the collapse of the german wehrmacht

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G 2 suut TARY OF ENEIJY ACTIVITY ON

xx CORPS FRONT

8 FEBRUARY 6 HAY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS,

Part . J The. Saar P a l ~ ~ i n a t e Triangle:. Penetrati9 t of the WostvvaU to\

the Rhine.

A. F o r c e ~ Opposing XXI Corps, 28 February ~ 9 ~B. Defense of the S a a r ~ a n d c. C 9 1 ~ a p s e in th Saarland.

Paj;*t II . The,;:9oi1apse t the Yfehrrnacht

Crossing the Rhino"

1\. "Dis-order of Battle

• j ~ : ; ~ . :

C. ,Strons f,Qints and S t ~ o r i . g IJen

1,1 .

.D R e ; ~ e r ~ r. i H e N a ~ o n a l Redoubt

F. ~ ~ ~ o w n of Nationai IvIorale'

~ t ~ r . b l \ l : s ~ ~ \



Introduction: The Wes-tem Front, February 1945

The war seemed to have come to a standst i l l af ter Field Marshall von RUl1d,stedt,! s abortive Ardennes offensive in December 1944. ' But 'military observers

knew that this desperate offensive effort was the l as t gasp of a once-povvcrfulV!ehrmacht. They Il1ight even find an analogy in the 1918 offerlSi ve of the Gerll1aU

J ~ , n w , a gamble designed to upset the Allied timetable and a v e r ~ the end, of, theT f ~ . i!{hen such a gamble fails;) the 1"85ult i s inevitable: . Both the German EU1d

A ~ - i e d BighCommands Imew t 0 Only those Nazis who s t i l l had a blind implicitfa i th inDer Fuehrer beleived that he Blight produce some s e c r ~ t T r e ~ p o n to avoidcollapse.

In the East the Russians had begun their long-heralded vrinter o f f e n s i v ~ and 'Vrere roll ing we s tward in e ale ulated dri:ve s <) The pres sure was sueh' that Hi t -

Iar had been forced to send tho SiJ;:th SS Panzer Army, vv-hich Tras ' s t i l l trying torecuperate from the Eifel Q i S a s t o T ~ acr-oss G e r m a n y i n t o H u n g a ~ r Thore t again

,attempted to delay the inevitable by lTI.ounting a coul1teroffensivenear Budapest.

This effort toovras doomed to f a i . l u r G l The Nazis hadnei thor the men nor themateriel to stop the Russian at tack. . \

On the Western Front thcrclo.: t ivo quiot during la te January and early February 1945 must have been distur'1J:Lng to the German High Command. They undoubtodlyknevr that while the Arden...1J.cs break-through had : r ~ q u i r e d a shi f t of Allied

forces t had not/upset the well",.dosignodplans for e,ffcnsivo 'action 'andthats be

, hind the qceries mill;i.Qns of mon wore preparing the dEath blow. Meanwhile on afrortt\ hundreds of· ~ ~ ~ \ 3 long that strotched from Hollaild to the upper roachesof tho Rhine, p r e \ ~ m ; p . a r y Allied forays were tes t ing the Gcrm8X1 lmos , jabbingand thrust ing likc,:a 'profossionalboxcr seeking his opponentls vvoaknosscs.

Eighty German. divisions, somo of'thom batterod and vrorn, 1iiTOre thus being

kept off-balance as the' stage VV tlS se t . n the North, Army Group uRn, vrith i t s

~ ~ o n t y f i f t h r ~ and Firs t Parachute Arnw, faced thcAl l icd 21st Arnw Group.the center , Arrrr:l Group HEu, composoc1 o Fifteenth Army and Fif th Panzer Army,.

was confronted. by tho American 12th 1 a l ~ W Groupo. .And in, tho South, four nor:Ul1alGorr:k'U1 Armies - Sli3venth,First, Ninoteen-th, and Tvrenty-fourth under iu my GroupfIGn, 'Vrere opposing 6th Arrrrj Group, On1-! the Seventh and Firs t German Arnrioswero 1YOrthy of tho name, for the Ninoteonth had l o s t most of its, 'combat cifGe ...

t ivos in the Colmar debaclo end was being forced· to send i t s rel1mailts to theNorth to hqlp ,meet the ever-increasing pressure. , The TT16nty-fourth A r n r ~ r wasa never real izod force vvrittOl1 up on paper and broadcast to confuse tho Allies.It -rras an almo$t cl1ildish'offort , for oven had such an army eJCis tedi t could

not have hal ted the Allied attack onco s tar ted• .During February this attack began - f i r s t in the cento!' vJherc 12th- Arrrry

Group s tar ted the push to the Rhine. Tho end-of the month found the offensive,vuth noreand more units involvQd, m.otlnting to a crescundovrith presstlre beingexerted ski l l fu l ly along tho whole front tothG Rhine southeast of Haguonau. <

With no re l ief on the Eastorn Front, whore the Russians continuod thoir tr:;i.pharm:lorbloW's in mili tary cadonce, tho YJehrmacht could do nothing but defund. Hoarsoly

tho Fuohror called upon his pooplo to protoct tho Fatherland" but his was a ,voice in th8vdldomo.ss. He had alroad;)r los t tho war even though he might stUb-

bornly rofuse to' recognize the fac t . Tho empiro he had envisioned was val1.ishingl iko a dissolving dream. .

Part • . 'The Saar-Palatinate Triangle:Penetration of tho Wostwall to the Rhino

A. Forces Opposing XXI Corps, 28 F o b r u ~ r y 1945

On 28 February 1945 XXI Corps took over i t s original sector in the centralportion of the Saar-Palatinate Trianglediredtly opposito tho most i l ~ o r t a n t 'cityof the Saar Basin, Saarbru6Qkon. This te r r i tory , especial ly ir.lportant to theNazis because of the ,loss of Silosia in the East and tho threat -to the RuhrValley in tho West, had been bi t tor ly defended 'during the carly Tdntor. Bohind

S01:10 of tho strongest fort i f ica t ions of the Siegfried Line , German forces hadrosisted a l l j;.llied probings

Now, hovlOvor, their position was baing mado untenable by tho rush of othor

l..lliod. i ~ r t 1 i o s

to theRhino ..

· North of tho} ~ s e l l o

River, vfhichropresontodtho

northern boundary of the Triangle . . , : · , ~ ~ : ~ ~ , ~ n e r i c a n Third Army. There was noSioGfried Line there to aSsist in thodofcnse. St i l l , froTJ. Adolf Hitler , camethe order that the Saar Basin should be hold to tho las t man. Llilitaryc01:ull<9ndors gave l ip sorvice to the c O l l 1 m ~ d , t r ~ 1 1 ~ l U : t ted t ~ 1 ~ order to 1 0 n r : , ~ e \ r ~ ~ l o n s -

. . U ~ i t



..

mld put precious gasoline in their personal vehicles as a precautionary Doasurc.

'rhe bost defense of Saarbrucken lay south of the ci ty , whore a ridge COD

manded the approaches to i t . lllong this l ine , . on the south sidG of the Saar

River". the Germans hadconstructod an extonsion of thoi rS iogf r ied Line for t i -

fic.ations. I t was this, l ine which tho GOl mans thought had to be ponotrated by

~ ; : X I Corps to roach Saarbrucken i t se l f

Opposite the Corps onerny forces wore. ostimatodto havoa total combat s t r -Qngth of 10,800 mon at tr.d.s time., i.bout half· of those wore accounted for b-y

tJ':tr:oo infantry divisions, while the rouaindor belonged to numorous fortress batta l ions, Volkssturm li..'1irts, and rniscollcU1oous :Sat t lu Group:;; (, . Such a grouping,

whilo t could n v ~ r bot classified as f i rs t rate m ~ i l i t r y personnel, could not be

discolmted completely a,s a defensive forcG bohind such fortif ications?'1'ho three d i v i s ~ _ o n s were 3L 7 Infm1try, 559 Volksgrenadior.; and 19 Infnntr'J.

347 Infantry D i v i s j o n ~ Imovm as tho flHmvk tl Division, was formod in Octobor 1942 ,and.appc<,l.J:>od ill, H()llnnd n early 9 L ~ 3 ~ I t participated in the Battlo of Franco,

but by January 1945 had vrithdraTJll tio the Saarland t had three reginonts and

on 28 February an estimated. combat strength of 1900 mon.19 Infantry Div::'sion was a Du.ch noro rodent formation. I t was formod as

tho IIJuttland Division1 in Dcmnark in tho autumn of 19.44 fron rOl:.mants of severalbattvrcd units. I t vras idont if iodon Sovonth DoS ArrlrJ front in January 1945,

whore i t s o1ononts WGro shuttlodfrom placo to placo in stopgap rolos B v thc 'end of February i t s combat strength was ostimatod at ~ ; L 6 5 cmd included throeinfantry regimonts 0 .

559 VG D i v i ~ o n W8 8 a nevrcomer in the area south of Saarbru.eken. I t had

come from the Bitche ~ e c t o r on 23-24 Februar; m1d represented an increase offorces in the Corps zone 0 The division ,,'fas one of the series of Volksgrenadier

divisions organized during the SUI:ll'I1er 9£1944 I t was f i r s t identified on the

Tvestern Front in Dc'tobor and fi:rst appeared before Seventh U,S. Arr:ry in January1945,·Numerica11y t was .woakest o f t h e ~ thre.e divisions opposing X : ; ~ I Corps.

On 28 FebruC),ryitvfas credited with only 160() combat effeGtives.

Tho . threedivisions were cOl:rponen-l; parts o t First German Arr:ry., Yvhich had'

ull.der l t s controla.:l.l units OppOSii1g Seventh U.S. Army. 19 InfantFy Division, de·p10yodto the southgast of Saarbrucken, was attached to XIII.SS Corps • . 559 VG

Division, holc1ingthe heights south of, the city ,and 347 Jnfantry Division/ .south and'iiiBst of the city on the opposite of the Saar River, vrore controlled by

:r;;c..C:I I Corps.Since the major concern .of tho Gerna.iJ. Conmand on XII Corps front was

dofol1seof Saarbrucken, greatest em.phasis was placed on tho disposition of ' for..cos. on the b r i d g e h e d ~ c r o s s the Saar River direct1ysouth of the ci ty . '1'0 the

south"ivost of Saar9ruck(m control of/the opposite bankaf tho .River 'was consideredof loss importance because of the ll8,turo of the terrain and the Siegfried Line

defonses between the city a11.dt,he River. Directly to the south of theci tYJhoyrevor _ , i twas of. c r i tic<ll inportMce that the. s outhorn shore of the River be

con-broIled. Here the banks of the River are high and the fOToos dominating' thOI:1dor.ti.nated Saarbrucken . .

How sensit ive the enemy was a t this pointbecamo clear during the attack rJade

by 70 and 63 U.s. Infantry Divisions south of.Forbach and StiriligWendol during

tho las t VtTeek of February 559 VG Division was iinJ'1odiatoly brought .J.nto tho areatel .reinf Ol?ce 347 Infantry·. Division,. \'rhich .had prE;v:i,ously controlled. tho ent iresectior •. In addition, eloments· of 3L f7 rnfgntryDivision, i ts .elf , unt i l then dispo'Scto the northwostof Forbach, 'were brought into the/vic ini ty of that tovm. FurthcJ

morc a battalion from 719 Infantry Division,whichVlas -holding a sector oppositeXX U.S.' Corps on our 18ft fla.'1k, Tras transferred into the area • . 67. Reconnaissanc(

Battalion of 2. Mountain Division .suddqnly appeared on ' the height.s south of Saarbrucken, where i t remained for some tiL10 before joining the res t of i t s divisionwhich had been sent t o stem the breakthrough made by XX U.S. Corpsin theear1y

days 'of .lIarch into tho area between the Saar and Mosolle Rivers. .The only armor in XXI Corps sector a t this t imebelcmgedto 0110 company of

17 S8 Assault Gun Batta,1i6n of 11. SS'Panzer Grenadier Division,v,hichTias doploye(ap'a.inst X V U.S. Corps on our r ight f lank. Later another company of th is battal imw ~ s identified nOJ:lth of tho Saar Rivqr in\support o f l l Infantry Division.



B Dofense of the Saarland

During tho f i r s t two weeks in ,IvIarch constant attl0cks mado by ,ZXI C 1 ; ~ 9 s troOpEserved to anchor three onol:JY dirisional, formations fn tho relat ively 118,rrOVT a a r ~bruckon sector , theroby proventing tho release of any ono' of thO ':l t : . roinforco,units opposing the major friendly, offort which 'was 'being r1adb b:>t Third U j S ~ A r l T f on our 10f t flank. This effor t consistod in forcing tho on01:1'1 back across the,Mosolle Ri VOl" and was clim8.Xcdby Third Armyt s thrust ' to tho Rhino i tSGlf at$dblonz. In spit e o f the shattering blovr8'which So'Vonth Gornlal1 Ar1W was rocoiving a t tho hai1ds o f Thj_rdArny-· blovfswhichult inatuly rodlicodtho Sovol'lth GorbanAruyt s combat offectp..vonoss by f i f ty porcont enemy,forces in tho Saarbruckon

aroa wore. noVur calloclupon to pt'ovido ro l iof tl . TpJ.s . i s .a l l tho 1:10rO surprising \bocause of tho heavily for t i f ied fixod dofenses ,of,theSiogf:riod Lino in the, Saar':'bruckon aroa and bocausoof /tho fact that t ho ros t of the Firs t Gorman Arqy duringtho month of Fobruar'".{ had s'ufforod a not loss of soven divisions; in Qrdor tostrongthen othor D}oro sovorely tbl catcnod SGC tors I As .vro havo soon, hoviOvor, tho

Saarbruckon aroa., instoad of giving up troops, was actually roinforcod during

that poriod.' .

As a rosul t of our aggressivo tac t ics , ,units facing XXI CorpsdtJ.i':tngtho f i r s

half of March suffor,o'<:l substantial lossoso RoplacoLlonts 'novertholess "fOro s t i l l

t o r ~ h c o r r d . n g 9 - n d u r J c r i c a l l ~ at leas t ~ o L l b a t s t : o n g t h maintainod. Tho qualityof °uhaso replacemonts, on tho othor h0l1d, docl?--nod ra,pJ.dly. C o n v ~ l o s c o n t s and .stragglers accounted for man;r' of thoLl'" w h i ~ o others cane fror.l. dissolved Gorl:1ql1.

Air Forco, :Nava.;i, and. Marino units.; St i l l anothQr source, of replacorJonts wasnoninfantrypersonn¢.l drawn fr01:1 Imgine:or, Ar't i l lory' ,and sorvico forlilatiol1s.

Roq.uction of support, and servico porsonnclwas, in i t sQlf .a s t ra in on operatingofficiency, lvhilo 1aole of i n f a n t ~ ~ training .Bl1d ,.poor morale' 8.aong tho repilacononte

inov.ttablyroducodth,e effoctivehoss of f ront l inouni ts .

Froq)lcnt, attot1p:ts woro ,rmdo to, avoid the conta,minaotingoffocts' of placing' ...this lower-grade porsopD.ol, alongsido regular Infantry troops b;r C 0 1 J 1 : r i . t t ~ p ; g then 'as separato alarm companies o Bv.t·ovGntual;J..y those 'unit s Viera dostroyea. and the i r

.re1:mru.1ts 'Vvcroabsorbud by noarby rogu1ar f ornations 0

During this period tho t1uch-vauri-cod Volkssturn Jado i s f i r s t appoarance inour zoneo , ThoyvfGrO employod in a varioty of way? ., Originally 'intondod sololyfor thy 'd:ofonse of t.heir homo towns, t vvas not surpris ing to find then DDl111ing

. f ixod fort i f ica t ions around S a a r b r u c k o n ~ During tho i n i t i a l onslaughts against· ~ h o F ~ ~ h o r ~ 2 J 1 d . t ,hOv\f0VOr, i t looked asd.f . thoir olilploynont was -Go .be, fa r norc ,oxtc;n,siva, and early indications pointed t'rO t he i r booo::1ing par t of' ,tho roplacoElont ,systOL1l' In ordor to cOJl1ponsate in pnrt for ' tho sovero draIn upon sorvico personna

which front l inodonands woro :nald.ng, Volksstu;fn yvorodraftod into roar' echelonT T o r k ~

In addition, Volkssturmunits Tiore found in tho f.ront linGS ther.1S01voscmdthoro Y v o ~ e somo cases llV"hero Volkssturn rJwt1bers ,yroro actually, inductodi.nto. tIlo WohrElachotvv:i.th l i t t l e regard to p h y s , i ~ a l fi tnoss. How inoffoctive those:broops 'ultimatoly provod 'will appear l a t a r . At th i s point , howcver , t seoned

l J ~ 2 u t J a t loast nUl110rice.llY' thoy night, pIer a s ~ b s t a n t i a l r o l oC. ,Col lapse· in tho Saarland

Anong .therqasons now being o f f o t e d b y ~ h o Gorr.mn High C o r ~ 1 T . u m . d t o o x p l a i n their d o f ; a ~ , H i t l o r t s intorJB,orenco in nattors 'of stratogy loolJ.slargo. His 03;'

dm'.' of no re t r8at froLlth0 Sanrlancl is citod by high ranking ,officers as 0110 oftho c r i t i ca l decisions loading to disaster . ' I t . l:mde 'dofonso of, tho Rhino in

Southern Gornlaqy imposs'iblo ,byprovcn cing an ordorly vdthdravial to tho Rivor.CaUGht in/ tpo Saar Pala t inatu t rap , First . and ,Sevonth German Arr.uos yroro, crushedbcdiTlOOl1· the; elos'ing jayJ'S of Seventh arld Third U(,S e Arrlios. Thus. thoporsol''..l101and cquipnont .W1'd 'rJuch valuablotimowhich night have boonuaodto forti;fy tho

c c ~ s t o r n hanks of the ,Rhino vvoro i r r o v o c a . 1 J ~ y los t ..jUlY, i l lusions ontor:tainod by tho GOl';danHighCOl:wland t r ra ta stand along ,tho

Rhil1o.yvould havo changed .tbD f;inal OU 'GcOi:lO are of .courso ,grol.l.ndloss ' Novertholossi tisUlldol:i.bticdlY truo that tho cOLrplotorollt ,of ' dorr-lan. forces in tho, Saar-Palut.inato r:erianglonado subsequent Rhino c6rssings t h e r e a t i v e l Y 8 a ~ J matter thoy'turnod out to be and; thus hastonod the ul t ioatodocis ion, I t also cxpla. insinlargo'1Jar-ttllo higly ,disorganized state, intO which Gornan Ordor of Ba t t lo iT.11:100.

ia t .o lyfo l l aJ.1d i 'ronwhich t novor rocoverod throughout tho rorJuiningT10qks of

tho canpaign in Southorn G,,;rtlcmy.



Onco Third U S Ar,my hadseizod control, of tho fu l l length of, tho ibsclloRi;"Or to t t s junction Y d t ~ t h o R h ~ l 1 a at Coblonz the fa te , tho. a a r - ~ ~ ~ < 1 t i n a : t o '1'r:l.tl.11glc was soaled. I t c o n c c ~ vablc, .however, that a n ~ l : 1 n c d i a t e wl"chd:r.avv.:l.lacross tho Rhine bySevonth and Firs t Gornan.AI'l'1ieSfJight have sparod thOl.l at,leas t part of the woo whi.ch the ensuing debaclO' brought d01,m .upon thoa, 7ho with.·dra.rro.l, hovrovor, began too l a t a andvrith 'too l i t t l ' e decision.

Tho f i r s t indications of ,-rithdra:rfal occurred onller Corps front on l J and 11 \

'March. This provodtobo a liLlited novonent, however, and involved meroly thoabffi1QOnnent of thebridgohoad across tho Saar River south of Saarbruckon exceptfor the heigl),ts diroctly south of tho city-_.Both 347 and 559 Divisions -oxcoptfor one re e i q ~ n t of thg j ~ i g ~ ~ ; t 1 J l , ~ , ~ f f i M t t ~ ~ * ~ r . , , ~ n to SaarbruckOl

a n ~ ,

\ ' ,' ~ ; ~ ~ i ~ ~ , ~ ~ \ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ : ~ ; ' 9 ~ ~ \ ? ~ ~ ~ i ; 8 ~ ; ~ , ', , butsoPillst9 have 1 D C : G ~ 1 i ~ : t t ¢ 9 P b t q c ',,' , . , ' , r l ny ' , Jiyht),§(1'

l i i : ¥ ; i ~ ; ; ; i f & , ~ l l ) j i i ' a : ~ t l I W i e t s ; ' t & , g i j i ' : B ' ~ l % l % ~ ' ; ' s : ~ t x i ~ i i i ~ ' i i j ~ i S ' ~ ~ ~ i ~ f i . ~ ~ · i £ i i l i ~ l i i j ~ i j , ' t ¥ : ; ; ; ) * ¥ i ; t @ ~ : a : t t e n ~ l P l : f ~ , ; l 1 6 ? : · ·' ~ ~ ' , ' f r t ~ \ : ' 1 ; ~ 1 . . ( ' F ; . : , ~ ' i ' : ' ' ' ' ' ' ' : ~ : ; ~ J i > , : ~ i ~ · , f ; ' - ~ . , i ~ - ' .. \ ~ \ ~ 2 ~ , ' , , ,,- - : ~ : ,_ _ , ' , f -- , • ,,' , ,_' , , , , , . k . 'l.',,' : : . . 1 ~ ; ( I l ; ' ; - , ; , ~ : , , : : . \ t i : f · ~ M r L - ~ ' · ' ; ' : . ' i ' ; ' : 8 ' ~ l . d < ' h , ; r : ~ ' t , ; ; r , , / , ' i "k::y:<r..-:

tdi;ii' thecnt i ro Saar-Palatinate Trianglo into shreds. ' . . . ,

I t was not unti l the night of' IB-19 Uarch that the order' for general with -dt'awal Vias given and by thcx.t t ino tho. gc.i".le wM up. Friendly oxnored c o l U I . J 1 1 ~ 1,"...erpracing through the SaarlWld betYJ8011 Saarbruckcn andthe Rhino so tha t the ci ty,;loaned on the verge of being scizod frOl:l the roar . On XXI Corps front 63 U" S].1fantry Division had crashed t,hrouGh tho Siegfried Linedeferisos, outflankihgSaarbrucken to tho cast , vlhi],e a crossing of tna Saar by 70 U S Infantry Div -

$ion to outflank t on the V't'Cst was L)EIinent. Withdrawal had conotoo la te ffi'ld

thoraco to the Rhinollvas on.Confusion and utter rout onvolopod.th.'8 oncqr forces during the G n ~ u i n g

~ e r i o d . · Tho roads wCrG.jalJned rJith vol1icles bunpor to bunpor pushing i.JastllVa,rd,which provided. a f i e l d day for friendly aircrC1.ft. Quantities of CQUiptlOl1t '1il(Ore

, dQstroycd, and ouch of what was not 1'[<18 dropped along way to fac i l i ta te rotreat .Orzm1izod f o ~ n a t i o h s were. soattercd ~ siJashed crystal i ~ a rvriad of fragnonts.Suall .groups Viere ,told to OOko, the ir "vYay to the Rhine independontly as best thoy

eouId. 1:Iany officers simply abandoned the ir men and scttttlocl for, safety invehicles nearest a t hand. Others , sooingthonselvos cut o f f s u r r ~ n d J r e d t h o i r units in whole. As in the caqO of 719 Infantry Division, entiro dj.,visionnlstaffs -vrere apprehended. 1'1101;'0 '1ivcro no frotJ.t;Linos. Prisoners '(i\TOre frequentlytakOll by our oym .rear area personnel, 'Vv-hiloin-'1;1c.U1y cases onel,W, troops arudous tosurrender vvalked q.ighways in Vein seeking sonconc to, capt,\u'o thorn.

In spito of the tur1J.oil whichchiil.ractorized the rotToat , tho GOl"l:19n ¥igp.Comnalidd:Ld !'-lake an effort to keop tho vtay o:pon for vr.i.thdrawal. In tho f i r s t

placo, certain fortress units vvorQ dosi271atod to coveJI' the retreat of the 1:10+,0

inportant divisional'1;'ornations by f ightingrearguard actions; but nany of tihosoaid not relish ~ I 3 ~ ' a o . i f i c i a l role til-tls il.1.posed on thon andoi'l$her took oft '(;if

. thoiroVffi accord oTsurre;nder<;;d. A r-1orosuccoS$ful attcmptatcovyring was Lmf,le

at tho s01.1thornnost corner of the Saar--ralatinate Trianglen vrhoro our l ines II

joined tho Rhino • Hore , though d o g ~ o d defense of theSiogfrfcd Lino oLlplD.conontstho 10Tior jaw of the trap livaS\. for s o v o : . ~ a l days kept closing. YO"c this f inal ef...fort availed tho onOlJy l i t t l e . I t 1iJ'ClS an elovont,h-hour nanouvor and coul..q.notavert the catastrophic effects of thorout.

About tho tJiddle Of l;YTarch, just bofdrothobroakthrou.gh, tho total c08bat

stronsth of the 28 nOLtinaldivisions ,n1ich c o r - ~ o s o d Firs t and Sovonth Gerrum ArniCilVD:S cstil:J.atod to b0 about 38,000 offocti \fes. During tho reduction of tho Saar ...1?l'l1at;D.lalia Pocket a large proportion of ovorlOO ,000 prisoners takon,rero support '011d servico personnel.. I t i s tl:J.(iJ)refore iT.1.possible to determine J10W' r.lanycol:lba.t

o f i ' o ~ ' G i v o s managed to extr icate tho,]selvcs in order to continuo tho fip.:ht on theoO-starn baaks of the Rhinc • A nunbar of tho o ~ i g i n a 1 2 8 divisiol'iswer.o so conla tely destroyod that thDy nover again appeared as inqependent lli1its. Tho te -

na:\nclor in qost cases got away as staffs only or yd.th a ferr atta.ched troops.Their l ~ t e r appearapce was in no senso as divisional ~ o r l J a t i o n s of tho old sor t .Thuy lil'C:r.O used l':loyly as control agol1cios about which night bo organized a hostof nisc')llanoous units which constituted the confusod ol picture for tho rCElaindor of tho ' w a r ~

AJ; i.\W Q r ~ t ' P G I I was in;,real1ty destroyod b e t i r r e e n ~ t h e · ~ S i o g . i ' : t i ~ d ~ e ·'and theRhino" S v o r , ~ L.roason.nblc Jliah CO;;:::k"U1d -iro:ulo. hav;e ~ q ; f \ l l ? e d t ~ c o ~ t i n U e the

S ' t J ~ n ~ ~ J . o : , But r e a ~ Q r l w.:cs ~ l ) t .4'l.0o:Jl.JP.Ud; Fnna:l;t:fils Yl ,\O knew that-s1.mt'on4ur spel-led their personal ddtm p X ' o s ~ d . 4 ' Q r , t im , ' hopi:ng .perhaps ' t ihata DiraaJ,.-.e r.rl..gh\,

tur.n <;1.side dost,iny.



I

Part I I

THE COLLA.PSE OF THE 1YEHF,MACHT------_ _-'-- - --- --_. ...

A, Crossihg, the Rhine. -e± ',-' _______

-:For reilsons already made evident the Rhine River; a t :l.east,in ,Southern Germany", never proved to be the formidable bar:::'iei.- original ly

e ~ e c t ~ d . A l r e a d y dramatically ~ r ' o ' s s e d at Remagen on 9 March by Firs t

Army, the River was crossed by ThirdArmy a t twb points south ot, Coblenz

between 21 and .25. MarchQ IV Corps troops sJ?earneaded Seventh Army's

crossing on '25.-26 Ma:,ch atWotms ; Yvbile'some resistanceV{&s encountered

in i t ia l ly , the 8stablished/bridgehead soon fanned out to meet ThirdA;rlmY'$,troops ,to the north and t 6 i h c l ~ l d e the ci ty of ,Mannheim to the south.

' . ;rt Yrould he art i f j .c ial , in a ~ u m m a r y of enemy activi t ies duri:ng theremaining weeks of the campaign'in Southeran Germany to t ry to divide thisact ivi ~ y : i n t o chronolo'gical stages., The stages are a.lmost ent i re ly a prop.uctof the fr iendly situa"tiono The enemy s tory :ts one of complete and

u t t e ~ ' c o l l a p ~ e , broken only by .scat tered and poorly coordinated l tttetnp-tst6br ing a l i t t l e or'derinto, the c h a o s ~ , ? f ~ m a l l and . ~ s p a r a t e l ihits whichdiu t te:vedthefront . .The f o ~ l o w i n g s e d t i d n s ~ accordingly, describe sev- .~ r a l phases '?£ehemi .8.ctivity durin'g the- per io-d-not 'nec8$sarily in chron..

ological order ' . , w h i c h wil l i l lus tra te the complete s ~ a t e of deTIforalizli'-bion into which the Wehrmacht had fal len q For considerations o f time and

place. i t . wil l be sufficient 110 recal l tha t the r ~ \ i te .of a d v ~ n c ~ of Corpstroop&during the month of April and u n t i l t h e c e s s a ~ i o n o f h o S ' t i l i t i e s on 6 Ma.y.was as follows: First , from Mannheim east t h r o ~ g h ;the Odenwald

to Wurzburgand,Schweinfurt o.

A swing to the .south was then made whichcarr ied the Corps to'Rothenburg) across the Schwaebisch 'Hi l ls into the

vlide Danube. 'Plain, and f i t ia l ly to the Danube i t s e l f at Dillingen •..... Herethe River was _ i m m e d ~ a t e l Y ' b r i d g e d _ . The f inal advance was southeast intothe Bavarian Alps, ,where the. Austrian border was crossed'by the't ime up-

'eondit ional surrender of'a l l German uni"ts in· the· Southwc9.s offered and

acce.pted.

Bt' Dis Order of Be t t l e

Thedi i s ionasa potent organized force had pract ical ly disappearedfrom the Southern German front by the· time _the Rhine was crossed .... ThiS

fact appears g;r"aphically in an analysis of PWs taken by the Third U.SArmy over a 'period of, time extending from before the penetra-t ionaf the /Westwall to the lastweeks of ' the W9-t • . ,At the beginning of the period thenumber of PWsfromnondivisional forma t i o n s - t h a t i s ,miscellane"ousuni ts

of· a l l sorts - was: almost negligible • At'the end of the period,. however,these mis'cellaneous formations accounted for ninety percent of a l l PWstaken. .

. . . ,The same • situ.ation .,existed. on X X ~ a . t 1 t f a d J a c e n t , Corps . fronts . Unitsbearing, d i v i s i 9 r l a l n l l m b e r s e x ~ s t e d , · . b l . l t i ? m c : > , s t c a s e s t h e y w e r e n ohingbu ta f fs. Insotne instances they managed. t o ~ . e x t e n d the i r con t ro l over

several i n d e p e n d e n t ~ a t t le ··'groups b u t f t e q ~ e n t l y th i s control axis ted

on paper only.,A r e w d i v i s i o n s n c o n t i I l U e ~

.tc.·appear ·with .the numberedl ' e F ; i m e n t w u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t ¢ ~ w : t t h t h e m . BUt these. were h a r d l y ~ o r e thanba:ttle groups. . Theywere,iweak· in numbers . and. in -supportingunits'. P e r ~ s8r,mel consisted of the 'rawest of recruits and equipmentwa$!'Shoddyor

~ 0 n e x i s t e n t 0

The bulk or the front consisted of "a wide "'1rariety of assorted u n i t ~ At times during tltese . f inal weeksitwa.s l1ot· :unusualfor c9 hundred di f

I B Y . ' e J . 1 t u n i ~ n a m e ~ . to,be represented b y · t . h e · p W ~ V ' t a k e r l d u r i n g o n e : d a yon t,neCo:r'ps front l .. ~ h e s e n a m e s indica tedahcs t of. replaqement uni ts , , trainingst;,hools, AA . 1 b ~ i t ; l i o n s , . Landesschuetzen. battalions and· iniscellaneous

g ~ v U p s o f ' = s t r a g g l e ' r ~ , c o n v a l e s c e n t s , r ~ m n a r t t s o f b r o k e n orormations,

lle7{.dral1ieos thrown'together into impromptu bat t legrqups.



Such, So conglomeration of units created sErrteral ser:i.'OD.'3 problem;]

for. those a.ttempting to keep track of e n ~ m y Or9-er of ,'Rattle in theusual manner In the fi:-ostplD.cethe report of a unitnG:nedicJ, not .\

n e c e s s a . r n y m e 9 . n ~ tha t the uni t itself,w.t.ts present" An improvisE;d batt legroup frequently cont3.ined stragglers; c o n v a l e ~ , c e n ~ s - , o r men Dn f \ t c r . l o u g ~ fro.rna nuobet' of other uni ts .. Batt legrot ;ps : w 8 1 ~ e t q r o w n togeth(3rso n ~ : , riedly that, oftenSoldbuchs were "not' ehmJ.geda'Jid'l t w ~ s m o : r e · ,then l ikely .

t h : l ~ the ~ W h a d n o i d 8 8 .. ? f ~ h e n a ~ e ,of h : 1 . ~ l 1 i 1 i t t . m t l . c h l e ~ s o ~ ~ t s , c.:mposi-\tion, and s t r e n g t h ~ .' AgaJ.n . , l . n c o n s ~ 8 T e n c y J.rl c''ll+J-ng· u ~ ~ _ t, b :i. 1.ts. n ~ . m b e r or by the nome of o ~ . ' i ' i o e r w h o c o m . ' ' I ' } 1 ~ l d _ 8 d i.·t, ,or by the name of the

town. in' which it' o:ri.p-jnated often \resuj_ t0d in the . reporting 'of :the singleformation' as ,two 01" ~ o r e diffeJ,"ent uni.ts;.. F :ceq\lE,n-(j changes of.'· COs complicated thfs probie1n:J

,

Another Q-iffir:ulty was encountered in attempting ,to determin,e a chainofcoJ;ntrmnd. on the qor?s ft·on·:-. theh.gsncies which c o n ~ r o l 1 e d thedifferent! units ' and t , h , ( ~ : ; r r e ' . l a i : l o n to 8a'(h' o i A t e r , g , . ' : - . A : c ' t u a } l y . ~ of ,course,

organizatiiolJ was,ve:cy l o o , ~ e and l.J?ec.;:uzn-:il:v'dj.d ·YlO:G-ezJ.st,) U n ~ t s r werecommitted 'and destx-cyed in su.ch hO;Eitethatthe:i.:r' a · G t · ~ G l l : n ~ r t,was nerer

kno,m,by 'themselves, . m u c l ~ , l e . s ~ b r 11S c 1 i \ T h e ~ ' e , o r 6 a n : ' _ ~ [ J ; G i o n d i d , , ~ x i s t i twas in a constant s t a : ~ ~ . of flEX,,' .As enem;y' t e : ' r : L t ( n ~ y was cut and severedby o u r · a r i n o r e d d r J . v e s t h e e r l e m ~ y w a s f o , ~ c ; e d , c O ' n - L i : r E J l l l y t o . change t,he .pa.ttern of his .orgemizhtion,;; ~ ve!ji' l'2.pidi1-)y of. these 'changps'-led toconfusion :tnthee'nemycc);;:u:nands" . F r e l . : : l . ~ e · n t l Y 1 T l o r e tiJ.an oneh,igher echelon

c l ~ d . m e d control over the. S8me f r b n t J . i n 6 0 Y g a n i z E ~ t i o n h a r r - i e c ~ . c o m m a n d e r of one of the lat ter ,happy to find 'his t i o u b : l ~ e s a t an('end in· our P'Wenclo'8uI'e, claittied.,that he had taken orders :Lnmos-cOq,ses coni'l : tctingfromno lass than eight h ~ g h e ~ c o m . 1 1 a n d s i n t h e spade o'f one n i g h t . ~

,.During · the f i r s t two weeks after our 'R:,1ine c r o s s i n g . c o m p l ~ t e . confusionexisted' in ~ n e m t O / B on the Cdrpsfront o After the fa l l . 9:f' W ~ r z b u : r g 4 ' however

Ja semblance of' organizat:i .on·· ·painfully achieved' a n d . · n e v e i ~ stable

began to 'appear\;. . enemy.wa.s provided a short, brea th ingspe l lby ourregrouping and supply rk'oblemsj which temporarily slov-fed our advance 1I 'Theyseizeq upon this ' occasion and attempted ... ,with par t ia l succ.ess .... to esta.blishsE;ctors andclo.rify' the lines. of authorfty in the sorainble"of 'Units toWhich the' Wehrmacnt had beenreduced o

On .the central ~ o r t i o n of our .front, ' ~ s o u t h w e s t of the Main River, thel'te .had appeared .a·collection, of ' bat t le groups { most ofwllich organized

~ n replacement and t r a i n ~ n g units. fr6.p the sUrJ:lounaing. ,region .BY 6 April

,J.t hadbeconleapparent tnroug0- captured documents).mapsJ.and. PWs tatementsthat these'unii:,s, were.? 'at least theoret ica l ly; . u:uder. the controil. ofa. 'Cpl.von Massenhach5 whowas' repiacect by.,a Lt J leol" VOl1 Uobe c: This 0011ec-

tiori'p1.lJ:'ported to ,be, a .division bearing the n'ame o ts co . I t ,had some ar. tillery, suppprt, and what few tanks, and. .assaul t .guns were··en?ountered ono-Lir front, were .under the .:oont1]'ol.of 'this . c p r r n ~ · t 1 . o n ~ Plfrs regularlyins is ted that the l5-6ddbatt le ' groups:qf the !'di-vil3iqnU were organized

on a thr,ee-regiment. basis Q With £?CJ.u,al regul?-rity the i r statements conf l ic ted a ~ t o _ w h i c h bat t le groups were,th(8'control1.ing units; and as to

t h e a t t p . ~ h m e t l t o f t h e o t h e r s / ~ c o n s i s t e n t l ine-up was never ascertained_ whichwas undoubtedly b e c a . u s e n o n e e t i s t ~ d ..

, , \.

{ After the.fa:ll of Wurzburg'the(. :remnantsfrom , this e n c o u n t ~ r ' retrec1-tedi:nto thear8a north or. the MainRiverto$chweinfur t . Acapture,d,--divisional

\combat order o f 6 April revealed tha1;, the staff of 416 InfanttyDivisionhad ~ . s s u m e d contro 1 of . this, .ent i re ,area" Anambitiou,s projec t I 'o r the

defefls8 of the region was. outlined iIi·the order andthe,dif.fer.ent <miscellan80us unitswerefgiven d e f i n i t e . a s s · ~ g r t r n e n t : s I t is doubtful, however,whct.ho:::'thtSi'program·got beyond the p$.per stage. Our drive through the

L area:xnd the. taking o f < S c h w e i n r u r t , ~ c ~ t t ~ r e d the numerous dei'ending lln1tsto thQ' four .winds and s m ~ s h e d .all . ' ... · \ , p r g a n i z i t l g · · ~ . 'ambitiOns' that 416"Infa.n

i try ' 'IJlvision may have hadQ . The defens1eof $qhvr;einfurt i tselfwo.s' :hStndled a Defense Comrnanderand 41qlhfantry'Divisioin does not see·m:to have

. f . x l r ; t i c j ~ p a t e d . , y J ~ t h , a . s h i f t i n g of bQunejtlJ!i,es between XV and 'XXI Gorps the

D ~ 4 v i s i o n passed into the former ' s 'sector. , :mdwas ,last heard.o£feebly a t-tempting to exe,rei,se i t s author,i ty oyer. small g r o u p ~ · adr i f t . in .the Nurnburg

area. ' "Iry. f'"' I; f t ICI t ft . ~ ; .;'.; 1., L.n'IV ...1f·§II:.!J



~ ~ l ~UN C [ASSlfi£ U

..-... The , c ~ u t t e r ·of ullits on 01lrSolltherrl\ f lank was a s g r , e a t , e ~ s .that ,on

yhe centsq.4./9- }d northernpot 't ions' ofthe'Gorps,ZOn8'j . Tho1;'e Y { G r e s a y e r c Q ~ candiqa.tgs" f'o' ' the joti of CQntrolling'agencY,$'buti'bwassOffio"ti}i"t§::bel,(3):'e

t A { 3 s c b ¢ r n e o f , o : r g a n i ~ a t i o n - s u c h as·i't:was': e l I i o r g 8 d o " : ; J ~ l n d Lpr: t l . .

a bat t le g'roup o:f§S":·AApersonr+e+B . ~ p e a r e d o n

theseene;i ccITl1n,snded, LtQolpi.- nage1. F0r' a t ime t e e m e d ~ s tho'u 5h he vrcn:tldplay the : e a ~ i n g

r o l ~ · i I f : . t h e ' t c r ~ e i a ; ' l , . ~ S h o r t l y a f t e r W a r d s "however, he' mo'ved:irito VI, Corpst e r r ~ . t e ' j [ V V : i t h . h i s SS t r o o p s a n d ~ i f t h e r e e v e r had been a,nlp.Xl:.for h i ~ o r g a n I i ~ i 1 g ' t ~ 6 . J s q c ; ~ o r ~ i ~ t £ o 1 1 t l ; r : ' O u g J j o . ' , . . ;

" " The t ask of,controlvvssfinaJ.lydividedpetween two dfvisionalstalfs , ; ,,212 VG DLV took over our, e x ~ r e m e :right flank, While '79 VG' D i v i ~ s ian assumedco1TJ.r land',of the area b-etween.Division;voh obe g,nd 212 VG

Diyj.sion. The battle groups ab'sorbt;cl' t>y212 '\Tn Diyisio lvvqre c d ~ s o l i d ~ t e d into' threenumberedr§3gii:lertts'(J:" Sometime , la, ter the ) n i : s c e · l l ~ n e o u · s gr:ollpstaken<,oyeI; .by?9 VG ] j f v i s i o p , p a : r a d . e d · ~ n e : ( i i T l y : . a c q t l i r e d , r e g : i m ~ p ; t . a l n u m b e r s •.

:'The f r a n t i c ~ e f f o r t s to welda



It vias inl;jvitable t h a t t h ~ , t e r i u o u s · · organization so hasti ly createdby the enemy on our front should crumble before such S'Vveeping a c t . i o n ~ Lines of communication were r ~ 3 1 1 t apart and divisionalformntions e · ~ a . porated. The spotty r e s i s ~ a n c e encountered during the f inal ,period wasmainly of a dela.ying nature in an effort to cover mass retreat . I t wascarried out by i sola ted batt le g r o u p s ~ such as the youthful SS uni ts committed in the vicinity/ of £talon ahd· Ellwangen,which were the homes of

their replacement battalions. Tv\l'O regir.lents of 151 Field Training D:i:visian were also rushed to help stem the ,.onslaught, but ~ Q ' e r e decimated a ~ : most immediately. The great majority of PHs who flocked into our cages

were' stragglers ana. deS0'rters'"'1-rhoknew -ulroacry that the C ' l t t ~ t a . i f . i ' ' ' h a d . ' f ~ l len

To the very end, however, the paper strategy game tlias played by the

G@rman ~ r r : r g f i e b 1 1 1 l ' n , a r t & o A · ' d t ) e t m i t m . ' t ~ ' d : ~ : t ' e ' d i ' t 1'Ia"- - ' O ' t ' I ~ ' ~ ~ ~ a j ' S W ~ ·~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; t ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ . ) proaches to the Alps ' in our. sector .xn thE; ear l ier stages of theSouthem)

Germany Campaign, 17 SS PG Division had been in contact on VI Corps fr9ntLater it had hastened to Nurnberg i n a vain attempt to hold that c i ty

g g a ~ n s t XV Corps. St i l l later i t l ias idontified in ,Third U. SOl Army zorn •But nov-; it was fleeing into the mountainfastness'es of Southern Bavaria

and Austria and attell1pting to ~ r e c t a paper barricade to our penetration

of these regions. ,That the Division was hardly more than a staff wasmade clear by the document,.,. The troops of, the once-crack S8 formation

YJ'ere 'now reduced to the n u c l e i : f o r > t f 1 r ? ~ : b a t t l e gnmups, most of Ylho?epersonnel ccun:e from a collection of. Ail units.· We did contact 17 SSPG

Division at this time ;contac'c VJas with 'fleeing r ~ m n a n t s h01lvever, and

:r'lot with last-ditch defenders:. ' I

Order of ''Battle b f the German Army. on XXI corps. front hAd C O l : 1 P l . e t e ~ 'collapsGd when·theend came,.on,6 l,Iay" ..It should be remembered, howcye,r,that disintegrat ion had overtaken Anny Group HGH with the penetration ,ofthe "t!estvJ'a:l1in H a r c h ~ Withth9 exception of temporarily stubborn ' resistance, in the few strongly defEfnded; tovms, y"hieh' ~ l l b e discussed inthe'following. section, enemy. action' east o,f' the Rhir+e wAs;J..argely, con,tinuation ·of that disastrous "flight t o t h e ~ River. through the Saar :-' pu+atmat 'e . T r i a n g l e ~ > ' . I

d:'. Strong Points a.nd strong HQ:l

During . t h e e ~ r l y part of\ April, Keitel, Hl 1lm1er, and ~ o : r ~ a l 1 1 ' r r ; a ~ e ' ; ; t . _ h e : ' f o : t ~ v n ~ g , , , j 0 d t ~ o b l \ r a d i ¥ I ~ h P , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : t ; } , ~ ~ ~ e , 4 : ~ : ; I ~ , L l ~ G ~ ~ Y y s ~ ~ J a - ..:Com- '.419.nd::' \ ; ~ . "",. ' , ' .

\ k , ~ ' ; ~ j : 0 J 9 . ~ , \ l ~ ~ i ' / ~ b ~ , ; l ~ i J f ~ ~ ~ ~ J l ~ · :11:

;, .. . ' :: -: , - : . ; > : : ~ , : , , J:> ~ : : > t I < ~ ~ : > f : { . 1... , \ - , ~ , ~ . _ : 1 1 , . ~ ~; Cit s.arc is i tuat ed,atimpQJ:'tant t ~ ~ f J f i c , . j u n c t ~ ) n s . : r h e ~ ~ f Q r , e ' i

: , t h ~ y 'l1l\l;st.' e . d ~ , f e ~ d ~ ~ . i ~ n ~ · h Q i d . : ~ ? 1 - t h 6 c U ~ l ~ O S t , ~ ~ ( ) - m a ~ t . ~ : l w P r a t P ~ q 7 ; , ; . :lnises qr threats are"carried,.by:. ~ n t e r m e d ~ a r , J . e q or:,,:r4dJ.ptl"an.snusfl ,"

' : s ~ . o n q · 1 ? y , t p ~ · ~ ~ e T : 1 Y .,':,For ; t h 8 : q x O : G u t ~ o r : , o f ' J t ~ } s ~ , , ? r d y r ~ h t ? ~ B ~ t t , l eCqrnr:1an<ier[3appointed i l l · e ~ e r y ; 'itoy{U .are, : p e r S 0 1 1 1 a , 1 1 K ; \ t l e f 3 p q ~ s + p l ~ l t ; ,

S l , 1 o u ~ d } h e y , d i ~ o J ) e y tJ.1:ts ;f301?-ierl:y;;quty, ]<¥lflc t ~ s l ~ , i 1 h ~ Y - w l ~ ~ , b e ' , F ~ p ' tenced to den.th,.like a ~ L l ; c i ~ 1 1 i a l 1 ' oft ic ials . Y { h o , . t ~ y t o 'pr,evenp the

, B a ~ t ~ ~ ' C 9 m m a ? - d ~ . i : < froLl ( ) i i g ' h i ~ ' duty 'or ' e v ~ n } l ~ I 1 d ~ r h i ¥ l vi!;lile, . i ~ l - , J i f l g h ~ s t a s k $ e ; . . .....'" " , . . . ' ' ." ., '.'

,' . . The ,J\:naYHigh;' ,C onuuand ~ C W J v,p.l:4 decicie v V h a t ' . c i t ; i . ~ s , ma.y .'not .,,,,. '. ., .. .. , , . , ., . . :, ' . , "" , , , .......J .:b,e ,dei:ended.,.. ' .. ,

, \

"r'ovms were 'important to 'the Arr:ry for several r,easons. The foregoing

statement c ~ i e s t h e i r . i l ~ p o r t Q l 1 c e a s ; t r a l f S p Q r l : a t i q n . { 1 U Q 9 ~ \ ' , h q y y r ~ r ~ a+6.9.,:rit,al".as 'centers bf t h e _ ' c o n 1 r a ~ i c a t t : 6 n : ' $ y s t e m : ~ ; Arn1ytelephonE?', allci:t"ele:'"

'> ;' . ' ' , . .•. •.. .. .,. •.. . .'.. . : . . , . . . . , . . . ..... ,. .. , . , ., ". 'I, . g ~ a p n . -traffic flowed .through ].ocal,.:,ci-vi1iwr sw:Litchb9rads • . Acdprqingly"

,yYhen a :to¥Trt: vras$e':i.i,eci b y t i ~ ; : I 1 i l i t a r y - ' ~ Q m t i U n i c a t i q n p , ~ n , t4e,vi,qinit¥,

; : w ~ r , _ e ' 9 0 m B l e t e i y d i s ' , ~ p t e ' 4 ( . · I ~ s ; a l y r ~ y s ~ w i ~ : q t h e ~ r ' b 1 ; ( ) c ~ s : . o f : · l 1 Q l i , ~ . p s ; ~ t'9YTrs

. \ ~ l s 0 proyi:d'3d e x c q l : : I . e . n t . d e ~ , e n R i v e , P Q s i . ~ i Q P s . , ~ , , T 1 l e ~ r v a J . . ~ B · i i t . . t h ~ $ , : r ~ s p e c t · fV{ClS", , ~ c t u p . l l y i n c r e a ~ o d , p y : p u r ) ~ o n , i b i l 1 g r a : L d s ' . \ ' · J : ~ ' : W ~ H P l 1 . r g \ p . l d S q h \ l 1 e t n ~ t u . : r : t , ,;t:s>f e X ~ i : 1 R J @ , ' t l ) ~ great piles of rubble provided' natural obstacles around

Which strong points could.Qy".: ui l t The greater the exist ing damago,' the

, . - l 1 ( ) r ~ , : t ; e ; 1 < i i l V i t l n 4 q . e t e ~ r l i . n e ~ , ,m s and ci t ies defended. .

... S • i:.\.:i;.. . ~ E . ~ O , ·.:1 .

; ] , 'T .±I »iifi.\:'"};,,



, J .. ,

Det'ensepfepar?;tions in rd 'USJi ast f t h e R h i n ~ V l e r e i I 1 . i t i a t a l at least{3.searlYQ:s F e o r u a r ; T ~ . On 23 Febrnarya plan fOl' tJ;i8er0:.;t.i.on ..of o b s ~ a c ~ e s . in the .BadMergerrt;h.eim.sector. ofWehrkre5,s X I ; ~ . I 7 : a s f.'l:'j:;}"sP.eQ.I t :called f O : r t o c h ~ 1 i c ~ reconnaissance .of the whole.' are().. i , r £ . l . ; ~ b : e rre))Era

~ i o n . o f aplamfor theere'ct±on ·of ta1tkob$tacles 'on roadf3t-m(j: s:c' J_o;al:i ty entranc?sand -t'0rthe p l , a c i r i ~ oi'demo1:)Jc,ioi1sat b:ridge§,;ta]"lroad

o v e r p a s s e s ~ darns and sofort11", Go:as1:,ro.ction work vIas , tobedQI\eby·theVolkssturmunder thf,3direction oft:-'ffllned e n g i l ~ E e J : ' s , ~ Some of'this.VforkwasaccoIllPlishedby; the time the AmerioaJis arTived q . Tt wasnBv(3r completed, i l o w e v e r ~ · . In Nurnberg" for examp1e, women Were c a : t l ~ d out at the

. +ast mOnle:t;lt ctoai,d, in the d:L,gging9:f: 'ol1·trenchmeritso

When tht'?,declsionwasrnade to defend a t own ,threatehed by ,us, theD e f e n ~ e Gonnnander -sent his HDefenso staff U, into the surrounci:ingareasto pick up s , t r a g g l e l ~ s a n d o r g f 3 , n i z e tneminfo alarm u n i t ~ Remnants, of'tact ical units retreatiT).g,throughthe. l e ~ 1 . v e r 8 t 3 u p p o s e d t o r e p 6 r t t b · ·theDefense Conunanderartd pa:rticip_3:ce 1.ni:;he defense either as ,inQ.ividualunits or merged with .aJ.arm unHsunder"theI!Defe1n.se S t a f f . l l ± i 1 s o m ~ .

cases, as in N u t n p e l ~ g , a l l mcnbetyreen the, ages of JS and 65 were cf3,1led. into the V o l l < : s ~ t u r m . M e a n s of. trai1s,P0rtatiQnand food supplies f o r t ~ B , B e improvised f ( ( n n . ~ t i o n s were \fJ:'ei:luentl,y confl.scatedf 'rom'thelocalpopula .... '.t ion. . . . . . ,

.

organizationof' the Defense Command i t se l f was at timet? obscure\ ,, ' ,/ : . ' -, ,. ,.

I t appears that the Wehrkre is c0l1ll11and was' supposed tobein<charge.qfsupplies and of defense preparations, while the Corps in. the field took

over when a town came within a battle arfta" comunicatibnswere sapoorhowever that,freque.i:rtly no one knew just whattlie channels· of commandwere.' .Consequently the effectiveness qfmeasurestaken1.lsually dependedupon.theenergy and determination'of t h e D ~ f e n s e C o : m I l l a n d ~ r o n , t h e scene.

-, ':. / J . : ' ;' . -\

, The ArnlYHighpomrrland had optirnist ically: asserted h a ~ i t . a : L o n e would decide w h a t c i t i e ~ would not b\3defended" Yet,:irt turned. outt1¥.tn;tanyotherfactors operating on the' spot had f.argreaterini'J-uencei thant h e d e c i s i o n ~ , o f a ' · + e m o t e H i g h co:m.mando·· ... The .Il'pmber of·.t,];'09Ps a v ~ i l , a b l e ,

. the supply of· gimS .and ammunition" as welt as tthe conditiol1 ofi]ixe,ddefenses, §.llplaY,ed a part 0 Furthermore" ,as -\riC shall .sGein a la ter 'section, an impor;hantfact'orwas ,civilian morale •. In almost every in

, s t a n c e l o c ~ l opinion was. violen;tly opp?sedto defense. , I t thereforet'oolc astrongdf.:;fense· o m m ~ m d e r t o o v . e r : i : i d e t l i i s o p P 9 : ? i t i o r i a n c iactually

carryout a defense p r o g r a m ~ . Thoful: l l ; l toryoftheintcrplayqfforceswithin towns ab.d ' ,citie.sas an AlliE:d attack became inuninentwould beai'q.sc,inating, °118 . T h ~ ' following' brief <s1J1l1!liariesofovents\inseveraltowns ,in XXIi.andXV corps ,sebtors oillY· sugge:s:t what must helVe b8e;r.goinL.'on b e h i n d t h e s c e n e . s ~ ,

. , . ,

In the caSe\ Schweihfurtat least : t . ' o u t D e f e n s e C o ~ a n d e ~ werJ'appointed'in rapid succession;, : In s p i t e o f a . r a t h e r n o n c h a l a n t a t t i t u d ~ the l a s t ,onG, Lt CoLLech, sawthe situation throu.gh and put up a fight . inthef£lce ofyigorou$ 'c ivil ian objections 0 . H e w a ~ f h e l p e d in: overcomil'lg

<the··opposition,.byour . bor.IDingof ~ h w e i n f u r t , 'which ide$troye<i : thecivi l -

ian a r g u i l l ~ n t · that c the 'ci ty would 'be' saved •i f surrendered., .. ,The bombingof ·W1lrzbupg ha,dhad. a. simifar ' ;effect, • a 1 t h o u g h , t h e . · d e s t r J J ; G t i o I ) . I ~ f ' b o t h these toWns played £j:'large part

i n l s w ~ n g i n g ; p . o p u l a t i o n s o f o ~ h e r t o v m _ ~ to; the ideapf quick surrendeToefore theywerepombed. .

. In N u ~ n b ~ r g ' oppbsit).on t o d e ; f k n ~ e o f . theeit,y.cameXlot-:pniy; f r o ~ the,populationthrollgh i t s Burgomeister but "aJ.so from r e p r ~ s e n t a t i v e s

s ~ ,the .AJ:'myi:tselfo Ab?ut10 A p r i l t h e I D e f e ~ s e G ? : m r l a ~ : r ; B ~ i g Ger: ... ' "·,]ff!1eller".a.I1d1:faj Gen v r y ~ s s e n b e r g e r ' . O G o f > W e n . J k r E ? ~ r ; t X I i I ) 1 ; > o ~ h ' . d e c ~ i e d · · ;

t h a : t , ) ~ t d e ; f e n s e · · of Nurnbergwas .. B l 1 s e 1 @ s s a ~ d ; b e : t \ l s e ( ; 1 to 1161dth.ecity .• · :,

Tl c . Party, hoVV;ever,- prOVed '. strongetthan t h e y ~ The,.two-genE;jrals wer.erelieved o f c ( ) l l m l ~ n d a n d Gauleiter:Kar.l "Holz was, appointedDE3fenSeCotl

L1-ander bYI1irmnI.er,; ....He ~ \ a p u t l inabso:1ute controloi ' ' a J . . J . o ; r g ~ i z a t i o n s , . -,ooth eivi+aTldmilitflry, in t h e a i ~ t r i e t •. ,·Deathby •. puoiJ,ichanging'was

· p r o - o 1 . 9 . : t m e ~ ' t 1 ; l e . : p ~ n a ~ t ~J o t even PJ?otestingllgainst , a s well a;srefusalto particiP.,ate' in, t 9 t ~ 1 9 : ~ f e n s e o f t h e c i t y .

, - 9 ~ - - · . ' . , . ~: , U i M C J · ~ : , S M J J J J p · 1

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Bad Mergentheim provides the case of a leader fu l l of big words

and l i t t l e action. The SS Comandor, Lt. Col. Dirnagel, took charge ofthe defenses of this town He boasted that the SS i1fought to the l as t

manu. Tb.ey did - tha t i s , to the l a s t man of the Stomach Battal ion

which Dirnagol put ou:t in front of his s troops 0 The SS, he said) vrouJP

hold the t l l ' [Rn The Colonel must have revised his tacticaJ. plans how

ever for by the time we reached :sad Mergentheim thisLR

had evaporated.From then on the IfLR proved sor;lewhat elusive" for we never encountered

any of Dirnagelfs dauntless SS troops in actual combat o

In Augsburgwe have the case of8.n Army_ cottnander, Brig Gen Fehn,

deternrl.ning to hold the c i ty not only against the advice of Burgomeister,

~ i s h o p and even Gauleitor, but also contrary to his own bet ter judgemert.

For the(defense of the ci ty he had at his disposal only 3 50 men from VJ:-

tous Army units , plus anoque.l nUYllber of Volkssturm. By the time tho

Americans arrived, the VolksstuTIa 'had gone home at the insistence of

thei r wives, while part of the ArJay personnel had vanished. The General'S

CP was inLiediately surrounded and he was t.aken prisoner 0

All in a l l ' the defense of t ~ i ~ T S in XXI Corps area proved of l i t t l e

hindranco-tq our advance in spi te of strenuous effor ts ma de by several

strong-willed individuals p 'one of·tho chief reasons offered by the

enemy for holding towns was to provide time to prepare a defensive l ine

further to the rear" In no case, however, vras such an opportunity ,pro

vided. Disintegration of enemy forces had progressed so rapidly thnt i twould have taken a Stalingrad to permit the time necessary for r e o ~ g n n -ization; 'and enemy troops and equipment had long passed the stage where

a defensive action equal t.o the histor ic Russian undertaking was possible.

Reserves

The problem of reserves must be divided into two warts: Local re-

placements and s t ~ t e g i c reserves or Borces capable of intervention.

The former was of most imn1ediate concern to XXI Corps, although the l a t -

t e r const i tuted -a fac-bor that could never be <;lisregarded even at a time

When Germany was so obviously feel ing Allied pressure on a l l sides.

The primary phenolilenon viewed in our advance was the complete bre'':'.akdown of the YJehrmacht repl3.cement system, with a resultant opportpn

i s t use _of reserve and t ra in ing units in the f ie ld o In foregoing sec-,

t ions i t has been pointed out that the old-time replacement system, inwhich every unit in the f ie ld had a responsible reserve uni t , h ~ d s tag

gered ill1der the impact of Alfied blows west of the Rhine. After the )River was crossed, there washo longer an organized attempt to provide

replacements for specific 'units . l i h r k r ~ s Jande some effor t to func

t ion, but thei r effor ts were frui t less because of the speed of the

vance and the '-disruption 01 . co:rnr:nmications. /Finally, replacement bat-

ta l ion cadres, t-ogether with Yvhatover attached personnel they were sup

posod to be t ra in ing, were called- up as alarm conpanies or were thrusthurriedly in to any larger formution. 'llhey could \0 0 l i t t l e in such a

si tuat ion, arid l i ke a roll ing snowball the disorganization became great

.er and greater •

. Yrith regard to s t rategic reserves military h i s t o r i ~ n s of the_

future wi l l hever agree as to the salient reasons behind Adolf Hitler1,s

deplcu.§illlent of troops. I t was a TIl?-tter of some concern to the Allied

nrl.litary leaders on al l fronts that the Nazis even in the i r dying "hours

appeared to have strength in reserve. liJhy.was no attempt made to bring /down froLl. Norvray more of the 11 Divisions tha t remained there to the

very, end of the war? Ymy was the High COIl1I]and unWilling to shi f t agreater nUl11ber of moD out of the I ta l ian Theatre, constrict ing the l inethe re i f necessary? TIlly wasn 1 t the Balkan' -territory abandoned in the

face of alElost certain eventual defeat so tha:t the 12 divisions t ied

up there . could bo used more effect ively on other fronts.

- 10

S



~ N l S S J f l [ D conceived as an ultimate defensive fortress has not been determined. At,the present time i t seems that the' concept' oxis todonlyin the ninds

.;;tnd on the, plO-ruling table oTa few Nazi high ranking officers, for i tturned out to be neither ' tlNational 'nor a uRedoubtt'I.,

But such thinking is after the fact . The Allios could ll afford

£ounderestirln:t;e t.he'willingnoss of the epemy to f ight . The natilDnal,

will to res i s t may have been cracl::ed anciL rent asunder in the l as t yearof tho war but there was always the possibi l i ty that the hard core of

resis·tance, the Naz:i fanatics, would retreat tio the Alps, there to fightand be exterminated rather than surrendero Such a possibi l i ty could not

be overlooked, despite the ,qvident disintegration of the ':rehrnacht.

Between Lake Constance and Steyr, from the I tal ian border toRosenbeim l io the Bavarian-Austrian··Italian Alps 0 Here was the bir thplace of Naziism" despite the Iact that Bavarians were not' the most en

thusiastic, of Part;} followers <:1 Here was the best defensive land available i f the Allies overran the rest of Gen11anyc Into th is area. i t mightbe possible: to withdraw troops frOLl Italy,,-, - Jugoslavia, Bohemia, and the

rrestern Front. In order t,o accor.lplish th i s , however" a sustained holdingaction was necessary to permit evacuation land regrouping, and this' wouldhave',to be carried' out in the face of constant and paralyzing bombardmentof r.lain t;ransportation and supply arteries by Allied Air Forces 0

Tthat took place was re la t iv01y s i m p l G ~ Approximately l O ~ d i v i s i o n s on the other fronts which might have r e t : r ~ a t e d to the mountains melted

in thefac.e of the Allied attack YThat occurred on XXI Corps front has

been seen. There was no e f f e c t i v e f i g h ~ i n g f o : c ~ 1 e f t in zone of.

advance to seek the natural dcfpnslvo t b r ~ a l n In the mountalns. And Intho Alps the often-reported crack SS nnd mountain divisions' in the vor'arlberg, Itmsbruok,andSalzburg areas .. natural focal points ,for resistance

fai led to:materia1ize as forces capable of determined defense.IEvanthough HiXl1Inler in February was reported to have ordered 100,000 raen to

this area, factors beyond his control prevented the strategic regroup

ing. TJhethor the,reports of troop concentrations wore e x a g ~ r r a t e d . or

whether the men melted away or we:re given discharges is not yet deter"'mined 0 Today we know only that the Campaign of the National Redoubtbecame one of cleaning out a'few pockets and elininatipg roadblock? defended by small aJ; r,lS fi,re

F II ':Bre:akdGwn of National Morale

. Theqisintegration of tha i-Tehrmacht, the inabi l i ty to s e tup aN ~ t i o n a l Redoubt, the lack of 'willingness to fight in the la t te r monthsof the war wore occasioned by a vir tual ly complete breakdown of natiorJ£llmorale 0 Tho dry-rot of cQrru,ption was apparent not only in-the r:ehrmacht but also in the German nation as a Whole' for some months e As the

Allied advance continued, the evidence mounted until the complete rottenness of the structu;r'Q could be seen by a11 0

There were certain specific phases of the breakdown that could

be traced in these nonths. The interrogation of PrIs steadily brought

to l ight manifestations of the'change in at t i tude. I t was s o ~ n bestin the Volkssturm, in the ensuing contest between civilians and military 1 :1en,

andin theul t inmte differences that . developed

bot'hbetween

Army and Nazi elements and between officers arid men. Because thes.'ewere pot-ent factors ' in 'the breakdown of' national mora:Le, leading f in

al ly to military impotency,col1e>ideration shoulC\. bel g'iven them.

In the autumn of 1944 as the trap began to close around the Nazi

empire, Hitler and his men realized that more manpower than could bo de;veloped for Regular Army use had to be prepared for de£ense of the Fa1rer

lando The result was the paper proclamation of a People's Army or Vons

sturm in a decree of the ' J: uehrer on 5 Septenber 1944. All German male s16 to 60 were to be l iable £01 service and organization was to· bo enttrely, in the hands or' the Party under th\3 leadership of H e i n r i ~ h H i m m l ~ r . '

\12

• g LIP



•. The plan was as methodical and complete a.s the German mind could

make i t t seemed l ike aforlilidablc forne -. on paper. But tho Nazishud not reckoned on S01:18 of tJ:-Wactors a t vrork in tho ninds of the i r

people. F,ighting a w i n n i n g i m f t f J ~ ~ seomod a f ine thing to most

Gernans theY'V'iore evon willi.ng to pay the cost in terms of sons., hus

bands, or brothers kiJ_led or maimod" But fighting in ono's own back...

, yard was a different 8'00ry" Tho cost now seomed too great , especial ly

since the a i r was f:i,11ed "VIJ:Lth tho roar of airplanos that made li.fe precarious day and nic;ht" The CO'1i.Gl.on man S00:11S to have read the handwriting on tho 'IVall and thr .S whi.le he :may hO-vo given'li:p service to thela tes t dictum a b o 1 ~ t the ,?Gople 1s ArmY:J many rosolvedto avoid giving uptheir l ivos f o r a los t e c ~ 1 1 s e '

The program was put into effect , but t appears never to havere -

ceived popular support" In part that dependc,d again on the qual i tyof local leadorship and tho degree of f a ~ l a t i c i s r l inculcated since 1933.But i t became increasingly apparent to Allied loaders that tho bulk of

the Volkssturm was ince.pe.1) l oo f fu l f i l l ing \any of the tasks assigned toi t . Even,whore olononts with tho 'Hill to fight wero found by our 1L11its

they had neither the , t raining nor the r.1c:.teriel to ' stop the Allied forces.

This was the case in XXI Corps zone of advance. Before Saarbruecken, Volkssturm elements had appeared;) but a l l in a l l they were a

pret ty sad 1 0 t ~ rThon they wore 10 i t as sacrif'icfual lambs, they demonstrated what they roalTy w e r e ~ bewildered civili.ans confronting_a mochanized aTluyo Few wanted to play 'tho r610 of Dartyr; few dido Those whohad been dri l led each Sunday- morning and had boon given the People'swoapon,the Panzerfaust, quiet ly threw the unfamiliar weapon away) took

off the volkS8turm amband, and as civili<111s waited i?he arf iyal of the,Allied forces;> Evon before the Danube had been reached thore vms no

Dare ta lk of tho People s Armyo 1'ho volkssturm had vanished in to th in

, a i r ~

So closely l inked with the at-tituclo of the Volkssturn M to be

vi r tua l ly indistinguishable wi,1s tho civi l ian dti tude. . There are,however, several pther points that should bo made in this connection,for they alsocon-gributed, to the military defeat of Germany.

Not 0::'11y was the Gorman unwilling to , die as a nenber of the Volkststur::l•. but as the Allied advance continued and he real ized more cJ.oar

ly wh;t wns happening ho als 0 b o c ~ m e interest-od in preserving what he

could of his o w n ~ Survival arrel the desire to save as nany porsQnal pO,s ...:Sessions aspoSJinble bocame the tenets of his creed. He CDmo to want

desperately to seo the Allied war r;;o.chine pass him by" He had seen.9i f ho l ived in a large c i ty with any industr ial significance .. what con

t ro l of the a i r Taoo.nt 0 He had hoecrd as 'livell What happened to those towns

and ci t ies where .the ITehrmacht t r ied to set\ up a defense 0 Ho wantedto avoid such catastrophe in his ownvillage J town, or city:;;. i f i t hadn' t, " 21ready been part ia l ly del:101ished .fron above" I f i t had) ho wasafra id ,of ' fur ther terror:, he waG sick ofporsonal war, of nights inbomb sllelters J of uncertaintY$ of wrecl<:age. '

There are exceptions to a l l generalizations, but on the basis oftho evidence co:':..lected by XXI Corps interrogators t soems safe to saythat tho clvi l ian wil l to res i s t had nlready beon broken in our sector

~ { t o r t h e .Rhine l imB crossed" I t hilS boen shown in an ear l ie r sectionof th is I 'oport , that thoJ;'o were occas::tonal strong points:J such as ,those

at V['JTzl)'urgand Scb:-,'winfurt , but thesewero tho exceptions" I t has boen

sh0w.n t ao that ,tho nel1JS of what h,q.ppened to such strong points sped ahoc:.r.:'" ofthl=, ref,re:'l-::,l:Lko a s ~ T o n g vYir"d" Tho rosult was a stiffeni11g ofci-":11ic;1dote:2D::x.:,,tion not to al::"ow thoi r owh Arny tOY:ltike a stand in

the i r 1m nGigJii..iorhooc'I.Qc ,Soldiers complainodithattho people would give

them no food and no ' sheltor as thoy-soUGht the ever-niovipg l1LR; civi l ians

-13

d



U CIASSI fJ ~ confronted Arny officers with theder.ltmd tha t thoy move) out and on;

women ploaded lIvith Ar11Y l m n t ~ u h quicklyboforo theAllies caught up; some civil ian o f f r ~ i o to telephone the i r

desire to surrender a to\m or sont er;u.ssariQs to capitulate white

:flags were. hung from the City Hall or on tho church ste?ple and each

houso fOlli1d a sheet or towol or napkin to indicate that i t s inhabi

t ants hac;i enouGh.f

Against .such an .:lttitudc the retro,;:-cting l1.rmy could do l i t t l e .

The situationpresontod a conflict , howevor, that was wagcdbit tor lyin soi:J.o placos. Somo. old Arlny officers joined with)I.Tazi elenonts todecry tho botraynL s tern J:1oasu:fos wore somctirJos taktim, as has a l-

ready boon shown Oivilinns· WOre ' shot and ho.nged for their roaclcit-ranee. But the sevority of thesoattompts to snvc the si tuation were

of no avail . Control Dust bo unifornuyeffoctive in putting down rebellion. of this k i n d ~ In Bavaria, Where SOl:le people had nursed agr i ev -

anco against North Germans and Na.ziisla fo r a long th le , neither the

party nor t ~ 1 e s t i l l r e s i s t i n g eleLlenlis of tho Lrmy could control the

ciVilian attitude.. The people in this torrit.ory had onough of war and,discernine: tho new weakness of tho opposition, were often '\lUlling to s'Wso.

', Iithin the Array i t se l f a struggle had boenapparont ever since

tho cracking o the ~ e s t w a l l in the Saar-palatinate Triangle. 11.ctu al ly there were two schisns: one betwoon tho' officers and non and

another between the Army and'8S elements. The f i r s t was characterizedby a persistent devotion of the officers to a losing cause through

habit or duty, which made them ex.'lort theirsor.1otimes-un1 1illing men tof rui t less stands. The r:ien, on the oither hand, the i r sp i r i t s o f t ~ n 'dulled by too much war and by the c.ertainty of eventual defo at , l o s t even

more of their :willingness to serve as they watched many of the i r offioorssave themselves. Tho frontlino ,soldier, l ike tho civi l ian, was willingto take part in a winning bdtt le. But: he knows best of allvvhat i t

means to have no a ir support, insuff ic ient fuel , food, and ammunition

and what i t means to fight a losing batt le , to have no reserves for re l i e f 0 There was no mutiny, no open rebellion in the ranks, but a soldier doesn1t,need to resort to such measures. As tho officers belaborod h i m t ~ fight on, many a private resolved to /get out of the war al ive.I t · often could be done nnd i t was done. Even before the Rh:ine was 'eros

sod, .the Corps record of interrogation :of pris proved that many of tho

prisoners ·were deserters in sp i r i t i f not in name • .

Later; af ter the passage of the Rhine and af ter i t had .becoLleevident that. no sec'rot weapon was forthcomne miraculously to turntho t ide, . the at t i tude of the officor.s swung toward that of the. men.Then larger andlargor numbers of nondons and officors arranged surren

ders or allowed thouselves to fa l l into oneL1Yhands after what amountedto l:1ere token resistance. o The vrill to l ive, to preserve what l i t t l e

thore was lef t f inal ly becane as strOl'lg aJaonl; both officers and soldiersas anong c i v i l i ~ s f All ranks seemed ready to compromise with the in -

evitablo o

r:

' In ardor to ,account for the fact that resistance oontinued for '80

long a time in spite of ' this breakdmvn of Army and civi l ian morale, i t

i s neceasary to turn to the SS for· an explanation The wil l to res is t

burned brightest and longest in the' SS, i f ·only because i t s personnel

had most to l o s e ~ Again and again the explanation waS offered to i n t e ~ roc;atoTs,:: fear of S5 'or. fear 6f indirect Nazi retal ia t ion strengthened

.the d: rrrr:d ng de sire to f ight 0 Naz2isIl had' a powerful, all.·pervasive organizatiQtl, i t s roots went deep intoe-v-oryform of livirig in Germany andi t could s t i l l crack i t s whip> Through habit or foal' there ;was s t i l l aresponse

- 14 -



h e n ~ h e end came, i t i s ironic to note, the SShad not enoughstrength within i t se l f to offer the last-man resistance i t had demanQed from the Army. For the same factors which had been leading to the

disintegration 0'f the Army had also been ope,rating within the SSe New.half-trained recruits had replaceq..1aany of the old stalwarts; the continued/Allied advance was making last-inqJ:l de.fense seem foolhardy to 'these recruits 17 S8 Panzer Grenadier Division, which appeared on XXICorps front at tHe las t TI;loment, turned out to be the same c o n g l o ~ r a t i o n of miscellaneous units that was found in the Regular Arr:ry formations.

The SS, l ike tho Army, broke under continued pressure and meekly submitted to the most-hated of military tonns, unconditional xurrender.

G Conclusion

General Gustav JodI on 7 Uay 1945 signed GertJany's unconditionalsurrender at Rheims, with a characteristic plea to the v i c t o ~ s to be

merciful to th.a vanqilished. Resistance ceased on al l fronts at 0001

hours 9 .May 1945.

But the end had cooe earl ier for XXI Corps. on5 May notif ication was given that an accredited representative would surrender al lof Arny Group uGit, effective 061200 Hay Because of the l a c ~ of com

munications with elements of theA:n:J.y Group, however,slight resistancein some sectors continued unti l news of the surrender could be broad

cast.

The impending collapse had be&n presaged.by events on a l l fronts the surrenq.er; of the Gerpan ArtJies on the I tal ian front; the fa l l ofBerlin, the reported negotiations in the North, the capture.qf' top- .

ranking military men l ike vonRUndstedt,~ h e

continued inexorable advance of Aliiedforces t h e inabil i ty of theeneLlY to spl i t the Alliesin the final I1ooents. All these and nore. were the hands of the "clockmoving toward midnight - t h e hour of the complete collapse of Nazidom,i t s leadets and the i r vainglorious warped hopes for world domnation.

The part that/XXI Corps played can be f i t only in:to this largerpicture. But on i t s front al l the elements COl':lpostng the whole are represented. The dollapse of the W(;3hrnmcht of the whole nation can beseena,s the story.uilfolds on the Corps front • . Not al l the data havebeen collected; .details of the; surrond!;lr have not yet been correlated.Through the ,ninth of Hay more than 200,000 PTs had been taken by the

Corps, most of them in the las t 60'days Of oper.:ltion. High':'rankingmilitary and civi l personalities -von ,Rundstedt,Ho:rthy, w JI:aan, 'Frick,

. e t al . - had paraded through the Corps Cage. 'lJhole German divisionshad evaporated on tb,e Corps front and l i tera l ly hundreds of small unitshad been swallowed up in advance. Hundreds of rules on both sideS ofthe Rhine had been. covered as,.the opposition was overthrown when i t appeared.

Historians will sane d,ay gather al l the sta t i s t ics correlate the

data, bring new evidence to l ight .and perhaps even change the interp r t t i o n ~ Buttoday.the. ol analysts. ca.nsee only those.factSherepresented. On the basis of ' this evidence interpretation has been of

fered. In XXI borps- zone part of aonce tJighty Army succ1lr.1bed,slowly\ "disintegrated, ,andbecanefin[J.l1y a riddled grouping of· heterogeneous

disparate units. This was their end; to surrender abjectly, uncondit ionally. And this the Ger:rL1annation ha.dbrougp.t upon its81.f When onthe second of Septsnber' 1939 i t declared war'on Poland. The end,almostsix years la ter :was not necessarily inevitable, for the ventureperilously close to succeeding. But i t was Dete and right that theGeman Elilitary power should fina.l1y have been ground to bits by those

who. believed that the Nazi way of · l ife was not '£or them.

7 ~ ~ ~ H ~ ~ H P ~ H H f * - ) H } - X ~ t ; { ~ . . H H ~ ~ . P , H H . ~ ~ - 15

the collapse of the german wehrmacht

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