what makes a successful entrepreneur? the effect of elite...
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What Makes a Successful Entrepreneur? The Effect ofElite College and Intergenerational Transfer
Naijia Guo 1 Charles Ka Yui Leung 2
1Chinese University of Hong Kong
2City University of Hong Kong
National Graduate Institute for Policy StudiesMay 16, 2018
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Section 1
Intro
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Motivation
This paper attempts to shed light on two important debates in economics
Debate on the “elite college premium” (ECP)I Students who attended more selective colleges earned about the same
after controlling for selection (Dale and Krueger 2002, 2014)I Black and Smith (2006) show that the estimates of the effects of
school quality are attenuated when a single measure is used
Debate on the “entrepreneurship premium” (EP)I Many individuals enter entrepreneurship and persist in running business
despite it has low median returns but very high risk (Hamilton 2000,Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002, Hall and Woodward 2010,Kartashova 2014)
Two debates help to understand social mobility and economicinequality.
We link the two debates by studying the effect of elite college onentrepreneur decision and performance.
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Summary Statistics by Career
All Employee Entrepreneur Unincorporated Incorporated
Age 35.90 35.41 38.10 37.44 39.59Years of schooling 14.34 14.28 14.57 14.32 15.12College degree 39.67% 38.66% 44.24% 38.44% 57.23%
Income(median) 51,645 51,343 54,010 48,093 72,996Income(mean) 63,288 60,314 76,689 58,542 117,360Income(std) 67,632 56,618 102,585 64,426 149,760
Observations 22,563 18,465 4,098 2,833 1,265Proportion 100% 81.8% 18.2% 12.6% 5.6%
Data source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Sample is restricted to white male aged 25-60.
Entrepreneurs are defined as those who own a business.
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Motivation
There exists significant differences in social economic status betweenworkers and entrepreneurs
These differences are mainly driven by incorporated business owners,while unincorporated business owners are very similar to workers(Levin and Rubinstein, 2017)
Self-employment has been shown to be not a good proxy forentrepreneurship; Many self-employed people are small businessowners; they are not growth-creating investors (Glaeser, 2007, Evansand Leighton, 1989)
Important to distinguish these two types of entrepreneurs; we define“successful” entrepreneurs as those who own an incorporated business
Research question: what makes people a successful entrepreneur?
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Intergenerational Tranfer
Correlation between father’s and son’s careerEmployee Unincorporated Incorporated
Employee 49.5% 42.1% 40.9%Unincorporated 28.4% 33.2% 24.9%Incorporated 22.1% 24.7% 34.2%
Correlation between father’s and son’s educationHigh school Non-elite college Elite college
High school 80.1% 47.9% 29.6%Non-elite college 16.3% 39.8% 38.8%Elite college 3.6% 12.3% 31.6%
Father’s status is in column and son’s status is in row. Data source:Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Following Black and Smith (2006), we construct a university rankingbased on factor analysis of five variables: faculty student ratio, rejectionrate, retention rate, faculty salary and mean of reading and math SATscore. The top 100 private universities are defined as elite college.
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Effect of Education on Career Choice
Education High school Non-elite college Elite college
Probability of owning unincorporated business25-34 10.8% 9.1% 6.5%35-44 15.5% 15.6% 18.3%45-54 14.4% 13.4% 19.1%average (25-54) 12.7% 11.9% 12.9%Probability of owning incorporated business25-34 3.1% 4.4% 4.5%35-44 4.4% 9.7% 13.1%45-54 6.0% 11.9% 17.5%average (25-54) 3.9% 7.4% 9.9%
Data source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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Effect of Education on Income
Education High school Non-elite college Elite college
Income of unincorporated business owners25-34 45,051 62,667 55,81035-44 47,894 79,527 104,56645-54 46,751 90,441 116,664average (25-54) 46,398 74,804 96,212Income of incorporated business owners25-34 67,035 94,467 107,22935-44 93,037 163,092 232,41445-54 110,003 111,520 173,325average (25-54) 85,020 129,013 186,506
Data source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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Motivation
Intergenerational relationship in career choice and educationI If the father owns an incorporated business, the son has a higher
chance of also owning an incorporated business; same forunincorporated business.
I If the father goes to elite college, the son is more likely to go to elitecollege; same for non-elite college.
Impact of education attainment on career choiceI Graduating from an elite college is associated with higher probability of
owning an incorporated business and better performance ofincorporated business.
I Elite-college graduates have a higher human capital endowment or alarger monetary transfer from their family – require a model to identifythe effect of elite-college education
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Research Question
Study two factors that are important in the decision to embark upon,and success in entrepreneurship (own an incorporated business):
I family background: if parents are successful entrepreneurs, theirchildren are likely to get higher family transfer in terms of both abilityand money
I education: college education, in particular elite-college education, alsoplays an important role in affecting the career choice by improvinghuman capital and providing networks.
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Literature Review
Wage effect of college qualityI Elite-college premium: Behrman et al. (1996), Brewer et al. (1999),
Hoxby (2001), Black and Smith (2006)I Not enough wage premium: Dale and Krueger (2002, 2014)
Determinants of entrepreneurshipI Parental entrepreneurship: Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), Nicolaou and
Shane (2010), Lindquist et al. (2015), Hvide and Oyer (2018)I Borrowing constraint: Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Cagetti and De
Nardi (2009), Bassetto et al. (2015), Corradin and Popov (2015),Bracke et al (2018)
I Schooling: Van der Sluis et al. (2008), Parker and Van Praag (2006),Samaniego and Sun (2016)
I Entrepreneur premium puzzle: Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009),Astebro et al. (2014), Dillon and Stanton (2017)
Intergenerational linkageI Causal mechanisms on the correlation between parental background
and children outcomes such as education and income: Black andDevereux (2010)
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Contribution
Our project develops a life-cycle model that incorporates family factor(intergenerational transfer in ability and money), education impact,and borrowing constraints in entrepreneurial decisions
We distinguish two types of entrepreneurs: unincorporated vs.incorporated
We propose that attending an elite college may be an importantfactor that leads to successful entrepreneurship
Understand the two puzzlesI Elite-college premium puzzle: introduce the effect of elite college on
entrepreneurshipI Entrepreneur puzzle: introduce the difference between unincorporated
business and incorporated business
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Methodology
An overlapping generations modelI Individuals self-select into different education paths: high school,
non-elite college, elite collegeI Individuals also make career decisions: employee, unincorporated
business, incorporated businessI Borrowing constraint applies when going to college and running
businessI Two types of intergenerational transfer: ability transfer and monetary
transfer
Data: Panel Study of Income DynamicsI A longitudinal survey that captures intergenerational mobility on
education attainment, career choice, and earnings
Counterfactual analysisI Shut down elite college and IGTI Relax borrowing constraints for college students and entrepreneursI Subsidies to incorporated and elite college students
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Preview of Results
Elite college increases entrepreneur’s human capital and leads to moresuccessful entrepreneurs and higher entrepreneurial income.
Intergenerational transfer slightly reduces the numbers of elite collegestudents and successful entrepreneurs.
Relaxing the borrowing constraint for entrepreneurs has a substantialeffect on the number of incorporated business owners and theirincome, while removing the borrowing constraint for elite collegestudents has a smaller effect.
Providing subsidy (universal or need-base) to elite college studentscan also increase the number of incorporated business owners.
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Section 2
Model
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Environment: Overlapping Generations Model
A model period is 5 years, each individual lives for at least 65 yearsand at most 100 years
For the first 20 years, an individual is part of the parent’s householdand does not make any economic decisions
At age 20, a young individual moves out of his parent’s house andforms his own household. At the same time, he makes educationdecisions: high school, non-elite college, and elite college, which aredenoted by e ∈ hs, nc , ecAt age 30, he has a child.
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Environment: Overlapping Generations Model
All working age households make career choices: employee, owning aunincorporated business, or owning an incorporated business, whichare denoted by d ∈ em, ub, ib;
I All agents decide how much to consume (c) and save (k).I An entrepreneur chooses the investment level (i).I Workers must retire at 65, but entrepreneurs can work after 65.
Individuals are partially altruistic towards their offspring: weight ofchild’s utility ω ∈ [0, 1]
I At the moment a child leaves home, the parent can give him aone-time gift of liquid assets (R), which helps the child pay foreducation costs or finance the business.
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Human Capital
Each person is born with two types of ability (A = Aw ,Ar),employee ability (Aw ) and entrepreneur ability (Ar ).
Abilities follow a log normal distribution and is imperfectly inheritedfrom parent according to an AR(1) process
logAc = θ logAp + ψ, ψ ∼ N(0,Ω2)
where Ac is child’s ability and Ap is parent’s ability.
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Human Capital
College helps to build up human capital
Employee human capital hw :
log hw = logAw + µwe + γ1x + γ2x2
Entrepreneur human capital, hr :
log hr = logAr + µre
where µwe and µre are the gain in employee and entrepreneur humancapital through college education. x is potential experience, γ’scapture return to potential experience.
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Technology
Two sectors of production: one populated by entrepreneurs and oneby non-entrepreneurial firms
Non-entrepreneurial sector production function:
Fw (K , L) = PwKαL1−α
where K and L are the total capital and labor inputs in thenon-entrepreneurial sector.
Entrepreneurial sector production function:
Fr (I ) = AI ν
v ∈ [0, 1], diminishing returns from investment.
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Technology
Employees’ earnings are defined as
Iw = whweεw
εw ∼ N(0, σ2w )
where εw is an idiosyncratic wage shock unobserved by individualsbefore they make career choice.
Unincorporated business
In = Pnhreεn iv
where i is investment and Pn is the technology of unincorporatedbusiness.εn ∈ N(0, σn), investment shock unobserved by individuals beforethey make career choice..
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Technology
Incorporated-business:
Ii = Pihieεi iv − CI1X 6= ib
I Use both employee human capital and entrepreneur human capital
hi = erAwhr
Incorporated business owners engage in activities demanding a highdegree of nonroutine cognitive skills (LR2017).
I CI is a fixed cost of opening an incorporated business.There are direct costs of incorporation, such as annual fees and thepreparation of more elaborate financial statements, and indirect agencycosts associated with the separation of ownership and control(LR2017).
I When employee ability and savings are above a certain cutoff,incorporated business becomes more attractive than unincorporated.
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Leverage
Entrepreneurs can borrow up to a proportion λ of their assets k(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997):
(i − k) ≤ λk
Maximum a student is allowed to borrow to get into college is givenby
Te − Fe − k ≤ λk
where Te is college tuition and Fe is financial aid, which is a functionof education type, family asset and ability (both need base and meritbase)
Fe = fe(kp,Aw )
If an individual already carries loans at the beginning of this period(student loan or entrepreneur loan), he is not allowed to borrow againbefore paying back all his loans.
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Preference
The individual utility function is given by
u(c , d) =c1−σ − 1
1− σ+ bub1d = ub+ bib1d = ib
+ bnc1d = nc+ bec1d = ec
bd ∼ N(0, σ2d), d ∈ ub, ib, nc , ec are shocks on the consumptionvalue of entrepreneurship and college, respectively.
A household’s lifetime utility, U, is given by
U =T∑t=1
βt−1ζ(t)u(t) + β6ωUc
Discount rate is β and survival rate is ζ(t). Child’s utility is Uc withweight ω.
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Retirement Stage: Employee
Retired employee (after age 65)
Wem(Ω) = maxc,k ′
u(c , em) + βζ(t)EV (Ω′)
s.t. c + k ′ = k(1 + r) + p(e)
c > 0, k ′ ≥ 0
where p(e) is the pension received by retired employees, which is assumedto be φ fraction of the average employee earnings before retirement
Ω = t, e,Aw ,Ar , k ,X , bub, bib,Ω′ = t + 1, e,Aw ,Ar , k′, em, b′ub, b
′ib
The expectation of V () is with respect to b′ub and b′ib.
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Working Stage: Employee, No Transfer
Working Employee
Wem(Ω, εw ) = maxc,k ′
u(c , em) + βEV (Ω′)
s.t. c + k ′ = k(1 + r) + Pwhweεw , c > 0
where Ω′ = t + 1, e,Aw ,Ar , k′, em, b′ub, b
′ib
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Working and Retirement Stage: Unincorporated, NoTransfer
Unincorporated business owner
Wub(Ω, εn) = maxc,k ′,i
u(c, ub) + βζ(t)EV (Ω′)
s.t. c + k ′ = (1− δ)i + Pnhreεn iv − (1 + r)(i − k)
c > 0, (i − k) ≤ λk
where Ω′ = t + 1, e,Aw ,Ar , k′, ub, b′ub, b
′ib.
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Working and Retirement Stage: Incorporated, No Transfer
Incorporated business owner
Wib(Ω, εn) = maxc,k ′,i
u(c , ib) + βζ(t)EV (Ω′)
s.t. c + k ′ = (1− δ)i + Pihieεi iv − CI1X 6= ib − (1 + r)(i − k)
c > 0, (i − k) ≤ λk
where Ω′ = t + 1, e,Aw ,Ar , k′, ib, bub, bib.
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Working and Retirement Stage: Career Choice
Agents are allowed to freely change their career paths at the beginning ofeach period, but they do not observe productivity shocks ε’s.
V (Ω) = maxEWem(Ω, εw ),EWub(Ω, εn),EWib(Ω, εi )
The expectations are over ε’s.Once agents reach retirement age, they are only allowed to choose theircareer paths if they were entrepreneurs in the last period, otherwise, theyhave to retire
V (Ω) =
maxWem(Ω),EWub(Ω, εn),EWib(Ω, εi ) if X = ub, ib
Wem(Ω) if X = em
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Working Stage: Employee, with Transfer
At age 50, parents are allowed to give a one-time transfer R to theiroffsprings
Value function of “employee-parent” at age 50 becomes
Wem(Ω, εw ) = maxc,k ′,R
u(c , em) + βEV (Ω′) + ωEJ(Φ|Aw ,Ar )
s.t. c + k ′ + R = k(1 + r) + Pwhweεw , c > 0
where J (.) is the value function of the child.Φ = Aw , Ar ,R, k
′, ηc , ηe. The expectation is over child’s ability Aw
and Ar , and shocks on consumption value of college ηc and ηe .Child’s abilities are correlated with parent’s abilities, but not observedby parents by the time of transfer.
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Working Stage: Entrepreneur, with Transfer
“Unincorporated-entrepreneur-parent” at age 50
Wub(Ω, εn) = maxc,R
u(c , ub) + βV (Ω′) + ωEJ(Φ|Aw ,Ar )
s.t. c + k ′ + R = (1− δ)i + Pnhreεn iv − (1 + r)(i − k)
c > 0, (i − k) ≤ λk
“Incorporated-entrepreneur-parent” at age 50
Wib(Ω, εi ) = maxc,R
u(c , ib) + βV (Ω′) + ωEJ(Φ|Aw ,Ar )
s.t. c + k ′ + R = (1− δ)i + Pihieεi iv − CI1X 6= ib − (1 + r)(i − k)
c > 0, (i − k) ≤ λk
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Schooling Stage
At age 20, a young agent makes schooling decisions.
Value function of the offspring is given by
J(Φ) = maxHhs(Φ),Hnc(Φ),Hec(Φ)
Value of high school
Hhs(Φ) = EV (0, hs,Aw ,Ar , k , em, bub, bib)
where expectation is over bub and bib.
Value function of attending college is
He(Φ) = maxc
u(c, e) + βEV (Ω′)
s.t. c + k ′ = (1 + r)(R − Te + fe(kp,Aw )), c > 0
Te − fe(kp,Aw )− R ≤ λR for e = nc , ec
where Ω′ = 1, e,Aw ,Ar , k′, em, b′ub, b
′ib.
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Equilibrium
Market clearing conditions
Labor market clears: total labor supply (in efficient labor units) fromworkers equals the labor demand from the nonentrepreneurial sector.
L =
∫j∈Sw
hweεwdj
Capital market clears: total capital from all agent’s savings equalscapital demand from both entrepreneurial and nonentrepreneurialsector. ∫
j∈Sw
kdj =
∫j∈Se
bdj + K
where j is the index of household, Sw and Se are the sets ofhouseholds who choose to be workers/entrepreneurs. b = i − kdenotes the amount of borrowing from entrepreneurs.
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Section 3
Data
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Data
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)I A longitudinal project began in 1968 with a nationally representative
sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families in the UnitedStates
I Keep track of these individuals and their descendants, even after theyform new families
I Restricted access data on school identifiersF Can be linked to the Integrated Post-secondary Education Data System
(IPEDS), which provides rich information on the quality of college thatthe respondent attended
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)I A longitudinal project began in 1997 that follows around 9,000
American youth born between 1980-84I Initial distribution of child’s ability (ASVAB score), own wealth, and
family wealth
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Data
Elite college definition
Use factor analysis to construct a college quality index (Black andSmith, 2006)
Index = 0.096 ∗ faculty-student ratio + 0.137 ∗ rejection rate + 0.257 ∗retention rate + 0.245 ∗ faculty salary (in millions) + 0.385 ∗mean of reading and math SAT (in 100s)
Private colleges and universities ranked in the top 100 are defined aselite college
sharefaculty-student
ratio
rejectionrate
retentionrate
facultysalary
SATscore
in-statetuition
out-of-state
tuition
elite college 16.5% 0.13 0.66 0.94 92,859 1,356 29,068 30,893non-elite college 83.5% 0.07 0.32 0.74 59,928 1,035 14,115 17,104
College Characteristics of Elite and Non-elite Colleges
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Section 4
Identification and Estimation
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Fixed Parameters
Parameter Meaning Calibration
β discount rate 0.821ζt survival rate after age 65 Health and Retirement Studyσ utility function parameter 1.5 (CDN2006)φ Pension 40% of average earnings (CDN2006)λ budget constraint 1.22 (RR2014)Te college tuition (Fu2014)
fe(kp,Aw ) college financial aid (Fu2014)
CDN2006: Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)RR2014: Robb and Robinson (2014)Fu2014: Fu (2014)
Fixed Parameters
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Calibration of Leverage Ratio
Robb and Robinson (2014): Kauffman Firm Survey, 5000 firms
(owner equity + insider equity + outsider equity)/(total capital)≈ 45% ⇒ λ = 1.22
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Calibration of College Tuition and Financial Aid
Tuition:I Elite college: 33,046I Non-elite college: 12,761
Financial aid:I Non-elite college: 13901− 32.5 ∗ family wealth/1000− 7432 ∗
employee ability below first tertile + 6875 ∗employee ability above second tertile
I Elite college: 20224− 32.5 ∗ family wealth/1000− 22267 ∗employee ability below first tertile + 12950 ∗employee ability above second tertile
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Identification
How to identify the effect of elite college on human capital?
Using panel data, we can identify worker human capital for elitecollege graduates (hwec) and that for non-elite college graduates (hwnc)
Then we can identify the human capital gains through elite andnon-elite college using the following equations
E (Aw |Aw > A∗w ) + µwec = E (hwec)
E (Aw |Aw ≤ A∗w ) + µwnc = E (hwnc)
1− F (A∗w ) = Pr(e = ec)
Hec(A∗w ) = Hnc(A∗w )
Four equations and four unknowns: µwec , µwnc , σe ,A
∗w .
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Estimation
Simulated Methods of MomentsI Education choiceI Career choice by education and ageI Average income by education, career, and ageI Variance of income by careerI Correlation between income in period t and t + 1 by careerI Transitions between career typesI Intergenerational mobility in education and career
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Section 5
Estimation Results
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Parameter Estimates
Employee Entrepreneur
Technology 1645 5.45/5.85 (UB/IB)Return to non-elite college 0.47 0.35Return to elite college 0.47 0.37Return to potential experience 0.32 -Return to experience square -0.032 -Std of productivity shock 0.45 0.32/0.53 (UB/IB)Fixed cost - -/80000 (UB/IB)Std of ability 0.65 0.45Intergenerational ability transfer 0.8 0.3Std of consumption shock - 0.0012/0.0007 (UB/IB)
Correlation between EM and EN ability 0Contribution of EM ability to IB human capital 0.2Std of consumption shock on college 0.0027/0.0014 (NC/EC)Weight on offspring’s welfare 0.057Output elasticity of capital 0.27
Parameter estimates
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Elite-college Premium Puzzle
There is no ability requirement imposed by elite college, but highability students self-select into elite college.
EM ability EM UB IB Total
HS 0.004 -0.348 0.064 -0.039NC 0.096 -0.120 0.199 0.076EC 0.302 0.041 0.353 0.270
EN ability EM UB IB Total
HS -0.124 0.505 0.675 -0.003NC -0.111 0.325 0.459 -0.024EC -0.035 0.324 0.454 0.065
Average ability by education and career
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Elite-college Premium Puzzle
Although elite college does not improve employee ability more thannon-elite college does, but it has a bigger impact on entrepreneurability (0.35 vs. 0.37)
However, since elite college charges higher tuition (33,046 vs.12,761), only those receive high consumption shocks on elite collegechoose to enroll
Elite college premium (= DPV of elite college student income - DPVof non-elite college student income) is -24,021.
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Entrepreneur Premium Puzzle
Our model incorporates several mechanisms that may explainentrepreneur premium puzzle
I Open a business is risky – people do not observe investment shocksbefore they make their career choice decisions
I Dynamic life-cycle decisions – with options of entry and exitentrepreneurship
I Option of staying in business after retirement ageI Allow for two types of businesses: the incorporated earn more than
salaried workers, the unincorporated earn less, and there are moreunincorporated than incorporated individuals
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Entrepreneur Premium
Entrepreneur premium – income equivalence
Career Premium
Entrepreneur 27,305Unincorporated 19,229Incorporated 42,946
Entrepreneur premium = DPV of entrepreneur income - DPV ofworker income
Consistent with Daly (2015), but control for selection in unobservables
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Incorporated VS. Unincorporated
IB has higher productivity than UB, but also more risky.
Cost of opening an incorporated business is 80,000.
Those with high employee ability and entrepreneur ability sort into IB;those with high entrepreneur ability and low employee ability sort intoUB.
Model’s predictions:I IB entrepreneurs tend to be successful salaried workers before becoming
IB. UB entrepreneurs tend to earn less as salaried workers thancomparable salaried workers that never become self-employed.
I UB rarerly incorporate and IB rarely become unincorporated.
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Model Fit0
.2.4
.6
high school non-elite college elite college
Education Choice
data model
0.2
.4.6
.81
HS data HS model NC data NC model EC data EC model
Career Choice by Education
employee unincorporatedincorporated
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Model Fit
05%
10%
15%
20%
25 30 35 40 45 50 55age
unincorporated data unincorporated modelincorporated data incorporated model
Career Choice by Age
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Model Fit
050
000
1000
0015
0000
2000
00
high school non-elite college elite college
Income by Education and Career
employee data employee modelunincorporated data unincorporated modelincorporated data incorporated model
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Model Fit
050
000
1000
0015
0000
25 30 35 40 45 50 55age
employee data employee modelunincorporated data unincorporated modelincorporated data incorporated model
Income by Career and Age
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Model Fit
Career Transition from Year t to t + 5
Data EM UB IB
EM 87.0% 38.7% 34.3%UB 9.8% 52.0% 12.7%IB 3.3% 9.3% 53.0%
Model EM UB IB
EM 90.2% 31.5% 21.8%UB 7.5% 49.1% 36.3%IB 2.3% 19.4% 41.9%
Period t in columns and period t + 5 in rows.EM: employee; UB: unincorporated business owner; IB:incorporated business owner.
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Model Fit
Intergenerational Mobility
Education choiceData HS NC EC Model HS NC EC
HS 80.1% 47.9% 29.6% HS 81.3% 60.1% 50.9%NC 16.3% 39.8% 38.8% NC 14.6% 31.5% 35.2%EC 3.6% 12.3% 31.6% EC 4.1% 8.4% 13.9%
Career choiceData EM UB IB Model EM UB IB
EM 49.5% 42.1% 41.0% EM 45.7% 31.6% 25.8%UB 28.4% 33.2% 24.9% UB 30.4% 35.1% 28.9%IB 22.1% 24.7% 34.2% IB 23.9% 33.3% 45.4%
Fathers in columns and sons in rows.HS: high school; NC: non-elite college; EC: elite college. EM:employee; UB: unincorporated business owner; IB: incorporatedbusiness owner.
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Section 6
Counterfactual Experiment
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Counterfactual Experiment
Effect of elite college and intergenerational transfer
Shut down the option of going to elite college
Shut down intergenerational transfer (IGT) in money and ability
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Effect of Elite College and IGT
Effect on education and career choices
Baseline No elite college No IGT
Education choice% of college 35.36% 30.72% 36.26%
change -4.64% 0.90%% of elite college 5.62% 0.00% 6.02%
change -5.62% 0.40%Career choice% of entrepreneur 18.32% 17.99% 18.43%
change -0.33% 0.11%% of incorporated 5.47% 5.30% 5.51%
change -0.17% 0.04%GiniIncome Gini 0.5584 0.5555 0.5576
change -0.0029 -0.0008
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Effect of Elite College and IGT
Effect on entrepreneurial performance
Baseline No elite college No IGT
Income by careerUnincorporated 59,389 56,588 59,964
change -2,801 -575Incorporated 118,269 112,309 118,668
change -5,960 -399% of incorporated by age25-34 1.74% 1.82% 1.76%
change 0.08% 0.02%35-44 4.61% 4.40% 4.59%
change -0.21% -0.02%45-54 7.55% 7.21% 7.57%
change -0.34% 0.02%% incorporated staying incorporated in the next period25-54 41.94% 41.77% 41.81%
change -0.17% -0.13%
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Counterfactual Experiment
Effect of borrowing constraints
Relex the borrowing constraint for entrepreneurs (λ = 1.5)
Remove the borrowing constraint for college entrance
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Counterfactual – Borrowing Constraints
Effect on education and career
BaselineRelax borrowing
constraint forentrepreneurs
Remove borrowingconstraint for
college students
Education choice% of college 35.36% 36.64% 36.80%
change 1.28% 1.44%% of elite college 5.62% 6.08% 5.78%
change 0.46% 0.16%Career choice% of entrepreneur 18.32% 19.71% 18.44%
change 1.39% 0.12%% of incorporated 5.47% 6.02% 5.55%
change 1.63% 0.08%GiniIncome Gini 0.5584 0.5590 0.5565
change 0.0006 -0.0019
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Counterfactual – Borrowing Constraints
Effect on entrepreneur performance
BaselineRelax borrowing
constraint forentrepreneurs
Remove borrowingconstraint for
college students
Income by careerUnincorporated 59,389 65,335 59,931
change 5,946 541Incorporated 118,269 127,980 119,196
change 9,710 926% of incorporated by age25-34 1.74% 1.97% 1.74%
change 0.23% 0.00%35-44 4.61% 5.13% 4.66%
change 0.52% 0.05%45-54 7.55% 8.23% 7.71%
change 0.68% 0.16%% of incorporated staying incorporated in the next period25-54 41.94% 42.07% 41.89%
change 0.13% -0.05%
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Elite College Enrollment
Any high-ability-low-wealth (HALW) students who do not go to elitecollege?
Borrowing constraint for entering college
Consumption smoothing
Wealth accumulation and entrepreneurship incentive. The borrowingconstraint will prevent people from starting a business if their asset isnegative or too low
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Counterfactual Experiment
Policy experiments
Provide $10,000 subsidy to incorporated entrepreneurs
Provide universal $20,000 subsidy to elite college students
Provide need-base $20,000 subsidy to elite college students fromfamilies with wealth below median
Government budget balance: use labor income tax to finance the subsidy.
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Counterfactual – Subsidies
Effect on education and career
BaselineSubsidy to
incorporatedSubsidy to
elite collegeSubsidy to poor
elite college
Education choice% of college 35.36% 35.52% 38.46% 36.62%
change 0.16% 3.10% 1.26%% of elite college 5.62% 5.66% 10.48% 8.00%
change 0.04% 4.86% 2.38%Career choice% of entrepreneur 18.32% 18.44% 18.48% 18.37%
change 0.12% 0.16% 0.05%% of incorporated 5.47% 5.55% 5.54% 5.50%
change 0.08% 0.07% 0.03%GiniIncome Gini 0.5584 0.5587 0.5578 0.5584
change 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0000
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Counterfactual – Subsidies
Effect on entrepreneur performance
BaselineSubsidy to
incorporatedSubsidy to
elite collegeSubsidy to poor
elite college
Income by careerUnincorporated 59,389 59,992 60,112 59,019
change 603 723 -370Incorporated 118,269 112,772 116,987 117,414
change -5498 -1282 -856% of incorporated by age25-34 1.74% 2.00% 1.81% 1.83%
change 0.26% 0.07% 0.09%35-44 4.61% 5.12% 4.58% 4.53%
change 0.51% -0.03% -0.08%45-54 7.55% 8.19% 7.68% 7.58%
change 0.64% 0.13% 0.03%% of incorporated staying incorporated in the next period25-54 41.94% 43.63% 40.80% 41.54%
change 1.69% -1.14% -0.40%
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Effect on Social Welfare by Ability and Wealth
01,
000
2,00
03,
000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Welfare Change by Worker Ability
subsidy to incorporated subsidy to elite-collegesubsidy to poor elite-college
01,
000
2,00
03,
000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Welfare Change by Entrepreneur Ability
subsidy to incorporated subsidy to elite-collegesubsidy to poor elite-college
02,
000
4,00
06,
000
0-10 20-40 50-90 100-190 200-290
Welfare Change by Own Wealth (in thousands)
subsidy to incorporated subsidy to elite-collegesubsidy to poor elite-college
01,
000
2,00
03,
000
0-10 20-40 50-90 100-190 200-290 300-390 400-490 500-600
Welfare Change by Family Wealth (in thousands)
subsidy to incorporated subsidy to elite-collegesubsidy to poor elite-college
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Conclusion
Analyze the determinants of entrepreneurial selection andperformance
I Elite college educationI Parental ability and monetary transfer
Shed lights on two puzzlesI Elite college premiumI Entrepreneurship premium
CounterfactualsI EN borrowing constraint has a big impact on the EN decision and
performance, while CO borrowing constraint has a smaller impact.I Providing subsidy to IB increases the number of IB but reduces their
average income. Providing universal subsidy or need-base subsidy toEC can also increase IB.
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