the ways of machiavelli and the ways of politics

THE WAYS OF MACHIAVELLI AND THE WAYS OF POLITICS*

Martin Fleisher

IAncients and Moderns1

The contemporary canon of what constitutes ancient political thought was fixedin the course of the nineteenth century by the then newly reigning discipline ofthe philosophy of history. It made little difference whether this discipline waspositivistically or dialectically inclined. Whatever the methodological commit-ment there was general agreement that the sources of ancient wisdom on thenature and ends of social and political life were to be found in the political andethical writings of Plato and Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, Cicero. HereCicero was read, in part, as a repository of a Stoic political wisdom that had notsurvived in the original texts. According to this tradition, genuine, if not final,political wisdom is to be found in the reflections of these ancient thinkers not a totally unexpected conclusion to come from philosophers. For thesenineteenth-century practitioners of Geistesgeschichte the essence of ancientexperience is distilled in its inner life, its art, literature, religion, and above allin its philosophical speculation, but not, for instance, in its political experienceas recorded in its history. There is another, older tradition which searches out and discovers politicalwisdom not in the speculative thought of the ancients but in their politicalexperience. Reflecting on this experience the political thinker uncovers theprinciples of political life, principles of which those undergoing the experienceeither were not fully aware or did not articulate. Viewed from the perspective of this tradition the ancients frequently actedbetter than they knew or better than they philosophized. The moderns, bystudying this history, can know better than these ancients and thus hopefully

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XVI. No. 3. Autumn 1995

* All references to Machiavellis works in Italian will be to the Feltrinelli edition (Milan,19605) of the Opere, hereafter cited simply as Opere. English quotes are from Machia-velli: The Chief Works and Others, trans. Allan Gilbert (Duke University, 1965), Vol. 1(hereafter Gilbert).1 This is the third in a series of papers that I have written exploring the nature of the politicalin Machiavelli. The first, Trust and Deceit in Machiavellis Comedies, appeared in theJournal of the History of Ideas, XXVII, no. 3 (JulySeptember 1966), pp. 36580. Thesecond, A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli, was publishedin Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, ed. M. Fleisher (New York, 1972).

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insure that they will consistently act more wisely. What was, in part or in whole,fortune with the ancients may now become virtue and prudence with themoderns. Critical to the understanding of this tradition is the recognition thatone of its leading modern innovators, Machiavelli, was consciously motivatedby the most direct and urgent political purposes in contrast to many nineteenth-century philosophers of history and historians of philosophy. Interest in the pastwas inspired by the desire to uncover a course of political action which wouldeffectively solve pressing present problems. What is more, since Machiavellihad already made the discovery for himself, his aim was to persuade others ofits feasibility: the end of his enterprise was supremely political, to establish thecorrect political order. The discovery involved a certain way of reading histo-ries or arriving at the true knowledge of them. It is in this reflection on the pastthat we see, in a crude but distinct way, the emergence of the idea of the ironyof history the idea that the actors are not always conscious of the fullsignificance of their actions. This notion of consciousness arises in a fairly direct and unsophisticatedfashion when contemporary political concerns are combined with the study ofthe political past. There is no question in Machiavellis mind that the politicalactivity of the ancients sometimes exhibited political wisdom of the highestorder, but he is equally certain that it is a wisdom whose principles the ancientpolitical philosophers never fully grasped. For Machiavelli the exemplars ofthis prudence are always political actors, never philosophical spectators. Theiractivities as recorded in histories are the real source of knowledge. Machiavelliis certain that he has succeeded in laying bare what was hidden to the ancientthinkers. Thus, by situating ancient wisdom in sometimes fortuitous politicalacts, laws and institutions, and then by claiming to have discovered theprinciples and structures of political life in these practices and institutionsrather than in ancient political philosophy, Machiavelli helped develop theideas of historical reason and the irony of history. He was conscious of treadinga new path and was quite explicit about it being the way to true knowledge, andespecially the way to the reasons or necessity of political history. But of theintimately related ideas of the reason and irony of political history, the formeris consciously pursued by Machiavelli while the latter, as befits such an idea,remains mostly implicit as its subterranean influence continues and finallysurfaces in the eighteeth century. And so, by an ironic twist, this older tradition of which Machiavelli is aleading practitioner contributed to a mode of historical consciousness, emerg-ing full blown in the nineteenth century, which reversed this order of reality. Itlocated culture in mind rather than in socio-political life and chose to locate therealization of the superior, because more fully conscious, wisdom of themoderns in the life of ideas and spirit the philosophy of history as the historyof philosophy the life, that is, of philosophers, rather than in a new politicalexistence for all. Now, as we briefly observed earlier, instead of the social and

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political experience of the Greeks and Romans, the subject for inquiry becomesthe ideas of Plato, Aristotle and Cicero; and the object is no longer to improvethe actual condition of political and social life but, increasingly, to cultivate anduplift the mind and morals of the individual. In the making of the canon of thehistory of political thought in the nineteenth century in the pursuit of theseedifying ends, justice was done neither to the ideas nor intentions of thesetheorists now wrenched out of the conditions and urgencies of their lives,reduced as they were to a system of doctrine isolated from their total situationand actual intentions. In contrast to these nineteenth-century philosophers, Machiavelli was highlyconscious of his own political intent. What must be known is the correctpolitical course at the present juncture. It is in the experience of states and inthe acts of statesmen and citizens, as Machiavelli insists, that this knowledge(vera cognizione) is embodied. With this observation Machiavelli not onlyinforms us where knowledge lies and also where it is not to be sought forexample it cannot be found in the nature of the Gods, or of the cosmos, or ofthe soul but what it is knowledge of, namely the best way to order politicallife. Even here Machiavelli remains true to his political vocation: the criterionof the best way of life is itself political and not imported from without via,for instance, a Hellenic eudaemonistic ethic, or the apathetic or hedonisticethics of Hellenistic times. Just as there is no inner or transcendent retreat frompolitical life, so the goal of that life is to be found within itself and not in somemoral or metaphysical principle external to politics.

IIAncient Examples and Modern Cognition

There is no doubt in Machiavellis mind, then, that he is engaged in a new taskwhich sets him apart from past and contemporary political thinkers. In the veryopening sentence of the Discourses Machiavelli speaks of discovering waysand methods that are new [modi ed ordini nuovi].2 He informs us that thisinvolves entering upon a path not yet trodden by anyone.3 In another fre-quently cited passage, this one from The Prince, Machiavelli again callsattention to his departure from the methods of others. Now it remains toexamine the wise princes methods and conduct in dealing with subjects or withallies. And because I know that many have written about this, I fear that, whenI too write about it, I shall be thought conceited, since in discussing this materialI depart very far from the methods of the others.4 It should be noted that while

2 Gilbert, p. 190; Opere, Vol. 1, p. 123, Discourses, I. Preface.3 Ibid.: entrare per una via, la quale, non essendo suta ancora da alcuna trita.4 Gilbert, p. 57, The Prince, XV: Resta ora a vedere quali debbono essere e modi egovarni di uno principe con sudditi o con li amici. E, perch io so che molti di questo hanno

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the reference here is to the conduct of the prince, both here and in the citationfrom the Discourses Machiavelli calls attention to the novelty of his enterprise. In none of these cases is it immediately clear what exactly is the new way ormethod. Of course, there have been many suggestions as to its meaning,including the identification of the new way with the introduction of aninductive method in the study of politics. Indeed, one enthusiast sees Machia-velli as the very father of the inductive method itself. Others associate the newway with the idea of a political art, or with the Polybian notion of historypossessing an independent structure.5 But perhaps it is just as well to turn tothese passages to try to see what Machiavelli himself thought he was aboutwhen he talked of nuovi ordini. In those portions of his writings where he speaks of modi et ordini nuoviMachiavelli makes a point of linking his remarks about a new way with hisfundamental complaint about modern princes and republics: they do not haverecourse to examples in antiquity to guide their actions. In setting up states, inmaintaining governments, in ruling kingdoms, in organizing armies and man-aging war, in executing laws among subjects, in expanding an empire, not asingle prince or republic now resorts to the examples of the ancients.6 In thisMachiavelli asserts they differ from modern artists, jurists and doctors who donot merely passively admire ancient art, jurisprudence and medicine, butactively imitate them. If we take seriously Machiavellis references to contem-porary practice in other fields we have already made a start towards arriving atwhat he understands to constitute the nature of his new departure or way.Machiavelli informs us that, in one sense, he is not treading a new path differentfrom his contemporaries. Modern sculptors, judges, doctors all learn andpractice their pursuits by imitating the ancients. What is new about Machia-vellis new way is not the imitation of the ancients but its application tostatesmen and to the arena of politics. But as the examples of the doctors and the jurists clearly show, what is newin general about modern practice for Machiavelli, is the reduction to order orcodification of ancient acts and decisions.

In the differences that come up between citizens in civil affairs, or in theillnesses that men suffer from, they ever have recourse to the judgments

scritto, dubito, scrivendone ancora io, non essere tenuto prosuntuoso, partendomi, massimenel disputare questa materia, dalli ordini delli altri (Opere, Vol. 1, pp. 645).5 Here, for example, is the editor of Vol. 1 of Opere on The Prince: il trattato di unascienza nuova che non si appaga pi delle classificazioni e dei termini tradizionali, ma tendea creare una propria nuova classificazione e terminologia adequata alla nuovit dellamateria che viene trattando (p. xlii). Also: Il criterio metodologico fondamentale rimaneperci il medesimo sia nel Principe sia nei Discorsi . . . il teorico della verit effettuale.(p. lvii.)6 Gilbert, p. 191, Discourses, I. Preface.


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or to the remedies that have been pronounced or prescribed by theancients; for the civil laws are nothing else than opinions given by theancient jurists, which, brought into order, teach our present jurists tojudge. And medicine is nothing other than the experiments made byancient physicians, on which present physicians base their judgments.7

Therefore it seems safe to conclude that one meaning which Machiavelliattaches to discovering modi et ordini nuovi is to reduce to rules the politicalexperience or decisions made by ancient statesmen and polities. 8 If Machiavelli is thinking of a scienza nuova9 it is new for him only in thesense that he is applying a method already traditional in art, medicine andjurisprudence to politics where it has not been utilized up to now. This methodis nothing more than the ancient one familiar to every student of rhetoric andpedagogy the derivation of rules which constitute an art, and by virtue ofwhich it can be taught, from the acts of its greatest practitioners, states as wellas individuals. Such a method is patently not new, in our sense of the term; andwith regard to those who still insist that this method is inductive, even inMachiavellis own terminology its mode of operation is clearly held to bereductive. What is the art that Machiavelli will reduce to order? He himself informs usthat he is going to uncover and codify the political arrangements, the modi andordini of political virt and prudence. These will include the modes of politicalconduct of statesmen and princes but also of republics as embedded in theirconstitutions and institutions.10 Thus, when Machiavelli refers to the discoveryof modi ed ordini nuovi it would appear to be a gross error to assume that heis pointing to an empirical or inductive method which can be sharply and easilydistinguished from the content or subject matter to which it is applied. First,because as is obvious from Machiavellis usage here and, indeed, throughouthis writings, modi and ordini refer to ways and means which are shot throughwith political content. Simply put, Machiavellis own way or method consists

7 Ibid.8 Opere, Vol. 1, p. 123, Discourses, I. Preface.9 Many twentieth-century interpreters cannot resist seeing him as the founder of a newscience of politics, as Galileo was of a new science of earthly and heavenly motion. See,for example, L. Olschki, Machiavelli the Scientist (Berkeley, 1945).10 J.H. Whitfield argues that with Machiavelli . . . the Florentine tradition of ordini,resolutely in the plural, and with the sense of constitutional arrangements or devices closely linked to leggi, but differentiated has become predominant (J.H. Whitfield, OnMachiavellis use of Ordini, in Discourses on Machiavelli (Cambridge, 1969), p. 145). Hegoes on to note that Machiavelli uses modi and instituti as variations or synonyms. I wouldlike to add that in Machiavellis usage, as often as not, modi occurs along with ordini in thephrase modi et ordini and not just as a variant or synonym of it. For further examples anddiscussion of Machiavellis usage see section IV, below.

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in uncovering the ways and institutions of successful political life. The pre-occupation with modi et ordini flows from the conviction that they comprisethe matter and not solely the instrumentalities of politics. Let us take a fuller look at the passage in The Prince cited above, whereMachiavelli explicitly lays claim to novelty.

Now it remains to examine the wise princes methods and conduct indealing with subjects or with allies. And because I know that many havewritten about this, I fear that, when I too write about it, I shall be thoughtconceited, since in discussing this material I depart very far from themethods of others. But since my purpose is to write something useful tohim who comprehends it, I have decided that I must concern myself withthe truth of the matter as facts show it rather than with any fancifulnotions.11

It is clear from this passage that, as many commentators have emphasized,Machiavelli feels he is embarking on a singularly new path in contrast toprevious writers on the subject in yet another sense, i.e. that his modi and ordiniwill be derived from the actual conduct of statesmen and republics and not fromimagination. Here Machiavelli is distinguishing himself not only from modernwriters on politics but also from ancient writers. Machiavelli is almost sayinghis way as a writer on political matters is not only new as compared with hiscontemporaries, but also unique: no one has ever codified the ways, rules andpolitical institutions of great statesmen and of successful republics. The passage in question reveals how intimately method and substance areinterrelated in Machiavellis treatment of politics. For it pivots around severalcontrasts rather than merely one: Machiavelli distinguishes between his ordiniand those of all others and that distinction is immediately developed into onebetween the useful and, by implication, that which is impractical. In the verynext clause this becomes a distinction between truth and imagination which inturn is linked to the contrasting pair action from necessity and action frommoral considerations. Arranged in two groups the result offers a strikingillustration of how Machiavelli has turned much of classical thought on itshead. The true and the necessary are coupled with the politically useful which,in turn, is contrasted with the speculative and the moral as politically impracti-cal. In Machiavellis scheme the political is given ontological priority. Theactual world of politics, the experience of the Spartans, Romans, etc., is held tobe real and not merely part of the world of appearances. One must not lookelsewhere, for example into the soul or out into the cosmos, to discover truebeing in the good or in necessity as universal reason. Instead, the examinationof histories will disclose, to the acute mind, the modi et ordini of real (political)existence, the nature of true necessity and the proper rule of conduct.

11 Gilbert, p. 57; for the Italian, Opere, Vol. 1, pp. 645.


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We may say then that for Machiavelli his new modi and ordini will emergefrom a new way of arriving at them. This new way involves turning towardshistory then reading it aright; that is (1) discerning necessities and (2) beinginspired to act in accordance with them. The errors of modern statesmen and ofmodern (and ancient) writers on political matters derive from not having a trueunderstanding of books on history, so that as we read we do not draw from themthat sense of taste, that flavor which they really have.12

IIIImitation and Renewal

It would appear that the failure to arrive at a vera cognizione delle storie13 isnot a failure solely of intellect but also, and perhaps mainly, of virt, of appetiteand guts for such matters. Vera cognizione, then, includes not only knowingwhat wise ancient statesmen did but also acknowledging the possibility ofimitating them and having the desire to do so. In Machiavellis hand the notionof vera cognizione is thoroughly politicized it includes the impulse to greatactions as well as the knowledge of how to perform such acts. Machiavelli, itmust not be forgotten, is addressing himself to statesmen and active citizens.So that these readers are to be left in no doubt on this matter, he repeats hisadmonition about political imitation towards the end of the Discourses. Aftercriticizing Florentine policy he points up the political lesson:

these are the errors I spoke of in the beginning [of the Discourses], thatthe princes of our time make when they have to decide about great affairs.As a consequence they should be glad to hear how rulers in antiquity whohad to decide about such matters conducted themselves. But mensfeebleness in our day, caused by their feeble education and their slightknowledge of affairs, makes them judge ancient decisions [giudicii]partly inhuman, partly impossible.14

The measure of man, of states-man, is to be found in the conduct of eminentmen their actions reveal humanity to us, the true norms of human behaviouras well as the wide range of human capacities. If politics is the art of thepossible, Machiavelli will not take the average politician of easy compromiseand infinite adjustability, the man of the middle way, as providing the measureof the possible. Instead it is the outstanding men concerned with great affairswho are able to be the standard of political prudence and political virt.

12 Gilbert, p. 191, Discourses, I. Preface.13 Opere, Vol. 1, p. 124, Discourses, I. Preface.14 Gilbert, p. 490, Discourses, III.27. Translation slightly altered.

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As to the training of his mind, the prudent prince reads histories andobserves in them the actions of excellent men, sees how they haveconducted themselves in wars, observes the causes for their victories anddefeats, in order to escape the latter and imitate the former; above all, hedoes as some excellent men have done in the past; they selected forimitation some man earlier than themselves who was praised and hon-ored, and his actions and heroic deeds they always kept before them, asit is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles; Caesar, Alexander;Scipio, Cyrus.15

It is clear to Machiavelli that modern statesmen do not read history with theproper (political) attitude. Lacking this interest in history, not reading it for themeasure, the modi and ordini, of the political ways of men, for the reality whichis to be imitated, they will discover neither their own prudence nor their ownvirt there. Machiavelli does not make too sharp a distinction between pru-dence and virt and does not envisage a division of labour between the two say, for instance, between the counsellor and the prince or between those whotheorize and those who practice. This division of labour does not really exist inMachiavellis image of his own role as a man (statesman) writing acommentary on Livy he will not only codify ancient prudence, more importanthe will get men away from this error16 where they think it impossible toimitate the ancients. Nevertheless, it is clear that the recognition of the need andpossibility of imitating the virt of ancient statesmen takes precedence overprudence in Machiavelli. His own intent in writing is unfailingly political. Themost important (new) lesson Machiavelli wants to teach the modern statesmanis to choose an ancient statesman for imitation whose actions he will continu-ally keep before him. In doing this he, in turn, will be imitating the practice ofgreat ancient statesmen who, as we have just seen, always chose an earlierfigure to imitate. The soul of the statesman, the animo, draws inspiration andlife from its adoption of a worthy parent, a magnanimo, which provides it withthe proper measure of its capacities and deeds. It is in this sense that Machia-velli conceives the recurrent needs of a people to return to its origins as the wayto revitalize its political life. Of course, the call for renewal and revitalization by means of imitation of theancients was itself not new in Machiavellis day. At the very moment he wroteof these matters Christian humanists like Erasmus and More were also issuingcalls for the renewal of prudence, virtue and society through the imitation ofthe ancients different ancients, the Church fathers, the Apostles, and aboveall Christ, and different ideas of prudence and virtue, but the emphasis on theneed for renewal is the same, and the emphasis on imitation of the ancients asthe way to accomplish it. For most early sixteenth-century European reformers,

15 Gilbert, pp. 567, The Prince, XIV. 16 Gilbert, p. 191, Discourses, I. Preface.


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to innovate is to renovate, to originate is to return to the source, to make newis to renew.17 A summary of the argument down to this point may now be in order.Examination of those passages in the Discourses, The Prince and elsewherehabitually referred to in discussing Machiavellis claim to novelty reveals:

1. a concern with the need to imitate ancient republics, statesmen, and citizens that has become a political problem precisely because hiscontemporaries feel it is not possible

2. a belief that this may be corrected by vera cognizione delle storie tobe derived from a reading of Machiavellis commentary that is itselfdesigned to facilitate the drawing of those practical lessons thatcomprise the goal of the knowledge of histories; and

3. the practical lessons are to be given, in part, in the form of ridurre inordine of ancient and modern political experience.

The comparison of ancient and modern events is to be an indispensable part ofthis task of teaching the lessons of history. Moreover, in the passage from ThePrince where Machiavelli speaks of his producing different ordini from otherswith regard to e modi e governi di uno principe,18 he introduces a distinctionbetween his concern with reality and the concerns of others with imaginarystates. Thus this passage too turns back to political histories, to previouspolitical action (to the modi del procedere of statesmen and citizens and gliordini of republics) as the proper subject matter of political thought but ofpolitical thought that, in its turn, is wholly and completely oriented towardspolitical action as the imitation of past greatness. This last point is critical: Machiavelli is preoccupied not with history, noteven with political history, but rather with the history of political greatness great statesmen and great republics. We have seen that vera cognizione in-volves political man seeing himself in a political figure a great politicalfigure of the past. Cognition is recognition. This is its form. The content ofvera cognizione involves other acts of recognition. For example, the acknow-ledgement by others of ones greatness. Greatness is inescapably public: it isthe open recognition by others of the greatness of a person or a state. Machiavellis specific concern is with the political renewal of his ownTuscany and this, he believes, can only come about by the recovery of ancientmodi and ordini, the source of virt and prudence. Ancient means only onething to Machiavelli, the Tuscan republics have only one true ancestor

17 I deal with this theme at length in M. Fleisher, Radical Reform and Political Persuasionin the Life and Writings of Thomas More (Geneva, 1973).18 Opere, Vol. 1, p. 64, The Prince, XV.

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Rome.19 Hence he begins the Discourses by returning to Rome and to its originsand first principles, to the ordini of the city. He shows how, despite the fact thatunlike Sparta and some other cities its original institutions were defective, itwas able to perfect them over time due to the happy accident of the conflictbetween plebs and senate.20 The conflict led to leggi e ordini in beneficio dellapublica libert,21 and therefore, despite the violence it created, it must bejudged good. So in Book I Machiavelli discusses the ordini by which Romegrew in greatness and perfected her vivere politico. The History of Florencealso opens with considerations on the origins of a vivere libero. The growth inthe reputation and power of Venice is attributed to its leggi e ordini22 and thebirth of the Florentine republic is also dated from the time when with ordinimilitari e civili fondorono i Fiorentini la loro libert.23 The difference betweenFlorence and Rome being that, while in both cases the founding ordini were notperfect, they were perfected and renewed by the Romans but, unfortunately, notby the Florentines, due in large measure to the difference in the nature of theinternal divisions in these two states. If Machiavelli begins the Discourses and the History with considerations onthe origins of autonomous political life and these origins are identified withfounding ordini and leggi, he closes The Prince and the Discourses withconsiderations on the renewal of political life, which renewal is identified witha return to original principles. Thus, when in the last chapter of The PrinceMachiavelli calls for a leader to find le nuove legge e li nuovi ordini24 torevitalize Italys military (and hence its political) virt they are new only forcontemporary Italy, otherwise they are as old as Etruscan and Roman virt andthe principle of grounding political life in correct military order, i.e. a militia.Thus, too, in the last book of the Discourses, Machiavelli turns to the problemof the renewal of the Roman vivere politico and its greatness which constitutesa return to origins. This is as it should be since for Machiavelli renovatio alwaysinvolves a return to original principles hence even ordini are to be judgedon how well they permit renewal or new ordini which restore the old vitality.Even ordini, that is to say, are to be evaluated partly, if not primarily, as waysof renewing political life, as productive of virt.

19 The Florentine republican ideology already invoked Rome as its sire in the days of theearliest chroniclers. See N. Rubinstein, The Beginnings of Political Thought in Florence,Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, V (1942), pp. 198227.20 Opere, Vol. 1, p. 134, Discourses, I.221 Ibid., p. 137, Discourses, I.4.22 Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 121, Istorie, I.29.23 Ibid., p. 146, Istorie, II.6.24 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 103, The Prince, XXVI.


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Renewal, then, is as necessary to a vivere libero as it is to all life. Politicallife (i.e. an autonomous political order) is born of the introduction of leggi andordini. It is perfected, as in the case of Rome, and in contrast to Sparta wherethere was one law-giver who ordered political life in its foundation at onemoment in time, by the subsequent introduction of new ordini in response tothe needs of the times. However in both cases political life must be continuallyrenewed by the revitalization of the ordini and modi of a people.25 Politics isessentially, if not exclusively, concerned with ordini and modi. It becomes forMachiavelli, in distinct contrast to much of classical political thought, what itis for statesmen and citizens, a continual problem in innovation. Nuove neces-sit require nuovi ordini.26 Politics always involves relating a modo delprocedere to i tempi, good or bad fortune is determined by the way modi areadopted to changing circumstances.27 By now it should be evident that my method of interpreting Machiavelliconsists of an attempt to lay bare the structure of his thought by tracing thevarious ways he uses the term nuovi in relation to modi and ordini. The relationof his idea of the new to the ideas of renewal and imitation having beenindicated, it is time to focus more explicitly on ordini.

IVOrdini

Turning once more to the opening paragraphs of the Discourses the term ordinein its broadest employment by Machiavelli refers to the unchanging arrange-ment or order of the heavens, sun, elements and man.28 Here order means theconstitutive nature of a thing. This is a very common usage with Machiavelli.It occurs many times even within the narrow confines of the first pages of theDiscourses where Machiavelli speaks of constituting republics,29 of the consti-tution30 of Rome, of reducing the decisions of ancient jurists to order,31 and of

25 Ibid., p. 439: impossibile ordinare una republica perpetua, perch per mille inopinatevie si causa la sua rovina. Discourses, III.17.26 Ibid., p. 241, Discourses, I.49.27 Ibid., p. 416, Discourses, III.9.28 Ibid., p. 124, Discourses, I. Preface. Machiavelli accuses his contemporaries of thinkingimitation of the ancients impossible as if the sky, the sun, the elements, men were changedin motion, arrangement [ordine], and power from what they were in antiquity (Gilbert,p. 191).29 ordinare le republiche, ibid.30 ordinato, ibid., p. 125, Discourses, I.1.31 ridutte in ordine, ibid., p. 124, Discourses, I. Preface.

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the fact that this ordinazione delle leggi is central to the founding of a city.32This basic constitution of a thing is determinative of its fate. Venice became themost celebrated Italian city per ordine e per potenza.33 Its security and thegrowth of its reputation and power it owes to its founding leggi e ordini.34Buoni ordini will secure buona fortuna.35 Now if, as in the case of Rome (and, inter alia, Florence) and in contrast toSparta, the founding ordini were not perfect but not so defective as to be beyondremedy, time will afford opportunities to improve political life. This introducesus to the second level of ordini and leggi the adoption of new ordini toimprove and perfect a civic life whose basic constitution has certain weak-nesses. The possibility of the introduction of such new institutions is itselfgrounded in the fact that the original order aimed in the right direction. Had itbeen totally off the mark, Machiavelli intimates, the situation would be hope-less. The virt of the reformer no matter how great cannot carry all before it.Indeed, it is the founding ordini which must produce and sustain virt. Romecould improve itself because its original order made for some virt and hencemade possible an increase in virt when the opportunity for change arose. Thenew ordini which resulted further increased the virt of Roman civic life. Thevirt and prudence (the two are almost synonymous here) of the lawgiver,founder, or reformer of a political society is manifested in the drawing up oflaws. But in the final analysis because no certain remedy can be given for suchtroubles in republics, it follows that an everlasting republic cannot be estab-lished; in a thousand unexpected ways her ruin is caused.36 For Machiavellithere is no possibility of a perfect political balance;37 there will always be newproblems arising;38 human affairs are always mutable. Hence new measureswill always be necessary to better stabilize the civil and political order. Herewe are witnessing the delineation of a third level of ordini, which can be shownto differ from the others. Machiavelli is proclaiming a need for laws to copewith changing times independently of founding structure or of institutionswhich remedy initial defects. Such changing times are potentially corrupting,a falling away from order and necessity. There is a continuous need to adjust

32 Ibid., p. 127, Discourses, I.1.33 Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 120, Istorie, I.28.34 Ibid., p. 121, Istorie, I.29.35 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 162, Discourses, I.11.36 Gilbert, p. 471, Discourses, III.17.37 bilanciare, Opere, Vol. I, p. 145, Discourses, I.6.38 Ibid., p. 144, Discourses, I.6.


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ones modo del procedere to i tempi.39 This is the heart of politics, of thesurvival ability of principalities and republics. Parenthetically, we may observethat precisely because the means adopted must be suitable to the times there canbe no fixed and permanent virt every virt carries with it potential defects.40But defect is not an extreme, as virt is not an Aristotelian mean:4l virt issimply a matter of what befits the occasion. Virt is what maintains (andexpands) a vivere politico. Thus virt too is politicized. Machiavelli also uses ordine in referring to his own enterprise. We havealready indicated that he proposes to arrive at his goal of vera cognizione dellestorie by means of a ridurre in ordine. Hence, further elucidation of ordine bothas an order and as a method or principle of ordering brings us back to theproblem of Machiavellis own method. Now, as we have observed, there is no general agreement among Machia-vellis commentators on either the nature of order or the method by which it isestablished. To return for a moment to the argument of Walker and others thatthere is a new method to be found in Machiavelli and that it is the method ofinduction, a method he, not Bacon, invented,42 we may now adduce severalobjections to this interpretation. The idea of inventing a method in the modernsense in which Walker uses it would be totally incomprehensible to Machiavelli another example of the anachronistic fallacy. So that even if Walker iscorrect in his conclusion that Machiavelli invented a new method, Machiavellicould not have been referring to this when he spoke of treading a path no otherhad walked. This is related to the other error discussed above with regard to themeaning of new in Machiavelli. Walker heads the section in which hediscusses Machiavellis method The New Method and the Claim to Original-ity. He has read Machiavellis statement that he is walking a new path as aclaim to originality which is defined in terms of post-sixteenth century, naypost-eighteenth century, notions of originality totally alien to the structure ofMachiavellis thought. To cite just one example which will illuminate thedifference: Walker well knows that one of Machiavellis basic themes is theneed for states to return to their origins, to become original again. ForMachiavelli origins never happen just once, they are not unique. Yet it is clearfrom Walkers usage that this is what he means by new and original. So be it just as long as we understand that Walker is calling Machiavelli original inWalkers terms, but this is not to be confused with what Machiavelli meantwhen he said he was walking a new path.

39 Ibid., p. 416, Discourses, III.9.40 Ibid., p. 447, Discourses, III.21.41 Machiavelli rules this out on the very same page.42 The Discourses of Machiavelli, trans. L.J. Walker (London, 1950), p. 92.

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Next, it must be noted that if what is new and original in Machiavellismethod includes the derivation of rules and generalizations from experiencerather than from any other realm, this principle is insisted upon at least asforcefully, and certainly more explicitly, by contemporaries of Machiavellisuch as Erasmus and More in their demands for the reform and renewal ofgrammar, pedagogy and theology, among other studies. They never tire ofrepeating that the principles of an art must be reduced from actual practice, andnot deduced from metaphysical or other a priori principles. What their criterionof actual or real practice is, is of course crucial for a proper understanding oftheir method. But this is no less the case with Machiavelli. Because he choosesto make the Roman experience the most authoritative of all does not make hismethod any more inductive than that of Erasmus and More. It does, however,indicate that his criteria of decisive experience are different:

1. obviously, for him the decisive realm of human experience is politicaland not moral, metaphysical or religious in nature hence Rome istaken as the examplar and not Socrates, or Christ;

2. and within this realm certain additional criteria are also operative,e.g. one political experience is to be preferred to another on theground of greatness. For this reason Roman experience is moresignificant than Spartan experience.

VVarieties of Cycles

(the method of cycles and the method of division)43

Another suggestion regarding the meaning of Machiavellis new path leads usback to Polybius and the idea of cycles. Now the influence of Polybius onMachiavelli the fact, for example, that the theoretical discussion on theorigin of cities and the cycle of governments in the early portion of theDiscourses is nothing more than a paraphrase of Polybius has been recog-nized at least since the nineteenth century. This has given rise to what amountsto a special field of inquiry within the wider domain of Machiavelli scholarshipcentring on the problem of how Machiavelli came be to acquainted with

43 Portions of this essay, including the discussion and analysis of cycles and the method ofdivision in Machiavelli, were presented in a paper delivered at a panel devoted to Machia-velli at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, The PalmerHouse, Chicago, Illinois, 25 September 1976. In his Machiavelli (New York, 1981),Quentin Skinner briefly (pp. 234) mentions what he calls the dichotomies in The Princebut he does not analyse or discuss their significance.


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Polybius cyclical theory of political history since Book VI of PolybiusHistories had not yet been translated in Machiavellis day.44 Modern scholarship has thoroughly identified Machiavellis borrowingsfrom Polybius45 and also contended that Machiavellis own conception ofhistory is cyclical. But, to the best of my knowledge, Robert Cumming in hismasterful Human Nature and History is the first to argue forcefully that, whenhe spoke of his new path, Machiavelli specifically meant this theory of history that is, the path which yields vera cognizione delle storie is the outline ofthe cycle of governments as given in I, 2 of the Discourses. This cycle, it willbe recalled, moves from principality to tyranny to aristocracy to oligarchy todemocracy to anarchy, and then back to principality.46 Such an interpretationis, of course, fully compatible with Machiavellis own language and many ofits basic notions. It does not jar our sensibility as do the many interpretationswhich view Machiavelli in terms of their own theories of what modern scienceor political science is all about. Cummings interpretation is subtly and con-vincingly argued and textually well grounded. However, although it parallelssome of the arguments presented here, and offers corroborative evidence forothers, it cannot be accepted in full because it does not offer the full story. Walker has argued that Machiavelli really dismisses the Polybian cycle.

Polybius goes on to say that a person seeking to apply this theory toexistent states might mistake the time at which a change would take placebut ought to make no mistake in regard to its being in process of decayor as to the form likely to supervene, provided he looks at the matterimpartially. Machiavelli, on the other hand, shrewdly remarks that thecycle is rarely completed; nor does he ever mention cyclic change again.47

Cumming shows that Walker has missed the point: the reason the cycle is infact rarely completed in no way vitiates the underlying theoretical argumentwhich Machiavelli does not repudiate. Furthermore Cumming demonstratesthat the argument Machiavelli offers to explain why the cycle is not finished isitself also derived from Polybius. Finally, Cumming indicates, cyclical changeis basic to the very structure of the Discourses.

44 See, for example, Felix Gilbert, L.J. Walker, Jack Hexter, Hans Baron. The early workwas by G. Ellinger, Die Antiken Quellen der Staatslehre Machiavellis (Tbingen, 1888),and A. Bini, Polibio e il Machiavelli (Montevarchi, 1900).45 See, for example, L.J. Walker and the editors of the Feltrinelli edition of Machiavellisworks. 46 I have omitted the very first government, the rule of the strong man which Machiavelli,following Polybius, drops out of the recurrent cycle.47 The Discourses of Machiavelli, trans. Walker, Vol. II, pp. 11 ff., 17.

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Nevertheless Walker does have one valid point: the Polybian cycle of thetransformation of one governmental type into its opposite is not the cycle whichgives structure to the Discourses and provides the basis for vera cognizionedelle storie. Cumming has Machiavelli taking over Polybius governmentalcyclical theory and one of his arguments for this is that

what Walker fails to recognize is the cyclical structure of Machiavellisown theory. The three books composing the Discourses follow a three-phased cycle: the first book considers the foundation of the state and thedevelopment of its internal structure; the second book, its external expan-sion and consequent transformation of its structure; and the third book,the program of reformation that will return it to its starting point.48

But this cycle, as Cumming knows, is quite different from the governmentalcycle. If we agree then that the idea of cycle constitutes one fundamental mode ofMachiavellis thought and is directly related to his idea of the correct knowl-edge of history, the problem now open for inquiry centres on the structure orordine of the cycle or cycles Machiavelli employs. The governmental cycle49 a cycle in which stage by stage, beginning with principato,50 the state goesthrough the various governmental medi only to return anew to principality51 is slighted by Machiavelli in subsequent discussions in the Discoursesbecause it is less relevant to the problem of the renewal of political life thanother cycles. Let us return to the cycle which Cumming finds embedded in the structureof the Discourses, a cycle consisting of

1. the foundation and development of Romes internal structure

2. external expansion

3. the programme of reformation returning the state to its starting point.

A closer look discloses some problems and complications with this schema. Forone thing the phases of this cycle are not necessarily temporally sequential: therenewal of Roman political life as discussed in Book III frequently overlaps thehistorical periods discussed in Book II and even in Book I. This is not becauseMachiavelli, like Homer, occasionally nods. It is explicable by reference toanother and much simpler cycle (if we may call it that) which Machiavelli

48 Robert D. Cumming, Human Nature and History (Chicago, 1969), Vol. I, p. 96.49 Opere, Vol. I, p. 133, Discourses, I.2: il cerchio nel quale girando tutte le republiche sisono governate e si governano.50 Ibid., p. 131.51 Ibid., p. 133, my translation.


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employs, which may even be viewed as an abbreviated version of the birth,growth/expansion, renewal cycle namely the order/disorder or decline/renewal cycle. In the History of Florence, in one version, order comes out ofdisorder and then disorder emerges from order again.52 In the Discourses ittakes on the form of the movement from the degenerative type of governmentto renewal in the next type to its subsequent degeneration.53 A further problem with the cyclical structure of the Discourses as Cumminggives it is that Book I is not devoted to a discussion of the foundation of Romebut, instead, the discussion is cast in terms of a general consideration of theorigins of cities. Now the form which is employed here is at least as basic toMachiavellis mode of reading, ordering and presenting the histories of variousstates as is the cyclical structure. It is the equally ancient one of the method ofdivision. Thus Machiavelli announces at the beginning of the Discourses that,since the first book will deal with the birth of Rome, he will initially beconcerned with the founding of all cities. He immediately proceeds to his firstgeneralization: all cities are built either by men native to the place where theyare built, or by foreigners.54 The particular method of division which Machiavelli, with rare exception,employs is the method of division by dichotomy. Division by dichotomy, as theexample immediately above shows, seeks to define and classify a subject bydividing it in two, supposedly along the line which distinguishes an essentialelement in the genus and hence significant differentia in the two species orsub-classes. The procedure of dichotomizing and the accompanying grammati-cal structure of either . . . or . . . is so native to Machiavellis style that it is apuzzle why commentators have generally chosen to ignore it.55 Machiavellisthought is so marked by this tendency that it may be taken as basic to its mododel procedere. The world is structured in terms of choices or decisions, but thechoices are not endlessly multiplied. Instead, where possible, Machiavelli lovesto present them as clear-cut alternative or antithetical principles of action forza or fraude, virt or fortuna, ozio or necessit. Perhaps the preoccupationwith Machiavellis modernity and with his empiricism inhibited the percep-tion of Machiavellis continuous recourse to an ancient mode of analysis andargument which goes back at least as far as Plato. In any event, the method of division permeates the structure of everyparagraph of Discourses, I.1, as well as providing it with its overall form. When

52 Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 325, Istorie,V.l, my translation.53 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 1312, Discourses, I.2.54 Gilbert, p. 192, Discourses, I.l.55 Behind this way of structuring both language and human reality one detects the Romanwill to structure things in terms of either . . . or (aut . . . aut), a dominant characteristic ofthe classical Latin style.

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it is continuously reapplied to the analysis of a subject or class it produces aseries of linked, descending levels or stages involving the splitting of just oneof the two halves, and thus it yields the particular branching form we associatewith Porphyrys tree. This is precisely the method Machiavelli follows soclosely in The Prince, giving rise to a long-chained argument which tightlylinks the first eight chapters. Let us turn, for a moment, to the structure of The Prince. Its very firstsentence establishes the form of the argument. All states . . . are either republicsor principalities. The diagram on this page reproduces and summarizes thestructure of the argument as developed in the remainder of Chapter 1.

Level Division A Division B

1 All states, all dominions are

2 either Republics or Principalities

3 either Hereditary or New

4 either entirely New or Additions to Hereditary states

5 either free or under a prince

*

6 Conquered by Conquered by arms mercenaries of a prince (Fortuna) (Virt)

(At the point marked by the asterisk the division applies to the acquisition ofboth dominions that were free and those that had been under a prince. Hencethe pattern of branching is broken at this juncture.)

The succeeding chapters discuss and dispute the problem of governing thevarious sub-types. Thus Chapter II deals with hereditary principalities(3, A); Chapter III with new principalities (3, B), but also with new addi-tions to old states (composite principalities); Chapter IV discovers a newdichotomy in a genus of principality which cannot quite fit into the treepattern as presented up to this point:


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Princedoms of which we have any record are governed in two differentways: in one there is a prince, and all the others are as servants . . . In theother, there is a prince, with the barons who hold their rank not throughthe rulers favor but through their ancient blood.56

Chapter V discusses the governing of newly acquired principalities which werepreviously free (5, A); Chapter VI deals with 6, B; Chapter VII with 6, A;Chapters VIII and IX introduce a new dichotomy not related to the tree; ChapterXII announces the end of the examination of the various species of principalityin favour of a general discussion of principalities and how they should organizethemselves militarily (Chs. XIIXIV); Chapters XVXIX (or to XXIII) areconcerned with how princes should behave vis--vis their subjects. The struc-ture Machiavelli employs at this point and frequently at other places, then, isnot the Polybian natural cycle of birth/growth and expansion/decay, but therational/necessary one of the method of division. In the Discourses the pattern is more truncated. A division normally is notpursued for more than a few levels, to be abandoned for another division notdirectly derived from the first, which in its turn is shortly abandoned. Thus, pursuing his favourite method of division, Machiavelli announces atthe beginning of the second discourse, Book I, that I intend to omit discussionof those cities that at their beginning have been subject to somebody, and I shallspeak of those that . . . governed themselves by their own judgment, either asrepublics or as princedoms.57 This genus he further divides into either thosethat at the outset or shortly thereafter had laws given them by one man at onetime, like Lycurgus to the Spartans, or those that acquired their laws by chanceat different times and circumstances, like Rome.58 On this level the commoncharacteristic is how cities get their leggi ed ordini,59 and the differentia isbased on whether they get them at once and at the hands of one man (by hisprudence) or at different times and by chance (accidenti). But it can readily beseen that this division sets up a pattern which does not necessarily overlapeither the Polybian natural govenmental cycle or the cycle of birth, expansionand renewal which Cumming recognizes in the Discourses. Sparta, whichobserved [its laws] more than eight hundred years without debasing them andwithout any dangerous rebellion60 obviously was subject to neither cycle in

56 Gilbert, p. 20, The Prince, IV.57 Ibid., p. 195, Discourses, I.2.58 Ibid., pp. 1956, Discourses, I.2.59 Opere, Vol. I, p. 129, Discourses, I.2.60 Gilbert, p. 196, Discourses, I.2.

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part for reasons which are irrelevant to the nature of these cycles, namely, thatit was instituted at once and by one person.6l In Sparta as in Rome the mixedform of the constitution blocks the effects of the natural governmental cycle(and offers another explanation why the governmental cycle plays no positiverole in the Discourses once we get beyond the first few pages). Sparta nevergoes through it its mixed form, with which it begins, supposedly preventsthe operation of the natural cycle. Rome, in beginning to pass through the cycle,acquires the mixed constitution which also removes it from the subsequenteffects of the natural governmental cycle. As numerous commentators haveobserved, the cycle that Machiavelli, following Polybius, has Rome actuallytraversing is no cycle at all, let alone the classic governmental cycle. In bothcases the idea of the cycle has a purely negative function: it indicates whatwould have happened if not for the proper ordini and modi. Thus almost in thesame breath that Machiavelli expounds the governmental cycle (Discourses,1.2) he declares it irrelevant to the subsequent considerations of the Discourses.Art, in the case of Rome, has triumphed over nature. Much more relevant to Machiavellis argument is the method of division andits distinction between Sparta and Rome. This is obviously more than anintellectual distinction. It represents a real political choice, indeed the onlychoice available for anyone [who] sets out . . . to organize a state from thebeginning,62 for to find a course [modo] half way between one and the otherI believe not possible.63 Thus, the way Machiavelli dichotomizes is the onlyway open to statesmen and republics. It is also one way by which he presentsvera cognizione delle storie or reduces historical experience to order. Continuing the analysis of the second cycle, the one Cumming focuses upon,as a description of Roman constitutional history, we find that Machiavelli seesthe original ordini of Rome, though not perfect in themselves, as putting Romeon the right road.

In spite of her [Rome] not having a Lycurgus to organize her at thebeginning in such a way that she could continue free for a long time,nonetheless so many unexpected events happened, on account of thedisunion between the plebians and the Senate, that what an organizer hadnot done was done by chance. Because if Rome did not gain the firstfortune, she gained the second; because her first laws [ordini], thoughthey were defective, nevertheless did not turn from the straight road

61 To the best of my knowledge, Polybius does not offer this as a significant reason forSpartas longevity. He attributes it to the perfection of the constitution that Lycurgusintroduces and not to the fact that it was introduced at one time.62 Gilbert, p. 209, Discourses, I.6.63 Ibid., p. 211, Discourses, I.6.


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leading them to perfection. Romulus and all the other kings made manygood laws [leggj], adapted also to a free society [vivere libero].64

The perfection of Romes constitution does not necessarily insure its immor-tality. Even as it is being perfected it is subject to decay, which if not reversedwill lead to ruin. Renewal may be a periodic political task, but its period doesnot mechanically arrive at the end of the cycle. Like organic life itself, a viverepolitico must be continually renewed. Its renewal consists of a revitalization ofits original or constitutive principles. The peroration with which Machiavelliends the Discourses takes as its theme the need of a republic which is interestedin maintaining its liberty continually to make new provisions to that end.65 Therepublic must be perpetually on the alert to introduce remedies to correctcorruptions when they appear. We may now detect the source of the second cycle. It lies not in thecosmological cycle of the circling stars to which the first governmental cycleis assimilated, but in the organic-medical cycle of growth/perfection/decay towhich earthly life is subject. This cycle too is of ancient lineage. Having citedPolybius for the other cycle we may just as well quote him on this one: everybody or state or action has its natural periods first of growth, then of prime, andfinally of decay.66 Machiavelli exhibits a tendency to short-circuit even thisabbreviated organic cycle so that we are sometimes left with an elementarycycle of decay and renewal, or order/disorder. This is obviously the cycle mostpolitically relevant to statesmen and republics in the widest variety of situ-ations. We may, with Machiavelli, consider even the case of perfecting apolitical order as involving renewal and, indeed, this is how he occasionallydescribes it. This leaves only the extremely rare case of the founding of apolitical order as outside the bounds of this cycle. Here we have the link between Machiavellis reduction of historical experi-ence to order by way of a cycle and by way of division: for the cycle oforder/disorder is plainly the division or exclusive political choice: either orderor disorder. It is also the cycle Machiavelli is most concerned with in his ownpolitical life. These same concerns of perfection-renewal underlie Machia-vellis perspective on the history of Florence and his recommendations for aFlorentine constitution. Florence, he insists, is not so corrupt that the institutionof a militia will not renew and perfect its political life. He not only urged thisstep on his friend Soderini when the latter was Gonfaloniere, he repeatedlysought to have it instituted under the republican regime. He was so obsessedwith the idea that he made it central to his Florentine Constitution even thoughit was addressed to the Medici who, of course, had no interest in buttressing

64 Ibid., p. 200, Discourses, I.2.65 Discourses, III.49. 66 Polybius, The Histories, vi.51.4.

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republican institutions. Finally, he made it the recurrent theme of his Historyof Florence, also written for the Medici. After the founding of the Florentinestate, he tells his readers, the single most important element missing from theconstitution was a provision for a genuine militia a citizen army. Machiavellimakes it abundantly clear that this deficiency could be overcome at any pointin the history of Florence right up to his own day. This is to say that whateverchanges Florence underwent since the republic was born, and Machiavelli datesits birth with the end of French and German control, approximately around1215, it had never been so badly corrupted that its political life could not bebrought to perfection or renewal with the introduction of the proper militaryorder. Military order and the virt of both states and statesmen are, of course,intimately related. It is the statesman of virt who establishes the propermilitary order for a society where it is lacking, or renews it where it is in decay.It is also the military order which produces citizens soldiers and statesmenof virt.67 This is surely one source of the ability of a vivere libero to breakthrough the various natural cycles to which life is otherwise subject. This waylies its longevity if not its immortality. Virt in this sense has never completely abandoned Italy. Machiavelli recallsthe Etruscans and then the Romans. But his compatriots must not make the fatalmistake of thinking that military virt fled Italy for good with the barbarianinvasions. Barbarian rule in Italy ended when the principal Italian states (Milan,Florence, Venice) drove them out and established their political autonomy.Previously Italian military virt had been concentrated in one city-state whichdominated the area, now it was present among the several Tuscan city-states.Thus, politico-military virt was not dead in Italy, it had merely to be renewedfor Italy successfully to confront the new barbarians the Spanish and French.Failing this, independent civic life would once again disappear in Italy. Butthere are no valid grounds for pessimism, let alone fatalism. Tuscany is readyfor a vigorous vivere civile.68 Unfortunately, no one with the requisite abilityand knowledge has tried it.

VIEither Virt or Fortuna

In addition to the recurrence of the passionate theme of vera cognizione asrecourse to the past for the sake of renewal of political life in the present, we

67 See Opere, Vol. II, pp. 3727, Arte della guerra, for one among many examples of thisargument.68 Opere, Vol. I, p. 257, Discourses, I.55: con lo animo e con lordine si vede, o che lemantengono o che le vorrebbono mantenere la loro libert . . . [all they need is] un uomoprudente, e che delle antiche civilit avesse cognizione, vi sintrodurrebbe uno viverecivile.


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can note a definite and characteristic tendency by Machiavelli to depart, timeand again, from the iron grip of the more naturalistically conceived cycles ofhistory. It is not merely that a mixed constitution prevents the occurrence of thegovernmental cycle. More important, knowledge of the natural cycle of gov-ernment does not constitute the essence of vera cognizione delle storie asPolybius stated it did. Polybius had argued that if the statesman knew in whatphase of the cycle he was he could act to forestall the advent of the next phase.Cumming attributes this notion of vera cognizione to Machiavelli, but even iftrue knowledge is primarily knowledge not of the natural six-phase govern-mental cycle but of the growth/expansion/renewal cycle, we have seen thatMachiavelli does not consistently adhere to it. He is too much the politicalactivist for that. If, as Cumming suggests, Machiavelli (following Polybius)recognizes a political structure in history, we must concede that he loosens itto the point where, for instance, he can contend that Florence was ready for theintroduction of an ordine nuovo, a proper militia, at any time over a three-hundred year period, that is, from its founding to Machiavellis own day.Obviously, whether we consider the act in the category of perfecting orrenewing the Florentine consitution, Machiavelli is not taking the growth/expansion/renewal cycle all that seriously. Otherwise he would have to con-cede that Florence was either improving or decaying over that long period, andnot that the time was perpetually ripe for the introduction of this new institution. Thus, while Machiavelli recognizes the limits of virt, he is extremelyreluctant to concede too much to fortuna, especially when it comes to anassessment of the political prospects of his own Florence. If we turn from thecontent of Machiavellis political interest to the form he gives it, we are onceagain struck by yet another recourse to the method of division and to mutuallyexclusive judgments in the pair virt/fortuna. It is now time to examine thismost celebrated of all Machiavellian pairs in connection with the relationbetween the order of division and the cyclical order. We probably owe the practice of sharply contrasting virt and fortuna to theCynic-Stoic tradition and its concern, in the Hellenistic period, to develop theinner moral resources of the psyche against the onslaught of external fortune,good or bad. Aristotle had, of course, seen no such antithesis between the goodsof fortune and the goods of the soul. Later, in what became a typical rhetoricalexercise, the Greeks living under Roman domination applied these categoriesto politics. They debated whether Romes greatness was due to her own virtueor to the goddess Fortune. Machiavellis own response is clear and unequivo-cal: Roman greatness is grounded in the reciprocal virtues of Roman statesmenand Roman institutions. Fortune, good or bad, does play a role in the affairs ofmen. The turnings of the heavens do result in changes in the conditions ofearthly states,69 but this power of heaven is diminished when prudence is used

69 Opere, Vol. VIII, p. 265, Decennale, II.

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to discover and remedy political ills. Machiavelli pursues the theme in hisliterary works. At heavens command the wheels of fortune are turned bynecessit and ozio. The one puts the mundane world in order, and the otherruins it.70 When Machiavelli contrasts necessit and ozio, another aspect of the sourcesand effects of virt and fortuna is illuminated. Necessity, for Machiavelli, is themother of virt, as ozio or idleness and luxury are the source of political andpersonal decay.

Men never do good unless necessity drives them to it; but when they arefree to choose and can do just as they please, confusion and disorderbecome everywhere rampant. Hence it is said that hunger and povertymake men industrious, and that laws (ordini) make them good.

Thus, while the basic cycle is order/disorder/order, men and states are not mereplaythings of fortune.71 Well-ordered republics and men of virt can takeadvantage of good fortune and forestall or even conquer ill-fortune. In a word,human design (ingenium) can outwit heaven and the cycle of fortune. The design must be based on vera cognizione delle storie. Vera cognizione,it is now clear, consists of knowledge of how to circumvent the natural cycles that is, it consists of the modi et ordini nuovi. But the knowledge which theycomprise are rules of practical actions. This brings us back to the statesman-citizen and his absolutely critical role,for it is he who must introduce new ordini and also be able to change his mododel procedere to meet new situations. If it is now granted that renewal isnecessary for the survival of political life it follows that, among other criteria,the ability to facilitate renewal is one standard by which to evaluate politicalorders. The Roman constitution is worthy of emulation because, among otherthings, the institutionalization of the struggle between patricians and plebscontinually revitalizes Roman politico-military life. It cannot go the way ofozio it is constrained by the new necessit embodied in its ordini. AlsoRome, and republics in general, are to be preferred to principalities because, inthe long run, they can take greater advantage of opportunities. Men, after all,are set in their ways their modi del procedere rarely change once they arefixed. Hence, success depends on the frequently fortuitous fit of ones way tothe situation. Since situations change but mens ways tend to remain the same,men will experience ups and downs in their lives and fortunes. If a country isruled by one man this will also be true for its political fortunes, but a republic

70 Ibid., p. 314, Di fortuna.71 Opere, Vol. II, p. 62, Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio. Also, Opere, Vol.VIII, p. 324, Dellambizione.


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will generally fare better simply because it can choose from among its citizenrythe statesmen whose modo del procedere is best suited to the times.

VIIThe Greatness of Politics and the Politics of Aggrandizement

We have seen that longevity is one criterion for preferring one political orderover another. But it is not the only one. For example, among republics, Romanordini are to be preferred to Spartan ordini, despite the fact that Sparta waslonger-lived, because they exhibit greater prudence and virt and allow forgreater political choice, greater both quantitatively and qualitatively. It ismanifestly the case for Machiavelli that the political prudence of the Romansis greater than that of the Spartans, if for no other reason than that Spartanprudence and virt owe more to fortune the good fortune of having oneextraordinary person in the right place at the right time to found it. Rome wasless dependent on such good fortune and more on its ordini, which are both theexpression of and the renewers of its virt. There is also another way in which Rome is more capable of taking advan-tage of changing circumstances. Given its constitution Sparta could not expandeven when political prudence dictated that choice since that would have speltthe ruin of its internal order. In contrast Rome was so ordered that expansionwould not destroy it. It could thus exercise a choice not open to Sparta. But vastly more important than the mere multiplication of choices forMachiavelli was the nature of this particular choice. By choosing the path ofexpansion Rome could choose the way to political greatness. The imperial waywas open to it but not to Sparta. Now in the last analysis, as far as Machiavelliis concerned, the way of political greatness is the only way for men and states.All creatures yearn for that expansion or aggrandizement we call immortality.For Machiavelli, immortality can only come through grandezza he has ofcourse ruled out salvation and the hereafter as an alternative way to immortal-ity. Besides, immortality is not simply a matter of living forever, of meresurvival. It is a matter of being superior and of that superiority being recognizedand acknowledged by others. Greatness, as Machiavelli uses it, always impliescomparison and exclusion. One is great relative to others who are not. If all aregreat, none are great. This because ultimately Machiavellis greatness is acondition enjoyed at the expense of others it is rooted in triumph anddomination over others.72 In this sense it is political. But, as a matter of fact,grandezza is political through and through. Thus all other forms of greatness for example, greatness in art are for Machiavelli historically preceded byand flow from political greatness. Moreover, this greatness is promoted whena people pursue the common good rather than private goods73 when, that is,

72 Opere, Vol. I, p. 280, Discourses, II.2. 73 Ibid., p. 87, The Prince, XX.

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their ends are political greatness and not wealth. In every sense, then, politicsis primary. In tracing the new path that Machiavelli said he was treading, we have notedthe significance of his selection of political histories as the subject matter fortrue knowledge. He then insisted that these histories must be read with an eyeto greatness and with an appetite for imitation and emulation. Both the idea ofimitation and of the reduction to order of the principles of political action arepart of his way, and when we follow Machiavellis way we discover it leads torepublican Rome, expansionist in its pursuit of greatness. Machiavelli calls upon his Tuscans to know themselves, not by lookingwithin for some moral principle but by turning outward to recognize them-selves in the greatness of their ancestors. They should choose and adopt forthemselves the civil order which the Roman experience shows to be necessaryto conquer fortune and achieve greatness. Little wonder he has since beenviewed as the prophet of realism by an imperial, expansionist West. Machiavellis method, it turns out, is not scientific, empirical or induc-tive. He takes over the old cyclical theory and the method of division and givesthem a political twist of his own. The method of division conforms to thestructure of political choice as Machiavelli chooses to see it. His perspective ispersistently political where political may be defined as greatness or therecognition by others of ones power. The end is political, and the way togreatness is also political. It involves choices which lead to the thwarting of thenatural cyclical tendencies of either cosmological or earthly organic origin. ForMachiavelli it is the Roman republic, and not Christ, that halted the recurrentcycles of the wheel of fortune that many ancients sought to escape, and providesthe proper example for imitation. Western republican thought from Harringtonto Montesquieu and beyond will return to Machiavelli and to the study of Romeand other historical states and to the idea of civic virtue, the citizen and thecitizen-soldier as basic to the location and solution of the problems of their day in a word, they will perceive these problems as political.

Martin Fleisher THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK


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the ways of machiavelli and the ways of politics

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