1

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND

In the Committee's view, this observation leads to the conclusion that the purpose of preventing an obstruction or miscarriage of justice cannot be fully carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses. There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of an inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice.1

The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people2. When

crime and violence proliferates it is their task to contain them. There are times that

the apprehension of the offender becomes more burdensome for the law enforcers.

Any kind of delay in the apprehension of the offender entails constant danger to the

community because of the of the former's capability of committing criminal acts. To

attain a better and more efficient system of crime prevention, the acts which delay,

obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice must be penalized. The State

called the society to actively participate in the administration of justice. Any person

who is indifferent and apathetic coupled with the acts constituting crime shall be

criminally liable.

PD 1829 or otherwise known as the Obstruction of Justice Law3 penalizes

acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful

apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. It is the indifference and apathy

towards the apprehension of criminal offenders that is discouraged by the State

because undeniably, it results to the delay administration of justice.

By the name itself (Obstruction of Justice), creates an idea that all persons

shall be covered. The mere fact of commission is a crime, by itself. It being a mala

prohibita, motive or intent is not essential. Definition of the crime obstruction of

justice is through enumeration. PD 1829 enumerates acts or omission that would

delay dispensation of justice. But taking a closer look on PD 18294, it is vaguely

worded as to who shall be penalized.

1 S.Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 2515, 2524.2 Section 4, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.3 Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders, Proclaimed by Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, 16 January 1981.4 Supra see note 3

2

The fact of its vagueness has been sustained by the Court in the recent

Decision5 penned by Justice Peralta, when the Doctrine of Pro Reo was used to

sustain the dismissal of the charge for violating PD 1829. When no less than the

highest tribunal had applied the said doctrine it presupposes that, the law is

ambiguous and need to be construed or interpreted; there are two interpretations,

one in favour to the accused and the other against it; and the fact that the law is

penal in nature (because such doctrine is peculiar only to criminal law6).

The researcher deemed it proper to focus on the ambiguity and the danger it

creates. It is respectfully submitted that researcher has reason to believe that this

post a problem to be resolved through a diligent study. Hence this dissertation...

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Is omission of offender perpetrating acts punishable under PD 1829, when

couched in general term resulting to defiance of the intent of the law, proper?

To be able elucidate the foregoing dilemma the study seeks to answer the

following queries as a guide, to wit:

1. What is obstruction of justice?

2. Who are covered by the law on Obstruction of Justice (PD 1829)?

3. What is the relation of the Revised Penal Code provisions to PD 1829?

4. Where the ambiguity does lies?

5. How did the court resolve the ambiguity (ubi lex non nec nos distinguere debemos or Pro Reo Doctrine)?

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objective of the study is to prove that the ambiguity on the Obstruction of

Justice hampers the administration of justice and that it is proper for the offender

perpetrating the acts enumerated on the law to be penalized and include flight as a

one of manners of committing the crime of obstruction of justice.

5 Angeles vs. Gaite, et., Al, G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009.6 Ibid.

3

In the prevalence of offenders hiding in the courts of law, flight of an accused

indeed hampers the dispensation of justice. Examining the reason of its enactment in

the Philippines and in the other countries shall prove the purest and noblest spirit of

the law which the researcher wishes to adopt. PD 18297 along with foreign law and

jurisprudence shall be examined.

SCOPE, DELIMITATION AND LIMITATION

This study shall covers the discussion on the nature of obstruction of justice in

general, the characteristics, peculiarity of the law, the manner of its commission, its

relation with the Revised Penal Code only to the extent of the similarity contemplated

in Article 19 and 20. The researcher shall point out the ambiguity in the law. It shall

present rulings where the Supreme Court interprets the law.

The study shall not delve into the details of each manner of commission or

elements thereof but merely deciphering the offender under the law and potentiality

of its commission by those not contemplated by the law. The resulting effect will

likewise, of the omission shall be tackled. The researcher’s interpretation on of some

words grounded on the laws and jurisprudence presented shall not generally apply to

all laws where such word or words can be found. The interpretation of words came

from the wisdom of the law that the researcher deemed to have sought.

However, due to time and resources constraints, it shall focus only to the

offender under the law and possible offenders not covered by the law and its

pernicious effect in the administration of justice.

DEFINITION OF TERMS, MAXIM OR DOCTRINES

7 Supra, see note 3.

4

Apprehension or arrest is the taking of person into custody in order that he may be

bound to answer for the commission of an offense.8

Common law crimes are wrongful acts which community/society condemns as

contemptible, even though there is no law declaring criminal act

Compounded crime or a single act which brings about two or more crimes, the

offender is punished with only one penalty, although in maximum period because he

acted only with one criminal impulse9.

Doctrine of Pro Reo (When ever the penal law is to be construed or applied and the

law admits two interpretations – that interpretation which is lenient or favourable to

the offender will be adopted10)

Mens Rea Doctrine, which, if simplified states that no act is criminal unless the mind

is criminal.

Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege There is no crime when there is no law

punishing the same

Obstructing justice: Impending or obstructing those who seek justice in court, or

those who have duties or powers of administering justice therein. The act by which

one or more persons attempt to prevent, or do prevent, the execution of a lawful

process. The term applies also to obstructing the administration of justice any was –

as by hindering witness from appearing, assaulting process server, influencing

jurors, obstructing court orders or criminal investigation.11

Obstruction of justice is an offense committed by any person who knowingly,

wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and

investigation and prosecution of criminal case through acts which militate against the

successful apprehension or prosecution of criminals.12

ubi lex non nec nos distinguere debemos (when the law does not distinguish, we

should not distinguish).

8 Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.9 Molina, Loc cit. p 111 10 Molina Notes, Criminal Law: The Revised Ortega Lecture Notes, p 611 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (with pronunciation), Centennial edition 1891-1991, U.S.A 1990, p 1077.12 Ismael G. Khan, JR., Everybody’s Dictionary of Philippine Law, Manila 2007

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CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter shall provide for the review of related literature and studies that

aided the researcher to come up with viable and verifiable theoretical framework. It

serves as a guide for the formulation of conceptual framework and in preparation of

the research design indicated in the subsequent chapter.

A. Review of Related Literature

Information gathered relating to the study predominantly came from the

decisions of Philippine and United States Supreme Court acquire through the

diligent search from several website and their respective sites.

The review of compilation of jurisprudence relating to obstruction of justice

and the different manner of commission are vital to support and strengthen the

findings of the study. They shall be classified as local, cases decided in our country

and foreign as to those cases promulgated outside the Philippines.

a. 1. Local literature

In Posadas v. Ombudsman13 certain officials of the University of the

Philippines (UP) were charged for violating PD 1829 paragraph (c). The UP officers

objected to the warrantless arrest of certain students by the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI). According to the Supreme Court, the police has no ground for

warrantless arrest. The UP Officers, therefore, had a right to prevent the arrest of the

time because their attempted arrest was illegal. The “need to enforce the law cannot

be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights.”

In Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras,14 respondent was charged

by his wife for dishonesty and falsification of public documents, harassment and

intimidation and immorality for siring a child with another woman. Along with these

13 GR 131492, 29 September 2000. 14 A. C. 5333, 18 October 2000.

6

charges is obstruction of justice when according to the complaint for disbarment,

respondent utilized strategies to obstruct justice, in the criminal action against him,

respondent used his legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail all the

proceedings. Respondent in his Answer denied the allegation and contended that “in

criminal case, the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are

legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer."15 The Commission on Bar

Discipline (CBD) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines investigated the complaint and

narrowed down the causes of action into two: the falsification complainant’s

signature and misuse of conjugal assets and immorality and criminal acts of

concubinage. The Supreme Court punished him with SIX (6) MONTHS on the

charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan

instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of

immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served

simultaneously.

In an administrative matter resolved by the Court ENBANC, regarding the

proposal of the Association of Sheriff regarding matter in performance of their duty,

filed by its president, it resolved in the following manner: “xxx The sixth proposal

seeking permission for sheriffs to file cases of “assault” or “obstruction of justice”

against persons who subject them to verbal or physical assault during the

performance of their official duties is likewise a superfluity and, thus, must be denied.

There are adequate penal sanctions provided by law for persons who subject sheriffs

to the verbal or physical assaults pointed out. Articles 151 and 152 of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended, for instance provide that:

ART. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. - The penalty of arresto mayor and fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.

ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. - In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board or commission,

15 Supra

7

shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.

Any person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by

competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the

protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio

policeman and barangay leader, and any person who tomes to the aid of persons in

authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,

professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized

private schools, colleges or universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of

their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed

persons in authority.

Sheriffs and process servers may also file a case for obstruction of justice

under Section 1, paragraph (e) of P.D. No. 1829 which penalizes any person who

delays the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of processes,

court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals’ offices, Tanodbayan, or in other

courts. 16At the end the Supreme Court stated in its dispositive portion states, to wit:

“ACCORDINGLY, the proposal/request of the Manila RTC Sheriff’s Association is hereby --1.] GRANTED as regards the following:a.] xxx2.] DENIED as to the following:a.] xxxb.] xxxc.] xxxd.] xxxe.] The filing of cases for assault and obstruction of justice where Sheriffs are subjected to verbal and physical assault in the course of the performance of their official duties; xxx17

16 A.M. No. 01-4-237-R A.M. No. 01-4-237-RTC (Re: Proposals Submitted by Mr. Elmer Diokno, President of the Manila RTC Sheriffs Association.)17 Supra see note 3.

8

Rodriguez, et. al., vs. Sandiganbayan,18 complaints for robbery and violation of

Section 1(b), P.D. No. 182919 against petitioners Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay

Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan when a joint

team composed of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the

Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine

National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine

Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed Ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay

Pancol, Taytay.  The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have

been done under the supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego

upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of

Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper permit or

license. Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense

for which they were indicted.

Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge

against them for instead of showing that the offense with which they were charged -

violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 (obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their

office, they argued that they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation

of P.D. No. 705 – the offense subject of the investigation which petitioners allegedly

obstructed or interfered with. In the present case, public office is not an essential

element of the offense of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The

circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged to have been

committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may not have

been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during

the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as

Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general and operational control and supervision

over the local police forces, used her influence, authority and office to call and

command members of the municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber

18 G.R. No. 141710. March 3, 2004.19 Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

(a) xxx(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair

its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, xxx.

9

which was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705. Hence, the

petition was dismissed.

In Enrile v. Amin,20 The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the

petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and

comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a

fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan

arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col.

Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of

firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion

had been filed. The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator

Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with

murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot

complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder21.

In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

a. 2. Foreign

Obstruction of justice is the frustration of governmental purposes by violence,

corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. It is a federal crime. In fact, it is several

crimes. Obstruction prosecutions regularly involve charges under several statutory

provisions. Federal obstruction of justice laws are legion; too many for even passing

reference to all of them in a single report. The general obstruction of justice

provisions are six: 18 U.S.C. 1512 (tampering with federal witnesses), 1513

(retaliating against federal witnesses), 1503 (obstruction of pending federal court

proceedings), 1505 (obstruction of pending Congressional or federal administrative

proceedings), 371 (conspiracy), and contempt. In addition to these, there are a host

of other statutes that penalize obstruction by violence, corruption, destruction of

evidence, or deceit.

20 G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

21

10

Witness Tampering (18 U.S.C. 1512). Section 1512 applies to the

obstruction of federal proceedings – judicial, congressional, or executive. It consists

of four somewhat overlapping crimes: use of force or the threat of the use of force to

prevent the production of evidence (18 U.S.C. 1512(a)); use of deception or

corruption or intimidation to prevent the production of evidence (18 U.S.C. 1512(b));

destruction or concealment of evidence or attempts to do so (18 U.S.C. 1512(c));

and witness harassment to prevent the production of evidence (18 U.S.C. 1512(d)).

Obstruction by Violence (18 U.S.C. 1512(a)). Subsection 1512(a) has

slightly different elements depending upon whether the offense involves a killing or

attempted killing – 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1) or some other use of physical force or a

threat – 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(2). In essence, it condemns the use of violence to

prevent a witness from CRS-2 1 18 U.S.C. 2 (“(a) Whoever commits an offense

against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures

its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be

done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the

United States, is punishable as a principal”). 2 18 U.S.C. 373(b), (c)(“(b) It is an

affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that, under circumstances

manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the

defendant prevented the commission of the crime solicited. A renunciation is not

"voluntary and complete" if it is motivated in whole or in part by a decision to

postpone the commission of testifying or producing evidence for an investigation and

sets its penalties according to whether the obstructive violence was a homicide, an

assault or a threat.

Auxiliary Offenses and Liability. Subsection 1512(k) makes conspiracy to

violate Section 1512 a separate offense subject to the same penalties as the

underlying offense. The section serves as an alternative to a prosecution under 18

U.S.C. 371 that outlaws conspiracy to violate any federal criminal statute. Section

371 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years and conviction requires

the government to prove the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the

scheme by one of the conspirators. Subsection 1512(k) has no specific overt act

element, and the courts have generally declined to imply one under such

circumstances. Regardless of which section is invoked, conspirators are criminally

11

liable under the Pinkerton doctrine for any crime committed in the foreseeable

furtherance of the conspiracy. Accomplices to a violation of subsection 1512(a) may

incur criminal liability by operation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 3, 4, or 373 as well.

Obstruction by Intimidation, Threats, Persuasion, or Deception (18

U.S.C. 1512(b). The second group of offenses within Section 1512 outlaws

obstruction of federal Congressional, judicial, or administrative activities by

intimidation, threat, corrupt persuasion or deception. In more general terms,

subsection 1512(b) bans (1) knowingly, (2) using one of the prohibited forms of

persuasion (intimidation, threat, misleading or corrupt persuasion), (3) with the intent

to prevent a witness’s testimony or physical evidence from being truthfully presented

at official federal proceedings or with the intent to prevent a witness from cooperating

with authorities in a matter relating to a federal offense. It also bans any attempt to

so intimidate, threaten, or corruptly persuade. The conspiracy, accomplice, RICO

and money laundering attributes are equally applicable to subsection 1512(b)

offenses.

Obstruction by Destruction of Evidence or Harassment (18 U.S.C.

1512(c), 1512(d)). Subsection 1512(c) proscribes obstruction of official proceedings

by destruction of evidence and is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20

years. Subsection 1512(d) outlaws harassing federal witnesses and is a

misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year. Both enjoy

the conspiracy, accomplice, RICO and money laundering attributes that to apply to

all Section 1512 offenses.

Obstructing Federal Courts (18 U.S.C. 1503): The Omnibus Provision.

Unlike Section 1512, Section 1503 does not to apply to the obstruction of

Congressional or administrative proceedings. It condemns obstructing pending

judicial proceedings. For conviction, the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt: (1) that there was an ending judicial proceeding, (2) that the

defendant knew this proceeding was pending, and (3) that the defendant then

corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of

justice. Offenders are punished according to the nature of obstruction: murder and

manslaughter are punished as those crimes are punished when CRS-4 committed in

12

violation of sections 1111 and 1112; attempted murder, attempted manslaughter, or

any violation involving a juror called to hear a case relating to a class A or B felony is

punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years; and all other offenses by

imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Conspiracy to violate Section 1503 can

only be prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute. Section 1503 offenses are

RICO predicate offenses and consequently money laundering predicate offenses.

Those who aid and abet a Section 1503 offense are liable as principals and are

punishable as if they committed the offense themselves. An individual who knows

that another has committed a Section 1503 offense and nevertheless assists the

offender in order to hinder his capture, trial or punishment is in turn punishable as an

accessory after the fact. And an individual who affirmatively conceals the

commission of a Section 1503 by another is guilty of misprision.

Retaliating Against Federal Witnesses (18 U.S.C. 1513). Section 1513

prohibits witness or informant retaliation in the form of killing, attempting to kill,

inflicting or threatening to inflict bodily injury, damaging or threatening to damage

property, and conspiracies to do so. It also prohibits economic retaliation against

federal witnesses, but only witnesses in court proceedings and only on criminal

cases. Its penalty structure is comparable to that of Section 1503. Section 1513

offenses are RICO predicate offenses and money laundering predicate offenses and

the provisions for conspirators and accomplices apply as well.

Obstructing Congressional or Administrative Proceedings (18 U.S.C.

1505). Section 1505 outlaws obstructing Congressional or federal administrative

proceedings, a crime punishable by imprisonment not more than 5 years (not more

than 8 years if the offense involves domestic or international terrorism). The crime

has three essential elements. First, there must be a proceeding pending before a

department or agency of the United States. Second, the defendant must be aware of

the pending proceeding. Third, the defendant must have intentionally endeavored

corruptly to influence, obstruct or impede the pending proceeding. Section 1505

offenses are not RICO or money laundering predicate offenses. Conspiracy to

obstruct administrative or Congressional proceedings may be prosecuted under 18

U.S.C. 371, and the general aiding and abetting, accessory after the fact, and

13

misprision statutes are likely to apply with equal force in the case of obstruction of an

administrative or Congressional proceeding.

Conspiracy t o Obstruct to Defraud (18 U.S.C. 371). Section 371 contains

both a general conspiracy prohibition and a specific obstruction conspiracy

prohibition in the form of a conspiracy to defraud proscription. The elements of

conspiracy to defraud the United States are: (1) an agreement of two more

individuals; (2) to defraud the United States; and (3) an overt act by one of the

conspirators in furtherance of the scheme. The fraud covered by the statute reaches

any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful

functions of any department of Government by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by

means that are dishonest. The scheme may be designed to deprive the United

States of money or property, but it need not be so; a plot calculated to frustrate the

functions of a governmental entity will suffice.

Criminal Contempt of Court. The final and oldest of the general obstruction

provisions is contempt. Contemporary federal contempt derives from statute, rule

and inherent or auxiliary authority. Criminal contempt comes in two forms, direct and

CRS-5 indirect. Direct contempt involves misconduct in the presence of the court

and is punished to ensure the decorum of the court and the dignity of the bench.

Indirect contempt consists of those obstructions committed outside the presence of

the court. Direct contempt may be summarily punished; indirect contempt may not. A

court may punish as criminal contempt disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ,

process, order, rule, decree, or command. Criminal contempt may be punished by

imprisonment or by a fine or both. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial limits the

term of imprisonment which a court may summarily impose to a maximum of six

months.

Contempt of Congress. Contempt of Congress is punishable by statute and

under the inherent powers of Congress. Congress has not exercised its inherent

contempt power for some time. The statutory contempt of Congress provision, 2

U.S.C. 192, outlaws the failure to obey a Congressional subpoena or the refusal to

answer questioning at a Congressional hearing. The offense is punishable by

imprisonment for not more than one year and a fine of up to $100,000.

14

Obstruction of Justice by Violence or Threat. Several other federal

statutes outlaw use of threats or violence to obstruct federal government activities.

One, 18 U.S.C. 115, prohibits acts of violence against judges, jurors, officials, former

officials, and their families in order to impede or retaliate for the performance of their

duties. It makes assault, kidnapping, murder, and attempts and conspiracies to

commit such offenses in violation of the section subject to the penalties imposed for

those crimes elsewhere in the Code. It makes threats to commit an assault

punishable by imprisonment for not more than 6 years and threats to commit any of

the other offenses under the section punishable by imprisonment for not more than

10 years. Another, 18 U.S.C. 1114, protects federal officers and employees as well

as those assisting them, from murder, manslaughter, and attempted murder and

manslaughter committed during or account of the performance of their duties. The

section’s coverage extends to government witnesses. Other provisions protect

federal officers and employees from kidnapping and assault committed during or on

account of the performance of their duties, but their coverage of those assisting them

is less clear. Beyond these general prohibitions, federal law proscribes the murder,

kidnapping, or assault of Members of Congress, Supreme Court Justices, or Cabinet

Secretaries; and a number of statutes outlaw assaults on federal officers and

employees responsible for the enforcement of particular federal statutes and

programs.

Obstruction of Justice by Bribery: 18 U.S.C. 201. Section 201 outlaws

offering or soliciting bribes or illegal gratuities in connection with judicial,

congressional and administrative proceedings. Bribery is a quid pro quo offense. It

condemns invitations and solicitations to corruption. The penalty structure for bribery

is fairly distinctive: imprisonment for not more than 15 years; a fine of the greater of

three times the amount of the bribe or $250,000; and disqualification from holding

any federal position of honor or trust thereafter.

Mail and Wire Fraud. The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes have been

written and constructed with such sweep that they cover among other things,

obstruction of government activities by corruption. They reach any scheme to

obstruct the lawful functioning in the judicial, legislative or executive branch of

15

government that involves (1) the deprivation of money, property or honest services,

and (2) the use of the mail or wire communications as an integral part of scheme.

Congress expanded the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes with the passage

of 18 U.S.C. 1346 which defines the “scheme to CRS-6 defraud” element in the fraud

statutes to include a scheme “to deprive another of the intangible right of honest

services.” Some courts have said that honest services fraud in the public sector

typically occurs in either of two situations: (1) bribery, where a public official was paid

for a particular decision or action; or (2) failure to disclose a conflict of interest

resulting in personal gain. Prosecutors may favor a mail or wire fraud charge over or

in addition to bribery charge if for no the reason than that under both fraud sections

offenders face imprisonment for not more than 20 years rather than the 15-year

maximum found in Section 201.

Obstruction by Extortion Under Color of Official Right (18 U.S.C. 1951).

Extortion under color of official right occurs when a public official receives a payment

to which he is not entitled, knowing it is being provided in exchange for the

performance of an official act. Liability may be incurred by public officers and

employees, those in the process of becoming public officers or employees, those

who hold themselves out to be public officers or employees, their co-conspirators, or

those who aid and abet public officers or employees in extortion under color or

official right. The payment need not have been solicited, nor need the official act for

which it is exchanged have been committed. The prosecution must establish that the

extortion obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate or foreign commerce, but the

impact need not have actually occurred nor been even potentially severe. Violations

are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years.

Obstruction of Justice by Destruction of Evidence. Other than subsection

1512(c), there are three federal statutes which expressly outlaw the destruction of

evidence in order to obstruct justice: 18 U.S.C. 1519 prohibits destruction of

evidence in connection with federal investigation or bankruptcy proceedings, 18

U.S.C. 1520 prohibits destruction of corporate audit records, and 18 U.S.C. 2232(a)

prohibits the destruction of property to prevent the government from searching or

seizing it.

16

Obstruction of Justice by Deception. In addition to the obstruction of justice

provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1503 and 1512, there are four other general statutes that

outlaw obstructing the government’s business by deception. Three involve perjury:

18 U.S.C. 1623 that outlaws false swearing before federal courts and grand juries;

18 U.S.C. 1621 the older and more general prohibition that proscribes false swearing

in federal official matters (judicial, legislative, or administrative); and 18 U.S.C. 1622

that condemns subornation, that is, inducing another to commit perjury. The fourth,

18 U.S.C. 1001, proscribes material false statements concerning any matter within

the jurisdiction of a federal executive branch agency, and to a somewhat more

limited extent with the jurisdiction of the federal courts or a Congressional entity.22

Section 1503 proscribes obstructions of justice aimed at judicial officers,

grand and petit jurors, and witnesses. The law makes it a crime to threaten,

intimidate, or retaliate against these participants in a criminal or civil proceeding. In

addition, section 1503 makes it illegal to attempt the bribery of an official to alter the

outcome of a judicial proceeding.

Besides these specific prohibitions, section 1503 contains the Omnibus

Clause, which states that a person who "corruptly or by threats of force, or by

threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors

to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice" is guilty of the

crime of obstruction of justice. This clause offers broad protection to the "due

administration of justice." Federal courts have read this clause expansively to

proscribe any conduct that interferes with the judicial process.

To obtain a conviction under section 1503, the government must prove that

there was a pending federal judicial proceeding, the defendant knew of the

proceeding, and the defendant had corrupt intent to interfere with or attempted to

interfere with the proceeding.

The legislative history of § 1503 indicates that Congress intended for § 1503

to cover acts of contempt that were out-of-court which should be handled by

22 Charles Doyle, Obstruction of Justice: An Abridged Overview of Related Federal Criminal Laws, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22783, December 27, 2007

17

indictment and trial rather than summary contempt proceedings.23 Although the

contempt statute and § 1503 often overlap, section 1503 encompasses a meaning

and purpose distinct from that of the general contempt provision.24

Two types of cases arise under the Omnibus Clause: the concealment,

alteration, or destruction of documents; and the encouraging or rendering of false

testimony. Actual obstruction is not needed as an element of proof to sustain a

conviction. The defendant's endeavor to obstruct justice is sufficient. "Endeavor" has

been defined by the courts as an effort to accomplish the purpose the statute was

enacted to prevent. The courts have consistently held that "endeavor" constitutes a

lesser threshold of purposeful activity than a criminal "attempt25."

United States v. Aguilar,26 respondent Aguilar, a United States District

Judge, was convicted of illegally disclosing a wiretap in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2232(c), even though the authorization for the particular wiretap had expired before

the disclosure was made. Because he lied to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

agents during a grand jury investigation, he also was convicted of endeavoring to

obstruct the due administration of justice under §1503. The Court of Appeals

reversed both convictions, reasoning that Aguilar's conduct in each instance was not

covered by the statutory language.

It was held: 1. Uttering false statements to an investigating agent who might

or might not testify before a grand jury is not sufficient to make out a violation of

§1503's prohibition of "endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede . . . the due

administration of justice." The "nexus" requirement developed in recent court of

appeals decisions--whereby the accused's act must have a relationship in time,

causation, or logic with grand jury or judicial proceedings--is a correct construction of

§1503's very broad language. Under that approach, the accused must take action

with an intent to influence such proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent

to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the

court's or grand jury's authority. Moreover, the endeavor must have the "natural and

23 United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 133124 Howard, 569 F.2d at 133625 http://www.answers.com/topic/obstruction-of-justice26 No. 94-270. Argued March 20, 1995 -- Decided June 21, 1995, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-270.ZS.html

18

probable effect" of interfering with the due administration of justice, see, e.g., United

States v. Wood, 6 F. 3d 692, 695, and a person lacking knowledge that his actions

are likely to affect a pending proceeding necessarily lacks the requisite intent to

obstruct, Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 206-207. The Government did

not show here that the FBI agents acted as an arm of the grand jury, that the grand

jury had subpoenaed their testimony or otherwise directed them to appear, or that

respondent knew that his false statements would be provided to the grand jury.

Indeed, the evidence goes no further than showing that respondent testified falsely

to an investigating agent. What use will be made of such testimony is so speculative

that the testimony cannot be said to have the "natural and probable effect" of

obstructing justice.

In United States v. A Brenson27, Ronald A. Brenson was convicted of

obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 by corruptly endeavoring to

influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Brenson also was convicted of

conspiring with one or more persons to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1503 by corruptly

influencing, obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

371. Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Brenson to 120 months

imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. Brenson now appeals

his conviction on both counts and the sentence imposed. We find no reversible error

as to his conviction on either count nor any error in the sentence imposed and

accordingly affirm.

Brenson was convicted under the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503: (a)

Whoever ... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or

communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence,

obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as

provided... 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1995). "The omnibus clause is essentially a catch-

all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due

27 104 F.3d 1267

19

administration of justice." United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651, n. 3 (11th

Cir.1990).

In order to convict Brenson under the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503,

the government had to prove that: (1) Brenson corruptly; (2) endeavored; (3) to

influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice. Thomas, 916 F.2d at

651. The government contends that the evidence presented at trial provided

sufficient proof as to all the necessary elements of § 1503. Brenson argues on

appeal, as he did during the trial, that because he in no way impeded, obstructed or

influenced the grand jury investigation of Fernandez or the indictment of Fernandez,

his conviction for obstruction of justice is not supported by the evidence and the jury

instructions given by the district court concerning the elements of § 1503 were in

error.

Obstruction of justice in the federal courts is governed by a series of criminal

statutes (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1517), which aim to protect the integrity of federal

judicial proceedings as well as agency and congressional proceedings. Section 1503

is the primary vehicle for punishing those who obstruct or who endeavor to obstruct

federal judicial proceedings.

President Bill Clinton was impeached by the United States House of

Representatives in 1998 for obstruction of justice charges based on allegations

Clinton lied about his relationship with Lewinsky in a sworn deposition in the Paula

Jones lawsuit. This made Clinton only the second U.S. president to be impeached

after Andrew Johnson. He was later acquitted by the Senate.

President Richard Nixon was being investigated for obstruction of justice for

his alleged role in the cover-up of the break-in at the Watergate hotel during his 1972

re-election campaign. Although it is widely believed that Nixon had no foreknowledge

of his re-election committee's "dirty tricks" campaign against Democratic presidential

candidates that led to the break-in, he was aware of it after the fact and paid money

to keep the participants quiet28.

28 Id.

20

What brought down President Richard Nixon was not any involvement in

planning the burglary of the Democrat National Committee's Watergate offices but

his efforts, while president, to obstruct the investigation of that crime. In this instance,

as in many others, Nixon's effort to cover up the burglary was not merely a separate

criminal offense but an offense arguably even more serious than the crime he sought

to cover up29.

Former Vice-Presidential adviser I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby was convicted of

obstruction of justice in March 2007 for his role in the investigation of a leak to

reporters that named a CIA agent, Valerie Plame. His prison sentence was

commuted by President George W. Bush in July 2007, just before Libby was about

to serve a two and a half year prison sentence.

Conrad Black was convicted of obstruction of justice in July 2007 for removing

13 boxes containing financial records from his office in Toronto after it had been

sealed by a court order, returning the boxes a few days later. Black claimed he had

taken the boxes because they contained personal items30.

A defendant charged with harboring a fugitive under 18 U.S.C. § 1071 could

not be convicted solely on testimony that she falsely denied the fugitive was there

and then insisted upon her Fourth Amendment rights when the police were trying to

get in to arrest the fugitive. United States v. Harris, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59406 (D.

Ariz. August 21, 2006):

The Ninth Circuit has held that "passive refusal to consent to a warrantless

search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered as evidence of criminal

wrongdoing. If the government could use such a refusal against the citizen, an unfair

and impermissible burden would be placed upon the assertion of a constitutional

right and future consents would not be freely and voluntarily given." Prescott, 581

F.2d at 1351 (quotation omitted). In this case, the only conduct engaged in by

Defendants in addition to Ms. Harris' assertion of her Fourth Amendment rights are

the false statements made by Defendants to the officers. The Government has

29 Daniel c. Richman, Obstruction of Jusice – General Obstruction Provision, Witness Tampering And Obstruction of Agency Proceedings And Congressional Inquiries, Other Provisions , http://law.jrank.org/pages/1623/Obstruction-Justice.html30 Loc. Cit.

21

conceded this fact and has identified no other evidence that Defendants provided

Briones-Lopez with physical assistance in avoiding detection by officers.

Defendant was talkative when being given a warning ticket and the officer

surmised that he was nervous. Consent was asked for without reasonable suspicion

and without having told the defendant he was free to leave. Motion to suppress

should have been granted. Reversed and conviction dismissed. United States v.

Jenson, 462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. August 23, 2006).

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant under Adams v. Williams

when he was arriving at a prearranged location for an alleged drug deal. Nexus for a

search warrant of his house was established by defendant leaving his house to go to

the drug deal. United States v. Spaulding, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59504 (N.D. Ohio

August 23, 2006).

There was PC from a commonsense reading of the affidavit to believe that

defendant's vehicle was involved in getting him to a store for a theft of

pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing meth. While he was arrested in the store

for possession of pseudo, that did not mean that there was no probable cause

shown. Rather, it was a reasonable inference that defendant was involved in an

ongoing crime of acquiring materials for making meth and something would likely be

found in the car. United States v. Cancilla, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59534 (W.D. Pa.

August 23, 2006).31

In Baltimore, Maryland - Jennifer Gouff, age 30, of Hagerstown, Maryland,

pleaded guilty today to harboring a fugitive, announced United States Attorney for

the District of Maryland Rod J. Rosenstein.

 

According to the plea agreement, the man with whom Gouff lived was indicted

on gun and drug charges. When agents went to arrest the man, he was not in the

home but Gouff was. Gouff was advised by law enforcement that the man had been

indicted and there was a warrant for his arrest. Law enforcement agents contacted

Gouff several times to determine the whereabouts of the man. Gouff advised the

31 http:// fourthamentment.com

22

agents that she had spoken with the man by telephone but that he was in West

Virginia and then later in New York.

 

On October 15, 2007, agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration and

U.S. Marshals Service received information that the man had returned to the home in

Hagerstown where he and Gouff resided. Agents went to the home and Gouff let

them in. The agents found the man hiding in the armoire in the master bedroom of

the home.

Gouff faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison, followed by three

years of supervised release. Chief U.S. District Judge Benson E. Legg has

scheduled sentencing for September 18, 2008 at 10:00 a.m.

 

United States Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein thanked the Drug Enforcement

Administration and U.S. Marshal Service for their investigative work. Mr. Rosenstein

commended Assistant United States Attorney Christopher J. Romano, who is

prosecuting the case.32

Defendants who skip bail are being tracked down more effectively and

causing less disruption to criminal trials, according to figures published today in the

Government's response to the Public Accounts Committee's (PAC) report Facing

Justice: Tackling Defendants' Non-Attendance at court.

The figures show that outstanding 'Fail To Appear' warrants have fallen by

26% across England and Wales since August 2004. This is due in part to the

success of Operation Turn-up, a nationwide crackdown earlier this year on

defendants who had failed to turn up at court.

The proportion of ineffective trials that fail to go ahead because of defendant

non-attendance has also almost halved over the last three years. Attorney General

Lord Goldsmith, who led the Operation Turn-up blitz said: "Operation Turn-up has

been a tremendous start to our crackdown on bail bandits. This short, concerted

effort by criminal justice authorities working in partnership has reduced 'Failure To

32 http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md

23

Appear' warrants by 26% since August 2004. It sends a clear message to

defendants who don't bother to turn up, that we will come looking for you.

"It's the first time that outstanding warrants have been targeted in this way

and it sets a benchmark for continued improvement, a total reduction of 36% in 'Fail

To Appear' warrants by March 2006. "Local agencies have learned lessons how best

to deal with bail absconders and we are building on those now."

Responding on behalf of the National Criminal Justice Board to the report's

nine recommendations, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord

Chancellor Lord Falconer said: "This is an important report and builds on an

increasingly successful government strategy to tackle all those who disregard court

orders.

"The report however describes the position in 2002 and I am therefore

delighted to say that the reality now is quite different and the non-attendance rate

has almost halved.

"We will continue to make substantial inroads into ensuring that orders of

courts are respected. That is why, for example, we will be taking forward our

commitment to ensure that courts try cases even where the defendant is absent."

Fiona Mactaggart, Home Office minister, said: "When defendants don't turn up at

court, the greatest impact is often on innocent victims and witnesses. They have

themselves made the effort to be at court and nothing is more frustrating than to see

that the defendant hasn't bothered.

"Skipping bail is a serious offence. Local Criminal Justice Boards will continue

their work to ensure that defendants turn-up in the first place and track them down

quickly if they don't."33

B. Review of Related Studies

33 No place to hide for bail bandits obstructing justice, 06 Oct 2005

24

Related dissertation was found tackling freedom of speech, of expression and

of the press guaranteed by the Constitution with the members of the media and the

confidentiality of sources in relation to harbouring violators of the law which is

punished by Section 1 (c) of PD 182934.

The study concisely averred, freedom of speech, of expression and of the

press is guaranteed not only by the highest law of the land but also by certain

statutes passed pursuant thereto, which further protect and strengthen press

freedom. One aspect of such freedom guarded by our law is the privileged nature of

communication between the newsman and his source information, otherwise known

as the privilege of confidentiality of sources.

Under Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477, the

publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine

or periodical of general circulation cannot be complied to reveal the source of any

news report or information appearing in said publication which was related in

confidence. However, the same law provides for the limitations of the media's

immunity --- that such is without prejudice to their liability under the civil and criminal

laws and that they can be compelled to reveal their sources if the court or a House or

a committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of

the State.

Indeed, the State has the right to preserve itself, and in the hierarchy of rights

and privileges, it is generally accepted principle that any right yield to the interest of

national security. Hence as declared by Republic Act No. 53 as amended by

Republic Act No. 47 freedom of speech is overridden when the interest of national

security so demands. Under the same law, however, national security appears to be

34 Section 1 The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

x x x

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

25

too encompassing that seemingly' a mere incantation thereof can defeat the

constitutional proscription.

On the other hand, there is the newsman who has a duty which he must

protect and uphold. In his profession, one of the most guarded principle of

journalistic ethics is to keep his sources confidential, for ultimately there lies- his

credibility' Thus, he is task to gather information and conduct investigations of

events, and report the same to the people. He serves the people by providing the

public with fair accurate and objective information, and to do the same fearlessly.

This is the role of the journalist i serving the society and it is in recognition of this

duty that the shield law was enacted.

However, there are times the journalist gets hold of sensitive information and

more often than not, such information is of the nature where the state claims crucial

interest... an interest protected by the sword of criminal prosecution.

The dilemma regarding these rights may lead to the following situation: while

the State is compelling the revelation of the journalist’s source of information,

invoking the protection of national security as a paramount interest, it is at the same

time contributing to the collapse of press freedom, which it is likewise duty bound to

protect.

In the final analysis, the supposed clash existing may be resolved if it is

considered that both interest are actually of the same entity - the People. To this

end, freedom of the press should not be construed as an unbridled right to report

anything and everything from whatever source. In the eyes of the State, he is a

citizen first and foremost, and the fact that he is journalist should not cloud the duties

of citizenship in his quest for a media “scoop”.

On the part of the government it should guard itself from over zealousness by

formulating, implementing and faithfully observing certain guidelines when the need

arises to secure privileged information. Although the judiciary may later on be able to

sustain the right of media in a particular case to preserve confidentiality, it should be

mindful that each subpoena, each “invitation” to disclose a confidential source or any

26

sensitive information obtained from such confidential source, and the faintest threat

of criminal prosecution, undermines and erodes irreversibly press freedom.35

Researcher had also come across with another related study pertaining to

obstruction of justice. It was a study dealing with police power, freedom of the press,

and their defiance to the lawful orders as penalized both by PD 1829 and the

Revised Penal Code.

It can be briefly stated as follows: Ours is a society of various powers and

rights - powers vested on the State and rights held by its citizens. And the legal

system governing such society depends heavily on the sound balancing between the

immense influence naturally wielded by the government and the vast entitlements

enjoyed by its people.

All throughout history, maintaining the balance has not been an easy task

Time and again conflicts have arisen, under numerous factual backgrounds and

various circumstantial scenarios, as to who exactly should prevail - the government

or the people. And despite the valiant efforts of our community to set guidelines as to

such balancing, little has changed, a tension remains still.

The most recent clash has been that between the police power of the State

and the right to free expression, more specifically, the rights of the press. Founded

on the events surrounding the latest hotel takeover by Antonio Trillanes and his

infamous Magdalo group, and ignited further by the stern warning of incumbent

Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales to the press that interference with police operations

may and will lead to criminal liability under the ambit of obstruction of justice, the

legal discord has reached critical mass.

This study seeks to ease the stress that the controversy has brought - it

intends to bring balance. First, it tackles the fraud and legal backdrop of the conflict,

attempting to give order to the various claims and stands thereof. It then focuses on

35 Monina V. Vierneza, INVOKING THE PRIVILEGE OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOURCES: CAN MEDIA BE HELD LIABLE FOR OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE AND HARBORING VIOLATORS OF THE LAW, A thesis presented to School of Law, Ateneo de Manila University, 1996, p.iii

27

the freedom of the press and doctrinal and statutory strength behind this potent

privilege. A transition shall then be made to the side of the government and its

exercise of police power with respect to the operations in response to rebellions and

mutinies. Finally, given the foregoing the study shall attempt to bring all the elements

together, balancing interests and resulting in guidelines to better understand the

conflict.

In the final analysis, this study shall show that given circumstances similar to

that of the recent Manila Peninsula incident that criminal liability does indeed

attracted to the press interfering with police operations, not withstanding the right to

free expression - that police power reaches far and wide even to such a well-

entrenched right in the name of peace and in the furtherance of order.36

C. Conceptual Framework

INPUTINPUT PROCESS PROCESS OUPUT OUPUT

36 Karl Cornelio Alejandro Cruz, Police Power as Against Freedom of the Press: Members of the Press may be Prosecuted for Obstruction of Justice Under Presidential Decree 1829 and Revised Penal Code for Refusing to Obey Lawful Orders, A Thesis Presented to School of Law, Ateneo de Manila University, 2008.

PHILIPPINES LAWS CRIMINAL POLITICAL

SUREME COURT DECISIONS

28

PD1829

(PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF

APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF

CRIMINAL OFFENDER)

PROPOSED BILL

US LAW ON OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

US SUPREME COURT DECISION

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

29

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Methodology involves brief description of the research design to be used

including the justification on why it is best method for the study.

This chapter covers the comprehensive description of Methodology which

includes research design37, data gathering instrument and analytical treatment of

data.

A. Research Design

The study is basically a combination of descriptive and case study analysis

methods of research. It is in the nature and within the framework of legal research.

Descriptive research is a design which aims to describe the nature of situation

as it exists at the time of the study and to explore the causes of particular

phenomenon.

On the other hand, according to Uma Secaran38, case study analyses involve

in-depth, contextual analyses of the matter relating to similar situations. There are

qualitative in nature and are useful in applying solutions to current problems,

understanding phenomena and generating further theories for empirical testing.39

This research is made to study the Obstruction of Justice Law in its intrinsic

and extrinsic form in order to resolve the apparent ambiguity of the law as to the

offender thereof. The study shall utilize various Supreme Court decisions to interpret

ambiguity in law.

B. Data Gathering Instrument

Data were gathered and acquired from the prominent law school in Manila.

The researcher took advantage of the present technology such as the internet, in

order to obtain copies of relevant law as and jurisprudence. Website of different

Philippine government agencies like the Philippine House of the Representatives,

Supreme Court of the Philippines, as well as foreign agencies like, U. S. Supreme

37 Maximo M. Rivera, JR. And Roela Victoria Rivera, Practical Guide to Thesis and Dissertation writing, Revised Edition, Quezon City, Philippines, 2007, p. 56.38 Professor Emerits of Management, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale (SIUC) Illinois39 Uma Secaran, Research Method for Business A skill Building Approach, Fourth Edition, 2006 p. 125.

30

Court and US Library of Congress to name the few. Library and internet research

was made.

Relevant laws, journals, including those posted in the internet websites,

international instruments and relevant statutes on the matter.

C. Analytical Treatment of Data

The data gathered was analyzed in relation to each other and their relevance

to the subject matter of the thesis. In case of Statutes, the researcher deemed it

proper to copy and reproduces the salient and relevant provisions of law in the

preceding chapter.

In cases of settled jurisprudence most were digested personally by the

researcher indicating the material facts, issue regarding obstructing justice and the

ruling thereof while selected few were already digested found in net.

31

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

This chapter is the core of this study, for here shall reflect the discussion of

the ambiguity with PD 1829. It is presented, in such a way that all the data shall be

given and afterwards, analysis and interpretation of those data shall be stated. The

gray area shall be exposed and treatment shall be laid. By presenting the obstruction

of justice in general, the law (PD 1829 itself), disclosing the nature of the law, its

peculiarity, its relation with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, all these shall

be given proper analysis and interpretation. Aside from the rulings of US Supreme

Court in Chapter II hereof, it is deemed proper to show United States law on

Obstruction of Justice.

A. PRESENTATION OF DATA Obstruction of justice in general P.D.1829 P.D. 1829 in relation to the Revised Penal Code US Law on Obstruction of Justice Recent Supreme Court Decision

(Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite, et., Al)

B. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA Overview

Nature Characteristics: Peculiarity in the Law on Obstruction of Justice

As to parties: Offenders and its problem As to Crimes Involved

Coverage of PD 1829 Relation to the Revised Penal Code

As to its cause and effect (evil sought to be prevented)

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE IN GENERAL

Obstruction of justice is a broad concept that extends to any effort to prevent

the execution of lawful process or the administration of justice in either a criminal or

civil matter. Obstructive conduct may include the destruction of evidence, the

intimidation of potential witnesses or retaliation against actual witnesses, the

preparation of false testimony or other evidence, or the interference with jurors or

other court personnel. The purpose of criminal obstruction statutes—which every

jurisdiction has, in one form or another—is thus to help protect the integrity of legal

32

proceedings and, at the same time, protect those individuals who participate in such

proceedings. Indeed, one of the earliest congressional enactments was a 1790

criminal statute that, among other things, established a number of obstruction

offenses.40

Obstruction of justice is a noun. It is a criminal offense, under common law

and according to the statutes of many jurisdictions, of obstructing the administration

and due process of law.

  In the US, it is likewise, a criminal offense that involves interference, through

words or actions, with the proper operations of a court or officers of the court.

The integrity of the judicial system depends on the participants' acting

honestly and without fear of reprisals. Threatening a judge, trying to bribe a witness,

or encouraging the destruction of evidence are examples of obstruction of justice.

Federal and state laws make it a crime to obstruct justice41

It is said that has one meaning: impeding those who seek justice in a court

(as by trying to influence or intimidate any juror or witness or officer of the court); can

result in a finding of contempt of court.

The crime of obstruction of justice includes crimes committed by judges,

prosecutors, attorneys general, and elected officials in general. It is misfeasance,

malfeasance or nonfeasance in the conduct of the office. Most commonly it is

prosecuted as a crime for perjury by a non governmental official primarily because of

prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors and attorneys general however commit

obstruction of justice when they fail to prosecute judges and other government

officials for malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office.

Modern obstruction of justice, in United States jurisdictions, refers to the crime

of offering interference of any sort to the work of police, investigators, regulatory

40 Daniel c. Richman, Obstruction of Jusice – General Obstruction Provision, Witness Tampering And Obstruction of Agency Proceedings And Congressional Inquiries, Other Provisions , http://law.jrank.org/pages/1623/Obstruction-Justice.html41 http://www.answers.com/topic/obstruction-of-justice

33

agencies, prosecutors, or other (usually government) officials. Often, no actual

investigation or substantiated suspicion of a specific incident need exist to support a

charge of obstruction of justice. Common law jurisdictions other than the United

States tend to use the wider offense of Perverting the course of justice.

Generally, obstruction charges are laid when it is discovered that a person

questioned in an investigation, who is not a suspect, has lied to the investigating

officers. However, in most common law jurisdictions, the right to remain silent allows

any person who is questioned by police merely to refuse to answer questions posed

by an investigator without giving any reason for doing so. (In such a case, the

investigators may subpoena the witness to give testimony under oath in court) It is

not relevant if the person lied to protect a suspect (such as setting up a false alibi,

even if the suspect is in fact innocent) or to hide from an investigation of their own

activities (such as to hide his involvement in another crime). Obstruction charges can

also be laid if a person alters or destroys physical evidence, even if he was under no

compulsion at any time to produce such evidence.

In United States v. Binion, malingering or feigning illness during a competency

evaluation was held to be obstruction of justice and led to an enhanced sentence42.

However, Black’s Law Dictionary defined obstructing justice as:

Impending or obstructing those who seek justice in court, or those who have duties or powers of administering justice therein. The act by which one or more persons attempt to prevent, or do prevent, the execution of a lawful process. The term applies also to obstructing the administration of justice any was – as by hindering witness from appearing, assaulting process server, influencing jurors, obstructing court orders or criminal investigation.43

In the Philippine parlance:

Obstruction of justice is an offense committed by any person who knowingly, wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and investigation and prosecution of criminal case through acts which militate against the successful apprehension or prosecution of criminals.44

42 Id.43 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (with pronunciation), Centennial edition 1891-1991, U.S.A 1990, p 1077.44 Supra, see note 12.

34

Presidential Decree No. 1829Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders

Now, the precise law prevailing in our jurisdiction regarding obstruction of

justice is worded in the following manner:

WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to effectively contain them; 

WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law do hereby decree and order the following:

Section 1.    The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:  

(a)    preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

(b)    altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;  

(c)    harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;

(d)    publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a

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judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;

(e)    delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;  

(f)    making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(g)    soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;

(h)    threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(i)    giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or the court.

If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.

Section 2.    If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Section 3.    This Decree shall take effect immediately.45

P.D. 1829 in relation to the Revised Penal Code

Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals

45 Proclaimed by Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, 16 January 1981.

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or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. 46

US Law on Obstruction of Justice

Presenting the law of the United States of America on Obstruction of Justice47

shall be made finding it necessary in the conduct of the study. In the US, obstruction

of justice be made in any of the proceedings; may it be judicial, quasi-judicial and

even in legislative, quasi-legislative proceedings. It may be in civil action, criminal

action and even administrative. (Copy of that law is appended. Those which has similar

provisions with PD 182948 are defined. Emphasis was made by the researcher.)

Notably, to add further, in relation thereto, Title 18 U.S.C. § 2. Principals. (a)

Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,

commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b)

Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him

or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a

principal.

46 Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Act of 3815 (1932)47 US Code, Title 18 , Part I, Chapter 73—Obstruction Of Justice48 Supra see note

37

It was noted however, that the legislative intent to punish as a principal not

only one who directly commits an offense and one who "aids, abets, counsels,

commands, induces or procures" another to commit an offense, but also anyone who

causes the doing of an act which if done by him directly would render him guilty

of an offense against the United States49.

Recent Philippine Supreme Court Decision

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES vs. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, ET., AL.50

“xxx Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care of the former by the girl’s grandmother and petitioner’s sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age of four.

Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a good school and attended to her general well-being for nine (9) memorable and happy years. The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and wrote the latter letters.

Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latter’s family who were regular beneficiaries of the undersigned’s generosity. Michael would frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day to day subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.

Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do a very important errand for which he was severely reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and that he was no longer welcome at petitioner’s residence.

Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on the following day by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioner’s custody. Michael used to have free access to the undersigned’s house and he took the girl away while petitioner was at her office.xxx”51

On the evening that day, diligent efforts to find the girl was exhausted but to no avail because they were given the run-around as the Michael Vistan and the relatives misled them with the false information that Maria Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latter’s wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province.

“xxx Petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against

49 Rothenburg v. United States, 1918, 38 S.Ct. 18, 245 U.S. 480, 62 L.Ed. 414, and United States v. Giles, 1937, 57 S.Ct. 340, 300 U.S. 41, 81 L.Ed. 493.50 G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009 51 Supra

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Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.

Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm of the law, Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with him his half-sister Maria Mercedes.xxx

Petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.

xxx Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but recommended that only one Information be filed against Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution to uphold the petitioner’s complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic) remained.

However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610 but approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829. Xxx”52

Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed but was denied in a Resolution dated 28 April 2000. Petition for Review and Supplement thereto before the Department of Justice was filed but was denied by the Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary of Justice. Then the Motion for Reconsideration which was likewise, denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez. The matter was elevated before the Office of President. The petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA assailing the Order of the Office of President. Petitioner contended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1829 (PD No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA No. 7610).CA ruled that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do not warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829. Motion for Reconsideration was filed which was, however, denied by the CA.53

Hence, this petition.

52 Ibid.53 Ibid.

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ISSUES:

Whether or not there was an obstruction of justice.

Whether or not the facts of the case warrants the filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829.

RULING:

The Supreme Court said petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without any basis in law. Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829, the same is quoted hereunder as follows:

(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of processes or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in Tanodbayan, or in the courts. x x x

Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's act of going underground obstructed the service of a court process, particularly the warrant of arrest.

This Court does not agree.

There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had disposed of the said issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice,” in the wise:

x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction of justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of “obstruction of justice” if and when the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life – and that the accused should be charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused. And if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the accused. Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x

As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission of another offense of obstruction of justice.

Petitioner, however, vehemently argues that the law does not explicitly provide that it is applicable only to another person and not to the offender himself.

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Petitioner thus contends that where the “law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.”

Again, this Court does not agree.

Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

Indeed, if the law is not explicit that it is applicable only to another person and not the offender himself, this Court must resolve the same in favor of the accused. In any case, this Court agrees with the discussion of the CA, however sarcastic it may be, is nevertheless correct given the circumstances of the case at bar.54

ANALYSIS and INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Overview

It is declared by none less than the basic and paramount law55 of the land that

the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life liberty, and property, and

the promotion of general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people the

blessings of democracy.56 It is the prime duty of the government is to serve and

protect the people.57 The State has the right to protect itself from lawless violence or

any criminal activity. The right of self-protection by the state necessarily includes the

right to create laws providing for effective means of capturing and suppressing

unlawful activities58, guided by the Mens Rea Doctrine, which, if simplified states

that no act is criminal unless the mind is criminal59. Just like in the New York Penal

Law, an agreement to commit any act for the perversion or obstruction of justice or of

54 Supra see note 155 Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 Edition, Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., Metro Mania, Philippines, p 4.56 Section 5, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.57 Section 4, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.58 Karl Cornelio Alejandro Cruz, Police Power as Against the Freedom of the Press: Member of the Press may be Prosecuted for Obstruction of Justice under PD 1829 and the RPC for Refusing Lawful Orders, Ateneo de Manila University, School of Law, 2008.59 Molina, op. cit. p 17.

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the due administration of the laws is a misdemeanor if an overt act beside the

agreement is done to effect the object60.

There is no crime when there is no law punishing the same (Nullum crimen,

nulla poena sine lege). This is true to civil law countries, but not to common law

countries. Because of this maxim, there is no common law crime in the Philippines.

No matter how wrongful, evil or bad the act is, if there is no law defining the act, the

same is not considered an act. Common law crimes are wrongful acts which

community/society condemns as contemptible, even though there is no law declaring

criminal act61.

Under the forgoing facts, it was shown that obstruction of justice has its

common law origin that is rooted in the concept of due process of law62. But since

ours civil law country, law pertaining to obstruction of justice was proclaimed.63

In the Philippines, as the crime and violence continue to proliferate despite

the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to effectively contain them, the law

was put into force, the Presidential Decree 1829 or Penalizing Obstruction of

Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders or commonly known as

Obstruction of Justice Law. This law was enacted to discourage public indifference

or apathy towards the apprehension of criminal offenders. The law deems it

necessary to penalize acts which obstruct of frustrate or tend to frustrate the

successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offender.

Nature of the PD 182964

By the title itself, Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and

Prosecution of Criminal Offenders, this is a criminal or penal in nature. A Criminal

Law is that branch or division of law, which defines crimes, treats of their nature and

provides for their punishment. PD 1829, defines what constitute obstruction of

justice, as those enumerated above and provide for punishment of imprisonment or

60 Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432 (1914)61 Molina Notes, Criminal Law: The Revised Ortega Lecture Notes, p762 “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of the law, x x x”, Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.63 Supra, see note 3.64 Supra note 5

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fine as stated therein. Moreover, if any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by

any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed. Likewise it

provides for additional penalties of suffer perpetual disqualification from holding

public office in case the act is committed by a public official or employee.

“It is one of the prerogatives of the Legislature to enact laws which punish an

acts that are harmful to the State regardless on whether exists in the mind of the

perpetrator, a criminal intent. The validity of such law, where the requisite of criminal

intent is absent, is not lessened. It is just as important and critical to the preservation

of peace and order in society. The rationale xxx these laws are enacted because the

subject acts, when performed, regardless of the existence of criminal intent, doe not

lessen the criminality of the act. The negative effects in society is what the enacted

law seeks to avoid. These acts are called “mala prohibita”.

“In many crimes, made by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessary so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself which produces pernicious effect which the statutes seek to avoid. In those cases, the pernicious effect is produced which precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. x x x It is quite different from the large of class crimes, made such by common law or by statute, in which injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act.”

In special laws, the intent to commit a crime, which constitute criminal intent,

is different from the intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person

may not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act,

and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to

commit a crime), there must be a criminal intent; the second (the intent to

perpetrate the act), it is enough that the prohibited act done is done freely and

consciously. The former, in case of violation of special laws, is not required while the

latter is still required.

43

Therefore, applying these principles in Presidential Decree 1829, otherwise

known as the law on Obstruction of Justice, it is apparent that criminal intent is not

necessary to be in violation of the said law.”65 (Emphasis made)

CHARACTERISTICS: PECULIARITY OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE LAW

As to parties: Offenders and its problem

Distinct trait of obstruction of justice is the presence of two sets of offender:

the accused in the pending criminal prosecution (fact precedent necessary to

establish obstruction) and the person committing those acts under PD 1829 (i.e. “any

person” who obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects

and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases).

No controversy exists in the first kind of offender for it is merely condition

precedent to a case of obstruction of justice. The dilemma lies on the second kind of

offender.

Section 1 provides for “any person” who obstructs, impedes, frustrates or

delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of

criminal cases, while Section 2 merely states that commission may be made by

public official or employee and the additional penalty of disqualification. It can be

deduced that offender under this kind may be private or public. In case of public

offender, it was not stated as whether acts punishable shall be conducted while in

performance of duty or not. However, perusal on the law66 and jurisprudence67

settled the issue applying the statutory construction ubi lex non nec nos distinguere

debemos (when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish). PD 1889

does not distinguish neither should we.

65 Loc. Cit. note 7, p 42.66 PD 1829 (1981)67 Angeles vs. Gaite, et., Al, G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009.

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Going to private offender, ambiguity lies as in case of where the first kind of

offender perpetrate those acts or omission punishable under the law and the a third

person other than the accused in the pending case (first kind of offender). Scrutiny

on those manner of commission dictates that paragraph a, b, d, e, f, h, and i or

seven (7) out of nine may be may be committed by the offender of the first kind as

well as the third person other than the former. In this case, how did the Supreme

Court resolved the issue?

In the case at bar,68 the Court used the Doctrine of Pro Reo while petitioner

claims it should be ubi lex non nec nos distinguere debemos for the law does not

distinguish.

Peculiarity as to the Crimes Involved

Acts constituting obstruction of justice under PD 1829 may be classified as

compounded crime or a single act which brings about two or more crimes, the

offender is punished with only one penalty, although in maximum period because he

acted only with one criminal impulse69. The presumption is that since only one act is

performed, it follows there is only one criminal impulse and correctly there should

only one penalty to be imposed. As Section 2 provides:

If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.

Also there could be an instance where theory of absorption can likewise be

applied under a special law, the PD 1829, as held a person charged with rebellion

should not be confine itself to common crimes but also to offense punished under

special law which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.70

68 supra69 Molina, Loc cit. p 111 70 Enrile v. Amin, G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

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Coverage of PD 1829 in relation to the Revised Penal Code

Any person who aids a criminal to evade detection or identification by the

police, before passage of the said law, was not a criminal act. In comparison to that

of an accessory to a crime, which states that when if the accessory does not perform

acts prior or simultaneous to the commission of the crime, the accessory still

performs acts which contribute to the evasion of the offender from the law enforcers.

The accessory is still guilty of the crime of committed by the principal but only a

lower penalty will be imposed. However, it can apparently be seen that the only

difference between an accessory and a violator of the law on Obstruction of justice is

that the former commits an act which is still substantially part of the criminal act while

the latter's acts are not include. However, substantially the same effect occurs on

both acts.

There are enumerated acts provided for in the said law. Each of which will

constitute a violation of the law and deemed an act of obstruction of justice.

The enumeration given by the law consist of violations as regards both criminal

apprehension and criminal prosecution. In criminal prosecution, the prevention of

witnesses from testifying in the court of law, the act of altering, destroying,

suppressing or concealing any document, paper, record or object, with intent to

impair its veracity, legibility, authenticity and admissibility as evidence in any

proceeding or investigation in criminal cases, the act of making, presenting or using

any record, paper or document, with knowledge of its falsity in order to affect the

proceedings in the criminal case or investigation and the act of threatening directly or

indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or properly

or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such

person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal

cases, or imposing a condition whether lawful or unlawfuI, in order to prevent a

person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal

cases are deemed acts of obstruction in the prosecution of criminal offenders.

In criminal apprehension the act of preventing persons from reporting the

commission of the offense to the proper authorities, the harboring or concealing, or

46

facilitating the escape of any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe

or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent

his arrest prosecution and conviction, the use of fictitious name publicly or the act of

using a name other than his true name in order to conceal a crime or evading the

prosecution or execution of judgment, giving of false or fabricated, information to

mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or

from protecting the life or properly of the victim; or fabricating information from the

data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background

information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to

mislead the investigator or to the court are the acts deemed as obstruction of the

criminal apprehension of the offenders.

In the acts mentioned, the common denominator is the act of interrupting public

officials in their official duty of law enforcement and/or criminal prosecution. In terms

of law enforcement, the person who commits obstruction of justice either impedes a

criminal investigation or causes the prevention or delay in the apprehension of

people who committed a crime. In the cases mentioned, although the violator did not

participate in the commission of the crime, the former prevented the law enforcement

agency from efficiently performing its duties by performing acts that disrupt such

process. These acts, like the prevention from the reporting the commission of

bribery, violence or intimidation, the facilitating of the escape of a person with whom

the violator had actual or reasonable grounds to believe that the person has

committed a crime, or giving false information to mislead the authorities, put the

security of the state in peril by allowing the criminals whom they protect to evade

arrest and continue to be a threat to the peace and order of society.

Cause and Effect

Evil sought to be avoided

Obstruction of justice presupposes: (1) there is a pending criminal

prosecution; or (2) apprehension or arrest is being ensued and (3) there is person

obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension, the investigation and

prosecution of criminal cases.

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Criminal prosecution may be instituted in two ways: first, it is commenced by a

person presenting to a court a complaint. Such complaint is the process which begins

the action. Finally, an action may be commenced by the prosecutor filing with the

court an Information. In that case, such Information is the process which institute the

process.71 The following stages after the commencement of the action marks the

pendency of the action.

Apprehension or arrest is the taking of person into custody in order that he

may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.72 An arrest is made by

actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of

the person making the arrest.73 It can be validly made by virtue of a valid warrant of

arrest.

Jeopardizing the proceedings by committing acts enumerated under PD 1829

is equivalent to obstructing the course of justice. And all persons may commit

those acts regardless if a person already charged, accused or apprehended or those

persons that what the law contemplates to be penalized: the third person aiding the

fugitive. Those persons already charged might thought fleeing, hiding, or even

committing acts under the law, but then again, they will not be punished by

obstructing justice. This is the evil sought to be prevented.

What is wrong with that? The researcher is not discounting the fact that

Revised Penal Code cannot punish offender that mostly enumerated under PD 1829.

But then again, intent is material in those crimes while in obstruction of justice the

mere act is being punished.

The researcher had provided the laws of the United States. Remarkably, they

are long and numerous enough to enumerate, cover various ways in committing the

offense. Clear enough to penalize those whoever committed those acts. Serious

enough, that in all kind of proceedings, this can be invoked. Apparently

administration of justice is secured and protected in their laws.

71 Manuel R. Pamaran, The 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, Central Professional Books, Inc., Quezon City, Philippines, 1999, pp 32-35. 72 Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.73 Ibid. P 225

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Why can’t the accused be charged with obstruction of justice? Just because

the Court called him fugitive he can no longer be held liable under Section 1 (e), PD

1829? But his act of deliberate hiding obstructs the service of process and shall

delay the prosecution of criminal case. The law being a mala prohibita the act when

deliberately done shall be punished regardless of intent….

When a person harbors or facilitates the escape of a person he knew or has

reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing

penal laws, he is penalized because he prevented his arrest, prosecution and

conviction. But when the accused himself went into hiding to prevent his arrest,

prosecution and conviction he will not be penalized because the court just simply

calls him fugitive. His act of preventing the arrest is not penalized but simply named

him as a fugitive… What is the difference when the 3rd person hide him to him hiding

himself. The result is the same anyway it prevented the arrest, prosecution and

conviction. So, why treat him differently?

If he the act of hiding will be penalized will it violate the right of the person to

be presumed innocent until contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt74? It is

submitted, it does not. It should be one of those acts arising from the established

fact that guilt is presumed. Question might arise as to what kind of presumption:

rebuttable or conclusive. Again, it is respectfully submitted that it shall be conclusive.

Conclusive as to the fact of obstructing justice [in violation of Section 1 (e) PD 1829]

because he (accused), deliberately hide went into hiding but not as to the

prosecution he wishes to escape. Take for instance the Anti-fencing Law75, it

punishes mere possession. How much more the act that is clear, blatant act of

violation under the penal law, that is, Section 1(e) of PD 1829. Let us examine the

raison de tere of the fact. The constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated

by the presumption of guilt established law arising from certain fact proved and

shifting to the accused the burden of proof to show innocence. Thus, in the absence

of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document

and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (People v. Sendaydiego, 81

74 Section 1 (a), Rule 11575 Section 5, PD 1612

49

SCRA 120 (1978)). x x x the constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply

as long as there is some rational connection between the fact proved and the

ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not

be unreasonable as purely arbitrary.76

Now, there would be a second thought of advising someone “magtago ka n

lang” (go and hide) on which sad to say, sometimes it came from the lips of a law

makers, law enforcers and even lawyers. But how could justice be serve?

In the history of law, there was a time when the flight of an accused should be

construed as conclusive presumption of guilt. In and EN BANC decision of the

highest Court in the case of THE UNITED STATES, vs. ANACLETO ALEGADO77:

In the case of Hickory vs. United States (160 U. S., 408, 422), where the same question, as to the weight to be given to flight as evidence of guilt, arose, the court charged the jury that "the law recognize another proposition as true, and it is that "the wicked flee, when no man pursueth, but the innocent are bold as a lion." That is a self-evident proposition that has been recognized so often by mankind that we can taken it as an axiom and apply it to this case." It was held that this was error, and was tantamount to saying to the jury that flight created a legal presumption of guilt, so strong and conclusive, that it was the duty of the jury to act on it as an axiomatic truth. So, also in the case of Alberty vs. United States (162 U. S., 499, 509), the court used the same language, and added that from the fact of absconding the jury might infer the fact of guilt, and that flight was a silent admission by the defendant that he was unwilling or unable to face the case against him, and was in some sense feeble or strong, as the case might be, a confession. This was also held to be error. But in neither of these cases was it intimated that the flight of the accused was not a circumstance proper to be laid before the jury as having a tendency to prove his guilt. Several authorities were quoted in the Hickory case (p. 417), as tending to establish this proposition. Indeed, the law is entirely well settled that the flight of the accused is competent evidence against him as having a tendency to establish his guilt. (Whart. on Homicide, par. 710; People vs. Pitcher, 15 Michigan, 397.)

Thus in the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of HICKORY v. UNITED STATES, Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. 'There is a little bit of history on that, and I apprehend the gentlemen won't take any exception to reading from this book [the Bible]. There are a great many exceptions filed here to almost everything said by the court, but I hope they won't take any exception to this.'

'And there is another fact that is so common that I have but to remind you of it, because that which makes up your common knowledge you can use in the investigation of these cases, and it is this: There is no man who has arrived at the years of discretion who has not been so created that he has that in his mind and heart which

76 Ruben E. Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure, Rex Book Store, Inc. Manila, Philippines, 2004, p308.77 G.R. No. L-8448, October 10, 1913

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makes him conscious of an act that is innocent upon his part; and his conduct, when connected with an act of that character, will be entirely different from the conduct of a man who is conscious of wrong and guilt. In the one case he has nothing to conceal; in the one case his interest and self-protection, his self- security, prompts him to seek investigation, to see to it that it is investigated as soon as possible. This is no new principle. I say it is as old as the days of the first murder. There is a little bit of history on that, and I apprehend the gentlemen won't take any exceptions to reading from this book. There are a great many exceptions filed here to almost everything said by the court, but I hope they won't take any exceptions to this. There is a little bit of history illustrative of the conduct of men:

"And Cain talked with Abel, his brother; and it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel, his brother, and slew him.

"And the Lord said unto Cain, where is Abel, they brother? And he said, I know not. Am I my brother's keeper?

"And He said, what hast thou done? The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto Me from the ground.'

"Am I my brother's keeper?' From that day to the time when Professor Webster murdered his associate and concealed his remains, this concealment of the evidence of crime has been regarded by the law as a proper fact to be taken into consideration as evidence of guilt, as going to show guilt, as going to show that he who does an act is consciously guilty, has conscious knowledge that he is doing wrong, and he therefore undertakes to cover up his crime.

The ambiguity of the law PD 1829 is more real than apparent. If a criminal

statute "define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people

can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement," then the statute is not unconstitutionally

vague.78 In the Committee's view, this observation leads to the conclusion that the

purpose of preventing an obstruction or miscarriage of justice cannot be fully carried

out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses.

There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of

an inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice.79

Hence, two things are certain; the law is ambiguous and needs to be cleared

to avoid judicial legislation and justice to prevail.

CHAPTER V

78 United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1992)79 S.Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 2515, 2524.

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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

The final chapter of this study shall concisely and briefly present the findings

on the research. In the concluding part it shall state the answer to the Statement of

the Problem presented in the first chapter. During the progress of the study based on

the gathered data the researcher shall propose the amendment of the law as her

recommendation.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. What is obstruction of justice?

Obstruction of justice is a penal in nature. Crimes therein are mala prohibita.

Distinct trait of obstruction of justice is the presence of two sets of offender: the

accused in the pending criminal prosecution (fact precedent necessary to

establish obstruction) and the person committing those acts under PD 1829 (i.e.

“any person” who obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of

suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases). It may be

classified as compound crime.

Obstruction of justice is an offense committed by any person who

knowingly, wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of

suspects and investigation and prosecution of criminal case through acts which

militate against the successful apprehension or prosecution of criminals that defines

crime and penalized any who knowingly, wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or

delays the apprehension and investigation and prosecution in criminal case on the

manner prescribe under the law.

2. Who are covered by the law on Obstruction of Justice (PD 1829)?

Under the law, any person who knowingly, wilfully obstructs, impedes,

frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and investigation and prosecution

of criminal case through acts which militate against the successful apprehension or

prosecution of criminals that defines crime and penalized any who knowingly, wilfully

obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension and investigation and

prosecution in criminal case on the manner prescribe under the law.

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Any person, pertains to private of public officer or employee are covered by

the law who committed acts punishable therein. Jurisprudence provides that only

those third persons can be liable under the PD 1829. Offender though perpetrated

the acts punishable therein are not liable as held in Judge Angeles case. They shall

be called fugitive.

3. What is the relation of the Revised Penal Code provisions to PD 1829?

Any person who aids a criminal to evade detection or identification by the

police, before passage of the said law, was not a criminal act. In comparison to that

of an accessory to a crime, which states that when if the accessory does not perform

acts prior or simultaneous to the commission of the crime, the accessory still

performs acts which contribute to the evasion of the offender from the law enforcers.

The accessory is still guilty of the crime of committed by the principal but only a

lower penalty will be imposed. However, it can apparently be seen that the only

difference between an accessory and a violator of the law on Obstruction of justice is

that the former commits an act which is still substantially part of the criminal act while

the latter's acts are not include.

Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to PD 1829. Also,

Theory of absorption of crimes are applicable to special law not only to common

crimes.

4. Where the ambiguity does lies?

The dilemma lies on the second kind of offender. Section 1 provides for “any

person” who obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects

and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, while Section 2 merely

states that commission may be made by public official or employee and the

additional penalty of disqualification..

5. How did the court resolve the ambiguity (ubi lex non nec nos distinguere debemos or Pro Reo Doctrine)?

It can be deduced that offender under this kind may be private or public. In

case of public offender, it was not stated as whether acts punishable shall be

53

conducted while in performance of duty or not. However, perusal on the law80 and

jurisprudence81 settled the issue applying the statutory construction ubi lex non nec

nos distinguere debemos (when the law does not distinguish, we should not

distinguish). PD 1889 does not distinguish neither should we

On the other hand, as to private offender, ambiguity lies as in case of where

the first kind of offender perpetrates those acts or omission punishable under the

law. Court now used the Doctrine of Pro Reo instead of ubi lex non nec nos

distinguere debemos as used in previous rulings.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the omission of offender perpetrating acts punishable under PD

1829, when couched in general term resulting to defiance of the intent of the law, is

improper.

PD 1829, being a special law, the mere deliberate act or omission of those

acts punishable as an offense shall make the person liable. The law shall apply to all

person similarly situated. No substantial distinction between two persons who both

defiled the law.

RECOMMENDATION

Proposed Legislation

It has been established by the study that PD 1829 suffers infirmity. The

proposed bill shall include necessary amendment as to:

It failed to punish all persons committing the acts or

omission. Any person shall be changed to A person

(Just like the proposed Bill 80 of Utah Law) or

Whoever.

80 PD 1829 (1981)81 Angeles vs. Gaite, et., Al, G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009.

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Any is defined as:

Any thing(s) or person(s); A guaranteed selection from (a set). At least

one, sometimes more (of a set)82

Any presupposes a previously selected subject. Within that subject choice

shall be made. Hence, any is different from A person which is universal, pre-

determined subject as to its application.

Fugitive or person having found to be probably guilty of the

Offense charged and flee, it is likewise recommended that

flight shall constitute as a presumption of guilt from the

fact of flight in the crime against Obstruction of Justice

Law.

The fact that the accused deliberately hide or flee to evade court processes

shall be construed of evading administration of justice. There is no violation of the

right to be presumed innocent because there is a rational connection between the

fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed , and the inference of one fact from proof

of another shall not be so unreasonable as to pure arbitrary

BIBLIOGRAPHY

82 en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Any

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PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Constitution

1987 Philippine Constitution

B. Statues

PD 1829

PD 1612

Revised Penal Code of the Philippines [ Act of 3815 (1932)]

The Revised Rules of Court

C. Jurisprudence

The United States vs. Anacleto Alegado, G.R. No. L-8448, October 10, 1913 (EN BANC).

Re: Proposals Submitted by Mr. Elmer Diokno, President of the Manila RTC Sheriffs Association, A.M. No. 01-4-237-R A.M. No. 01-4-237-RTC

Angeles vs. Gaite, et., Al, G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009.Enrile v. Amin, G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Foreign Statute

Enrolled Copy H.B. 80

US Code, Title 18 , Part I, Chapter 73—Obstruction Of Justice

B. Foreign Jurisprudence

United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331

Rothenburg v. United States, 1918, 38 S.Ct. 18, 245 U.S. 480, 62 L.Ed. 414

United States v. Giles, 1937, 57 S.Ct. 340, 300 U.S. 41, 81 L.Ed. 493.

United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1992)

Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432 (1914)

Howard, 569 F.2d at 1336

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C. Textbook

Philippine Textbook

Agpalo, Ruben E., Handbook on Criminal Procedure, Rex Book Store, Inc. Manila, Philippines, 2004

Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1998 Edition, Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., Metro Mania, Philippines

Khan, JR., Ismael G., Everybody’s Dictionary of Philippine Law, Manila 2007

Pamaran, Manuel R., The 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, Central Professional Books, Inc., Quezon City, Philippines, 1999

Rivera, JR. Maximo M. And Rivera Roela Victoria, Practical Guide to Thesis and Dissertation writing, Revised Edition, Quezon City, Philippines, 2007

Foreign Textbook

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (with pronunciation), Centennial edition 1891-1991, U.S.A 1990

Secaran, Uma, Research Method for Business A skill Building Approach, Fourth Edition, 2006 p. 125.

D. Articles

Charles Doyle, Obstruction of Justice: An Abridged Overview of Related Federal Criminal Laws, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22783, December 27, 2007

Cruz, Karl Cornelio Alejandro Police Power as Against Freedom of the Press: Members of the Press may be Prosecuted for Obstruction of Justice Under Presidential Decree 1829 and Revised Penal Code for Refusing to Obey Lawful Orders, A Thesis Presented to School of Law, Ateneo de Manila University, 2008.

Molina Notes, Criminal Law: The Revised Ortega Lecture Notes

Richman, Daniel C., Obstruction of Jusice – General Obstruction Provision, Witness Tampering And Obstruction of Agency Proceedings And Congressional Inquiries, Other Provisions.