Finally, the relationship leads to accountability by

changingtheincentivesofprovidersandresultingbehaviorchange.


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15

In reality, as the literature indicates, the relationship among these concepts is much

morecomplex.Whiletheclaimsofmanytransparencyandaccountabilityinitiativesare

ambitious,the

underlying

assumptions

are

often

untested.

At

the

outset,

there

is

an

assumptionthatifinformationismadepublicthroughtransparencyinitiatives,thiswill

exposecorruption.Thenconcerned citizenscanparticipate in thegovernanceprocess

byexercisingtheirvoiceandhaveaplatformtoexpressdiscontentwiththestatusquo.

The relationship between participation and improved accountability, however, is not

inevitablystraightforward.Asseen,Fox(2007)arguesthattransparencywillnotalways

ornecessarilyleadtoaccountability.

Asecondsetofclaimsarguesthattransparencymay leadto increasedresponsiveness

by providers, improvements in access to services and better development outcomes.

Thisassumesagainthatexposureofpoorperformanceonthepartofproviderswilllead

to improved responsiveness. Italsoassumes that theshortcomings inservice delivery

canbe attributed topoormotivation ofpublicofficials rather thanbecauseof lackof

resources or capacities. Additionally it assumes that with these mechanisms in place,

publicofficialswillbemotivatedtobetterbehavior.Yet,asJoshi2010states,thereis

no clear reason why all of these assumptions will hold true in specific cases: public

providersmaybeimmunetoexposureofpoorperformance,increasedcitizenvoicemay

be met with backlash and reprisals, lack of resources may constrain public officials

capacitytorespond,andaccountabilitymechanismsmaynotbeenoughofadeterrent"

(Joshi,2010,p.6).

Growing

evidence

indicates

that

transparency

alone

is

insufficient,

and

only

leads

togreateraccountabilityininteractionwithandinrelationtootherfactors.Byframingthe

question around under what conditions can transparency lead to accountability, it

becomespossibletounderstandthose factors. Forexample,thiscould includeasking

whether particular institutional spaces are used for inclusion (A. Cornwall & Coelho,

2006). With this is the related assumption that effective institutions are necessarily

transparent and accountable. However, there is a tension between effectiveness and

accountability(Mainwaring,2003).Itiscriticaltounpacktheconditionsunderwhichthe

twointeract.


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16

A final, related setof claims is that transparencyandaccountability initiatives lead to

greater participation of the poor and empowerment with greater awareness of

informationandrights.Thisassumesthatwithinformation,comespower.Joshiargues

that we simply do not know much about when citizen groups engage in socialaccountabilityactivities.To the extent thataccountability initiativesarecollectiveand

aggregate citizen voice, they can be empowering of the poor, whose strength lies in

numbers. (Joshi,2010).McGee argues that little maybeknownabout the incentives

andconstraintsofcollectiveactiontousethisinformation(2010).

What factors are then necessary to ensure transparency, accountability and

participation?Oneframeworkisthesetof"ARVIN"indicators,developedbytheWorld

Bank,whereAssociation(A)relatestothefreedomofcitizenstoassociate;Resources

(R) refers to their ability to mobilize resources to fulfill the objectives of their

organizations;Voice(V)

to

their

ability

to

formulate

and

express

opinion;

Information

(I)

totheiraccessto information,andNegotiation(N)totheexistenceofspacesandrules

ofengagementfornegotiation,participationandpublicdebate.Eachoftheseissubject

to the existing legal and regulatory framework, political and governance context,

socioculturalcharacteristicsandeconomicconditions.Thefullframeworkisasbelow:

Legaland

Regulatory

Framework

Politicaland

Governance

Context

SocioCultural

Characteristics

EconomicConditions

Association

Freedomof

association

Proceduresfor

registeringCSOs

Policiesand

proceduresfor

licensingCSOs

Recognition

and

accreditation

policiesand

procedures

Conflictof

registrationand

licensing

regulations

Social

capital

Gender

barriers

Illiteracy

Attitudesto

youth,

disabled,

elderly

Social

hierarchies

Cost

of

legal

registrationsand

accreditations

Costofconvening

meetingsandforums

Costofcommunication

andtravel

Resources Taxlaws

Lawson

foundations

Regulationof

fundraising

Procurement

regulation

Government

grants,private

funds,other

transferences

Donations

frompoliticians

Political

interferenceon

Social

philanthropy

(thecultureof

giving)

Historyof

associational

life,selfhelp

Impactofeconomic

pressuresonCSOfunding

sources

Impactonemployment

Infrastructureandcost

ofcommunications


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17

contracting andgapfilling

Voice

Constitutional

provisionsand

lawsonfreedom

ofexpression

MediaandICT

relatedlaws

Political

controlof

publicmedia

Restrictionon

civicprotests

Massmedia

influenceon

policymaking

Professional

trainingof

journalists

Communication

practices(use

ofmediaby

differentsocial

groups)

Gender

barriers

Relations

betweenmedia

andCSOs

Fees

associated

with

expressingviewsinmedia

(adsvs.oped)

Coststo

present/publish/distribute

views(petitions,

newsletters,radio

stations)

Information Constitutional

provisionson

accessto

information

Freedomof

informationlaws

Regulationsfor

accesstopublic

information

(people,places

anddocuments)

Information

disclosureof

policiesand

practices.

Abilityto

demystify

publicpolicy

andbudgets

Roleof

information

movements

andnetworks

Barriers

createdby

illiteracy

Socialbarriers

Theuseof

wordof

mouth

(oralcultures)

Costs/feesforaccessto

publicdocuments

Printingand

communicationsfacilities

Negotiation Legally

established

dialoguespaces

(referendums,

lobby

regulations,

publicforums,

etc.)

Decentralization

legislation,

provisionfor

participation

Legal

frameworkto

define

Politicalwill

andcapacityto

engagecitizens

CSO

collaboration

with

legislatures

Political

limitationsto

theroleof

legislatures

Institutionalized

dialogues

Social

accountability

Socialvalues

andhierarchies

thatsetrules

and

expectations

onwhocan

speakonwhat

subjectinwhat

contextand

when(social

exclusionof

childrenand

youth,

disabled,

elderly,and

otherspecial

Impactofeconomic

pressuresonautonomy,

bargainingpowerand

advocacyofCSOs

Riskofcooption

Impactofbudget

constraintsoncapacities

oflegislatorstoengagein

budgetaccountability


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18

institutional

roles,checks

and

balances:

Legislature,

executive,and

auditorgeneral

Legal

frameworkfor

rules/regulations

guidingthe

budgetdecision

makingprocess

mechanisms interest

groups)


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19

ARVINhasalreadybeen applied inSenegalandAlbania. A more information focused

framework is suggested by Heeks (2000) who argues that government provision of

information for transparency and accountability relies on assumptions that a) data is

madeavailableandtransparent;b)thisdataisaccessedbystakeholderswhoareabletoassess itandtransform it into information;c)thatthis informationcanbeactedupon

andd)usedto initiatecitizengovernmentandcitizencitizendialogueandactivism;e)

thatgovernmenttakesactionbasedontheseprocesses.Thisinformsourunderstanding

and typology of "pre"or "non" ICT initiatives. Firstly, informationneeds to bemade

transparent throughright to information initiativesand transparentbudget initiatives.

This can then be audited through complaint mechanisms, citizen report cards and

community scorecards. And finally, there is the potential and space for dialogue and

activism (e.g. used for participatory community monitoring, participatory budgeting).

Seefigure2below.

However,thepotentialforeachofthese,andtheirtransformationintothenextstageis

influenced by a number of contextual factors, as indicated by ARVIN. Therefore,

although the next section deconstructs "traditional" transparency and accountability

initiatives into those that make government information transparent (access), those

that audit government information and services (assess/adapt), and those that

encouragedialogue

and

activism

(act),

along

the

lines

of

Heeks's

framework,

this

is

a

deliberatelyartificialdistinction,toillustratehow,aswillbediscussedinsections5and

6, ICTs conflate each of these steps, making the process of access/assess/act shorter,

moreiterative,moreseamlessandmoreparticipative.


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4 Traditional(non/preICT)transparencyandaccountabilityinitiatives

There are a number of different types of initiatives in the transparency and

accountabilityspacethatexistedwithouttheuseofICTs.Mostoftheserevolvedaround

the label social accountability such as citizen report cards, community score cards,

community monitoring, public hearings and audits. (Ackerman, 2004; Davis, 2004;

Deininger&Mpuga,2005)Thesearebasedontheideathattraditionalservicedelivery

has failed the poor and that demandled accountability initiatives can improve the

effectiveness of servicedelivery.Social accountability encompasses several definitions

including monitoring by citizen groups of public authority (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz,

2006), participation in policy making, policy advocacy as well as deliberation (Joshi,

2010).Itcouldbeonepartofapackageofstrategiesthatcitizengroupsusetoacquire

betterservicesthroughmobilization,politicaladvocacy,andintermediation.Specifically,

wewillnowlookatanumberofsocialaccountabilityinitiativesthatwerenotICTbased.

Witheachinitiative,wewillhighlightthetheoriesofchangeforimpact,theunderlying

assumptions,thefactorsthatinfluencetheprocessandevidenceofimpact.

4.1 Makinggovernmentinformationtransparent4.1.1 RighttoinformationOver85countriesaroundtheworldhaveimplementedlegislationtoensurefreedomof

access

to

information

held

by

governments.

In

the

United

Kingdom,

the

Freedom

of

InformationActwaspassedin2000,comingintoeffectin2005.Atthetime,theBritish

PrimeMinister,TonyBlair,statedthat"theveryfactofitsintroductionwillsignalanew

relationshipbetween governmentand people: a relationshipwhichsees thepublic as

legitimate stakeholders in the running of the country and sees election to serve the

public as being given on trust." Ecuador signed a "Transparency and Access to

InformationLaw"in2004.MalaysiapassedaFreedomofInformationActasrecentlyas

2011. Mexico's "Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government

Information"wassignedbyVicenteFoxinJune2002.

In

India,

the

Right

to

Information

Act

was

implemented

in

2005,

where

any

citizen

can

requestgovernmentheldinformationinanystate(excludingJammuandKashmir).This

markedawatershedintermsoftransparency,ifnotaccountability.Thelawstatesthat

any enquiry or complaint made to a "public authority" must be addressed within 30

days.Thereare inevitablybothbenefitsandweaknessestoactssuchasthese.Onthe

one hand, requesting information in itself may speed up government processes. This

was the case reported of Chandra Devi, a rural citizen of Jharkhand, in India, who

applied for a government grant to build a bricks and mortar house, but whose

applicationwentunaddresseduntilsheaskedforfurtherinformationastowhereithad


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21

reachedandwhyotherswerebeingsuccessful(Polgreen,2011b).Oncetheenquirywas

made, her grant was approved. However, there are several critiques levelled at the

underlyingassumptionofthe"righttoinformation".Oneisthatalthoughitmayactasa

pressure valve to speed up processes, the overall nature of bureaucratic corruptionparticularlythatofmiddlemenisnotaddressed.Anotheristhatifthereisnoequivalent

horizontalaccountabilitymeasures(suchasthepowerofthepolice,ombudsman,and

legislation); citizens may make themselves even more vulnerable. Queries can end in

fatal consequences, as in the example given whereAmit Jethwa, attempting to stopillegalquarryinginGirNationalParkinGujarat,wasattackedbyassassinsbelievedtobe

linked to the local politicians backing the quarrying, after leaving his lawyer's office.

Jethwahadrepeatedly filedRTIrequests,and foundthat55 illegalquarriesexisted in

andaroundthepreserve,andtheprocessofestablishingthesehadbeendocumented

onlandleases,electricityrecordsetc.heldbythegovernment(Polgreen,2011a).

While the principles of Right to Information precede the widespread use of ICTs,

particularly in developing countries, many countries are developing ICT platforms to

handle access to information requests, including India, Chile and Mexico. Technology

can and has certainly speeded up the process of accessing government information.

Civil society organisations in many countries act as intermediaries, e.g. Germany's

www.abgeordnetenwatch.de (SimplyAskYourGovernment),theEU's"AsktheEU"and

Spain's upcoming tuderechoasaber.es.However, as discussed in the above paragraph,

unlesstheoverallcontextoftransparencyandaccountabilityisaddressed,technologyis

nomorethanatoolwhichcanalsobemanipulatedandencapsulateexistingcorruption.

4.1.2 TransparentbudgetinformationA national budget is an implicit agreement between the government and the people

where the government commits to provide specified public services in return for the

draftitmadeonprivateresources.Citizenshavetherighttoknowhowtheirfundsare

being collected, how it is being spent and what their governments priorities are (IBP

2010).Theycanrightfullyaskthegovernmentforanefficientandequitabledeliveryof

wellintended services. Over the past two decades, governments made efforts to

improvetheirbudgetingsystemthroughtheadaptationofPerformanceBudgeting,the

Single Treasury Account and other reformation systems. More importantly, there has

been a growing need and interest in making government budget information publicly

available.

Budget

transparency

is

a

fundamental

cornerstone

to

accountability

and

providing efficient and effective government services. In addition, timely access to

information opens up opportunities for citizens to participate in fiscal policy decision

makingthathavesignificantimpactsontheirlives.


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OpenBudgetIndexThe Open Budget Index (OBI) established in 2006 by the International Budget

Partnership

(IBP),

evaluates

how

accessible

and

transparent

countries

budget

documentsandprocessaretotheircitizensandrateseachcountry.IBPwasestablished

in 1997 by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities to help nongovernmental

organizationsconductbudgetanalysistomaketheirbudgetsystemsmoretransparent

andresponsiveinemergingdemocraciesanddevelopingcountries.TheOBIisbasedon

the Open Budget Survey which focuses on the content and timeliness of a countrys

eight key budget documents: PreBudget Statement, Executives Budget Proposal,

EnactedBudget, InYearReports,MidYearReview,YearEndReport,AuditReportand

Citizens Budget. OBI is designed to provide citizens, legislators and civil society

advocates with relevant information needed to comprehensively and practically

evaluateagovernments

commitment

to

budget

transparency

and

accountability.

The OBI has been released by the IBP every two years since 2006 and encouraged

governmentsmaketheirbudgetmoretransparent.The2010Indexwasconstructedby

averaging the countries answers to the Open Budget Survey that included 123

questions (91 questions in 2008) relating to information contained in each countrys

national budget documents that should be open to public. The number of survey

participants has been on an upward trajectory. Carlitz (2010) adds that the OBI is

particularly notable in that itexplicitly incorporates advocacy into its researchdesign,

creatinganetworkofcivilsocietyexpertswhoconducttheresearchtoinformtheIndex

and then participate in various coordinated advocacy activities based on the OBI

findings.

The2010OpenBudgetSurveyreportfoundthat74ofthe94countriesassessedfailed

tomeetthebasicstandardsoftransparencyandaccountabilitywhenitcomestotheir

national budgets. Of those 74, 40 countries did not release any meaningful budget

information. However, the average performance of these 40 countries has improved

nearly 20 percent in a relatively short period of time over the course of three

consecutiveOpenBudgetSurveys.Thisisanotableachievementandapositivesignfor

future.

The2010surveyincludesfourkeyfindings:

1. The overall state of budget transparency is poor. Only a modest minority ofcountries can be considered to have open budgets while a large number of

countriesprovidegrosslyinsufficientbudgetinformation.

2. The general trend toward open budgets is nonetheless favorable. Budgettransparency is improving substantially, especially among countries that

providedlittleinformationinthepast.


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3. Budgetengagementbytheauditinstitutionsandthelegislatureistypicallyweakand is strongly correlated to the lack of budget information made available to

theseinstitutionsandthepublic.

4. Therearemanysimplestepstoopeningupbudgetsthatgovernmentsarefailingtoundertake.Suchstepscanbetakenbytheexecutivebranch,the legislature,

andthesupremeauditinstitutionsalike.(IBP2010,p.37)

In addition, according to the report there are correlation between democracy and

transparency,alsocorrelationbetweenincomeandtransparencysothatcountriesthat

havestrongbudgettransparencyaregenerallyhigh incomecountries,whilecountries

thatlackbudgettransparencyhavelowincomeingeneral.However,itisnotimpossible

forlowincomecountriestoachieverelativelyhighlevelsofbudgettransparency.

4.2 Auditinggovernmentinformationandservices4.2.1 ComplaintmechanismsArguably, the most obvious form of complaint mechanism in democracies is that of

elections. Elections provide an opportunity for citizens to exert their options of "exit,

voiceor loyalty"(Hirschman,1970),eitherbyvotingfor theirpoliticalparty,switching

allegiance, or abstaining altogether. Rather than a purely "citizens with rights"

perspective, therefore, elections also present a marketization reminder to politicians

that citizens are consumers with choices. However, Ackerman identifies three major

problems with elections: elections only hold elected officials accountable, whereas

corruptionmay

occur

through

appointed

bureaucrats

who

are

not

directly

accountable

tothepublicthroughtheelectoralprocess;secondly,becauseelectionsoccureveryfew

years and include many opinions and evaluations, citizens tend to vote for an overall

perspective;and finally,asmanypoliticiansareelectedbyonlyasmallpercentageof

thepopulation,theymaypandertothissegmentonly,encouragingamutualpatronage

(Ackerman,2004).

4.2.2 CitizenreportcardsandcommunityscorecardsCitizen report cards (CRCs) are based on the premise that measuring quality and

responsivenessofserviceprovidersingovernancewillspurtheseproviderstoimprove

(Deichmann

&

Lall,

2007).

This

is

usually

influenced

by

the

"glare

effect"

of

putting

the

services under the "public scanner" and shaming poor performers (Paul, 2006).

Frequent executions of the report card also monitor performance improvement over

the years (J. M. Ackerman, 2005). The underlying premise is therefore a shift from

seeingcitizensasbeneficiariestocitizensasclientswhoprovidecustomerfeedback(J.

M.Ackerman,2005;Paul,2006).

Themostwellknowncaseofcitizenreportcards isthat implemented inBangaloreby

the NGO Public Affairs Centre (Paul, 1998, 2006; Ravindra, 2004). The first citizens

report card was attempted in 1993, which asked a sample population of 807 general


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households and 327 poorer income households (both in the same localities) their

satisfaction levels with government services. Amongst the public agencies for

telephones, municipal corporation, electricity, water, health, regional transport,

BangaloreDevelopmentAuthority,publicsectorbanksandregionaltransportoffice,theBangaloreDevelopmentAuthority(responsibleforpropertyandhousesites)wasfound

to have 65% dissatisfied customers, the highest out of all the agencies. This was also

foundtohavethehighestpercentageofcorruption.Ithasbeenreportedthatalthough

response from the agencies was "lukewarm", with five out of the eight agencies not

showing interestorcontradictingfindings,itwasthemediawhichhelpedpublicizethe

findings.TheTimesofIndiaforexamplestartedaweeklyfeatureforabouttwomonths,

publicizingoneofthestudyfindingsatatime(Paul,1998).Ifimmediatechangewasnot

seen in the agencies, Paul (1998) felt that this led to increased citizen awareness of

widespreadcorruptionproblems,andgreaterpublicpressureontheagencies.Indeed,a

secondreport

card

implemented

by

the

PAC

in

1999

showed

a"partial

improvement

in

public satisfaction" (Paul, 2006). Corruption levels appeared to have increased,

however, in certain agencies. This second report card also appeared to have a more

tangible impact, where within a few months of the report card, the chief minister of

Karnataka (the state in which Bangalore is the capital) created the Bangalore Agenda

TaskForce (BATF)asapublicprivatecivilsociety forum (Paul,2006).The third report

cardin2003showedaradicalincreaseinsatisfactionlevels(between64and96%)(J.M.

Ackerman, 2005). Overall, the impact varied from agency to agency. Providing the

report card information was only one part of the story, other factors that influenced

how much impact the citizen report card had included leadership, resources and the

institutional

environment

of

each

agency

(Ravindra,

2004).

Although citizen report cards were implemented in other countries including the

PhilippinesandtheUkraineaswellasother IndiancitiessuchasNewDelhi,Mumbai,

HyderabadandChennai(Ravindra,2004),thereneedstobeamoreconcertedefforton

understandingtheimpactoftheseinitiatives.Equally,anumberofcritiqueshavebeen

made regarding CRCs. Firstly, it has been argued that these are not citizen led, but

rather NGO led. In the case of Bangalore, a market research agency designed and

executed the questionnaire in collaboration with the NGO, so it was not a truly

participatory design. Secondly, it was argued that even in quantitative surveys,

satisfactionisasubjectivemeasure,dependentonexpectations,andinfluencedbywhat

respondentssee

in

comparison

to

their

neighbors

or

peers.

In

analyzing

the

Bangalore

scorecard data for water services, Deichmann and Lall (2007) found that households

betteroffthantheirneighborstendedtobemoresatisfiedandviceversa.Thereforeif

servicelevelswererelativelyhomogenousacrossagivenlocality,theywereconsidered

satisfactory, unless somebody can make a comparison with another level of service

delivery.ThiswasshowntobeparticularlythecaseinPeru,whenconductedinarural

setting, as users had a limited knowledge of quality standards and challenge in

comparing with other service providers. Therefore, it could be argued that CRCs are

more effective inanurban rather than rural environment. Thirdly, it was argued that


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25

CRCs do not achieve anything in themselves, largely because government service

providerstendtobemonopolistic.Thiscouldengendertheattitudeamongcitizensthat

nothingwouldchangeandtheywereatthemercyoftheseproviders.Relatedtothis,

other stakeholders were necessary in order to publicize and pressurize, such as themediaasseenintheBangalorecase.

MakingservicestransparentthroughCRCscanclearlyhaveawide impact.Paul(2006)

statesthatoneoutcomewasthe incentiveof interagencycompetition,andemployee

prideincomparingwithotheragencies.HegivestheexampleofaBangalorepublicbus

driver who told a customer "don't you know that the PAC has rated our transport

serviceasthebestamongstalltheservicesinthecity".AccordingtoRavindra,theBDA

(BangaloreDevelopmentAuthority) andBangaloreWaterSupply and SewerageBoard

initiatedtrainingprogramstoimprovecustomerorientedskillsoftheirstaffasaresult

ofthe

second

scorecard

(Ravindra,

2004).

However,

as

argued,

it

is

difficult

to

attribute

these changes and initiatives such as the BATF exclusively to the report card (J. M.

Ackerman,2005;Ravindra,2004).Finally, itremainstobeseenhowmuch ICTscanbe

usedtodisseminatecitizenreportcardsifthesearerevived.

Incontrasttocitizenreportcards,communityscorecardsappeartobemorequalitative,

participatory,andfocusedon immediatedialogueandpolicymaking.Ackerman(2005)

findsthefollowingdifferencesbetweenCRCsandcommunityscorecards:


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TheCitizenReportCard TheCommunityScorecard

Unitofanalysisisthe

household/individual

Informationcollectedviaasurvey

questionnaire

Reliesonformalstratifiedrandom

samplingtoensurethatthedatais

representativeoftheunderlying

population

Themajoroutputistheactual

perceptions

assessmentofservicesintheformofthe

reportcard

The

media

plays

the

major

role

in

generating

awarenessanddisseminatinginformation

Conductedatamoremacrolevel(city,

stateorevennational)

Moreusefulinurbansettings

Timehorizonforimplementationislong

(about36months)

Intermediaryplaysalargerolein

conductingthesurveyanddataanalysis

Feedback

to

providers

and

the

governmentisatalaterstageaftermedia

advocacy

Unitofanalysisisthecommunity

Informationcollectedviafocusgroup

interactions

Involvesnoexplicitsampling.Insteadthe

aimistoensuremaximumparticipationof

thelocalcommunityinthegatheringof

information.

Emphasishereislessontheactual

scorecardandmoreonachieving

immediateresponseandjointdecision

making

Reliesmoreheavilyongrassroots

mobilizationto

create

awareness

and

invokeparticipation

Conductedatamicro/locallevel(village

cluster,andsetoffacilities)

Moreusefulinruralsettings

Timehorizonforimplementationisshort

(about36weeks)

Roleofintermediaryismostlyas

facilitatoroftheexercise

Feedbacktoprovidersisalmost

immediate

and

changes

are

arrived

at

throughmutualdialogueduringthe

interfacemeeting

Oneexampleofcommunityscorecard implementation is inMalawi,wherescorecards

areusedinthehealthsectorbytheNGOCARE,inpartnershipwithvillageleadersand

membersofLocalHealthCommittees(comprisingcitizensconcernedabouthealthcare

in the local area). A list of indicators isjointly devised by all these stakeholders to

evaluatelocalhealthcentres,andparticipantsareaskedtoranktheperformanceofthe

healthcentre

against

these

indicators

(J.

M.

Ackerman,

2005).

Staff

at

the

health

centres

gothroughasimilarprocess,andwhiletheindicatorsmightbesimilar,aswasthecase

in Malawi, the evaluations, presented at an "interface meeting" might be different,

providing the opportunity to work together to design solutions. Evidence from the

Malawi study showed improvement in centre service between the first and second

scorecardprocesses,andthatthis improvementwasattributedtothe implementation

of the scorecard. However, inevitably, questions can also be asked here, in particular

that of the role of the intermediary (in this case CARE) in facilitating discussion and

reachingagreement,andalsohowtheselocallevelinitiativescanbescaledup.


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4.2.3 CommunityMonitoringA related, but different initiative to the score cards is community monitoring. This a

processby

which

the

community

plays

awatchdog

role

in

relation

to

service

providers

because of ineffective monitoring and weak accountability relationships(Bjorkman &

Svensson, 2009). Rather than rate outcomes like with the scorecard, the idea of

communitymonitoringistomonitorongoingactivitiesofpublicagencies.Thetheoryof

change isthatcommunitymonitoring issupposedtoensureongoingperformanceand

qualityofservicessuchasmonitoringofteacherordoctorattendanceorensuringthat

appropriate procedures are followed. Specifically, studies indicate that community

monitoring has been useful in exposing instances of corruption or diversion of public

resources.

There are quite a few examples in which it has been reported that community

monitoringhas

improved

the

quality

of

public

services.

This

is

based

on

the

argument

ofcogovernancethatcivilsocietyparticipationandstrengtheningthestateapparatus

arenotmutuallyexclusiveorcontradictory.

Community monitoring has also been found to be useful in monitoring the quality of

schooling (Prew & Quaigrain, 2010). Prew and Quaigrain (2010) highlight community

monitoring in a case study of school performance data driving school and education

district office accountability. The case shows that the generation of school level data

that can inform planning enables schools to monitor their performance in promoting

access for children to school. Another example is Bangladesh, where Transparency

International Bangladesh has set up CCCs (committees of concerned citizens) who

monitoreducation

and

health

services

in

specific

geographic

clusters.

This

case

has

been

found to have an impact on service delivery. Duflo et al (2008) found that teacher

attendance rates in India improved with improved incentives for teachers and strong

accountabilitymechanisms.Schoolsweregivencamerastophotographteachersatthe

beginning and end of each day. Teachers were given financial incentives that were

linkedtoattendancerates.Thestudyconcludesthataccountabilitymechanismsalone

maynotbesufficienttoleadtoresponsivenessonthepartofproviders.Incentivesand

greatercapacitiesoftenneed toaccompanyaccountability initiatives (Duflo,Hanna,&

Ryan,2008).

Finally, the case of police and school reform in Chicago is another example of

community monitoring and the evidence of impact (Ackerman, 2004). Through theinclusionandparticipationofcivilsociety,thepoliceforceandschools improvedtheir

performance.However,thiswasnotastraightforwardprocessandtheyexaminelevels

ofaccountabilityand lookattherootcausesofwhythe levelsofcitizenparticipation

werelowerthanothercases.


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4.2.4 PublichearingsandsocialauditsSocialauditsareinitiativesinwhichorganizationsauditpublicprogramthroughvarious

mechanismsincluding

public

hearings.

The

case

of

MKSS

in

Rajasthan,

India

and

RKS

or

Action Committee for rationing movement in Mumbai illustrate that when reformist

bureaucratsarefacedwithanactiveproaccountabilitymovement incivilsociety, it is

possibletomakeimportantinroadsintotheareaofsocialauditing.(Ackerman,2004).

Both of these organizations faced accountability problems in service delivery to the

poor. The MKSS was a pioneer in holding public officials accountable for local level

implementation of programs through the use of public hearings. These hearings are

basedoncollectinginformationaboutthebudgetandexpenditures,andverifyingthese

inapublicgatheringwithalltherelevantstakeholderspresent (Joshi,2010). There is

strong evidence of impact on public services in these casesmainly revealing

discrepancies between official accounts and reality of practice. These initiatives

empowered

people

to

demand

accountability

and

claim

rights.

The

evidence

is

more

mixed,however,ontheimpactsonqualityofserviceitself.

4.2.5 PublicExpenditureMonitoringPublic expenditure monitoring activities have a variety of forms and methodologies.

AmongthemCarlitz (2010)notesthatthemostprominentexample isthesocialaudit

scheme developed by the Indian social movement Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan

(MKSS)foundedin1990inRajasthan,India'slargeststate.MKSSoriginallycampaigned

forthepaymentoftheminimumwageinpublicworkandlaterexpandeditsmissionto

'Right to Information' campaign. After successful this campaign, theMKSS launched a

participatory

process

for

monitoring

government

programs

in

their

communities

by

adoptingsocialaudit,publichearingsandexpendituremonitoring.(Seethewebsiteof

MKSSformoreinformationontheinitiative:http://www.mkssindia.org)

Thereareothersuccessfulcases inPhilippinesandMalawi.TheConcernedCitizensof

Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) in the Philippines aims to increase community

participation in the monitoring of development programs and triggers an official

government audit and expenditure monitoring. (See the website of CCAGG for more

information: http://www.ccagg.com) InMalawi,anassociationofover60civilsociety

groups,theCivilSocietyCoalition forQualityBasicEducation(CSCQBE)hasmonitored

itsprogresstowardsachievingtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs)ineducation

sectionin

particular.

CSCQBE

has

conducted

public

expenditure

tracking

survey

(PETS)

every threeyearssince2002andraisedpublicawarenessaroundreducingcorruption

and better monitored budget. (See the website of CSCQBE for more information:

http://www.cscqbe.org)

More importantly, PETS is the best known methodology developed in Uganda in the

1996when'aidleakages'atlocalschoolsprevailed.TheUgandaPETSisoneofthemost

frequentlymentionedsuccessfulcasesofanticorruptionindevelopingcountry(Sundet,

2008).ThestrengthofthePETS is itssimplemethodologyandquantitativeanalysis. It


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has inspireda largenumberofsimilar initiatives inothercountries includingTanzania

where PETS was conducted for tracking nonwage recurrent expenditure, known as

OtherCharges(OC),intheeducationandhealthsectorin1999.

4.3 Publicparticipationinbudget4.3.1 ParticipatorybudgetingAlthough more and more governments are making budgets transparent, there is a

growing acknowledgement of the necessities of public engagement in budgeting.

Budget transparency and accountability strategies include the now wellknown

participatory budget approach (PB), as well as gender budgeting, public expenditure

monitoring,participatoryauditing,theuseoftheOpenBudget Index,andotherforms

of budget advocacy (McGee & Gaventa, 2010). Among them, we will examine

participatorybudgeting

and

gender

budgeting.

With

each

initiative,

we

will

look

at

the

definition,itsimpactandfactorsofsuccessandlimitations.

Inthelasttwodecades,ithasbeenagrowingbeliefthatbroaderparticipationinbudget

setting is essential for effective, democratic and relevant local governance.

Governments started to support information sharing between citizens and local

governments. This helped strengthen the ties between communities that have an

interest in discussing local budgets, authorities and statutory agencies such as the

healthservicesandpolice.

Ackerman defines participatory budgeting as determining budget allocations as

efficiently

and

transparently

as

possible

by

ensuring

that

budget

decisions

reflect

consensusdeterminedprioritiesandremoving informationbarriersbetweenstateand

society(J.M.Ackerman,2005).PublicAffairsFoundationdefinesPBmorebroadlyasa

mechanism or process whereby citizens participate directly in the different phases of

budgetformulation,decisionmaking,andmonitoringofbudgetexecution.Participatory

budgetingcanbeinstrumentalinincreasingthetransparencyofpublicexpenditureand

in improving budget targeting (Sirker and Cosi, 2007). Participatory budgeting is

different from a regular budget planning process in that it establishes a reciprocal

process inwhichthediverseactorsgivefeedbacktodirectly impactpolicychangeand

distribution of public resources. It is beyondasimple consultation of fiscal policies or

lobbying, but a direct participation in a decision making process in democratic way.

More importantly participatory budgeting is noteworthy because it addresses two

distinctbut interconnectedneeds: firstly, improvingstateperformanceandsecondly,

enhancingthequalityofdemocracy(Shah,2007).

Participatorybudgetingbeganin1989inthemunicipalityofPortoAlegre,thecapitalof

Brazilssouthernmoststate,RioGrandedoSul.TheUnionofResidentsAssociationsof

PortoAlegre(UAMPA)firstadvocatedthe introductionofastatesocietycollaboration

mechanisminthecityin1986.ItbegantobeadoptedinothercitiesundertheWorkers

Party in the early 1990s. Local governments throughout Latin America began using


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participatory budgeting shortly thereafter, especially after 1996, when the United

Nations Habitat II Conference in Istanbul recognized Porto Alegres participatory

budgetingasoneof42bestpracticesinurbangovernance(Shah,2007).

PortoAlegresparticipatorybudgetingincidentbecameanexemplarycase.Since1989,

thePortoAlegrecitygovernmenthasheldthepeopleaccountableforover10%of its

annualbudget,andhadnormalcitizensparticipateintheintensenegotiationprocessof

settingpriorities forgovernment investment in infrastructureandbasicsocialservices

(Ackerman, 2004). The significance of this event is that it was an arrangement where

normalcitizenswereinvitedtobeapartofthegovernmentbeyondacoproduction,

whilemaintainingahealthybalancebetweendecentralizationandsupervision.

Dependingonhowstrictlyonedefinesit,PBhasexpandedfromabout12citiesmostly

in Brazil to between 250 and 2,500 locales in Latin America alone (Goldfrank, 2006).

While

Latin

America

has

the

most

extensive

usage

and

rapid

development

of

participatory budgeting, there are several meaningful case studies in Asia, Africa,

EasternEuropeandalsoWesternEuropeincludingEnglandandGermany(Shah,2007).

Broadly speaking the impacts of Participatory Budgeting on transparency and

accountabilityare:

1. enhancedparticipatorydemocracy2. improved quality as well as the quantity of budget information to citizens by

making them more accessible and developing citizens capacity to analyze and

influencegovernment

budgets,

3. reduced possibilities for corruptive behavior and political use of governmentbudgetthroughprovidingalternativechannelsforcivilsociety

4. betterdecisionstailoredtocitizensneed5. increasedbudgetandadministrativetransparency6. enhancedthecitizenstrustingovernmentsactivity

Althoughparticipatorybudgetingbecameawidereaching,globalphenomenonwithits

potentialbenefits

(Sirker

and

Cosi,

2007),

there

are

still

major

constraints

and

concerns

relatedtotheuseofparticipatorybudgeting.Carlitz(2010)citesanumberofpotential

limitations:1)riskofcooptation(Abers,2000)and2)distortionofpublicopiniondueto

misrepresentationofsocietybecausecivilsocietyorganizations(CSO)engagedinPBare

notalwaysrepresentativeofsocietyatlarge(Heimans,2002).Furthermore,thereexist

institutional barriers such as discretionary provisions of PB adoption and

implementationand lackoftimeasamoretimeconsuming bottomupparticipatory

model.


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Carlitz(2010)pointsoutpreconditionsinasuccessofPBinitiatives:1)politicalwill(i.e.

supportivelocalofficials),2)socialcapital,3)bureaucraticcompetence,4)smallsize,5)

sufficient resource, 6) legal foundation and 7) political decentralization. Furthermore

the accordance between the supply and demand side for accountability is a crucialfactorforsuccessofPB.

Beyond transparency and accountability initiatives and participatory budgeting, there

has been substantial growth in monitoring public expenditure by citizens for the

purposeofpromotingequityinmanaginggovernmentsbudget.

4.3.2 GenderBudgetingActual budgeting is the consequence of political negotiations on how government's

budgets are allocated and spent. Therefore the budget corresponds to the map of

power

in

society

and

reflects

gender

relations

as

well

as

power

relations

betweenwomenandmen.Inthissense,governmentshavebeenadoptingapproachesforpublic

expenditureinmoregenderequitableways.

The Public Affairs Foundation defines participatory gender budgeting as the use of

gender analysis to evaluate the impact of budgets on females and males to assess

whetherbudgetsrespondtotheneedsofbothwomenandmenadequately(Sirkerand

Cosi, 2007). Similarly, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of

Women uses a term Genderresponsive budgeting (GRB) as a government planning,

programming and budgeting that contributes to the advancement of gender equality

and the fulfillment of women's rights (http://www.genderbudgets.org). In theory,

genderresponsive

budgeting

can

have

aconsiderable

impact

on

developing

countries

withalargegendergap,particularlyinparticipatorybudgeting.However,thesuccessof

genderbudgetingisasyetunderresearched.

Theneedofinformationandcommunicationtechnology(ICT)inparticipatorybudgeting

is increasing. While traditional participatory budgeting such as Porto Alegres doesnt

necessarilyutilizetheadvantageof ICT, it isclearthat ICTsprovideanopportunity for

citizengovernment connection and government transparency. ICT, in particular the

internet,canbedemocratictoolwitheaseofaccess,greatdatacapacityandtwosided

interactionandrevolutionizestheaccessibilityandtransparencyofinformation.Wewill

lookindetailabouthowICTcontributetobetteraccountabilityandtransparencyinthe

technologies

for

transparency

section

with

a

case

study

of

the

dBrain,

digital

budgetingandaccountingsysteminKorea.


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4.4 DialogueandactivismArguably, the element of engagement in transparency and accountability that proves

mostchallenging

to

bring

to

fruition

without

ICTs

is

dialogue

and

activism.

There

are

of

course innumerable cases of NGOs and other civil society organisations which

spearheadcitizenactivismwithregardtogovernmenttransparencyandaccountability.

For example, in Peru, "roundtables for attacking poverty" were established bringing

togethergovernmentofficialsandcivilsocietyrepresentativesin2001,whereconcerns

could be raised (J. M. Ackerman, 2005). In Indonesia, Ackerman (2005) reports of a

Justice for the Poor initiative, which works on strengthening transparency in several

legalareas(e.g.nonstatevillage leveldisputeresolution).However,thesemechanisms

requireanumberofpreconditions: lawstoprotectthosewhocomplain,astrongand

independent media willing to take up causes, a vociferous civil society caucus,

championingindividuals,andagovernmentwhichiswillingtorespondtocomplaints.

Currently,there isastrongmovement in Indiatopassstrongeranticorruption laws.A

billtoformanindependentanticorruptionLokpal(ombudsman)hasbeenpresentedto

Parliament several times since 1968, but has always been rejected. The NGO India

againstCorruptionhasbeencampaigningforrevisedlaws,amovementwhichcametoa

headinApril2011,whenaprominent74yearoldsocialactivist,AnnaHazarewenton

hungerstrike,followedbyhundredsofpeopleacrossIndia,untilthegovernmentagreed

(fourdaysafter the fastbegan) to formacommittee topass stronger laws. Although

suchalawwasdra

technologies for transparency and accountability: implications for ict policy and recommendations

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