weithman natural law property and redistribution

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Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

Natural Law, Property, and RedistributionAuthor(s): Paul J. WeithmanSource: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1993), pp. 165-180Published by: on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

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NATURAL LAW, PROPERTY, ANDREDISTRIBUTIONPaul J. Weithman

ABSTRACTIn his essay "NaturalLaw, Property,and Justice," B. Andrew Lustig ar-gues for what he calls "significant correspondences" between JohnLocke's theory of propertyand scholastic theories of propertyon the onehand, and between Locke's theory and contemporary Catholic socialteachingon the other. These correspondences,Lustig claims,establish anintellectual "traditionof propertyin common." I arguethat linking Aqui-nas even via Locke to the redistributivismof contemporaryCatholicsocial teaching requires distorting his political theory. This distortion, Iargue,obscures the possibilityof using Aquinas's political theory as a ba-sis for radical social criticism.

1In his article "Natural Law, Property, and Justice: The GeneralJustification of Property in John Locke," Professor B. Andrew Lustigexamines how various natural law theories of property have accom-modated the claims of those who lack material goods sufficient tomeet their basic needs. The focus of the paper is, as its subtitle indi-cates, John Locke's property theory. Crucial features of Lustig's in-terpretation of Locke have, as he acknowledges, been anticipated byother scholars, and his paper does not aim to review the argumentsthey have offered in support of that reading. Lustig's primary contri-bution is his attempt to link Locke's property theory to others.Lustig argues for three theses:1. Locke's theory of property is "a certain recasting of Scholastic nat-ural law arguments" that "shares significant correspondences"with scholastic property theories (Lustig 1991, 121). The theoriesLustig has in mind are those of the medieval scholastic ThomasAquinas and the Renaissance scholastic Francisco Suarez.Thanks are due to Phil Quinnand EleonoreStumpfor helpful comments on an earlierdraft.

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166 Journal of Religious Ethics2. Locke's property theory also "shares significant correpondences"(122) or "basiccorrespondences"(145) with "the discussion of thesocial obligations of property in Catholic social teaching" (122).3. There is a tradition of thought running from Aquinas throughLocke to contemporary Catholic social thought, the members ofwhich are united by their acceptance of certain fundamental the-ses about property. Lustig calls this tradition "the tradition ofproperty in common" (143).Before examining Lustig's defense of these claims, I want briefly torecall their importancefor religious ethics. The first thesis contradictsthe interpretation of Locke propounded most prominently by C. B.MacPherson, against whom Lustig explicitly argues. According tothat interpretation, Locke is the father of "possessive individualism"and not a thinker who "must be understood in light of the Scholasticdiscussion of property-in-common" 119). The argument against thatinterpretation shows that theological assumptions play a large role inLocke's political theory (stressed also by Mouw 1991). This feature ofhis thought is often neglected by students of religious ethics. The sig-nificance Lustig attaches to the second thesis is somewhat less clear.Certainlythe arguments in its supportare meant to discreditinterpre-tations of Locke according to which his views are inconsistent withrecent Catholic social teaching (131) or with the "systematic [govern-ment] redistribution"that that teaching has recently endorsed (145).Lustig's concluding remarks, however, suggest more far-reachingim-plications. There he claims that "one can reconstruct Locke's naturallaw position to comportwith recent Catholic social thought on the le-gitimate function of government in safeguardingthe positive . . . rightsof individuals"(145). Perhaps Lustig means that Locke's thought canbe reconstructed to support or to legitimate ascribing redistributivefunctions to government. This raises the possibilitythat Locke's view,far from being inconsistent with egalitarian elements in Catholicthought, could be exploited to provide it an intellectual foundation.1This second and stronger claim is an intriguingone, but since Lustigdoes not pursue it, I will not either. Nor will I contest the weakerclaim that Locke's thought is consistent with contemporaryCatholic

1Lustig'sassertion of continuitiesbetween Locke'sthoughtandThomism,the tradi-tional source of Catholicthought, might also be intended to show it appropriate or thispurpose. Hisbriefcriticism of John Rawls (143)mightbe intended to show that Locke'sview providesan intellectual foundationsuperiorto the Rawlsian views on which someCatholic social thought has recently relied;cf National Conferenceof CatholicBishops1986,paragraphs86 and 90, which are reminiscent of Rawls's Difference Principle.



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Natural Law, Property, and Redistribution 167

social teaching. I do not disagree with the exegetical claim thatLocke's theory "must be understood in light of Scholastic discus-sion[s]," nor do I want to defend MacPherson's interpretation ofLocke. In what follows I want to focus on what I take to be the realsignificance of the first and second theses for religious ethics: theirsupport for the third.The third thesis is significant because it ties recent Catholic socialteaching's endorsement of "systematic redistribution" (145) to thework of Aquinas,the defacto source of much Catholicthought and thede jure source of twentieth-century Catholic social thought.2 Indeedthe ties between Aquinas and contemporary Catholic social teachingare so close, Lustig argues, that this endorsement gives "the moralforce" of Aquinas's property theory its appropriatecontemporaryex-pression (144). Lustig's interpretation of Locke is crucial to this his-torical argument, for Locke, he claims, facilitates an importanttransition within the "traditionof property in common." That transi-tion makes possible the "translation]" (144) of Aquinas'sviews into acontemporaryredistributive idiom. Let us therefore see how Lustigtakes the first and second theses to support the third and how hethinks Locke insures the continuity of this tradition.

2The "sharedcorrespondences"asserted in the first and second the-ses reflect, Lustig claims, a shared underlying view about "property ncommon." For Aquinas and the authors of contemporaryCatholic so-cial thought, Lustig writes, common property enjoys "moralpriority"(for Aquinas, see 123-24; or the latter, see 145). For Locke, too, com-mon property has a "moral priority" (121), is a "priornotion" (138),and serves as a "moral heuristic" (138).Lustig believes these three property theories share three doctrines.First, according to the natural law, material goods are given to thehuman race as a whole to meet the necessities of life. Second, the ne-2See Leo XIII [1879]1947,xv: "Trulyall civil society would be much more tranquiland much safer if healthier teachingwere given in universities and schools;a doctrinemore in unison with the perpetualteachingoffice of the church,such as is containedinthe volumes of ThomasAquinas. He disputesabout the true nature of liberty,which inthese days is passing into lawlessness;about the Divine origin of all authority;aboutlaws and their binding force; about the paternal and just government of sovereignprinces, with our obedience to higher powers, and the common love that should be

among all. The wordsof Thomasabout these things, and others of a like nature, havethe greatest strength, indeed a resistless [sic] strength, to overthrowthe principlesofthis new jurisprudence,which is manifestly dangerousto the peaceful order of societyand to publicsafety."



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168 Journal of Religious Ethicscessities which material goods are to meet are social needs or pur-poses, including, prominently, the perpetuation of the species and ofsociety (124, 145). Third,those in great need have an overridingmoralclaim on the rightfully held propertyof others. Accordingto the firstand second of these theses, then, propertyis commonin that it is givento all to be used for all humankind and/or for all of society. Propertyin common enjoys "moral priority" in that claims of those in needcouldbe foundedon the social purposesof propertyand could overrideclaims to private property.Lustig does note significant differences among various thinkers inthe "traditionof property in common." Locke, following Suarez, ar-gues that individuals in need have "ad rem claim rights" to the prop-erty they need (130,emphasis added) and that they have a "rightto aliving" (139,emphasis added). Aquinas, Lustig concedes, has no suchnotions. Nonetheless Suarez's formulation, which Locke takes over,merely "clarifies the ad rem implications of Thomas's more modestproperty-in-commonconsiderations"(129). It "recasts"Aquinas'sownlanguage (129)and is a "meaningfulextension" of it (132). That Lockemerely elucidates the "ad rem implications" of Aquinas's theoryshows that there are "significant correspondences"between Lockeand Aquinas. These significant correspondencesensure the unity of acommon property tradition including Locke and Aquinas. There isalso a difference between Locke's theory and Catholic social teaching:Locke does not advocate government redistribution to satisfy individ-ual claim rights, though he "inno way resists [it]"(134). Nevertheless,the fact that Locke's theory can, as we saw above,be "reconstructed ocomport"with Catholic social teaching shows "significantcorrespon-dences" between that teaching and Locke's view (145). These corre-spondences suffice, Lustig believes, to ensure that Catholic socialteaching belongs in the tradition in which he locates Locke and Aqui-nas. Locke is an important transitional figure in the tradition, for his"recasting" of Aquinas's views with the notion of "ad rem claimrights"makes it possible for thinkers later in the tradition to endorsegovernment intervention to fulfill those claim rights.Lustig suggests that differences among propertytheories within thetradition are best understood as but different expressions of underly-ing moral commitments and priorities. Thus he writes of differencesbetween Aquinas and Locke on the one hand and Catholic social en-cyclicalson the other: "Asagriculturalmodels grow increasinglyirrel-evant to the stratified interdependence of modern economic life, themoral force of property in common is appropriately translated intospecificwelfare guarantees"(144,emphasisadded). This talk of trans-lation is reminiscent of Lustig'searlier claims that Locke's theory "re-



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casts" Aquinas's and that his theory can be "reconstructed" tocomportwith Catholic social teaching. It is hard to know what Lustigmeans by these claims. His treatment of differences among Aquinas,Locke, and Catholic social teaching suggests, however, that Lustigthinks Aquinas the source of an intellectual tradition that is bothfaithful to his property theory and marked by significant conceptualchange.John Pocock, Quentin Skinner (1978,ix-xv), and other historians ofpolitical theory have, in the last three decades, produced very power-ful reasons for thinking that linguistic and conceptual differences inthe expression of theories reflect very profound differences amongthem. These same historians have produced strong arguments againstthe hasty assimilation based on linguistic similarities of politicalthinkers into traditions of thought. That Lustig asserts a tradition ofproperty in common therefore shows how much weight is born by histheses about "sharedcorrespondences." He links Aquinas's theory ofproperty to the redistributivism of contemporary social teachingthrough the transitional figure of Locke. He forges this link in theface of powerful historiographicreasons to believe that doing so re-quires neglecting or distorting central elements of Aquinas's politicaltheory.I suggest that historiographicreservations of the sort Pocock andSkinner have expressed are very well founded. In the remainder ofthis paper,I will try to substantiatethis suggestionby focusing on Lus-tig's treatment of Aquinas and will do so by arguing for two points.First, there are essential elements of Aquinas's discussion of justicethat imply his opposition to systematic government redistribution.Second,Aquinas'stheory, if properly interpreted, affordsa standpointfrom which to criticize much of what Lustig subsumes under thephrase "the stratified interdependenceof modern economiclife" (144).The claim that the "moral force" of Aquinas's arguments properlyfinds expression in arguments legitimating the welfare state obscuresthe critical power of his theory of distributive justice. It thereby ob-scures the value of Thomism as an intellectual basis of social and cul-tural criticism.

3Aquinas's discussion of property at Summa Theologiae II-II 66 iscrucial to the questions at issue here, as Lustig himself notes. Article2 on private propertywith common use and article 7 on the permissi-bility of stealing in times of need are especially important.



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170 Journal of Religious Ethics

In the latter article, Aquinas famously argues that someone in needmay take what belongs to another, and that this is not stealing "prop-erly speaking"(ad 2). Lustig notes by way of comment on this articlethat "In times of need, all propertyis to be consideredcommon"(127).This interpretive remark suggests, even if it does not imply, the conge-niality of governmental redistribution to Aquinas's discussion of theclaims of the needy. If, in time of need, literally all property is com-monly held or is to be used by all or any, then whether the poor taketheir share or the government distributes it to them might seem im-material. Before asserting that Aquinas'sviews in this article are con-genial to or consistent with such redistribution,however, we must seewhether Aquinas says in article 7 what Lustig claims that he does.In that article Aquinas draws a distinction, which Lustig neglects,between two cases. One is that of a person in "urgent and evidentnecessity ... as when there is imminent danger to his person." Theother is that of someone in need, but not in such dire necessity.In the former case, Aquinas says, the needy individual A may takefrom person B what A needs to survive. Note first that Aquinas is notmaking a claim about all of B's property, as Lustig seems to assert.Rather, he is making a claim about some of that property namely,what A needs in order to address his urgent needs. Moreover,thoughLustig reads Aquinas as saying that this propertybecomes common, itis important to see in what sense this is so. The property of B that Aneeds to survive does not, in virtue of A's poverty, come to be ownedby society corporately. It is common only in the limited sense thatanother may use or consume it without being guilty of theft.3 Theformer sense of "commonownership" is clearly congenial with gov-ernment redistribution,since governments redistributewhat becomessocially owned through taxation. However, it is the latter and not theformer sense of "commonownership"that Aquinas has in mind.Aquinas's treatment of the other case mentioned in article 7 notonly does not suggest the congeniality of governmental redistribution,it is, I shall argue, incompatiblewith it. A crucialpremise in Aquinas's

3Aquinas'sparadigmof common use here is almost certainly an example he takesfrom Aristotle'sPolitics: "The Lacedaemonians, or example, use one another's slavesand horses and dogs as if they were their own; and when they lack provisionson ajourney, they appropriatewhat they find in the fields of the country" (1263a35ff.).Aquinaswould, I believe, assimilate treatment of the needs of those in povertyto thisdiscussionof those in need on a journey and would argue that in both cases those inneed may avail themselves of another'splenty to satisfy their need. Aquinascites Aris-totle's example in his commentary on this passageof the Politics; cf. In Libros Polit-icorum [1269-72]1873, II.4. Oddly, Lustig takes no account of this work in hisinterpretationof Aquinas.



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treatment of this case is expressed in a passageof which Lustig makesmuch: "Whatevera man has in superabundance is owed, of naturalright, to the poor for their sustenance" (II-II 66.7, quoted at Lustig1991, 128). Shortly thereafter, however, in an equally crucial passagethat Lustig fails to mention, Aquinas writes: "But because there aremany suffering necessity and it is not possible to sustain them all fromthe same thing, the stewardship of his own goods is left to the judg-ment of each, so that from these [things] he may meet the need ofthose suffering it" (emphasis added).There are a couple of points I want to note about these passages.First, Aquinasdoes not say that all property"isowed, by natural right,to the poor for their sustenance" as Lustig claims in the remark Iquoted above. He says only that that "held in superabundance"is.Second, Aquinas'sremarks in the second passage suggest that here, asin his treatment of "urgentand evident necessity,"he thinks propertyheld in superabundanceis common in a very weak sense. It is com-mon only in that any individual having such property is obligated touse it to meet the needs of another. Aquinas does not say that prop-erty held in superabundance s common in the sense that it is ownedby society corporately,that it is owned by the poor corporately,or thatit is owned by some specifiable poor person or persons singly. Theweak sense of "commonproperty"to which Aquinas commits himselfis not, therefore, the sort of common property which is a prerequisitefor governmental redistribution.Aquinas does juxtapose the remark about property held in supera-bundance with a quote from Ambrose, which Lustig translates as:"The bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the clothingyou shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth isthe redemption and freedom of the penniless" (cited at Lustig 1991,128, emphasis added). His employment of this quote does not, how-ever, establish that Aquinasthought superabundantpropertycommonin a stronger sense than I have indicated. Rather, Aquinas's own re-marks about the morally required use of superabundant propertyshould be taken to express both his own view about the sense in whichsuch propertyis common and the sense he attaches to "belongs" n thepassage from Ambrose.4

4In fact the passageis better rendered"It is the hungry man'sbread that you with-hold" since Aquinas uses the possessive Esurientium panis rather than some Latinword meaning "belongs."My point is therefore that Aquinasinterpretsthe use of thepossessivecase in this passage.The exact provenanceof the passageis difficult to ascertain. Aquinas'stext at thispoint indicates that he knows the passage from the Decretum Gratiani where it is



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172 Journal of Religious Ethics

Even so, Aquinas'spicture of someone administeringhis superabun-dant goods to satisfy the needs of the poor is very suggestive. Perhapshis place could be taken by a government administrator. And perhapsAquinas's theory can be "recast" or "translated"without significantalteration so that it contains the stronger sense of "commonproperty"that government redistributionpresupposes.The problem with this suggestion is that the way in which Aquinassays that goods are to be used for the benefit of the poor by the judg-ment or discretion of the person possessing them in superabundanceis essential to his property theory. To replace the person in questionwith a government administratorand to make his goodssociety's prop-erty would not be to "translate"Aquinas'sview or to draw out "its adrent implications" (139). It would be to distort Aquinas's theoryprofoundly.Briefly put, Aquinas, following Aristotle, thinks that developmentand exercise of the virtues are among the reasons people live in polit-ical society. To structure political society so that significantopportuni-ties for virtuous activity are lost is therefore to put in place a politicalsociety that thwarts what Aquinaswould regardas one of its own fun-damental purposes. Now consider a government that forcibly confis-cates property through taxation backed by coercion and that effects"systematic redistribution" (145). Such government activity clearlyrestricts the scope of the personal judgment in the redistribution ofquotedandexplicitly attributed to Ambrose(Gratian[1140]1879c.l, d.47). Aquinasun-doubtedlyacceptedthe veracityof the Decretum'sattributionof the wordsto Ambrose'sSermon 81 on Luke 12:18. Unfortunately,I have been unable to locate a copy of thissermon. Volume 17 of Migne 1845, where one would naturally expect to find thehomily, seems not to contain it. A footnote to II-II 32 in the Blackfriar'sedition of theSumma Theologiae 1975,vol. 34) locates the sermon at Migne1845,17:613-14, ut sinceeditions of Mignediffer in both compositionand pagination,I have been unable to findit.Two problems account for the difficulty of locating the sermon. First, while thenumber81assignedthe sermonby the traditionalordoantiqua is widely accepted,othersystemsfor numberingAmbrose'ssermons seem also to be employed. Second,scholarsdisputewhetherthe sermon in questionis authenticallyAmbrose's. On this disputeandthe consequent omissions of Sermon 81 from some editions of Ambrose's collectedworks, see Gratian[1140]1879,171 n. 72.The passageAquinas quotes and attributesto Ambrose bears an extremely close re-semblance to a remarkin Basil'sHomily6 on the same scripturalpassage. Quite possi-bly AmbrosereadBasil'shomily in the Greek,translated it loosely without attribution,and incorporated t into his own sermon. At S.T. II-II 32.5 ad 2 Aquinas quotes therelevant passagefrom Basil in a Latin translationthat does not coincidewith Ambrose'sparaphrase. He does not indicate whether he is aware that Ambrose drew on Basil,though after quotingBasil he notes that "Ambrosesays this same thing"and alludes tothe passagein the Decretum. Basil's sermon can be found at Migne 1885,31:277-78.



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Natural Law, Property, and Redistribution 173one's own goods that Aquinas mentions in II-II 66.7. However, Aqui-nas thinks that by exercising this discretion or judgment, one developsand exercises a number of virtues to which he attaches great impor-tance. Governmentconfiscationand redistribution of propertyfor thebenefit of the poor thus thwarts one of the purposes Aquinas ascribesto political society.Does Aquinas regardthe exercise of judgment in the distribution ofone's own goods as an opportunityto develop and exercise the virtues?Aquinas's perfunctory allusion to this judgment in II-II 66.7 can onlybe interpreted properly if read in conjunction with II-II 71.1 and II-II32.5. In the former of these passages, Aquinas discusses mutual aid atsome length. In the latter, he also discusses mutual aid and analyzes"superfluity"or "superabundance,"a notion left unanalysed in II-II66.7. It is to these that we must turn to determine why exercise of andacting on the judgment mentioned in 66.7 should be consideredvirtuous.

In II-II32.5Aquinasexplicitly says that giving awaywhat one has insuperabundanceis an act of virtue. His subsequent discussion showswhy he thinks this is so. According to that discussion, determiningjust what one has in superabundance(and thus what one is requiredtogive away by 32.5and 66.7)requiresquite sophisticatedjudgment. Thebenefactor must determine what is necessary to sustain herself andwhat is needed by all those "whose care is incumbent upon her."As Aquinas hastens to add, determining what persons need is noeasy matter: benefactors need not give away all property above whatthey and their families need for bodily survival. It is morally permissi-ble, Aquinas says, to live "according to [one's] station." Propertyjudged necessary for this, even if not needed for bodily survival, neednot be given away, as Aquinas makes clear in II-II 32.6. Deciding towhom to give one's superfluous goods and how much one must give toeach of the recipients also requires sophisticated judgment. Generalconditions concerning to whom aid is owed are laid down in II-II 71.1and are explicitly appliedto material aid in the corpus of II-II 32.5andin the responses to objections 2, 3, and 4. Exercising the judgment towhich Aquinas alludes in II-II 66.7 therefore requires significant exer-cise of practicalwisdom.

Acting on the judgments of practicalwisdom also draws on and ex-ercises the virtues. Giving away one's superfluous goods is an act ofjustice, as the location of II-II 66 in Aquinas'sdiscussionof that virtueshows. Voluntarily giving away one's own goods requires that one notbe unduly attached to them and that one be appropriatelyaffected bythe plight of another. This act of justice thus presupposes acts of the



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174 Journal of Religious Ethicsvirtues of liberality and mercy, as Aquinas notes in II-II 117.5 ad 1and 3.

By setting a tax rate, the government restricts the citizen's opportu-nity to decide how much of her income is to be given to the poor. Byredistributing tax revenues, the government rather than the citizendetermines who is to receive goods the government deems held in su-perabundance.5A welfare state is therefore a state which restricts cit-izens1opportunitiesto exercise the virtues of practicalwisdom,justice,mercy, and liberality. The more effective the welfare state, the moresharply restricted are these opportunities. In a maximally effectivewelfare state with a sound health care system and a maximally atten-tive bureaucracy,there would per impossibile- be no opportunityatall to exercise these virtues by benefitting the poor because therewould be no poor. I am not, of course, arguing that Aquinas thinksthat there should be poor people just so that those with superfluousgoods have the opportunity to benefit them. To impute this claim toAquinas would be to require him to object to the limitless plenty ofthe state of innocence on the grounds that, had original sin not beencommitted, there would have been no poorto be benefitted.6 I assumethat Aquinas takes moderate scarcity of material goods (for this no-tion, see Rawls 1971, 127f.) to be a permanent feature of our fallencondition. The issue that divides Aquinas from the welfare state theo-rist is the mechanism by which scarce goods should be redistributedand poverty ameliorated.

5Aquinasdoes not envision a state of affairs in which there are no mechanismsforenforcingthe moralobligationto help the poor. Since he arguesthat givingawayone'ssuperfluousgoods is an act of justice, Aquinas presumablythinks that those who fail todo so sin seriouslyandperhaps mortally. Perhapshe thinks that fear of divine sanctionfor serious or mortal sin would strongly influence people to help the poor with theirsuperfluousgoods. Perhaps he thinks that citizens would regularly and forcefully bereminded by the church both of their obligationsand of the operationof divine sanc-tions. However, even the presence of such mechanisms leaves significantscope for de-velopment and exercise of the virtues. Divine sanctions backed up by ecclesiasticalexhortation andenforcementstill leave individualssome scopeforjudgmentin decidinghow much they hold in superfluityand a greatdeal of latitude in decidingwhich of thepoor to benefit. These opportunitiesare not present in a welfare state with a fixed taxrate used to fund entitlement programs. Thanks are due to Eleonore Stump for thisimportantpoint.6Aquinas, of course, did not think the fall inevitable. He, like Bonaventure andotherscholastics,wasquite interested in what would havehappenedhadoriginalsin notbeen committedand had innocentsmultipliedto fill the earth. The most famousof hisspeculationsoccurs at Summa TheologiaeI 96.4,where Aquinas argues that even in-nocents would have needed to be ruled by political authority.



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The welfare state theorist argues for "systematic [government] re-distribution"(145). Aquinas,because of the importancehe attaches tothe exercise of the virtues in political society, would argue instead fora political structure in which poverty is ameliorated by citizens per-forming works of mercy and justice. Such a state, he would argue, isnot only of benefit to the poor;it also benefits the benefactors by af-fording them the opportunity to exercise the virtues.This reading of Aquinas is not without precedent in recent socialethics. Peter Maurin,co-founder of the Catholic Worker movement,argues that what he calls "social reconstruction"should be effected byindividuals performing the works of mercy, rather than by govern-ment redistribution(Maurin 1934). Among the reasons he favors indi-vidual action to help the poor is that it gives the benefactors theopportunityto be good. It is in part because Maurin finds these ideasin Aquinas'ssocial thought that he finds Aquinas'swork so attractive(for Aquinas's influence on Maurin, see Ellis 1981,180 n. 30).I have argued,then, that accordingto Aquinas's theory of property,the poor are to be cared for by others' exercise of the virtues and per-formance of works of mercy. His is therefore a theory fundamentallyat odds with government redistributivism or welfarism. Claiming, asLustig does, that the "moral force" of Aquinas's property theory isbest expressed or "translated" nto programsof government redistri-bution seriously distorts his thought.

4It might be objected that by stressing the importance of discretionand individual judgment in the care of the needy, as he does at II-II66.7, Aquinas makes relief of the poor an act of supererogation. In-

deed, there are passages suggesting that Lustig believes an act is su-pererogatory if it is discretionary.7 Aquinas, the objection mightcontinue, is no libertarian and cannot have intended that poverty bealleviated only through the performance of supererogatoryacts. Myinterpretation, hinging as it does on the remarks about individualjudgment in II-II 66.7,must therefore be incorrect.7He contrastsjustice and "discretionary harity" early in his paper (119),and nearthe end of his paper he contrasts "the language of justice"with "ourusual notions ofdiscretion involved in dischargingthe duties of charity" (144). Belief in a necessary

connectionbetween discretion and supererogationtogether with concern to establishthat Aquinasholds care for the poor to be obligatorymay jointly explain why Lustigomits the crucialpassageaboutdiscretionary udgment from his own quotationof II-II66.7.



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176 Journal of Religious EthicsThe crucial premise in this objection is the claim that discretionaryacts, acts requiringthe exercise of judgment, are ipso facto supererog-atory. The fact that an act is discretionary,however, does not entailthat it is supererogatory,as a simple example makes clear. Though Iexercise discretionwhen I vote for one among a number of candidatesin a free election, it certainly does not follow from that fact that votingis supererogatory.8Similarly, Aquinas says, person A should exercisediscretion or judgment in deciding to which of the many needy shewill give her superfluous goods. It does not follow from that that A'sgiving her superfluous goods away is supererogatory. The premise on

which the objection rests is therefore mistaken.That premise seems plausible only if two ways in which an act canbe discretionaryare confused. An act is discretionaryin one sense justin case the act belongs to some species S such that the agent is underno obligationto perform any act that belongs to S. Acts falling underthe counsels of perfection are discretionary in this sense. An act isdiscretionaryin another sense just in case (1) it belongs to some spe-cies S' such that the agent is obligated to perform some act or otherbelonging to S' but (2) there is no particular act belonging to S' thatthe agent is obligated to perform since any of a number of acts cansatisfy the obligation. Acts discretionaryin the first sense are supere-rogatory;those discretionary in the second sense, of course, are not.Aquinas would say that giving away one's surplus goods is discretion-ary in the second sense rather than the first.It might also be objected that alms-givingis an act of charity and istherefore supererogatory. The use of surplus goods to aid the poor, asthis use is discussed in II-II 66.7, is a requirement of justice. My reli-ance on II-II 32, which treats of alms-giving, to illuminate II-II 66,which occurs in Aquinas's treatment of justice, might therefore bethought to blur the importantdistinction between requiredredistribu-tion and supererogatoryalms-giving.This objection, too, is mistaken. Aquinas clearly distinguishes re-quired from supererogatoryalms-giving at II-II 32.5. Immediately af-ter drawingthis distinction, he analyzes the notion of superfluity andthe conditionson mutual aid. These analyses, I have argued,illustratethe complexity of the judgment made by someone giving alms. Aqui-nas's discussionmakes it clear that he is talking here about those whoare giving alms to fulfill the moral requirement that they give awaytheir superfluous goods. As if to drive home the points that not all

8Voting may be supererogatory,but it is not the voter's exercise of informedjudg-ment in choosingamong candidates that makes it so. If it did, then people would beobligatedto cast their votes if and only if a single candidate were runningfor election.



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alms-givingis supererogatoryand that II-II 32.5 bears on II-II66.7,as Ihave claimed that it does, Aquinas refers at 32.5 ad 2 to the passagefrom Ambrose that he quotes at 66.7. Nothing in my interpretationimplies, therefore, that Aquinas thinks that using one's surplus tomeet the needs of the poor is supererogatory.It might, however, be objected that Aquinas's property theory, as Ihave interpreted it, is simply impractical. The political and economicstructures of the First World have created enormous inequalities ofincome and wealth, and millions around the planet live in dire want.It is illusory and foolish, it might be argued, to suppose that povertycan be eliminated or significantly amelioratedby individualsperform-ing the corporalworks of mercy, even if most of those with superflu-ous goods were inclined to perform them, which they conspicuouslyare not. The only way to alleviate poverty, it might be concluded,is toprovide "specificwelfare guarantees"(144) through "systematicredis-tribution"(145). It might seem a virtue of Lustig's interpretationthat,rather than marginalizingAquinas's work, he has shown its contem-poraryrelevance by locating the work in a tradition that expresses its"moral force" by so "translating" t that it legitimates just such gov-ernment redistribution.

The claims that, given current economic and political conditions,poverty can only be alleviated through massive redistribution of in-come and wealth and that poverty will not be significantly reducedbyindividual performance of the works of mercy are quite plausible. Itdoes not follow, however, that we can or should "recast"or "translate"Aquinas'sproperty theory to legitimate government redistribution.The fact that Aquinas'sdiscussion of justice cannot be pressed intoservice to legitimate government redistribution does not imply its ir-relevance to "the stratified interdependence of modern economic life"(144). Aquinas'spolitical thought, which accordsa central place to thedevelopment and exercise of the virtues in social life, furnishes theintellectual resources for thoroughgoing social criticism of moderneconomic and political structures. Aquinas could surely criticize theseor any structures for leaving so many in want, a criticism in whichLustig would presumablyjoin him.Aquinas also has grounds for further criticism:these structures aresuch that the preferred solution to poverty cannot work. Aquinaswould argue that political society ought to allow ample scope for thedevelopment and exercise of the virtues, that it should be structuredin such a way that virtuous activity is for the most part effective, thatit should not generate massive inequalities of income and wealth, thatit should not leave millions in dire poverty, and that what povertythere is should be susceptibleto alleviation by the just activity of those



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178 Journal of Religious Ethicswith surplus goods. If contemporary social and political structuresdepart from these norms, then they are to be criticized for theirdepartures.These may not be all of the norms that Aquinas would impose onpolitical society. Defending these norms and enumerating otherswould require appealing to a great deal of his political and moralthought. Surveying all the grounds for Aquinas's claim that politicallife should permit exercise of the virtues would, for example, requireexplicating his notoriously elusive discussions of the commongood, itscentrality to a good citizen's structure of motives, and the perfection oflegal justice by charity. Substantiating the claim that he thinks ine-qualities of wealth should be restricted even in agricultural societieswould require exegesis of his treatment of the Mosaic law.9 I cannot,of course, undertake this exegetical work here. My point is merelythat Aquinas'swork provides ample resources for developing a modelof social life that is very different from "moderneconomic life" and,therefore, for illuminating the shortcomings of the latter. Far frombeing irrelevant to modern economic life, Aquinas's political thoughtpermits construction of an ideal that can be critically and instructivelycompared with structures that generate the very conditions govern-ment redistribution seeks to improve.A number of distinguished disciples of Aquinas,from activists Doro-thy Day and Peter Maurin to philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre,10haveeschewed constructivepolitical theory addressedto the modern world.Instead they have employed Aquinas's moral and political thought asthe foundationfor their social criticism. Their efforts have proven ex-traordinarily fruitful for the theory and practice of religious ethics.The possibilityof readingand employing Aquinas in this way is unfor-tunately obscured if his views are employed even via Locke to le-gitimate contemporarywelfarism.

9That Aquinasthinks massive and persistent inequalities improperis suggestedbyhis approvalof Old Testament laws requiringthe communityof Israel to return prop-erty to its originalowners every fifty years;cf. I-II 105.2. I cannot interpretAquinas'sargumentshere, but see Kries 1990.10For a concisestatementof Maclntyre'spositionas critic of "thepolitical,economicandmoralstructures of advancedmodernity,"rather than as a communitarianpoliticaltheorist, see Maclntyre1991.



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REFERENCESAquinas, Thomas1873 In Libros Politicorum. 1269-72. Vol. 21. Parma: Fiaccadori.1961 Summa Theologiae. 1256-72. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cris-tianos.1975 Summa Theologiae. 1256-72. Vol. 34. Translated by R. J. Batten,O.P. New York and London: Blackfriars in conjunction with Mc-Graw-Hill Book Company.Ellis, Marc H.1981 Peter Maurin: Prophet in the Twentieth Century. New York:

Paulist Press.Gratian1879 Decretum. 1140. Vol. 1 of Corpus Juris Canonid. Editio Lipsien-sis Secunda post Ae.L. Richteri curas recognovit et adnotationecriticainstruxit Aemilius Friedberg, Lipsiae.Kries, Douglas1990 "Aquinas and the Politics of Moses." Review of Politics 52:84-104.Leo XIII1879 Aeterni Patris. Reprinted in Summa Theologiae. Translated by

the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Ben-ziger Brothers, 1947.Lustig, B. Andrew1991 "Natural Law, Property, and Justice: The General Justificationof Property in John Locke." Journal of Religious Ethics 19.1

(Spring): 119-48.Maclntyre, Alasdair1991 Untitled commentary. The Responsive Community 1.1: 91.Maurin, Peter1934 "Christ the King Alone Can Reconstruct the World: The Practice

of the Seven Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy Is the Basisof Christian Society." Catholic Worker 2 (October): 1, 6.Migne, J.-P.1845 Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus. Paris.1885 Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus. Paris.Mouw, Richard1991 "John Locke's Christian Individualism." Faith and Philosophy8:448-60.National Conference of Catholic Bishops1986 Economic Justice for All. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Catholic Con-ference.Rawls, John1971 A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress.



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180 Journal of Religious EthicsSkinner, Quentin1978 Foundations of Modern Political Thought Cambridge:Cam-bridge University Press.

weithman natural law property and redistribution

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