the critic as artist: oscar wilde’s prolegomena to shape ......wild—even dangerous—to think...
TRANSCRIPT
RESEARCH
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomenato Shape Grammars
George Stiny1
Published online: 4 January 2016
� Kim Williams Books, Turin 2015
Abstract Shape grammars include Wilde’s aesthetic (critical) method—I can
calculate with shapes as in themselves they really are not. Embedding makes this
possible with schemas and rules that are ‘‘superb in [their] changes and
contradictions’’.
Keywords Shape grammars � Embedding � Schemas � Rules
The title of this essay shortens my original one that failed editorial muster—it’s the
concatenation of Wilde’s main title (in italics) and mine. But the expurgated pieces
are key—Wilde’s subtitles
Part I: With some remarks on the importance of doing nothing
Part II: With some remarks on the importance of discussing everything
and a parallel caption of my own
With some remarks on the importance of calculating without symbols
These rhetorical flourishes are meant to delineate my essay and in fact, take it
from where it begins to where it ends, discussing myriad things in between.
There are twin ways to look at the relationship between seeing and calculating,
each one described in a different metaphor
& George Stiny
1 Department of Architecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 7-304C, 77 Massachusetts
Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Nexus Netw J (2015) 17:723–758
DOI 10.1007/s00004-015-0274-4
1. Seeing is calculating
and inverting this commonplace today to get
2. Calculating is seeing
Researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences and in computer science are working
to solve 1. Dana Ballard provides a generous account of brain computation that
includes seeing and strives to explain creative work—Michelangelo and Shake-
speare—in terms of brain activity [2015]. But this isn’t my goal. My eyes are fixed
squarely on 2. I take seeing for granted and go on from there to talk about visual
calculating, and what it might mean. I want to explain creative art and design, too—
not by studying the brain, but by adding to what calculating does. My problem isn’t
how seeing works—I know that already, doing it and believing whatever I see. My
problem is how calculating works, given that I have the ability to see. This leads
straight to shape grammars with schemas for rules, and then to embedding to let
rules change what I see freely [Stiny 2006]. This isn’t the standard stuff that’s taken
for granted in brain computation, and it may appear strangely idiosyncratic. Surely,
Alan Turing and Alonzo Church defined symbolic calculating comprehensively, and
once and for all nearly 80 years ago. Why bother with the question of what
calculating is, when it’s been decided in mathematics and logic, and confirmed in
everyday practice? Everyone knows from experience what computers do—they’re
indispensible in many ways—but is it possible that there’s more to calculating that’s
waiting to be used? The Turing-Church thesis is only that, a good guess, not a solid
proof that all calculating is combinatory with invariant units (primitives). What if
calculating is like painting, where what I see changes as I look at things in an open-
ended process with indefinite goals, or at least goals that alter without rhyme or
reason? What if surprises (unexpected shifts in what I see) aren’t something to fix
but the reason for going on? No—whatever calculating is, it isn’t that; calculating
isn’t about surprises and making use of them in surprising ways. How can I take
something that’s unexpected, that I haven’t seen before, and that I may not
understand, and use it? Surprises are confusing and usually mess up my plans. It’s
wild—even dangerous—to think that calculating is seeing. In calculating, things are
clear and distinct. Symbols are strictly what they are in themselves—alone or in
combination, 0’s and 1’s are 0’s and 1’s that are always the same all-or-none bits
(units) with nothing in between. There’s simply no room for anything to be vague or
ambiguous, or different than it is.
But maybe painting isn’t such a bad idea. Herbert Simon, a giant in computers
and cognitive science, suggests as much when he describes design as painting in his
still seminal The Sciences of the Artificial, but later in a second edition, in a new
chapter on social planning. It appears that Simon didn’t finish the first time
around—there was more to say of real importance about design
Making complex designs that are implemented over a long period of time and
continually modified in the course of implementation has much in common
with painting in oil. In oil painting every new spot of pigment laid on the
canvas creates some kind of pattern that provides a continuing source of new
ideas to the painter. The painting process is a process of cyclical interaction
724 G. Stiny
between painter and canvas in which current goals lead to new applications of
paint, while the gradually changing pattern suggests new goals [1981: 187].
But don’t be misled. Simon takes a strikingly Epicurean approach to painting that
denies what I see, and the everyday physics of paint
I shall emphasize … that forms can proliferate in this way because the more
complex arise out of a combinatoric play upon the simpler. The larger and
richer the collection of building blocks that is available for construction, the
more elaborate are the structures that can be generated [1981: 189].
Lucretius’s epic poem On the Nature of Things limns the Epicurean swerve needed
for atoms to collide freely and link, to create what’s in the world. (Today, atoms
attach in many ways, some even for self-assembly. In synthetic biology, BioBricks
have sticky ends, while Legos line up pins and holes, and Velcro puts hooks in
loops). Epicurus’s colliding atoms and Simon’s combinatoric play with building
blocks are close in spirit, if not exactly the same. Both start out with units that are
independent in combination—a good way to calculate—but where Simon assembles
building blocks in different ways to satisfy a given test (fixed description), the
atomic swerve is capricious to let in free will. Of course, Epicurus doesn’t stop with
his enduring invention; he ties thinking to seeing, as well—they’re not atoms—and
encourages plural causes, else we ‘‘fall away from the study of nature altogether and
tumble into myth [choose a single point of view, even as multiple perspectives are
equally true]’’ [Diogenes Laertius 1950: 617]. This is the opposite of Ockham’s
razor that’s indispensible in science and logic, but it’s just right for painting, and for
art and design. Seeing and plurality are key in shape grammars. My point of view
isn’t fixed, but alters every time I try a rule, and any perspective I take now is as true
as any one I’ve taken before—even if there’s a contradiction. It isn’t necessary that I
begin with a collection (vocabulary) of building blocks to calculate—they change
with everything else as I go on. Well, maybe—but Simon’s combinatoric play with
building blocks is, undoubtedly, the logical way to calculate. Turing and Church
would unswervingly approve. And no one doubts that it’s the most parsimonious
way, as well—in fact, for most, there aren’t any options. But for me, there are
alternatives in shape grammars. As the way to paint, combinatoric play with
building blocks is an awkward start; as the only way to calculate, it tumbles into
myth. Building blocks (units) and tests aren’t enough for art and design; they aren’t
necessary to calculate.
Nonetheless, I’m pretty sure Simon is onto something big when he puts design in
painting, and precisely for the reason he gives—things change as I go on
independent of my original intentions and goals, if I know (remember) what they
are, or I pretend to. (Elliot Eisner touts ‘‘flexible purposing’’ in art education for this
reason, too [2002]). There are always surprises and plenty of room for new
insights—I’m free to change my mind to see as I wish. Insight—seeing things in
new ways—is, surely, what creative activity is about, and shape grammars show
how this is calculating. They make it easy, because rules apply with no inherent
memory. Every time I look at anything, it’s for the first time—right now, with
nothing definite beforehand or ahead. I’m free to see four triangles
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 725
even if I tell you I’ve drawn two squares and that I intended to. What I mean is
entirely clear, and so is what I see. Experienced draftsmen (computers have replaced
most of them) used to draw like this, with longest lines (maximal elements), and
then see what they pleased, embedding this to make that. Ivan Sutherland considers
this an entirely unruly process with dirty marks on paper [1975: 75]. His pioneering
programs for computer-aided design, parametric models, and computer graphics are
disciplined and prophylactic—because they have an underlying structure, as Simon
notes admiringly [1981: 154]—but they also have a blind spot for triangles. And
there are pentagons, hexagons, and big K’s and little k’s in vast excess. Simon and
Sutherland are willing to give up a lot to calculate. But no one seems to be
concerned—or conceals it if they are. Now more than ever, computers are too
powerful to fret about trivial limitations—they vanish in the blinding dazzle of
digital-success. There’s scant reason to see when you can count really fast. Speed
and data overwhelm mere insight.
Not everyone is willing to forego the accidental (illicit) pleasures of seeing
freely—and the creative opportunity this affords—for the certainty and predictabil-
ity of invariant and consistent structure that computers rely on to draw, etc. In his
famous essay, The Critic as Artist, Oscar Wilde elaborates a purely aesthetic method
that’s ‘‘superb in [its] changes and contradictions’’ [1982: 391]. Wilde inverts
Mathew Arnold’s apodictic critical formula to suit himself, so that ‘‘the primary aim
of the critic is to see the object as in itself it really is not’’ [1982: 369]. (I suppose
this is what I’m trying to do for calculating). Wilde’s aesthetic method isn’t
objective, certainty is never the goal—neither axiomatic in logic nor Bayesian in big
data. This evidently isn’t for Wilde, especially not the latter—‘‘No ignoble
considerations of probability, that cowardly concession to the tedious repetitions of
domestic and public life, affect it ever’’ [1982: 365]. And Wilde isn’t alone; he
aligns with diverse artists—painters, poets, philosophers, and essayists—in crucial
ways. One axis running through art and design is defined with Leon Battista Alberti.
In the opening lines of De Statua, Alberti diligently observes landscapes rife with
contours and outlines at the source of creative work [1972: 121]. He takes what he
sees in random things—‘‘a tree-trunk or clod of earth’’—and refines and corrects
lines and surfaces in many ways to form images and likenesses of real things. (This
switches easily to begin with actual faces and other real things—even pictures. I
guess all seeing works like this). William Shakespeare does the same in the wild
wood, where he indulges fancy with no bounds; he admits plural causes and
supposes a bush a bear, in branches and leaves, or in the empty spaces in between
Such tricks hath strong imagination,
That if it would but apprehend some joy,
It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
Or in the night, imagining some fear,
726 G. Stiny
How easy is a bush supposed a bear! [2009: 143, 145]
Even as wild fancy, this is a creative insight that I can act on as I please, seeing
exactly as Alberti suggests. But unrestrained, strong imagination is likely to be
disorienting. It takes what John Keats aptly names ‘‘negative capability’’—holding
on to ‘‘uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and
reason’’ [1958: 193]. To embrace all that ambiguity allows, and not try to limit this
with insipid proofs and lifeless certainty, is the heart of the matter. All descriptions
are true and none is final. For Wilde, beauty is the only goal, and this varies freely in
his artist/critic, who knows that
Beauty … whispers of a thousand different things which were not present in
the mind of him who carved the statue or painted the panel or graved the gem
[1982: 369].
and takes these undertones anywhere they lead
You see then how the aesthetic critic [as artist] … seeks rather for such modes
as suggest reverie and mood, and by their imaginative beauty make all
interpretations true and no interpretation final [1982: 370].
Modes for reverie and mood may seem a tall order, but really, they only change
what I see—at will, in the free flow of creative experience. This is the full
importance of doing nothing, of taking all the time in the world for observation and
contemplation, carried by caprice wherever it goes. It’s the imaginative root of
Wilde’s aesthetic method and of Alberti’s landscapes and contours, as well. The
idea is secure in Wilde’s critical spirit, before things are divided and named—
Plato’s artists wander lost in a maze, and as Wilde drifts with every passion,
William James is caught in a stream of consciousness, and Walter Pater is in a
whirlpool of impulse and privileged moments (epiphanies). But more, it’s how
embedding works to make calculating an open-ended process that can go in any
direction. The schemas in a shape grammar and the myriad rules that they define in
unrestricted assignments—‘‘modes as suggest reverie and mood’’—let me wander
as widely as I please, to see whatever I wish. Shapes express entirely what’s
impressed on them, that’s embedded with rules I choose for myself
The longer I study, Ernest, the more clearly I see that the beauty of the visible
arts is, as the beauty of music, impressive primarily, and that it may be marred,
and indeed often is so, by any excess of intellectual intention on the part of the
artist. For when the work is finished it has, as it were, an independent life of its
own, and may deliver a message far other than that which was put into its lips
to say [1982: 368].
Every time I try another rule to see things in ever-new ways, there’s insight, and
with it, delight. This is, no doubt, disturbing. Everyone knows the artist/critic
doesn’t calculate. At the very least, this seems scant of refinement and sensitivity,
and to flaunt ‘‘an excess of intellectual intention’’. But reverie and mood won’t be
denied. Dreams go least where anyone expects. Maybe calculating is more like an
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 727
American cowboy (a drifter) painting the town red. The slang is all American, and
as Wilde appreciates, only Americans have Walt Whitman, and borrow their slang
from the highest literature (The Devine Comedy of Dante) [Healy 1904: 134–135].
This seems reason enough for my dreams to begin with painting—to turn high art
into crude calculating (inverting things is Wilde’s aesthetic method), and far more to
keep seeing forever changing, in the here and now, neither past nor future, at the
quick of experience. (In The Poetry of the Present, D. H. Lawrence applies this to
Whitman’s ‘‘unrestful, ungraspable poetry of the sheer present, poetry whose very
permanency lies in its wind-like transit’’ [1993: 183]). Shape grammars overlap the
artist/critic in untold ways.
My use of Wilde here and throughout this essay accomplishes two things. First,
Wilde is a provocative way to introduce some central themes in shape grammars.
The members of my graduate seminar—old and new—found him exhilarating and
usefully thought-provoking, as a locus for discussion, especially with shape
grammars and how they handle his concerns. Wilde lays out an aesthetic taxonomy
that ties up to many of the key ideas in visual calculating. Moreover, I can show that
shape grammars include Wilde—what better evidence is there that they’re exactly
right for art in its purest, most demanding modes and forms (Wilde’s words)? In
fact, shape grammars often suggest more than Wilde’s critical method, with greater
focus and force. I suppose it’s because they’re a way to calculate. But there are
others who add to this—who confront what it means to calculate with their eyes.
The Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Kohler reviewed Norbert Wiener’s classic
Cybernetics soon after it appeared. Kohler noticed that machines and calculating
lack insight [1951]. Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts, Wiener’s fellow
cyberneticists, had already shown that neural nets calculate whatever I can describe
in words. Even so, McCulloch agreed with Kohler—I suppose because words aren’t
enough. ‘‘The problem of insight, or intuition, or invention—call it what you will—
we do not understand’’ [McCulloch 1965: 14]. Descriptions are incomplete and are
never enough—but what happens before insight, if it isn’t a result of calculating?
This overwhelms cybernetics, and computers and Simon’s sciences of the artificial
alike, including AI. ‘‘Insight remains handmade’’ [Gondek 2014]. But shape
grammars take a stunningly different tack, where seeing is all that I need and
describing things before I calculate isn’t necessary. That’s what embedding is for, to
see. Descriptions are the result of calculating and aren’t a prerequisite. Descriptions
vary as I calculate; they’re empty before I start and incomplete as long as I go on—
with no end in sight. Shape grammars are a kind of insight engine. This is an
ambitious goal for visual calculating, but whether it’s symbolic calculating or not is
something to consider first.
The reverse of this is easy to show—symbolic calculating with Turing machines
(computers) is a special case of visual calculating with shape grammars [Stiny 2006:
272–273]. Intuitively, the result seems pretty obvious, if not immediate. Turing
machines and shape grammars both involve recursion, but Turing machines depend
on an identity relation for symbols that’s the same as embedding for 0-dimensional
elements like points. If one point is embedded in another, they’re identical.
Embedding for higher-dimensional elements—lines, planes, and solids—doesn’t
work this way; it’s a partial order. One element can be embedded in another without
728 G. Stiny
identity. However, whether Turing machines include shape grammars no matter
what remains, to some extent, an open question. There’s equality, although it takes a
real effort to show, for elements with linear descriptions—points, lines, planes, and
solids—and conics, and, no doubt, more up the polynomial ladder [Stiny 2006:
275–277]. A pretty credible result; even so, is it strong enough for everything I can
see? Brain computation implies this if it’s a Turing machine—I use my brain to see.
But until this is a proven fact, I’ll fret. Are there things I can see that I can’t
represent (describe) or simulate in Turing machines with polynomials and added
math and logic? And even with equality, are Turing machines a good way to talk
about shape grammars? Turning a visual process into a symbolic one is a scientific
triumph, but empty, if there isn’t room to see. I’d rather stick to shape grammars,
and agree to make them Turing machines if asked. My visual intuitions are too vital
to abandon. Trying computers to calculate with shapes in easy ways shows why
shape grammars are worth keeping.
For computers (Turing machines), what I’m able to do typically depends on the
descriptions I use to calculate. This is so in AI—at Stanford, John McCarthy takes it
as an article of faith and a personal source of pride [2009]—and it’s a common
practice in object-oriented programming. I can make up my mind (forget how I do
this) that there are two squares in the shape
and that each is a symbol as in a Turing machine or equivalently, an object with
definite properties, maybe position, size, etc. If I use this to describe the shape as a
set of two squares, one a transformation t of the other, or more exactly, as a spatial
relation
fSquare; tðSquareÞg
it’s hard to see or imagine other polygons or letters—triangles, pentagons, hexa-
gons, K’s and k’s. And if I add this up, it’s indefinitely many things that I may
miss—so much for insight and many of my intuitions. I have no trouble seeing this
or tracing it out—my hands and eyes are the same—but I can’t do it with two
squares. Maybe I can change my description, but how do I decide how to do that
before I’ve seen what’s there? Does this prove that calculating isn’t seeing? Well,
maybe for symbolic calculating with Turing machines—at least it doesn’t look
simple—but what about visual calculating with shape grammars. There’s abundant
opportunity to describe things there, too, but as the result of calculating and not
before I start. That’s a huge difference, and it’s why Wilde has so much to say about
visual calculating. I can drift with the rules I use to see—‘‘modes as suggest reverie
and mood’’. Anytime I look, no matter where, it’s going to be new, and there’s
always the chance for more. It’s surprising how little it takes for this to happen.
Identity rules in the schema
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 729
x ! x
more than suffice—showing the importance of doing nothing, merely seeing to
calculate. The contents of a line exceed whatever time I take to try identities. That a
line is a line is all I need
(If I add copies of this identity, I can pick out any part of any shape). I can go on as
long as I please. Alberti appreciates this, and with greater power, so does William
Blake
For a Line or Lineament is not formed by Chance: a Line is a Line in its
Minutest Subdivisions: Strait or Crooked It is Itself & Not Intermeasurable
with or by any Thing Else [1974: 878].
Blake is famous for his granular view of infinity that’s something of an adolescent
cliche. But the line, a simple segment
is sublime. It invariably overwhelms the artist and critic alike. It would impress
Edmund Burke with its sheer vastness, although William Hogarth can see only stasis
and death in unyielding uniformity, preferring instead the serpentine
that parametrically inflects the line
as a locus of beauty. But ‘‘Strait or Crooked,’’ a line is a line with endless patterns
and devices embedded in it, that’s intricate in all of its changes and contradictions.
Wilde’s critic is, truly, an artist, and shape grammars show why.
It’s not simply how descriptions work in shape grammars, it’s also what’s to be
described, and where and when. There’s a stubborn ambiguity in the things (shapes)
I see—being one way or another seems never enough. The descriptions (names) I
use don’t stick. They’re incomplete—whenever I look, there’s more to see that
needs to be added in. (It’s easy to leave who and why outside of visual calculating
and the details of shape grammars. I typically assume I’m who, and why is because
it’s fun. This strikes me as a perfectly natural assumption in sync with shape
grammars, and what they do. Seeing is an inherently personal way to calculate, and
the ability to see in diverse ways, to be surprised, ‘‘eureka, I’ve found it,’’ is a
marvelous delight. Where would painting be, and art and design, without
delight? See Wilde [1982: 365]).
730 G. Stiny
How descriptions work depends first on schemas and assignments to define rules,
and then on embedding and transformations (usually linear ones, but this isn’t a
requirement) to apply rules. I’m free to apply a rule A ? B to a shape C when
there’s a transformation t that embeds the shape A—what—in C, and so determines
where. The goal is to find a part of C that’s like A, and the shape t(A) may be any
part of C, including all of C itself. This isn’t the standard way to calculate in
computers (Turing machines) with minimal units (symbols) that match identically,
and precise addresses. Whatever parts C has (units or not), they aren’t specified in
advance—without A, there aren’t any parts to find. Moreover, parts are dispersed
and may interact in strange ways. In the shape
there are four pentagons like this one
but if I erase any one of these pentagons, the other three disappear. And there’s
even more magic in letters. How many K’s and k’s vanish if I erase any one of
either? The rule A ? B describes C with respect to t(A) and the rest of C, that is to
say, its relative complement C - t(A). (This also leads to topologies for shapes
[Stiny, 2006: 282–287] and if I squint, to trees that show how sentences are divided
into phrases and words in a generative grammar. Identity rules work recursively for
the latter—if I apply the rule NP ? NP to a sentence S, where NP is a noun
phrase, then S - NP is a verb phrase. And there are identities for NP and for S -
NP, etc.). Before I try A ? B, C doesn’t have parts—or underlying structure of any
kind. I don’t know what to say about it or what to do with it until I see t(A). Then, I
can change C into a new shape C’, by use of the formula C’ = (C - t(A)) ? t(B). I
erase t(A) and add the shape t(B) to the result. But what about C’—what can I say
about it? Well, whatever I want to. The parts that make C’ fuse—they aren’t
preserved when I evaluate (C - t(A)) ? t(B), so that embedding isn’t limited. I can
write out what I did to C to get C’, but there’s no memory of this in C’ itself—it has
no divisions. In fact, t(B) needn’t be in C’ the next time I apply a rule, even though
t(B) is what I added to C - t(A). The parts I combine do so seamlessly without even
a trace. I need to describe C’ whenever I look at it, and that’s exactly the reason for
rules—to do what I see now. In shape grammars, it’s never once and for all, but one
more time, with no final goal ever in sight. When is over and over again—I just go
on. So, does calculating end? No, it merely pauses between the rules I try. There’s
always something different to see, and more to describe. That’s how it goes—and
for painting, and art and design. It’s why I hang pictures on my walls and am never
tired of looking at them—doing nothing in observation and contemplation is one
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 731
way, maybe the only way, to make art. (Also for pictures, etc. in art museums—
there’s art in museums if there’s someone to look, and only for those who see.
Experts, Aunt Sophie and Uncle Al, critics, curators, docents, historians, etc., make
a difference, but this is no substitute for personal experience. Seeing is never
secondhand).
Wilde is magnificently aware of this, at least for the critic as artist—who is ‘‘both
creative and independent’’ [1982: 364]. The critic deals ‘‘with art not as expressive
but as impressive purely’’ [1982: 366]. Shape grammars show that this holds, too,
for the artist and designer when they look at their work—finished or ongoing—and
choose what rule to try next. For artist and critic alike, there’s always more. They’re
on equal footing, as they go freely this way and that, seeing and doing—first artist as
critic, then critic as artist, and intricately entangled. It makes no sense beyond
professional decorum to keep the distinction, especially when I calculate with
shapes and rules. (The equivalence of artist and critic is also patent in a different
way in Algorithmic Aesthetics that I wrote with James Gips [1978]. Still, it’s easier
to justify with shape grammars, where seeing informs Wilde’s aesthetic method of
reverie and mood. Many things come rapidly to mind when embedding isn’t strictly
an identity relation between symbols or units. In reverie, seemingly intractable dif-
ficulties vanish—in object-oriented programming, for example, recognizing a
rectangle in an addition of two squares with a common side [Smith 1996: 47–49].
Ludwig Wittgenstein considers similar things in the Tractatus when he explains a
Necker cube as a complex of constituents related in two different ways [1977: 54].
Pretty neat, although I can do the same without constituents using the identity rule
for squares—or an identity for parallelograms. But where do constituents come
from? Maybe Wittgenstein’s constituents aren’t what I imagine them to be—it’s
unlikely I’ll get all I can see, enumerating the combinatorial variants for
0-dimensional elements (primitives) related in one way or another. Maybe
Wittgenstein implies as much
This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same
time a priori.
Whatever we see could be other than it is.
Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is.
There is no a priori order of things [1977: 58].
And this seems right when Wittgenstein goes on to 1-dimensional figures and more
in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. He adds polygons with a common
side—a triangle and a hexagon—to get an ambiguous result, and wonders what
mathematics, or for that matter, computer programming, would be like if this is how
things work [1967: 189e]. Are there two polygons that I can’t ignore, or is there
more that I’m free to see? Nothing is what it’s meant to be. Wittgenstein’s a priori—
pure intention, whether God’s or Plato’s philosopher’s—mars beauty and also
calculating. This is embedding and Wilde all at once. Shape grammars are a nice
way to see and dream, with no excess intellectual baggage).
A rule A ? B in a shape grammar is easy to represent in a heuristic that helps
explain how the rule works. I do what I see, in this way
732 G. Stiny
see A ! do B
Whether it’s the artist or critic who uses the rule (or you or me) is of no conse-
quence—it’s exactly the same. When artists look at what they’re doing to go on,
they’re doing what the critic does. And whenever anyone looks closely at anything,
they’re acting in this way, too. Beautiful things for artist and critic alike are never
done—there’s always more to see and do. It’s important to see as you please, and to
discuss everything you find—even with changes and contradictions. There’s never a
final conclusion. Wilde’s critic as artist beholds beautiful things from an individual
point of view. Wilde’s critical method is himself
The critic occupies the same relation to the work of art that he criticises as the
artist does to the visible world of form and colour, or the unseen world of
passion and of thought [1982: 364].
It treats the work of art simply as a starting-point for a new creation. It does
not confine itself—let us at least suppose for the moment—to discovering the
real intention of the artist and accepting that as final. And in this it is right, for
the meaning of any beautiful created thing is, at least, as much in the soul of
him who looks at it, as it was in his soul who wrought it. Nay, it is rather the
beholder who lends to the beautiful thing its myriad meanings, and makes it
marvelous for us [1982: 367].
The artist and critic alike are observers, and always for themselves. They see, and
what impresses them is in their souls—in the rules they try. Each lends beautiful
things their myriad meanings, and is free to take any of these back to see others. The
process goes on—how could this be otherwise? Beautiful things, even as they are
being made, don’t stand up and say, ‘‘This is what I’m supposed to be; this is what
I’m supposed to mean’’. And even if they could, how am I supposed to understand
that? Do their utterances tell me? It doesn’t matter whether beautiful things are
rendered visually or verbally—it’s simply more of the same. They’re incomplete—
at least they’re never complete for the artist or critic individually, or as one. There’s
everything to add that only rules provide. Seeing and doing are related in rules, and
in whatever way I handle the beautiful things around me. And it’s what I see that
makes the difference. My heuristic holds true—I do what I see. Then, each one of
us, individually, is creative and independent.
Describing shapes only starts with the various rules I try. Descriptions of shapes
interact, so that the description I use now changes the descriptions I’ve used before.
No description is immune from revision. This is one way to ensure that there’s some
kind of continuity or consistency as I calculate—in retrospect anyway—no matter
how radically the rules I use change what I see [Stiny 2006: 296–301]. There’s a lot
of room for surprises and no reason to keep what I’ve done. For as long as I go on,
I’m free to revise whatever I’ve said about the past in whatever way I want,
reconfiguring it according to the rules I try now. History works in reverse. The
lessons of the past are made in the present; the latter molds the former. As Wilde
notes wryly—‘‘The one duty we owe to history is to rewrite it’’ [1982: 359]. And
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 733
rewriting history is exactly what happens when I calculate in shape grammars. For
example, consider the shape
once more, that’s two squares or four triangles. And actually, there’s no reason to
look at anything else. I can always see in another way to make the point I want to
make now. There’s a tree, that is to say, a description, for each way of seeing the
shape, and more when I put these trees together to show how I can see triangles after
I’ve seen squares—and vise versa (sometimes history is reversible). Two squares
aren’t four triangles—the categories are different and the arithmetic is totally
wrong. Squares don’t make triangles unless squares and triangles as in themselves
(maybe the definitions I learned in school) they really are not. I can use the trees
I’ve already got, either with squares or triangles, to decide what. Describing shapes
isn’t just once and for all, but open-ended—and for this, there are rules. I’m free to
revise what I say in terms of the rules I use to see. I can rewrite history as I please.
John von Neumann, whose name is synonymous with computer architecture and
design, worries about describing shapes, too, as visual analogies
Suppose you want to describe the fact that when you look at a triangle you
realize that it’s a triangle, and you realize this whether it’s small or large. It’s
relatively simple to describe geometrically what is meant: a triangle is a group
of three lines arranged in a certain manner. Well, that’s fine, except you also
recognize as a triangle something whose sides are curved, and a situation
where only the vertices are indicated, and something where the interior is
shaded and the exterior is not. You can recognize as a triangle many different
things, all of which have some indication of a triangle in them, but the more
details you try to put in a description of it the longer the description becomes.
In addition, the ability to recognize triangles is just an infinitesimal fraction of
the analogies you can visually recognize in geometry, which in turn is an
infinitesimal fraction of all the visual analogies you can recognize, each of
which you can still describe. But with respect to the whole visual machinery of
interpreting a picture, of putting something into a picture, we get into domains
which you certainly cannot describe in those terms. Everybody will put an
interpretation into a Rorschach test, but the interpretation he puts into it is a
function of his whole personality and his whole previous history, and this is
supposed to be a very good method of making inferences as to what kind of a
person he is [1966: 46–47].
Embedding lets me see triangles without having to say what they are in advance—
there’s no visual analogy (spatial relation, or alternative description or test) before I
calculate. Of course, triangles may be three lines, as von Neumann suggests in his
734 G. Stiny
visual analogy. And in fact, it’s easy to apply the boundary schema x ? b(x) and its
inverse b(x) ? x (alternatively, x ? b-1(x)) to switch points and lines and planes,
to traverse this graph
and test for triangles. And if I add a rule, so a line is a serpentine, and its inverse
I can complicate the graph in this way
to extend my test. But my rule also gives me more
Is this the end of it for triangles? Von Neumann is open to this, but pictures are a
hedge; shape grammars show otherwise. Triangles may also be three angles
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 735
or something entirely different, say, puzzle tiles in ‘‘ice-rays’’ (decorative Chinese
lattice designs that evoke cracking ice on a frozen lake)
It all depends on the rules I try; seeing doesn’t end. But learning visual analogies
and using them in place of what I see somehow misses the point. Seeing isn’t
recitation—they’re separate and needn’t match. I can recite what I’ve learned
entirely by rote, with my eyes shut tight, blind to everything. Wilde is right to worry
about this—‘‘Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time
to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught’’ [1982: 349]. Facts fixed in
advance aren’t enough, as I calculate to go on—seeing exceeds all of the standard
descriptions I memorized in school. Yes, a triangle is three lines and a square is
four, and no, this doesn’t work all the time. Visual analogies may be horribly
incomplete—unless there are teachers and tests (computers) to ensure that
everything is correct and no one flouts the law. But I can put anything into a
picture. At first, every shape is a Rorschach test, and then, any visual analogy I
please. (Surely, a Rorschach test is what a test as in itself it really is not. I can
contradict myself freely). Is this von Neumann or Wilde?—‘‘The one characteristic
of a beautiful form is that one can put into it whatever one wishes, and see in it
whatever one chooses to see’’ [Wilde 1982: 369]. With embedding, the visual
analogies I can see are endless. They’re defined on the fly as I go on, and they vary
freely with every rule I try. This may be inconsistent and possibly disingenuous.
Maybe that’s the reason Sutherland spurns dirty marks on paper—the draftsman’s
drawings are dishonest. But no doubt, this is why Wilde would insist on them—
‘‘What people call insincerity is simply a method by which we can multiply our
personalities’’ [1982: 393]. I guess that’s what the Rorschach test is for, to expose
insincerity, as it traces personalities in flux. (At university, it’s choosing a major,
and later a profession—there’s security and comfort in names). I can’t describe this
in advance of what I see—von Neumann and Wilde would surely agree. This is an
extraordinary place for art and science to meet. Von Neumann fears that visual
analogies may be incomplete, as Wilde resolves this in his aesthetic method—not
once and for all, the possibility von Neumann broaches, or in the invariants so
prized in science (try Ockham’s razor on a triangle and not miss something), but
again and again in an ongoing process. It’s like this for visual calculating with shape
grammars. (A neat technical result is hard to ignore. Notice that reduction rules—
they’re defined by embedding—let me decide if different arrangements of elements,
in particular, lines and planes, etc., describe the same shape or not, maybe a triangle
[Stiny 2006: 187]. But what the reduction rules don’t do is tell me the arrangement
736 G. Stiny
of elements that makes sense to me now. That depends on how I calculate in a shape
grammar with endless opportunities for surprise and change).
Today, the STEM subjects—science, technology, engineering, and math—seem
to have eclipsed art and design, even if visual calculating with shape grammars
proves just the opposite. It helps to wander around—what’s eclipsed and how
complete this is, depend on where you stand. Nonetheless, there’s MIT engineering
and problem solving with mind and hand, that sets clear aims and goals, and takes
the MIT path to solutions in STEM. An essential goal is to make the art of
innovation a science, presumably with predicable results. But once again, Wilde
assumes a critical view that’s pretty much like calculating in shape grammars—‘‘It
is because Humanity has never known where it was going that it has been able to
find its way’’ [1982: 359]. Simon implies the same in The Sciences of the
Artificial—surely, innovation is part of this venture—when he puts design in
painting; it’s inevitable when I use shape grammars to calculate. There’s slight
reason to eschew art and design as painting in education, or for artists and designers
to adopt engineering methods and give up their studios for research labs, business
models, startups, etc. The engineering method at MIT and the aesthetic method of
artists and designers are alike when it comes to calculating—in fact, the former may
be a special case of the latter, if calculating is merely combinatoric play with
building blocks. STEM misjudges its size; it’s too small for art and design. I
suppose that’s why art isn’t taught. The successes of mind and hand are obscure
without eyes to see. What good is science without art—with both on the same
footing, neither in thrall of the other, each with its individual methods? Separately,
art and science tumble into myth. It’s high time to take art seriously, as a way to
describe things as in themselves they really are not. That’s the way insight and
creativity work, and true innovation, too. There’s plenty to gain and nothing to lose
if art is art—surely, there’s no loss of mathematical or logical rigor, as shape
grammars show. I thought that honest standards were the reason for STEM. To keep
art out of schools to concentrate on STEM, and to discourage art for the STEM
occupations that big business shortsightedly demands constrict education and
experience for everyone. Wilde is much too optimistic without art (no doubt, this is
something beyond his ken), and all that art lets in, including innovation. Has
Humanity lost its way?
The idea that shape grammars don’t calculate the same way computers do, with
minimal units and addresses, repays another look. Noam Chomsky suggests that
units and addresses are the correct way to explain language [2014]—I’m pretty sure
Ballard would agree for brain computation generally. Chomsky emphasizes
recursion and the lexical or word-like elements of language as the atoms (minimal
units) of computation [2009: 199]. This is pretty close to Simon’s combinatoric play
and building blocks—but even so, computers may be evolving in novel directions.
Near the end of Turing’s Cathedral, George Dyson speculates about the future of
calculating, with an oddly different approach that exceeds units and addresses to
describe something more in keeping with visual calculating. For me, this was a
pleasant discovery
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 737
Given the access to content-addressable memory, codes based on instructions
that say, ‘‘Do this with that’’—without having to specify a precise location—
will begin to evolve. The instructions may even say, ‘‘Do this with something
like that’’—without the template having to be exact. The first epoch in the
digital era began with the introduction of the random-access storage matrix in
1951. The second era began with the introduction of the Internet. With the
introduction of template-based addressing, the third era in computation has
begun. What was once a cause for failure—not specifying a precise numerical
address—will become a prerequisite to real-world success [2012: 309].
Whether this is an accurate prediction for computers or not, isn’t a concern. Rather,
it points to what shape grammars do, and relates them to computers. In fact, it’s one
of the few places I’ve found in computer science where there’s something that
resonates closely with shape grammars—von Neumann is already conspicuous, and
then there’s Newton’s method for polynomials, as an advance on Turing machines,
and the footing for numerical analysis and scientific calculating. Lenore Blum,
Felipe Cucker, Michael Shub, and Steve Smale do the math; they begin with von
Neumann’s talk at the Hixon Symposium in 1948, in which he contrasts the
continuous methods of analysis with the discrete methods of logic, noting the ease
of the former and the combinatorial rigors of the latter [1951: 16]. (Von Neumann
does visual analogies here, too [1951: 23–24]). Blum and partners add to this—they
believe that the Turing machine as a foundation for real number algorithms
can only obscure concepts [1998: 23].
Moreover, they argue that
A Turing machine for implementing Newton’s method, by reducing all
operations to bit operations, would wipe out its basic underlying mathematical
structure [1998: 38].
It’s like this for visual calculating—with shape grammars for real number
algorithms or Newton’s method, and insight for concepts. The key difference in
shape grammars is embedding, and this easy extension of identity clouds the
definition of shape grammars in Turing machines. And note that visual calculating
and Newtonian calculating align in some basic ways. Turing machines are a special
case for both, and there are algebras (infinite rings), etc. Art and science are equally
telling in calculating. Taking the time to think about painting, and art and design,
reveals as much about calculating as thinking about science and numerical
analysis—and might show more with its focus on seeing. A return to real numbers
isn’t the sole way to extend calculating. To slight painting, and art and design, and
stress science and engineering only, even as fruitful as they are for airplanes,
bridges, computers, etc. in an ABC of STEM, diminishes calculating. Is it any
wonder that artists and designers shun calculating—it’s too spare for art and
design—or that scientists and engineers find it easy to ignore other modes of reverie
and mood? It seems that everyone is ready to crimp experience for the ease of
familiar things. This is neither shape grammars nor Wilde. There’s full-bodied
calculating in both.
738 G. Stiny
Shape grammars make Dyson’s ‘‘template-based addressing’’ possible with as
much formal, mathematical rigor as anyone might ever demand, in terms of
embedding, assignments, and transformations—just as they manage object-oriented
programming and Wittgenstein’s polygons. Embedding brooks failure and even
encourages it; it’s all about content (shapes and their parts) and ignores precise
numerical addresses (they’re dispersed and depend on how rules are tried). Content
and addresses meld as one, and aren’t usefully distinguished. Then, assignments and
transformations make a convincing start on what it means for shapes and things to
be alike—in a personal way depending on the artist/critic. Dyson’s third era in
computation may actually date to 40 years ago, when I first showed how embedding
and transformations make shape grammars work [1975]. Is a ‘‘shape-machine’’ a
physical possibility? Is real-world success with computers now in sight? I’m not
sure, but it’s something to think about, especially if what computers do is supposed
to accord with art and design, and maybe even science. Otherwise, what I can see
and what computers can do will invariably conflict, highlighting the inescapable
drawbacks of computers today. What do limits like this accomplish? Shape
grammars are too useful to be held back in this way, for what they show about
calculating and for what they do in art and design. I like to think that visual
calculating is the real success, on computers or not.
Wilde’s critic as artist approaches art as if there’s nothing to it
All art is quite useless [1982: 236].
The only beautiful things … are the things that do not concern us. As long as a
thing is useful or necessary to us … or is a vital part of the environment in
which we live, it is outside the proper sphere of art [1982: 299].
When a thing is useful and a vital part of life, it has a definite description, namely,
its use, that’s hard, if not impossible, to ignore—Marcel Duchamp pulls this off with
readymades. The ‘‘use’’ of a useful thing lowers the likelihood for other
descriptions. I have no choice, but to see it as in itself it really is. There isn’t any
room for art—to say what as in itself it really is not. Wilde is very canny about this,
when he uses his critical method reflexively. He’s a creative artist—‘‘I live in terror
of not being misunderstood. Don’t degrade me into the position of giving you useful
information’’ [1982: 349]. Wilde wants to be misunderstood because the alterna-
tive—conveying definite facts and figures, or always being sincere—isn’t art.
(Language seems trivially for communication—it’s a knack I have to change the
subject to suit myself). This is another reason for Simon and Sutherland to prefer
computers to draftsmen—they give us useless drawings instead of useful
information. All shapes are quite useless, when I calculate in shape grammars.
This is the nub of visual calculating. Otherwise, mere combinatoric play with
building blocks exceeds what I need—with the terrifying prospect of always being
useful (described or measured in merely one way) in a utilitarian paradise. This is no
fancy. Computers as in themselves they really are, are why utility works [Streitfeld
2015]. (Wilde espouses Socialism, and not because it’s utilitarian. For Wilde,
‘‘Socialism itself will be of value simply because it will lead to Individualism’’
[1982: 257]. That’s an odd coincidence. Simon finds painting in social planning, as
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 739
Wilde locates the critic as artist in Socialism. To no one’s surprise, art and politics
align without rhyme or reason. The art of politics is to see the world as in itself it
really is and struggle to change it—to remake the world as in itself it really is not.
But no change is ever the last. There’s no doing it right, without it all being
strangely different later on. That’s why visual analogies matter to von Neumann—
they’re variable and incomplete, and later on, they’re not the way they were. Try as
he will, he can’t shake the vague and queasy feeling that nothing is fixed and final.
There’s no end to painting, and to politics as usual. The trick is going on—Epicurus
encourages seeing and plurality, and Wilde adds in modes of reverie and mood, as
shape grammars calculate with embedding and rules).
Of course, there are other ways to think about this—the claim that art is useless
isn’t new with Wilde. John Ruskin finds uselessness essential in architecture—‘‘a
vital part of the environment in which we live’’—if it’s to surpass mere building to
become an art of its own. He adds art to building in this way
Let us, therefore, at once confine the name to that art which, taking up and
admitting, as conditions of its working, the necessities and common uses of
the building, impresses on its form certain characters venerable or beautiful,
but otherwise unnecessary. Thus, I suppose, no one would call the laws
architectural which determine the height of a breastwork or the position of a
bastion. But if to the stone facing of that bastion be added an unnecessary
feature, as a cable moulding, that is Architecture. It would be similarly
unreasonable to call battlements or machicolations architectural features, so
long as they consist only of an advanced gallery supported on projecting
masses, with open intervals beneath for offence. But if these projecting masses
be carved beneath into rounded courses, which are useless, and if the headings
of the intervals be arched and trefoiled, which is useless, that is Architecture.
… Architecture concerns itself only with those characters of an edifice which
are above and beyond its common use [1981: 16].
The ready embellishment of a building with decoration and ornament impressed on
its form is architecture. I guess this is Wilde’s aesthetic method, literally. And
figuratively—try to frame a firmer metaphor than ‘‘art is architecture’’. No one
doubts that decoration and ornament are useless. In Wilde’s terms, I have no
pressing reason to describe them in either this way or that, so I’m totally free to
describe them entirely for myself—after all, decoration and ornament are beautiful
forms. In fact, Wilde praises decorative art as an impulse and source for purely
creative and critical work. His appeal for a forceful kind of aesthetic formalism
neatly anticipates the original spirit of shape grammars and their use in art and
design—the focus of the first paper on shape grammars was on painting and
sculpture, and how to describe these visual modes in a generative scheme [Stiny and
Gips 1972]. Unaware of it at the time, this was congruent, perhaps necessarily, with
Alberti’s way of describing architecture that separates form and material [1999: 7].
(It’s worth noting, too, that my generative scheme lets me switch freely between
form and material, to develop them reciprocally). But Wilde is best as himself, and
fervent about decorative art
740 G. Stiny
By its deliberate rejection of Nature as the ideal of beauty, as well as of the
imitative method of the ordinary painter, decorative art not merely prepares
the soul for the reception of true imaginative work, but develops in it that
sense of form which is the basis of creative no less than of critical
achievement. For the real artist is he who proceeds, not from feeling to form,
but from form to thought and passion [1982: 398].
When I started out with shape grammars, I instinctively emphasized strict
abstraction and hard-edged geometric form, because this let me see—without being
distracted by the common meanings of familiar and useful things. My effort to see
went always ‘‘from form to thought and passion’’. My eyes were aglitter, calculating
with shapes that were forever alive with varying possibilities—surprises that my
rules let me see. I regret now that I didn’t read Wilde then. But I was probably too
self-absorbed seeing to pay very much attention to a writer. Who would imagine
that his odd company could add to an exciting personal adventure to create
something more enjoyable than it already was? I suppose that any prolegomena to
shape grammars is possible only afterward—when ambiguity and misdirection are a
delight without any irritable search for source and influence. The new seeks
mooring, not to drift away. Shapes are like this when I calculate with rules, and it’s
the reason for everything I say, and, undoubtedly, repeat more than once. Repetition
has its own aesthetic form, and at every pulse, there’s the opportunity to see things
differently. (The weavers of Ancient Greece banned the everyday use of the
checkerboard pattern—the paradigm of visual repetition—precisely because it was
too unstable. And of course, this goes for the line, as well). The central materials I
use to teach are much the same every year, especially in my graduate seminar, but
entirely new each time. So I try them again, and wait and see. Shape grammars let in
insight.
But Wilde’s absolute kind of uselessness may ask too much. Isn’t it enough that
decoration and ornament don’t add anything to what I’m trying to do now, even if
they’re useful in other irrelevant ways? I can discard them without loss to my
immediate goal of building—they’re beyond the necessities of common use. All I
need is this relative kind of uselessness for art in architecture and possibly, in added
disciplines, as well. In fact, there may be art in calculating if there are useless
rules—whatever kind of uselessness this is. But it’s vital that calculating be a
science, so innovation can join it when it’s no longer an art but a science, too. Some
easy ways to keep calculating a science, and to keep art out, are well known. These
show once more how visual calculating with shape grammars readily exceeds what
symbolic calculating with Turing machines is expected to do. What’s useful when I
calculate depends on shapes and symbols being the same. Of course, this is Turing’s
combinatory sense of symbols rather than Wilde’s evocative sense. Wilde handles
symbols ‘‘not as expressive but as impressive purely’’—they are as in themselves
they really are not. Wilde puts this in a striking formula—‘‘All art is at once surface
and symbol’’ [1982: 236]. This goes for shapes, as well. Shapes are all surface and
entirely superficial. They’re merely what’s apparent now, with no structure of any
kind that’s deep, hidden, or underlying. That’s why shapes vary with the rules I
try—there’s nothing to keep them fixed. In essence, what you see is what you get.
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 741
And in symbols, there are untold things—‘‘Beauty has as many meanings as a man
has moods. Beauty is the symbol of symbols’’ [1982: 368]. Shapes are surface and
symbol in any way I wish. Turing’s symbols are all units, invariant 0’s and 1’s. I
know—that’s their power and beauty.
Useless rules have fascinated me for years [1996]. The most conspicuous ones
are in the schema x ? x, for example, this rule
that says a square is a square. (To be precise, the shape in the left-hand side of a rule
is ‘‘this,’’ and in the right-hand side, ‘‘that’’. Names are too definite, and restrict
what I see). The rules in x ? x are identities. But it doesn’t mean much that this is
this. That seems useless enough—it’s an empty tautology—however, there’s more
uselessness to come. Identities don’t change anything when I use them to calculate.
If I try my rule for squares on the large, outside square and on the small, inside
square in the shape
I can calculate trivially so
simply doing nothing. And if I go on to try the identity rule for triangles
clockwise from the bottom-left triangle, or in whatever order you want, I get the
longer, but still redundant series
Identity rules can be eliminated without loss—and coders, especially graduate
students, rush to do this. Although Ruskin might demur, it’s somehow very
satisfying to get rid of useless things you don’t need—it’s a modernist obsession—
but is it the proper thing to do in shape grammars? Calculating in this way doesn’t
742 G. Stiny
go anywhere. Nothing changes either for squares or triangles—but that’s not really
what happens. A shape is seamless and undivided before I try a rule. Identities let
me pick out the parts I see as I calculate, and define trees that show alternative ways
of doing this. The shape
is first two squares, one inscribed in the other
and then four triangles arranged around a tacit square
Both trees are instances of the scheme
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 743
for hierarchies, that’s defined for identity rules in x ? x. The scheme is
recursive—I can use it again for x or for its relative complement C - x. And the
scheme is easy to extend in terms of the schema x ? prt(x) for parts, so that it’s
Now the two trees above are each defined by use of erasing rules in the schema
x ? that complements x ? x. Both erasing and identity are properly included in
x ? prt(x). For squares, the erasing rule is
and for my triangles, it’s
What kind of tree is defined if I use identity rules in x ? x? And what happens if I
use rules in x ? prt(x) that are neither identity rules nor erasing rules? There are
plenty of ways I can describe shapes when I try different rules. (A given vocabulary
may limit the rules I try. Designers, especially architects, are invariably looking for
one to inform their work. But this rarely makes sense without calculating first).
Additionally, my two trees combine in a more elaborate graph or network
744 G. Stiny
to describe what I see, switching back and forth between squares and triangles. At
the top, the shape
is described as two squares, what as in itself it really is, and at the bottom, it’s
described as four triangles, what as in itself it really is not. But the red elements in
the middle show how this pair of contradictory descriptions can merge, so that
squares and triangles as in themselves they really are not. As a result, I can see the
shape in alternative ways. And I can complicate the graph—endlessly—if I try other
identity rules in the schema x ? x (or erasing rules in the schema x?), maybe
identities for pentagons and hexagons like the ones here
But perhaps this is too predictable—big K’s and little k’s vary in size in any way I
please, and for k’s, also in shape. Identity rules are useless because they don’t
change shapes when I use them to calculate, but they make up for this because they
change what I see. Useless rules have uses—critical ones. Evidently, this goes in
some sense for shapes and symbols alike, as I’ve already suggested for identities
such as NP ? NP that divide sentences into phrases and words. But sentences and
other things made with symbols come with invariant divisions in place—fixing parts
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 745
is just grouping symbols. Shapes, in contrast, are utterly undivided. Of course,
identities aren’t the only kind of useless rules. There are useless rules that separate
shapes and symbols more emphatically, and that show how they differ. In the right
circumstances, all rules are useless in this way.
In computer science (the theory of formal languages and automata), any rule in a
formal grammar (Turing machine) is useless when it contains a non-generating
symbol or an unreachable one [Hopcroft et al. 2001: 256–259]. Unreachable
symbols provide another way to show how rules work in shape grammars. In
outline, the core idea is this—a symbol is reachable when it’s in the initial string of
a grammar or recursively, in the right-hand side of a rule that has only reachable
symbols in its left-hand side. This doesn’t seem very hard—maybe my initial string
is SSS, and my rules are these five: S ? AB, C ? BD, AD ? ABC, A ? a,
B ? b. Starting with S, then recursively S, A, B, and concluding, S, A, B, a, b are
the reachable symbols. So, C and D are unreachable, and C ? BD and AD ? ABC
are useless rules that I’m free to delete. The grammar works fine without them. This
is unremarkable for unreachable symbols—there’s no way to apply the rules in
which they occur. But is this the case if symbols are shapes? Can I tell when shapes
are unreachable or not? Let’s see how it goes if I try to discard useless rules in shape
grammars. With shapes, there are bound to be some surprises.
Suppose I start with the initial shape
and then calculate as usual in shape grammars with the rule
in the transformation schema x ? t(x), that translates a square back and forth
746 G. Stiny
And suppose, too, that I absentmindedly add the rule
in x ? t(x), and also from this schema, the inverse
to translate a triangle back and forth, as well
The triangle in the left-hand sides of these rules is neither in the initial shape—
obviously there are three squares, if I apply the erasing rule for squares to eliminate
them one at a time (this is the proper way to count things, isn’t it?)—nor at any
place I’m able to see in the right-hand side of the rule that moves a square. Triangles
aren’t squares—it’s pretty clear, the triangle is definitely unreachable, and the rules
are undeniably useless. My mistake. (The corresponding identity rule is twice
useless—first, it’s an identity, and then, the triangle is unreachable). But let’s see if
it’s prudent to say this. If I try the rule
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 747
on the largest square and on the smallest square in the shape
in that order, I get this series of shapes
that ends with a Pythagorean figure—that unmistakable symbol of number,
rationality, and usefulness. What would students learn in grade school and beyond,
especially in STEM subjects, if there were no Pythagorean theorem? But also, it’s
good for art, as Lionel March shows powerfully in A Book of Kells [2012]. The
748 G. Stiny
Pythagorean theorem is about right triangles and their sides. It’s the formula
everyone knows by heart and can recite effortlessly. It’s easy to say in words
a2 þ b2 ¼ c2
But this is merely letters and numbers—32 ? 42 = 52. What made the triangle
appear as if by magic, when I started out with three squares, as counting confirms? I
can apply the rule
to translate the triangle and thereby calculate some more to get
and this hardly seems useless. In fact, it might be very useful. And I can go on in
this manner to move the triangle again
That’s kind of strange—who would ever have imagined such a thing? Now my first
rule for squares
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 749
the one that was so useful before, is useless. I suppose this can happen with
symbols, too, but then it must be forever. I can use the inverse
twice to retrieve three squares that pop out all at once, and then move them
separately in multiple ways (eight ways for each to be exact, corresponding to the
symmetry of the square). I guess useless/useful rules can turn into useful/useless
ones, and then switch back again—and, surely, in endless ways. (This is a
marvelous source of plots that are worthy of Wilde). A trio of useless rules—two
with an unreachable triangle and one with an unreachable square—that I assumed I
could discard with nary a qualm, are perfectly useful in obvious ways but at
different times. I must be missing something vital—visual calculating and symbolic
calculating can’t be so distant. Calculating is calculating, isn’t it? This seems
reasonable—everyone takes it for granted—but it’s probably a mistake, even for
simple things. It’s more likely just the opposite.
But maybe this is simply a misunderstanding. Maybe squares and triangles are
really four lines and three lines, respectively, as I was told in school. Why not use
these visual analogies (spatial relations)? There must be a good reason for them,
although my teachers were totally baffled when I asked for one—why bother about
this? And I guess my teachers knew best. It seems lines can be like symbols (0-
dimensional elements) in visual analogies for squares and triangles, and work just
like units as I calculate, so that visual calculating is the same as symbolic
calculating. Being practical—taking things as in themselves they really are—works
wonders. (This lets me approach my Pythagorean figure as Wittgenstein does a
Necker cube using constituents related in alternative ways, and skirt what he does
adding polygons, in reverie it would seem in terms of embedding. This highlights
the key difference between set grammars for spatial relations and shape grammars
[Stiny 1982]. I tried the latter, but failed to distinguish useful and useless rules).
The initial shape, exploded a little bit to separate ‘‘symbols’’, is 12 lines
750 G. Stiny
that are all units, and my three rules, also in exploded versions, are
Lines are reachable—they’re in my initial shape and the only symbols in my
rules—and so, no rule is useless, even if it’s hard to imagine how rules for triangles
might be used. That’s the reason to calculate—to find out—and when I do,
everything works
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 751
‘‘Education is an admirable thing’’—if I keep strictly to the lines in squares and
triangles. But are these visual analogies really a sure thing? Do I need to add any
more details to be positive that they’re complete? And how and when do I know
this? Consider the little triangles in red—the so-called ‘‘emergent’’ ones
I should be able to move them, as well—with embedding I can, if triangles are
undivided and not lines that are symbols in a visual analogy. And what about the
emergent square in red
752 G. Stiny
In fact with these surprises, my three rules should all be useful. But I can’t move
either of the triangles or the square because they don’t have sides—lines (symbols)
put in by my rules—or they have fewer sides than they need. And suppose they did
have sides, then what would happen to the lines in my three initial squares and in the
triangle they contain? How many additional rules are necessary to make any of this
work? All of a sudden, things seem to be getting awfully complicated—simply
trying to move squares and triangles around. Neither individual shapes nor shapes in
rules can be described before I calculate. It may be that squares and triangles are
actually lines, but how do I know which ones? Can I find out just by looking at my
initial shape and my rules? This is OK in formal grammars—symbols are given in
advance and are always the same—but it seems useless in shape grammars. I can’t
decide what I’ll see before I’ve seen it, and I need embedding and rules for this. In
shape grammars, I have to calculate to find out if the shape in the left-hand side of a
rule is reachable or not—it’s never enough to look at the initial shape and the other
rules—and this makes it hard, no, it makes it impossible, to tell. There’s nothing I
can do before I try my rules, to find out what’s going to happen next. Visual
analogies and other descriptions aren’t a reliable way to start. They rarely work and
are usually misleading without calculating first. There are untold possibilities that
are worth knowing—but for most, this means going on. They can’t be taught.
The use of embedding makes a huge difference. Once again, useless rules turn
out to be useful. And this may be it for uselessness—it’s easy to cook up examples
like mine for squares and triangles for any polygons, and in fact, for any shapes
made up of linear elements. There are endless things to see, but this, no doubt, is
enough for now. It seems visual calculating with shape grammars isn’t the same as
symbolic calculating with Turing machines. In the latter, symbols are as in
themselves they really are—is this the end of Wilde and his wanton aesthetic
method, and of painting, and art and design? I suppose calculating isn’t seeing, after
all—unless calculating as in itself it really is not. That’s what I’ve been trying to
show. I said so parenthetically, at the start of this essay, but perhaps there’s a more
expressive way to put it. Seeing (embedding) is impressive purely—that’s clear
enough—and there’s a corollary, too
Shapes aren’t symbols, alone or in combination.
This is key for Wilde’s aesthetic method, and the center of painting, and art and
design. Shapes are seamless—they’re divided again and again on the fly, in another
way every time I try a rule to calculate with what I see. It’s what makes modes of
reverie and mood possible, with countless changes and contradictions. Seeing—
using shape grammars—goes on in ever shifting ways, that no one can know in
advance. Embedding animates Wilde’s artist/critic. This is the importance of
calculating without symbols.
(I asked Gips to look at my Pythagorean example for unreachable squares and
triangles, and beyond my influence, he described it so
The squares. Just floating [drifting] down into the Pythagorean figure. And
then those two triangles. The first time you see it, it’s a total surprise. Once
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 753
you’ve seen it and look again, there is an inevitability, a destiny to it. A Greek
tragedy for calculating with symbols. The inevitable outcome of its tragic
flaws [2015].
The Greek spirit is the source of Wilde’s artist/critic, whose descriptions are always
true. I like this one because it contrasts shapes and symbols as the former leads to
surprises that the latter can’t handle, and surely within Wilde’s critical compass,
reverie and mood go anywhere embedding desires. Unexpected or not, tragedy is
inescapable as long as symbols describe shapes fully and once and for all in terms of
what’s already known. No matter the effort put into this, shapes exceed anything
that’s fixed in advance. Shapes are ineffably sublime).
Whenever I talk about shape grammars, someone invariably feels compelled to
explain to all and sundry everything that I’ve misunderstood—as I ought to.
Sometimes this is with a lesson to learn about how things really are, and sometimes,
it’s with sincere regret, as if I’m lost desperately in a personal (psychotic) reverie.
Aficionados of the arts sigh and wring their hands—he just doesn’t get it. Scientists
and engineers aren’t much better, and may be worse—who told you, you could
calculate like that? Ah, the strange conventions of science, but I prefer to see for
myself. No matter who stands up, they’re keen to recite the same old, useful
information, propaganda that’s become hard fact. It seems little more than blind
prejudice
Art is breaking the rules!
The mere utterance of this formula makes me cringe, and it must—again, I haven’t
been misunderstood. But somehow it ensures that art and calculating are
irredeemably apart. It seems art breaks the rules, so it can’t be calculating, because
it only follows the rules. Maybe so for symbolic calculating, but this isn’t so for
visual calculating, where breaking a rule simply means trying another one, or using
familiar rules in new ways. That’s why Wilde’s aesthetic method provides a
valuable introduction to shape grammars. Wilde’s critic as artist sees the object as in
itself it really is not—with rules, I’m free to see in this way, as well, exactly as I
please. I can draw two squares and then see four triangles, or pentagons, hexagons,
and K’s and k’s, etc. There’s simply no end to breaking the rules. Ambiguity and
like uncertainties—change, contradiction, incompleteness, inconsistency, etc.—are
the nub. Some of my protagonists promote this, some don’t. But getting them to
agree isn’t the problem—the trick is to exploit ambiguity, as I calculate. This
requires embedding, so that any rule I try works. Whether I’m consistent or not
doesn’t make any difference—I can go on. Nothing blocks my way. It’s worth
repeating—rules apply with no inherent memory, so I’m seeing for the first time,
every time I look. And what I see—anything at all—corresponds to a rule. There’s
no way around this, because what I see is a shape. Of course, the insistent question
remains of whether I can predict the rule I’ll try next or not. In answering this, I
invariably opt for not—picking a rule to use is exactly the same as putting an
interpretation into a Rorschach test. Ballard’s goal of using brain computation to
explain Michelangelo and Shakespeare isn’t as crazy as it sounds. Each of us
754 G. Stiny
calculates in a unique way, as ‘‘a function of [our] whole personality and [our]
whole previous history’’. Brain computation may do the job, but not without
Michelangelo and Shakespeare as artists who can’t be described, and critics to see
their pictures and plays, etc. Artist-computers aren’t enough. This may be
reassuring, but it’s irrelevant. The rule I try, whatever it is, works now, no matter
what I see without ever having to re-describe this in another way tailored to the
rule. How do I do that? Rules forget what I’ve seen and neglect my plans; they
needn’t respect the past to work, or anticipate what’s to come. Embedding lets me
drift freely in an open-ended process, to play myself fully. It’s the way Wilde’s
critic works—as an artist.
In an earlier essay, I asked the question
What rule(s) should I use?’’
and gave the seemingly cavalier response
Use any rule(s) you want, whenever you want to [2011: 15].
But this is a far from trivial answer—in visual calculating with shape grammars, I
can try any rule I want, to get a result. This is evident for useless rules—especially,
for identity rules in the schema x ? x, that let me see freely in any way. And my
schemas provide heuristics to define an unlimited repertoire of rules that add to
Wilde’s modes of reverie and mood, and to Alberti’s landscapes dense with the
contours and outlines of real and fancied things. This can’t help but include the
novel and unexpected. I drift with every passion, to see as I please. In fact, I’ve
already given three primary schemas that are a productive place to start. These are
the part schema x ? prt(x), the transformation schema x ? t(x), and the boundary
schema x ? b(x) [2011: 17]. From these, I can define more in six ways, in terms of
subsets, copies, inverses, adding, composition, and Boolean combination—there
are, no doubt, other ways, as well. For example, my primary schemas yield the
coloring book schema
x ! x þ b�1ðxÞ
when I add the subset x ? x of x ? prt(x) or x ? t(x) to the inverse of x ? b(x).
For a building plan in lines, this does poche for walls or fills in rooms, depending on
the shape I assign to the variable x. Going from one to the other is something like an
epiphany or Gestalt switch. There are rules for anything I wish, for insight and
delight—surprises abound. (In reverie, I sometimes match up the heuristic force of
schemas and embedding with that of Harold Bloom’s six ‘‘revisionary ratios’’
[1997: 14–16]. I try other matchups, too, but in this one, revision—seeing again—is
key, and then acting on what I see, even doing nothing. Bloom meets the extrav-
agant eye with description, and ‘‘When [one] describes [one] is a poet’’ [Wilde
1982: 361]—‘‘the turbulence of the sublime needs representation lest it overwhelm
us’’ [Bloom 2011: 21]. Greek weavers tried to ban instability early on, and my rules
offer temporary refuge in trees and graphs, in topologies, and in other kinds of ad
The Critic as Artist: Oscar Wilde’s Prolegomena to Shape… 755
hoc structure. But this isn’t what rules are for; they let me go on, in ways that alter
everything I see. The sublime won’t be calmed).
My schemas and rules are also an effective way to teach art and design that
values Wilde’s outlook on education, and they include use. Shape grammars assume
Wilde’s aesthetic method without loss to the other two-thirds of the Vitruvian
canon. Separately, Firmness and Commodity are equal to Delight. This has been a
durable standard in architecture, and it’s not too bad for art and design, with varying
weight on each of its three categories—after all, art is architecture. But typically,
computers exhaust Firmness and Commodity; they handle the necessities of
common use, with scant attention to Delight. Still, there are alternative standards—I
can try the thoroughly modernist formula
Firmness þ Commodity ¼ Delight
Not surprisingly, early applications of computers in architecture—no, applications
even today—invoke this formula confidently. And there’s immense truth in it—
useful things can work in very beautiful ways, as in themselves they really are. At
heart, I’m actually an engineer. But shape grammars include Delight in Wilde’s
aesthetic (critical) sense. That’s the really hard problem to crack by calculating, but
it seems it’s bad manners to try. That’s the reason I focus on it a lot, to the exclusion
of Firmness and Commodity. This is wrong, and I know it. It’s lucky for me that
there’s an easy fix already in place—remember that symbolic calculating with
Turing machines (computers) is a special case of visual calculating with shape
grammars. As a result, both Firmness and Commodity are categories I know how to
use, at least to the extent that anyone else does. It’s high time to pay attention to this,
and to apply shape grammars in art and design to embrace the entire Vitruvian
canon with its three coequal categories in this expression
Firmness þ Commodity þ Delight
There’s a lot to calculate in each category alone, or as they go together in diverse
ways. Sundry visual techniques and symbolic ones have been tried for all of this that
allow for the categories to interact reciprocally in n-ary relations to define designs—
and many of these devices for shape grammars have been around for a longtime.
There’s an excess of useful promise. I can use shape grammars to see the object as
in itself it really is not, as I pay equal attention to its use. And Wilde may not be
very far behind—at least this possibility is worth considering anon
Ernest. Ah! You admit, then, that the critic may occasionally be allowed to see
the object as in itself it really is.
Gilbert. I am not quite sure. Perhaps I may admit it after supper. There is a
subtle influence in supper [1982: 371].
756 G. Stiny
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George Stiny is Professor of Design and Computation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. He joined the Department of Architecture in 1995 after 16 years on the
faculty of the University of California, Los Angeles, and currently heads the PhD program in Design and
Computation at MIT. Educated at MIT and at UCLA, where he received a PhD in Engineering, Stiny has
also taught at the University of Sydney, the Royal College of Art (London), and the Open University. His
work on shape and shape grammars is widely known for both its theoretical insights linking seeing and
calculating, and its striking applications in design practice, education, and scholarship. Stiny’s third book
is Shape: Talking about Seeing and Doing (The MIT Press, 2006); he is the author of Pictorial and
Formal Aspects of Shape and Shape Grammars (Birkhauser, 1975), and (with James Gips) of Algorithmic
Aesthetics: Computer Models for Criticism and Design in the Arts (University of California Press, 1978).
758 G. Stiny