SEP 16 1954

BY WAR DOWNOFIFloro AT 3 YEAR r '7EnV t:.l.S; I

tJ( t ,. SSHI£O i rCi!;:' , _n HS I W_O_D_lli_5M.~W 1

HISTORY

THE EMPLOYMENT OF V-WEAPONS

THE GERMANS DURING WORLD n '

~__________ ~ ________~

BY

LlEUT COLONEL M.C .HELFERS

DRAFT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

·.~

SU"3JZCT: Transmittal of ~; onograph

Commandant Command & General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

8 September

Forwarded with for retention is l

The

r~--. , ,r.,r If ... ... \.T""""1:"1. . ~' i .t.f 1 .. ... .. "l\I

_'-II" D!E1. t,':'::'v . .,\,,1 -- .. _-- -_ .... . --... ... UCFE"?JtEN

Colonel, Infan

ODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZFD

HIS 1954IN REPLY REFER TO:

TO:

____ copy~

of " Employrr:en t of V-,Veapons by t he Germans during Jor l d ~ ~ar II."

here ~

FCR 'l'HE cm::.'" OF :rHLIT.~RY EI3TORY:

"- 'r -;rCl " .......

l ' · /\ ~.-) -'1-_- ' -7.--I, - , ----- -_ _- -• A. -' /'// / -,.-~i..'"?__l~-

~Incl(J) C. D. a/s Copy~ No(~) _""_' Lt. tr ~'34=____

::;)

THE EMPLOYMENT OF V ,lYEAPCNS BY THE GERMANS -)URHr G iNGRID 7iAR II

by

Colonel M. 0, II&lfsl's

,- j ,f'ij",, ........... f! ..... ~_if_t)_7_1..,...,.3...,.n-e-F.·-llI-~--.-"V-'t'_'L_S_i' "_M_""'_""_"'_'" 1 ct~,Ij)~)[tlm Ali'1',Ef< 12 Yt.Al'I5. "-1, . .. I! Jo.,',' , .~OD D. 1R 16200.10 QC'ILJI b!!$Ii41W .- . 1

{

! THIS MGJ'OCRAPH MAY NOT BE

REPRODUqED,. ]}J I¥ROLE OR IN PART WITHOUT THE PEPJHSSIJ1J OF THE

CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY

Copy No. 3 t of 50 copies.

,Office of the Chief of Military History Departmsnt of the Army

'.\I'ashington 25, D.C.

-

i ' ' ________ __ __ .... ~

I '

[p,REFACE

:rhe te~pical aspects of German V-weaponsr..ave been covered :in

l:i"t.e.rally hunqf"eds of published books and magazine

" :" "w t" ~t ,: '

~j,,~LLj{~~~f ~~u.

food for thoug)1t 18 to Lov; p:rtcosent day ~,nd future guided missil·~s shot;ld

be conuni tted in time of 'nur. The t:,rm "food for thought" is PUrpo[·,el::

used, for G:::rman cxpericmces with V-';'feapons, as any past happenings,

must be studied in their entire background beforo any lessons valid for

today and tomorrow can be dra....m fro"l t.hem. ',ihat may and might have

been good for the Germans during ·;rorl.d ';-rar II is net necessarily good

for us to;]ayl

This monograph is based on official German source material whc:re

such was readily avnilable. 301e; reliance on official documents, h ovrevel' ,

would have rcsulted in a study which lacked continuity. It has thereforo

b:::on nocess.:1ry to borrow rathe r GxtensiVGly from previously publishod

material on German V-wc

was the spot research assistance of >Ir. D~Jtmar H. Finke, Mrs. l!~gna

Bauor, .2.nd Lt. Thoma.s C. f:line. Prc;::,ublic.qtion revie"w of the manu

script by Brig. General P. M. Robinett and Lt. Colonel John F. Freund

grc3tlyassisted the writer in deciding on its final content. Tho

maps, sketches, and dia grams were drawn b:;r }~r. Frank Vogel, and the

typin g was done by Mrs. Ha ttic C • Smith.

1:. C. HELFERS Lt. Colonel, Infantry Chicff, Foreign Studies Branch

31 l:ay 1954 ,f',

HAPS F'o. cing Pn. (~C

1. Operational Planning for the CO!nlnitmcnt of V-l's

from Germany by LXV Corps (Early October 1944) •••••••••••••••• 40

2. V-l Op2rational Lrcas (.~:id-Octob8r 1944) •••.•••••••.•••••••••••• 42

3. "Pr'o'p'dsG'd~ V-2' L.q'°Y''':Ou:t' 'in' "N ortheOrn France •..•••...•.......•'.• •0'••••0 58

4. V":'2" 'Ope'r'a\:ional Command 'Set-Up" (Scp 19Lr4~)IU 19.t.,} ......•.....• 70

5. ·V..:.2 'Opc"r'a'tions (1 Sop 1944 -- I Oct 1944) ••••••••••••••.' •• .- •• 0. ~ •• 72

6. Si tUc:1tion Map: 901st Lrtillcry Regiment z. V. (Ntz.)

(}leorch 1945) •••••••••••0_ ................... ~ ................... 82

Placing V-l on Launching Dolly.•••••••••••.•..•.•••••..••••••••••••• 30

Preparing V-2 for Launching•••••••••••••••••.• ~ •••••••• ; .••••••••••• 66

V-2 Ready for Launching••.••.••••••••••••.....•• ~' .••.••••••••••••.•• 74

V-l era tcr and Damage, London, 9 l!.ugus t 19/+4•••••••••••••••••••••••• 92

V-2 Crater and Damage, /~ntY1erp, 28 December 1944•..................• 94

'r:Je his-tory of the Ger;.nan V-1veapon fi.eld cOITc,l1and be gins in the f311

of 1943. A t that tin,e the Germans es tima ted tha t both the 7-1 (a :JulE~e

jet-pro''lelled flying bOr.lb) and the V-2 (a liquid-fuel roc]~et) l?lould ~Je

re.3.d~y .for action at about the same tir~e (early 1~)',4) from the sr:n-:1e ~I'(:ne~'lal

'T "1.-. F ) . t rh al +'''1 (""e ~ (~ruthern ,,!,':",- a" a'n "1:1)2.. Tea ( 1'Ilor"GlJ.ern ranee agalDS'.1 ·uL.e E3';we gener uc

------

~ .~ ~ ~I. ~ ;,i:

.~ .~. "'::'; ~.' ~ t.

~ ~ ~. : ~~...... '

-., ~. ,: .- --' bOl"nbing a ttacl~s, ~etore tte .7Iea?001 wns '. fl\lly emplace,'l. 12: January 1',)~-5 the

--reapon ~[..,a~ n:3uc~e~sfu11yn '~mpl~y~d '~r"rith A'sbortenAd barrr:l ~~:.~3inst LuxGmbourC- Ci ty and hnti,·vero, r(:~aching in these tvYO cOmT1i t:"lSD ts a maximum ra.ng8

cf 35 :·:~;,les. (I'ornberf.::er, 'ler (~eh~ ins ;'e1 tall, 'Op. 265-266, and Pa tton,

jar As I Kne'1,r..r It, pp. 210-211.)

b~3 controlled in the field. St~~ff ~lanning 2nd conf~rences between t(l2 Army

and the Air Force on this matt(·;r lafjted until the end of ~~ovember, 9.1'::1 on

1 December 1943 Hi. tIer signed a directive which desif?:;n;;t t0d the ill Armee 2

Korps, !.~. Y.., as the flGCl rlquarters respon,3ible for the co,w~i t~:je~"]t 'Jf all long-range 'weapons ag0.inst ~ngland. The ConFitander in Chief, ,{,,1St, yras

desi gna ted the imri1e~ia te superi.or of tLe Cor:lrnanding Gen:::ral, LXV Corns,

and 7:as authorized to issue all necessary orders concerning preparations

for the commi trnent of V-weapons to hea~Jquarters of the Air Force) Navy,

Organization Tod-t, and Reich Labor '"3ervice located in his area. (1\ copy

of this :lirf~ctive and of the dcta:L1Ad instru.ctions in this matter issn8ej

by the Armr:Jd ?orc-~s High Command, tr;-1nslated from 6.n extant copy in the

"Naval ~~ehrer Dirsctives," is to be found in .1\~"'pendix L .• )

Since the LXV Corps ~.~las to com:. and both Army and Air Force uni.t,s ~nd

,:-?!11ploy 17eapons 3ev21oped by both services,.3 a joint Army-Air Force head

quarters ~r.Jas orga.nized. The det2.ils of the orc:anization of this special

corps headquarters were worked 01J.t by ·the Gr[;anization Branc~~, of the

German )rmy General Staff and pL blish0d on 22 T\Tovember 1943. The corps

2. LXV Lrmee Korps, z.b.V., prooerly trG.nslated would be LXV Infantr;r corps for Special-Er;plo;yment: tll~ z.b.V. standing for tte German uzur besonderen--V;;rwendung. n For !:)"u.rposes of simplici ty plain LX~j Corps is used in this narra tive.

http:superi.or

cOimn;:md2r ",'Ins to come from the I,rmYj

Force. 'ib; operations officer anc1 thE supply officer ',vere: to be f1ll"nished

by the Army. The intelUg,;nce officer -:'8.5 to come from h.ir ?':rc.:, ;:1~ tLourh

'i;" 'Jt?rman staff organiza.tion he naturally",as under the operations cfficer.

In goneral, the headquartt?rs ','V'as l-)]'canized on a carefully worl:ed out ,joint

bases. "I1flen the chief of 0. section C"1.';l(" fro.:n the Army, l"is deputy ca:"l8

from the ilir Force. Even cleri.c9.1 !'CCrsonnel '.'fe.s (tuite e:qually :livide(~,

altbough in the end a~Jout two-thirfJs the beadquartcrs car:2 frOl'1 tLo i.rmy.l)l

The constr,uction tschnicians were to bi=: furnished by OrEanization Tout; the

V-,;earon tecLnicioiDs b:{ the Army and Air Force agencles which had devFloped

CO'(lLand of the LXV CorDS 1l[:lS giv·:m to Lt. C~neral ;rich, Eeine'nann, 3.

62-y'coar old a.rtillerYl'lan ':!ho prev"Lously l:ad beeD t~onman:Jant of the Artill.2ry

Scheol E',nc1 wDo,',-as eonsidered spi3ciall;,r su.! table for this position :» virtue

vf j;is c:xperience i;-c d?vising tactical l.lcthods for handling new ?,rtillJry

1,'!:?apons. T;l2 posi tion of chief of 3 tc;ff ~!"Jas given to Air Force r;oloDel

'2:ugen --Falter. ThE' op'r'ations cff),csr "as, I,t. Colonel the:ne~r0r, '.11'

1'i:6 V-":'18apOn fi.eld CQ1l!l1and ~[~Lich actually functioned as such until

1 3e;)tember 1944 W2S the folloyring:

uNclASSlf~LD (Gene::: :::::nann)

V-l Opera ti ons V-2 Lattc:.rs

155th Flak ~ecinlent Senior Artillery CommandGr (Colonel 'Iachtel) 191 (Cen2ral Hetz)

On 12 lecerr.~er 1943 c,enc3ral 'L{einemann and Colonel ~!alter '.vere briefed

on the V-l and the V-2 by E'emb0rS of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and

the Air Force Genernl Staff. Colonel ';valter, 'l:ho has ~"lri tten a post--,"Jar

n.'1rrative on V->Jeapons,5 stat8s that the briefil1:g '."las superficial and that

l1si thE'r b8 nor General Eoinen:ann ha-:-1 had any previous kn01:l1cdge of the

c;xistencG and development of th.~;S.2 Vleapons.

Hr-:'ajquartcrs of LXV Corps moved to France sLo~tly after its organiza

tion and es tablisr..ed i ts command pos t :~l t St. G8rr.J.ain, ncar the Headquarters

of the Commander in Chief, l';st. Jurine" '~h8 first ~alf 8f 194/+ it :prirnarily

supervised. the construction of V-l lau.nching si tGS, r~ff(~cting rnan~- changes

and modifica.tions in the elaborate constrl:ction initia11~/ ordered by tl~8

Air Force ':i:echnical 3ervice. Tte traininE 3nd other prepara tions of V-l

fie ld uni ts '.~las carried ou t by- the 155tr: Flak Ee giFlsnt, -'.'!rich 'vas alr~'ady

5.' )f.S # B-689, ItV--Ys>apons." This n~anuscript is an item. in the G=rl1lan :tranusoript Coll'?ction held by the Offi.ce cf the Shief ,of rJili tary History. In trv; "Pr(·face" Colonel 'Falter sta.tos tha't his riarratt ...vG is reconstructed from ~1e'.nor'- an,d tho, t l"",e c.?,l'I1'}ot vouch for thr; pr:~cisc d~curac}," of any figures, . locali ttcs: and (~~ tos. He does aece-,~t r.;sponsibili ty for th~ ·~::s.s:~ntial-trl'.tb of his ~eGcriptior.. Colon~l 'Y':ll ter' s fi €::urcB, loe-ali ties, an r l !ja tcs, 'Nben us("~d in t~lis study, !~'av8 been checked 8.gatnst official records ano other sources, :::tnd corrocted 71Len necessary.

http:Lattc:.rs

':['-18 spli t into tV·IO sections, on,,; establishec~ in tt-:y ~~if'?l area 3[~'~ Ol'}O in

~ . '") s cl: 8 'je~S_lh••••___

-----_._.

j~t t~;.e time LX~T Corp Y!as organiz~~d, it -~'!9S the intention ·.')f the i'rmod

Fcrces 0P:;;I'L1 tions St:.ti'.f to divide V-:~ matters ':J(. tv/c'en a 2.I com, :anG and a

6field co.n.'and. Ji.t first, Gen(:'ral ,~lt2r ~or~b0rgsr h0ged to unite ~oth

thGSG CO('EID.nds in ilis ov.n pors on l,n~L;l' t: ,8 ~h_l?,l ti tIs, S ~)eci21 Army Com

r~1lSc)J_OnLr for 7-2 b~atters ~rLl Senior Artil1..;ry CO~l1Inander 191. ro~r:sver,

technical IX oblems in the deve lopmcl1 t of tbe 'V-2 de'.;-_and2C"1 30 r,nJ.cll ci l~,is

6. The sinCLlla l" posi. tion of GenEl'21 Jornber f.!cr in V-2 ma ttc::c,s is brought out i~ Cha,~tc·;r III. ~s -~vas ar'point2d S'-)(?cial ).rmy· Commissi oner for V-2 Ea tters anr : .3eni or Artillery· CO:!l:Tlanr)E~'r 191 on 1 3e rtembr-:-r 1:]':f3.

-5

~~N'~ r ;'~" ~ ~ '~, -, ... ,;- "T

.'

~ • .t-.. J,.~,

time th;:;;. t hn soon r ,,~·slized ho could not hold d01,vn both joQs. Thus on -: f "'"

'was appointC.'~ 'senior !1rtillcry COr.lrnander 191.

Cbncral Jornbergc;:t' could. nsvcr h:l,VC: ;''ivcn it. The ~;fforts 0f tJ::u t-'!O ':7cre

to Lave complemen ted ::.3.ch othc r. Ins t.:;ad there '·,'as cO!1siderabI0 fric ti on

of 1943 ·J..-1Cld b2EUn to take ,'111 unusuel int2r::-'st in tb.2 V-2, notic:3d tr.is

fricti-on. ,ihen after th(; :3 tt(Jmpt':;'d as:::'.3sina tion of Hi tl;~:r on 28 July 1944

. Hi;nmler 'was appoln tc d COGl£~,ander of th,:; Replacement Army, 3,3 Genc:ral Karnmlsr

tOll. days ~·r.itnessed almost l:ttar cO'~'fusion in th~ V-2 field cOIn.,and set-up.

But by 1 3f)ptembcr, i'olloYring nu;-,~~, rous n:CSSClces be b'reen LXV Corns .3nc1 tL.e

j\rmed Forces Opera tions 3ta ~f and a stormy Y:l::;cting in Brussels on 31 J\Lgtlst

bet111cen Generals ~ornber1?:.:r .3nd ~1c~tz, C~oloncl ".:"p.,lt';r, anj ,3S Ccneral

Ka!If11l1cr, tbe latt3r c(tJ.c:rgcl.i in comc1and of all V-2 opcr3tions. tnifj.·::o

for almos -c a yr..::ar, thus C8)IH; to an .:::n.J tcn.pJ:rarily.

provis(:d a l-·:.:aclqua:rtcrs at Brussels, arId the first V-2 in combat \'{as ac

tually launched on 8 September'. It. Y!2.S soOn r2ali?ied that a lc;rt,;e:r and

bet-sc:r organized h2a(~.J.s.uarters WetS n,:.icded, c'1nd on 30 Septe:.1ber the Army

High COJr'!3nd, at Einl.rnl...:r's instance, issued instr'Llctions for the organi-

UNClASS\ftED

~. f·....... ,\7 7

za vlon o~ .l.JlV1G10n z. v. S8· General

namGd clivision COI!lJr13nc!cr.

LXV Corps H,:?adql1art~_rs, 'which :3.ft~'r 1 SGptember continued to bo

it. ~::.;port(]d tha t V-l opera tions coulrj scon be rc:sumcd from !J.2V'J' launching

sites in Hollor,d and Germany. On 21 Cc'cobcr the fi:::-'st c.Jntinental V-I

target, Bru.ssels, was hi t. In the mean time, on 19 October, LXV Cor8s was

l"c:d':signated ill. ~ Korps, ~.£.y'., pr·\.~sumably for rr-:asons of Je:ccption.

Genc;ral Heinemann ~rJas rcli8V'cd of cO~:1..manr1 ,of ttlis corps on 26 October, to

be folla."led b~/ Gcncrsl von Trr;skO'N (until l5 November) and O8nc.1 )[;1 Ylo.J'l'el,

'.-:bcn xz:~, Ccrps :'iJ.:::S rolieved of i ts V-l field corcunand. Part of th:3 corps

staff "(',,ras used in organizing t:· e 5tl-1. Flak Di visio:1, 'which b(JCanle the 7-1

It T0S not long before SS Genor21 ham:r:11,:~r -;:;·:t.ended his pCYIJ2rS to include

cO~ltrol OV:!l~ 'V-l opera tions. This he ,Ji ..~ by l:avtn&, th ..; !~rmed Forc8~-) O~I-:-::'a-

tions 3taff (iirc:ct the Orf~[1niz8.tion.. of ';,·!hat ';I:JS s;:tlled Jirmec Korps ~.y.,

fie Id cormnarv) '.vf.'ich t~xi.s t2d un ti 1 30 };~,z.rch 1945, .. ?!hen Eirmnl:jr OrdR!'c~d the

c:..'ssa ti on of all. V-~"Jea pan OpOT"2 ti ODS, ".;,?,S the follorJing:

7. Here the abbrav:Lation cl·.;arly stsncis for t!zur V2rg21tung, IT meaning Bror reprisal."

-7

--------

ArfiK'(; Korns z. V. · (SS General Karunler)

V-l_ Opera tions V-2 Operati~

•fth• ~ T"\. • Division z. V • r'l k :J1. VlS10n Colonel 'Jolf) (53 Gene r3:1 Ka~111sr)

'rhe V-~7eapon field ,coITliuand now '"r:.S unified once more, tJlis time

though under an SS man who, according to Genera1._Dornb\~rg2r, h,sr1 fl truly

fantas tic mili tar~'- career, p:irticularly since he h~1d never served a day

.. . 8 as a soldier arid had had no mili tary t-r2'lnlng wha tsoev2r. j\n or'ler signed

by tl:o Chief of the Armed Forces Cpera ti on,s :s taft · on 31 Janu£':t';r s t~. ted

tha t n tar ge ts f'0r t-h~se IJ:7 '1f!~3apOns '~7ill be r)csi gna ted by t.he Arm2d ForC0S Opor3tions Staff accor'dii1g to tb2 diroctions of fji tleU. H This cn'dr:r

also :-~esigYlated tbe chain of comr:

b;;gan to ':,~lSe himsr.;lf out of the V....;weapon organizftior. On 11 Ar)ril he

i~:;sued his las t or~ler to Corps ~. V., dirocting th~ t 'wha t ·t,N~~ left# of it,

sp'.:C!ifically Division z.V., be reor}~:anizcd at onCG into an artil1:'~1':r corps

23 part of Provisional 'L~rmy Blum:?ntritt in Holland. Prior to iA~is, rCrlDants

of V-lr;capon uni ts had been org~:11ized i.nt.o rcplaccr;lcnt uni ts. Nlany of these

'ended the 1,~!sr' as infantry. Tt:8 last of the former V--',-c;[lpon uni ts s1J.rr:-.:nder

(Jf B-3 having esc:lped to Bavaria. ;~:i8 en t. from the V-"~:"2.pon sc;:;ne "'r~lS as

nbrupt as -::03 his ~·ltrance.

The ch8rt beloy! illustrates the fluctuations in the centrc~lization

of the ClCrrnan 1"J-7::apon field cont 'and. Tbe V-l y.r~JS ;}eveloptJd by the l\ir

Force; t.he V-2 b::r tl:'G Arr.1Y. F;~om 2~ i~ovGmb:ar 19L~3 to 31 Augus t 194.4, tho

field comrnano of both -'!':JaDons ;,yas unifi8d under LXV Cor~s, 3. joint Army

-:':'r:,~"pons '."Tors ccrnmi tte:J sC·,Jo.ra t:~ly in the field. Such unifie·j effort DS

ey:is tGd during this time ~:.,as at Armod Forc2s lev(;l •. j,i'rom 28 Janu.ary 1944

to the end of the V-vleapon calTl pa:l gn t}~c commi tnL~~ t of the two 'weapons "':78.S

llnified ag3.in,. this time though under an iD2xperienced poli tical general.

In brief, the V-yr(2':"i!/on field comJland VI2.S unified at first, then seDarated~

tLt:~, vnified D.gain, and finally complctelJ' dis,organized.

-9

http:sC�,Jo.ra

'

THE EMPLOYMZNT OF THE V-IUNC. ... 'LASSIFlliiter II.

The s tory of the ori gin of the German . ,V-l is S omewha t shrouded in

uncertainty, particularly wi th reference to exact names and dates. The

theory behind the V-I, essentially a pilotless aircraft, goes back as

far as ~for1d ~."{ar I, during which, ,pioneer pilotless aircraft were designed

by the Allies to carry explosives behind the German lines. It was the

Germans though who first applied the theory in combat in the form of a

fl:y~ng bomb.

The V-I was proposed to the technica'l service of the German jlir 1

Force Ministry in July 1941. ~t was readily accepted 'by the Air Force,

prima~ily because it would furnish the Air Force with a cheap offensive

weapon and also give it a guided missile of its 'O'Nn to counter the Army·s

development of the V-2 rocket. ~ts capabilities were descri.bed at that.

time as th9se of a pulse jet-propelled pilotless apparatus, capable of

being directed in flight on two courses by'compass, of flying 155 miles

at a speed of 341 to 372 miles an hour, .qnd of carrying 1,650 pounds of ,2

explosives with an accuracy of 50% on a target 3.?2 square miles.

The first V-I to take to the air was launched at"Peenemuende on

2L,. December 1942. , It flew a distance o,f 30'00 yards. By July of the

next year the weapon had been developed to the point of flying 152 miles

1. The German designa tion "V-l" was first suggested by Dr. Goebbels in a conference with Hitler on 28 June 1943, the "V" standing for the German "Vergeltungs1.Qaffe" (reprisal or vengeance weapon).

2. ~Jolfgang Vorwald, "Die Deutsche 1uftwaffenruestung im Rahmen dar Gesamtruestung, It ~Jehrtechnische He..fta (Heft 1 1953), p. 17.

UNCLASSfF~ED -10

Chart I UNCl~SS\f\tD

July 1941

(Development and Preliminary

Training of Field Units under Air Force Technical Service.)

22 Nov. 1943 (Construction of Launching Sites

and Training of Field Units

under ~ Corps. )

(Initial Committment under ~Corps.)

ISep.1944 (Contin u e d Com mit t men t

under 1:XYCorps.)

190ct.1944

(Continued Committment

under XXX Corps.)

28 Jon.1945

(Continued Committment

under Corps z .V. )

30 Mar.1945

(End of V-Weapon Campaign.)

17 Dec. 1930 (Development and Preliminary

Training of Field Units under

Army. Ordnance Office)

22 Nov. 1943

(Construction of Launching Sites

and Training of Field Units

under ~ Corps.)

1Sep.1944 (lnitial Committment under

5.5. General Kammler's Improvised Headquaters)

30Sep.1944 (Continued Committment

under Division z.V.)

28 Jan.1945 (Continued Committment

under Cor ps z. V. )

30 Mar. 1945

(End of V- Weapon Campaign.)

THE V-WEAPON FIELD COMMAND

UNGlASSt'dEU

and impacting within a half a mile of its target. Tbe V-I was thus de

veloped in the space of two years from blueprint to successful trial

firing. The results were sufficient to encourage the Air General Staff

to order its urgent development, and all preparations were placed under 3

the 1ir Force Chierof Antiaircraft Artillery. The 15th of December

1943 was provisionally fixed as the d'te for the start of fl;ying bomb

operations against England.

By 26 May 1943 the V-I h:3.d been sufficiently developed to permit a

demonstration shoot at Peenemuende for the benefit of a recently organized ,

commission for long-range firing. This demonstration shoot was organized

to assist the members of the commission in advising Hi tIer on the develop

ment of both V-weapons, specifically on whether the development of one of

them should be curtailed in favor of the other.

In spite of the day's firing going in favor of the V-2, the commis

sion ivas sufficiently impressed with the V-I and its future possibllities

to recommend to Hitler that the development of both w'?apons be speeded

up, with the view of commit ting both of them simultaneously. This de

cision was based primarily on the feeling that the differences of the

two lve'apons '.lJould equalize each other and that in the matter of long-

range firing the principle of mass employment VIas most important.

The Air Force General Staff at t.his time directed tl a t an antiair

craft regiment be organize¢! for the individual an"! unit training of per

sonnel needed to fire V-I' s in the field. hccordingly the 155th FInk

3. German organization placed all antiaircraft units, with the exception of some Army antiaircraft units, under the llir Force, just as coast artillerv Vias under the N~vy. .

. _ .'.- ; \ r" '" 1;''''' : ',.- r \ ~ !:'I.,) I to ".. e I"\.~.. J." . I ~, i

'l' 'J-.i " ., '" ~, ....' J...,.! - l \~. ~~. i. i, "¥l "" ¥. .~ . ' t ~

~, ~ '\\, f \ ~ t·· ~ \J ;'~";d i. j..e

Regiment was organized at Zempin (nearPeenemuende) under Colonel Vlachtel.

Concul..r~;ntly with these and other personnel preparations, such as the

training of officer and enlisted specialists at Peenemuende, plans for

the cons truction of launching sites in northern France 'V'21' e developed.

The plans for these sites were drawn up in the Air Ministry, and coverod

both the manner in which the sites wore to be constructed and vlherc they

were to be located. All told a belt of.96 sites facing England and

stretching from Cherbourg to Calais was· envisaged - 64 main sites a.nd

32 reserve sites. The construction plans called for the building of

storage and assembly facilities and a launching ramp at each site. Light

heavily protected supply c·enters, each capable of holding a supply of

250 V-lis, WEre also envisaged, By the end of September 1943 some 4

40,000 1'vorkers of the, Organization Todt wer·2 employed on this work.

On 16 October 1943 the first V-I firings by the 155th Flak Regiment

were conducted at Zempin. Five days later onG battalion of the regiment

left for the Calais arGa to assist in the final preparation of sites.

By November sufficient progress had been made in the construction of si tes

and in the training of units to warrant the estimate that firings against

England could begin on 15 necember, the planned date, from 88 sites.

This estimate did not materialize because of heavy R.A.l.i'. and ~int.l1 Air

Force bombing attacks, which be.san on 5 Dacembcr, and because of l,qst

minute technical difficul tics of the weapon. 'llhe first commi tment was

therefore postponed to the first half of January, the use of modifi~d

sites and the

new or[,anization, the LXV Corps, to cOllYt3nd an,l control the employment

of all long-range weapons ¥lere drawn u').

The, organizati~n of the LX:V Corps is covered briefly in thE pre

ceding chapter. In size it Y'las slightly larger than a normal corps

heAdquarters, and had a strength of 28 offi Mrs, 7 ofncials, 40 non

commissioned offic.:.:rs, and 92 ..,;nlist.;.d rod1, or a total str.1ngth of 167.

Its officer Pi: rsonnr.::l was almost entiroly hand picked and 'Came from the

Army, JUr 201'co, and Organization 'I'odt agenciGs which -NCY."2 chargc:d with

the d"vclopm:mt of the, V-l and V-2.

Hcadq-q,art2rs of LXV Cor?s ~';as initially ,;;,stablishcd at St. Q(Ormain,

nE:ar the H::adquart,~rs of the. Commander in Chief, 'Nest. Among ttl..:: first

things ttat intcr:::sted General Heinemann, the Corps Comnander, was the

status of launching si tGS in the operational area. .4n insiJ:;ction tour

of these s1 tes r(;v(;al2d that prior to the arriv"ll of J]V Corps in France

work on V-l sites had bGen under Hegional Air Force fi,:;adquarters for

Belgium/Northern Franco in Brussels end under RC[,ional Air Force Ikad

quarkrs for .iestErn Franca in :Gtampes. These h23dquarters wGre carrying

on an elaborate cOI'struction of firing positions, supply installations,

and cOlmnunications for V-l employment. The:ir main guiding instructions

were bluG-prints prep3.red by the Air Force Construction Headquartcrs in

Berlin in col1abora tion with engincors workinf, on the developms nt of the

weapon. Labor employed by the Ai!' Force construction units consisted

of French workers. In many instances tr'G work was actually carrid out

by Frc;nch contractors under the

UNCLASSlftEO,zation Todt. In all 96 posi tions were planned, 50 of 'whicb wer::; almost

completed.

From the standpoint· of camouflage these posi tions were poorly si ted

and too elaborate in construction. This fact and ·the true status of V-l

development led·ths· corps comnander to feel that all hi~her hsadquartsrs

including hitler - were actually in ignorance as to the true stJ.te

of progress. 1-:8 was convinced of' ·this when he r6caive'd a teletype message,

dated 23 December, from the Armed Forces Operations Staff nirecting him

to be pre'pared to commence firing against London during the first half

of January.

The reaction of UV Corps to the teletype of 24 De'cember was irnme

diate, but not of the nature expected by the Armed 'Forces Operations

Staff. LXV Corps answer(~d that operations could not begin in January

and tha t a. ropor t lNould be subm.itted by 5 January d ascribing in detail

the actual status of V-weapon employment. In ordor to obtain full in

formation on y!r,ich to base a detailed report, IJXV Corps had instructions

issued for a c.)nf8reDce. to ho held in .?aris on 28 December and 2 January.

This conferencG was attended by representatives of all agencies, indus

tries, and mili ta:'Y es tablishrnents dealing v:i th V-weapons. While the

chief of staff of LXV Corps had difficulty in obtaining definite and

clear information from the representatives of ZI agencies and industries,

sufficient information was obtained to prepare the promised report by

5 January. Tte report covered tho following points:

a. The main effort should ba concentra ted fer t~le

ti:me being on the V-l, as the technical development of the

V-2 was not sufficiently advanced to p~rmit a practical

estimate for its employment. The ~~l might possibly be

ready for employment in four or five months.

b. LXV Corps should, take qver all the construction

work for V-l sites. For security reasons Fronch labor and

firms should be excluded from all construction work and from

the transport s~rstem. This 'Jllork sho~ld be done by the troops

themselves and by additional military forces brought in for

tha-:' pu:.... p:Js :..,.

c~ jl~" L:.l~).:5ing and construction should be simplifiod

gan2 ~d ':.:,.'-)"0-, )bf .A.~ (,~ 08 set- up to counteract sabotage and the

This :,:",;;~-,~):f " . "'.:;:; ~,t=1.ir(~ssed to Hitler a.nd read by General Heinemann

himself to ,)~:L '. !',,:., }\J~~L t81, Chief' of Staff. of the firmed Forces Staff, on

10 January d L -~>~ t:0adquarters of It'ifteenth i-~rmy in TOllrcoing. A copy

of the report ~ 'vas als 0 given General Kei tel for transmi ttal ,to Hi tlGr.

Colonel '~alter, Chief of Staff of LXV Corps, doubts whether Hitler ever

saw it.

Since at best only one of the V-w~apons, the V-I, could be 1elivered

to LXV Corps wi thin the next four months, corps headqU~~~nturallY

-l1\l\tl~S~\t \~·t\J

concerned itself primarily with the construction of V-l storc:p.l?! f:::ciliti~s

and launching si tes. In this matter considerable difficulty 'Nas experi

enced with the Armed Forces High Command, which, because of the influence

of Organization Todt, felt that concrete was the final answer for pro

tection against aerial bombardment. For additionCl,l protection caves and

old mine shafts were preferred.. LXV Corps, however, favored from the

very beginning the development of facilities and equipment which were

simple and mobile. Large caves or tunnels in the rear area might serve

satisfactorily to store weapons and fuel. Whenever possible though, a

policy of dispersion, alternate positions, mobility, and simplicity was

followed.

This stand of LXV Corps was vindicated by l;ter developments. None

of tbe large concrete structures, some of which were highly interesting

and admirable, was ever put'to practical use, all of them having been

destroyed by aerial hombs although some of ttlem were of concrete sixteen

feet thick. The caves and tunLels which were located by the Allies and

bombed from the air were also rendere'd useless in short order, in spite

of coverings of natural ground and rock up to 80 feet thick. The results

of the first heavy Allied bombings we:'1e reported in 'writing by LXV Corps

to higher headquarters, together with photographic rjata. Construction

with concrete, nevertheless, was ordered continued. The corps cOID;uander,

howt?ver, .in this and other matters more or less assumed an attitude of

not doing what his supe-riors ordered but doing lll!hat he felt his superiors f

would, have ordered had they been familiar ".'ITi th the actual situation.

This then was the line he follovved in his prepara tions from February

UNCl~SS\f\£D' -16

UNCl~SSif\EU.

through lviay for the firing of V-I' s.

Ll.:V Corps actions wi th respect to the construction of posi tions :;.~':Y'

be summed up as follows:

a. Positions and ·servicing _ins·tallations hitherto

con~tructed or being constructed 1..vere abandoned as im~

practicable in respect to camouflage and as usele~s in

respect to protection against aerial bombardment~

b. . Jork v\ras nevertneless· continued as a' deceptioh

.mea.sure on the positions under construction, tb'e French

wo:rkers being gradually and·unobtrusively pulled out.

v·fork on positio~s in the Cherbour g. peninsu la ;Nas particu

larly carried on for deception purposes only.

c. Entirely new positions ~~lere construct~d along

simpler lin.as, ignoring the purely theoretical instructions

of the Air .Force Construction Department in .Berlin,~

d. No servicing installations were constructed. In

stead suitable caves were reconnoitered and prepared further

to the rear and all servicing 'i'lorh: ~Nas transferred there.

e. All new construction ,\;vas done exclusively by tbe

units assigned to LXV Corps and by aviation construction

engineer battalions brought forward.

One of LXV Corps' major concern W2.S the matter of security. This

~'las especially bad a t firs t in view of the initial employment of French

labor and firms. Hence, in the construction of new sites only persons

-17- UNCLASSIFiED

UNCLASSIFIED,with special passes were allO\ved to enter the installations, t J .,'\ ""

Force training regiments were employed'for guard purposes, ~nd counter

intelligence men were employed along wi th the men a t work. Other se

curity measures consisted ot transferring thQ headquarters of the 155th

Flak Regiment -- identified by the All~e5 as' a unit for the employment

of a'secret weapon -- to Paris and later sending it to a new location

,under a code designation. Also, mail a,nd furlough privileges of all

,newly 'arrived uni ts were suspended after they were informed of their

mission.

In the matter of security and counterintelligence LXV Corps 'J(as

extremely fortunate in intercepting a large parcel containing written

material of results, obtained hitherto on V-weapons by enemy espionage.

Thus, at one stroke practically all leaders of the enemy espionage system

were caught, so that this phase of Allied activity was paralyzed for a

considerable time.

The matter of target observation receiv~d ~ttention quite earlJ~

as this had to be considerably more elaborate, "tr.,an the observation of

artillery fire. :?reparations by LXV Corps for .this consisted of the

followmg:

a. The Armed Forces High Command-was rcquestc~ to

send agents to England with instructi'ons to report hits and

their effect.

b. In collaboration wi th the Chief of A.ntiaircraft

Ar.tillery and the Chi.ef of the Air Force ,Intelligence Service,

-18

, tests ~yere carried out in the 2I ',1I1i th miniature radio trans

mitters installed in V-l's. The transmitter 'was to' send out

messages automatically during flight up to the moment of im

:Ja.ct.

c.. The offer of 5S Headqual"lters of an SS' observa tion

battalion was accepted. This observD.tion battalion was posted

..along a wide front on the northern coast of France in order

to loea te .the impact erea of V-I' s in England by:means of

.sound locating and seismogra.phic instruments (operated by

Garman scientific personnel).

d. Arrangem.ents were made with the Third liir Fleet

in Paris and with the IX Air Force Corps (the Air Force unit

conducting air operations against England) whereby the air-

c.raft warning service and .air reconnaissance could assist in

de terrnining the course of fl:l.gh t aDd effect of V...:.I' s.

e. Observation posts were set up at suitable points along

the coast to report on the behavior of V-lIs' in fligh.t, .on

enemy action against V-I's, ar.d on the vieather condi,tions in

the English Channel.

f. Contact W:1S established wi th all .~\rmy and Navy

artillery observation posts at suitable points on the coast,

with the request that the course of V-l's and Allied defense

measures be reported to corps headquarters.

As LXV Corps gained more experience in solving its special problems,

it became more 8nd more convinced that in spite of the security measures

U~JCIA:SS')Qlr"~~Dtv .L ',vW1t .~ adopted it could not be assumed tha t all of the new launchi!'lg s:!. tr]s p.,·~d

facilities would remain concealed from the Allies until the firulg of

the first V-I against England. Some of the positions ~ould in all prob

ability be destroyed before operations beean or shortly thereafter.

Hence, the greatest possible number of alternate positions were planned

and constructed. Measures were also taken to insure the camouflage of

the series of trains wtich would be coming from the ZI with V-Its and

other equipment shortly before opening of fire. Arrangements were I~de

to get large stocks of V-I equipment to storage places in Fr~nce. Authori

zation was received for trains bringing in V-l's and i;mportant installa

tion equipment to be given priority and to be so equipped and manned that

they could be rerouted quickly and could approach close to the launching

positions. A special railroad I'epair battalion was organized to repair

rail strentches and railroa.d junctions wh~ch might be destroyed on the

lines carrying V-I' s. Plans were made to have a.t least 1000 V-l's on

hand and a daily resupply of at least 250 before operations .began.

By May LXV Corps had so improved the procedure for constructing sites

that 1I'Jork which formerly took from six to eight 1.vaeks 1;1':1S done in eight

to ten days. (Before LXV Corps was disbanded in Octobe~' 1944, the time

required to construct launching sites was reduced to 18 hours.) TIle con

cre'te roads and all permanent buildings and w.oo.den structures' had dis

appreared. Only two narrow lanes remained, surfaced where necessary Vii th

logs, for bringing V-lIs and equipment forward. At completed sites only

.,two easily,camou!'laged tents were erected. The launching r81nps '.l'lere still

on concrete foundations, but considerable progress had been made in

-20

UNCLASSIFiEDcamouflagin6 them. i' ~ ..As stated previo1.:s1y, the troops destined to fire the V-.1., 1..:

155th Flak Regiment, were already being moved to France in October 1943

in order to a~sist in the construction of sites. Since the Armed Forces

Operations Staff had ordered that no V-lor its special vehicles and

equipment were to be brought into the operations area until shortly be

fore the beginning of opera tions, V-I crews were returned singly to the

testing ground at Zempin in order for each to fire at le8st a few live

V-lIs. At the same time such practical training as could be done in the

operations zone was carried on.

By this time the organi7,ational structure of "the 155th Flak Regiment

was about complete. The regiment consisted of four battalions, each

battalion having three firing batteries and one maintenance and supply

battery. Each firing battery had three firing platoons, and each platoon

manned two firing positions (sections). Each firing crew consisted of

about fifteen men •. The 155th Flak Regiment consisted of 6500 officers

and men. The total number of troops involved -in V-1 action was roughly

10, 000. The en tire operationa.l area was betweeh the Belgian border, on

the right, and the Seine River, on the left. The firing positions were

located along the Channel coast, at distances between ten and thirty-five

miles from the shore.

As Allied bombings in France grew in intensity, particularly on rail

way junctions and shunting stations, LXV Cor:,s began serious planning for

the tra~~port of V-l equipmen~ and supplies in the event the railroads

were knocked out. Requisi tions for addi tton'al motor transport were made

on the Commander in Chief, West, and on the Third Air Fleet. However,

-21

able to supply very li ttle, and the Corps was

forced to obtain addi tional transporta tion by bu:,,-ing it on the F:' ·,.I1~:.

market and by other appropriate means. In tbis manner sufficient trans

portation was obtained before operations began.

Certain other important problems, however, were not solved before

opera tions began. Several requests were ma.de to obtain ·'""lis persion charts

from tre testing installation. Such charts Dever 'did rea'ch Franco. Also,

a technical development recormnended early by 1Y:J Corps, namely, the de

velopment of angular fire to permit the V-l to change its course at least

once in flight, was not perfected be.fore operations' began. Angular fire,

however, was later perfected, and positions developed by LXV Corps at

that time with this in mind were used.

Early in May 1944 the development and production of V-l'S in the ZI

and the construction of launching si tes and facilities in northern France

indicated that the opening of V-l operations against Eriglnnj was near at

hand. .final prepara ti ons cons is ted or:. .

a. Obtaining a t least one trA.ining V-I for ··each

battery, so that the crews could pr,.~ctic8 tfgun drills lt as

units and within their actual co~nand set-up.

b. Securing a special officer from the f.. i'r Force'Supply

Service to handle the details of supply.

c. Two war games were conducted by LXV Corps ~~i th all

combat, supply, and transport headquarters taking part. 1n

tnis way many ;

doubtful points of procedure ~ere ironed out

and all participating commanders obtained an idea of the

-22

http:F:'�,.I1

Uil~r~\l. f\~(~,f\£\l: ,'luLn,.)u course vlhich events, would folIo-VI! u n receipt of the D-Day order.

d. Provisions were made for all Army and ~ir Force

uni ts to report crashes of V-l IS in th8ir area ei ther as

a resul t of shorts or of mis siles taking a circular course.

"Crash Report Charts" Vlere compiled and furnished down to

regL~ental headquarters, to the headquarters of the Third

Air Fleet, and to the meteorological service. These charts

explained to the .troops tha t a new type of weapon "lvould ..

shortly be used for the first time. The troops would be

warned when to expect this weapon by means of a code word.

(rhe object of these "Crash Report Chartstt '.vas to enable

LXV Corps to learn iIrJTlediately when and where a V-I crashed,

so that for security and for technical reasons it could be

immedia tely destroyed or removed.

e. Provisions were made to have representatives of

industry and engineers from the tes ting sites present to

assist the firing troops during the first .fe~N weeks. '!'he

9l:gineers 'were to help in correcting any flaws on the spot;

the repr2sentatives of industry were to report immediately

to their factories any defects of manufacture.

f. Escort companies were formed to accompany and protect

all transport for LXV Corps by rail or by motor. TIlese com

panies were trained to take imrnedia te steps against espionage

and sabotage to inc lu'd e , for example, the closing off of the

. -23

UNCLASSIFIED'

UNCLASSifIED incidents and of carrying on t demo1i tions if necessary. They were under their respective tranE3,port

commanders. For the greater part they were stationed at

the factories and dumps in the ZI and at servicing depots

and supply dumps in the operations area.

g. The setting up of a radio sending syst~m along the

French coast to mislead the Allies into believing the V-I

was radio controlled.

h. A six-day standard operating procedure was drawn

up, tested, and issued to the troops. Six days vvere necessary

because 'until a warning order was actu~lly issued .nothing was

permitted to be at tbe sites except the level concrete plat

form for the launCher, the timbered lanes, cleared spaces for

t111JO tents, and a small foxhole for the chief of the firing

section. The necessary equipment: V-I'~, launchers, ~team-

boilers, compressors, etc. were, on orders of the Armed

Forces Operatiops Staff, still in the 2I. B.ecause of Allied

air superiority the entire procedure of going into positions

h~d to be done a t nigh t.

On or about 20 May 1944 LXV Corps furnished the Armed Forces

Operations Staff 'vi th a complete report on the precise stage of all

training, construction of sites, technical development, and production.

The report was presented by Colonel Jalter in person. Lttention "',vas

drawn to the bad effect the necessary secrec:r had had on training and

to the defects still inherent in the V-I. Tne request that a minimum

-24

llt'lCt,f~~SII~ ~~£:D'

of 250 V-I's be supplied LXV Corps da ily YJas once more pr8sented.

The report stated that 95 si tes wer2 ready fo~ action, 60 to (f·~~' ().f

which could go into action simultaneously. Tr.e supply organization was

gone over in detail as the most important element at this time. Two

supply officers and a transportation officer were directly· under corps

headquarters. 'rhe rate of supply depended on the daily rate' of fire,

the w6tlther conditions, and the railroad situG.tion. Supplies w·ere re

quisi tioned by corps headquarters from the factories and dumps in the Z1.

The transport of snpplies v!as to be carried out in special trains with

high priority. The trains were to have light AA gun prot8cti.on and

excort companies. They 1/I.'ere to go to the V-I servicing sta tions {caves)

or, if the rail conditions and the weather permitted, directly t'o the

unloading sidings in rear of the oper a ti ons zone.

At the servicing stations the missiles were to be received by the

supply chiefs, technically checked, repaired if necessary, and, stored

for immediate issue. From the servicing stations truck columns were to

move them to the launching sites. ~"~issi'les which went directly 'to un

loading sites were to be 'received by the mainter~nce and supply battery

of the respective battalion, checked, and brought fOI'Vlard to· the launch

ing sites by motor transport. li.'lissiles which had minor defects were to

be repaired immediately; those with serious damage were sent to a tech

nical battery.

Fuel supplies were to be sent to fuel supply dumps which we:ce part

either of the general supply depots or located at small railroad stations

in the vicinity of general supply depots. From there they YJere brought

-25

UNClASSIFtrD

http:prot8cti.on

UNClASSIH[O

forward by motor transport.

Supply officers and transpor ta tion officers were to ~'i ork in .' L; ::e

coordination to insure a timely supply of missiles and fuels at all

times at the battery positions. Not more than ten V-lIS were to be

stored at individual firing positions.

On 6 June a preliminary conference rege,rding the commitmant of V-I' s

was held at corps headquarters. This conference was attended by the

commander, the supply officer, and the motor transport officer , of the

155th Flak Regiment and by the leading V-I technicians assigned to the

corps. All matters pertaining to the progress of the work, as well as

logistical problems and the planned exe cution of'the operation, were dis

cussed in detail. The regimental commander r eported that work on the

launching si~es Vlas progressing satisfactorily. No mention was made of

the da te on which operations were to begin.

La ter tha t da~r LXV Corps was directed to begin op'era tions on 12 June.

This meant that all work at the launching sites and final supply arrange

ments had to be completed within six days.

On 7 and 8 June major transportation difficulties arose because of

Allied air action against the railroads in Fr9.nce. ' For the time being

trains could operate only at night. To compensate for this loss of rail

trans.portation, truck columns were obtained f~om quartermaster, construc

tion, and Nazi party agencies in France.

On 11 June the regimental commander, the regimental adjutant, the

operations officer, and the supply officer of the 155th Flak Regiment

were ordered to report to corps headquarters to receive the operations

-26!J~.. ,' . \ CIo,. ~ · f' " .~'f" tf ......,.l ' ' ~ . j.'\ "I~ .J" .t.ot '...;; 'f.' { . " I t.·.U' ", .I \ ' )If." '1\• , . . f·~", · 1' ~' I ." ·t t•. : ~ ' . U lao , t, ~.~ ~~' l 'j " ~ &. A,,(.

order. During this meeting the plan of ~ction and th'2 V-I Su!~;-~l:r- pi +.1'~~_

progress of ·~vork and the supply si tua tion were such that opera tions could

begin on 12 June.

The number of V-I fS and the amount of V-I fuel actually on he.nd at

the launching si tes on 12 June, based on a report signsd by Gen(:;ral

He inemann on 14 June, was as follows:

Authorized Actually I In EXC~3SS of Below Author. Allowa.nce on Hand IAuthor. AllaR. :

I AIIO'Nance

I

I j,

;V-l Missiles '1st Battalion 240 !48~192 2d B,qttalion i192 240 48 3d Battalion :192 1192 ,4th Battalion 192 if201

l 9 .

,- ~

iStandard Gasoline ,:lst Battalion j 135 eu. meters~18S eli • r:~Q te1'5 Ij 53 cu. meters:- cu. meters t2d Battalion 135 II n 236 n H 101t 1 " "

~

" " 3d Battalion 135 n !116 It It : 19, B" " " " If II tt4th Battalion ! 135 i 66.4 1 68 •6" " " " " ....~-.---I I

I

Hildrogen Peroxide It i_'1st Battalion 13.5 :19.8 1 6.3

I

" " " " " " " n II If n:2d Battalion ~ 13.5 21.4 7.9"" " " It IIt3d Battalion :13.5 '20.1 ! 6.6" " " " " "

It H tf n ft'4th Battalion '13.5 :22.0 8.5" " "

.Sodium Permanganate! It 11;lst Battalion 1 1.6 .0.6 " "" " " " It rt 11 tt'2d Battalion 1 tr 1.6 0.6 IT !I"

13d Battalion n 2.6 It 1.61 " H " " " " 11 1f 1t:4 th Ba ttalion 1 It 0.6 f1 tt :0.4 ""

UN' i'L'A-SSIF'~D-27- . "lI ,... Li.

UNCLASSIFIED:

A final meeting of the regLmental commander, the regiment:Ll. Sll"':-'~~'

officer, the regiment3.1 motor transport officer, and t}-1e lc;ading ~c-c;.·,~-

cians w~s called at corps headquarters on the morning of 12 June. The

intentions of LXV Corps and final orders for action were issued and dis

cussed. During the discussion the regimental commander ana the leading

technicians mentioned that everything had not gone according to plan during

the preceding night because of improper loadings of equipment. All de

fini tely affirmed though that everything would be in readiness by that

evening. The desires of the commanding general If.'ere once more stressed

by the chief of staff. The main thing was for the first action to be

completely successful, so that the st'.rprise factor might be fully exploited.

Allowances were being made for all manner of incidents, especially the,

fact that the troops could not be fully acquainted with the new w::;apon.

Should any detaii not be absolutely in order, the commanding general was

ready to cancel the opening of fire for th;) t night, regardless of wha t

any higher command might say or 00. ,ii th th::l.t the regimental commander'

VJaS made r(osponsible for reporting on the readiness for 'lction.

At noon the regimental conunandEir repor ted tha t not all launching

sites were rsc:dy., but that all positions would be r f3ady by 1800 at the ..

latest. On this the order was given to co~~ence firing against London

at 2240 from all positions simultaneously.

Arrangements were made with the Third Air Fleet to carry out a short

surprise raid on London between 2130 and 2200. .t.fter the raid the planes

were to return to their bases so that the "All Clear" would be sounded in

London. Fighters were toreconnoiter the target area wi th instructions

-28

~NCl~SS'f\ED

to report hi ts in the gel-lOral impact area. Simultaneously ';1[i th the

opening of firo the r2.dio companies along the coastwcr0 to send out

arranged signals in order to simulate' ~adio control of the missiles.

During the afternoon the commanding general proceeded to the regi

mental CP at SalGux, just southwest of Amans. At 2000 he ir.formed the

chief of staff that at the regilnent Gverything was in 'order "and everyone

expected success in the initial firings. The chief of staff .asked how

many positions wera ready for action at that time. He ,'lias told th'1t a

full report on this would reach him shortly.

Between 2000 !J.nd 2100 a railwt'ly target in the: vicinity of the P..:;ogi

mental CP ,vas heavily bombed by the Allies, l,vi th the result that the

entire telephone comm,md network with the firing batteries was disrupted.

Communications were carried on for thE tim'E1 being by radio.

Since not all positions h2d reported in C'nd because of the bombing,

the regilllentaJ commander at 2100 requested corps' headquarters for por

mission to delay" the opening of fire by one hour. To this the chief of

staff asked whether it would' not b::: 3dvisable to postpon'c action entirely

until the next night. The reg±ment,':11 comm;mder' did nbt consider this

necessary. The commanding general then taok the phon'e an:Jafter'l brief

r:1iscussion with tho chief of -staff ordered the one hour postponement.

The chief of st2ff accordingly informed tho Third .A:Lr Fleet.3.nd Commandor

i'n Chief', we·st. '''HQI,,/E)'Ver ;':itwas no longer possible to ·recall the bombing

raid on London, which took place as scheduled.

By 2300 hours 63 of 72 intended positions were reported as ready for

action. Since the telepl;one communication net,lOrk 1"128 out in m9.ny places

-29

UNClASSIHED

http:Fleet.3.nd

~nd since the chief of staff felt that any further inquiri.es would only

confuse the situation, no more calls were made from corps l·:::-:~d"ll~.' .:,'.'

Around 2400 a report carne in th8:t f.iring,had commenceQ and was continuing

according to schedule.

Actually only 9 V-l's out of a total of 63 emplaGed left ,the.ir

launchers. Not a single V-I of this ~irst ,"salvo" reached. E~g~and.

A second salvo, scheduled for 0330, w~s a bit more successful. This

time a total of ten V~l's were launched, !ou~ of whi~h r~a?hed England, 5

one actually landing in London. Four of the ten, crashed n~ar the vicinity 6

of the sites from which they were launched.

The true state of aff~irs was no~ known at.corps headquarters until

after daybre~k the next morning. Essential parts. ~a,d. not arrl,ved at

a number of the positions, some of this bei.ng due to mis.shipments and

improper packing. The troops, having bean ~eprived of mail and fur

lough privileges for almost a year, had during the past six days and

nights worked with the gr.satest .enthusiasm ~nd were determined that,

cost what it may, the initial operation would oe a success. ·AII manner

of extemporizations and i~provisations had been carried out by the troops

and the technicians. Mos t of the po.sitions actually, believed the,Y were

re~dy for action when they r~ndered that. report. 13:1 the final analysis,

5. Bri tish Air Ministry, ~ Rise ~ ~all o~.~ German ~ir Force, (London, 1952), p. 344.

6. Message 1'J: 6954, Commander in Chief, 'j~est, to Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, 13 June 1944.

-30

UMCLASSlF~ED

http:inquiri.es

PLACING V-l ON LAUNeHING DOLLY (Captured Photograph)

flaws in the missiles, explained the failure.

On the morning of 13 June the corps chief of staff ordered the im

medi·-~te cessation of fire and the camouflage of all posi tions. The

regimental. commander was directed· to constitute a board of :Lnvestig.9tion

and to submit a full report on the"failure without delay. The Commander

in Chief,.West, and the Armed Forces Operations ?taff were informed of

the situation by telephone.

ODe fortuna te thing in the whole rna tter was tha t corps 0eadquarters

had previously c·onvinced the Armed Forces Opera tions Staff not to allow

radio and press' publication of the operation until the Allied press and

radio. reacted.

All dur:;i..ng,-13 June corps teadquarters WflS busy answering q~es tiona

on the' operation fr'om .many headquarters' and high ranking individuals,

particularly 'of the Air Force. By evening a clear and precise picture

of 11vhat ,had; happened during the preceding night was available. A written

report on the operation was dispatched by courier on 14 June to all

appropriate he:adquarters and agencies. By 15 June'· all causes for the

previous failure had been corrected and the ·ope.ration was again ready

.. to 'be undertaken. After innumerable t'elephone consultations 'with the

Armed Forces Opera tions Staff, the night of 15/16 June 'w:as designa ted

for a second attempt.

At this .paint it ~.~ c~nv~nient ~o review br.iefly the .Allied reac

tion to the secret weapon threat. In February 1944 an aerial reconnais

sance of the entire French coas t :.'\fE1S ordered for the third time. By

Ut~'CUI\SSI['rD: 1 . H . ric. e pract1.ca "j" a:ll of the 96 p~rmanent sites had been identified and subjected to corttinuous bombardment, some as often 33 l;t) tiL:: . .,~-

cording to Colonel ,'{alter. .However, since the' first of the Y8ar corps

headquarters had abandoned the idea of using the'motherthan as dummy

positions and had begun constructing modified sites. .5i!

11"rlA~S'FtED

From the reports oUll" n"m radio intercepts it was evident

to the Germans that the Allies were almost entirely ignol'ant of t.r-:f; r:~ L~:.·-;

of the V-l and the V-2. Particularly was it e.vident that the Allies did

not know the difference between the two, w..eapons. 'The Germans felt tha t

the Allies knew that something wquld ,happen soon in the secret weapon

field. The Allied or ganiza tion for V-weapon . es~-=rLona. ge and sabotage was

reorganized immediately after the Qe·rmans ... broke 'i t up early in 1944.

Groups of agents 1Jve,re landed simultaneously in France. The German cap

tured two of these groups. The third one. managed 'to escape' and pre9

sumably vras able to ca~ry out its mission of :,espionage.

The second attempt at open~ng ~he V~l campaign -- that of the night

15/16 June - Y1aS a pa,rti~l ".success, If 301 though the initially planned

massed fire of at le:is,t 1000 missiles was not reached. 'During that night

55 sites v.rere abl~ to Ip.un.ch 244 missiles. By 29 June 2000 V-I's had

been launched agatn~.t England., mainly ,at London.

Allied reaction t~ ~his ttlrea t, was, immediate. A t a meeting of the

entire British W'ar Cabine,t calle9 ,by Pr.iine Minister Churchill on the

morning of 16 June, . ~t was de.cided .to go all 'out on'I'd'e.fensl.ve measures

to protect London,. but not to let the V-I threat· 'dt'srupt ground opera

9. They ~ Lond.on by Bernard Ilewman (London, 1952) might lead the reader to believe that the Allies knew practically everytp.ing about the V-I by 12 June from Polish underground so,.iroes. The book rela tee 'that a complete V':':'l was actually smuggled out of Poland on 25 July 1944, but tr~is was a mO!'!th and a half after,- V-I opera tions began~' .

-33.

.UN&l~SS\fiED

http:on'I'd'e.fensl.vehttp:Ip.un.ch

London and the Kent and Sussex coasts. 'Antiaircraft b3tter~~ , ~ :.' ~ '.~ '

placed along the coast and a balloon barrage of the greatest'density ever

axis ting was erected around the outer suburbs or' London. -·The]· channel

area and the are'a between the coast and' London "we-re"le:ft; free, for fighter

action, and RAF Tempests, with a sp~'ed 50 iniles' a~ :hour fa.ster~ ·than the . '

V-I, were successfully employed a'gainst' the :rnissiles, e:i'ther. 'by shooting

them drnll[n 'or by flying along side them and causirig them to cra.sh by

maneuvering the wing ti'ps of the plana a gains t the viing tip of· the V-I.

RAF pilots discovered later that the described maneuver executed in close

proximity to the V-I 11118,5 enough to' send 'i t crash iri'g ' to earth.

Allied bombing of V-l sites and installations·..··in France ··. at no time ..

seriously disturbed V-I firings once these firi'ngs began.' As:a rule, the

Germans were able to erect alternate iaunching sit'as faste·:r than Allied

bombers could knock out the ones being used. Allied:'air attacks on supply

communications in France and Germany were much more s'ffective, so much

so that the 155th Flak Regiment never operated a·t full capacity. In

stead of reaching a planned rate of fire of one "miss11e from each si te e~ery 26 minutes, ' the best average rate reached' was one everY 'hour to

every hour and a half. During the period 13 Jun.e to 1 s.QPt~~per 1944,

thE! ,' ~r~ns . repor.tedlY ,la~nched an average :o~ ..102', V-l' 5· 'daily, "w'lli th a

maximum of- ·295 i~ one 24~hour perio~. Dtiri~.g this 'period ~, 340 reached

Lo~don and 3,7651 ~lere 'des 'tr'~yed: by' AA 1,575, by air 1,9l2 , .and 278 by

10. Craven and Cate, ~.£h1., p. 527.

UNCLASSIFiED -34

11

ba1loon barrage ..

nated by Hitler. From time to time Commande,r in Chief, Yest, and tho

Corps Comrnander tried to obtain permission to fire on tile Portsmouth

"Southhampton area and even -:to engage Allied troop concentration and supply

installations on the Cherbourg periins'ula .. · Each· ·time these sugs~Gst(:d

targe~s :vere disappr?ved b.Y the A~med Forces 6pe .~a tions Staff'~ usually

in vlords a 's follows': "Commitment of the V-I in the ;beach~he:ad does not .

·promis.a .t":nicces~. . The V-I is intended primarily a5·,'8. terror weapon against

inhabited ~ocali tics, whereas the beach-head' con tains . only- gro:und troops" , ' 12

a&~ainst which artillery and aerial 'bombardment will have .. a , like effect.

NC;3vertheless, LXV Corps on its ovm ini tiative B.round 15 June fired some

60 t .9 80 V-Its against the fortsm'outh-S6uthhampton area. If these

f~rings'would leao to' the 'breaking ,up of ship concentrations and caused

ships to strike na val mines as they sca ttered" it "'Jas thGn decided to

report these unauthorized firings to higher ho'adquarters. Favorable,

although .erroneous, repo~ts 'r(~'ached LXV ·Corps. ~ '!'he "successful" opcra, . f" ; J • ' . • '. '

tion was 'duly 'reported t·o higher· hGadquartors. The reply was a severe

roprimand and the a~bitrary ord(:r' tha t ,London "Nas the only target to bo

engaged. ~'Vti6n-·Hi tIer visited -France on 17 'June, 'thq corps commander

. 11 •. , U ~S. Tvar Department, Handbook 'on Guided Missiles, CArashington, -1911-6),' P.' li-l-":4. In 'the last ~olume of his memoirs, Triumph and Tragedy, Sir ~inston Churchill cr(dits the balloon barrage with 232 (Life, Vo~ ..35, ,I'J~.~?" 26,Qct 53, p. :89).

12. Message No. 772141/44, 25 June 1944, Armed Forces High Command to Commander in Chief, ~'lcst.

UNClASSIFIElJ

once more brought up tho matter of supporting the ground forces tacti~:1J-

ly with tho V-I. Hitler once again prohibited the or l. gage~n0nt of . : iJ'

target other than London and concluded the moeting with a romark that he

v!as proud Germany Ylas fighting wi th such mcdern ~oapons;.""

During :the first 1Ne :~k of July arrangements wore ·compl€ ted whereby 13

V-l's i;~ere to be air launched from HE III modium bombOTs'~· ·The first

~ ..," .

.lJ.~. This important aspect of V-:-l opcrat~

UNClASSlfU:~

b. Experiments which resulted in a me tho,d, of launchirli! V-lIs

from aircraft wero first carriod out at Pecnomuende. The P:: 1J~ "0:':':'

'was used for this, the V-l being slung on a carrier plac"d und,r t:,

wing botween the engine and the fuselage. The V-l was usually launc'ih;J

from a height of 1,500 foet,' after which it first sV{Qoped down a bit

3D? then rose again and followed its presot course. By this means the

range of the V-lwas increas

UNCLASSlf:Corn It 1.S Ui\I-J ural that a weapon such a.s the ~-l, which the Chief

of Staff qf tht;: German 'Air Force in a mossage of ~ July 1944 d ·::scr:.L:-,../.:

as a piec~ qt. 'complicated equipment' d~.veloped in less than two years from the dr,l1f-tsman ~s table to ,field c0ml1l:itment, shqu.ld ct?ntain many

teci1nlcal f}.aw~. It: was not :these Gxp;ecied technical defeots' that ex

~s~~ated LXV CQrps after scvera~ hundred"V-l's had ~e.pn" fir$d, but

rathor the fact that nothing was bein~ . do~e about ' 6~rrccting ~ 'them. The

s~t-up : exi'stoQ whereby the ox~erienc~ g~ined QY _ ev~ryone - d~aling with

V~l!..s,_. in , :the field; including the p,?rsonnel at each firing po~ition, was

c?l~Gcte.d at a, central -agency, evalue.ted, and sent to the ZI for correc

tion. Monthly meot.ings attended by representatives of LXV Corps at the

Germa-ri Air hinistry brought about no improvemen.t- in -tho V-Ij·· other than

that .s,ome of ·.the defects caused by sabotage were corrected. r

The indus

trialists we~e against any changes in design which '\rvould disrupt serial

production, wi tb the result that all during the '·' time the v-i w~s fired

from positions in France no substantial improvements were made on the

weapon. Of the 8,564 V-Its fired ag~inst London between 12 June and 15 .

31 August, 1,006 crashed shortly-after take-off.

Early in Augus tit became clear to the Germans thatit would not

be possible to hold up the Allies along the Seine. All V-l installa

tions were therefore furnished demolftion equipment. On his O\~m initia

tiv.o the corps commander ordered all surplus equipm·3nt moved north

o3stward to the arc:a of Belgium and Holland. 'On 12 Augus t the 155th

15. Ibi~., p. 345.

-38

trcme left and begin an organizGd vvithdravval to tho Belgium coast, so 38

tb extend the "righ t. flank of the: rs gim8nt. At th2 same? time, most of

the COi"'ps he~dquar.ters, including the cOlmnanding: general, moved to newly

prepared quarters at ~~terloo, south of Brussels. All corps oquipment

th3t could be sp·3.r~d -013S takGl1 along. Only tho chief of staff, th,G

operations (air) section" and the supply (air) section ' remained at

Mais ons Lafi ttcs •

The withdrawal of the regiment did not occur as 'planned b8ca~s8 the

regim8ntal co~rnan.der bogap to remove equipme nt and units along his en

tire fron t i: .~stead of be ginning wi th his left flank. This caused the

uni ts on ·the lQ f~ to be pr~;ss(1d for time, and led to d0n101i tions that

c~uld have be ~n avoided. In the opinion of the chief of staff the rogi

omental commandor was more anxious to get away than to salvage; his 8q~ip-

merit~ .Signs of ,~,l?ck discipline, indifference, and disc'ou:r;'age~lGnt among

the troops we:ro qU~tc evident at this time.

·Equiprne:q.,t w~i9h cQ~ld be moved was sent to CC'mp Maria ,tGr Heide near

Antwerp' ano to depots ~l! northern Holland a'nd irt : the rcuhr ?.nq " R~~nqland

areas. Equi:pmc.nt which ..c,?uld not be moved to the rear ·wa.s dcmoltshed or

left in caves, the entrances of which were bla'st'eO. ' Extr·a gasol~n8 was

issued , to tank ano motorized units that' happened :to be pass~ng .. ~rough.

All special V-I fuels were removed. Dur'ing'the night of'lS-19 ,A\1gust

the chie f of s te.ff with the res t of corps hcadquarteIts ' moved , to ~!'fa terloo.

The right f13nk unit~ of the 155th Fiak Regiment continued, · to fire on

London until 0/+00 hours 1 Soptember, At vlhich t:ime ·the remaining 3,500

-39

UNCLASSIF~ED

http:Equi:pmc.nt

Uf~CLA~SIF'rD' o:hfcers an~ of the JieginiBnt-

L.o.utott

R T H SEA

O.tend

.~4'" ..... J.t. ,

~# t G . :,' .... : ~ I ,...,. ~'Jl!t

,.

j I I Wt:! .• J. ..~ ...

I I I

"c--t ..... I, I I

r:_~· · ' _".N .. ~M • ,1

I I I I, I I I I I \ \

Map I

OPERATIONAL' PLANNING FOR

THE COMMITMENT OF V-I',

FROM GERMANY BY ~ CORPS

Earl, October 1944

i

.'..:' e~)Colavne ( .' • • L.ounchlnv Area . '.•• on RIVht Bank of·9' Rhine River .' .." . .....

\,.-------" .,

L.aunchinv Areo on L.eft BanI! of

Rhine River

-, '; ~' '- ~~ ,;',- 0 . ~ . , ~ , ,,; ' :, ~ ~ ~

posi tions Yv lOre als 0 ro c6nrlo'i~};; d···c':oJt"of· · th~ Rld.11~' R.iver behind th::~

line Bonn - Andernach. By early October the ':-lork on t l l(; ~) o;;i ti on-: " .c·

so far AdvAnced trat launchings could soon be resumed. On 5 October

the r ima ining construction work was turned over to the Comrr.andant of 17

Fortii'icCl tions, west, for completion by engineer units and corps bead

qu:!rters W)S assembled again at Meschede, which was chosen bec8.l1s.3 the

amplifier station there provided facilities for direct telephone com

munica tion with the Eifel area and also ):Vi th Holland. A.t about. t.his

time the n;!3. tter of engaging .~ntwerp came up. Tbis t".rget could only

be rClC.:hed from launching areas in Holland, "md propos ,ls '.'!ere submitted

which recommended the ::Jeventer area !3.nd 3.1so the ",- rea south of Rotterdam.

en 19 October 1944 the LJ:Il Corps W:lS redesignc\t ed ;gx Armee Koros ~.£.::L.,

pr8sumably for r e!lsons of deception, 2 S the new XXX Corps c3rried on

where the. I..rv Corps left off, -':ith, however, the size of tne corps head

quarters consider3. bly reduced. (M~p 1, based on en original German

sketch, shows the operational planning by LXV Corps during thp, first

pqrt of October.)

~Vhile no definite i nformation exists on what happened to thG 1st

and 4th Ba tt!3.1ions during the retreat from France J it can be assumed

from existing documents that during this time these ty

UN&l'~~'I\·r'rD: . ,·~!\7i:l"~r'" i . set up as the . . . . i ~u..t~ rest of the :regi;~.ent rever+. to Air f.'orce qon~rol ano be reconstituted a'~ a regula::" a nti ,:)ircr"~ ;"'::'

regirnent. How,eyer, opttmistic messages from LXV Corps on the possibili , "

,ties of continui~g th~ V~l , campaigri from launching ~~eas i~ Germ~ny and

Hol12nd lead to the 'recirding of thif5 order. By 20 October -~he 155th

Flak Regiment i/~as ,9rgan~za tionally sound again a.nd in hop?~ ?,l 300n being

able to resume y-l firings under the ilmnediate control of ;~ C,orps.

'Lt1e V-',jeapon Fie1d Command ske tch a t the end of Chapt~,r I sh ows

tha t after 1 September 1944, LXV Corps no longer controlled the field

commitment of V-2's, this ~ mission h?ving fallen to SS Genar('),l Kammler.

Wflen LXV Corps was redesign£. ted XXX 'Corps, the Corps missi~n r~~~ned

the same. During the period 20 Octobar 1944 - 19 Januar~ 1945 XXX Corps

YJith the 155th Flak Rt~gim8nt as its action agency carried out V-I opera

tions from Germany and Holland against English :1nd continental :t2,rgets

quite independently of V-2 operations". On 19 January 1945 XX~ Corps

-:JJas relieved of its V-I mission, and the 155th Flak Regiment was" re

constituted as the 5th Flak Division. For a short period, fr?!l1 19 to

27 January, tbe 5th Flak Division, with Colonel .lGlter, the f~rffiar~

corps chief of staff, as divis1.on cOlmnand(jr carried on as the sol~ V-I

field command. On 28 Janu9..ry 1945 ·all V-weapons Vlere once, m~r~ brought

'together in a single, field command, the Armee Korps ~.y. under SS ~~eral

Karr.mler. Under Corps z. V. the, 5th Flak Division, 'Nith Colonel ·~vo~f .as

"~ ~"f~lU\"-' , -42UivG ..SSlf:fD .

C'?""~I

;Hoft~~..:"

;;2·~,::. ~";-'.. ~. .... .. ~ f~' ''''''' .." ...,......-... '" ~h*.-" ~.

,~ (/1-;('''''\ "~",, f.-'

t~ .~ "-:;"i '~..;l'" ~:~l 'J'!'I$')-,j-'~~

. ,~. ~ .... -. ,;

Map 2

V-I OPERATIONAL AREAS

Mld-Octob.r 1944

16 Firino Positions 8 Alt.rnat. Flrlno Positions Basic Dir.ctlon: Antw.rp

Th. Haou.

N o R T H s E A

l unk.rqu. I

I '.TWERP~I

\ I

\ ~/~ .,pop,1I!

\ II .N.....~ ~:-j\ / I

~'-T1III\/I', , I Right Bank of the Rhln. River r~·J~ I 'I MONS 3~ Flrino Positions

16 AIt.rnat. Firino Positions / ~ C:7Basic Dir.ction' Du. WestI \ ",~

I \"

/I \\L-----------~~~~~~------~~~~~--~ ~ About 'SOu...11., \

About 150 MU,s

UNCl1tSSIFltO

division com.rnander, carried out V-I operations until the end of the

German V-we ,3. pons camPct i gn •

Before LXV Corps 'was redesign8ted X~{X Corps, it completed the plan-

n'it"'g necess;,:iry for ~~Jh3t might be called the seconrl r-lnd final phase of

V-I O~Jp.r8 tions ~ Fap 2 'is a reponstJtutecJ sL:etch of the actual lTIr2p sent

by LXV Corps t

UNf~l.· . A··S.' ftJj"!l1IIu. it ,U. aL.U against Antl'oJerp and 110 against Liege. ll1ring the latter part of December.

. ""\ '\' h.V-I activity increased cOi:si,erabl~r aLa.ins t An tNerp ~: ·. n '":' r..:: . -}f:~~). J.I

January saw El decr~A.se again. From 8 January to the end of the V....v·Jeapon

CGJJ v~:tgn some 3500 V-Its were luunched at Antwerp_ Attacks on Liege

ceased practically nfter 18 January. During this lutter period London

encountered less than 75 V-I 's, all air-launched. J~s the V-I opened

the V-1Neapons campctign on 13 June 1944, it is perhaps only natura.l that

it sr.ould close the camp,::tign. This it clid on 30 March 19~.5 with a final 19

V-l ::.g,:1inst An~..7erp.

19. Royce L. rrhomps on, 1f': ·.~i1i t8.ry Imp:! ct of the Gerr.lan V-~V8apons, 1')43-1945," (~VashinEton, 1953), pp. 10-12. (en file in the Office of fJii.li tary His tor:r. )

http:decr~A.se

Chapter III.

The V-2 was a rocke,t-propelled missile. Going back to first causes,

one lGarns that the C~rman creation of the V~2 was only part of a develop

ment 'Nhich ' had -been going on for many centuries '. There is some basis for

believing that the Chinese used rockets vlith black, pCJ;vder propellant (:s

early 'as 3000 B.C. If this early orogin of rocket , is not accepted, the

' credit for inventing war rockets must go to the Chinese just the sarna.

The Chinese'used them in the form of "fire arrows u against the i'!ongols

in 1232 A.D. By 1249 news of the Chinese use to rockets had reached

Europe, for in that year Roger Bacon published , a treatise describing

the ' use of rockets. In the eighteenth century an Indian prince had a

rocket corps in his army which used rockets rathtsr effectively against

the "Bri tish. This experience 'by the Bri tish led to a reemphasis on the

use of rockets in western Europe as a weapon of Weir. Sir !illiam Congrave

star'ted a study of artillery rockets and by 1806 hp,d developed iron-cased

rockets wliich were used by the 'British in their bombardment of Boulogne.

These rockets apparently were not very succes'sful, for the Duke of

1ellington was "not too impressed by them and is reported to have commented

. that if artillery guns had been invented 'after ttlS ' 'r.ockets - as they

actuaJ:ly were - 'what an improveme,nt they would .have' been thought.

Serious planning for the use of rocke~~ ..py... th~ " United States Army

goes back as far as the 1840's. In "J.ecember 1846 .a rocket battery if/as

organized at Fort Monroe, 'Virginia. This battery fired two tJ.~s of

rockets, one vteighing 6 pounds and the other 12 pounds. The maximum

-45

UNCLASSifiED

rango of 1847 tOh ~br~ ~nckct hattGrics

were activated. Soma of these units yrcro used during tho ~ I: ·~·xic ; )r!

H?l.vever, the development of rifled artillery soon caused the intetest

in rockets to decrease, so much so that during '1lorld War I rockets VTsre

used almost entir.:tly as flares for battlefield illumination and for

signalling.

The theory of the use of rockots for space travel was a pos· t-~¥6rld

:Jar I development, al though already in 1654 Cyrano de Bergerac sugges ted,

no doubt playfully, their use in this manner. Early development ' of the . ,

theory of travel in space took place both in Germany and in.- the Uhited

States. In this country Dr. R. H. 'Goddard set down 'the" laws : governing

rocket propulsion in mathematical form and in 1926 fired the first suc

cessful liquid fuel rock~t. In Germa,ny the pioneer was Profe'ssor Hermann

Oberth, who in 1923 published a study called' ~ Rocket ~ Interplane-

It was the work of Dr. Godrlard, Professor Oberth, and' the German'

Interplanetary Society which led the German Ar'my' in 1930 to c·onsider·,

seriously the possibility of using rockets to supplement its' weakness

in artillery and air power, the former of which was res trio'ted and' the

latter completely denied by the Vorsailles Treaty.

1. The reader's attention is called to t,h'3 Gxceilent ' article, "Rockets in .~arf·~re, It in the II/lay 1954 issue of Army Informa tion Digest. This article brings out especially the importance and extent · of Dr. Goddard's contribution to the, development of modern r~ckets.

UNClASS1'fIEu

The German Army's firs t official act in ro gard to the development

of rockets was a conference of officers of the Armv Ordnance Office h\::lJ .. • 11. ' . ' • • II ... .

on 1? December 1930. At this conference the ·/fork of .th~, civilian engineers

[~nd scientists in the. field was reviewed •. A powder rocket projector de

veloped in Sweden in ~he .ear,1y 1900's .'Tl!as ,di.scuss~d in.. detail, as wc~re

also the experiments of Dr. Goddard. ,The conforees agreed to push the

development of rockets, to equip the ~rtillery provi~g ground at Kummers

?orff , . south qf Berlin, for ro~kGt deve~opment Clz:1d ~.rails, and to place

a technical~.y qualified off.icer in charge of the .prQje9.t. Fifty thousand

do~lars were set aside from Ordnance Funds for t~e .fir~t yearts develop2

ments.

The first year of the Army' 5 supper t ~aw sufficient pr ogress for

the Chief of the Army Ordnanco Office to approve tqc allotment of another

$50, 000.00 for tpo I?roject. By 1 August 1932 th~. orga~izational set-up

for research and development was definitely formed. "Research Station :3

;/est, under Captain T"Jalter pornberger -assisted by three pioneer engineers

2. The officer who administered the funds of the Army Ordnance Office, a Colonel Karlowski, was enthusiastic about the project from the start and readily authorized the d~penditurG.

3. Captain Dornberger, a regulnr nrtillery officer, attended a Technical university in Berlin (Hochschule Charlottenburg) from 1 April 1926 to 1 April 1931 as a full..;.timo student.·, He was avrarded the tj.tle of Graduate Engineer (Diplom-Ingenier) in 1930 and an ·hOnorary doctor's degree in engineering in 1934. From 1931 to the end of the ,war he played a lo~ding part in the Rocket Program and rose from captain . to brigadier general without any further troop duty, the lack of which is frequently mentioned in his efficiency reports. There is no doubt that he was - and still is - a qualified technician in the field of guided missiles. His salesmanship and .his enthusiasm did . much to keep the Rocket: Program going and to carry it as far as the Germans did. Th(-J Gerrran Guided ~;J:issi1e Program, particularly the phase dealine; with the V-2 Rocket, is largely the story of Dornberger from 1931 to 1945.

U"1CLA"S'S' 'frro..·Il,· · .. . I, it and sCientists, existed at Kurnrnersdorf. A powder rocket which was an

improvement on the early Swedish model had been developed ~nd the fensi

bility of liquid rocket propulsion had been sufficiently proved to Captnin

Dornberger to justify further experimentation.

Th8 first real progress in the development of liquid propulsion 4

rockets was made at Kummers'dorf. By'Decembor 1934 two rocke'ts W'JI'e 5

launohed successfully on the IS'lan'd of Borkum in the North Sea. ThGse

launchings were wi tness'ed '-,by' the ,Commander in Chief of the Army, General

von Fri tsch. High ·level · support for the project :was thus assured, fbt.

General 'vori' F'ritSdh passed on 'his faith in it :to his successor, Field6

ma'rshal von Brauchits ch.

It was General von Fritsch who advisod Gnptain Dornberger to ex

press in concrete ·terms :what he hoped to:do ' with rockets or ,.- this type.

4. Hitler visited Kummersdorf in 1933, but was not impressed with what "he sa~l. He' was',. ,however', the first 'Chancellor ·bT Germany to ·interest himself sufficiently in 'woapons development to visit Kum.T~v~rsdorf since Bismarck 'visi t'eD there ··in 1890. ' (~derian, Erinnel'ung ' e~ines sold,~. teri, p.24. )

5. Thase first tv/o rockets, named '~,J1axlt' and i,iMoritz; n were of the type designa ted A-2, having a thrus t of 660 pounds. The ...la,tar. V-::2 :WR..S, designClted A-4.

, "6. A letter vIri tten by Hilnmler to Fieldmarshal von Brnlichitsch 6 January 1945, wishing him a Hgppy New Year, cont,~~ins this highly interesting and significant statoment: "You will surely bo happy to knov~ ~"'hat.~ powerful weapon we have in toe V-·2, the former A-4, which was deve~oped at Peenerouende. The Fuehrer often montions that it was only because of you that the necGssary research and development could be undertaken over a period of 10 yoars." (Doc. No. 1959, Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 24 October 1945.)

UNCLAS~.lfrrD . In February 1936 - et, with 3300 pound in the meant~mlJ ~ -Jf.e thrust, had been tested - Captain Dornberger 12id dov·m :1is Z5PUC _~ j' '- ,.-:'

tions in terrns which a layman could understand and Yvhich would impress

::~rmy circles, partf.cu13rly artillerymen. He 'claimed that he could de

delop 'a long-range rocket which would nccurntely carry one ton of ex7

plosives' twice as far as the famous "Faris Guns. tt

C ~J ptain Dornbcrger's claim, coupled with salesmanship, led to the 8

establishment of .~ joint ;irmy-Air Forco research station at PGenemuende

on the Baltic Sea at a cost of $?5,OOO,OOO.OO~ The move from Kummersdorf

to Peenemuende was made in :Jlay 1937. At Peencmuende the res89rch offort

vIas divided into two sections: PGenemuendu' illest, for the Air Force, and

Peenemuende East, for the Army. At first Army and Air Force co-opera

tion was close and mutually beneficial, but in timo the Army alone carried

on with liquid propulsion rockets, while the Air Force developed other

projects.

The first full-sized V-2 rocket was launched at Peenemuende on

6 Juno 1942. Tho first such rocket to reach its target area 167 miles

from Pcenemuende was launched on 3 October 1942 and was actually the

fourth V-2 to be fired. Before this time, h~Never, Dornberger'had al

ready begun to visualize its field employment. At this point one can

7. By -,-vorld ·:rar II standards this was not an impressive claim as to the 'amount of explosives. The "Paris Guns" fired 21 em. shells for a maximum range of 76 miles (Ency. ~., 1953 Ed., Vol. 2, p. 468). As to tho rocket itself, tremendous' development was still nc rjded. The f:.-3 t s thrust of 3300 pounds was only 1/16 as great as that of the V-2, and the watter of aiming was in its infancy.

8. Fieldmnrshal Kosselring, then in charge of Ger~~n Air Force administration, supported the project.

-49

http:5,OOO,OOO.OO

~ 1~\iP ~! i\ \:

na tely rose and fell with the whims of Hitler, cven to th r ,' point v! ,t

at one time Hitler dreamt that the V-2 would never be uSed against England,

':·:hich T'8sulted in a specific two-month set-back in development. The fall

of 1941 marked several import~nt aspects in the future of tho V-2.

that time Dornberger and his group were fully convinced that tbe missile

was pr:-=tctical. HO#evcr, by then money for its continued development v!as

running out. Its continued d~v~lopment was also being hindered by its

low priority, '!lhich led to the ch:-~nn2ling of the needed raw rna teriClls to

projects and m~nufccturing of items of higher priority. Dornbcrger's

persistence though managed to keep tho project going and to raise it first

to a position of priority and later, in ;~ay 1943, after a personal meet

ing v!ith Hitler, to a position of highest priority. Hitler, however,

apparently was beginning to view the project with more favor even before

the meeting wi th Dornberger, for on 29 March 1943 he authorized Organiza

tion Todt to begin construction of 3 V-2 bunker at mtten on the channel 10

coast in Belgium.

The construction of the bunker si te at 1;{attcn was th(~ first inswnce

of a field coron-·and becoming involved in the emplo:yment of guided missiles.

10. Hi tIer, at the time he :lpprovcd the construction at ~i\fa.tten, is reported to. .havG said tha t the site could always be used -as .:1 troop shelter if the V-2 did not rna tarialize sufficiently to use it. Post-war invr:stiga tion hns ShO'Vll1 that seven large sites of the ~:Va ttcn type 'VIere plRnnsd.l 'fatten itself having been designed as an underground factory fo:::' ch2m:""';s.1~ us :}d in firing both V-I and V-2. It h3S been estimated thE:! t at J.~ast 200,000 persons cmId have been sheltered in n single one of ~hGse 12rge sites, (Cr2ven ~nd C~te, The Armv .Air Forces in World---~ --- -- ----War rr., Vol. III, p. 90.)

·tJNClASSlfjED

Chiof, ,Vest, was kept informed in a general way of the developments and

iLTtentions at Wa tton, but for security reasons he Vias ini tially not given

any control over preparations or any detDiled inform2.tion about them..

At the time Dornberger submitted his illustrated "Propos:!ls for

the Operational Employment of the Long-range Rocket A-4, u the first step

vilas takon to put planning for tho employment of the V-2 on a practical

basis. It th~t time all army personnel engaged in the experimental effort

at Peenemucnde wero grouped for administrative purposes under .'-3 unit

known as ResEarch Command North. Niany of these were former civilian

technicians who had been 'iraftcd or recruited by the Army and sent to

Peenomuende, some ir