The armies of World War II are studied by military profession-als and amateur militarg history buffs alike. Probably the moststudied army, and the one most cited as a role model for effi-ciency and effectiveness, is the German Wehrmacht. Blitz.krieg, Auftragstaktik and Schwerpunkt are only a few of theconcepts that have been examined and offered as innovationsworth emulating. Was the Wehrmacht really that good?

On the

Wehrmacht MystiqueRoger A. Beaumont

WEHRMACHT

SINCE 1945,except for brief inter-vals in the Korean and Vietnam

Wars, Western Europe has been the mainfocus of US Army doctrine and resources.In view of 40 years of cohabitation, it isnot surprising that German forms andconcepts have grown in their intluence onthe US military system. Thus, the persist-ence of the Wehrrnacht as a model forstudy and doctrinal support is a matterworth examining closely.

The image of German military prowessand unique eficiency, widely accepted inthe United States, is not new. In the late19th century, the Germans entered mar-kets long dominated by other powers, andtheir sales pitch was based on thoseimages. Their victory over France in 1870had widespread effects. A view of Teutonicthoroughness was visible in the Wilhel-mian Empire, under the Weimar Republicin the Nazi era, and in the Wirtschafts-wunder, the economic miracle of recoveryafter World War 11.

Running parallel to it was an image ofGerman ruthlessness. This arose from19th-century master race theories, in theGerman colonies in the early 19th centuryand in the Schrecklichheit (frightfulness)which the Allies’ propaganda mills mademuch of in World War L Nazi propagandabuilt substantially on such images, pro-jecting a facade of industrial and militarypower, efficiency and ruthlessness wellbeyond actual levels of strength. Thisserved to weaken the will of the enemiesof the Third Reich before and duringWorld War II.

From 1945 to 1948, Germany sufferedmajor privation. Fuel, food and amenitieswere scarce but were somewhat moreaccessible to those closely linked with theconquerors. Thus, well before the ColdWar plunged to freezing after the commu-nist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, manybonds between Germans and Western

occupation forces had been forged. We/zr-nzaclst veterans served the Allies as borderguards, technicians, intelligence agents,administrators, professionals and labor-ers. The US Army paid Wehrnsacht ofti-cers to write monographs, as the Air Forcedid later on. The US space program de-veloped around V2 rockets and Germantechnicians gathered by the Army. At thesame time, B. H. Liddell Hart, the Britishmilitary writer, was interviewing Germ’an .

The power of the Wehrmachtmystique is evident in adjectives

used in recent military analyses—for example, the German restruc-turing of defenses after France’s

collapse in 1944 deemed ‘nearmiraculous,’ while a retired US

general viewed Erwin Rommel’sInfanterie Greift An (Infantry

Attacks) as ‘awesome.’

officers in British custody. After 1948,denamtication and the Nuremberg trialswere shelved as West Germany became’the bastion of tbe North Atlantlc Treaty jOrganization (NATO). 3

Many Allied troops came to admire th~Germans as they cleaned up war wreckag~ ~and rebuilt their economy. Bonds offriendship, sRort and amusement allowedGermans to present their views on the warin social settings. Many occupiers, how-ever, did not realize how little supp~rtthere was in West Germany for rearma-ment. In the early 1950s, the Bundeswehr ,grew more slowly than expected—but it ~grew.

Meanwhile, World War 11 was beingrefought in print. Memoirs by Germancommanders such as Heinz Guderian,Erich von Manstein, Hans Speidel and

MILITARY REVIEW ● JUIY 1986 45

Albert Kesselring and works by Westernwriters as well—Liddell Hart, J. F. C.Fuller and Chester Wilmot—criticizedAllied performance. Disclosures of intelli-gence errors before Pearl Harbor, anti-Roosevelt historiography and S. L. A.

The Nazi victories in 1939-.tO,however, proued to be more image

than substance. While the numbersof forces overcome were great; the

vanquished were not effectivelyallied. . . . Neutrality and appease-ment had major political support in

each country on the target list.

Mar-shall’s studies showing weak USinfantry battle participation added to thesense of malaise, as did Inter-Alliedrecriminations and tbe Strategic BombmgSurveys.’

Although significantly distracted InKorea and Vietnam, each time the USArmy returned to its favorite scenar]o—conventional war in Europe. The power ofthe Wehrrnacht mystique is evident ]nadjectives used in recent milltary analy-ses—for example, the German restruc-turing of defenses after France’s co] lapsein 1944 deemed “near miraculous,’” whilea retired US general Jiewed Erwin Rom-mel’s In fanterze Gr’ecft An (InfantryAttacks) as “awesome.’” A Department ofDefense monograph praised German doc-trine while suggesting US doctrine wasInappropriate in NATO defense + In dls-cussmg AirLand Battle doctrine m thespring of 1984, a West Point cadet wrotein Mdttary Review:

To understand the philosophy behindour new doctrine, ufe must search fOr Lts

apparent antecedents. A stud-v of mdztary

hwtory r-weals that the doctrine employed

by the German army from 1917 ;O 1945and its underlying philosophy bears astrong resemblance to what we are tryingto instill 1n ourselves today

We are all famzllar colth the superbrecord of tactzcal and operational successthe Germans enjoyed from the routzng ofthe Italians at Caporetto zn 1917, throughthe spectacular Western Front offensives of1918, to the dazzllng days of the blitzkriegin 193941 ‘

It should also be noted that very fewWest German works criticizing the Ger-man-Nazi mllltary tradition were pub-lished In Great Britain or the UnitedStates. A positive view of German mili-tary models was also presented by SamuelP. Huntington’s The Soldler and the State:The Theory and Polztzcs of Ctclzl-MzlttaryRelattorzs and Edward A. Shlls and MorrisJanowitz’s “Cohesion and Dlslntegrationin the German Wehrmacht in World WarII.’”

Huntington argued that the Germanofficer corps had no pol]tlcal yearningsbefore Adolf Hitler.” Judged by soldierlystandards, “they [German officers] comeoff well,’” and US officers “c%uld do farworse than resurrect the trad]tlon of[Gerhard vonl Scharnhorst and iKarl VOUIClausewitz’” whose views are in opposi-tion to those of some hmtorlans of the Ger-man army. ”

Shils and Janow:tz’s article, based oninterviews of German prisoners of war,has often been Invoked in post-Vietnamcritiques to suggest that small-groupcohesion outweighed Nazi indoctrinationin keeping German troops fighting beyondhope. ” While many senior commandersre~ected Marshall’s claims of poor USinfantry combat performance, it led to a“buddy” system and more crew-servedweapons before the Korean War. After UStroops’ performance in combat and as pris-oners of war became a matter of public

46 July 1986 ● MILITARY REVIEW

“Mirsd Trnfflcon Russian Road” by Hm8el, II) February 1S44(CaplurmiGerm. wdr ml)

debate in the mid-1960s,” a major attemptto establish unit integrity close to percep-tions of superior European models wasmade.

In the wake of Vietnam, a wide-rangingsearch for nostrums” led to the oversim-plification of Shils and Janowitz’s article,leaving its complexities and sophistica-tion far behind. Shils and Janowitz did notdiscount Nazism’s motivational powersince their data were drawn from pris-oners facing defeat. While being seen as aNazi was something to be avoided,” afterthe war, some German officers sawNational Socialist training as a source ofinitiative. ” Cross-links between the mili-tary and Nazism were extensive and, fromlate 1943, the Wehrmacht had Nazi com-missary, the .VSFO (National SocialistLeadership Officers).

After an attempt on Hitler’s life on 20July 1944 failed, Heinrich Himmler,chief of the Gestapo/SS (state secretpolice/elite guard), became commanderof the Ersatz A rmee as the SS screenedof?icers and took over the V2 rocket pro-gram. Army generals, including Karl vonRundstedt and Guderian, sat on honorcourts that punished plotters. ” Germantroops, moreover, fought on after unitcohesion and integrity were lost ideals,and individuals were assigned as fillers toad hoc combat groups.’ The driving forces

of fear of retribution and atrocity anddefense of one’s own homeland obviouslyhad some effect in stiffening resistance,but an effect not easily measured.

Nevertheless, a pristine and profes-sional view of the Wehrmacht mystiquedeveloped, even as links between Germanmihtarism and Nazism remained a matterof concern in the Federal Republic of Ger-many (GE). The GE, as an open society,also faced the special problem of bothcrypto-Nazi para-Nazi movements andWaffen-SS veterans. ” While such ele-ments did not become politically powerfulin the GE, admiration for Nazism did notdie out in Germany” or in the world at’large. N Neofascism has grown on thej~

fringes of European politics, drawing o.working-class racism and the alienation $youth, visible in some forms of “pun@/* ~style, and Na~ symbols have appeared akan index of psychopathology.”

The endurance of the Wehrmacht mys-tique raises several questions: If theywere so good, why did they lose? Were fheodds just too great? If they were so smart,after losing once, why did they try again? <How good were they, relative to an objet- ‘tive scale? The frequent reliance on theWehrrnacht’s performance as a hallmarkof excellence overlooks that, in” manyrespects, Nazi propaganda successfullymasked rickety underpinnings.

MILITARY REVIEW . JUIY 19S6 41

Nor was the Wehrmacht outside orwholly free of links to the Nazi regime. Itwas recruited out of a society that was, inthe six years before the war, heavily per-meated by Nazism. Many went along toget along, but the steady reshaping of Ger-man culture could not be avoided anymore than Soviets could avoid the imprintof Joseph V. Stalin, or the Chinese, MaoTse-tung. That fusion, although resistedby many, was a central fact. Senior ofti-cers, the Reichswehr and elements seek-

The Wehrmacht’s involvementin major campaigns before the attack

on the USSR in June 1941 had beenabout three and one-half weeks in

Poland, about two and one-halfmonths in the spring of 1940 and

six months in the Balkans. Only the1940 campaign in France, the

Netherlands and Belgiumcame close to the scale of

operations in the east.

Ing rearmament helped weaken therepublic in the early 1930s and maneuverHitler into power. Hitler than bent themto his will—against varying degrees ofresistance.

The harshness of the Versadles Treatyhad hardened the hearts of many Ger-mans who sought revenge. The Germanmilitary quickly claimed a “stab in theback’’—the home front had let the armydown by revolting in October 1918 Manynon-German pohticians, historians, jour-nalists and diplomats accepted that view,and the appeasement by Great Brltalnand France in the 1930s and US isolation-ism gave fascist dictators a special advan-tage.

The legends of a stab in the back and an

unfair peace settlement overlooked theharsh peace agreements imposed by theGermans on France in 1871, on Romaniain 1916 and on Bolshevik Russia in 1918.The militarists successfully pushed bur-dens of guilt for a war they started andpromised a victory in up to the final hoursonto German politicians who opposed thewar and policies like unrestricted U-boatwarfare. The Weimar Republic and demo-cratic government were thus flawed fromthe outset, and rearmament was linkedwith national honor in the eyes of manyGermans.

The Nazis were but one of many politi-cal and social subgroups which reveredand used the mihtary traditions and val-ues that ran back to the origins of thePrussian state in the 17th century. Prus-sia, a nation built around an army, grewsteadily and survived many defeats. In1815, after throwing off Napoleon Bona-parte’s occupation, it shared in the victoryat Waterloo.. In 1870, Prussia led in thesmashmg of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte’sSecond Empire as a unified Germanycame under the Prussian royal house ofIIohenzollern. Up to 1914, m&tery of thetechniques of offensive warfare, coupledwith nationalist propaganda and diplo-matic subterfuge, had paid great divi-dends. After 1918, Germany still soughtreward from war and, from 1939 to 1942,It seemed that it might pull it off.

The Nazi victorie; in 1939-40, however,proved to be more image than substance.~~While the numbers of forces ~vercomewere great, the vanquished were not effec-tively allied. Belgium, the Netherlandsand Norway rejected Iiaison with GreatBritain and France—whose own rapportwas less than ideal. Neutrality and

appeasement had maJOr political supportin each country on the target list. GreatBritain, under a “1 O-year rule” on arma-ments from 1920 to 1938, scrambled to

48 July 1986 * MILITARY REVIEW

catch up with German rearmament afterthe humiliation of Munich, In the first twoyears of World War II, most armiesdefeated by the Nazis were second or thu-drate. France’s forces included many first-rate units, but equipment, doctr]ne, orga-nization and morale were unevenlyorchestrated. The British ExpeditionaryForce was small and weak In armor.

Germany’s bhtzkrieg wctories of 1939-41 were close to home. .Most of the victimswere within medium bomber range ofGrossdeutschland, and seven were on itsborders. A main defect in the German mil-itary system was revealed In 1940 whenthe Wehrmacht could not move qumkly toinvade Great Britain after France fell.Weak interservlce cooperation, a lack ofcontingency plans and an air forcedesigned to support the army In a shortwar undercut Operation Sea Lzon. How-ever great its skill in some areas, amphib-ious operations were beyond the Wehr-macht’s reach throughout the war

The Wehrnmcht’s involvement in majorcampaigns before the attack on the USSRin June 1941 had been about three andone-half weeks in Poland, about two and

one-half months in the spring of 194o andsix months m the Balkans. Only the 1940campaign in France, the Netherlands andBelgium came close to the scale of opera.tions In the east Tbe Invasion of theUSSR, moreover, was not designed to bethe great prolonged close-hugging matchof hundreds of divisions that developed.Hitler and many others saw the USSR as ~easy game. The purging of the Red Army’s

upper ranks frOm the mid-l 930s until tbewar’s beginning was followed by Sowetfloundering in the Winter War WIt’h tiny )

Finland. Ultimately, German misesti$4mates and Soviet ploys masked and dls:t ,

torted real !tles. Soviet tank strength w&”underrated, the state of highways wasoverrated, the great Ural industrial coni-plex was a cipher and tbe Soviet capacityto generate reserves was underestimate&

Mllltary professionals or students ofwar can hardly Ignore that titamc strug-gle, but the problem is where to look. USanalysts tend to focus on maneuvers of tbekind they envision in their NATO defenserole, with Ilttle attention paid to propa-ganda and psychological warfare. TheNazis, of course, did not invent propa-

MILITARY REVIEW ● July 1986 49

two-thirds of the way through the war.

\:: J

ganda. But Germany is the land ofJohannes Gutenberg where the poster andleaflet wars of the Reformation and Peas-ant Rebelllon raged, and the Nazis arosein the wake of Allied success in discredit-ing Germany m World War I.

The Nazis’ flair for shaping images car-ried over into the war. In the fall of 1939, aNazi documentary of the blitzkrieg inPoland played m New York to audiencesincluding Allled attaches. Nazi propa-ganda cut several ways, however. Imagesof power and ruthlessness frightened butalso angered, and Hollywood directorFrank Capra later used Axis films to showUS troops what they were fighting. Whileimages of mechanized force led the A.!! iesto see Germany armed for totai war, Ger-man Industry did not go to full war pro-duction untd 1943. Hitler hoped cheapvictories and a high standard of livingwould keep the public from turningagainst the regime a la 1918. Whether fullmobilization earlier in the war wouldhave gained victory or generated majorresistance to Hitler cannot be determined.In any case, it was not done, mainlybecause victory seemed just within reachto the Nazi leadership until mid-1943,

The Germans did not put the first jetsinto the air or lead in radar development.Nor.were they ever ahead of the Allies indeveloping nuclear weapons. Their V2program was developed from lines ofinvestigation begun by an American, Dr.Robert H. Goddard. They also built on for-eign developments in shaping the blitz-krieg, including tanks and dive bombers.After rejecting tanks as useful in WorldWar I, many senior ofticers in the Reichs-wehr and the Wehrmacht remained skep-tical about them until after the warbegan. It is not clear how much a part theReichswehr’s secret training in the USSRduring 1925-35 shaped the blitzkrieg, butarchitects of the panzer forces later testi-fied to their reliance on British theoriesand exercises.”

The roots of the Stuka Junkers Ju-87dive bomber lay in US Marine Corpsdevelopments in Nicaragua in the 1920sand subsequent refinement in the USNavy. The Stuka itself was a designderived from US Curtiss Hawk fightersshipped to Germany in the late 1920s byErnst Udet, later the Luftwaffe’s chief ofdevelopment.” The dive bomber conceptretarded German heavy bomber designand development.” Its early successes inSpain and the blitzkriegs of 1939-40 wereeclipsed by heavy losses. When the resultsof resistance to long-range-level bomberdevelopment in the era of “Stukamania”2’became evident in 1941, Udet and anothersenior Luftwaffe dive bomber advocatecommitted suicide?’

How much Nazi military technology fellshort of their enemies’ perception becameapparent only in stages. In the Battle ofFrance in 1940, for example, the WesternAllies had more and better tanks.” Theblitzkrieg was based on rapid advanceagainst weak points, control by radios andbringing dive bombers to bear against

50 July1986 ● MILITARY REVIEW

WEHRMACHT

resistance before it could harden. Eventoday it is not generally realized that two.thirds of the German army marched.Throughout the war, its guns and trans-port were mainly horsedrawn.

It would be silly and unfair to suggestGerman troops did not fight very well,especially in infantry and armored com-bat. Yet, they had many problems, includ-ing difficulties with green troops early

The Nazis’ flair for shapingimages carried over into the war. Inthe faU of 1939, a Nazi documentary

of the blitzkrieg in Poland playedin Ne w York to audiences including

Allied attaches. . . . Images ofpower and ruthlessness frightened

but CISOangered, and Hollywooddirector Frank Capra later used

Axis films to show US troopswhat they were fighting.

~n.l, Armor design Improved after early

deficiencies but tended to trade offquan-tityinfavor of quality The.NazIs also hada major geospatial advantage. Since theydid not have to put tanks on ships as theAllies did, they could develop largermodels—but so could the Soviets, Theirtank engine development, however, didnot keep up with size, and It took two7’zger tanks to tow one. Armor expertsgenerally view the Soviet T34 as tbe bestall-around tank in World War H.

In the mid-1970s, a major Welzmnachterror was revealed in the disclosure of theUltra secret. Higher headquarters hadused radios and what were believed to befoolproof encryption-decryption devices totransmit messages until very late in thewar, giving much vital information to theBritish. Only then did growing suspicion

of interception lead to the use of othermeans of communication .30The infantry

lacked walkie-talkies at the small-unitlevel, putting the men at a growing disad-vantage as the war progressed. This wasmainly due to pressure on the electronicsindustry to provide systems to counter thebomber offensive.

The Wehrrnaclzt lagged behind theWestern All}es In several key areas oforganization and coordination. Germa”nInterservice rivalry was far worse than onthe Allied side. For example, in the Battleof the Atlantlc, where long-range bomberswere critical, the Luftwaffe failed to pro-vide even the small number that mighthave made a crucial difference in 1940and failed to develop a successor to thestructurally weak FW200 Condor.z:

The Luftwaffe, most Nazlfied of We/zr-rnacht services, had its own firmament ofgaffes. Command and control deficienciesin the 1940 campaign led to the bombingof Rotterdam and, a fewdaysearlier, ofaGerman city, Freiburg.’’ Contrary to thewidespread impression that Hitlerordered the bombing of London in August \

1940 against the “best professional judg-ment” of alr commanders, he was urged to ‘do so by several of them ‘‘ >,b

As already noted, Nazi leaders, fro’m~ ‘June 1940 until the summer of 1943, }expected to hold their gains and the Allies;} 1to grow weary of the war. In September.1941, Hitler ordered no military or naval”research and development to continuewhlcb would not deliver a product to theforces within a year.” This view caus~dHans Jescbonnek, who later took his ownhfe, to refuse the urgings of many that the ;Luftwaffe begin full-scale war training.He argued that tbe imminent victory overthe USSR would fred manpower andresources needed for such a task.”

Another misjudgment was the abandon-ing of high-speed Intrusion raids to

MILITARY REVIEW ● JUIY 1986 $ 51

destroy US bombers over Great Britain asthey returned to base.” In September1943, senior ofticers told Hitler that divebombers sank the Roma when it had, infact, been dispatched by a single FX1400radio-controlled glide bomb.”

The Luftwaffe, of course, did not havea monopoly on missteps. In 1943, alsoseeing victory just around tbe corner, theNavy used Duraluminum, critically scarcein the aircraft industry, to build insect-proof barracks frames for naval bases inthe tropics when Germany regained itsold colonies. ” Major malorganizationalso blunted aerial photography andinterpretation. Although it had veryhigh-quality aerial cameras and film,the Wehrmacht assigned interpretationto noncommissioned officers (NCOS),eschewing the use of stereoscopes andphotogrammetry by officers, standardpractice in the British and later the USforcee. ” (Admirers of the Wehrmacht,however, have subsequently tended to seethe use of NCOS to do officers’ Jobs InAnglo-American forces as a good thing su tgenercs. )’”

Eventually, senior Wehrmacht oftlcerscame to “look with envy” on their foes’“unified system of command,’’” Germanarmy theater and army group com-manders were denied control over a vastarray of Nazi elements operating in theirarea, sometimes Including substantialnaval and air forces. ” Although now castby some Western analysts as a part of theGerman milltary doctrinal tradition,Rommel expressed contempt for what hesaw as overly academic influences in theWehrrnacht and praised US flexibihty andadaptiveness, observing

. the general balance of Americanorganization and the steady developmentthey have achzeued in equzpment andarmament are things we have not yet beenable to equal. ,“

Much inefficiency stemmed from thetangle of Nazi civil and military organiza-tions—for example, the Gestapo; the SD(security service); various SS formation%the Todt Organizatio~ and the NSKK—National Socialist Motor Corps. That isnot to suggest, however, that the rela-tively “pure” military side performed at auniformly high level of efficiency. Theresistance to tanks has already beennoted. When the war began in 1939, inspite of years of clandestine preparationand three years of major rearmament,only 242 of 19,400 German army officerswere fully qualified staff officers.~+

Nor was the army of one mind on goingalong with the Nazis. Elements in thearmy that resisted Hitler were suppressedby trumped-up morals charges. GeneralWerner von Fritsch and General LudwigBeck were chased out; others were boughtoff or murdered. The changing of the sol-dier’s oath in 1934 to a swearing of loyaltyto the Fiihrer was a moral watershed, w wasacceptance of Nazi insignia as another sym-bol of the crumbling of resistance.46

Nevertheless, substantial forces in Ger-many opposed Hitler, witliln the Armyand outside, but with little effect. TheWestern democracies did not take advan-tage of overtures from such groups duringthe era of appeasement, nor were theyexplolted during the war. When Beckresigned in 1938 as chief of the GeneralStaff and called upon key officers to shunHitler, nothing happened. In 1943, Ger-man resistance to Hitler was undercut bySir Winston Churchill and presidentFranklin D. Roosevelt’s Casablanca Dec-Iaratlon. Before the “unconditional sur-render” statement, however, some seniorcommanders, who later claimed they

OppOsed or resisted Hitler, accepted grantsof property in conquered territorie~theso-called Dotationen’’—just as manyaccepted field marshal’s batons.

52 July 1986 ● MILITARY REVIEW

Nor is there agreement among histo-rians or survivors about the tough stancethat some commanders described after thewar in memoirs about their dealings withHitler. Arguments that Hitler’s interfer-ence lost the war must be weighed againstthe fact that the army got Ilitler started inpoht]cs, that It played a key role in hisbecoming chancellor In 1933 and that veryfew blocked hls way until Germanyappeared to be defeated. It seemed clearwhen Hitler was In hls heyday that theNazis had used tbe German army’s desweto rearm to get to power and then usedrearmament to coopt tbe Army ‘“

There is considerable irony, consideringesteem for the German-.Nazi mlhtary sys-tem In some quarters, In the frequencywith which Its performance fell wellshort of perfection. Ironically, the HlgbCommands fallrrres in World War I ledthe radical wing of the Nazis to call fornew mllltary structures The Arbezfdierzst,Luftwaffe and other paramilitary groupsmade Inroads on the army’s traditionalpreserves before the war although Hitlerpurged the .$A tBrovm Shirts) to placatethe army m 1934, Rommel was hyped bythe Nazi propaganda machine during thewar as a general outside the Prussianestablishment who had cooperated withthe Nazis. The W’affen .SS, which took thecream of the manpower and equipmentfrom 1942 on, was ehte in the enlisted

ranks but generally the reverse in respectto senior officers,

Beyond that, errors in prediction andperformance by senior officers aidedHitler. They overestimated French resist-ance to German reoccupation of tbeRhlneland in 1936 and France-Britishreaction to Hitler’s Czech demands in1938. In 1939, Hitler berated senior offi-cers for their anxiety over the forthcomingattack on France and the Low Countries.During the 1940 campaign, the panzers’successes alarmed many senior officers,and a halt was ordered to “regroup” dur-ing the great sweep across the Alhed arm- !Ies’ rear. When wctory canys’far more eas-llY than they expected anh%he High C?m-mand had no contingency plans for a ,follow-through against Great Britain, the ? ‘officer corps was again one down to the ~amateur Fuhrer. ,,(%”1

Friction between Hitler and varioussenior officers continued. Senior corn- “manders became involved in an embar-rassing squabble at the begmnmg of theattack on the USSR. The General Staffhad no contingency plans for winter oper.atlons. There was no winter clothing, no iemergency shelter and no antifreeze or ‘winter 011. One hundred thousand menwere crippled by frostbite, and one-quar-ter of a mdllon horses died.”

Wehrmacht plannlng failures also

appeared EMthe Allies advanced across

MILITARY REVIEW D July 1986 53

France in the late summer of 1944. As theGerman High Command scrambled to con-struct a defensive line, it was found thatthe Siegfried line on Germany’s westernfrontier had been ignored since 1940. Bun-kers had not been modified to handlelarger antitank guns that had come intouse as the war progressed. Many hunkerssheltered families displaced by bombing,or served as warehouses, while mines andbarbed wire had been removed for use onvarious fronts.”’

German army theater andarmy group commanders were

denied control over a vast array of,Vazi elements operating in theirarea, sometimes including sub.

stantial naval and air forces. . . .Rommel expressed contempt forwhat he saw as overly academicinfluences in the Wehrmacht

andpraised US flexibilityand adaptiveness. . . .

Whatever lts strengths and weaknesses,the Wehrmacht was a product of Germanculture at a certain time, It was also awartime conscript force, with a small coreof vOlunteer/regul ar elements. Conscriptswere socialized by far different forces thanthose that did or would shape US forces.Beyond that lies the special problem of theperformance of the opposing overall sys-tems as compared with components of thesystems.

In World War II, the use of “combinedarms” became a basic aspect of conven-tional land combat. Most analysis of com-bat, however, has focused on ground war-fare and mainly on Infantry and armorrather than on artillery and air support.The overall system, therefore, is left out of

focus, distorting the analytical process.Most military history does not depict artil-lery and air effects since they are far morediffuse and difficult to portray in maps,diagrams and tables than infantry andarmor actions and movements. While it isobviously desirable to have US combatarms perform at as high a level as the Ger-mans, it seems unlikely that purchasingsuch a specific advantage by weakeningother parts of the overall combined armssystem or the harmony of them would be ahigher wisdom.

Wehrmacht doctrine can be seen in doc-trines and discussions revolving aroundsuch concepts and documents as FieldManual 100-5, Operations, FIRST BA7’-

TLE, AirLand Battle 2000, and Division86. Beyond the realm of tactical dynamics,there are value questions. Emulating sucha model presents a special dilemma sinceit comes in the wake of a great structuralchange m US history—the creation of theA1l-Voluntwer Force by the Nixon admin-istration in 1970. Whatever else thatchange wrought, it cut the “feedback loop”linklng US society and the .~ilitary in thedraft. With that Isolation in view, there-fore, grawtatlon toward the Wehrmacht asa model should generate concern amongstructuralists who sense how organiza-tion, pol Icles and procedures shape behav-ior and attitude. It should also interestthose concerned with civil-military rela-tions m a broader-sense.

Obviously, the analysis of many modelsand cases can be of use, and a carefulstudy of Wehrmac/zt doctrine and tacticscan aid doctrinal and tactical formulation.The related intellectual and historicalcomplexities, however, are rarely kept inview,,, nor are the many linkages between

the old German army and Nazism .’l Fromthe 1860s through 1909, many in Con-gress and the US Army feared the effectsof adopting a strong variant of the Grosse

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WEHRMACHT

Generalstab. That is not being proposednow, at least not directly.

There is another potential paradox.That is the tendency for peacetime expec-tations to beconfounded and reshaped inwar—not just plans but doctrine itself.Students of the American Civil War willremember the windrows of dead thatmarked the use of Napoleonic tacticsagainst dug-in rifles. Variants of thesyn-drome appeared again and again at Muk-den, Verdun and on the Somme as relianceon a single doctrine collided with complexrealities and technical change.

The search fora more rarifiedprofes-sional self-image on the part of the USofficer corps in the wake of Vietnam haesome parallels with the Reichswehr, or soit should he presumed, given the dangersof seeking for firm guideposts in suchuntirm ground. It may be possible to teaseout the threads of pure operational-tacti-cal art from the tangle ofrelatedtibersofculture and behavior.

But Nazism and militarlem flourishedin tandem. The West Germans rememberit, andso should we. Interpenetration ofideology, doctrine and behavior betweensuch systems as the Soviets, Chinese,British, French and other military sys-tems is complex and profound. The adap-

The General Staffhad nocontingency plans for winter opera-tions. There was no winter cfothing,

no emergency shelter and no anti-ii-eeze or winter oil. One handred

thousand men were crippled b~frostbite, and one-quarter

of a million horses died.

tation of Chinese communist doctrine byEvans F. Carlson of the US Marine Corpsin his second raider battalion is but oneexample. What must be asked is Giventhe rising sensitivity to the complex inter-action of such elements, is it reasonable tobe confident that a major element ofWehrmacht doctrine can be absorbed withnone of the side effects manifest in thatcase-and without the controls built intothe Bundeswehr with that dilemma inview?

In conclusion, it is worthy to considerthe caution of David N. Spires in his studyof the Retchswehr, the crucible from whichthe Wehrmacht was poured:

TheprofessLonal army, which finds itselfmore isolated from its social base than the ‘national conscript army, requires special >attention from within and without. . . .’*” $,”

4,.. ,

1 General G ewe C Marshall RectmThe Wmm.g 0? me War $.

Europe anti me Pamfm B,e”maf Rwon of the C.ref of Salt of me Un,md

Statea -?rnw 7 July 1943 to 30 June 7945. to the Secrefaw o! war

Smmn & SCiWSter N Y .19452 T N D“Duy, A G.”,., for W., Tiw German Army 8“0 Genera!

staff 7807 794S, Pren!,m.Ha,l, En91ewooa Cl,fts. N J. 1977, P3, w<,,,.”, F “.,,,. Cl”+u. ,“6 Twbsack. 7 Ann” Jan.aw

:’~.NOTES

-?980, DDel,.,. of E.mPe,

4 EdWard N L.li

. ..- ....,. . .. . ., 2,, and .,s. see W,ll,am E DeP”y, ‘T,WI”OIOW ,“0’ Tad,cs 1;

Army, Awtl t979 !2!) 1425

‘.wk 8.0 Steven L Ca.by Mmaml Nwonar styles

m W.ifare and m. OPwmm.al Level of Pla..,ng, Conduct ..0 AnaIvs,s.

c & L P.s=ctates. Potomac,Ma. <W. m 31 ~5 Cade!SteonenVi R,chey,.,ThePnmsol)tucalBasrs01theA,rLa.6

BaNIR, MMWV Re.mv hlw 1984. P 496 Eeware A Sh,ls a.o Morns Ja..w$tz. C.heSI.. and D,s,.1.wal!..

,. lhe Gemm. Wehrmachl $. worm war 1!. P.M. Own,on Quar?edy.

swmner ,94S, DD 280315 Theauthorsnotedmat surmom?gslu&eslet mumm be sewed from the stanaPomt ot SC!e.llfc Wor m 314).

!h&t faltb 1. Aoolf H,ller was W3esvre.d U“UI h!, death (P 304), ,“., .s1!

German ..(IS burlt around a .tr..9 N.t,...l S.c[.t,,t n.,a ..r. P.~.fm

best Imp 285.861, and that me hee.,k Naz,fied Waffen-SS was rewecte+m other “rut, [p 304)

7 Samuel P Hunlmgtm The So!dmr ,“u [he Stare 10. Thecq 8n0

Polmcs of CIw-MrlLSw Refaoons Random House, N v., 7957, do 121.22 1

8 !0!. ,P122

9 [otti, o 124,0 For ,?”ample, ,,. Jo.” w w*eelr,r. Bennet, The F4.mes,, of

Pow,, The German 4MW ,. Pol,bm, 7978-7965, V,Kl17g Press, N Y. ..”...

11 smls ma Ja.owttz, w crt, LO 280.83

12 EugeneKmW.?d, m Every w., ,%t 0.., w w Norm. & Co, N Y,

1960, and A1beti Oraerman, The Rozsd to Calumny Macmm.. & Co,NY ?967

13 The strongest ?..0 mostCvntmvers.al aw.rnents have been Put

fom C. %.nam A G.brml and Paul L Savage. Cns!s m Commmo M,..mm.geme.[ t. me Army. HII1 .S Wang, N Y 1978, G,.mm.tus, 6e!l-

Destruct,o. The D!3,.teg,am. *IIO Decay of me U S Army D.nng theV<etn.m E,., W W Norton 8 Co, N Y 1SS1 and Edward L K,”g, me

Oeam of theAmIv An lns,der 8 Sf.m,.g Rapoflon me S7e.koOwnof the

MILITARY REVIEW * JUtY 1986 55

Ame”can M!l![a,y, Saturday Rwtew Press, N Y 1972 Less str)d.”t I“

lone and strucl.re m W$llmm L Ha.ser, Am.ncas Army m C.s!s AStu6y m C!v+M(l!t.wy Refations, .l.ahns HOPk(”S Un,vers!ly Press, B.HI.more Md 1973

14 Arnold Kmmmer, NE,?, P“sonws of War !“ +!me”ca Sle(” & DayPub!(shws, Bmarcl,tf Manor, N V 1979, ssPe,!.lly PO 147.227

15 8 H Ltdddl Ham, The Other S,de of tn. H,(I, C.,,.(I & CO Lo”-

cb., E“g 195?, 0P425.27?6 Alberl S,,10”, me Gemmn Ann”, N<netee” Thmy hee to forty

f,,., St, Mae,.% Press, N Y ,7982, D 234

17 MIX Hasttngs German T:a(mng, Oummh Dmere.!, Houston

Chro”,de, 6J””e 1984, SetiIc4P4, P 2

18 Charies W Sydnor, ,,The H,$toq of m. SS Totenkopfdlvmo. ..6me Pr,$!war Mymology .1 me Waf!en SS. Ce.rrti European MrstoV.December 1973. m 33962. and. {or b!ommomcal data ,“d,eat,”a cross.

II”k,”g see Jest W’ Sch “wOW, Ve.e(hun; G.nehm,gt,, ed(ted a“> tra”$-

lated by W!”dw McCon”ell Be”dW Publxshmg C. S.” J.,., CaM1977

19 US smtal sae”t,sts wrveymg m the US .0”, OIOC.UP,IIO” $“ 1948

CQnelu.akd UWr researcn report ‘Mm me obserwtlon that There 1%noream” t. belwve that !he German PeOLMe h.”. ever w“.? UP the,. CO”.srsle”t SUDPWI .31 Naz$sm t“ $m”c@e See H L Anw.cher, Alhtudes

.s1Germ.. Pnsmners of War A Studyol the oynamms of Nalmnal Sore.!,UC F.a[lowersh,P, Ps”ch.log,c., MonograDtis 194S N umber 62 P 3S

A“ exnaus!,ve $tu4y o! nm.Naawr and m,l,tansm n the B.”oeweDu.91,k(s K“” B Ta”bm, Beyond Eagle and SW.st,ka, Wesleyan Unwers,ly

PIe53 M,ddletm?” CO”” 1967 For Stat,StrC, .“ s,”1, “mrlt$ .,0.,ss..5m Polk 20 yews all.,, $.. El,sabeth NoN. and Ewh P Neunmn rhe

Germans Puboc OPmIon Polls, 7947.7986, Verlag fur Dem. SkOPte0,.”, GE, 1967, PD ?95.206 For a ,tra,ghtfoward ,XW.SS!O” Of U“al.

tered 0“,,0.,. ,.9. Alberl Kesse[nng A SOldter s Record. Greenwood

Press, Westporl, can” ,7954 ,Wec,.lly pp 3?5- 76

20 For examPle, see Douglas Cu(kga” The N.,, Pam,,. 0!?7”,.

October 1980, D 52

21 The Merck Manual of D?agnost$ arm T..rwy, edited by R.QwISerk.aw, Th,rt.enth Ed,ho”, Merck & Co Ra.w.y, N J 1977, P 527

22 EdmonO Taylor The Strategy of rerror E“ro17@ s (nmr FrontHo”ohto” M,lf,m Co Boston. M.= .1940

23_ For example, see Sqfr,ed WestPhal, The German Armv (n theWest, Casse[] & CO , London. E“g 195? P 38. He,”. G“der, a”. Panzer

Leader. Mmhaek Joseoh, Londo. En9. 1952. PD 21.23 and F W .0.

Mellmth>”. Panzer BalQ’e8 A Sf.Uy .{ the Ernwo””mm of Anmor I“ [heSecond Wo,id We,, U“8verS8N d Oklahoma Pm,, Norma” Ok,. 1955

ppxv xv,,24 Edward L Ham., The L.lwaHe s Fa,lure !0 DeveloD a Heavy

Bomber 8efow world War 11, Aerow.m Hwor,a., March ,977 P 25FWd Edward C JOh “s.”, Marl”e Corps A“!.! ?.” The E..” “ems 19721940, ed,ted b“ Graham A Crmma,, US Mar,”, Corw WaW(”@O”,

D C .1977. w 53.5625 For 0,!.,1,, ,,, C,]”, Bek,er The w#wtIffe War D<.”,. Iran,

1.1,0 8“0 eO,led by Frank Z,egler Doubted.” & C. Gwaen C,W N V1968 .31 .ass,,n and ,,s. see LL,ftwaffe A )f,stom .d,led t,” Howard

Faber; Em;$ Books N V 1977, w 134.35 anti 149.’53

26 Karl Ban. Swastma ,n the A,r wrlham .,m.er & c. Lon60n.

Eng ?956 I) 3S

27 Rlchara Suchenwmh Tummg Pants t. me Germ.. A!r FOX. W.rF#ofl. Mono.raDh Numb,{ 189 US A,, Force H,s!.r!cal Dl”!s!on, N Y

1968; PP 36-;S28 See “.”.”% strength tables and cm”r”e”talv m A Gout.wd The

B,”(. cJFra”ce, 1940, translated by A R P Burgms Frader,,k M“ller,

Lonaon Eng .195829 For exmnjw, see Trouble # [(z., Modem Bdue, M(!ti by Paul

ThcJmPsJ” W W No”.”& L% N Y ,1941, w 139.45

30 A“fhony Cm. Brown, 8otivguard of L!es, HarPm & Row PuL!.IIshem, N Y 1975 ewecmlly w ?5-$0

31 See AsImr Lee, The Germ.” Or Force, HarPer & Brothers, N Y1946 Pp198 205 For a German navy PersDecWe, se. Fned,,ch Ruge,

Der SeeRneg, The German Na@$ Story ?939-45, translated by M GSaunders US Neval 1“s!,,”1., ArmaPol,s, Md 7965

32 The secret Conferences of or Goebbe!s The N.zt Propag.no.aWar 193943 w ted by W,(Ire A Boetcw and t,ansla!ed by Ewald 0,,,,

E P Dull.”, NV ?970 P?9

33 Fmnc,s K Mason Em). over Br,fa!”, Mcwh,ler Twns, Lo.so”,E“g 1969 P 368

34 FL7.rer D(rect,ve 11 S’@ember 1941 m Suchenwstih, 01) M D 51

35 ILVO PD 202936 W(ll!am H Tantum a“O Edward J Ho ff.wnm,O! The RBe .“0 Fall of

!he Germ.. .4,, force 7933.7945 We !“, Greenw\ch, Con. 1969,

r) 56

37 Bekker w c,, P 22638 Luftwaffe A HIS1OW. OD c(1 cm 7495039 Tantdm and HOtl$c”m,dt, w ctt w 4446 an4 ?04.840 For e.am,?le ,., Marl,” Van Crev.ld, F<ghong Power Gem.”

and U S Army Perlomance 1939 7945, Greenvmoo Press, WeStPOrlc..” 1,87 .5.-------i, Wes$p”a, op c>t w 200201

42 (b,cl P 201 .,s0 ,,. AIveo Vagt$ fir”,, s S..0”0 Army, Peng.,nPress N Y 1943 and E N P.,,,,.., The lwm,s o, l+,,,., s Power,

P.,.,,,.” U“,”,,,,,” Press, P,,”.,!.” N J 1969 w 43952

43 Erwn R.”!,.,,, The Romnw Pwar$, edtecl by 0 H L,ddell Ha”

and translated by Pad F,ndlay Hare..n Brace N V 1953, cm 516 17.“d 522 A Brt,sh armor :heor,s! “0!,s th.! the US combat command

SYStem of Wor,d W w II was Ihe most ati”a”ced 01 any wllorecl 10,,, a“O

that lb. Bu”ties%ehr .doPted a nmfl,lted 1.,,73 ., ,! s,. R,cb.,d M

OW,~’e.’cz 4rm..red %.es. Arc. P.bt,shlw N v. 1970. m 1S?.8244 seato”00 .8, pD98,“6 ?7345 For exmnDle see Robe,! J O N.(,I The German Arm” and the Nan

Pa”” ?9J3 39 Jam., H tieneman” P.b(,sn>ng, N Y 1966, DD 176.77

.“. Matthew COOPer % German Arm” )ts Polt,tca, anti M,!,(8w ,%,,u,, Macdmald 8 Jane s kmdon E“o !978 D 194

6 seato”w 0, -p 16647 Herman. Ra,,s.hn,”g me %“0,”,,0. of N,h,l,sm Wam,.g to ,/7.

P/est Longrmm Green N Y 1939 m 1233248 Ear, F Z,enl+ Arm” w,,.”.,) Serf.. S,,I(”W.W to Be”,” The

German ‘3,1..91 r“ In, East Oft C, of M, Ch\ef of M,I,wY H,SIOV W.,”.,ngto. O C 1958

49 Chester W,lnmt The Sfr.ggre for Eufwe Hd}oer & Brothers, N Y

1952 P 47850 For ..,,.,,0.s see R,c?a,ti F T,mm. n,. Le$$o”s From till Pas!

for NATO w 3 1? and John M N.len J C S Refomn and me Lessons01 German I+story P.r.metem Adt.nm 1984 m 2-20

51 Fr,ecr,cll “0. 8er””aro,, 0. we, 01100,”, ,,.”s1,,,0 by K.,, .0”

Do”at 000a & Mead N Y ?9?4 P 9S Ir.”,ca,l”, ID. Pru$sm” lhe.sr,stV.” Ber”bard, taut ,“ed e. Der#e”,e of w., c,” never be SPPl,eO

d re.t)y to ,,, l.ture The w,.,,”, m “. must .“1,,80 .,. exoer,ence .1 the

f,ture

57 DB”M N SD,re$ {“age .“0 Re.l!t” The MaktncJ of a German Off,cer 1921 1933 Greenwood P.,:, Westwfl, Con. 7984, P 1!31

56 July 1986 ● MILITARY REVIEW