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Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Anne Morrison Piehl Rutgers University and NBER

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Page 1: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation

Kristin F. ButcherFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Anne Morrison PiehlRutgers University and NBER

Page 2: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

How do Immigrants Fare in the United States? Immigrants have tended to have low wages in

the U.S. (recent change at high end) Men aged 25-64, immigrant-native wage

differential:1970: 0.009 1980: -0.097 1990: -0.166 most recent earn 38% lower in 1990 (Borjas 1995) male immigrants earn 19% less in 2000 (Borjas 2004

and Borjas & Friedberg 2004) Poor labor market outcomes have led to concerns

about immigrants adding to the “underclass” and thus the population with poor social outcomes.

Page 3: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Reasons to Think Immigrants Contribute to the Crime Problem

Immigrants share characteristics in common with the native born population that is disproportionately incarcerated.

Cities with greater shares of immigrants have higher crime rates.

Those with poor labor market outcomes are disproportionately likely to engage in criminal activities.

Page 4: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Cross-sectional ExperienceOverall metropolitan area (MA) crime rates by fraction immigrant,

1990

01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,0009,000

10,00011,00012,00013,00014,000

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55

Fraction immigrant, 1989

Ove

rall

crim

e ra

te, m

ovin

g av

rg '8

9-91

Page 5: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Figure 4. Predicted Institutionalization for Immigrants

0

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

1980 1990 2000

Year

Pre

dic

ted

Fra

ctio

n In

stit

uti

on

aliz

ed

Prediction based on age

Prediction based on age, race/ethnicity, and education

Page 6: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Changes in 1990s 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act –Among other things, greatly expanded list of crimes for which non-citizens could be deported, made it retroactive, imposed mandatory detention following conclusion of prison term.

1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act –Among other things curtailed non-citizens access to welfare programs (originally for all non-citizens, later amended to grandfather in those already here at time of law’s passage).

Large numbers of immigrants. Crime rates down 30% over the decade. Incarceration rates up 63% over decade.

Page 7: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Today’s Paper

Examine how immigrants’ institutionalization rates compare to those of the native born.

Examine how these change across cohorts and over time.

Discuss the potential reasons for these changes: deportation, deterrence, self-selection.

Page 8: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Results Preview We will see that immigrants have lower

institutionalization rates than the native-born – about 1/5 the size.

This gap is much bigger in 2000, suggesting improvement along this dimension.

Direct effect of deportation appears to be small; positive selection of migrants appears to have increased over time.

Page 9: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Model of Immigrant Self-Selection

Roy (1951) reformulated in Borjas (1987) I=(

are mean log wages in host and source countries

are deviations of earnings in the two countries is cost of migration divided by the wage in the

source country (“time cost” of migration) individual migrates, I<0 individual stays Borjas used this model to explain changes in

cohort quality of immigrants to U.S. over last few decades. US attracts high skilled from compressed

earnings distributions, low skilled from unequal

Page 10: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Model of Immigrant Self-Selection continued

In Borjas, migration cost is constant across individuals, but suppose it varies with quality of social networks (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005, Hanson forthcoming). -> those with productive networks have lower wage

threshold for migration. Further suppose, =f(is expected

policy environment. -> shift in policy may shift migrant selection

If migration decision depends on multiple factors, can get very different implications across different dimensions of “skill.”

Page 11: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Data: U.S. Censuses, ’80, ’90, ‘00

We examine institutionalization among 18-40 year old men. (In 1980, 70% of this group are in correctional facilities).

Demographics in Table 1. Highlights:

Fraction immigrant tripled (6% - 17%) Education differs; improvements for natives. Changing racial and ethnic distributions. Citizenship correlated with time in the country

and has declined over time.

Page 12: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Figure 3.Fraction Immigrant in Institutions

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.1

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

1980 1990 2000

Year

Fra

ctio

n I

mm

igra

nt

Fraction Immigrant Non-Institution

Fraction Immigrant Institution

Page 13: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Figure 5. Institutionalization by Age

0

0.005

0.01

0.015

0.02

0.025

0.03

0.035

0.04

0.045

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Age

Fra

cti

on

Ins

titu

tio

na

lize

d

Native-born 2000

Native-born 1990

Native-born 1980

Recent Immig 2000

Recent Immigs 1990

Recent Immigs 1980

Page 14: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Table 2. Institutionalization across Cohorts

1980 1990 2000

Natives 0.0135 0.0217 0.0345

Immigrants 0.0042 0.0107 0.0068

1996-2000 0.0037

1991-1995 0.0050

1985-1990 0.0068 0.0072

1980-1984 0.0117 0.0106

1975-1979 0.0029 0.0117 0.0096

1970-1974 0.0036 0.0128 0.0141

Page 15: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Table 3. Stacked Logit(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)

Immigrant -0.0251

1996-00 -0.0208 -0.0137 -0.0116 -0.0117

1991-95 -0.0192 -0.0130 -0.0111 -0.0113

1985-90 -0.0162 -0.0118 -0.0105 -0.0108

1980-84 -0.0094 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0089

1975-79 -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0075 -0.0082

1970-74 -0.0012 -0.0031 -0.0052 -0.0062

Page 16: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Three Hypotheses Deportation

In 1994 and 1996, expanded list of crimes for which could be deported.

Increased resources for deportation. Concerned with mechanical effect on

institutionalization rates. Deterrence

Due to above or general increase in punishment. Selection

Changes in welfare, criminal justice, or economy could have made US less attractive to certain potential migrants.

Page 17: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Use Cohort / Time Variation

To test hypotheses, need estimates of institutionalization of cohorts that vary by period.

Run separate logits by year and compare cohort effects across periods.

90 90 903 85 90 9 50 59...i ii i i

I a b c b c X

00 00 00 00 001 96 00 2 91 95 3 85 90 8 60 64...i ii i i i i

I a b c b c b c b c X

Page 18: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Table 4. Synthetic Cohort

(1) (2) (3) (4)

1985-90 -0.0074 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0043

1980-84 -0.0086 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0041

1975-79 -0.0098 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0040

1970-74 -0.0075 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0031

Page 19: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Deportation Laws and Probability of Institutionalization of Noncitizens “[M]andatory detention now applies to

almost all noncitizens . . . Deportable on crime-related grounds” (Legomsky 1999).

INS has removed fewer than 20% of criminal aliens under criminal justice supervision (Shuck & Williams 1999).

Noncitizens served longer prison terms than natives or other foreign born (Butcher & Piehl 2000).

Sanctuary laws also restrict enforcement of deportation orders (LeDuff 2005).

Page 20: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Citizenship

Those who just arrived have rates of “take up” of less than 10%; after 20 years it is 70%.

2000 recent arrivals have the lowest rates of all.

Rates did not increase over years. No appearance of negative selection

into citizenship.

Page 21: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Table 4b. Citizens Only

(1) (2) (3)

1985-90 -0.0137 -0.0065 -0.0054

1980-84 -0.0140 -0.0072 -0.0060

1975-79 -0.0137 -0.0072 -0.0060

1970-74 -0.0144 -0.0072 -0.0061

Page 22: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Deterrence If migration selects people especially

responsive to incentives, might be more deterred by policy changes.

General deterrence should affect citizens and noncitizens, as we saw in Table 4.

Compare native-born movers to immigrants to see if migration selects for responsiveness.

Page 23: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Table 4c. Movers Only

(1) (2) (3) (4)

1985-90 -0.0030 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0019

1980-84 -0.0044 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0014

1975-79 -0.0051 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0012

1970-74 -0.0034 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0007

Page 24: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Changes in Immigrant Selection

Perhaps migration itself selects for positive outcomes on criminal justice, and changes in the 1990s increased the extent to which this is true.

Would expect those arriving after 1996 to have the largest change if the legislation from mid-1990s is driving the change in selection.

Page 25: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Table 5. Constant Exposure Time

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Fewer than 5 years

-0.0110 -0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0051

5 - 10 years

-0.0142 -0.0067 -0.0054 -0.0058

Page 26: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Conclusions Immigrants are much less likely to be institutionalized

than natives; 1/3 to 1/5 as likely by 2000. A version of the Roy model shows that policy changes

may lead to increasingly positive selection. Deportation is not driving these findings; naturalized

citizens show the same patterns as immigrants overall. Native movers act somewhat like immigrants. Those already in the country and newly arrived

immigrants reduced their relative incarceration probability over the decades.

The process of migration appears to select for responsiveness to incentives.

Results suggest that immigration decision should be modeled over multiple dimensions.

Page 27: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Extra Slides: Data Validity

Page 28: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Enumeration and Group Quarters

Enumeration generally done by administrators for those in institutions.

Thought to be quite good by Census staff.

If anything, undercount of institutionalized immigrants will be lower in 2000 than 1990 due to new incentives to report to INS.

Page 29: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Undercount of Noninstitutionalized If undercount in immigrant communities was

less severe in 2000 than in 1990, then denominator artificially increased and improvements we see are overstated.

Robinson et al. (2002) used demographic analysis to estimate undercount at 1.65% in 1990 and 0.12% in 2000.

Because this analysis cannot be done for immigrants, we show how our estimates change for different assumptions of undercount for immigrants relative to natives.

Page 30: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Appendix 1. Effect of Assumptions on Relative Undercount (of noninstitutionalized)

Undercount RatioImmigrants : Native-born

Fraction Institutionalized

1990 2000

1:1 0.0105 0.00679

2:1 0.0104 0.00678

3:1 0.0102 0.00678

37:1 0.0067 0.0065

Page 31: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Figure 6. Changes in Metropolitan Area Crime Rate by Changes in Fraction Immigrant (1990 to 2000)

-4,000

-3,000

-2,000

-1,000

0

1,000

-0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10

Change in fraction immigrant

Ch

an

ge

in o

vera

ll c

rim

e ra

te

regression line weighted by MA populationt=-1.82

Page 32: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Other Migration Concerns Lubotsky (2000) notes re-entrants may be

classified as recent arrivals. In wage studies, this leads to

overstatement of secular decline in wages. For our setting, if low earners more likely to

be incarcerated then “recent immigrants” biased up. But it is not clear we can infer this from wage studies.

If crime-prone immigrants migrate home before committing crimes, our results accurately reflect crimes but not criminality.

Page 33: Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation Kristin F. Butcher Federal Reserve Bank

Figure 1: Institutionalization and Real Hourly Wages, 2000, by Country

0

0.005

0.01

0.015

0.02

0.025

0.03

0.035

0.04

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26

Real Hourly Wage

Fra

ctio

n In

stit

uti

on

aliz

ed

U.S.

Mexico

Japan

India

Guatemala

Canada

Dom Rep Jamaica

Cuba

Colombia Germany

Haiti

Vietnam

Phil.

Italy

England

Korea

China Iran

Taiwan

El Salvador

weighted regression line w/o U.S.