two theories of good in plato’s republic

Two Theories of Good in Plato's Republicby Gerasimos Santas (Irvine)

"For nothing that is imperfectis the measure of anything." Rep. 503.

Recent studies of the ethical argument in the Republic have focusedalmost exclusively on Plato's account of justice. What justice is, whetheri t is a greater good than injustice, how Platonic justice relates to"vulgär" justice, whether social and soul justice coincide — these havebeen the concerns of many able papers in the last quarter Century. *

These discussions have increased our knowledge of Plato's theoryof justice and its problems, while little if anything has been done tosimilarly enhance our understanding of his account of the good.2 Yetif Plato's ethical theory is teleological, the good is prior to the right,and we can hardly understand his view of justice without going intohis account of the good. Further, the intimate connection Plato seesbetween ethics and metaphysics can hardly be appreciated withoutunderstanding his metaphysical account of the good and its relationto the functional account on which his theory of justice is built.3

Further yet, the paradox of the philosopher-king depends entirely onthe epistemology that is an integral part of the metaphysical theory ofthe good. For all these reasons, the grand design of Plato's ethics inthe Republic, its depth and sweep, will never come completely into ourview unless we examine his theories of the good, their relation to eachother and to his theory of justice.

In this paper I hope to clarify these matters. In the first section Itry to show that Plato's ethical theory is basically teleological, and l

1 Promineni examples are the influential papers by Sachs [13] and Vlastos [17].[18].2 A notable exception is White's discussion, [19], pp. 30 — 48.

3 The relation of the ethics and politics of the first half of the Republic t o themetaphysics and epistemology of the second half may well be regardcd äs oncof the big Standing problems in understanding that work. Annas' discussion. tholatest we have, illustrates the diiTficultics forcibly cnough: [1], pp. 216 21\

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224 Cieras imos San t a s

posc tlic inain problem of this papcr: thc puzzling fact that Plato putsforward not onc Hut two theorics of good. Ncxt, I sketch the first ofthcsc theorics, the functionul account, and try to show that his theoryof justicc is built on the basis of it. In the third section I sketch themetaphysicul theory of the Form of the Good. And finally I speculateabout the relation between the two theories of good.

IThe Right and the Good

The structure of an ethical theory depends on how it relates the right and thegood. A theory is teleological if (1) it gives an account of the good independentlyof the right, and (2) then defines the right äs what maximizes the good. A theoryis deontological or non-teleological if it denies (1) or (2) or both.4 John Rawls'theory, for example, is nonteleological because it denies (2), whereas the theories ofJ. S. Mill, and G. E. Moore pretty clearly satisfy both conditions and are thusteleological.

It is a consequence of a teleological ethical theory that the good is prior to theright both epistemologically and ethically. Since the right is conceived äs whatmaximizes the good, pretty clearly we cannot know what is right unless we firstknow what is good.5 Ultimate ethical disagreements are about the good; once theseare settled we can settle disagreements about the right by discovering true empiricalpropositions about what maximizes the agreed upon good. Moreover, the goodplaces constraints on what is right, the very reverse of deontological theories.6

Teleological ethical theories have a certain appealing simplicity and elegance, andthey seem to embody the ideal of rationality. Once an account of the good is asettled matter, what is right appears to be entirely a matter of rational choice, onthe modest assumptions that the good is something we want and that rationality inconduct implies taking effective means to what we want.

The structure of the ethical theory in the Republic basically satisfies, I believe,the requirements of teleology äs explained above, though this is often obscured bycomplications. To begin with, several accounts of justice are put forward, those ofCephalus and Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Plato's own. And a majoraim of the work is to show that Platonic justice promotes social and individualgood more than the justice of Thrasymachus or Glaucon. Though the comparisons

4 This way of distinguishing teleological from deontological ethical theories comesfrom Rawls, [11], pp. 24 — 25; but it is shared by other writers such,as Ross,,{12],16 — 17, Frankena, [3], pp 14—15, and Moore, [6], pp. viii —ix.

5 Plato, at any rate, thinks that the Good has such an epistemological priority.Rep. 506AB. See also White, [19], pp. 46-53.

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Two Thcories of Good in Plato's Republic 225

with thc other accounts arc not always in sight, Plato argues for the adoption ofbis concept of justicc consistently on the ground that it maximizes the good. Thusthe first Version of the principle of social justice, the division of labor according tolatent, is adopted on the ground that more goods will be produced and better andmore easily (370C). In Bks. III and V major institutional reforms are proposed, forcducalion, the equality of womcn, the abolition of private property and family, onthc ground that they promote the good of the city äs a whole. In Bk. IV thesuperiority of Platonic soul justice is argued on the ground that, being like healthin the body, it is beneficial to the just soul; and the argument is reinforced in Bk.IX, where Plato tries to show that the Platonically just man will enjoy more genuineand pure pleasures than the timocratic man or the man of gain.

Moreover, the metaphysical account of the Good in Bk. VI is constructedindependently of justice and the other virtues, and we are told that the guardianswill have no adequate understanding of the virtues till they know the good (506A).Similarly, the functional account of good at the end of Bk. I is independent of thevirtues, and indeed virtue is defined on the basis of it.

All these moves are characteristic marks of a teleological theory, though somerecent writers have doubted that Plato's theory is teleological.7 The Republic is of

7 The most recent, Annas, argues that Plato's theory is neither deontological nor"consequentialist" [1], pp. 60 — 4. However, she draws this distinction differentlyfrom the way I have. She seems to think that a deontologist cannot recommendjustice on the basis of consequences at all, while a consequentialist can appealonly to consequences. She then points out that in response to Glaucon's threefold classification of goods ("Things we find desirable in themselves", "Thingswe find desirable in themselves and for their consequences", and "Things we finddesirable only for their consequences", p. 60), Socrates puls justice in the middleclass and undertakes, the defence of justice äs such a good. I think this way ofdrawing the distinction invites confusion: given Annas' distinction we would haveto say, for example, that Rawls4 theory is consequentialist and not deontological.since he teils us, correctly I believe, that "All ethical doctrines worth our attentiontake consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not wouldsimply be irrational, crazy." ([11], p. 30). Aside from this, even given her distinc-tion, there is some confusion, I think, in her argument that Plato is not aconsequentialist: "For consequentialists would put justice in the ihird class sincefor them only consequences show something to be morally justified. Con-sequentialists cannot allow that anything is morally desirable 'in itself""; (p. 62.Annas' italics): This seems to me besides the point when applied to Plato: thcquestion Glaucon and Socrates are debating is not whether justice is "morallydesirable", whether for itself or its consequences, but whether it is desirable; notwhether it is morally good, but whether it is good in the sense of being beneficialto the agent. The point is confirmed by the argument which, according to Annasherseif, Plato offers at the end of Bk. IV for justice being a good in itself. thchealth analogy. A teleologist is not barred from arguing that justice in the soul.being like health in the body, is a good in itself, so long äs hc has an account ölgood independent of justice. Finally, Annas seems to ignore the strong casc Sachshas made that what Plato means by saying that justicc is good or desirable in



226 Gcras imos Santas

coursc a vory rieh work, with may complications that sometimcs obscure its overallstructurc and may evcn thrcaten ils cohercnce. For our purposes two major com-plications are worth noting.

The first complication is that Plato is not content to define social justice, theprinciples of a just society and its major institutions, and then define a just individualäs onc who subscribes to such principles. Rather, he adopts an unusual "doubletrack" strategy of first defining a just society and then constructing a seeminglyindcpendent definition of a just man, the only obvious connection between the twobeing an isomorphic similarity.8 Nor is he content, äs one kind of teleologist mightbe, the utilitarian, to show that justice maximizes the good of society äs a whole;he wants also to show that it maximizes the good of the individual. The philosophicalmotivation for this complex and unusual strategy is not easy to discern clearly. Itwould appear that Plato is sensitive to the Claims of ethical egoists such äs Thra-symachus, that he is worried about the very rationality of justice from the point ofview of the individual, and about the apparent conflict between Systems of socialjustice and the good of the individual. Thus it is noteworthy that one of the majorquestions of the Republic, whether justice benefits, is framed from the beginning in

itself is that by itself it has good effects on the soul of the just man ([13], pp.143 — 6). Moravcsik also doubts that the modern distinction between deon-tological and teleological theories applies to the Ancients. I find myself in muchagreement with the positive Interpretation he puts forward, but his essay is farranging and goes over the Republic very briefly (three pages out of thirty seven)so it is hard to know if there is any real disagreement ([7] pp. 222 — 6). White'sdiscussion, on which Moravcsik partly relies, makes careful qualifications toapplying this distinction to the Republic, but he allows after all that the theorycan be classed äs a kind of utilitarianism ([19], pp. 54 — 58). Irwin also perhapsdoubts that the Republic theory is teleological, but his view is not entirelyclear to me. He argues that "the Socratic dialogues assume that happiness is adeterminate end describable without reference to moral properties", but that thisis not true of the Republic: "For since justice is a component of happiness, andsince no previous definition of happiness is allowed to control the inquiry intojustice, beliefs about justice and about happiness must infiuence each other, andneither can be adequately defined without the other." ([4], pp. 188, 189). Well,we have two definitions of justice in the Republic, of justice in the city at 433and justice in the soul at 441, and neither makes reference to happiness. And wehave no explicit definition of happiness. Irwin gives us no references for theseStatements. Perhaps Plato does hold in the Republic that justice is a componentof happiness. But if he holds this on the ground that justice is a good in itself,and he has a theory of goodness independent of justice, he can still be a teleologist.Finally, even if Plato's theory is not purely teleological the problem posed in thispaper still remains. No one disputes that Plato argues that justice is a good tothe just man and that one is better off being just rather than injust. This issue issubstantial and cannot be resolved only by definitions, and Plato's positiondemands that he has some account of good independent of justice.

8 For Plato's argument connecting the two accounts of justice, see Vlastos [17],127 ff.




terms of thc good of the individual: is one better off being just rather than unjust?The appropriateness of this question is never questioned: on the contrary, it is madea major test of any System of justice. The major dissatisfaction Socrates has withthe view of Thrasymachus is that under his System of justice a subject is better offbeing unjust, disobeying the commands of the ruler or the stronger, provided hecan get away with it. And even under the more reasonable view of Glaucon, a manwould be best off if he were unjust but had a reputation for justice, the perfectcombination of the "free rider" and the hypocrite! By contrast, Plato sets his sightson a very high ideal: to construct a theory according to which justice and the goodof the individual are in almost perfect harmony and the only rational choice onecan make is to be just. Whether he succeeds of course is another question. Thepoint to be kept in mind is that Plato's complex strategy is within the frameworkof a teleological theory, though it is neither clearly utilitarian nor egoistic but anuneasy and difficult combination of — or compromise between — the two.9

The second major complication presents the main problem of this paper: Platogives not one account of good but two seemingly independent theories: the functionalaccount of good at the end of Bk. I, and the metaphysical theory of the Form ofthe Good in Bk. VI. This is in itself puzzling. Why should Plato give two accountsof good in the same work? To make matters worse, while he apparently holds thatthe metaphysical account is the more fundamental, it is the functional account heuses to construct the definitions of social and individual justice. More puzzling yet,Plato does not even attempt to relate the two accounts in any explicit fashion. Nowonder Aristotle and Sir Karl Popper became exasperated and even contemptuousof the theory of the Form of the Good.10

Now pretty clearly, if the two accounts of good, the functional and the meta-physical, are not in substantial, agreement, the Republic will be in danger ofbeing an incoherent work, on the assumption that it contains a teleologicalethical theory.11 But if they are in substantial agreement, we shall have a bridge

9 In discussing this matter White does not perhaps entirely appreciate what I calledthe "double track" strategy ([19], 9 — 13, 54 — 58). I think Plato clearly gives autilitarian justification of social justice (in terms of what is good for the city äsa whole — see, e.g. Rep., 419 — 21), and an egoistic defence of soul justice (c.g.Rep.t 444 and Bk. IX). White is still right in saying that the whole view is notegoistic. For soul justice is not defincd in tenns of the good of the just soul. butby reference to the proper function of each part of the soul. Only after thisdefinition is accepted is it argued on the basis of the health analogy that suchjustice is good for the soul that has it. In so far äs Plato defends his soul justiceon this basis he seems to allow an egoistic motivation äs proper enough motivalionfor being just. This is what I mean by saying that the combination is "uneasy".while the difficulty of proving that social and soul justice coincide niakes itdifficult.

i», [10], 145-6, Aristotle, N.E.. Bk. l, 6.11 J have argued for this assumption because I belicve it clarifics thc structurc ofthe argument in the Repuhlic and also because it puls thc problem of two theories



22S G e r a s i m o s S a n t a s

hciwccn Hks. l — V and V — V I I I , and u cliancc lo throw frcsh light on onc of thcbiggest standing problcms of thc Re/mblic, the rclation of Plato's cthics and politics(o his mctaphysics and epistemology. So für äs I know, no writcr on the Rcpuhlichas considcrcd thc matter in this way.12

Are the tvvo theories of good thcn in substantial agreernent? We need to sketchthc two theories betöre we can tackle this question. Two secondary puzzlcs willbe why Plato thought the metyphysical account more fundamental, and why henevcrtheless began with the functional account.

IIThe Functional Theory of Good

Plato sketches the functional theory all too briefly at the end of Bk.I, and does not make its use explicit in the construction of the virtues.Partly because of this it has not received the attention it deserves,nor has its role in Plato's teleological ethical theory been explicitlyrecognized.13 Its main tenets seem to be äs follows:1. Some things have a function (352 ). Assumption2. The function of a thing of a given kind is what only things of that

kind can do or can do best (352E, 353A). Definition3. A thing may perform its function well or poorly. Assumption4. There is an appropriate virtue for every kind of thing that has a

function (353B). Assumption5. A thing performs its function well by, and only by, reason of

the presence of its appropriate virtue, poorly by its vice (353C).Assumption

of good in clear light. But even some deontological theories, such äs that ofRawls, need some account of the good that is independent of justice — what hecalls the "thin theory of the good" (See [11], pp. 395 — 99). It would be just äspuzzling were we to find two such theories in Rawls, each seemingly independentof the other.

12 Vlastos recognizes pretty explicitly the use of the notion of , äs defined inBk. I, in the defmitions of justice: [17], p. 115; [18], pp. 21, 24, 25, 35. And sodo Annas and White, though less explicitly. But none, so far äs I can teil,recognizes the functional account äs a theory of good used to built up the theoryof justice. Penner does see it äs a theory of good, but he was doing Socraticethics and was not concerned with the rest of the Republic at the time ([9], 136).

13 That is, Plato's use of the functional account äs a theory of good within ateleological theory of the right or virtue. The latter, äs I have specified it, cannotbe built without some account of good. In the Republic the functional theory isthe only candidate we have for the ethics and politics of Bks. II —V. Themetaphysical account comes later.



Tvvo Theories of Good in Plato's Rcpublic 229

This is the bare skeleton we are given, but Socrates illustrates thetheory and applies it to the human soul. On the basis of these remarkswe can make a few comments and additions.

The theory is put forward with an air of truism. The defmition offunction is not immediately understood, but once Socrates illustratesthe first disjunct with the eyes and ears and the second with a pruningknife, the definition is accepted without argument.

There is no commitment to the idea that everything has a function.so there may be important limits to the scope of the theory. If thereare things that have no function and yet can sensibly be called good,the functional theory will be unable to account for their goodness.

In the definition of function there is no reference to desires, purposesor interests, human or otherwise, a crucial point often misunderstood.As Annas points out, Socrates gives criteria for a thing's έργον, whichmay not correspond to our notion of function; things made for apurpose, artifacts, are clearly only a sub-set of things with έργα. Theessential reference in the definition is to capacities, potentialities orcharacteristic capabilities, what only something can do or do best. Thiswill turn out to be an important point for the relation of the functionalto the metaphysical account.14

From the immediate application that Socrates makes of the theoryto the human soul, we can add, I think, two propositions to the theory:6. A thing is good of its kind if it carries out well the function of

things ofthat kind.15

7. The good of a thing of a kind is what enables it to carry out itsfunction well, i.e. the virtue of things ofthat kind.16

14 [1], 53—4. This is crucial point: if Plato had defined έργον by reference to humanwants or purposes, he would have a theory of the good s the satisfaction ofdesire, a theory which he in fact opposes and which is really part of Glaucon'stheory of justice. As I shall argue later, Plato frames his definition of functionso s to cohere with the perfectionist theory of the Form of the Good heintroduces later.15 This is a generalization from Socrates' application of the theory to the humansoul at 353E: having assigned ruling s the function of the soul, he says: "A goodsoul will rule well, a bad one poorly." See also Penner.

16 In his own famous function argument Aristotle presupposes a similar proposition:N.E., I, 7. At the beginning of it he teils us: "... for all things that have a functionit is thought that the good and the well reside in the function." (1097b27 — *)):From the subsequent argument it is clear that by this he means that a good l·' isone lhat carries out well the function of F's, and also that what enables it to do

* so is the good of an F. J don't think that Plato or Aristotle confuse the conccptsof a good man and the good of a man, or more gencrally the conccpts of a good



230 Gcras imos S a n t a s

The last three propositions, 5, 6 and 7, are plausible and work welllöget her when applied to organs and artifacts. If the virtue of an eyeis vvhat enables i t to perform his function well, i.e. what makes it agood eye, we would concede that having such a virtue is also good forthe eye. But though we would concede that the human virtues makea man a good man, it is debatable whether they constitute the goodof a man — indeed that is the issue being debated, whether justicebenefits a man and makes him happy. So Socrates is not entitled totake proposition 7 for granted when the theory is applied to humanbeings, but this is just what he does. That is why his application isunsuccessful and Plato has to Start over again. Plato himself in the restof the Republic does not make the same error: he gives explicit argu-ments that the just man will be happy.

Finally, we may note that the theory sketched above is formal. Byitself it does not teil us whether something is good; it only teils us howto find out whether this is so. For example, if we wished to find outwhether Socrates had good eyes, the theory teils us to find out thefunction of the eyes and then determine whether Socrates' eyes per-formed that function well. If in addition we can discover what makeseyes see well, we shall have discovered the virtue of the eyes.

Let us now see how Plato applies this theory of functional good tobuild up the theory of the social and individual virtues in Bks. II —V.He now has a preliminary or provisional account of good, which hecan use to construct a theory of right or virtue. By looking at a fewcrucial passages we can see that the theory of functional good is theformal backbone of his search for the virtues of the city and the soul.

After the Speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates undertakesa new search for the nature and defence of justice. Having remarkedthat there is justice in an individual and also in a city and that it wouldbe easier to look for justice in the city first, he begins äs follows:

I think a city comes to be, I said, because not one of us is self-sufficient, butneeds many things. Do you think a city is founded on any other principle? —On no other. As they need many things, people make use of one another for

F and the good of an F. They take it for granted that the human virtues makea man a good man, and they then argue that the virtues are good for a man.The notion of function, thought of äs the exercise of characteristic capacities, isused to bridge the two concepts. There need not be any confusion so long äs wenotice what is being defined and what argued for. For recent discussions of thefunction argument in Aristotle, with which I am in substantial agreement, seeAnagnostopoulos [2] and Key t [5].



Tvvo Theorics of Good in Plato's Republic 23 l

many purposes. They gather many associates and helpers and live in one place,and to this settlemenl we give the name of city. Is that not so? It is. And theyshare wilh oiie anolher, both giving and taking, in so far s they do, becausethey think this better for themselves? Quite so. Come then, I said, let us createa city froni the beginning of our discussion. And it is our needs, it seems, thatwill create it. Of course. (369BC)

Plato does not explain why he Starts in this particular way in his searchfor social justice. But if we assume the theory of functional good, heis making exactly the right Start. For on that theory, to discover thejustice of the city and it other virtues, he has first of all to specify thefunction of a city, then imagine a city that performs that function well,and finally look for the social conditions in that city that enable it toperform its function well. This is pretty much what he does betweenthis passage and the end of Bk. IV, though there are so many ins andouts and so many complications that it is easy to lose sight of thegrand strategy. Thus, having specified the function of the city, he goesinto the longer Job of constructing a city that performs that functions well s possible. He Starts with a simple economic model, where the

function is to satisfy the needs for food, shelter, and clothing, andargues that because of innate differences in talent and because differenteconomic occupations require training and scheduling, the city wouldperform this function best if it were organized according to the principleof division of labor by talent. Given these assumptions, this muchdisputed principle can now be seen s an instantiation of the definitionof virtue using the second disjunct of the definition of function. Socratesthen expands the economic model to include the needs for defence andgovernment, argues for the same principle for the larger model, andgoes into the details of the talents and education needed for the threemain professions, those of artisan, soldier, and ruler.17

17 In the passage we quoted, 369BC, Plato does not use the word έργον; he uscsπρεία which much later (601C — 2A) is linked with αρετή in a way that cohercswell with the functional theory. Because Plato is not always explicit. manyunclarities remain in the application of the functional account. Just to prevcntmisunderstanding, I take the function of the city to be to satisfy the needs of thecitizens. This function is of course complex and it is carried out by the citizens

s citizens in accordance with the principle of division of labor by talent. In sofar s satisfying the needs of the citizens contributes to their welfare and happi-ness, carrying out the function of city according to the division of labor by talentcontributes to the welfare and happiness of the city s a whole. This is whal lthink Plato wants to argue. See, c.g., Socrates' reply to Adciniantus' objcctional 420B-421D.



232 ( » e r a s i m o s S a n t a s

Wc comc now to another crucial passagc that marks the transition(o the scarch for thc virtucs:

Well, son of Ariston, I said, your city might now be said to bc cstablishcd. Thcncxt stcp is for you to look ... and sec where justice resides in it, and whereinjustice, what the difference is between them, and which of the two of them theman vvho intcnds to be happy should possess ... I hope to find it this way, I said.I think our city, if it has been rightly founded, is completely good. Necessarilysso, he said. Clearly then it is wise, brave, moderate, and just. Clearly. (427DE)

Onee more, the theory of function provides a clear rationale for thispassage. Having identified the function of the city, Socrates and Glau-con have constructed a city which, they think, performs its functionäs well äs possible. If they made no mistakes, then what accounts forthis well functioning is the presence of the social virtues, and now theycan try to determine what these are. Finding it easier to identify socialwisdom, bravery and moderation first — for there has been no disputeabout what these are — they proceed by an argument by eliminationto identify social justice äs the principle of division of labor by talent.That principle itself, it is worth noting, is functional in nature: eachcitizen can perform a given occupation — after all they are all fairlysimilar in body and soul — but not äs well äs another citizen who isinnately more suited for that occupation and has been subsequentlyeducated for it; therefore, by the definition of function, each citizen'ssocial occupation or social function is that which he is suited to dobetter than other citizens. Thus the formula "doing one's own work"has essentially a functional Interpretation, äs Professor Vlastos hasnoted.18

The functional theory is also the formal backbone for the con-struction of the virtues of the soul. But this is obscured by the factthat Plato does not Start all over again and apply the functional theoryto the human soul. If he had done that, he would have started byidentifying the function of the human soul, then he would have im-agined a soul that performed that function äs well äs possible, andfinally he would have tried to identify the conditions reponsible forsuch well functioning — the very procedure he used for discoveringthe social virtues. Instead, he relies on the definition of social justicealready at hand and on the principle that a just man and a just societywill not differ at all with respect to justice; and consequently he seesäs his main task showing that the human soul has the complexity

[18]. 24-5.



Two Thcories l Good in Plato's Republic 233

required for an isomorphic similarity between just man and just city(434D —435C). By a long and difficult argument he concludes that "inthe city and in the individual there are the same kinds, equal innumber", and then proceeds to defme the four soul virtues, using thedefmitions of the social virtues already at hand and the principle ofisomorphic similarity.

His reasons for proceeding in this way, instead of duplicating theprevious functional procedure, are not easy to discern. They may besimilar to his reasons for starting with the city first. My guess is thathe found it less difficult to apply the functional theory to the city, sincein general it is easier to assign functions to things that men bring aboutthan those that come about by nature; we usually have reasons forbringing about something such s a city or a pruning knife, and thereasons usually reveal the function. Even though, s we saw his defi-nition of έργον does not presuppose purpose, this is compatible withthe fact that in the case of artifacts the purpose of creating somethingusually reveals its function. The modified strategy has also the ad-vantage of connecting up the social and soul virtues. If he had startedall over again, by applying the functional theory directly to the soul,he would have run the risk of there being no connection at all betweenthe soul and the social virtues.

Even so, it is clear, I think, that the functional theory is behind theconstruction of the soul virtues. For one thin, even the modifiedprocedure he uses relies on that theory, since it relies on the definitionsof the social virtues already at hand, and these have been constructedfunctionally. For another, there are crucial passages in the discussionof the soul that show the functional theory in the background. Thusthe argument for the tripartite division of the soul opens with thequestion whether "we learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger withanother, and yet with a third desire the pleasures of nutrition andgeneration and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul ... weact in each case." (436B). If we plausibly suppose that for Plato it isonly with the soul we can do these things, it follows that these arefunctions of the soul. Moreover, each part of the soul is functionallyconceived: thus near the end of the argument (439D), we are told that"in the soul that by which we reason is called reason, that by which itloves, thirsts ... the appetitive ...". These are functional identificationsof parts of the soul: they are identified by and named after thcirfunctions, just s a shield is named after its function, shiclding.

* The soul virtues themselves are functionally conceived. Thus indivi-dual wisdom, knowledge of what is bencficial for the wholc soul. is



23*4 Geras imos Sa n las

that by the prcscncc of which rcason can calculate and rule well. Andthc dcfinition ofsoul justicc prctty clearly reflects thc functional theory:"... euch of us also in whom the several parts within him each doesits ovvn is a just man and a man who docs his own." (441 DE). Thisdcfinition is derived from the defmition of the just city, from thetripartite division of the soul which establihes functions for each partof the soul, and the principle that a just city and just man do not differwith respect to justice. Thus if the just city is functionally conceivedso is the just soul; the phrase "its own" in the definition can only referto its function, the work a part of the soul can only do or do betterthan other parts.19

In sum, it is fairly clear even from this brief sketch that the functionalaccount of good and of the virtues underlies the major Substantiveconclusions Plato reaches about the individual and social virtue by themiddle of Bk. V. These conclusions are reached by putting togetherthe formal theory of functional good and Substantive propositionsabout the functions of cities and souls and how these functions can becarried out in the best possible way. We need now to sketch the secondformal theory of good in the Republic, the metaphysical theory, andthen compare the two.

IIIThe Metaphysical Account of the Good

I have given elsewhere a detailed Interpretation of Plato's theory of the Form ofthe Qood, together with the evidence for it and consideration of objections.20 HereI have space only for a sketch of its main elements, but I wish to emphasize thatthe matter is quite complex and the sketch is no substitute for the original paper. Icall it the metaphysical account because it is essentially embedded in Plato's theoryof Forms, but it could also be called a perfectionist account of good with equalpropriety.

In the notoriously difficult passages where Plato speaks of the Form of the Good(505 A - 509B), he makes the following Claims:

19 [17], 115.20 [14]. This paper was written in 1977 and widely distributed by the Society fpr

Ancient Greek Philosophy in the Fall of that year. In it I discuss in detail thefive passages on the Form of the Good I quote below and much of the con-siderable secondary literature on them. White's book [19] was not available tome then. His results are very compatible with mine in [14].



Two Theories of Goocl in Plato's Republic 235

(1) The grcatest study is the study of the Form of the Good, by participation inwhich just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial ... . If we knowall things without knowing the Good we would not know that anything isbeautiful and good. (505AB)

(2) The Good every soul pursues and does everything for its sake, diving what i t isand yet baffled and not having an adequate apprehension of its nature ... .(505E)

(3) Our constitution would not be perfectly ordered unless the rulers know howjust and honorable things are good and they will not know this unless theyknow the Good. (506AB)

(4) ... the Form of the G.ood gives the objects of reason their reality and to reasonits knowledge of them ... the Form of the Good is the cause of truth andknowledge. (508B, 508DF, 509A)

(5) ... the objects of knowledge receive not only their being known from the presenceof the Good, but also their being and essence comes from it, though the Goodis not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power. (509B;Shorey, transl.)

In addition to these passages, we have of course the three great similes, the Sun,the Line, and the Cave, which are supposed to illustrate the theory.

From these Claims and the similes it can be seen that in the Republic the Formof the Good is the highest ethical or value object, the highest epistemological object,and the highest ontological object. A complete Interpretation would aim at showinghow the Form of the Good can be all these things, and explain how it can playsuch a unifying role in Plato's philosophy in the middle dialogues.21 Here we shallconcentrate äs much äs possible on the ethical aspects of the theory.

The first three passages quoted pose again the problem we are investigating inthis paper: if one cannot know that anything is good without knowing the Formof the Good, how did Socrates and Glaucon know that the city they constructedwas "completely good" and the conditions that made it so the social virtues? Thatconstruction was based on the functional theory with no reliance whatsoever on theForm of the Good. And if they didn't know, äs Socrates now implies, still thefunctional theory must have been a reliable guide to the construction; and so somesuitable relation is presupposed between functional good and the Form of the Good.But before we can examine this, we still must try to understand the theory of theForm of the Good, and especially the last two passages quoted. What does Platomean by saying that the Form of the Good makes the objects of reason or knowledge.i.e the other Forms, knowable, and that they receive from it their being and essence?

The proposed interpetation is based on two distinctions and two correspondingassumptions.

21 l try to do some of this in [14], including an explanation of the scnsc in whichthc Form of the Good is the "highest" object cthically, cpistcmologically andontologically.



23(i ( f c r a s i i n o s S a n t a s

tlrst distinclion is bclwccn t wo conccplions of thc Formst thc Forms con-ccived äs a t t r ibu t ies or propcrties, on thc onc band, and äs ideal exemplars orparudigms, scir-cxcinplifying or sclf-.predicating, on thc olhcr. On thc first concep-( u > n , thc Form C'irclc, say, is thc attributc of bcing circular; on thc sccond, it wouldbc thought of äs an ideal cxcinplar or paradigm, the Circle. And similarly with thcForm Man, C'ily, Bed, or whatnot. In rccent years, commentators havc found bothconccptions of thc Forms in Plato, though thcre is much disagreemcnt on how clcarPlatt) was on thc distinction and wherc he had onc conception or the othergoing; and of course therc is much disagreement on the meaning and scope ofsclfprcdication that goes with the second conception.22 The assumption we makehcrc is that in the middle dialogucs, and certainly in bis theory of the Form of thcGood in the Repnblk\ Plato was thinking of the Forms äs ideal exemplars, self-exemplifying paradigms, rather than a properties or attributes. There is muchevitience for this conception of the forms in the Symposium and the Republic.23 Butpcrhaps the strongest evidence for this assumption is that it helps us make scnse ofPlato's remarks about the Form of the Good. On the difficult question of self-predication I can only indicate here what is needed and what must be avoided. Onthc one band, we need something stronger than "Pauline self-predication", thenotion that "The Form Circle is a circle" means that anything that participates inthe Form Circle is necessarily a circle. Resemblance, the dominant notion ofparticipation in the Republic, äs is shown by the three great similes, does not fit thisweak notion of self-predication, nor is it strong enough for understanding the notionof Forms äs ideal exemplars, which is essential for the theory of the Form of theGood. On the other band, we need to avoid the absurdities of attributing materialityto Forms, something that Plato would object to in any case: the absurdity ofsupposing that the Form Bed is a physical bed. To my knowledge, this has not beenachieved.24

The second distinction we need is between formal or ideal attributes of Formsand their proper attributes. Roughly speaking, an ideal or formal attribute of aForm is one that a Form has by virtue of being a Form or because it is a Form;whereas a proper attribute is one that a Form has by virtue of being the particular

22 [14], 382, Note 17.23 To the authors who think that Plato sometimes conceived the Forms äs paradigms

with some sort of self-predication, we can now add White [19], 37 — 8, and Annas[1], 203-8. Thus White: "... Forms exhibit perfectly or fully the attributes thatsensibles exhibit only imperfectly, and are paradigms that sensibles replicate toonly a sensible extent." And Annas on Republic 479 — 80: "Only the FormBeautiful is unqualifiedly beautiful, always beautiful and ncver the opposite ofbeautiful." And: "... 'the F itself which is completely and fully F and never theopposite."

24 In correspondence Prof. Charles Young has made a Suggestion that comes close,I think. to providing what is needed and avoiding what must be avoided: thatthe self-predicating attributes of a Form are just those that would be includedin the definition of it.



Two Thcorics of Good in Pluto's Republic 237

Form it is. Thus being immune to changc or bcing ctcrnal are formal or idealattributes of the Form Circle, since it has them be virtue of being a Form. On theother band, being a circlc is a proper attribute of the Form Circle, since it has itby virtue of bcing the particular Form it is. The distinction is drawn by Aristotlein Topics, 137b3 —13, and it has been discussed recently by Profs. Keyt, Owen, andVlastos. There is much disagreement on whether Plato observed the distinction andwhether it is even compatible with the ontology of Platonic Forms.25 The assumptionwe make her is that the distinction is compatible with Plato's theory of Forms,providcd that the Forms are conceived äs ideal exemplars or paradigms. I thinkthere are passages where Plato seems to have observed the distinction, but againthe chief evidence for our assumption is that i t helps us make sense of Plato'sremarks about the Form of the good.26

There is a famous passage in the Symposium where both our distinctions seemimplicitly present and both our assumptions satisfied, the passage where Platodescribes the Form Beauty, the highest object of love at the top of the ladder oflove:

The Beautiful, Plato teils us, "... first of all is eternal, and neither comes intobeing nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes; then it is not beautiful in part andugly in part, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relationto one thing and ugly in relation to another, nor beautiful from one point of viewand ugly from another." (211 A)

Here Plato lists two sets of attributes of the Beautiful, the first explicitly, thesecond by implication:

I — l The Beautiful is eternal (or everlasting), ungeneraled and indestructible,and unchanging.

1 — 2 The Beautiful is beautiful in all its parts, it is always beautiful, it is beautifulno matter compared to what, and it is beautiful to all who apprehend it.27

And the second set clearly implies a third:

P The Beautiful is beautiful.Attributes of the first set are clearly formal or ideal attributes, those of the third

proper attributes, by our definitions. Those of the second set do not fit neatly eitherdefinition, but they clearly give a sense to the notion that the Beautiful is beautifulwithout qualification, something characteristic only of the Forms; so we may classthem also, I think, äs formal or ideal attributes. In any case, some of the attributes

25 D. Keyt, "The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus", Philos. Rev. 1971; G. E. L.Owen, "Dialectic and Ersitic in the Treatment of Forms", in: Arislotle on Dialcctic,G. E. L. Owen, ed., 1968; and G. Vlastos, "The 'Two-Level Paradoxes' inAristotle", in: Platonic Studies, 1973. Their views are discussed in dctail in [14].

26 [14], 385-98.27 This of course is not stated explicitly in the text. It is clearly suggcstcd by the

contrast to sensibles, and it gives a clear sense, I think, to the idea that the FormBeauty is "unqualifiedly" beautiful.



23S Cic ra s imos Santas

of the sccond sei can bc dorivcd from thc other two: thus, if the Beautiful iscverlasling or cternal and unchanging and it is also beautiful, il follows that it isalvvays beautiful. Wo can perhaps usc the phrasc "completely or perfectly beautiful"äs u summary of the ideal attributes of the first two sets. There are passages in theRepublic that can be interpreted by means of our distinctions. The most famous isin Bk.V (477 ff.) where Plato teils us that the objects of knowledge, the Forms, "arein every vvay" whereas the objects of opinion, sensibles, "both are and are not".These expressions can be understood by means of our distinctions: the Forms arewhatever they are always, no matter compared to what, etc.; whereas their sensibleparticipants are sometimes one thing sometimes another, or one thing compared toone thing, another to another, and so on.

How does all this enable us to understand Plato's difficult remarks about theForm of the Good? The main idea is that when Plato speaks of the "being andessence" of the Forms he is referring to their ideal or formal attributes. And whenhe says that the Forms receive their being and essence from the Form of the Goodhe means that all the other Forms have their ideal or formal attributes by virtue ofparticipating in the Form of the Good. But why should the Form of the Good,rather than some other Form or no Form at all, enjoy this exalted position? Herethe conception of the Forms äs paradigms or ideal exemplars, rather than äsproperties, comes to our aid. They are exemplars or paradigms in the sense of beingthe best objects of their kind, and they are so by virtue of their ideal or formalattributes. The Form Circle is the best circle there is or can be, and it is so becauseit is circular in every part of itself, it is always circular, it is circular no mattercompared to what, it is circular to every one who apprehends it, it is completely orperfectly circular. And similarly with the Form Man, City, and whatnot. What theyall have in common äs Forms, we might say, is bestness of kind, and so it isPlatonically appropriate that they should have this in common by participating inthe Form of the Good. To be completely good of a kind is to be completely thatkind, äs only the Form of that kind can be; that is, to have the ideal or formalattributes of that kind.

In addition, we may note that it is the very same ideal attributes that make theForms epistemic paradigms, the best objects of their kind to know. It is the idealattributes of the Form Circle that make it a clear, undeceptive and stable epistemicobject. And since the Form has its ideal attributes by virtue or participating in theForm of the Good, this is why the Form of the Good makes it possible for reasonto know the other Forms. The Forms are at once the best objects of their kind andthe best objects to know. In studying the Form Circle one learns at once what acircle is and what the best circle is. In studying the Form City one learns at oncewhat a city is and what the best city is. That is why the philosopher-king must studythe Forms.

The Form of the Good itself is, I think, conceived by Plato in ?. very abstractand formal way. It is not another paradigm of goodness, it is what makes the'otherForms paradigms of goodness of kind. It is the very ideality of the Forms, theirideal attributes abstractly conceived: what makes the other Forms always the same,the same in every respect, the same no matter compared to what, the same to all




who apprehend them. And that is why the philosopher-king must make the studyof the Form of the Good bis greatest study. To "see" the Form of the Good is tograsp the very essence of the Forms, to "see" them in their splendid Isolation, apartfrom the confusions of materiality. But once the Good is grasped and the otherForms are Seen äs the best objects of their kind, they can now be seen äs the onlytrue measure of the goodness of sensible things. Sensible objects are good of theirkind, not by directly participating in the Form of the Good, but by participatingin the ideal attributes of the Forms of their kind, and thereby participating in theForm of the Good to some degree. One circle is better than another, one city betterthan another, one living man better than another, in so far äs they participate in orresemble more their respective Forms. The ideal attributes of the Forms are theirgood-making characteristics. This and their epistemological stability is what makesthe Forms the foundation stones of the ethics and politics of the Republic.

The theory of the Form of the Good in the Republic is a perfectionist andobjectivist theory of goodness. It is perfectionist in that perfect specimes of goodness,the Forms, are set up äs the only true measures of the goodness of things in thisworld, with the Form of the Good äs their formal, perfection-making property. Itis an objectivist theory because whether anything, Form or sensible participant, isgood is independent of any desires, attitudes, or interest a sentient being may takein it. But every soul desires the Good. And since the perfect specimes of goodness,the Forms, are also the epistemic paradigms that only reason can discern, this istruly the reason why reason ought to rule the soul, and why the philosopher, theman of reason, ought to rule Society. In the theory of the Form of the Good wecan see that Cherniss was not off the mark when he spoke of "the philosophicaleconomy" of Plato's theory of Ideas.

IVThe Two Account s of the Good Compared

Earlier we remarked that unless the two theories of good are insubstantial agreement the ethical theory of the Republic äs a wholewould run the risk of being incoherent. Are the two theories äs wesketched them in substantial agreement? Let us first clarify this ques-tion. The theories are formal: they teil us what makes things good andhow to find out whether something is good, but not by themselveswhat things are good. But presumably when each theory is put togetherwith appropriate factual propositions it will yield proposition aboutwhat things are good. Evidently then the two theories are in substantialagreement if, when conjoined with the same factual propositions, theyyield the same conclusions about what things are good. Morcover,since Plato's ethical theory is teleological - the right is what maximizes16 Arch. Gesell. Philosophie »d. 67



240 Gcras imos Sa n t äs

thc good — , thc two theorics should yield thc same account of thevirtucs whcn put togcthcr with thc same propositions about societyand human beings.

New I havc combed the Rcpublic with a view to discovering whetherPlato presents any arguments for an affirmative answer to our question,whether the two theories of good are in substantial agreement. I havefound none; he does not even raise the question. This at once hints atthe possibility that our Interpretation is all wrong. Perhaps there arenot two accounts of good in the Republic, and that is why we find nodiscussion relating them. But I do not think this is correct. Thefunctional account is clearly enough in our texts, and its applicationcan be clearly detected from Bk. II to the middle of Bk. V. After thatthe metaphysical account is foreshadowed in Plato's language andexplicitly presented in Bk. VI. But Plato does not apply the meta-physical account, äs he did the functional theory, to determine oncemore the social and individual virtues and the good of man and society.Hence Popper's Charge that the metaphysical theory of the good is an"empty formalism", and Aristotle's objection that it is useless. Andhence the chasm between the two halves of the Republic: How is thephilosopher-king to discover, by looking at the Form of the Good andusing the other Forms äs paradigms, the just man and the just cityand the good of each? And why did Plato suppose, äs he must have,that the philosopher-king would by so doing arrive at the same resultsthat Socrates reached earlier by applying the functional account?

The most plausible hypothesis, I think, is that Plato thought thatthe two accounts are in obvious agreement and no argument wasnecessary. But how? His commentators have certainly not found itobvious, from Aristotle to the present day.

One difficulty in seeing any connection between the two theories ofgood is that each is stated seemingly independently of the other. Neitherin the Statement of the functional theory nor in its application to themiddle of Bk. V do we have any reference to Forms or the Form ofthe Good. And the theory of the Form of the Good in Bk. VI is statedwithout reference to function, for reasons we shall see directly below.

A second difficulty is that there i s an obvious way of connecting thetwo theories, which is clearly incorrect: that is to suppose that theForms are functional paradigms, objects that carry out their functionsperfectly. This cannot be Plato's thought, for the Forms have nofunctions in the relevant sense. The Forms are at "rest", they don'tperform any activities, they don't "do" anything, and they may noteven be in time. The Form Eye does not see, the Form Knife does not



Two Thcories of Good in Plato's Republic 24 J

cut, the Form Man does not deliberate, the Form City does not protectanyone, and nobody can sleep in the perfect Bed, not even the perfectMan. We cannot therefore suppose that the Forms are perfect specimes,and the paradigms of goodness of kind, because they function perfectly.These absurdities cannot plausibly be attributed to Plato. In addition,this way of relating the two theories would make the functional theorythe more fundamental of the two, whereas Plato seems to have heldthe reverse. The Forms are the best objects of their kind because ofwhat they are, not because of what they do. Their goodness is notspread out in time, we might say, whereas the goodness of their sensibleparticipants is. The seeming chasm between the two theories of thegood seems to be a direct consequence of the chasm that separatesForms and their sensible participants, the chasm of time, space, andchange, the chasm, between being and becoming.

But this gap is not unbridgeable. It is bridged by the relations ofsensibles to the Forms. In the middle books of the Republic theserelations seem to be ontological dependence and resemblance, the tworelations illustrated over and over by the three great similes, the Sun,the Line, and the Cave. Thus, though the Forms have no functions,all sensibles with functions also "have form" in the sense that theyparticipate or resemble Forms. This is an obvious "truth" in Plato'stheory, part and parcel of the postulation of Forms and the relationof sensibles to them, introduced in Bk. V. It is here that we must seekthe agreement between the two theories of good and the "priority" ofthe metaphysical theory. And now that we have come this far, onlyone possibility seems to satisfy both conditions, agreement betweenthe two theories and priority of the metaphysical theory: Plato mustbe assuming (1) that what function a sensible has "depends" on whatit is, i.e. what Forms it resembles; and (2) how well it carries out itsfunction "depends" on how far it resembles these Forms. The first ofthese assumptions must have been obvious to him indeed. After all,whatever a sensible is, essentially or accidentally, whatever structure,organization, or characteristics it has, it has by virtue of resemblingsome Forms. So, whatever activity or work only a sensible of a givenkind can do or do more efficiently than a sensible of another kindmust depend, if it depends on anything at all, on one or another ofthese, the structure, organization or characteristics it has. What eisecould it depend on? And that it does so depend also seems obvious:by changing the shape of the edge of a knife, from sharp to Hat wccan affect its cutting; by changing the shape of a wheel we can affcctits rotation; by changing the structure of an cye its sccing. and so on.



242 C i e r a s i m o s San tas

Hovv Plato conccivcd of this rclation is not entircly clear. We can sayvvith some confidence that hc vvould not be inclincd to identify whata sensible is and its function or to construct functional defmitions ofsensibles, äs Aristotle sometimes did. The Separation of Forms fromsensibles and the fact that Forms have no functions would prevent himfrom doing that. Beyond that, perhaps the most we can say is that hethought of the relation between what a thing is and its function ässome sort of causal relation, perhaps analogous to the relation betweenthe virtue of a thing and its functioning well: just äs the virtues of athing enable it to perform its function well, so what a thing is enablesit to have a given function.

Assumption (2) is also a natural one for Plato to make, especiallyin view of (1) and the proposition, which is also part of the theory ofForms in the middle dialogues, that sensibles resemble the Forms moreor less but never completely. Indeed, (2) seems to follow from (1) andthis proposition. If, for instance, what enables a sensible wheel toperform its characteristic work, e.g. rotating, is its circular shape, andthe sensible wheel is more or less circular though never completely so,it seems to follow that the more circular it is, the more it resemblesthe perfect Circle, the better it will rotate. Just äs what work a sensiblecan do depends on what it is, what Form it resembles, so how well itdoes that work depends on how far it resembles this Form.

If Plato made these two assumptions, we can see why he thoughtthat the two theories of good in the Republic are in agreement, andalso why he thought the theory of the Form of the Good is the morefundamental. If these two assumptions hold, in principle one couldjudge the goodness of a sensible in either of two ways and be assuredthat he would get the same result: either by knowing the Form(s) thata sensible resembles and determining how far it resembles it relativeto other participants in the same Form; or by knowing the functionof that sensible and determining how well it carries out that functionrelative to other things with the same function. Moreover, on theseassumptions the theory of the Form of the Good is the more fun-damental in this sense: though a sensible can show or exhibit itsgoodness in the efflcient performance of its function, this is really aresult of what it is and how far it is what it is, i.e what Forms itresembles and how far it resembles them. It is the degree of resemblanceto the Forms that makes it good, the degree of resemblance to thethings that are perfectly good; and these in turn are perfectly good oftheir kind by virtue of participating completely in the Form of theGood.



Two Theories of Good in Plato's Republic 243

But if Ihis is so, isn't Plato's procedure in the Republic rather stränge?If the theory of the Form of the Good is the more fundamental, whydid he not Start in Bk. II with the theory of Forms and the Good andproceed in the way he recommends the philsopher-king to do? Lookat the Forms City and Man and construct the closest possible re-semblances to them? Actually, Plato describes such an undertaking inthe Timaeus: the Divine Craftsman, being unenvious, wishes to fashionthe sensible world so äs to be äs good äs possible, that is, äs good äspresumably matter, time, and space allow. To do so he looks to theForms and using them äs paradigms he fashions sensibles that resemblethem äs much äs possible. As I have argued elsewhere,28 the theory ofthe Form of the Good is presupposed in this creative act: The Formsare thought of äs the best objects of their kind, for why eise would theDivine Craftsman imitate them in order to create the best possiblesensibles? The Divine Craftsman can do this because he has completeknowledge of the Forms and the Form of the Good, knowledge thatis obviously prior to and independent of any perception of sensibleparticipants. But Socrates in the Republic, though he describes howthe philosopher-king can, through dialectic, ascend to the Form of theGood, does not pretend to have any such knowledge; he has onlyopinions about the Form of the Good. Humans approach the Formsby being "reminded" of them through the perception of their sensibleparticipants.

So perhaps we can see why Plato Starts in the Republic with thefunctional theory of good and builds up the theory of the individualand social virtues on the basis of it. The functional theory deals withsensibles, and it is closer to our evaluative practices in medicine andthe arts. We judge the goodness or "health" of organisms and theirparts by how well they function, and the products of the arts by howwell they do what they have been made for. But Plato has framed hisdefinition of function in terms of characteristic capacities, rather thandesires or interests we take in objects, so that judgements of functionalgoodness will accord with judgments of perfectionist goodness madeon the basis of the theory of the Form of the Good eventually intro-duced. At least so he thinks, I have argued, given the usual asuinptionsof the theory of Forms and the plausible truth that what a sensiblecan do depends on what it is. If he is correct, the Republic is indeed acoherent work, and the agreement between the two theories of good

114].



2-14 Geras imos S a n t a s

unites thc ethics and politics of thc first half with thc metaphysics andepistemology of the sccond.

In thc Rcpnblic\ the theory of the Form of the Good is so formalund abstraet and seems so removed from any evident application thati t sccms empty and barren, and the complaints of Aristotle, Popper,and many other commentators are understandable. But if it could beunited with the functional theory, äs Plato thought, it would emergeäs the first great perfectionist theory of goodness. I think that Aristotle,though he rejected the Separation of Forms and he was more sensitiveto the Claims of desire and pleasure, followed in Plato's footsteps whenhe united essential form and function, and produced a more modestbut perhaps also a more successful perfectionist theory. In eitherversion, the Ancients gave us one of the great alternative theories ofgoodness. As great an alternative, I think, äs that other theory thatPlato constantly fought, the moderns favor, and Rawls so wellexpounds, the conception of the good äs the satisfaction of rationaldesire.29

Bibliography

1. Annas, J.: An Introduction to Plato's Republic Oxford 1981.2. Anagnostopoulos, G.: "Aristotle on Function and the Attributive Nature of

Good", in: The Greeks and the Good Life. D. Depew, ed. Hackett, Indianapolis1980.

3. Frankena, W.: Ethics, Prentice Hall 1973.4. Irwin, T.: Plato's Moral Theory, Oxford 1977.5. Keyt, D.: „Intellectualism in Aristotle", in: Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Vol.

II, J. P. Anton and A. Preus, eds., SUNY 1983.6. Moore, G. E.: Principia Ethica, Cambridge 1954.7. Moravcsik, J.: "On what we aim at and how we live", in: The Greeks and the

Good Life.8. Owen, G. L. E.: "A Proof Peri Ideon", in: Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, R. E.

Allen, ed., Humanities, New York 1965.9. Penner, T.: "Socrates on Virtue and Motivation", in: Exegesis and Argument,

E. N. Lee et al, eds., Vangorum 1973.

29 Earlier versions of this paper were read at the annual classics Conference at U.C.Berkeley in 1982 and at the philosophy colloquium at U. C. San Diego in 1983.I am indebted to several members of the audience for helpful comments, includingespecially Profs. Anagnostopoulos, Code, Lee, Stroll, Vendler, Vlastos and SteveChurchill; also to two anonymous referees of this Journal. Needless to say, theymay not agree with all the revisions I have made.



Two Theorics of Good in Plato's Republic 245

10. Popper, K.: The Opcn Society and its Enemies, V. 1., New York 1962.11. Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice, Harvard 1971.12. ROSS, W. D.: The Right and the Good, Oxford 1930.13. Sachs, D.: "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic", in: Philos. Rev., Ithaca 1963.14. Santas, G.: "The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic"', in: Philos. Inquiry,

1980; reprinted in Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. II, J. Anton and A. Preus,eds., SUNY 1983.

15. Santas, G.: "Plato on Love, Beauty, and the Good", in: The Greeks and theGood Life.

16. Thayer, H. S.: "Plato: The Theory and Language of Function", in: Plato'sRepublic, A Sesonske, ed., Wadsworth 1966.

17. Vlastos, G.: "Justice and Happiness in Plato's Republic", in: Platonics Studies,Princeton 1973.

18. Vlastos, G.: "The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato's Republic", in:Interpretation of Plato, H. North, ed., Leiden 1977.

19. White, N.: A Companion to Plato's Republic, Hackett 1979.



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