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DOI: 10.1177/0971721806012001072007 12: 141Science Technology Society

Leonardo Silvio VaccarezzaSociety: A Critical Analysis from a Quantitative Perspective

The Public Perception of Science and Technology in a Periphery

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PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF S&T IN A PERIPHERY SOCIETY 141

Science, Technology & Society 12:1 (2007)

SAGE PUBLICATIONS LOS ANGELES/LONDON/NEW DELHI/SINGAPORE

DOI: 10.1177/097172180601200107

The Public Perception of Science and

Technology in a Periphery Society:

A Critical Analysis from a

Quantitative Perspective

LEONARDO SILVIO VACCAREZZA

In this article a series of variables referred to the general public’s valuations of science

and technology are analysed. These valuations refer to different dimensions of science and

technology—as a utility of scientific knowledge, their legitimacy, their bond with the cul-

tural matrix of everyday life. The analysis is based on information from a survey carried

out in a great urban conglomerate of a little scientific developing country, Argentina. We

see that valuation variables discriminate the public according to their positive or negative

responses about science, but that there is no evident association between them. We consider one variable in particular dividing the public into those who are ‘trustful’ and those who

are ‘cautious’ regarding the advances of science, and we see how it is related to other

significations of valuation. The pre-eminence of positions of ambivalence or contradiction

in the population’s perception regarding this topic is discussed. A factor analysis is

presented that comprises these variables and that presents a set of ‘valuation orientations’

towards science as a result. Finally, it is interesting to see how education and the level of

understanding of scientific knowledge affect the public’s valuation, which questions the

basic supposition of the tradition of public understanding studies.

THERE HAS BEEN a significant development in studies on the public percep-

tion of science and technology in advanced countries in the last fifteen

years, motivated by different interests: political, cognitive, educational,

professional and even commercial. This has given risen to a set of per-

spectives that, although contradictory in many aspects, are all concerned

Leonardo Silvio Vaccarezza is Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia y

la Tecnología, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina. E-mail: [email protected].








142 Leonardo Silvio Vaccarezza

about the relation of non-experts with the expert knowledge produced in

the institutionalised framework of science and technology. Thus, those

who focus this question on scientific literacy as a function of scientificeducation in educational institutions deal with the question of what to

teach and with what objectives (Fourez 1997; Shamos 1995) within the

concept of ‘good citizen’ (Lee and Roth 2003). From another perspective,

the concept of public understanding of science (PUS) established by the

tradition of national surveys to measure the public’s level of understand-

ing of scientific knowledge, interest in scientific issues, and attitudes re-

ferred to science and technology goes about this question not only in

order to help overcome the increasing gap between science and the public

(Bensaude-Vincent 2001) for a higher participation of the individual in

the contemporary world, but also in order to strengthen the social legit-

imacy of science. The studies that criticise the PUS perspectives aim to

question the implicit superiority of science on technical decisions with

social consequences, and, specially, on the consideration of the techno-

logical risk. From a perspective directly influenced by the social stud-

ies on science, the objective is to analyse science just as common sense

knowledge is analysed, to articulate its construction with the local senses

in which science is produced, which is influenced by the cultural contentsof the society where science is constructed. The attention on the non-

experts’ knowledge based on experience and on the signification given

by them to expert knowledge in local processes of negotiation of technical

decisions opened a new promising grounds for studies on the relation

between the understanding of science and technology by lay people and

the social use of expert knowledge (Collins and Evans 2002; Irwing 2001;

Wynne 1995; Yearley 2000).

These lines of inquiry have been consolidated in empirical studies,

which in general have been carried out in developed contexts, that is local

or national environments in which science is produced. This means there

is a dense framework of relations of knowledge (Dagnino and Thomas

1999) among several types of social actors, and proximity between the

‘responsible’ experts and lay users, which implies, in the case of the lat-

ter, a clearer awareness that scientific and technological knowledge is

the product of their own society. It is not possible to discard that the so-

cial perception of science and technology within non-developed contexts

should be influenced by an effect of absence of local scientific and techno-logical production. In developed countries the relation between the core

set of technological decisions with public effect and the user public is









closer (as identification of the institutional sites where those decisions

are taken and as recognition of scientists and technicians involved), so

the relation between qualified experts and the experience of non-experts(Collins and Evans 2002) finds a more structured social space.

On the other hand it could be stated that the social perception of scien-

tific knowledge as a cultural product and of science as an institution of

modern society is a component of the globalised culture, spread through

internationalised mass media and through uniform technologies, not much

affected by hybridisation processes in local situations. Thus, the public

perception of science will not be presenting significant differences be-

tween central and periphery countries with intermediate development,

which are similarly subject to the use of international technology and to

the discourses involved in public controversies about the activities and

impacts of science and technology.

In spite of the different perspectives of analysis, it can be said that the

studies on the public perception of science and technology constitute a

field of not stable knowledge types, with important theoretical gaps and

inaccuracies, and with widely recognised methodological weaknesses.

Apart from the dispersion of topics and conceptual frameworks, we should

also mention the question of universal and local knowledge on this matter—in other words, the differences of this phenomenon between social con-

texts that are clearly divergent in terms of the centre–periphery dimension.

Thus, there is a new field of inquiry in which uncertainties are higher.

In this work we will not go along this line that requires a comparative

strategy. In turn, we will analyse some indicators of valuation made by

the public about science and technology in a context of their lower institu-

tionalisation, compared to the situation in central developed contexts.

By doing so, we think we may be contributing to broadening the scope

on this topic by making an analysis corresponding to a context that is notoften investigated by specialised research.

The analysis presented is based on information from a survey carried

out in the urban conglomerate of Greater Buenos Aires, which applies

some internationally used indicators.1 These quantitative studies have

been criticised for the lack of subtlety of the indicators to identify its

significations among respondents (Davison et al. 1997; Michael 2002;

Wynne 1995). It should be taken into account that the surveys carried

out by national or supranational entities of scientific policy have paid at-

tention to three types of PUS components: knowledge, attentiveness andattitudes (Miller et al. 1998). The definition of these general concepts,

as well as the sub-dimensions they consist of and the indicators formulated









to measure these concepts show important weaknesses. The indicators

of knowledge are, then, only a set of scientific affirmations that are certi-

fied and codified (some are currently controversial), and the understand-ing of the scientific method is a strictly Popperian version, which neither

guarantees the pretensions found in the idea of scientific literacy regarding

the communication of the ‘scientific mentality’ (Davis, quoted by Shamos

1995), nor the claim that lay people’s knowledge of science and tech-

nology can be considered for its utilisation (Fourez 1997). The idea of

attentiveness refers to the self-valuation of the surveyed agent, subject

to a simple scale of categories (very, moderate, not at all), whose signifi-

cations granted by the agent are unknown and, therefore, this makes it

impossible to compare these terms in the whole sample. Last, the attitudes

are used without a clear theoretical orientation of what that concept means.

They can be considered fixed devices in the subject’s dispositions that

are activated by a certain prompt (a question or exposition to a valuation

phrase) to generate a conduct (response, measured by the Lickert scale).

This poses two kinds of doubts: on the one hand, as in the case of the

concept of attentiveness, the pretended homogeneity in the meaning sub-

jects give to the prompts. On the other hand the validity or utility of such

device to characterise valuation concepts of the subject, which is con-structed in ever-changing scenes of interaction. In this regard, the attitudes

derived from the behavioural tradition may be interpreted as a component

of concepts like that of ‘social representation’ (Moscovici and Morková

1998), understood as a continuous construction in processes of interaction,

so that it is difficult to say that attitudes keep their subjective significations

unchanged.

For all that has been said, the quantitative approach is very rustic in the

analysis. Even so, it is legitimate to use it so long as the statistical outputs

are carefully interpreted, that is we try to avoid considering the agent’sresponses to valuation prompts as a fixed and constitutive attitude of the

subject. These responses are, instead, expressed in the fleeting scene of

interviews in a context of signification comprising different aspects: the

historical moment full of events that affect the meaning of responses,

and also the immediate context of the questionnaire and the different

prompts ordered to get the subjectivity of the respondents. This makes

results (the positive and negative responses in terms of appreciation of

science and technology) somewhat provisory, and this should be taken

into careful account when interpreting the data. On the other hand thesurveys on this topic are increasingly more present in the field of scientific

and technological policy, and this cannot be overlooked. All governments









have been incorporating them in their public agendas, thus following the

classic path of ‘institutional isomorphism’. As such, they are instruments

of power, which requires paying more attention to their use, not in orderto indicate inherent conceptual and methodological weaknesses, but

in order to explore the deviation and contradictions so as to generate

new interpretative frameworks of the public perception of science and

technology.

In this work we will analyse a series of variables referred to the re-

spondents’ valuations of science and technology. These valuations make

reference to different dimensions of judgement on science and technology,

for example, the utility of scientific knowledge, their legitimacy, their bond

with the cultural matrix of everyday life. We will see that these variables

divide the public according to their positive or negative responses about

science, but that there is not an evident association between them. We

will consider one variable in particular, classifying the public between

those who are ‘trustful’ and those who are ‘cautious’ regarding the ad-

vance of sciences, and we will see how it is related to other significations

of valuation. We will discuss if this indicates the pre-eminence of positions

of ambivalence or contradiction, and we will try to formulate some hypoth-

eses to this respect. Then we will present a factor analysis that comprisesthese variables and that presents a set of ‘valuation orientations’ towards

science as a result, and we will discuss the interpretative value of this tool

in the context of the analysis. Third, we are interested in showing how

educational level and the level of understanding of scientific knowledge

affect the public’s valuation, which will question the basic supposition

of the tradition of PUS studies.

Trustful and Cautious

One question from the questionnaire formulated as ‘Many people think

that science development brings about problems to humanity. Do you think

this is true?’ shows us two different categories depending on whether the

answer is in the affirmative or negative. The first ones are referred to as

‘cautious’ towards science, and those who are not afraid of its develop-

ment as ‘trustful’. The sample was divided almost in halves between both

options: 141 cases for the first and 145 for the second. Respondents hadto justify their answer. The question was made after a set of Lickert scale

prompts about valuations of science and technology that could be both









positive and negative, and after a set of statements on scientific knowledge

that the respondent must consider as true or false. Once the question

is taken into account along with the previous questions, it cannot be saidthat they have systematically conditioned the understanding of the

prompts or the response. Of course, we did not have any argument to en-

sure a homogeneous meaning in the surveyed population;2 however, from

a syntactic and semantic point of view, the question was made in a col-

loquial way and did not seem to lead to ‘mistakes’ or to an interpretation

bias. It may be argued that the fact of presenting the topic as an affirmative

statement held by ‘many people’ might have led to affirmative responses

to the question. But the colloquial nature of the expression only stresses

the importance of the affirmation rather than suggesting a net preference

of the public.

The dichotomous response to the question does not bear any statistical

association with the valuations of science (or of science and technology)

that are expressed through other prompts. In fact, the questionnaire in-

cluded a set of affirmations of the agreement–disagreement type that

made reference to different aspects: the utility of science or scientific re-

search, the legitimacy of scientific knowledge as a cultural basis of so-

ciety, the integration or strangeness of science regarding ordinary people’severyday life, scientific knowledge as a source of risks to life, the valu-

ation of scientific activity and of scientists as professionals. Some of these

indicators were worded as positive statements towards science and others

as affirmations with a negative meaning. Some of them gave responses

that were focused on either of the values (agreement or disagreement)

and others made a more equal discrimination. In Table 1 it is possible to

see valuation indicators, showing the percentage of responses that are

‘favourable’ to science and technology (whether as an agreement or dis-

agreement response depending on the meaning with which the statement

was made) for the total sample and for the group of ‘cautious’ and ‘trustful’.

Science and technology are highly appreciated since for 74.7 per cent

of the sample it is the main cause for improvement in quality of life; it is

expected to cure diseases like AIDS or cancer (92.7 per cent); its benefits

are more than the prejudices it can arouse (72 per cent); science is the

best resource of accurate knowledge about the world (67.8 per cent); and

it prevents us from becoming an irrational society (60.7 per cent). What’s

more, 58.3 per cent of the respondents think that science promises solu-tions but fails to fulfill the same. However, this positive valuation of sci-

ence is not universal: for example, only a minority of 42.6 per cent think









TABLE 1

Percentage of Opinions Favourable to Science and Technology

Gamma

Prompts Cautious Trustful Total coefficient

The main cause of the improvement in

human life quality is the advance of

science and technology 68.8 80.6 74.7 0.260

The progress of ST will help cure diseases

like AIDS, cancer, etc. 91.3 94.2 92.7 –0.115

The application of ST will increase

work opportunities 31.9 54.7 42.6 0.391

Science and technology can solve all problems 11.8 16.0 13.4 0.234

Science seems to promise the solution to all

evils, but in the end these promises

remain unfulfilled* 50.0 68.4 58.3 –0.322

The benefits of science are more than

the prejudices 63.8 79.9 72.0 0.219

Science is the best accurate knowledge

resource about the world 63.8 71.9 67.8 0.166

If we neglect science, our society will be

increasingly more irrational 57.5 65.8 60.7 0.040

The world of science cannot be understood

by ordinary people* 34.1 44.6 39.1 –0.210Over time science will make it possible to

understand all that happens 36.3 48.7 41.7 0.221

If scientists were in charge of government

policy, things would be better 35.5 36.0 36.0 –0.054

We attribute too much truth to science and

little truth to religious faith* 39.1 44.6 41.9 –0.135

Science and technology do not care for the

problems of the people* 61.6 67.6 64.4 –0.130

Science changes our way of life very quickly* 29.1 40.0 33.7 –0.271

There are too many issues related to ST on

which not even scientists themselves can

agree, and it is difficult to know if they are

good or bad for humanity* 14.9 31.0 23.0 –0.395

ST are out of control and there is nothing

we can do to stop that* 63.2 75.3 68.3 –0.291

Note: *Indication of the percentage of ‘disagreement’ with the statement.

the application of science and technology will increase work oppor-

tunities, while only 41.7 per cent think that over time science will enable

us to understand all that happens. At the same time just 13.4 per centdare to support the idea that science and technology can solve all prob-

lems. Most people also reject the idea of scientists charge of government









(only a third consider it convenient). Thus, the enthusiasm for science

and technology finds its limitations in the achievement of sciences, but

also in other negative valuations: 57.3 per cent of the respondents think we attribute too much truth to science and little to religious faith; 57.9 per

cent think science changes our way of life very quickly; for 60.5 per cent

it cannot be understood by ordinary people; and 66.2 per cent feel that

there are too many issues related to ST on which not even scientists

themselves can agree, and it is difficult to know if they are good or bad

for humanity.

Thus, it can be said that most people surveyed have expectations and

a favourable valuation of science and technology, that the valuation does

not lead them to have exaggerated expectations—or, in other words, that

they recognise there are limits to the benefits deriving from science and

technology—and that, although they do not think they advance without

any control, they do so without considering other sources of knowledge

like, for example, religious or the concern for keeping traditional values

intact. In this regard, ordinary people tend to see science as a strange

force, which is beneficial yet incomprehensible and at times turbulent.

As it can be seen from Table 1, the values are relatively independent

from whether respondents feel either precaution or trust. Although in allcases the positive valuation of science is higher among the trustful ones

than among the cautious, the percentage differences between them and

the association coefficients show there is proximity in their attitudes. For

example, in spite of having the opinion that science brings about problems

to humanity, 68.8 per cent of the cautious respondents consider it the

main cause of the improvement in quality of life, nine of ten hope it can

cure current serious diseases, almost 64 per cent think science is the best

resource of knowledge and that its benefits are more than prejudices,

for 57.5 per cent science is a guarantee against an irrational society, and

63.2 per cent consider its development does not represent any danger of

its becoming uncontrollable. In these cases the percentage difference

with trustful respondents does not exceed 16 per cent. And even among

these, despite their more positive orientation towards science, many of

them have a critical point of view: more than 80 per cent of the trustful

ones do not believe it can solve all the problems of humanity; less than

half expect that science will allow them to know all that happens in the

world; 55 per cent seem to regret that science is so highly appreciatedto the detriment of religious faith; 58 per cent are afraid that science and

technology may change our way of life very quickly; 62 per cent think









the uncertainty about the advances of science and technology is due to

scientists’ unresolved controversies; and, moreover, scientists are not con-

sidered to be the governmental ideal (56 per cent). In general, the coeffi-cients of association show that there is independence between the trustful

or cautious orientation and the indicators of valuation. In the case of higher

coefficients, both groups concentrate their cases on the same positive or

negative value of the indicator.

The highest coefficient of association can be seen between the preven-

tion trust attribute and the perception that scientific controversies give

rise to uncertainties regarding the consequences of the development of

science and technology (gamma = 0.395). This indicator brings up a core

affirmation of the concept of ‘risk society’ developed by Beck (1992),

according to which a reflexive society faces the uncertainty caused, espe-

cially in the scope of environment, by the application of scientific and

technological results, undermining the trust in science. The fact that the

coefficient of association is low (even if it is the highest in the series) in-

dicates that the public’s concern for the lack of consensus in science is a

significant dimension of ‘reflexive modernity’.3 In fact, the cautious seem

uncertain about the advance of science of scientific controversies (only

14.9 per cent refute the statement about the lack of agreement betweenscientists as a source of uncertainty on the benefit of science for human-

ity). Nevertheless, among the trustful also a low proportion refute the same

statement (31 per cent), that is, those who do not tend to think that science

can cause problems to humanity. Even among those who trust science,

most perceive a shadow of insecurity cast by the advance of knowledge.

As we have seen, for 70.5 per cent of the total sample ‘the world of

science cannot be understood by ordinary people’. The difficulty for lay

people to understand scientific content does not help configure the image

that science neglects the problems of people. In fact, 61 per cent of those

who consider that science is an entity cognitively isolated from everyday

life reject the affirmation that science does not care for the problems of

people (the percentage for the total sample is 64.4 per cent). This leads

us to an important concept: the distinction between esoterism and respon-

sibility, which suggests that, as an ‘expert system’ (Giddens 1990), far

from the experience of real life, it nonetheless fulfils a responsible func-

tion in society. The distinction between lay people’s alienation of under-

standing and the responsible function of science becomes evident whenrelated to another indicator of valuation: those who believe that people

who cannot understand science mostly think (64 per cent) that if science









were neglected, we would succumb to irrationality. In this sense, not

only does science care, according to the perception of the public, for the

problems of people, but it also constitutes the cultural matrix essential tomaintaining a rational lifestyle of modernity.

Evaluative Ambivalence or Complexity of Science and Technology

Just as we can see that the two orientations of precaution and trust towards

science are not associated with the values that could be considered equiva-

lent to other indicators of valuation, there are no significant associations

among these. As we can see in the matrix in Table 2, the gamma coefficient

of association only gets above 0.4 in a few relations. But even the highest

of them—between the opinion that the benefits of science are higher

than the prejudices, and that science is the best resource of true knowledge

(0.503)—we find a high number of respondents that contradict this asso-

ciation: almost 50 per cent of those who think that science does not ensure

more benefits than prejudices believe that even so it is the best resource

of knowledge, and almost 60 per cent of those who do not agree with

this preference of science maintain that its benefits are higher than theeffects arising from prejudice. This distribution model with high percent-

ages of deviations from the main diagonal of the expected association

among indicators of valuation can be seen in all the variable crosses, in-

dicating a strong ambivalence as to the meaning of science and technology

for the public.

There can be different explanations for the public’s valuation ambiva-

lence4 on science. According to a first hypothesis, the different indicators

could reflect different prevailing values in society. Since values do not

set perfectly compatible borders among them, but rather ambiguous sig-

nifications in their applications, social agents tend to have preferences

that are mutually incompatible. For instance, Luján and Todt (2000) have

found responses in which ethical values overlap with utility values regard-

ing applications in biotechnology.

The second hypothesis does not stress the ambiguity of valuations by

the agent, but the complexity of the object of value. According to this,

the discourse on science and technology would refer to a complex and

extended object in such a way that each of the indicators built covers asegment of the object’s signification. Considering that science ‘brings

about problems to humanity’ does not take its ‘negativity’ to science by









T A B L

E 2

M

a t r i x o f C o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n V a l u a t i o n I n d i c a t o r s ( g a m m a )

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 0

1 1

1 2

1 3

1 4

1 5

1 6

1

1 0

. 4 8

0 . 3

8

0 . 0

8 9

– 0 . 1 0 3

0 . 4

1

0 . 4

3

0 . 3

8 3

0 . 3

2

0 . 3

6 3

0 . 2

4

– 0 . 0 2

– 0 . 0

7

– 0 . 0

9 5 – 0 . 0

7 7 – 0 . 1

4 9

1

2

1

0 . 1

2

– 0 . 1

3

– 0 . 2 0 8

0 . 4

2

0 . 4

4

0 . 3

1 7

0 . 1

2

0 . 1

8 5

0 . 1

6

0 . 1 6

– 0 . 2

2

0 . 1

2 4

0 . 0

6 6 – 0 . 1

6 4

2

3

1

0 . 2

6 7

0 . 0 1 4

0 . 2

5

0 . 1

5

0 . 2

0 2

0 . 0

2

0 . 2

8 9

0 . 2

5

– 0 . 0 4

0 . 0

1

0 . 1

3 5 – 0 . 1 1

6 – 0 . 3

3 1

3

4

1

0 . 0 3 4

0 . 1

4

0 . 2

0 8

0 . 1

4 9 –

0 . 2

5 6

0 . 4

5

0 . 3

1 1

0 . 1 4

9

0 . 0

2

0 . 2

4 1 – 0 . 2

0 7 0 . 3

2

4

5

1

– 0 . 2

7 1

– 0 . 1

7 2

– 0 . 0

7 9

0 . 3

7 5

0 . 1

3 6

0 . 1

5 6

– 0 . 1

0 . 3

0 5

0 . 2

7 8

0 . 3

1 2 0 . 4

4 8

5

6

1

0 . 5

0 3

0 . 3

9 1

0 . 2

7

0 . 2

7 8

0 . 3

1

0 . 1 3

0

0 . 0

4 6

0 . 1

3 5 – 0 . 1 4 2

6

7

1

0 . 4

6 9

0 . 1

7

0 . 3

0 5

0 . 2

6

– 0 . 0 2

– 0 . 1

5

0 . 0

2 1

0 . 0

7 – 0 . 0 6 4

7

8

1

0 . 1

5 9

0 . 3

1 6

0 . 2

2 1

– 0 . 0 5

8

0 . 0

1 2

– 0 . 0

9 6

0 . 0

5 – 0 . 0

0 3

8

9

1

0 . 1

6 9

0 . 1

3

0 . 1 5

0 . 1

3

0 . 1

3 2

0 . 1

0 1 0 . 1

9 5

9

1 0

1

0 . 0

7 2

– 0 . 0 6

5

0 . 0

2 2

0 . 0

4 7

0 . 1

0 7 0 . 0

4 5

1 0

1 1

1

0 . 0 4

0 . 1 1

– 0 . 0

0 9

0 . 0

5 3 0 . 0

1 7

1 1

1 2

1

0 . 1 1

0 . 1

3 6

0 . 1

0 2 0 . 1

4 5

1 2

1 3

1

0 . 1

7

0 . 1

6 6 0 . 2

2 6

1 3

1 4

1

0 . 2

3 9 0 . 2

9 2

1 4

1 5

1

0 . 0

5 9

1 5

1 6

1

1 6

N o t e s : 1 . T

h e m a i n c a u s e o f t h e i m p r o v e m e n t i n l i f e q u a l i t y i s t h e a d v a n c e

o f s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y . 2 . T

h e p r o g r e s s o f S T w i l l h e l p c u r e

d i s e a s e s

l i k e

A I D S , c a n c e r , e t c . 3 . T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f S T w i l l i n c r e a s e w o r k o p p o r t u n i t i e s . 4 . S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y c a n s o l v e a l l p r o b l e m s . 5 .

S c i e n c e

s e e m s t o p r o m i s e t h e s o l u t i o n t o a l l e v i l s , b u t i n t h e e n d t h e s e p r o m i s e s r e m a i n u n f u l f i l l e d .

6 . T h

e b e n e f i t s o f s c i e n c e a r e m o r e

t h a n t h e

p r e j u d i c e s . 7 . S c i e n c e i s t h e b e s t a c c

u r a t e k n o w l e d g e r e s o u r c e a b o u t

t h e w o r l d . 8 . I f w e n e g l e c t s c i e n

c e , o u r s o c i e t y w i l l b e i n c r e a s i n g

l y m o r e

i r r a t i o n a l . 9 . T

h e w o r l d o f s c i e n c e c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d b y o r d i n a r y

p e o p l e . 1 0 . O v e r t i m e s c i e n c e w

i l l m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d a l l t h a t

h a p p e n s . 1 1 . I f s c i e n t i s t s w e r e i n c h a r g e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y , t h

i n g s w o u l d b e b e t t e r . 1 2 . W e a t t r i b u t e t o o m u c h t r u t h t o s c i e n c e a n d l i t t l e

t r u t h t o r e l i g i o u s f a i t h .

1 3 .

S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y d o n o t c a r e f o r t h e p r o b l e m s o f p e o p l e . 1 4 .

S c i e n

c e c h a n g e s o u r w a y o f l i f e v e r y

q u i c k l y .

1 5 .

T h e r e a r e t o o m a n y i s s u e s r e l a t e

d t o S T o n w h i c h n o t e v e n s c i e n

t i s t s t h e m s e l v e s c a n a g r e e , a n d i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o k n o w i f t h e y a r e

g o o d o r

b a d

f o r h u m a n i t y . 1 6 .

S T a r e o u t o f

c o n t r o l a n d t h e r e i s n o t h i n g w e

c a n d o t o s t o p t h a t .









inducing the opinion that it is not ‘the main means of knowledge’. This

means that the public thinks of science as a polyhedron that may give

rise to different attitudes in the same person.Third, we could support the idea that the question of science and

technology—mainly the first—is not a topic of exchange and social sig-

nification in everyday life. Thus, the public should not be expected to

build stable and integrated significations about it on a common or so-

cialised background of knowledge (Alfred Schütz), so that coherent and

mutually exclusive ideological schemes referred to this issue could be

integrated.

Last, should we accept the concept of ‘reflexive modernity’, then the

relationship of the public with science and technology is full of ambiguity.

On the one hand science has gained ground as the base for technological

solutions to society’s problems and its significations have gradually moved

further away from common sense (Bensaude-Vincent 2001), making ex-

pert systems act as legitimate mediators of the gap between social experi-

ence of the problem and solution (output), reducing the agent’s autonomy

when faced with the impositions of techno-science (Giddens 1990). On

the other hand the reflexivity of society regarding science and technology

is presented as the perception of consequences that are undesired andunforeseen by these (Beck 1999), which questions the trust and legitimacy

in these institutions. In the same sense, the ambiguity of attitudes towards

science and technology can be interpreted as a consequence of techno-

science phenomenon. Ziman (2000; 2003) says that the public sees a

base of trust in non-instrumental science (academic science), but techno-

science (science colonised by technology and utility) corrupts the cul-

tural sense of science, and its relation with society and the public (the

civil society). It could be said that the public’s ambiguity derives from

its perception of the tension between non-instrumental academic scienceand techno-science.

The four hypotheses presented about the ambiguity in the public’s re-

sponses to the indicators of valuation of science and technology5 are not

incompatible with one another. In particular, the fourth hypothesis stresses

the distance of scientific knowledge from common sense and everyday

life, as does the third hypothesis, but the difference is that the latter makes

more emphasis on the attitude of fear and the perception of technological

risk. It can also be stated that the process of late modernisation of reflexive

modernity has an influence on the valuation integration of society andmakes the agents’ preferences more scattered. At the same time the grow-

ing complexity of science and technology—as a body of knowledge,









institutions, practices and professional types involved—gives rise to more

aspects or dimensions of science and technology for the valuation scrutiny

of lay people. However, we will not go deeper into the empirical analysisof these hypotheses as long as the source of information available does

not make it possible, these being left as plausible explanations for further

studies.

Factor Analysis

For a set of eighteen indicators of valuation of science and technology6 a

varimax factor analysis was carried out, the maximum adjustment result-

ing in four factors (Table 3). A first factor, which we called ‘adherence

to science and technology’ encompasses a series of strongly affirmative

indicators of the value of science, specially in terms of the utility of know-

ledge (‘the benefits of science are more than the prejudices’, ‘the main

cause of the improvement in life quality is the advance of science and

technology’, ‘the progress of science and technology will help cure dis-

eases like AIDS and cancer’, and ‘the application of ST will increase

work opportunities’), and of science as an essential component of culture(‘science is the best resource of accurate knowledge’, and ‘if we neglect

science, our society will be increasingly more irrational’). The perception

that science cannot be understood by lay people is added to this factor

with a relatively low value.

Both in relation to the question of utility and to the validity of scientific

knowledge as a basis of culture, this affirmation is not incompatible with

the hypothesis that was discussed regarding the growing gap within the

public between science and its valuation as reliable expert knowledge.

A second factor—which we called ‘criticism to science and technology’—

shows indicators of negative valuation or which play down the value

of science. First, an expression of insecurity in knowledge due to the

lack of agreement among scientists, and the perception that science often

fails to fulfil the expectations people have of it. There is also the con-

viction that science brings about problems to humanity, and that science

and technology do not address the problems of people, although this in-

dicator shows a lower coefficient. In general, the factor represents an

attitude that questions scientific and technological activity, not becauseof their own value, but because of the failure to fulfil promises and an

adequate orientation to meet the problems of humanity.









T A B L

E 3

F a c t o r A

n a l y s i s B a s e d o n V a r i a b l e s o f V a l u a t i o n o f S c i e n c e a n d T e c h n o l o g y

I n d i c a t o r s o f v a l u a t i o n o f s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y

1

2

3

4

T h e b e n e f i t s o f s c i e n c e a r e m o r e t h a n t h e p

r e j u d i c e s

0 . 7 2 0

T h e m a i n c

a u s e i n t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f l i f e

q u a l i t y i s t h e a d v a n c e o f S T

0 . 6 9 9

S c i e n c e i s t h e b e s t r e s o u r c e o f a c c u r a t e k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e w o r l d

0 . 6 8 3

I f w e n e g l e

c t s c i e n c e , o u r s o c i e t y w i l l b e c o

m e i n c r e a s i n g l y m o r e i r r a t i o n a l

0 . 5 8 9

T h e p r o g r e

s s o f S T w i l l h e l p c u r e d i s e a s e s

l i k e A I D S , c a n c e r , e t c .

0 . 5 7 3

T h e w o r l d

o f s c i e n c e c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d

b y o r d i n a r y p e o p l e

0 . 5 0 4

0 . 3

8 0

T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f S T w i l l i n c r e a s e w o r k o

p p o r t u n i t i e s

0 . 4 6 1

– 0 . 3 0

7

T h e r e a r e t o o m a n y S T i s s u e s o n w h i c h n o t e v e n s c i e n t i s t s c a n a g r e e , a n d i

t i s d i f f i c u l t t o k n o w

i f t h e y a r e g o o d o r b a d f o r h u m a n i t y

0 . 7

1 0

S c i e n c e p r o m i s e s t h e s o l u t i o n t o a l l e v i l s , b

u t i n t h e e n d t h e s e p r o m i s e s r e m

a i n u n f u l f i l l e d

0 . 6

9 5

T h e d e v e l o

p m e n t o f s c i e n c e b r i n g s a b o u t p

r o b l e m s t o h u m a n i t y

0 . 5

1 5

S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y d o n o t c a r e f o r t h e

p r o b l e m s o f p e o p l e

0 . 4 7

7

S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y c a n s o l v e a l l p r o b l e m s

0 . 7

2 6

S c i e n t i f i c k

n o w l e d g e i m p r o v e s p e o p l e ’ s a b

i l i t y t o d e c i d e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s

0 . 7

0 3

I f t h e g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y w e r e i n c h a r g e o f

s c i e n t i s t s , t h i n g s w o u l d b e b e t t e r

0 . 5 9

7

O v e r t i m e ,

s c i e n c e w i l l m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o

u n d e r s t a n d a l l t h a t h a p p e n s

0 . 4 3 1

0 . 5 2

6

0 . 3 6

4

W e a t t r i b u t e t o o m u c h t r u t h t o s c i e n c e a n d

l i t t l e t r u t h t o r e l i g i o u s f a i t h

0 . 6

7 4

S c i e n c e c h a n g e s o u r w a y o f l i f e v e r y q u i c k

l y

0 . 6

1 0

S T a r e o u t

o f c o n t r o l a n d t h e r e i s n o t h i n g w

e c a n d o t o s t o p t h a t

0 . 5

8 9









The third factor—‘naïve optimism’—is shown by a set of valuations

towards science that seem exaggerated, and this is expressed in different

aspects. First, it is expressed through the efficacy of science to solveall problems or to understand all that happens around the world. Second,

by its value as a means or instrument for the individual to manage life.

Third, by means of the trust in scientific knowledge to be used as govern-

ment of the state. The factor indicators consist of taking the expectations

people have of science and technology to an extreme. Unlike the first

factor, which evaluates both in comparative terms (‘it is the best resource

of knowledge’, ‘it has more benefits than prejudices’, ‘it is the main cause

of life quality’), the third factor evaluates them in absolute terms (‘it

will solve all the problems’, ‘it will understand all that happens’) and

establishes a direct relation between science and agency (‘it will enable

me to take the important decisions’, ‘it ensures a good government’).

The last factor—‘conservative opposition’—outlines a negative orien-

tation mainly based on the rejection of science and technology, and on

the fear of its consequences (‘it changes our way of life too quickly’, or ‘it

is out of control’). This negativity is supported from a system of different

knowledge: religious faith. Unlike the second factor, in which the nega-

tivity was based on the inefficacy or disorientation of science to fulfil itsprogress function, in this case science is rejected because it goes against

established life.

The coefficients of the components in each factor that conceptually

define it are high and significantly low in the other factors; consequently,

the correlation among factors is low or non-existent. This enables us to

underpin the plausibility of the interpretative concepts that were elab-

orated. We can see that, in general, in the correlation matrix presented

earlier, the components associated with each factor have relatively high

association coefficients among them (although they are always lower

than gamma = 0.500). However, the covariance is not high enough to

discard the existence of several cases deviating from its direction, which

makes it impossible to configure the sample according to the four factors

detected and to define social groups adjusted to the four orientations de-

scribed. From a theoretical interpretation of the factor analysis, it could

be stated that it enables to make a description of culture but not of society.

In fact, it enables us to describe the valuation orientations or the signifi-

cations allocated to science and technology by the public, but it does notallow us to group the members of the sample into differentiated parties.

Instead, we can conclude by interpreting that the four orientations are









present to variable degrees in the set of individuals the surveyed public

consists of. Once again, this reinforces the idea of the ambiguity previ-

ously discussed.

Valuation and Educational Level

The affirmation of educational level affecting the ability to understand

scientific and technological knowledge, which in turn affects the positive

valuation of science, has been established as an axiom of studies on pub-

lic understanding of science based on general surveys. The first part of

the affirmation is stressed by the values shown in Table 4, according towhich the highest understanding of scientific knowledge is 10.5 per cent

at the primary education level up to 75.6 per cent at the complete univer-

sity level. Regarding the second part—the relation between the under-

standing of scientific knowledge and the different valuation indicators

of science and technology—however, the data do not appear to be in ac-

cordance with it. This is clearly shown in the table.

TABLE 4

Level of Understanding of Scientific KnowledgeAccording to Educational Level (%)

Index of Educational level

understanding P IS CS IT CT IU CU

0 to 3 47.4 17.3 11.3 5.3 7.7 6.4 2.4

4 to 6 42.1 63.5 64.5 47.4 53.8 38.5 22.0

7 to 8 10.5 19.2 24.2 47.4 38.5 55.1 75.6

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0

Notes: P: complete primary school; IS and CS: incomplete and complete secondary educa-

tion; IT and CT: incomplete and complete tertiary education; IU and CU: incompleteand complete university education.

Although the association coefficients between the levels of understand-

ing and the evaluation indicators are low, some of them describe sys-

tematic variations depending on understanding. For example, the opinion

that science is incomprehensible for ordinary people decreases, as is

expected, as the level of knowledge increases. Although the majority of

the people that are most informed about science think that science and

technology are the main cause of the improvement in humanity’s lifequality, this affirmation is less frequent among them than among the less









qualified agents. The perception that the benefits of science are more

than the prejudices also decreases as knowledge increases, or that sci-

ence is the best resource of accurate knowledge, as well as the maybenaïve valuation that over time science will enable us to understand every-

thing, or that scientific knowledge enhances our ability to take important

decisions. A more negative datum is presented by the favourable expectation

of a government managed by scientists, which goes from 63.6 per cent

among the less qualified to 27.6 per cent among the most informed re-

spondents. Among those that have more scientific information, the per-

ception that ‘the development of science brings about problems to humanity’

is higher (only 27.8 per cent do not agree with this). This group of indi-

cators reveals a more relative attitude towards science and technology

among the most informed share of the population, and the same trends

can be observed should the independent variable be educational level

(see Table 5).

On the one hand these data question the axiomatic affirmation that

links knowledge of science to valuation. On the contrary, the most in-

formed public seems to question the intrinsic goodness of scientific and

technological advance. This can be clearly seen in the indicators con-

tributing to the factor we called naïve optimism (the government managedby scientists, the virtue of science to understand it all, or that science im-

proves our ability to take important everyday decisions).

However, on the other hand, the higher the level of understanding of

scientific knowledge, the higher the acceptance of scientific activity as an

effort made by society: for example, the higher the level, the higher the

recognition that science cares for the problems of people; the lower the

acceptance of the opinion that science and technology offer false pro-

mises, the higher the rejection that science is out of control. In this sense

the level of understanding of the cognitive content of science and tech-

nology (and educational level) reinforces the support to science from a

critical point of view and discredits the exaggerated adherence to a naïve

optimism.

The indicator ‘development of science brings about problems to hu-

manity’ enabled us in a previous section to distinguish two groups: those

that are trustful and those that are cautious of science and technology.

We observed that the level of understanding of scientific knowledge has

a negative influence on the share of trustful respondents. As regards edu-cational level, relation is not so clear (Table 6).









T A B L

E 5

P o s i t i v e R e s p o n s e s t o I n d i c a t o r s o f V a l u a t i o n o f S T A c c o r d i n

g t o L e v e l s o f U n d e r s t a n d i n g o f S c i e n t i f i c K n o w l e d g e ( % )

U n d e r s t a n d i n g l e v e l s c o r e

I n d i c a t o r s o f v a l u a t i o n o f S T

1 a n d 2

3 a n d 4

5 a n d 6

7 a n d 8

T o t a l

G a m m a

T h e w o r l d

o f s c i e n c e c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d

b y o r d i n a r y p e o p l e

8 1 . 8

6 3 . 6

6 1 . 0

5 0 . 0

6 1 . 5

– 0 . 2

6 4

T h e m a i n c

a u s e o f t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f l i f e

q u a l i t y i s t h e a d v a n c e o f

s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y

9 0 . 9

8 1 . 8

7 3 . 2

6 8 . 2

7 6 . 0

– 0 . 2

9 8

T h e b e n e f i t s o f s c i e n c e a r e m o r e t h a n t h e p

r e j u d i c e s

6 3 . 6

7 2 . 7

7 8 . 0

5 4 . 5

6 9 . 8

– 0 . 1

3 3

S c i e n c e i s t h e b e s t r e s o u r c e o f a c c u r a t e k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e w o r l d

8 1 . 8

7 2 . 7

6 8 . 3

6 8 . 2

7 0 . 8

– 0 . 1

3 6

I f g o v e r n m

e n t p o l i c y w e r e i n c h a r g e o f s c i e n t i s t s , t h i n g s w o u l d b e b e t t e r

6 3 . 6

6 3 . 6

2 2 . 0

2 7 . 3

3 7 . 5

– 0 . 4 7 7

S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y d o n o t c a r e f o r t h e

p r o b l e m s o f p e o p l e

3 6 . 4

6 3 . 6

7 5 . 6

8 1 . 8

6 9 . 8

0 . 4 2 6

T h e r e a r e i s s u e s o n w h i c h s c i e n t i s t s d o n o t

a g r e e , a n d i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o k n o w

i f t h e y a r e g o o d o r b a d f o r h u m a n i t y

0 . 0

2 2 . 7

3 4 . 1

4 0 . 9

2 9 . 2

0 . 4 2 3

S c i e n c e p r o m i s e s t h e s o l u t i o n t o a l l e v i l s , b

u t i n t h e e n d t h e s e p r o m i s e s

r e m a i n u

n f u l f i l l e d

3 6 . 4

5 4 . 5

7 3 . 2

8 1 . 8

6 6 . 7

0 . 4

6 6

O v e r t i m e s c i e n c e w i l l m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d a l l t h a t h a p p e n s

7 2 . 7

5 0 . 0

4 6 . 3

2 7 . 3

4 5 . 8

– 0 . 3

6 8

W e a t t r i b u t e t o o m u c h t r u t h t o s c i e n c e a n d

l i t t l e t r u t h t o r e l i g i o u s f a i t h

4 5 . 5

4 0 . 9

4 8 . 8

4 5 . 5

4 5 . 8

0 . 0

4 2

T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f S T w i l l i n c r e a s e w o r k o

p p o r t u n i t i e s

2 7 . 3

5 4 . 5

5 6 . 1

4 0 . 9

4 9 . 0

0 . 0

2 5

T h e p r o g r e

s s o f S T w i l l h e l p c u r e d i s e a s e s

l i k e A I D S , c a n c e r , e t c .

1 0 0 . 0

9 5 . 5

8 7 . 8

9 5 . 5

9 2 . 7

– 0 . 1 9

2

S c i e n c e c h a n g e s o u r w a y o f l i f e t o o q u i c k l y

2 7 . 3

1 3 . 6

5 1 . 2

4 5 . 5

3 8 . 5

0 . 3

5 9

I f w e n e g l e

c t s c i e n c e , o u r s o c i e t y w i l l b e c o

m e i n c r e a s i n g l y m o r e i r r a t i o n a l

6 3 . 6

6 8 . 2

6 5 . 9

5 4 . 5

6 3 . 5

– 0 . 1 2 6

S T a r e o u t

o f c o n t r o l a n d t h e r e i s n o t h i n g w

e c a n d o t o s t o p t h e m

2 7 . 3

7 2 . 7

7 5 . 6

8 6 . 4

7 1 . 9

0 . 4 8 0

S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y c a n s o l v e a l l p r o b l e m s

1 8 . 2

9 . 1

1 2 . 2

1 3 . 6

1 2 . 5

– 0 . 0

0 4

T h e d e v e l o

p m e n t o f s c i e n c e b r i n g s a b o u t p

r o b l e m s t o h u m a n i t y

( p e r c e n t a g e o f t r u s t f u l o n e s )

4 7 . 8

5 1 . 1

4 4 . 4

2 7 . 8

4 2 . 0

– 0 . 5

8 4

S c i e n t i f i c k

n o w l e d g e i m p r o v e s p e o p l e ’ s a b

i l i t y t o d e c i d e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s

5 4 . 5

3 1 . 8

1 9 . 5

2 2 . 7

2 7 . 1

– 0 . 1

9 7









TABLE 6

Distribution of Trustful and Cautious Respondents Regarding

Science and Technology According to Educational Level (%)

Educational level (grouped)

I II III Total

Trustful 42.3 58.0 46.9 48.8

Cautious 57.7 42.0 53.1 51.2

Notes: I. complete primary and incomplete secondary education; II. complete secondary

and incomplete tertiary education; III. complete tertiary and complete and incom-

plete university education.

The gamma association coefficient between educational level and those

trustful or cautious of science and technology is –0.018, while for the

relation between the level of understanding of scientific knowledge and

the same dependent variable its value is 0.584 (see Table 5). Conse-

quently, educational level does not affect the orientation of prevention

from or trust in science, but this does happen in the case of the level of

the agent’s scientific information.

Social attitudes and representations are built in environments of inter-

actions (Moscovici and Morková 1998). The construction of significa-tions of science and technology—and among them the valuation and

expectations—is built and prevails through systems of interaction in which

it is especially significant to see how scientific knowledge is created and

utilised. An environment of interaction in which this is relevant is univer-

sity. We have observed that among respondents with incomplete university

education, those who attend university show a predominance of cautious

towards science, while those who do not attend university are predom-

inantly trustful (Table 7).7

Table 7

Distribution of Trustful and Cautious Respondents with Incomplete

University Education, According to Whether They Attend University

Attend university

Orientation towards science Yes No Total

Trustful 37.5 60.6 47.1

Cautious 62.5 39.4 52.1

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Gamma = –0.439.









The environment of interaction—in this case, university—is a resource

to explain the association of the indicator ‘trustful–cautious’ with the

level of understanding of scientific knowledge. Indeed, going to universitynowadays is a stimulus to maintain the recall of scientific content. Litera-

ture has pointed out the effect of forgetting that content in adult life, which

is removed from educational institutions (Shamos 1995). Thus, within

the environment of interaction where scientific knowledge is created

and utilised, it is possible to see a relatively strong tendency to strengthen

precautionary attitudes towards science and technology; at the same time

in this environment it is observed that there is a higher level of understand-

ing of scientific content. Although the data are not enough to carry out a

more consistent test on these affirmations, we think it leaves the door

open for future explorations with significant empirical, theoretical and

political consequences.

Conclusions

In this study we have explored some indicators of the valuation of science

and technology by the public. This public consists of inhabitants of a

modern city that is located in a periphery country, both as regards inter-

national politics and economy, and the production of science and technol-

ogy. We have seen that the predominant perception confirms the advantages

of scientific knowledge, evaluating it in terms of utility and grounds of

modern culture, although it points out, at the same time, its limits and

negative effects, considering science a strange force, beneficial but incom-

prehensible and turbulent for the world. In this sense, we have observed

that the data reinforce the idea of trust in science as an expert system

characteristic of modernity, but they also reinforce the uncertainty gen-erated by controversies in science and in the application of technology.

This enables us to classify the surveyed population in terms of the concept

of risk society, which is a characteristic feature of reflexive modernity.

On the other hand we have pointed out the lack of correlation among

the valuation indicators, which seems to reflect an ambivalent culture

towards science and technology. Although we can only account for such

ambivalence as a mere disparity of judgement between positive and nega-

tive values towards science and technology, we have tried to formulate

some hypotheses about its origin. The data available do not enable us tofurther explore these hypotheses; nevertheless, they may be used as guide-

lines for future research. The ambivalence can be seen in the four types









of orientations towards science and technology which has been provided

to us by factor analysis. According to this, we have described two positive

and two negative orientations. The first ones are differentiated due to thehigher value of utility allocated to science or to a more unconditional

and naïve adherence to its good qualities. The negative ones comprise a

critical vision of science and technology that is based on the lack of sci-

ence’s commitment to society, and another vision based on the traditional

perspective and that which rejects science as a disturbing factor of trad-

itional life. These orientations coexist within the agent’s subjective space,

giving shape to its responses, without resulting in social groups or parties

among the public.

Last, we questioned the positive relation between education and the

valuation of science and technology. We observed that in the case of many

indicators, a higher level of education or knowledge does not imply a

more positive valuation of science, but that it is in fact the other way

round in the case of some indicators. We also did some empirical tests,

which, though weak, indicated that the valuations of science tend to be

more critical in contexts where the interaction in terms of knowledge is

high (universities). We suggest, then, that this should open a research line

with relevant and countless theoretical and political consequences.

NOTES

1. The survey was carried out in 2002 and covered a random sample of 300 cases. A

description of the study and its main comparative results with other cities of Ibero-

American countries can be found in Albornoz et al. (2003).

2. Before being applied, the questionnaire was subject to revision by a discussion group

of eleven people who analysed the meaning allocated to each prompt. There was an

immediate agreement about this question in particular.3. In spite of this, some authors have indicated Beck’s exaggeration in considering this

perception of the public particularly important in the relation between society and sci-

entific knowledge. See Yearley (2000).

4. Ambivalence is only given an operational meaning due to the lack of association be-

tween indicators of positive and negative valuation towards science and technology.

5. We do not include methodological errors as hypotheses in the design of indicators. The

fact that the ambiguity of responses has been made evident in other empirical studies

allows us to avoid the methodological hypothesis (see, for example, Eurobarómetro

55.2 2001).

6. Apart from the sixteen used in the previous section, two indicators were added: the

one we already used to differentiate the two basic orientations of trust and precaution,

and another presented in the following affirmation: ‘Scientific knowledge improves

people’s ability to decide important things in life’.









7. The same analysis cannot be carried out at the other educational levels. In the case of

those who have a complete level, attendance of educational institutions is almost non-

existent. At other incomplete levels the number of cases (either among those who do

attend or among those that do not currently do so) is very low.

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