why democracy is wrong

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WHY DEMOCRACY IS WRONG Democracy does not deserve the semi-sacred status accorded to it. In Europe, democratically elected politicians such as Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Silvio Berlusconi, Umberto Bossi, Gianfranco Fini and Pim Fortuyn are a reminder of democracy's defects: an anti-racist dictatorship is preferable to a racist democracy. Democracy is expanding globally, but not because of its moral superiority. Military intervention is now the standard origin of democratic political systems. Any universal ideology will tend to crusades and messianic conquest, and democracies feel entitled to 'bring freedom' to other countries. Below, more on the ethical problems, definitions of democracy, the issue of inequality, the defects of democratic culture, the nation as the 'demos', the claimed justifications for democracy, and alternatives to democracy. Revised December 2002, last changes 13 May 2006. In a large ocean there are two neighbouring islands: faultless democracies with full civil and political rights. One island is extremely rich and prosperous, and has 10 million inhabitants. The other is extremely poor: it has 100 million inhabitants, who live by subsistence farming. After a bad harvest last year, there are no food stocks, and now the harvest has failed again: 90 million people are facing death by starvation. The democratically elected government of the poor island asks for help, and the democratically elected government of the rich island organises a referendum on the issue. There are three options: Option A is a sharp increase in taxes, to pay for large-scale permanent structural transfers to the poor island. Option B is some increase in taxes, to pay for immediate and sufficient humanitarian aid, so that famine will be averted. Option C is no extra taxes and no aid. When the votes are counted, 100% of the voters have chosen Option C. After all, who wants to pay more taxes? So 90 million people starve. Yet all electoral procedures on both islands are free and fair, the media are free, political campaigning is free, there is no political repression of any kind. According to democratic theory, any outcome of this democratic process must be respected. Two perfect democracies have functioned perfectly: if you believe the supporters of democracy, that is morally admirable. But it clearly is not: there is something fundamentally wrong with democracy, if it allows this outcome. The defect is not hard to find: the people most affected by the decision are excluded from voting. The issue is the composition of the demos, the decision-making unit in a democracy: it is a recurrent theme in the ethics of democracy. Democratic theory can legitimise a political community in the form of an island of prosperity, and then legitimise the selfish decisions of that community. This theoretical possibility corresponds with the real-world western democracies. Millions of people are dying of hunger and preventable disease, yet the electorate in rich democracies will not accept mass transfers of wealth to poorer countries. They will not accept mass immigration from those countries either. A causal relationship has developed at global level, between democracy in the rich countries, and excess mortality elsewhere (famine, epidemics, endemic diseases). This is not the only such problem with democracy. Despite its quasi-sacred status, democracy has many ethical defects which are either evident in practice, or easily illustrated by hypothetical examples.

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Page 1: Why Democracy is Wrong

WHY DEMOCRACY IS WRONG

Democracy does not deserve the semi-sacred status accorded to it. In Europe,democratically elected politicians such as Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, SilvioBerlusconi, Umberto Bossi, Gianfranco Fini and Pim Fortuyn are a reminder ofdemocracy's defects: an anti-racist dictatorship is preferable to a racist democracy.Democracy is expanding globally, but not because of its moral superiority. Militaryintervention is now the standard origin of democratic political systems. Any universalideology will tend to crusades and messianic conquest, and democracies feel entitled to'bring freedom' to other countries. Below, more on the ethical problems, definitions ofdemocracy, the issue of inequality, the defects of democratic culture, the nation as the'demos', the claimed justifications for democracy, and alternatives to democracy.

Revised December 2002, last changes 13 May 2006.

In a large ocean there are two neighbouring islands: faultless democracies with full civil andpolitical rights. One island is extremely rich and prosperous, and has 10 million inhabitants. Theother is extremely poor: it has 100 million inhabitants, who live by subsistence farming. After abad harvest last year, there are no food stocks, and now the harvest has failed again: 90 millionpeople are facing death by starvation. The democratically elected government of the poor islandasks for help, and the democratically elected government of the rich island organises areferendum on the issue. There are three options: Option A is a sharp increase in taxes, to pay forlarge-scale permanent structural transfers to the poor island. Option B is some increase in taxes,to pay for immediate and sufficient humanitarian aid, so that famine will be averted. Option C isno extra taxes and no aid. When the votes are counted, 100% of the voters have chosen OptionC. After all, who wants to pay more taxes?

So 90 million people starve. Yet all electoral procedures on both islands are free and fair, themedia are free, political campaigning is free, there is no political repression of any kind.According to democratic theory, any outcome of this democratic process must be respected. Twoperfect democracies have functioned perfectly: if you believe the supporters of democracy, thatis morally admirable. But it clearly is not: there is something fundamentally wrong withdemocracy, if it allows this outcome.

The defect is not hard to find: the people most affected by the decision are excluded from voting.The issue is the composition of the demos, the decision-making unit in a democracy: it is arecurrent theme in the ethics of democracy. Democratic theory can legitimise a politicalcommunity in the form of an island of prosperity, and then legitimise the selfish decisions of thatcommunity. This theoretical possibility corresponds with the real-world western democracies.Millions of people are dying of hunger and preventable disease, yet the electorate in richdemocracies will not accept mass transfers of wealth to poorer countries. They will not acceptmass immigration from those countries either. A causal relationship has developed at globallevel, between democracy in the rich countries, and excess mortality elsewhere (famine,epidemics, endemic diseases).

This is not the only such problem with democracy. Despite its quasi-sacred status, democracy hasmany ethical defects which are either evident in practice, or easily illustrated by hypotheticalexamples.

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The treatment of minorities is perhaps the most recognised defect of democracies. Between themid-1930's and the mid-1970's, the Swedish government forcibly sterilised thousands of women,because of 'mental defects', or simply because they were of 'mixed race'. Yet Sweden has been amodel democracy for the entire period. The democracy worked: the problem is that democracyoffers no protection to marginalised and despised minorities. The usual answer of democrats isthat excesses can be prevented by constitutionally enforced individual rights. There are twoproblems with that.

First, no constitutional rights are absolute: President Bush showed how easy it is to overturnfundamental constitutional protections. Simply by redefining some American citizens as 'illegalenemy combatants', he was able to intern them. Some groups are in any case openly excludedfrom the usual democratic rights, most notably illegal immigrants (more on this later). TheAustralian government detains asylum seekers in internment camps in the desert: its hard lineaccurately reflects the attitudes of a racist electorate. The detainees can't vote, can't engage inpolitical activities, and have no free press, but Australia is still considered a democracy.

The second problem is that basic rights allow wide limits. Treatment of minorities may be harshand humiliating, without infringing their rights. A recent example in the Netherlands is aproposal to impose compulsory genital inspections for ethnic minorities. The aim is to combatfemale genital mutilation, but every ethnic Somali parent, regardless of their own circumstances,would be obliged to present their daughters for annual genital inspection. Eritreans, Egyptian andSudanese might be included under the legal obligation, even if they were naturalised Dutchcitizens. The proposal has majority support in Parliament. It is not law yet, but since Somali's area marginalised and often despised minority in the Netherlands, there is nothing they can do toprevent its implementation.

So long as they avoid certain types of policy, and outright violence, democracy allows ademocratic majority to impose its will on a minority. They can impose their language and aculture, and both impositions are normal practice in nation states. They can also impose theirvalues, which may be unacceptable to the minority: the best example is democratic prohibitionsof alcohol or drugs. Alcohol prohibition in the United States, enforced through a constitutionalamendment, was a direct result of democracy. Since there was (and is) no 'right to drink', theChristian anti-alcohol majority could simply use the democratic process, to make their values thenational values. 'Prohibition' was repealed in 1933, but the 'War on Drugs' of the last 20 years isat least as comprehensive in terms of policy and effects. Successful prohibition movements are aspecial case of the inherent anti-minority bias in democracies.

There is a more general effect: it is very difficult for an innovative minority to succeed in ademocracy - and most innovations are first proposed by a minority. Like many political systems,democracy has an inherent bias toward the existing, as against the possible. Innovations must gothrough the political process, which in that sense is an anti-innovative barrier, but the existingsocial order does not have to prove its existence rights. A large-scale example of failedinnovation in democracies is the European high-speed rail network, first proposed in the 1970's.Since then, not even planned national networks have been completed. The pan-European projectfailed primarily due to lack of political enthusiasm. But should it be abandoned, simply becausethere is insufficient 'will of the people'? If an innovation has no democratic mandate then ademocracy will not implement it - but should democracy have this priority over innovation? Theissues are scarcely considered in democratic theory: the priority is simply taken for granted.

Empirical: testable propositions aboutdemocracies

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The best-known classic hypothesis about democraciesis the so-called democratic peace theory. It ispromoted by pro-democratic campaigners and bypoliticians, as 'scientific evidence' of the need fordemocracy. The claim is that 'democracies do not goto war with each other'. The research typicallycompares dyads - pairs of countries/states. Astatistical measure (frequency of war) is possible fordifferent categories - democracy against democracy;democracy against non-democracy; and non-democracy against non-democracy. It is one of the fewclassic 'testable hypotheses' in international relationstheory. Unfortunately for the democracy lobby,research failed to demonstrate conclusively thatdemocracies are more peaceful among themselves.Nevertheless, it suggests other testable propositionsabout democracy. Several of the criticisms ofdemocracy presented here, can be stated associological or political-science hypotheses,indicating possible research projects: they are given inseparate boxes such as this one.

Definitions of democracy

Definitions of democracy follow a standard pattern, a sign of a stable and established ideology.Often, as in the version by Thomas Christiano, the definition separates the historical ideal, andthe structure of modern democracies. The historical ideal is usually Athenian democracy, butthere is no real continuity between ancient and modern democracy. The comprehensive surveyAntike Traditionen in der Legitimation staatlicher Systeme shows that most western politicalregimes appealed to classical predecessors.

a) Reiche in der Nachfolge des Imperium Romanum.b) Absolutistisch verfaßte Fürsten-Staaten.c) Aristokratische Stadt-Republiken.d) Stände-Konföderationen.e) Herrschafts-Vikariate und Kolonialverwaltungen.f) Konstitionelle Republiken.g) Demokratische Republiken (i. S. eines parteilichen Volksbegriffs).h) Konstitutionelle Monarchien.i) Moderne Diktaturen.k) Moderne imperiale Systeme.l) Moderne internationale Gemeinschaften.Antike Traditionen in der Legitimation staatlicher Systeme, Christian Gizewski, TUBerlin.

It is very unlikely that all these regimes correspond exactly to one regime 2500 or 2000 yearsago. The appeal to classical models is itself a tradition in western culture - not an absolutehistorical truth. As modern industrial societies, Nazi Germany and democratic Britain probablyhad more in common with each other, than either of them with ancient Athens.

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Robert Dahl's version is the best known of the dual definitions. He was one of the first to revisethe simple definitions of democracy, and introduced the word 'polyarchy' to describe moderndemocracies. The polyarchy definitions, which emphasise political pluralism and multi-partyelections, have become the standard political science definitions of democracy. The newestdefinitions emphasise democratic rights, rather than the democratic regime itself. But rememberthat most definitions of democracy (including those quoted below) have themselves been writtenby supporters of democracy. No neutral definitions exist...

...the Greek democracies were not representative governments, they were governments runby the free, male citizens of the city-state. All major government decisions and legislationwere made by the Assembly; the closest we've come to such a system is "initiative andreferendum," in which legislation is popularly petitioned and then voted on directly by theelectorate. The Greek democratic states ran their entire government on such a system. Allthe members of a city-state were not involved in the government: slaves, foreigners, andwomen were all disbarred from the democracy. So, in reality, the democratic city-statesmore closely resembled oligarchies for a minority ruled the state - it was a very largeminority, to be sure, but still a minority.World Civilizations general Glossary: Democracy, Richard Hooker

Let us focus more closely on the basic ideals of democracy. First, in a democracy, thepeople rule. Popular sovereignty implies that all minimally competent adults cometogether as one body to make decisions about the laws and policies that are to regulatetheir lives together. Each citizen has a vote in the processes by which the decisions aremade and each has the opportunity to participate in the deliberations over what courses ofaction are to be followed. Second, each citizen has the right to participate as an equal.Political equality implies equality among citizens in the process of decision-making....Third, each citizen has the right to an opportunity to express his or her opinionsand supporting reasons to every other citizen as well as a right and duty to hear a widespectrum of views on subjects of public concern. Each has a right, as well as a duty toparticipate in open and fair discussion. These are the ideals of democracy.These ideals are partly realized in features of modern democratic societies. One-personone-vote is observed in the process of electing representatives to the legislative assembly;anyone may run for election to public office; in elections, a number of political partiescompete for political power by advocating alternative visions of the society; the politicalcampaigns of candidates and parties consist in large part in discussion and argument overthe worth of these opposing views, and everyone is permitted to have a say in this process;and the society tolerates and often encourages vigorous debate on all issues of publicinterest.Thomas Christiano (1996) The Rule of Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory.Boulder: Westview. (p. 3).

...polyarchy is a political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions, all ofwhich must exist for a government to be classified as a polyarchy.1. Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionallyvested in elected officials.2. Free and fair elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conductedelections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.3. Inclusive suffrage. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.4. Right to run for office. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices...5. Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the dangerof severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials,the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology.6. Alternative information. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of

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information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws.7. Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above,citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations,including independent political parties and interest groups....all the institutions of polyarchy are necessary to the highest feasible attainment of thedemocratic process in the government of a country.Robert A Dahl (1989) Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. (p.221-222).

Democracy literally means rule or government by, or power of, the people. Logically andhistorically implicit in this is the notion of majority rule. Representative democracy is aform of democracy in which the people govern indirectly, through elected representatives,rather than directly governing themselves.Constitutional implications from representative democracy, Jeremy Kirk

...democracy in its 20th Century form means:- regular elections for the most powerful government positions,- competitive political parties,- near universal franchise,- secret balloting, and- civil liberties and political rights (human rights).Democracies don't fight non-democracies, Rudolph J. Rummel. (Peace Magazine)

It is by now a truism that what's most important is not a country's first election, but ratherits second and third. And what matters is not simply that people have the right to vote, butthat they are offered a real choice, under conditions that are truly free and fair.Elections, moreover, are but one note in the democratic symphony. A full orchestra isrequired, including markets that reward initiative; police that respect due process; legalstructures that provide justice; and a press corps that is free to pursue the facts and publishthe truth.lecture by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

In der alten DDR war es also mit der demokratischen Legitimation nicht weit her, wie inallen autoritär-kommunistischen Staaten, auch wenn eine erste Grundbedingung erfülltwar: es existierte eine formal-demokratische Verfassung. Diese Bedingung ist aber nichthinreichend.Die Verfassung muß zweitens auch materiell rechtsstaatliche Verfahren, die Willkürausschließen, garantieren.Drittens müssen Grundrechte und Grundwerte durch Verfassung und Rechtspraxis auchfür kritische Minderheiten verläßlich garantiert und geschützt werden.Viertens müssen diese Verfahren und Grundrechte vom Bürger anerkannt werden, und erdas Vertrauen haben können, daß er sich auf sie verlassen kann.Probleme der Demokratie und der demokratischen Legitimation, Ulrich von Alemann.

Entgegen der wörtlichen Bedeutung des Begriffs sind bislang Versuche, das gesamte Volkdirekt an der Herrschaft zu beteiligen (zum Beispiel in Form von Räten), nirgendwodauerhaft verwirklicht worden. Grundlage der meisten westlichen Industriegesellschaftenist die bürgerlich-parlamentarische Demokratie. Sie hat sich im Kampf gegen denFeudalismus herausgebildet, blieb aber auf die Vorherrschaft der Bürger bedacht. Nach derDurchsetzung des allgemeinen, gleichen und geheimen Wahlrechts hat das Volk dieMöglichkeit einer indirekten politischen Mitwirkung:.... Das Hauptkennzeichen vonDemokratie ist die Möglichkeit des Machtwechsels ohne Blutvergießen, das heißt ein

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Machtwechsel nach anerkannten Regeln.Sociologicus: Lexicon

What exactly is democracy? We must not identify democracy with majority rule.Democracy has complex demands, which certainly include voting and respect for electionresults, but it also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legalentitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of newsand fair comment. Even elections can be deeply defective if they occur without thedifferent sides getting an adequate opportunity to present their respective cases, or withoutthe electorate enjoying the freedom to obtain news and to consider the views of thecompeting protagonists. Democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanicalcondition (like majority rule) taken in isolation.Democracy as a Universal Value, Amartya Sen, Journal of Democracy. (US Congresspublication).

At a minimum, a democracy is a political system in which the people choose theirauthoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were notdesignated by the government.Freedom House Annual Survey

Voor wie de klassieke idealen van de democratie wil handhaven, lijkt het daarom voor dehand te liggen, in een zekere analogie tot Dahl, onderscheid te maken tussendemocratische idealen en democratie. Deze is dan een specifiek procedureel engrondrechtelijk kader dat gebaseerd is op de democratische idealen van vrijheid,gelijkheid en volkssoevereiniteit en waarin deze idealen tegelijk in open competitie staanmet andere doelstellingen. Zo is elk land waarin dit kader bestaat een democratie.Uwe Becker (1999). Europese Democratieën: Vrijheid, Gelijkheid, Solidariteit enSoevereiniteit in de Praktijk. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. (p. 11).

Democracy is a form of government in which the major decisions of government -- or thedirection of policy behind these decisions -- rests directly or indirectly on the freely givenconsent of the majority of the adults governed.Encyclopedia Americana

Democracy is a political system in which different groups are legally entitled to competefor power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and areresponsible to the people.Tutu Vanhanen (1997). Prospects of democracy: a Study of 172 Countries. London:Routledge. (p. 31). The book summarises definitions of democracy of the last 40 years onp. 28-31.

Most contemporary definitions of democracy have several common elements. First,democracies are countries in which there are institutional mechanisms, usually elections,that allow the people to choose their leaders. Second, prospective leaders must competefor public support. Third, the power of the government is restrained by its accountabilityto the people. These are the essential characteristics of political democracy.Some writers add additional criteria to the list of what makes a polity a democracy. LarryDiamond argues that a democracy must have "extensive civil liberties (freedom ofexpression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations)." SamuelHuntington recognizes that democracy "implies the existence of those civil and politicalfreedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organize that are necessary to political debateand the conduct of electoral campaigns."Why the United States Should Spread Democracy, Sean Lynn-Jones

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more Academic definitions of democracy, collected by William Su.

Demokratietheorie: Eine vergleichende Analyse verschiedener Demokratietheorien,Emanuel Möcklin.

It is now standard to include political and/or civic rights in the definition of democracy. The bestknown example of this approach is the Freedom House Annual Survey. In fact, rights checklistsseem to be the emerging standard definition of democracy. The online paper The theory andmeasurement of democracy (Gizachew Tiruneh) includes a list and comparative table of indicesof democracy: most are rights checklists. Here is the Freedom House political rights checklist:

Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through freeand fair elections?Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honesttabulation of ballots?Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitivepolitical groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of thesecompeting parties or groupings?

These rights are associated with the alternation of government: they allow one government canbe replaced by another. The polyarchy definitions of democracy insist, that there must be apossibility to change the government, through democratic procedures. However democrats alsoinsist, that there should be no other possibility to change the government.

The Freedom House checklist on civil liberties and the rule of law includes:

Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religiousexpression?Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization (political parties, civicorganizations, ad hoc issue groups)?Is there an independent judiciary?Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equallyunder the law?Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whetherby groups that support or oppose the system?Is there open and free private discussion?Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice ofemployment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?

Note again that this is largely a checklist of rights, yet I am quoting it as a definition ofdemocracy. That is how it is used in practice. It reflects the current idea of democracy, amongtheorists and public in the democratic countries. Civil rights, political rights, and democraticgovernment are all seen as integral components of democracy.

the opposite of democracy

Supporters of democracy refer to Hitler and Fascism, to imply that anyone who opposesdemocracy is "like Hitler". That is usually intended as an insult, rather than an insight into thenature of democracy. However, political theorists do contrast democracy with dictatorship,

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authoritarianism, and totalitarianism, and the last of these is indeed based on the Nazi regime, asa historical model.

The theory of totalitarianism was formulated in the United States in the early 1950's, in a climateof anti-Communist hysteria. Its central claim is that the ideology, regimes, and social systemsunder Hitler and Stalin were more-or-less identical. In the Second World War the United Statesand the Soviet Union were allies against Hitler, but the 'reversal of alliances' at the start of theCold War made the theory of totalitarianism attractive.

Coined in the interwar years, but coming into wide usage only after 1945, the termpointed to features of Nazi and Communist regimes that were said to make them"essentially alike" and that distinguished them from traditional autocracies....Whateverthe theory's analytic merits, in the 1940s and 1950s it performed admirable ideologicalservice in denying what to the untutored eye was a dramatic reversal of alliances. It onlyseemed this way, the theory asserted; in fact the cold war was, from the standpoint of theWest, a continuation of World War II: a struggle against the transcendent enemy,totalitarianism, first in its Nazi, then in its Soviet version.Peter Novick (2000). The Holocaust in American Life. New York: Houghton Mifflin. (p.86).

By the 1960's the theory was out of fashion, although the comparison Hitler-Stalin is still usedby liberal propagandists. And 'totalitarian' is still the word most democracy theorists would use,if they were asked to name a political system opposite to democracy. Second would probably be'authoritarian' - and terrorism would not be named at all. Although President Bush may speak ofa 'war on democracy and freedom' by terrorists, that does not mean he sees terrorism as a systemof government. It is possible to speak of a totalitarian regime, or a totalitarian society - but it isdifficult to imagine a permanently 'terrorist' society or a terrorist parliament.

With hindsight, the definition of totalitarianism is too obviously a description of regimes andpolitical styles of the 1930's and 1940's. Like George Orwell's '1984", also written at the start ofthe Cold War, its image of oppression now seems dated. In 1953, Carl J Friedrich listed 5defining characteristics of totalitarian societies:

1. An official ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vitalaspects of man's existence, to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhereat least passively; this ideology is characteristically focused in terms of chiliastic claimsas to the "perfect" final society of mankind.

2. A single mass party consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population(up to 10 per cent) of men and women passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to theideology and prepared to assist in every way in promoting its general acceptance, suchparty being organized in strictly hierarchical, oligarchical manner, usually under asingle leader....

3. A technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control (in the hands of theparty and its subservient cadres, such as the bureaucracy and the armed forces) of allmeans of effective armed combat.

4. A similarly technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control (in thesame hands) of all means of effective mass communication, such as the press, radio,motion pictures, and so on.

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5. A system of terroristic police control. depending for its effectiveness upon points 3and 4 and characteristically directed not only against demonstrable "enemies" of theregime, but also against arbitrarily selected classes of the population, such arbitraryselection turning upon exigencies of the regime's survival, as well as ideological"implications" and systematically exploiting scientific psychology.Carl J Friedrich (1954) 'The unique character of totalitarian society'in: Totalitarianism. New York: Grossett & Dunlap.

Historically, the vast majority of regimes were non-democratic - but most of them do not fit thisprofile. And today, a society with none of these characteristics might also be seen asfundamentally undemocratic. In 1953 'human rights abuses' were not mentioned - yet they arenow considered a definitive characteristic of non-democracies. So totalitarianism is not usable asa general ''definition of non-democracy'. Probably, the early theorists did not intend that anyway,but the term has acquired a secondary meaning of 'non-democratic'. Since the definitions ofdemocracy are increasingly checklist definitions, the word totalitarian is used simply to mean 'aregime without a, b and c' - without free elections, without political pluralism, without a freepress, without all the other elements on the checklists. So although most pre-modern regimeshad none of Friedrich's characteristics, they are sometimes thrown into the general category'totalitarian'. A similar problem exists with 'authoritarian' and 'authoritarianism' (and often with'autocratic' as well). Although specific definitions exist for specific types of authoritarianpolitical system, the term is often used to mean simply 'non-democratic'...

There are a wide range of alternatives to democratic government. We shall call regimesthat have little or no element of democracy, authoritarian or autocratic governments.There are, of course, many kinds of authoritarian regimes including traditionalmonarchies and aristocracies; non-traditional dictatorships and military juntas; andtotalitarian regimes. For the purposes of this paper, we will ignore the importantdifferences between these different authoritarian regimes.Are Democracies Stable? Compared to What?, Marc Stier and Robert Mundt.

Democracy exists where the principal leaders of a political system are selected bycompetitive elections in which the bulk of the population have the opportunity toparticipate. Authoritarian systems are non-democratic ones.Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (eds., 1970), in their 'Conclusion' ofAuthoritarian Politics in Modern Society: the Dynamics of Established One-PartySystems New York: Basic Books. (p. 509).

When Huntington and Moore wrote that in 1970, the one-party state seemed the definitivemodern form of non-democratic state. Like the definition of totalitarianism, however, that nowseems too historically specific, too obviously based on the 'Soviet Bloc' state.

defining the democratic ethic: legitimacy and secession

The 'democratic ethic' is easier to formulate, than a definition of a democratic system. In aperfect democracy with no anti-democrats, the inhabitants would all adhere to this ethic. Two ofits basic principles are given below. It is not fictional or hypothetical - most inhabitants of thedemocracies do indeed think like this. However, that can not in itself justify democracy.

The first and most important component of the democratic ethic is so obvious, that it is rarelyexplicitly named. It is the principle of ethical and political legitimacy: "a democratic governmentshould not be overthrown". In the normal course of affairs, democratic states rely on legitimacyto preserve their own existence and cohesion. Overthrow of the government is totally off thepolitical agenda: it is taboo to even discuss it. There is no large army to suppress armed revolts,

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because there are no large armed revolts - and no small ones either. The United States is a nationof gun-owners, but despite a month of political feuding over the Gore-Bush election result in2000, not a shot was fired for political reasons. That was a remarkable achievement, in a countrywith a history of secessionism, Civil War, and military conquest of ethnic minorities. The'normal course of affairs' is historically not normal at all.

What would happen if legitimacy disappeared completely? In principle, you could hold free andfair multi-party elections in an open society - and then overthrow the democratically electedgovernment, after each election. That could happen every week, but it would not be considered'democracy'. This emphasises the formalism and proceduralism of democracy: once followed, thedemocratic procedures are claimed to produce legitimacy. The government which is elected bythe democratic procedures becomes the absolutely legitimate government. If legitimacy isstrong, then it becomes culturally taboo to overthrow it. It even becomes taboo not to see it as'our government'. Because US citizens think this way, the United States is politically stable.

To be a democrat means, that you think this should happen: you believe that the democraticallyelected government is legitimate and must be accepted as legitimate (unless it is itself anti-democratic). The procedures are not an ornament, they are the essence. This legitimacy claim is amajor ethical defect of democracy - because procedure is no substitute for morality. Mostdemocrats go much further, and would claim explicitly that a democratically electedgovernment, which has acted on a decision made in accordance with democratic procedures andthe rule of law, should not be overthrown, even if the action is morally wrong.

At the heart of democracy is something which is morally unacceptable. What democrats aresaying, is that no value may override democracy. In terms of regime preference, they are saying,for instance, that a democracy which tortures, is preferable to a dictatorship which does not.Now, all states claim political legitimacy - that their laws should be obeyed, that their judges areentitled to judge, that they may raise taxes. However, the claims of democrats imply ethicallegitimacy, a claim to moral authority. It is more like the infallibility claim made by the CatholicChurch, which asserts that certain declarations by the Pope are the absolute moral truth. Thedemocracy theorist Christiano writes...

Other values may compete with democratic ideals and sometimes override them...Thomas Christiano (1996) The Rule of Many: Fundamental Issues in DemocraticTheory. Boulder: Westview. (p. 4).

But democratic governments do not generally concede this. Instead the word 'democratic' iswidely used as a synonym for 'legitimate", legitimate in both the political and moral sense. Thismoral judgment is extended outside the narrow political sphere. Many democrats see democracyas a morally legitimising force, which can be applied to any decision - a sort of moral detergent.These views are vaguely held, but democrats are more explicit about the mirror image of thisattitude. They generally believe that there is no moral force, or authority, or principle, which canlegitimise non-democratic reversal of democratic decisions.

In the democratic ethic, the only remedy for any defect of democracy is democracy itself. In ademocracy, there is certainly no political authority external to the democratic process: there is no'appeal to a higher tribunal'. No other method or process is accepted as a legitimate response tothe democratic process, and certainly not the use of force. The word 'undemocratic' is used as asynonym for 'criminal' or 'hostile'. It is used to suggest an attack on society, a form of terrorism.

Christiano and other theorists of democracy are ignoring these political realities, if they suggestdemocracy is not an absolute. In practice, democrats accord an absolute moral priority todemocracy, and an absolute legitimacy. The evidence for this is simple: they will concede

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nothing that overrides it. Not even principles such as justice: the democrat will simply say thatdemocracy is itself justice, or at least the path to justice. If democrats deny that any moralprinciple can override democracy, then it is correct to say that they treat democracy as a moralabsolute. These claims for democratic legitimacy indicate the primary function of democratictheory in western democracies. It serves to legitimise the existing order, however wrong thatorder may be. Pro-democracy theorists have a lot on their conscience.

The second important component of the democratic ethic is the prohibition of secession. Unlikethe legitimacy claim, the democratic principles concerning secession are often discussed - forinstance in Canada, in connection with Québec secessionism. Unlimited secession would makedemocracy pointless. If free and fair multi-party elections are held in an open society, but anyonewho disagrees with the result can set up a separate state, no democrat would accept that as ademocracy. For democrats there must be a unit, beyond which secession is not permitted:this unit is the 'demos'. Again, its modern expression is the democratic nation state. Theindivisibility of the demos is as important as legitimacy, because legitimacy collapses in the faceof secessionism. Secessionists see the existing government as 'foreign', and they no longer feelany obligation to its laws, institutions, and policies. So a democratic government ultimatelydepends on military power to sustain itself in office, and to prevent the unlimited secession ofminorities. This aspect of the democratic ethic brought democrats into a long-term alliance withnationalism. No guns,no democracy.

Inequality and democracy

Democracy has failed to eliminate social inequality, and this seems a permanent and structuralfailure. It is undeniable that all democratic societies have social inequalities - substantialdifferences in income, in wealth, and in social status. These differences have persisted: there isno indication that inequality will ever disappear in democracies. In the stable westerndemocracies, inequality is apparently increasing. The pattern established in the United States is,that the lowest incomes do not grow: all the benefits of economic growth go to the higher-income groups.

Average household income before taxes grew in real terms by nearly one-third between1979 and 1997, but that growth was shared unevenly across the income distribution. Theaverage income for households in the top fifth of the distribution rose by more than half.In contrast, average income for the middle quintile climbed 10 percent and that for thelowest fifth dropped slightly. Furthermore, income growth at the very top of thedistribution was greater yet: average income in 1997 dollars for the top 1 percent ofhouseholds more than doubled, rising from $420,000 in 1979 to more than $1 million in1997.Historical Effective Tax Rates, 1979-1997., Congressional Budget Office, 2001, p. 5

Some form of social inequality is inherent in democracy - a fact neglected by most democratictheory. In a theoretical democracy of 100 voters, a party of 51 voters can confiscate the propertyof the other 49. They can divide it among themselves. However, if one voter is sick on electionday, they lose their majority. A party of 52 has more chance to divide the property of theminority, but now the minority is 48 and there is slightly less to divide. A party of 99 will haveguaranteed success against a minority of one, but the shares after division will be small.

In practice, a coalition of two-thirds, or three-quarters, can successfully disadvantage a minority(one third, one quarter). For instance, the majority might exclude the minority from the mainlabour market, and then force this excluded underclass into workfare. The emergence of anunderclass is usually seen as a structural change within a society, but it might be simply a side-effect of democracy. Every democracy is a temptation (to the majority) to disadvantage

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minorities. In practice, every existing liberal democracy is a dual society, with some politicallymarginalised minority (typically the urban underclass).

Testable propositions: inequality

Several testable propositions are available for thehypothesis of structural reinforcement of inequality indemocracies:

in all democratic states there is inequality ofwealth and incomeinequality of wealth and income has notdeclined permanently in any democratic statein democracies stable over more than onegeneration, inequality of wealth increasesin democracies stable over more than onegeneration, inequality of income increases

The first proposition is more or less self-evident: theinequality is there. The fact that democracy is rarelyinvestigated as a causal factor is itself a politicalchoice. Most sociologists are democrats: they are notlikely to blame democracy for inequality.

In the past, aristocratic conservatives feared that democracy would allow the poor to confiscatethe wealth of the rich. In reality, the historical trend seems exactly the opposite. Increasingly,western democracy is not about 'ordinary people' against the elite: it is about ordinary peoplejoining with social elites to 'bash the underclass'. Guarantees of fundamental rights do notprevent a low-status minority being targeted, politically and socially. In several Europeancountries political parties compete against each other, to show how tough they are against anunpopular minority - for instance asylum seekers. There is nothing the minority can do, so longthe political parties do not infringe their rights. Unfortunately this development is probably stillin the early stages: the worst is yet to come. In a democracy, those at the bottom of the socialscale can expect steadily worsening conditions of life.

a fatal transition to democracy

The post-1989 transition in central and eastern Europe provided the first comprehensiveindication of the negative effects of democracy. (Liberal democracy in combination with the freemarket, which is what western media and governments mean, when they talk of democracy ineastern Europe). In the older democratic states, the present model of democracy was formed over100 or 200 years. Britain in 1800 can not be compared with Britain two centuries later: the hugedifferences are not simply 'the result of democracy'. However, in eastern Europe modern statesacquired a new political and economic system within a few years - with a complete statisticalrecord. Russia in 1985 can be compared with Russia in 1995: the difference is largely due to theeconomic and political transition. The UN Development Program listed 7 social-economic costsof the process (the reference to "life expectancy levels achieved in the 1990s" should apparentlyread "1980's"):

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The process of transition in the region has had huge human development costs, many ofwhich still continue unabated....

The biggest single 'cost of transition' has undoubtedly been the loss of livesrepresented by the decline in life expectancy in several major countries of theregion, most notably in the Russian Federation, and most strikingly among youngand middle-aged men....Most regrettably, the trends in life expectancy have meantthat several million people have not survived the 1990s who would have done so ifthe life expectancy levels achieved in the 1990s had been maintained....The second cost of transition has been the rise and persistently high level ofmorbidity, characterized by higher incidence of common illnesses and by thespread of such diseases as tuberculosis that had been reduced to marginal healththreats in the past....A third cost of transition has been the extraordinary rise in poverty - both incomeand human poverty....A major contributor to the increase in poverty - along with falling incomes andrising inflation - has been the rise in income and wealth inequality, and this hasbeen a fourth cost of transition....A fifth cost of transition has been rising gender inequalities. During the Soviet era,quotas for women helped to incorporate them into positions of economic andpolitical decision-making and authority, but the advent of more democraticregimes has led paradoxically to lower percentages of women in such positions.Women have found themselves progressively pushed out of public life.Simultaneously, their access to paid employment has declined and their total workburden both within the household and outside it has increased....A sixth cost of transition has been the considerable deterioration of education....A seventh cost of transition has been the rise in unemployment, underemploymentand informalization of employment....

Summing up the seven costs of transition across the whole region underscores thedramatic and widespread deterioration of human security....TRANSITION 1999: Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe andthe CIS, UNDP (Chapter 1).

The report itself has more detail on all of these aspects, and especially on poverty. In historicalperspective, this is clearly not indicative of a voluntary choice for emancipation and progress.Instead these characteristics are consistent with the traditional historical pattern of expansion byconquest: more on this 'democratic conquest' below.

So what would happen if the existing market democracy was abolished, in an older liberal-democracy such as Britain or the Netherlands? It is not possible to recreate 1980's 'Soviet-bloc'societies in these countries, but experience in eastern Europe indicates the possible benefits of areverse transition...

life expectancy would risepublic health would improve: the incidence of infectious diseases would fallpoverty would decline sharply, although the mean income would probably also fallincome inequalities would fallwomen would have higher social status, more access to political-administrative structures,and more access to employmentthere would be more resources for education, and access to education would improveunemployment would fall: there would be fewer people in insecure jobs, and possibly alsofewer in low-productivity 'junk jobs' (also a form of underemployment)

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Supporters of democracy themselves use social and political comparisons between very differentsocieties - for instance between Stalin's Russia (or Hitler's Germany) and the present USA. Thewestern lobby in favour of the transition process in eastern Europe also quote its successes -again using longitudinal comparisons of non-comparable societies. If cross-generational, cross-cultural, cross-societal comparisons are acceptable in justification of democracy, then why not incriticism of it?

death in democracy

Income inequality is probably not the best indicator of structural inequalities in democracies.The statistics on health give a more comprehensive picture of a fundamental, long-term,inequality - apparently resistant to all declared government policy. The evidence for a worseninggap is also clearer in the health statistics.

Above all, inequalities in mortality are a moral defect of democracies. This comment is onwestern European countries: all of them are democracies:

The differences in mortality and morbidity are quite shocking. Economically inactivemen have three times the risk of premature death observed for employed men. Whilestrong health selection increases the risk of exclusion from the labour market, it seemslikely that there is also reverse causation due to social isolation and stress. Finland andNorway were used to illustrate the concept of healthy life-expectancies. Norwegian andFinnish men with post secondary education live 3-4 years longer than men with basiceducation, and 10-12 years more of healthy life, that is, without chronic debilitatingillness. One important change between the 1970s and the 1980s is that Sweden, Norwayand Denmark have lost their relatively favourable international position in terms of thesize of mortality differences between classes. There are some other striking findings;French men in lower socio economic groups had much greater excess mortality than theEuropean average, which Kunst et al suggest may be due to the level of alcoholconsumption; and while Nordic countries show large morbidity differences by educationlevel, Great Britain shows large mortality differences by income.Health and health care policy : inequality and the risks of exclusion, Council of EuropeHuman Dignity and Social Exclusion Project. See the CoE site for footnotes andreferences, deleted here.

Public health and epidemiology journals are full of such examples of health inequalities. Inseveral countries there have also been major national studies, which confirm that health andmortality inequalities are a general pattern. In Britain, the 1998 Acheson Report on healthinequalities showed that they had worsened since the last major study, the Black Report in 1980.Those were the years of the Conservative governments in Britain, so perhaps the Conservativepolicies are responsible. But that is the point: those Conservative governments weredemocratically elected. If democracy was a system which prevented inequalities in death rates,then democracy would prevent a government which worsened those inequalities. If democracywas a system which prevented inequalities in death rates, then there would be noinequalities anyway. But there are, and democracy is apparently making them worse....

Over the last twenty years, death rates have fallen among both men and women andacross all social groups. However, the difference in rates between those at the top andbottom of the social scale has widened.For example, in the early 1970s, the mortality rate among men of working age wasalmost twice as high for those in class V (unskilled) as for those in class I (professional).By the early 1990s, it was almost three times higher. This increasing differential isbecause, although rates fell overall, they fell more among the high social classes than

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the low social classes....not only did the differential between the top and the bottomincrease, the increase happened across the whole spectrum of social classes....Death rates can be summarised into average life expectancy at birth. For men in classesI and II combined, life expectancy increased by 2 years between the late 1970s and thelate 1980s. For those in classes IV and V combined, the increase was smaller, 1.4 years.The difference between those at the top and bottom of the social class scale in the late1980s was 5 years, 75 years compared with 70 years. For women, the differential wassmaller, 80 years compared with 77 years....Premature mortality, that is death before age 65, is higher among people who areunskilled. Table 4 illustrates this with an analysis of deaths in men aged 20 to 64 years.If all men in this age group had the same death rates as those in classes I and II, it isestimated that there would have been over 17,000 fewer deaths each year from 1991 to1993....Inequalities in Health: The Current Position, Independent Inquiry into Inequalities inHealth Report (Acheson Report). Footnotes and references deleted.

The estimate of excess deaths - excess in comparison with equal death rates - gives an idea ofthe scale of suffering involved. Research in Spain estimated a national 10% excess mortality bygeographical areas:

Excess number of deaths in the most deprived geographical areas account for 10% oftotal number of deaths annually....Total annual excess of deaths was estimated to beabout 35 000 people in Spain.Juan Benach and Yutaka Yasui. Geographical patterns of excess mortality in Spainexplained by two indices of deprivation, Journal of Epidemiology and CommunityHealth 53 (1999): 423-431.

It is hard to show that democracy causes these deaths, but it certainly does not prevent them. Thatis, in itself, reason to question its moral legitimacy. In eastern Europe, the scale of deathsassociated with the transition to market democracy was far greater. Roland Scharff estimated thetotal excess deaths in the reform years (1992-1996) at 3,5 million.

Als vorläufiges Fazit bleibt festzuhalten, dass sich während der fünf Reformjahre einNatürlicher Bevölkerungsverlust in einem Umfang von 3,5 Mio. "toten Seelen"aufsummiert hat.Roland Scharff . Transformation und Bevölkerungsbewegung in der RussischenFöderation, Osteuropa-Wirtschaft 43, 3 (1998): 255-268.

This mortality episode is the best documented in history, and the transition itself was its cause.Yet even this fades into insignificance, compared with excess mortality at global level....

the issue of Africa: global inequality

Although the democratic states are the most prosperous in history, democracy has failed toeliminate inequality at global level. Despite the great personal wealth evident in somedemocratic nations, millions of people in the poorest regions of Africa live under conditions,comparable to mediaeval European averages. Although not all states were democratic during the20th century, the richest states were. Nevertheless, the general global distribution of wealth hasnot shifted substantially in the last 150 years. This also seems a permanent and structural failureof democracy. Democracy does not induce the rich to give their money to the poor: not locally,not globally. Not as individuals, not as societies, not as states.

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Every year the wealth of the democracies increases: every year the gap between the richestdemocracies and the poorest countries increases. Mass resource transfer, for instance in the formof transfer taxes, is increasingly feasible - and also increasingly urgent. Some democratic stateshave organised programmes of resource transfer: the largest in history is probably the aid to EastGermany after reunification, financed by an extra income tax. But that is a special case of adivided 'Volk'. The European Union has an explicit policy that no regional 'GNP' should staybelow 75% of EU average. It also aids applicant states, with a maximum of 6% of their GNP inany one year. Yet no such transfer programme exists for the poorest countries. Probably, onlythe German programme matched the level of resource transfer from the Soviet Union toMongolia: approximately 30% of GNP. The collapse of the Soviet Union promptly led towidespread extreme poverty in Mongolia, with famine in the spring of 2000.

The pro-democracy development theorist Amartya Sen claims that democracy prevents famines:

...in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurredin any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. We cannot findexceptions to this rule, no matter where we look: the recent famines of Ethiopia,Somalia, or other dictatorial regimes; famines in the Soviet Union in the 1930s; China's1958-61 famine with the failure of the Great Leap Forward; or earlier still, the faminesin Ireland or India under alien rule. China, although it was in many ways doing muchbetter economically than India, still managed (unlike India) to have a famine, indeed thelargest recorded famine in world history: Nearly 30 million people died in the famine of1958-61, while faulty governmental policies remained uncorrected for three full years.The policies went uncriticized because there were no opposition parties in parliament,no free press, and no multiparty elections. Indeed, it is precisely this lack of challengethat allowed the deeply defective policies to continue even though they were killingmillions each year. The same can be said about the world's two contemporary famines,occurring right now in North Korea and Sudan.Democracy as a Universal Value, Amartya Sen, 1999.

Yet the rich democratic states had enough resources to feed all these people: and they did not.Structurally, they did not. They could have flown these millions of hungry people to the UnitedStates, western Europe, or Japan, where there was enough food. They did not. Amartya Sen doesnot regard this as a defect of democracy: indeed, he seems blind to the issue. If opposition partiesin parliament, a free press, and multiparty elections stop famines, and the worlds richest state hasall of these, then why are there still famines on this planet?

A causal relationship between democracy and famine exists primarily at a global level. It wouldbe most acute, in a world order of perfectly democratic nation states. Such a world order wouldinstitutionalise the selfish behaviour of the hypothetical rich democracy, described in theintroduction. Nation states generally consider the national wealth as reserved for that nation - notavailable for total redistribution to others. In nation states, by definition, the national territory isreserved for members of the nation. The democratisation of a nation state reinforces thereinherent qualities. The electorate generally does not want to give 'their money' to foreigncountries, and they do not want to dilute their standard of living by mass immigration. Ademocratic and national world order does not cause droughts or crop failures. However, itdestroys two standard historical responses to famine: redistribution of food, and migration tonon-famine areas. Although there is no historical tradition of mass migration for medical care inresponse to high mortality, it destroys that option also. The national-democratic world order - thedream of Kofi Annan - imprisons the poor in poverty and ill-health. In some cases their situationis improving: in Africa it is acutely worsening.

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Testable propositions: global inequality

In terms of inequality, it seems that a planet is betteroff without any democracies. Historically, the rise ofdemocracies coincided with a period of unprecedentedglobal inequality. Supporters of the democratic peacetheory imply causal relations from this kind of simplecorrelation ("if there is no war, then democracycaused the peace"). Similar conclusions can be drawnin connection with these testable propositions, such asthese about inequality...

absolute global inequality between states, as thegap between the gross domestic product (GDP)per capita in the poorest and the richest state, isgreater since modern democracies emergedrelative inequality between states, as the ratio ofper capita GDP in the richest and poorest states,is greater since modern democracies emergedstatistical measures of 'national-income'inequality will show a greater coefficient ofinter-state inequality in the period ofdemocracies (about the last 150 years) thanbefore itinter-state inequalities of this kind are greaterbetween democracies and non-democracies,than within the group of democracies, or thegroup of non-democracies

Testing some of these would be difficult: historicaleconomic data is limited. But it would be verysurprising if they are not true - for the simple reasonthat the democratic countries are the rich countries.

There is already enough data on long-term patterns of economic growth, to conclude that therich-poor gap among states is increasing. Research by Angus Madison for the OECD, indicatedthat the gap (in GDP/capita) between western Europe and sub-Saharan Africa was about 3-to-1,in 1820. By 1990 it had increased to 20-to-1. During this long period western Europe was notcontinuously democratic, so this Europe-Africa gap is not equivalent to the gap betweendemocracies and non-democracies.

However, that has changed: in the last generation, 'democracy' and 'rich country' have becomealmost equivalent. According to the 2004 World Bank estimates, over 1,1 billion people live onless than $1 a day, the same as a decade earlier. (These figures are already corrected for thedifferences in purchasing power). In sub-Saharan Africa the proportion living under this official'extreme poverty' limit rose to 46%.

The income ratio - of the poorest 20 countries to the richest 20 - has doubled in the last 40 years.And for that time at least, most of these rich countries were democracies. There are a few richnon-democracies, such as the United Arab Emirates, and some poor democracies such as CapeVerde. But the correlation between a democratic regime and prosperity is now so strong, that

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some democracy theorists see prosperity as a precondition of democracy. Others claim a causallink in the other direction - "democracy makes you rich'. Perhaps - but the statistics suggest itdoes so by keeping others poor.

In broad terms, sub-Saharan Africa has a European 19th-century standard of living. It would take150 or years to follow the path to prosperity taken by western Europe - and western Europe hadno massive HIV/AIDS epidemic. 150 years may not even be enough. At the current rate ofprogress, according to the UNDP Human Development Report 2002, it would take more than130 years, simply to rid the world of hunger. The UNDP seeks to reduce child mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa by two-thirds by 2015, but the 2003 Human Development Report estimates itwill take 150 years more at current trends. Figure 2.1 gives estimates of the time needed toachieve all the 'Millennium Goals' relating to poverty, health and equality: it extends to 2200. Insome areas 'progress' is negative - at current trends the goals will never be reached. Here too, thenegative trend at global level is most acute in the mortality statistics:

....while there is heated debate on whether income inequality is increasing between richand poor countries, inequality in child mortality has gotten unambiguously worse. In theearly 1990s children under five were 19 times more likely to die in Sub-Saharan Africathan in rich countries - and today, 26 times more likely (figure 2.2). Among alldeveloping regions only Latin America and the Caribbean saw no worsening in the pastdecade relative to rich countries, with children still about 5 times more likely to diebefore their fifth birthdays.United Nations Development Programme.Human Development Report 2003, 39-40.

Inequality for the mothers is even worse: the 2004 World Bank estimate is that mothers in thepoorest countries are 100 times more likely to die in childbirth or pregnancy, than mothers in therich countries. More detailed statistics from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) show that theestimate was too optimistic. Chapter 7 of the State of World Population Report 2004 gives theratio between maternal deaths per 100 000 live births in the developed countries and sub-SaharanAfrica. It is 20 to 920, or 46 times worse. Because birth rates are higher, the 'lifetime risk ofmaternal death' is 1 in 2800 in the developed regions, but 1 in 16 in sub-Saharan Africa - 175times greater. The difference is so great, that almost all maternal mortality would be prevented,if the health care standards of the developed world applied globally. About 500 000 lives wouldbe saved each year. It is the worst measured health inequality:

But huge differences - up to a hundred-fold - exist in the risk of pregnancy betweenwomen in rich and poor countries, the highest differential of any public health indicatormonitored by WHO. The lifetime risk that a woman in West Africa will die in pregnancyor childbirth is 1 in 12. In developed regions, the comparable risk is 1 in 4,000. Becausethey receive prompt and effective treatment, women in the developed world rarely die orexperience permanent disabilities from pregnancy-related problems.United Nations Population Fund.State of World Population Report 2004, 52.

Nevertheless, the rich countries did not provide sufficient funds to extend their own health carestandards to Africa and Asia, or even a fraction of what would be needed. In fact they evendefaulted on earlier commitments, so that only half the agreed funding was available. A monthbefore the G8 summit in 2005, with its dramatic talk of 'Marshall Plans' and increased aid, theUNDP confirmed that earlier grandiose promises, in 2000, had not been met. The World Bankis, not surprisingly, pessimistic about the future...

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On current trends, the goals of reducing child and maternal mortality will not beattained in most regions, and only a small proportion of countries (15 to 20 percent)appear to be on track. The goal of halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS andother major diseases (malaria, tuberculosis) appears daunting; their incidence continuesto rise, further aggravating conditions affecting child and maternal mortality andentailing broad and serious economic and social consequences. The risks of failure tohalt the spread of HIV/AIDS are especially high in Sub-Saharan Africa...IMF / World BankGlobal Monitoring Report 2004, Summary

And the UNICEF progess report on the Millenium Goals (May 2006) confirmed that goals forreduction in undernutrition are not beng met either. Again, in Africa there is no progess at all...

But little improvement has been seen in sub-Saharan Africa, where underweightprevalence remained roughly the same over the 1990 - 2004 period. In fact, given thislack of progress and due to population growth, the total number of underweight childrenactually increased in sub- Saharan Africa.

It is not morally acceptable to insist that Africa should 'develop itself' by duplicating thepoverty and inequality of 19th-century England, while suffering a demographic crisiscomparable to the Black Death. It is not morally acceptable to demand 130 years of avoidablehunger, even if the result is universal prosperity. The 'development' option is no longer an optionat all.

Yet this is apparently what the democracies are demanding. Certainly there is no 'political will'in the democracies, to introduce the massive transfer taxes that would be necessary to close thegap. Democracies seem structurally unable to generate this political will. The UN aid target of0,7% of GNP has never been reached. According to the OECD Development AssistanceCommittee, its member states donated 0.33% of GNI in 2005. That was up from 0.26% in 2004,but most of the rise in 'aid' was accounted for by one-off debt relief arrangements, and theDevelopment Assistance Committee expects a fall in aid in 2006 and 2007. The UNCTAD LeastDeveloped Countries Report 2004 shows a total aid to the poorest countries of $15 137 million(Table 23). For their 700 million inhabitants, that is $22 per year, or 6 dollarcent per person perday. That is a gesture, not a transfer of wealth and income. An indicator of the unwillingness totransfer is provided by the World Health Report 2004: 4 to 8 million people need immediatetreatment for AIDS, and at most 10% are getting it.

All the DAC members are democracies, with maximum scores for 'political rights' in theFreedom House Survey. What chance is there, that they will ever approve the 70% incometransfers needed to evenly spread global 'GNP'? The realistic answer must be: it is simply notpossible to close this gap, so long as they are democracies.

The conservatism of democratic culture

At best democracy is no more than a system of government, but in western democracies it hasacquired a sacred status, and it is taboo to question it. Yet there is no moral basis for this cult ofdemocracy, for this sacralisation. As Bhikhu Parekh says of liberalism:

Unless we assume that liberalism represents the final truth about human beings, wecannot indiscriminately condemn societies that do not conform to it.Bhikhu Parekh (1993). The cultural particularity of liberal democracy, in David Held(ed.) Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West Cambridge: Polity. (p. 169).

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A democracy is different from other possible societies, cultures, and regimes: by definition itsubstitutes itself for them. This substitution is not inherently good: democracies have specificdefects, in their culture and society. Most prominent is the conservative bias: democracy anddemocratic culture structurally limit innovation.

The uniformity and conformity of liberal-democratic societies has been criticised, for almost aslong as they exist - from the 19th century on. At first, these criticisms amounted to a nostalgia foraristocratic individualism, and it is still a favourite tactic of democrats to label all criticism ofdemocracy as 'elitist'. John Stuart Mill is typical of this type of aristocratic criticism, directed atthe emerging mass society:

It does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men areeverywhere become or becoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective tothat tendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those who standon the higher eminences of thought. It is in these circumstances most especially, thatexceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in actingdifferently from the mass. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unlessthey acted not only differently, but better. In this age the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Preciselybecause the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable,in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity hasalways abounded when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amountof eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius,mental vigor, and moral courage which it contained. That so few now dare to beeccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.On Liberty, John Stuart Mill 1859.(Chapter III: On individuality, as one of the elements of wellbeing).

However not all anti-conformist criticism can be dismissed as aristocratic nostalgia. In the 100years after Mill wrote, the aristocratic culture of noble eccentricity became culturally marginal.Instead, new forms of individualist 'eccentricity' emerged within mass culture, especially fromthe 1960's onwards.

Criticism of conformity is primarily criticism of liberal society, rather than democracy as apolitical regime. Democracy in itself can not be blamed for a uniform culture, a static culture, orsocial conformity. But in their political culture, democracies have failed to match the image theypresent. Pro-democracy propaganda, for instance in eastern Europe just after 1989, presentsdemocracy as politically dynamic and internally diverse. In reality, all western democracies havestable party systems, dominated by elites: together they form what in Italian is called the classepolitica. It is extremely difficult to break open this 'political class', from outside: the system isneither dynamic, nor open to innovation. As a result, it is not a force for social and culturalinnovation either.

Testable propositions...

The idea of increasing political conformity anduniformity is difficult to operationalise, but thesepropositions could be investigated...

in democracies, the range of political ideas (inthe manifestos of parties elected to parliament)shrinks.

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in democracies, the difference in stated aimsbetween major parties (those with more than5% of the vote) also shrinksdemocracy inhibits the formation of major newpolitical parties (fusions of existing partiesexcepted): the chance that, in any 10-yearperiod, a completely new party will gain morethan 5% of the vote, is small.democracy inhibits the formation of major newpolitical-ideological groups of parties(comparable to the green parties in westernEurope, the only such example in the lastgeneration)

Democracy has brought societies which are monotonous and uniform, at least to some of thepeople who live in them. But not only that. Democracy has failed to bring utopia. That is, it hasfailed to bring into existence any proposed ideal society, or any other proposal of a 'utopian'type. Democracy itself can be labelled a 'utopia', and the present liberal-democratic societies arehistorically unique - nothing like them existed before the 19th century. So, in that sense,democracy has brought at least a new democratic society, which is itself an ideal society forsome people. But nothing else. No dramatically new type of society has emerged among thedemocracies, differing from the standard model of these societies. And most liberal-democratswould in fact be hostile to the label 'utopia' being applied to these liberal-democratic societies.

The liberal tradition is resolutely hostile to utopias: anti-utopianism seems a definingcharacteristic of liberal ideology. That hostility has shaped the present liberal-democraticsocieties. Liberal anti-utopianism and democratic anti-totalitarianism are in practice the samething. Some liberals explicitly equate the two, and see totalitarianism as the result of utopianideals. They believe that the 20th-century totalitarian regimes derive from the European utopiantradition. The early-modern ideal city, the ideal city-states of the type described in ThomasMore's original book 'Utopia", were for them the source of all later evil. (Many postmodernistsshare this distaste for utopia, and the belief that there is a direct line from Thomas More toAuschwitz). In other words, there are liberal-democrats who believe that the political systemshould be so structured, as to save society from utopian experiments. To them, democracy is (atleast partly) a mechanism to prevent utopia. I think they are right about the nature of democracy:but it is democracy, not utopia, which must disappear.

....historical inevitability dictated the triumph of individual human rights that wasinherent in the political transformation that mankind was experiencing, particularly inthe phenomenon of mass political awakening with which we wanted to identify the forcesof democracy and freedom.This was our response to the challenge posed by the notion that so dominated ourcentury: that a coercive utopia derived from dogmatic hubris, that a perfect society, aform of heaven on earth, could be constructed by political compulsion.Zbigniew Brzezinski, Morgenthau Memorial Lecture 1995.

The resistance of democracy to innovation, is clearly related to the reluctance to accept anycriticism of it. Although pro-democratic theorists often say they are not claiming democracy isperfect, in practice it does have a semi-sacred status. So in democratic societies, criticism ofdemocracy, even without questioning its fundamental principles, is regarded with suspicion andhostility. Especially, democrats are reluctant to accept that a democratic system can be corrupted.They may try to associate this criticism with fascism: corruption and 'decadence' were indeed

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major themes of anti-democratic propaganda in the 1930's. Logically, that implies that there is anunderlying belief that democracy is in some way 'pure' or 'perfect'. In turn this creates a tendencyto social self-worship, at its most extreme in the United States. Widespread belief that theexisting society is perfect or quasi-sacred, creates a climate for complacency and socialconformity, not for innovation. Sacralisation is, by definition, a contra-innovative socialphenomenon: the sacred is preserved, to abolish it is sacrilege.

A conservative and anti-utopian bias has specific effects inside a nation state. No existingdemocracy began in an ethical and cultural vacuum of the kind used in social-contract theories.Their values are the pre-existing values of the constituent demos (nation). The 'democraticvalues' in a democratic nation-state are the values of the dominant ethno-cultural group, whichfirst constituted that nation-state. Danish democratic values are Danish values, Norwegiandemocratic values are Norwegian values. Rejection of these values would require an individualmoral choice, and the truly democratic citizen does not exercise individual moral judgment, butblindly accepts election results. That mentality is unlikely to produce innovation in the corevalues: most will be transmitted unchanged from one generation to the next. Paradoxically, thesource of values in a democracy is often not the voters, but the voters' ancestors.

The myth of moral superiority of democracy

Democratic states can claim no morally superior origin. Their own mythology places theirorigins in the political movements of 'the people' (starting with the older western democracies).

Let me sum up the past two hundred years of democratic history. The intertwinedhistories of democratic legitimations, social movement activism and institutionalchanges generated, in some of the world's states, a significant democratization of theinstitutions of government. Despite antidemocratic countertrends, the long run directionof change in some of the states was a democratization of state power.Globalization and the Future of Democracy, John Markoff.(Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. V, 2, 1999, 277-309)

This mythology is sometimes linked to a belief in the superiority of a proto-liberal westerncivilisation - 'from Plato to NATO'. But the reality of democratic expansion has more to do withNATO than Plato, or any other philosopher. The Iraq war has shown, once again, just howbloody 'democratisation' can be.

the military origins of democracy in Europe

The NATO actions in Kosovo were the first explicit 'war for democracy' in Europe, since the endof the Cold War. With hindsight, this seems an inevitable development. By the end of theSecond World War in 1945, citizens of western Europe or the United States found it normal toenforce democracy by war. During the geopolitical stability of the Cold War, however, fear of anuclear holocaust eroded that attitude. Now, democratic conquest is back, inside and outsideEurope. Once again, democratic values are explicitly claimed to justify war. Most democraticregimes in Europe were enforced from outside anyway - by invasion, occupation, or as acondition of economic aid. Democracy in Europe came from the barrel of a gun, or from thepower of the dollar, but rarely from the people....

AlbaniaBreakdown of centralgovernment after collapse ofCommunist regime in

Germany (East)Accession of eastGerman regionalgovernments (Länder) to

NetherlandsInterim military governmentestablished by invasion of US,British and Canadian forces in

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1990/1991: stable democracymade a condition of foreignaid. Italian troops stationed toaid democratisation process.

AndorraMini-state with tradition oflocal democratic assemblies.

ArmeniaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid, afterbreak-up of Soviet Union.

AustriaDemocracy re-established byfour-power Allied occupationforces, between 1945 and1955.

AzerbaijanDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid, afterbreak-up of Soviet Union.

BelarusNot considered democratic bywestern institutions.Democratisation made acondition of foreign aid, afterbreak-up of Soviet Union.

BelgiumDemocracy re-established byUS and British troops in 1944.

BosniaDemocratisation enforced byIFOR and SFOR militaryforces (predominantly NATO), and a civilian HighRepresentative with widepowers. Democratisation alsoa condition of reconstructionaid.

BulgariaRegime change in 1989:democratisation of this regimemade a condition of foreignaid.

CroatiaThe present democratic state,

the Federal Republic ofGermany in 1990,automatically broughtthem into its system ofgovernment.

GeorgiaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid,after break-up of SovietUnion. Demonstratorsstormed Parliament in2003, to install the pro-western PresidentSaakashvili.

GreecePeaceful transition frommilitary rule todemocracy.

Great BritainPre-existing system ofcitizen representationtransformed into fullparliamentarydemocracy, between1830's and 1930's.

HungaryInternal transition todemocracy.

IrelandUndergroundparliamentary democracyestablished by the IRA in1918, and recognised byBritain in peace treaty of1921.

IcelandPre-existing localdemocratic tradition:democratic Republicestablished under USmilitary occupation in1944.

ItalyDemocracy re-established by invasion

1944, re-establisheddemocracy after US pressurein 1945.

NorwayDemocracy re-established in1945, after surrender ofGerman forces without Alliedinvasion.

PolandInternal transition todemocracy over 10-yearperiod.

PortugalDemocracy established bymilitary coup in 1975

RomaniaRegime change in 1989:democratisation of this regimemade a condition of foreignaid.

RussiaCollapse of institutions ofprevious regime from 1989onward: present governmentnot considered fullydemocratic in the west.Further democratisation is acondition of foreign aid, butRussia is less dependent onthis aid than other countries ineastern Europe.

San MarinoSmall principality with stronglocal democratic tradition, defacto part of Italy.

SlovakiaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid, afterbreak-up of Czechoslovakia.

SpainInternal transition todemocracy after death ofautocratic dictator.

SwedenParliamentary democracy

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in the borders of the previousYugoslav republic, wasestablished by rebellion ofpro-secession military units in1991. Subsequently,democracy a condition ofmilitary aid in war withSerbian forces, and of post-war reconstruction aid.

Czech RepublicInternal transition todemocracy.

CyprusDemocratic constitution acondition of independencefrom Britain.

DenmarkDemocracy re-established in1945, after surrender ofGerman forces without Alliedinvasion.

EstoniaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid, afterbreak-up of Soviet Union.

FinlandDefeated by the Soviet Unionin 1944/1945, but neverthelesspre-war western-styleparliamentary democracyrestored, on condition ofneutrality.

FranceDemocracy re-established in1944 by invasion of US,British, and exile Frenchforces.

Germany (West)Democratic Federal Republicestablished by US, British,and French occupation forces.

of US and British forcesin 1944.

KazakhstanNot considereddemocratic by mostwestern institutions.Democratisation made acondition of foreign aid,after break-up of SovietUnion.

KosovoDemocratisationprogramme in progress,funded and controlled bythe OSCE and EU,enforced by NATO-ledoccupation force.

LatviaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid,after break-up of SovietUnion.

LiechtensteinSmall principality withlocal democratictradition, de factodependent onSwitzerland.

LithuaniaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid,after break-up of SovietUnion.

LuxembourgLocal democratictradition. Democracy re-established by invasionof Allied forces in 1944.

MacedoniaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid,after peaceful secessionfrom Yugoslavia.

MaltaDemocratic constitutiona condition of

established by 1920's, on thebasis of pre-existing citizensrepresentation.

SwitzerlandParliamentary democracyestablished by 1920's, on thebasis of pre-existing citizensrepresentation.

TurkeySince the establishment of thestate several transitionsbetween military rule anddemocracy. Continuingdemocracy is a condition ofEuropean Union membership.

UkraineDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid, afterbreak-up of Soviet Union.Western-backeddemonstrations forced newelection in 2004, installing apro-western president at thesecond attempt.

VaticanNever a democracy, by anydefinition.

Yugoslavia (Serbia andMontenegro)Military defeat by NATO inan air war, occupation of partof the national territory, andeconomic sanctions,weakened the Milosevicregime. In combination withsubstantial financial aid to thedemocratic opposition, thisprecipitated its fall in October2000.

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independence fromBritain.

MoldaviaDemocratisation made acondition of foreign aid,after break-up of SovietUnion.

MonacoSmall principality withlimited local democratictradition, de facto part ofFrance.

The present democracies in Europe do not match the democratic mythology. They are not theproduct of successive popular uprisings against absolutist monarchies or totalitarian regimes. Afar more appropriate term is 'democratic conquest', more on that below. There is nothinginherently noble, admirable, or moral, in such a war of conquest.

Tutu Vanhanen reviews the explanations for democratisation in Prospects of Democracy: aStudy of 172 Countries (London: Routledge. 1997. p. 10-21). At least, the explanations whichhave been proposed in English-language political science, including the many theorists who saythere is no single factor. The list includes no mention of military intervention (or economicwarfare) as causal factors in the transition to democracy. A theory of colonialism which did notmention the colonising powers, and suggested the transition to being a colony was a processinternal to each colony, would be unacceptable.

testable propositions

If democratisation was categorised historically on theanalogy with colonial conquests, these hypothesescould be researched...

of the states which have made a transition fromnon-democracy to democracy since 1939, mosthave done so following a military interventionby democratic powers.past military intervention by a democraticpower, rather than any traditional explanationsuch as economic development, is the bestpredictor that a country will be a democracy.of the military interventions since 1900 with thestated purpose of imposing a political system ona state, the majority (if not all) were to imposeor restore democracy

Even when the explanation of democratisation is expanded to include non-internal factors, thereis a reluctance to mention military force. Laurence Whitehead suggest three basic models for theinternational spread of democracy: contagion, control and consent.

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The essential point is that approaching two-thirds of the democracies existing in 1990owed their origins, at least in part, to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention fromwithout (acts, moreover, that were undertaking within living memory). Given this, aninterpretation which excludes from consideration the roles played by external actors,their motives, or their instruments of action is bound to produce a highly distorted imageof the international dimension of democratization...Laurence Whitehead (1996) Three international dimensions of democratization, in TheInternational Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas Oxford: OUP.(p. 9).

Since that was published, there have been more explicit examples of the 'internationaldimension', in Kosovo, Serbia and Timor. The invasion of Iraq, for the declared purpose of'regime change', is probably the best example of 'external actors' in democratisation. Severalyears before the Iraq war, USAID (the official US aid agency), had prepared a list of pro-democracy tactics. It indicates how thorough the 'external actors' can be - especially with militarybacking...

USAID's democracy programs will support:

Constitutional mechanisms, including technical and organizational assistance toconstitutional conventions and constitution-makers.Democratically elected legislatures, including programs to improve the material,technical, and decision-making capabilities of legislatures.Legal systems, including independent judiciaries and civilian-controlled police,and alternative and informal mechanisms for resolving disputes.Local government entities, particularly those that have recently acquiredadditional institutional authority and responsibilities.Credible and effective elections, where voters have confidence in the process.Local, national, regional, and international organizations that protect humanrights, including the rights of workers, indigenous peoples, minorities, and women.Trade unions, professional associations, women's groups, educational entities,and a wide range of indigenous NGOs, particularly those that are partners indevelopment programs.Political parties and other national mechanisms of political expression in a strictlynonpartisan manner and, consistent with statutory limitations, in a manner thatdoes not influence the outcome of an election.Independent media outlets and groups formed to promote and protect freedom ofexpression.Improved civil-military relations, including effective civilian control of themilitary establishment.Institutions and organizations that increase government responsiveness andaccountability at the national, state, and local levels.Educational efforts for children and adults that reflect community participation,promote the development of local NGOs, and encourage tolerance within society.Finally, as a natural complement to longer-term democracy-building efforts,USAID, in consultation with other U.S. Government agencies and with adequatehuman rights safeguards, will support programs in transition situations for theestablishment of democratic political institutions and for the demobilization andretraining of soldiers and insurgents.

USAID'S Strategies - Building Democracy

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This is quite different from a popular uprising. By definition, no process initiated by USAID orother external agency, derives 'from the people' inside the territory concerned. In Bosnia andKosovo, democratic powers could implement a democratisation programme because of a militaryoccupation. That is the stated aim in Iraq, without much success so far. Generally, suchprogrammes emphasise funding of pro-democracy parties, groups and media. The funds go to asmall elite: perhaps for that reason, no multi-ethnic political system has yet emerged, in eitherBosnia or Kosovo. It is not likely in Iraq either.

exclusion of the undemocratic: total democracy

The democratic claim to moral superiority is partly based on the treatment of persons withindemocracies. Liberal democracies also claim to be politically neutral. Nevertheless, even modeldemocracies exclude (and often politically persecute) anti-democrats. In this respect, ademocratic system is like all other regimes: it takes measures to ensure its own survival. Thewestern Cold War slogan "at least there is free speech here", usually did not apply toundemocratic organisations. That is still true in the liberal democracies. Anti-democrats are oftenexcluded from the use of human and political rights, and anti-democratic parties are sometimesforbidden. The new European Charter of Fundamental Rights contains such an exclusion:

Article 54 Prohibition of abuse of rightsNothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in anyactivity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedomsrecognised in this Charter....Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The Charter also includes the basic political rights now used to define democracy, includingvoting and candidacy rights. Article 54 therefore constitutes an exclusion of anti-democrats fromthose rights. The German Constitution is another example: for historical reasons, the 'defence ofdemocracy' plays a greater role in German political culture, than in other democracies.

Artikel 18 - Einbüssen von GrundrechtenWer die Freiheit der Meinungsäusserung, insbesondere die Pressefreiheit (Artikel 5 Abs.1), die Lehrfreiheit (Artikel 5 Abs. 3), die Versammlungsfreiheit (Artikel 8), dieVereinigungsfreiheit (Artikel 9), das Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis (Artikel 10),das Eigentum (Artikel 14) oder das Asylrecht (Artikel 16 a) zum Kampfe gegen diefreiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung missbraucht, verwirkt diese Grundrechte. DieVerwirkung und ihr Ausmass werden durch das Bundesverfassungsgerichtausgesprochen.Bundestag: Grundgesetz

Article 18 [Forfeiture of basic rights]Whoever abuses freedom of expression of opinion, in particular freedom of the press(Article 5 (1)), freedom of teaching (Article 5 (3)), freedom of assembly (Article 8),freedom of association (Article 9), privacy of letters and secrecy of post andtelecommunication (Article 10), property (Article 14), or the right to asylum (Article16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order forfeit these basic rights. Suchforfeiture and the extent thereof is determined by the Federal Constitutional Court.Constitution of Germany

The suppression of political parties is normal practice in established liberal democracies. In anarticle on party bans in Israel, Raphael Cohen-Almagor gives the typical justification for thispractice:

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This article argues that it is neither morally obligatory, nor morally coherent, to expectdemocracy to place the means for its own destruction in the hands of those who eitherwish to bring about the annihilation of the state, or to undermine democracy, and whotake active steps to realize those ends.Raphael Cohen-Almagor (1997) Disqualification of political parties in Israel: 1988-1996

But if you substitute the word 'dictatorship' for 'democracy", this formula justifies thesuppression of democratic parties by a dictatorship. The line of argument is not itself coherent: itis morally arbitrary. Nevertheless it indicates the pro-democratic fervour of democracy.Democracy is not above the parties - the democrats are themselves a party. Western media andgovernments usually support such 'democratic forces' in other countries: the implication is thatthey have a special claim to be elected. If democracy was politically neutral, candidates supportfor democracy would be irrelevant. In reality, democrats are pro-democracy - as you wouldexpect - and democratic systems are pro-democracy.

It is even possible to define democracy by these characteristics- as a political system wheredemocratic forces hold absolute political power, at least in relation to non-democrats, and wherethey institutionally persecute anti-democrats. It is not a comprehensive definition, but it isdescriptive of most democracies. If democracy were truly a superior system of government, thenit would (presumably) not need this harassment of its opponents.

All democracies also maintain a culture of democracy - a parallel to the 'national culture', whichall nation states support. It is the exclusive political culture: there can be no 'culture oftotalitarianism' in a democracy. Paradoxically, in the stable democracies, this has created a 'totaldemocracy', with the characteristics attributed to totalitarian culture. In the liberal democracies,democratic attitudes pervade all aspects of life, and especially education. At universities inliberal democracies, standard political science courses include only pro-democratic theorists.

Despite this total-democracy culture,democrats often claim that living in a democracy isequivalent to 'freedom' - usually meaning political freedom. The classic example is again theFreedom House annual survey, which claims to show how many countries are 'free'. It is oftenquoted in the media as factual truth, without any further analysis. Many of the leading theoristsof liberal market democracy work on Freedom House projects: that group overlaps with the USforeign policy establishment. (The academic advisors included Larry Diamond, JeaneKirkpatrick, Seymour Lipset, Alexander Motyl, and the neoconservative Islam-basher DanielPipes). Their definition of freedom overlaps the definition of a liberal democracy: it is nosurprise that liberal-democratic countries get the best scores for 'freedom'. But this is no morethan circular reasoning: if political freedom is defined as 'living under a democracy', thendemocracies have political freedom.

Nevertheless people are also unfree in democracies - in ways that seem specific to liberal marketdemocracy itself. In general it is the market which limits social and economic freedom, ratherthan their political regime. The operation of the labour market, and the conditions ofemployment, provide the best examples. Some US employers in the services and retail sectorsrequire their employees to smile permanently, at least in the presence of customers. In a fewcases, employers have required plastic surgery, as a condition of employment. These areimpositions, and restrict personal freedom. The point is, that they are apparently culturallyspecific to the liberal market democracies. Unlike, for instance, poverty or inequality, they arenot reported in any historical non-democratic society. Apparently, the market democracies havecertain specific unfreedoms, which undermine their claim to be 'free'.

the illegal immigrant and democracy

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The pretensions of liberal-democratic states are undermined especially by their treatment ofillegal immigrants. Unlike many previous 'democratic deficits', this can not be remedied insidethe political structure of these states. For instance, until the time of the First World War, womenwere excluded from voting in many western democracies. That democratic deficit was remediedby the introduction of universal adult suffrage in the 1920's. Still, the 'demos' in the democraticsystem continued to be the same nation, that formed the nation state. Britain was no less British,when British women got the vote. But conceding full citizenship to anyone who can cross theborder (legally or illegally), would ultimately change the population structure of the westernnation states. Most democratic theorists are apparently unwilling to welcome 500 million newAfrican fellow-citizens: and so they defend a 'demos' equivalent to existing populations of nationstates.

The fifth and final criterion for the democratic process is, then, as follows: The demosmust include all adult members of the association except transients and persons provedto be mentally defective. Admittedly the definition of adults and transients is a potentialsource of ambiguity.Robert Dahl (1989). Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. (p.129).

How does a typical western democracy, such as the Netherlands or Britain, appear to an illegalimmigrant? Again the Freedom House checklist can be used - this time to check on the peoplewho wrote it, or at least the system they defend. First the political rights of illegal immigrants,the 'transients'...

Can illegal immigrants vote for the head of state and/or head of government in free andfair elections? No.

Can illegal immigrants vote for the legislative representatives in free and fair elections?No.

Have they equal campaigning opportunities? No, in practice, since any public activity canlead to their arrest.

Do illegal immigrants have the right to organize in different political parties or othercompetitive political groupings of their choice? No. Formal legal registration of anyassociation would be difficult: registration of the party for electoral purposes would be inpractice impossible, since the illegals would have to disclose their address. Such a partycould operate only by using legal residents as a front.

The civil rights checklist, especially, indicates the second-class status of illegal immigrants...

Can illegal immigrants have their own free and independent media and other forms ofcultural expression? No. Any offices of a newspaper, any TV studio, would be subject topossible police raids and detention of the illegals. Their media would also have to operatethrough a front.

Have illegal immigrants free religious institutions, and is there free private and publicreligious expression? Yes, in private. Police in the EU member states rarely arrestimmigrants at a mosque, for instance. But public expressions, religious or otherwise,expose the speaker to arrest and detention.

Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion for illegalimmigrants? No. A demonstration or meeting, specifically for illegal immigrants, wouldbe an invitation to the police to detain all the demonstrators. In practice immigrants can

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only participate in demonstrations or meetings organised by legal existing groups. Theymust rely on the political influence of the organisers, to prevent their arrest during theactivity.

Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization for illegal immigrants? No.Again, any organisation specifically for illegals could not operate from a fixed address, orwith legal registration. Illegals who participate in existing political organisations must trustthat organisation to protect them from arrest.

Is the population treated equally under the law? No. Illegal immigrants are excluded fromparticipation in the legal system, as judges and lawyers, and as jurors in countries with ajury system.

Is there protection from unjustified imprisonment and exile? No. In fact this is thestandard fate of the illegal immigrant: detention and deportation. (The term 'exile' impliesthat native-born citizens somehow suffer more from a deportation than an immigrant - aracist distinction).

Is there personal autonomy for illegal immigrants? Does the state control travel, choice ofresidence, or choice of employment? Yes, the state controls all of these, or attempts to. Inthe Netherlands you must have a valid residence permit to travel on the train, rent a housein the social sector, or get a legal job. If these kind of controls limit personal autonomy,then illegals do not have full personal autonomy.

It is clear that the treatment of illegal immigrants in western countries would be called'repression', if it was applied to political dissidents or ethnic minorities elsewhere. The treatmentof asylum seekers is similar - although they are not 'illegal immigrants' while their application isbeing processed.

The 'Tampa incident' illustrated the realities. The Norwegian container ship Tampa had pickedup asylum seekers at sea, and entered Australian territorial waters in August 2001. The right-wing Howard government made a stand on the issue - explicitly refusing to admit the asylumseekers to Australian territory. They were kept on board the ship, and prevented from leaving itby soldiers of the elite force SAS. They were isolated from the media and lawyers: only theNorwegian ambassador was permitted to visit the ship at first, and later one delegation. In effectthe asylum seekers were placed in detention - which is in any case their normal treatment inAustralia. Now, people held incommunicado on a ship, guarded by soldiers, obviously have nopolitical rights - none at all. There is no question of them voting in Australian elections,demonstrating, or participating in any way in the political process there. The soldiers preventedall access to the rest of society, a policy emphasised when the asylum seekers were transferred toan Australian troop ship (the media were excluded from this military operation). This de factomilitary detention was nevertheless enforced on people, who had committed no crime inAustralia.

The question for the defenders of democracy is this: if a recognised legitimate democracy cantreat one group like this, why not others? From the point of view of an illegal immigrant, awestern democracy such as Britain or Australia has most of the characteristics attributed todictatorships or 'authoritarian regimes'. Yet they meet the criteria of Freedom House for politicalfreedom. If a clever dictatorship can arrange repression, in such a way as to meet the standard of'democracy' and 'freedom' applied to illegal immigrants, then why is such a dictatorship wrong?And if any dictatorship can meet these standards, merely by clever administrative arrangements,than why is dictatorship fundamentally wrong?

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And from the other side: why is a political regime, which treats people like the Howardgovernment treats refugees, morally desirable? Why is it noble and good? It is not because thesystem failed - the Australian democracy works perfectly well. Howard was democraticallyelected, in free and fair elections, in a society with a free press and guaranteed civil rights.Opinion polls showed he had the backing of a huge majority, for his hard line toward the asylumseekers on board the MV Tampa. Australia recognises and implements all the human and civilrights, which are supposed to protect minorities against the tyranny of the majority. But, as theTampa case shows, they are no guarantee at all. The Howard government is not a distortion ofdemocracy, it illustrates how democracy works. The people rule, and in this case 'the people' area xenophobic people. The political system expresses their collective will, exactly as intended.But is it right?

The constitution of the demos

Modern democracy is inextricably linked to nations, to nationalism, and to the nation state asform of state. Liberal democracy and nationalism developed together in Europe. To a largeextent, democracy and nationalism are parallel. Democracy presupposes a demos, a communityin which 'politics' takes place. The demos of modern democracies, and the nation of modernnation-states, are the same thing. Western politicians speak interchangeably of 'the nation", 'ournation", 'the people", 'the community'. Democrats, almost by definition, believe it is necessary tomaintain the demos as a political unit: this has led to an association of democracy andconservative nationalism.

Most democrats believe, that a democracy is legitimate regardless of the criteria used to selectthe demos. Even a completely closed racial community, with zero immigration, can be ademocracy. (According to democratic theory, it would be more legitimate than a dictatorshipwhich allowed free immigration). Although several western democracies have a 'right toemigrate', no democracy has ever had a right to immigration. In practice the criteria of citizenshipin democracies is biological descent: typically, more than 90% of the citizens acquired that statusfrom their parents.

Opponents of immigration in democratic states even use democracy as an argument - claimingthat the cohesion of the political community will be undermined. In the EU conservativenationalists use the explicit argument, that no European-scale geopolitical entity can belegitimate, because there is no European demos.

European integration, on this view, may have involved a certain transfer of statefunctions to the Union but this has not been accompanied by a redrawing of politicalboundaries which can occur only if, and can be ascertained only when, a European Volkcan be said to exist. Since this, it is claimed, has not occurred, the Union and itsinstitutions can have neither the authority nor the legitimacy of a Demos-cratic State.The State 'über alles": Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, Joseph H.Weiler, 1995.

Weiler's article is a commentary on a decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the GermanConstitutional Court (inspired by nationalist fears about the Maastricht Treaty). Describing whathe calls the No-Demos thesis, Weiler summarises the democratic-nationalist position...

Critically, Volk/nation are also the basis for the modern democratic State: The nationand its members, the Volk, constitute the polity for the purposes of accepting thediscipline of democratic, majoritarian governance. Both descriptively and prescriptively(how it is and how it ought to be) a minority will/should accept the legitimacy of amajority decision because both majority and minority are part of the same Volk, belong

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to the nation. That is an integral part of what rule-by-the-people, democracy, means onthis reading. Thus, nationality constitutes the state (hence nation-state) which in turnconstitutes its political boundary, an idea which runs from Schmitt to Kirchhof. Thesignificance of the political boundary is not only to the older notion of politicalindependence and territorial integrity, but also to the very democratic nature of thepolity. A parliament is, on this view, an institution of democracy not only because itprovides a mechanism for representation and majority voting, but because it representsthe Volk, the nation, the demos from which derive the authority and legitimacy of itsdecisions.The State 'über alles": Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, for footnotesee original.

This democratic-nationalist position is accepted by most modern democrats, and all existingdemocratic states. Democracy therefore reinforces nationalism as a state formation ideology.That is wrong in itself, and it encourages nationalist violence in state formation. New nationstates are comparatively rare (about one per year on average), and some were formed withoutbloodshed - such as Slovakia. But blood was certainly shed to found some others, or to save anexisting state. That happened partly because nationalists (on both sides) believed their nation-state was essential to democracy.

Testable propositions: fortress democracy

The combination of the nation state and globalinequality has created a historically unique pattern of'islands' of wealth co-existing with oceans of poverty.The island metaphor is not entirely accurate, sincemost rich countries border on other rich countries.They are not in fact surrounded by extreme poverty -it is generally further away from their borders.Mexico, for instance, is no longer a poor country: thepoorest immigrants at the Rio Grande come from itssouthern neighbours. Similarly, most illegalimmigrants who cross the Strait of Gibraltar comefrom sub-Saharan Africa, not from Morocco itself.However the island metaphor is accurate at globallevel: those who are born in a rich society will live ina rich society, those who are born amid extremepoverty will die there also. The outward transfer ofwealth is minimal: development aid is less than 0,5%of GDP in rich countries, and the percentage isfalling. The inward transfer of population is minimal.Never before has it been cheaper to travel from onecontinent to another, never before has the gap inincomes been greater, but migration into the richwestern democracies is deliberately kept at a lowlevel. This is what is historically unique, and it doesseem to be specific to democracies, in the formsuggested by these propositions

high-income democracies admit lessimmigrants than the few high-income non-

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democracies (such as the United ArabEmirates)the countries which have historically spent thehighest proportion of GDP on immigrationcontrol are democraciesmost countries which have installed electronicsurveillance at their borders, in order to limitimmigration, are democraciesin democracies, economic growth produces nocorresponding rise in development aidthe highest absolute gaps in GNP per capita, forpairs of states, are between democracies andnon-democraciesthe 'privilege' of immigration into a richdemocracy is granted disproportionately tothose who already come from a rich country.For any specific high-income democracy, thepoorest countries have the lowest immigrationrates into that democracy, taking account of therelative populations of the two countries.high-income non-democracies are more likelythan high-income democracies to acceptimmigrants from poor or very poor countriesthe more democratic a country is, the lower thepercentage of refugees among its population

The equivalence of demos and nation also undermines the legitimacy of democratic decisions.Imagine a referendum on the prohibition of pork (pig meat), which Muslims consider unclean. Ifthe referendum is held in France or Germany the result will be: no prohibition. If held in SaudiArabia, there will certainly be prohibition. If the referendum is only for women, world-wide,then there will probably be no prohibition. But if the referendum is only for veiled women, thenpork will be forbidden. You can get any result in this referendum, by choosing the unit ofdecision.

That is a general characteristic of democracy - although to get some decisions, you would have tobe very selective. Supporters of democracy claim that a democratic decision is legitimate,because it is the result of a free and fair decision-making process. But what if the oppositedecision can be obtained, in an equally free and fair democracy, with different voters? Why isone free-and-fair decision to be respected, and the other not? In practice the legitimation of thedecision is historical. The unit of decision is the nation state, based on a historic group: only theirdecisions are recognised as legitimate.

The same issue arises in social-contract theories: the group formation itself is morally arbitrary.Can two people come up to me on the street, tell me the three of us form a nation, and thendecide by majority vote, that I must enter military service under their command? If they try thattrick with several million people, they might succeed. In the last 100 years, many people havesuddenly found themselves in newly established nation states - which then demand their patrioticloyalty. In such cases, the principle of democracy is used to retroactively legitimise the formationof the national unit. National liberation movements usually claim to be democratic, at least sincethe late 19th century. So, having forced people into a political unit, they attempt to legitimise it -by holding an election within that unit. Democrats usually accept this form of legitimisation,

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provided the elections are fair. However, the democrats are wrong: an election can notretroactively legitimise the involuntary formation of the electorate.

Equally, the typical nation-demos is arbitrary in terms of exclusion. The opposite of democracyis usually said to be autocracy, authoritarianism, or totalitarianism. However, it can also be givenas xenocracy - a rare term for rule by foreigners. In practice all democracies limit immigration, topreserve existing community. If democracy was intended to give maximum power of decision toindividual persons, then all democracies would allow voting from outside. During the formationof many existing nation states, democracy was indeed equated with 'non-xenocracy', even if thatword was not used. The claim to democracy was treated as equivalent to the sovereignty claim,and both claims as implying the removal of foreign populations. Sometimes only a few colonialadministrators were expelled, sometimes millions of people. People are not only forced intonation states, they are also forced out of them. An election can not legitimise ethnic cleansing ofthe electorate before the election.

Historical expulsions are not the main cause of exclusion from voting. Most 'excluded potentialvoters' were not expelled from the democracy: they never lived there anyway. If the idea of afixed territorial-political unit was abandoned, all these billions of potential voters could arrive tovote. The reality in democratic states is exactly the opposite: non-resident aliens are neverallowed to vote. The fact that a nation is democratic, is said to legitimise its immigration laws.But this is a circular reasoning: if the potential immigrants were allowed to vote, they wouldusually outvote the resident population (and grant themselves citizenship). Again, an electioncan not in itself legitimise exclusion from that election, no matter how fair it is. An ethnicallypure nation with totally closed borders might still be a perfect democracy, but that does notjustify such states: instead it suggests something is wrong with democracy.

more problems with the demos: minorities and the future population

All democratic theorists have to acknowledge the issue of the disadvantaged minority. Muchdemocratic theory is concerned with showing this disadvantage is not unjust. At its simplest,there is a pure anarchist objection to democracy. Such an anarchist would say: "No-one shoulddecide on my life - not kings, not oligarchs, but not fellow-citizens either". However mostanarchists today are not anti-democrats. Instead they believe in small-scale community, often in ademocratic form. They no longer object to the democratic principle, just to the scale. Anarchismtoday is more a form of localised communitarianism, often politically acceptable to democraticnation states.

In contrast, the political individual counts for less and less, as a unit of democracy. In moderndemocracies there is a threshold for political influence: an organisation representing less than 1in 10 000 of ordinary citizens is unlikely to have any political weight. Although communitarianscriticise 'individualism', 'atomism' and 'egoism' in modern democracies, in reality the un-organised individual is politically marginalised, and so are very small minorities. Mostdemocratic theory simply assumes, that individuals will join political parties and otherorganisations and exercise rights collectively.

Localist neo-anarchism can not resolve the general problem of the minority in democracies. Itwould only work if the disadvantaged minority was locally concentrated and homogeneous. Norcan the mainstream 'scale ideologies' - federalism, regionalism, urban democracy. Subsidiarityand devolution to smaller political units do not affect the position of a dispersed minority. Theywill be outvoted at local level, just as they are at national level. There is only one resolution ofthe problem of the disadvantaged minority: leave the demos, secede.

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Democracies can guarantee basic rights for minorities. However, they can not guarantee them asociety built on their values. Guarantees of civil and political rights can not compensateminorities, for living in a society which they consider morally intolerable. Issues likeabortion and euthanasia clearly show the limits of democracy. It can not resolve an ethical issue,and there are many ethical issues in modern societies. If anti-abortion groups want abortion to becriminalised, then the legislature must either accept or reject that demand. There is no thirdoption: delay is rejection of the demand. Laws are either in force, or they are not. Either way,given ethical differences, some people will live under laws which they can not accept inconscience.

The successful prohibition of alcohol in the United States was already mentioned, as an exampleof how religious fundamentalists impose their values through democratic process. This kind ofdemocratic legislation can produce the most acute issues of conscience: democracies cangenerate humiliating and grotesque repression of 'ethical minorities'. Consider this proposedanti-abortion legislation in the American State of Georgia, which has a conservative Christianmajority. It attempts to ban abortions, by forcing women to seek a death penalty for the fetus, ina jury trial:

As used in this Code section, the term:(1) 'Abortion' means the intentional termination of human pregnancy with an intentionother than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus.(2) 'Death warrant' means an order of a superior court providing that an execution mayproceed.(3) 'Execution' means an abortion.

(b) No physician shall perform an execution in this state without first obtaining a deathwarrant as provided in this Code section.

(c) Any person seeking to have an execution performed shall first file a petition in thesuperior court in the county of the petitioner's residence. Upon the filing of suchpetition, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the rights of the fetus. Theguardian ad litem shall be authorized to demand a jury trial to determine the rights ofthe fetus. Within 30 days after the filing of such petition, the court shall hold a trial forthe purpose of balancing the fetus' right to live against the rights of the person seekingto have the execution performed.Bill to amend Article 6 of Chapter 5 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia

Many people would find it abhorrent to live in a society which treats women this way, but ademocracy has no room for conscientious objections, even on these religious issues. If ademocratic government allowed objections of conscience to all its decisions, then it could not bea democracy. It would not even be a government, in the usual meaning: it would be a debatingsociety. Yet there is no reason why people with conscientious objections to a society should beforced to live in it. If there is no other state - no other demos - which corresponds to their values,then even emigration is not an option. The failure of democracies to allow 'freedom of exit' is amajor ethical defect. Again it seems to be a structural defect: no change is in sight.

The use of futures scenarios, for instance in spatial planning, has introduced a related issue, fordemocracy theory. When decisions are being taken about the future, can democracy claim anyspecial legitimacy? A typical futures study claims that a democratic city government maylegitimately decide on the future shape of the city. Yet many of the people who will live in thefuture city are not alive today, or have no vote. In the case of long-term planning (50 years ormore), most of those who elected the present administration will be dead.

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If a present population takes decision for a future population, the future population is (bydefinition) excluded from the process. No political procedure can correct that exclusion. In thisway, democracy allows the present population to 'rule' the future population - in contradiction ofits own logic of representation and participation. It is obvious, that this is an inbuilt advantagefor conservatism. If political concerns shift from immediate issues, to the future shape of society,this defect of democracy will become more important.

The permanence and expansionism of democracy

A more abstract ethical objection to democracy is, that it blocks the transition to a post-democratic world: democracy is for ever. Self-preservation probably characterises most socialstructures. In liberal-democratic states, there are usually specific legal prohibitions againstoverturning democracy. These include the constitutional restrictions on anti-democratsmentioned already, which are now duplicated at the level of the European Union. All suchprohibitions are unethical, for it is unethical to block change. If necessary, innovation shouldtake precedence over democracy. However, democrats claim that democracy itself has priorityover other values: the abolition of democracy would at least prevent them from enforcing thisvalue preference.

Historical process can not legitimise the permanence of democracy. In Europe, the first moderndemocracies followed absolute monarchies. That does not mean democracy should neverdisappear, and certainly not that any future non-democracy is a restoration of absolute monarchy.The implicit historicist claim in this type of argument is: "everything in the present is better thanit was in the past, therefore it should never be abolished". But change does not consist ofaccretion only. That which came, can also go - without implying a 'return to the past'.

Not only is democracy for ever, it is for ever becoming more democratic. More than any otherregime of government, it is concerned with its own maximisation. It is normal for democrats todemand more democracy: it would be unusual for a monarch to demand more monarchy. It is notsimply a monopoly in time and space. It goes beyond monopoly: even if all the world isdemocratic, for ever, many democrats will still insist on more democracy, furtherdemocratisation. For them, 100% democratic would not be enough.

a democratic planet, no less

Since the world is not yet 100% democratic, 'democratisation' generally refers to spatialexpansion. There are organisations in western states (government-funded and private) whichexist for the specific purpose of converting other states into democracies. There are also realorganisations of democratic states, such as the Community of Democracies, which first met inWarsaw in June 2000. Such organisations indicate a willingness to form some sort of democraticbloc:

We will seek to strengthen institutions and processes of democracy. We appreciate thevalue of exchanging experiences in the consolidation of democracy and identifying bestpractices. We will promote discussions and, where appropriate, create forums onsubjects relevant to democratic governance for the purpose of continuing and deepeningour dialogue on democratization. We will focus our deliberations on our commonprinciples and values rather than extraneous bilateral issues between members. Weresolve jointly to cooperate to discourage and resist the threat to democracy posed bythe overthrow of constitutionally elected governments.Final Warsaw Declaration: Towards a Community of Democracies

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Proposals for a Union of Democracies existed before the Second World War, and there wereolder proposals for unions of 'civilised states'. At the time both of these meant the US, Britainand its 'white colonies', and a few west-European and Scandinavian states. After the end of theCold War the idea enjoyed a revival - indicative of the mood of democratic expansionism.Democratic expansionists believe that they are entitled to impose democracy, without limit intime or space. Indeed most of them would claim - like US Deputy Secretary of State StrobeTalbott - that this cannot possibly be an imposition.

Democracy, by definition, can never be imposed. In any country under anycircumstances, it's dictatorship that is, by definition, an imposition, while democracy is,and can only be, a choice.Strobe Talbott to NATO foreign ministers, December 1999

Inherent in democracy is a claim to a democratic world order - and by definition, any globalclaim is a monopoly claim. Like universal religions such as Christianity and Islam, democracycan ultimately tolerate no competitors, no 'other gods'. Yet a democratic world order would belike a prison covering the whole world - 'prisoners' could escape, but only into an identical cell.That model approximates to the emergent world order, of liberal (and neoliberal) market-democratic nation states.

Democracy intensifies itself, and maximises its spatial extent. Historically, as soon as onedemocratic great power emerged, it became likely that democracy would expand to cover theworld. Francis Fukuyama was right on this point, despite all the scepticism he attracted in the1990's. American soldiers in Saddam's palaces dramatically illustrated the process. His view,that after '1989' the remaining non-democracies would be pressured out of existence, now seemscorrect - at least on present trends. That would indeed generate a democratic monopoly, a spatialmonopoly of the entire planet.

The idea of democracy is inextricably linked to the national identity of the UnitedStates...The United States is vigorously engaged in all corners of the globe, acting as aforce for peace and prosperity. Expanding the global community of democracies is a keyobjective of U.S. foreign policy.Democracy and Governance, US Agency for International Development, USAID.

The progress of liberty is a powerful trend. Yet, we also know that liberty, if notdefended, can be lost. The success of freedom is not determined by some dialectic ofhistory. By definition, the success of freedom rests upon the choices and the courage offree peoples, and upon their willingness to sacrifice. In the trenches of World War I,through a two-front war in the 1940s, the difficult battles of Korea and Vietnam, and inmissions of rescue and liberation on nearly every continent, Americans have amplydisplayed our willingness to sacrifice for liberty.... Every nation has learned, or shouldhave learned, an important lesson: Freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, andstanding for -- and the advance of freedom leads to peace. (Applause.)And now we must apply that lesson in our own time. We've reached another greatturning point - and the resolve we show will shape the next stage of the worlddemocratic movement.President George W. Bush at the National Endowment For Democracy, November 2003.

So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democraticmovements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of endingtyranny in our world...President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, January 2004.

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Five different versions of the history of democratic expansion are compiled at SteveMuhlberger's site Chronology of Modern Democracy: Five Different Views - those of FrancisFukuyama, Samuel P. Huntingdon, Tatu Vanhanen, the Freedom House's End of CenturySurvey, and Matthew White. The last includes online maps of regime types at 10-year intervals.Multiparty democracies are coloured blue (the traditional colour of conservatism), and in themap series a wave of blue is slowly covering the planet. However, unlike many historicalphenomena, this is accompanied by an explicit normative theory. The democratic theorists arenot just describing what is happening, they say clearly that they want it to happen.

Nevertheless, there is no inherent moral reason, why all the planet should have one system ofgovernment, and why all others should be forced out of existence. Any system or regime ofgovernment, or regime of law, which is not known to be perfect, should allow escape andevasion. A pan-democratic world would not allow this escape. Non-democrats would have nochoice but to live in a society which regarded them as evil "supporters of tyranny", as peoplealien to its own foundational values.

democratic recolonisation

So democracy is not only a system of government, it is a war against anti-democracy. Democraticexpansionism implies, in global perspective, a planetary civil war between democrats and anti-democrats. When the democrats have won, the planet will be democratic: from their perspectivea war of conquest is logical.

However, the minimal western definition of democracy, in places such as Kosovo, Timor, andnow Iraq, is simply 'rule by democratic forces'. In order to rule, these democratic forces must kill(or at least defeat) the anti-democratic forces, usually with western help. But the 'democraticforces' in such territories are generally a small elite anyway: pro-American, English-speaking,and usually upper-middle-class. On this definition, the new democracy leads to the creation of aspecific political structure in such territories. Bosnia, Kosovo and Timor have seen a remarkabledevelopment in geopolitics, unforeseen by most IR theorists - the return of the protectorate.Occupied Iraq was governed, at first, in true colonial style, by a military governor. The realpower in Iraq still rests with the United States - the de facto governor is US AmbassadorNegroponte. (If internal security collapses, some form of official UN protectorate might still beinstalled).

In the new protectorates, the majority of the population are excluded from the political andadministrative structure by language and cultural barriers. On Timor, there were riots when theUN administration made knowledge of English a condition for employment - excluding 90%,perhaps even 99%, of the population. Here and in other countries, 'democratic transition' and'democratisation' are processes administered in English. The protectorate importedadministrators, and was externally financed, at least in the beginning. The powers of theseadministrators are very great - including in Kosovo the choice of music played on local radiostations.

The accurate term for such political regimes is 'colonial'. They display the classiccharacteristic of a colonial regime, namely the imbalance in the exercise of power. Australiantroops imposed a new Portuguese-financed civilian administration in East Timor, but theTimorese population was not given a piece of Australia, to administer by their standards. Nor arethey allowed to vote in Australian or Portuguese elections. Kosovars were not given a piece ofthe United States, where they can tell the local radio stations what music to play. Yet this one-sided process is described as 'democratisation'. Whatever the justification for the arrival of the

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troops, the democratisation becomes the justification for their stay. A new type of territorial unithas emerged - the democratising protectorate - but it is firmly within the general category of'colonies'. Recolonisation is apparently the present specific form of democratic expansion.

The next 20 years might see a spectacular growth in the number of protectorates. Much of Africais affected by intermittent or endemic conflicts, including 'official' wars among states. All ofthese are potential justifications for intervention, and often there are pro-intervention lobbies inthe west. The most serious are the Sudan civil war and the interconnected wars in theDemocratic Republic of Congo, Ruanda and Burundi. A few Latin American states withendemic internal conflicts, such as Colombia, might also become protectorates: they are alreadytargets of military intervention in varying degrees. And there are always other justificationsavailable, such as 'weapons of mass destruction', or simply the threat that they exist. A generalrecolonisation - unthinkable during the Cold War - is now a medium-term possibility.

Colonialism can be distinct from democratic expansionism. The wave of colonisation in Africafrom 1870 to 1910, the 'scramble for Africa', was not driven by any ideals of democracy. It wasdriven by commercial pressure and great-power rivalry, and legitimised by doctrines of racialsuperiority and the 'civilising mission'. However, the crusade for democracy and human rightscould become the 'civilising mission' of a global recolonisation - and democratising protectoratesthe standard form of colony. In a worst-case scenario, about 1000 million people could live insuch protectorates in 2020 - ruled by administrators from Europe and North America, and a localEnglish-speaking elite.

Influenced by a global pro-democracy elite, western public opinion might genuinely believe thatthis is the final triumph of democracy. However, in the protectorates 'democracy' is simply themilitarily-enforced rule of non-European ethnic groups by imported administrators. That is nodifferent from the political regime of 19th-century colonies, and it is difficult to claim it has anyspecial moral legitimacy, especially when cultural and linguistic barriers separate theadministration from the population. 'Liberated Iraq' will no doubt provide more examples, of lifeunder a democratising imperialism.

Justifying democracy

Democratic theorists attempt to justify democracy - that is, to explain in the language of ethics,why there should be democracy. As with the definitions of democracy, there is a standard list ofjustifications, indicating a well-developed and stable ideology. They fall into 3 or 4 clusters:moral autonomy and sovereignty of the individual; the requirement for consent of the governed;the basic equality of individuals or at least citizens; and the educative capability of democraticcitizenship. The first two are often linked together.

There are also justifications with a more nationalist emphasis: they see the sovereignty of 'thepeople' (meaning the nation) as the primary justification of democracy. And in liberal politicalphilosophy, there are justifications of democracy on the ground of procedural fairness. Thisjustification is typical of liberalism, which can almost be defined by its claim that 'processjustifies outcome'. The objection to such claims is also well known:

Morality requires that procedures tend to produce good laws and policies, and goodlaws and polices are not just any which happen to result from a certain kind ofprocedure.William N. Nelson (1980) On Justifying Democracy. London: Routledge. (p. 33).

All these are formal criteria used to justify democracy. In the democracies, three other

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justifications are common - less formal and less philosophical. The first is the historicalcomparison with totalitarian atrocities, especially with the 'unholy trinity' of Stalin, Hitler andPol Pot. The second is simply the widespread belief, that there must be a democracy, and therecan be no valid opposition to it. Thirdly, some purely instrumental arguments are also used tojustify democracy: they say it will produce a specific desirable effect. The democratic peacetheory is almost always used in this way - on the assumption that everyone wants peace.

However, some of the formal justifications can also be used to justify totalitarian or authoritarianregimes. Even the doctrine of consent can be used in this way. Most democrats claim thatgovernment must derive from the consent of the governed, or consent of the people. Howeverthey also say, that this does not mean factual consent. Factual consent would be, for instance, aletter from me to the government, giving them permission to govern me. As noted above, somespecific categories are excluded from this principle anyway, in typical democratic theory. Theimmigrant or asylum-seeker, who is stopped at the border of a nation state, is clearly 'beinggoverned'. But unless they are admitted, and given citizenship, they will not be able to participatein the democratic process. And democrats often promote the military imposition of democracy -which contradicts any real consent. So the 'consent' in democratic theory is either implied, or it isa philosophical fiction. But if consent is a fictional construction, with no relation to politicalreality, then a totalitarian state can equally claim to derive legitimacy from the consent of thegoverned (especially if there is free emigration). If a dictator allows all critics to leave thecountry, then it is just as plausible to say that those who remain have 'consented' to thedictatorship.

At first sight, the doctrine of consent is self-evidently right. Imagine there was a list of allpossible actions of the state, divided into two categories: 'acts with consent' and 'acts withoutconsent'. The first category seems to correspond to the list of 'good actions', the second to the listof 'bad actions'. However, there is no automatic equivalence of this kind. Acts which are good inthemselves require no consent. They can not be made wrong, by lack of consent to them.

In a more politically realistic form: certain acts, goals, and policies do not require the consentof the governed, or the consent of the people. Innovation does not require the consent of thepeople. Justice does not require the consent of the people. It is therefore not necessary to have agovernment which always acts on the basis of consent. This 'necessity' can not be a justificationof democracy.

There is a second reason why a democracy can not be justified from a requirement for theconsent of the governed. It is very simple: the population of a state can be so arranged as toproduce the consent of the governed - once again, the issue of the exact nature of the demos indemocracy. If, for any decision of any government, a group of people can be found who consentto this decision, and these people are formally considered to be the people governed, then allgovernment decisions have the consent of the governed. No special political regime is necessaryto guarantee this consent.

Is this a real option? Historically, it clearly is: there is a long tradition of forced migrations andpopulation transfers of unwilling subjects. The section on alternatives to democracy lists otheroptions for adjusting the demos. It is for the supporters of democracy to demonstrate explicitly,what they claim implicitly - that a democracy is the only structure which generates consent of thegoverned.

The classic phrase 'government of the people, by the people' can not be the basis of ajustification of democracy either, at least not of existing liberal-democracies. They are allmajority-rule democracies. Exactly the same arguments, which are used by democrats against

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rule by an elite, can be used against rule of the minority by the majority. If the people are fit togovern themselves, then why are the minority within the people not fit to govern themselves?

It is true that in a perfect consensus-democracy, the problem would not arise, because nominority would feel disadvantaged. But in a real democratic state, any minority dissatisfied withthe majority decisions, could claim to be a 'people' - and that is exactly what secessionist groupsdo. And that simply brings the issue back to the question of what constitutes a legitimate people,a legitimate demos, or a legitimate secession. Government of which people, by which people, forwhich people?

The fact that the arguments against elite rule can also be used against majority rule, does not initself justify elite rule. But any justification of democracy should be consistent. If the principle isthat 'the people' govern themselves and not a group external to that people, then the sameprinciple should be applied to the composition of the people. If they must govern themselves,let them select themselves also. And since this would open the door to unlimited secession, itwould in itself end the present order of liberal-democratic states.

Consent and autonomy justifications are related to the ideal of individual freedom. Democratictheorists claim, that human political freedom exists only in conditions of where the individual isnot governed by another. Participation in a democracy, in their view, makes the individual 'self-governing'. They recognise that most voters never participate in the day-to-day decisions of thegovernment: their theory on this point is intended to get around this objection.

There is, however, no individualist-libertarian argument for democracy. On the contrary,democracy is collective, by definition. The demos decides, the people rule - not the individual.Democracy does not give you 'control of your own life', democracy gives most 'control of yourlife' to your fellow citizens, millions of fellow citizens. And most democratic theorists rejectindividual freedom to choose tyranny, authoritarianism, or totalitarianism. Rather thandemocracy, personal political autonomy implies a Robinson Crusoe 'society' - or at least anexplicitly voluntary state. If the state is voluntary, the individual can reassert individual controlby leaving it - and so back to the issue of secession. This approach is summarised well byThomas Christiano:

Social organization could accord with our own will if society were like a club that wecould join or leave at will. If we could enter societies that have laws of which weapprove and leave societies that have laws of which we do not approve, then we wouldbe self-governing on this view. This conception of self-government does not requiredemocratic participation: it merely requires that we be able to leave one society to joinanother. We do not need the right to a vote to satisfy this liberty but merely rights toenter and exit. Even a world of small dictatorships is compatible with this liberty as longas each person can leave one for another.Thomas Christiano (1996) The Rule of Many: Fundamental Issues in DemocraticTheory. Boulder: Westview. (p. 22).

Christiano, as a democrat, rejects this option, on three grounds. First, the high social cost ofmigration (including perhaps learning a new language and culture), which makes it unrealistic.Second, that these costs would be more easily met by the rich, who could convert this advantageinto political power. And third, that a world of many small states would require some largerauthority anyway, and the issue of participation would re-appear at that level. This issue isknown, after a book by Albert Hirschman, as 'exit versus voice'.

Democratic theory therefore rejects a choice of societies (states), as an alternative to democracyin each society (state). But is this rejection consistent with the reality, that all democracies arefree market economies? After all, the defenders of free markets emphasise, that true freedom is

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freedom to choose. How does the free market look, if you apply the tests of democracy? If yougo to buy ice-cream or software, are you allowed to participate in the running of the ice-cream orsoftware firms? Do you become a 'citizen' of these firms? Are you allowed to attend theirdeliberative assemblies, or vote for your representative there? The answer is no, not unless youare a shareholder. I am not: yet according to the theory of the free market, that does limit myfreedom in any way. My 'freedom' as a consumer, consists in my ability to choose betweenproducts of different entrepreneurs. If I do not like one, I can choose another.

Apart from a few producer-consumer co-ops, the market economy is never run on the basis ofparticipation. As Hirschman pointed out, in the market the principle of 'exit' applies. If you don'tlike the ice-cream, you take your custom elsewhere. If you go to the ice-cream factory anddemand to vote on the flavour of next weeks production, they will laugh at you. They will tellyou to buy your ice-cream from someone else. If that is 'individual free choice', then why is itwrong for a dictator to laugh at pro-democracy demonstrators? Why not just let them take theircitizenship elsewhere, to another state?

This analogy with the free market does not, in itself, justify such a multiple-state alternative todemocracy. But again, democrats should be consistent in their justification of democracy.Democrats can not claim that governments must allow participation, when at the same time theyallow business firms to reject it. What is not demanded of the firm, can not logically bedemanded of the state.

instrumentalist arguments for democracy: democratic peace

Instrumental justifications are claims that "democracy will achieve a certain result, thereforethere should be democracy". The claimed capacity of democracy to educate citizens, as citizens,is an example. The best known instrumental justification is the democratic peace theory. None ofits supporters are neutral scientific investigators: they all use it as a justification for the spread ofdemocracy. Their claim, which they often state explicitly, is that the whole world should consistof democracies, in order to bring universal peace. As mentioned already, the evidence for thedemocratic peace hypothesis is not convincing. As more research was done, it became moreapparent that democracies do go to war, even against other comparable countries. Supporters ofthe hypothesis responded, by changing their definitions to fit the observations. In everyembarrassing case of war between democracies, at least one combatant is reclassified as non-democratic: the counter-example disappears. A recent book on the democratic peace hypothesisuses the categories "genuine democracies" and "well-established republics". And some wars, theauthor suggests, are not wars either...

We cannot study wars between well-established democracies, for no such wars haveexisted....There were confrontations in which democracies deployed military forceagainst one another, although they did not quite go to war. And there were wars betweenregimes that somewhat resembled democracies.Spencer Weart (1998). Never At War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One AnotherNew Haven: Yale University Press. (p. 6).

Weart's case studies are typical of the methods used: redefinition and reclassification, to fit thedemocratic peace hypothesis. Spain in 1898 (when it fought the USA in Cuba) was nominallydemocratic, but "...was actually controlled by an oligarchic and aristocratic elite..." (p. 311). In1990 there were free elections in Yugoslavia, but "The public had not learned how to choosewisely in such an election..." (p.316). And the CIA intervention in Guatemala in 1954 was not awar between Guatemala and the USA, because Guatemalans did all the fighting (p. 314).

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If you allow this kind of manipulation of the categories, you can prove anything at all. The fall ofthe Mengistu regime in Ethiopia in 1991 led to a peaceful secession of Eritrea: that was quoted asan example of the success of democratisation in Africa. But by 1998 the two exemplarydemocratising states were at war, in a border dispute over desert land. Supporters of thedemocratic peace hypothesis will simply re-classify them as 'not fully democratic' or 'not well-established'. Since the majority of states in history were not democracies, let alone 'well-established', the hypothesis shrinks to a group of about 20 or 30 states in the post-1945 period,many of them allies of the United States anyway.

So ultimately the democratic peace hypothesis is, that this limited group of states will not fighteach other. The hypothesis therefore relies on a special definition of 'peace'. It refers to the kindof peace that applies between Britain and Canada. But outside of this 'peace', some of themembers of this group are engaged in quasi-permanent military conflict, certainly the UnitedStates and Britain. This list of post-1945 British interventions and colonial wars is from awebsite specifically dedicated to Britain's Small Wars:

1945-48 India Decolonisation and Partition1945-48 Palestine1945-46 Dutch East Indies Restoring Dutch Colonial rule1946 H.M.S. Volage hit by mines off Albania1946-48 Greece Supporting Gov. forces during Civil War1947 Aden Riots1948 Gold Coast Riots, British Honduras1948-60 Malaya Emergency1948-1951 Eritrea (Operations against Shifta Terrorists)1949 Akaba Threat of Israeli Invasion1950 Singapore (Hartog riots)1950-53 Korean War1951 Akaba (Moussadeq Oil Nationalization)1951-54 Suez Canal Zone1952-56 Kenya, Operations against the Mau Mau1953 British Guiana1954-83 Cyprus1955 Singapore Riots, Buraimi Oasis operations1956 Bahrain riots, Hong Kong riots, Singapore riots, Suez operations, Clash on YemenisBorder1957 British Honduras, Yemeni border clash1957-59 Muscat and Oman1958 Nassau strike, Jordan/Lebanon intervention, State of emergency declared in Aden,Nyasaland (Malawi) Riots1959 Gan riots1960 Jamaica1961 Kuwait, Zanzibar1962 British Honduras, British Guiana, Aden riots, Brunei1963 Swaziland, Zanzibar, Aden1963-66 Borneo1964 Zanzibar revolution, Tuanganyika Army mutiny, Uganda Army mutiny, Kenya Armymutiny , British Guiana, civil unrest1964-67 Aden and Radfan1965 Mauritius, Bechuanaland1966 Hong Kong riots, Das Island, Seychelles1967 Hong Kong riots1968 Bermuda & Mauritius State of Emergency

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1968-69 Antigua Civil unrest1969 Anguilla March to September. So called Upraising1969-84 Northern Ireland1970 Cayman Islands April Demonstrations against Colonial administration1971 Pakistan - Refugee evacuation1970-76 Dhofar1973 Bermuda1979 Iran - Evacuation of civilians1979-84 Operation Agila Rhodesia/Zimbabwe1980 New Hebrides - Civil unrest1982 Falklands War1983 Beirut1983 Aden - Evacuation of British Nationals (civil war)1987-88 Gulf - Mine sweeping / clearance1991 Persian Gulf War1991 Kurdistan Humanitarian Relief1991-? N Iraq - Northern 'No fly' Zone1991-? S Iraq Southern 'No fly' Zone1992 onwards Bosnia1994 Yemen - Evacuation of various embassy staffs1997 Congo - Evacuation British nationals (civil unrest)1998 Congo - Evacuation British nationals (civil war)1999-? Kosovo- NATO peacekeeping2000 East Timor - UN peacekeeping2000 Sierra Leone2001 Macedonia - Disarming fighting factions

So the invasion of Iraq, explicitly intended to 'democratise' the country, is just one item on a longlist. For United States interventions, see Zoltan Grossman's list From Wounded Knee toAfghanistan. This long list is clearly not 'peace', even in the limited sense of absence of war. Yetfor the supporters of democratic peace hypothesis Britain is indeed at peace. Spencer Weartcould find only one possible exception - the Cod War, a fishing dispute with Iceland in the1970's. There is a racist undertone here, in the way that colonial wars and post-colonialinterventions by the democracies are ignored. Democratic peace evidently means 'white peace',even while others are subjected to brutal military campaigns. This kind of double standard cannot form the basis of a moral justification of democracy.

Alternatives to democracy

Alternatives to democracy fall into four main categories: the systematic modification ofdemocracy to remove its ethical defects; the simple overthrow of democratic governments; anon-democratic political system, and innovation in the system of states, with redistribution ofterritory and populations. But first it is useful to reconsider what they would replace: the relevantcharacteristics of the existing democracies.

The older definitions of democracy referred to historical origins, or simply to 'the rule of thepeople'. They were followed the polyarchy definitions, and later by rights-and-procedureschecklists. None of these give a complete picture of modern democracy. A new definition wouldhave to start at the global level, the level of world order. By now it is clear that democracy is nota one-country regime, not a characteristic of single states. Just as the ideology of the nation stateimplies a planet of nations, democracy implies a planet of democracies.

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A democratic world order starts from the premise that only certain groups are a legitimate'demos'. At any one time, therefore, there is a fixed number of legitimate regimes, eachcorresponding to a democratic state. For democrats, no other regime is legitimate. They claimthat these non-democratic regimes may be converted (by military force or external pressure) intodemocracies. When this process is complete, and the fixed number of legitimate democraticstates has been reached, no further change in the order of states would be legitimate. Thiscorresponds to the claim made by nationalists, that only a world order of nation states islegitimate. This should be qualified by the recent trends in democratic interventionism. Althoughthe number of cases is small so far (Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor) the democratising protectorates arealso considered part of 'global democracy'. A world order consisting of (mainly western) fulldemocracies, and their democratising protectorates, might simply be accepted as 'globaldemocracy'.

However, with or without protectorates, the pan-democratic world would have a fixed number ofregimes, corresponding to a fixed number of states. In a world where democrats consider eachstate to correspond to a legitimate demos, democracy is an implicit prohibition of new stateformation. Once again, the prohibition of secession appears to be a defining characteristic ofdemocracy - far more than any of the characteristics listed in the polyarchy definitions.

There is also no place in democracy for any 'trans-demos' or 'extra-demos' political decision.Democracies can work together, but in the last instance each democratic state has its owndemocratic elections. In other words, no group can constitute a political unit comprisingmembers of more than one demos. They can form associations, but not a regime or agovernment: that would require formation of a new state. Since a cross-demos grouping is (bydefinition) not itself a demos, democrats would not allow it to form a state anyway. Theemergence of a single global democracy would not help a cross-demos group - they wouldsimply become an internal minority in a global demos.

The alternatives to democracy are alternative to this emergent world order of stable democracies- a world in which there is literally no place for social and political innovation. From thisperspective, it is possible to reformulate the definition of democracy. The most helpful literaturefor this new definition was not the existing definitions, but Joseph Weiler's description of theeurosceptic No-Demos thesis.

A democracy is a political regime in which political power is exercised by controlling themembership of a demos, a group within which political decisions are taken, in practice anation state. Control of territory and migration are preconditions for democracy. Ademocracy claims political legitimacy from both the claimed legitimacy of the demos, andthe claimed legitimacy of the decision-making procedures. Often, the procedures areclaimed to legitimise the demos, and the demos is claimed to legitimise the procedures. Ademocratic world order is a world order with a fixed number of decision-making units(demos, plural demoi), and in which those units are considered legitimate, and those unitsonly. In turn this world order is considered legitimate, and the only legitimate basis forstate formation.

This definition implies, that the most comprehensive alternatives to democracy can only befound at the level of the world order, and in state formation processes. Nevertheless there arealso 'internal' alternatives.

rolling back democracy

'Rolling back democracy' (borrowed from Margaret Thatcher's commitment to "rolling back thestate") is a non-spatial strategy. It could be applied inside an existing democratic state, and it

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would often be incompatible with the spatial anti-democratic strategies described in the nextsections. The 'rollback' uses the checklist definitions of democracy. The outcome of thedemocratic process can be improved, if not all of the checklist applies to all of the people, all ofthe time. The right to vote is the best example, since it is considered the core political right ofindividuals in democracies.

Bill Gates has an individual right to vote, as a US citizen. That includes the so-called passivevoting rights - the right to stand as a candidate for political office, to receive the votes of others,and to be elected. But Gates is also the world's richest man. Even without his connection toMicrosoft, his influence on the US government is almost certainly more than that of the millionpoorest voters in the USA. The exercise of his individual vote in elections will not change that.So why should he have the right to vote? In practice the rich (and some other categories) have adouble, and more than double, vote. Depriving them of formal voting rights partly corrects thisstructural injustice in western democracies. Voting and candidacy rights could be removed fromsuch categories as:

persons with personal wealth above a fixed limit: in the EU approximately € 100 000 inliquid assets would be appropriate.persons with high personal income: in the EU above approximately € 50 000 per annum.entrepreneurs, since the organisations of entrepreneurs already exercise a disproportionateinfluence on governments. The exclusion should cover not just the typical individualentrepreneurs such as Bill Gates or Richard Branson, but also the more anonymousexecutive managers who run most enterprises.advisors to the government, who exercise influence on government policy through theirwork anyway. This should include the policy staff of influential think-tanks.

That may seem a broad range, but it would probably be less than 5% of the population in EUmember states. Limiting the right to vote can only be a first step in rolling back democracy. Thenext step would be to restrict political pluralism. Freedom to form political parties, and theirfreedom to operate, feature on all the checklist definitions of democracy. The conservativeeffects of democracy can be reduced, by prohibiting conservative parties, including associatedconservative think-tanks and lobby organisations. In the USA many organisations openlydescribe themselves as 'conservative': the Heritage Foundation database lists over 300 of them.In Europe, conservatives often hide behind another label. Religious parties, which seek toimpose the principles of a religion on non-believers, should also be forbidden - that wouldinclude all the European christian-democratic parties. (Religious parties with a protective role,for their own members only, would not be covered by this prohibition).

The next step could be to exempt certain types of decision from the democratic process. Theexample of the European high-speed rail network shows how democracies filter and restrictinnovation. Exemptions from the democratic process, in such cases, allow the innovation toproceed without it. In Europe, exemption could apply to...

infrastructure planning in general, and specific infrastructure projects which would remainunbuilt in a market democracyreform of the units of local government, where localist and traditionalist oppositionpreserves obsolete territorial divisionsspatial planning in general, including demographic and regional planning - at least,alternatives to the market-led planning in the democraciesredistribution of wealth and housingtransfer taxes, to fund development in eastern Europe and Africa.

One issue which should certainly be removed from the democratic political arena is immigration.Demographics are probably the most urgent planning issue in Europe: demographic collapse will

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affect most of the continent within a generation. However, European electorates are hyper-sensitive to immigration issues, and clearly prefer zero immigration. Policies for replacementmigration - with tens of millions of immigrants - can not be formulated in this political climate.In general, 'The People' can not be trusted with the immigration issue - because the manifestationof 'the people' on this issue is without exception a racist populism.

A more specific type of exemption from democracy relates to basic values. The Europeanconstitutional treaty explicitly lists the 'values of Europe'. However, despite much talk of'national values', such lists are not usual in national constitutions. The German Constitution doesopen with a deliberate choice of national fundamental value:

Artikel 1 - Würde des Menschen(1) Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen istVerpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.Bundestag: Grundgesetz

Article 1 [Human Dignity](1) Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all stateauthority.Constitution of Germany

The constitution of a state can list its fundamental values, or value hierarchy - deliberatelyremoving them from the political arena. For instance it could place equality above propertyrights (a classic conflict of values). Inevitably, this would lead to more pressure for secession:the secessionists would be able to clearly indicate what values they rejected. On the grounds ofits values, there are legitimate objections of conscience to the existence of the German nationitself - the constituent 'demos' of German democracy. People can legitimately say that an entitywith such a value hierarchy has no existence rights. The political case for secession is then clear:those who reject even the existence of the 'demos', are clearly not part of it. If all nation stateshad explicit lists of national values in their constitution, many more people might discover, thatthey do not belong in their own nation.

spatial alternatives to the system of democratic states

Secession is one of the few geographical issues in political and moral philosophy. Usually issuesof space, geography and territory are considered irrelevant to ethics. Some theorists, such as LeaBrilmayer, try to keep these issues out of democratic theory also, and simply reject secession.However, it is difficult for democratic theorists to claim that secession is never acceptable: mostof them live in states which once seceded from a larger empire. Recognising even one secessionas legitimate, introduces a territorial element into the ethics of democracy - and secession is onlyone way to change the pattern of states. Those changes are 'geopolitics' rather than 'politics' -secession, acquisition of territory, creation of artificial territory, transfer of territory, the divisionof states by barriers, the creation of new states, and transfer of population. There are historicalexamples of all of these processes, but very little discussion of the ethics.

The truth is, that by manipulating geopolitical factors, you can can almost any result out of anypolitical process. The referendum examples (on prohibition of pork) show how this is possiblewithin a democratic system. Changing the electorate changes the referendum result, andMuslims are a clearly identifiable group who will vote in a predictable way. And that is, after all,what secession means in a democracy - it changes the electorate. If it is internal to an existingelectoral process, territorial interference of this kind is called gerrymandering - manipulatingelectoral districts to include or exclude specific populations, with known political preferences. A

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classic example was the manipulation of the electoral boundaries in the city of Derry, inNorthern Ireland, to maintain Protestant control over a Catholic majority.

The basic complaint in these areas is that the present electoral arrangements areweighted against non-Unionists...In Londonderry County Borough there was thefollowing extraordinary situation in 1967:

Catholic Voters Other Voters Seats

North Ward: 2,530 3,946 8 Unionists

Waterside Ward: 1,852 3,697 4 Unionists

South Ward 10,047 1,138 8 Non-Unionists

Total: 14,429 8,781 20

23,210

Disturbances in Northern Ireland Report of the Commission appointed by the Governorof Northern Ireland, 1969.

Democratic theory says this is wrong - it rejects all internal manipulation of the electoral process.Democratic theory says there should be a 'fair' arrangement of electoral districts, or a 'fair'national voting system, without districts. But democratic theory can not say that about the globalsystem of states: there is no clear conception of what exactly global gerrymandering wouldmean. For a start, it is not clear what a 'fair' global arrangement of states would be. The presentsystem, where the African poor are excluded from voting in the rich western states, certainlydoes not seem fair. If anything, it is the existing system of states which is 'gerrymandered' andunfair. So why not change it? And why stop at a few secessions? Why stop at one new state peryear? Why not 100 new states, or 100 new population transfers?

The spatial, geopolitical, and territorial alternatives to democracy form a reservoir of non-democratic options for the future. They contravene the democratic order, yet they do notnecessarily imply a transfer to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Perhaps because the optionsare not taken seriously themselves, there is no serious attempt by democratic theorists to criticisethem.

The simplest spatial definition of a democracy is that decisions are taken by those who live in anarea or zone, and that these decisions then apply to that area (zone). The hypothetical opposite tothis is only possible on an infinite land surface: namely, that every possible use of a zone isallocated a sufficiently large territory to allow effective existence of that zone. Or, in socialterms, that every possible form of society is allocated sufficient territory to exist. The planet'ssurface is finite - but that does preclude some form of territorial allocation.

Starting from these two opposites, a simple definition can be given of a post-democratic state: astate is a territory with a purpose. The conventional definition of a state, learnt by allInternational Relations students, is that a state consists of: a territory, a government whichcontrols all or part of it, and its population.

At its simplest, the extent to which that population controls the government determines thedegree of democracy. Democracy concerns specific territory: here again is the symbiosis ofdemocracy and the nation state. In a world of nations, a democratic regime governs a historicallyconstituted people inhabiting a specific territory - a classic nation state. Exceptions to thatprinciple are very rare. In July 2000, a convention in Praha (Prague) proposed European Unionrecognition of the Roma as a non-territorial nation, with its own Parliament. However this is socompletely contrary to the standard pattern of one parliament, for one nation, on one territory,that recognition is unlikely. Recognition of a non-national territory, as such, is even more

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unlikely. Yet that is what the definition of a post-democratic state implies: a state is a territorywith a purpose, and therefore does not even need a population. If the purpose of a territory isfixed before it has a population, obviously there can be no democratic process. Any suggestionof this type is treated with deep suspicion among liberal political theorists.

Three formal characteristics define the spatial order of a post-democratic world:

state formation is free and multiplestates formed do not necessarily have an initial populationthe population migrates to occupy states formed.

In other words, the transition to post-democratic space involves the migration of the populationof the Earth, to achieve a maximum of possible states, or at least a plurality of states. The mainobstacle to such a migration is not economic feasibility, or the transport system, but politicalresistance. Ignoring that issue, and assuming such a migration, what kind of states could beformed?

The least productive grounds for state formation are the irreconcilable ethical universalisms. Itwould be possible to partition countries with abortion controversies (Poland or Ireland, forexample) into two states: one where abortion is legal, one where it is not. However, very fewpeople would be satisfied with this: they regard it as a moral issue, concerning in principle thewhole world. On the issue of abortion, there is no ethical or cultural relativism, and there is noterritorial solution to the problem of conflicting universal beliefs. State formation on this basiscould only be a form of territorial clarification, an illustration of the ethical divide.

A second category of possible states allows for evasion of moral wrong or injustice. Thiscategory includes forms of 'refuge states', in effect an extension of the principle of asylum, tostate formation by victims of injustice. If no existing state offers asylum protection, a new stateoffers the only effective guarantee of protection from discrimination, persecution, injustice,racism and oppression. There is already one state which claims refuge from persecution aslegitimation for its formation: Israel. However Israel has never used that as the only justificationof its existence - relying instead on the more usual claim to a national homeland for a specificpeople.

A third type of possible state is founded on non-universal ideologies or beliefs. As an example, itis possible to imagine state formation on the basis of existing political parties. In the electoralgeography of western Europe, some regions have long-term political preferences, over centuries.(Political geographers in France have been the most successful in tracing these regionalpreferences). Even medium-term concentrations of support for political parties, over onegeneration approximately, could serve as a basis for state formation. In practice, there arelegitimate objections to using political parties as the basis for division of territory. They wouldcollectively gain a near-monopoly of territory, but their active membership is rarely more than1% or 2% of the population.

A fourth category relates to certain semi-political historical preferences, usually ignored inpolitical theory. Many people have a preferred 'Golden Age' related to their political views. ForEuropean Christian Democrats, it is often the Catholic Middle Ages, for classic liberals the free-trade era of the early 19th century. If people wish to return to the past in this way - in whole or inpart - they could be given territory to do so. State formation, based on the reconstruction of apreferred past, is a feasible way of dividing territory - 'nostalgia states'. For instance, when theterritorial integrity of Italy seemed under threat during the last 20 years, proposals for thereconstitution of the Papal States surfaced. The Italian nation state has proved more durable than

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expected, but the political consequences of a revived Papal state are interesting. TraditionalistCatholics from all over Europe would gain a 'homeland' to which they could migrate.

These first four categories are related to familiar issues in political theory, but they are far fromexclusive. There are many other possible bases of state formation. Among existing nation statesit is possible to find differences in social organisation and constitutional tradition. But these arethe tip of a huge iceberg. Many options of this kind are so far apart, that they could not beaccommodated in the same state. A modern nation state assumes some underlying cultural unityor shared basic values: 'multi-cultural' might work, but not 'multi-constitutional'. This is anindicative list of the types of option involved...

social organisation: is society hierarchical or egalitarian? is the family treated as the basicunit of society? is the educational and workplace tradition hereditary or meritocratic?legal systems: are there universal laws, or separate group laws and courts (such as existedin many colonial territories)?economic structure: is there a central bank and a single currency? are there any banks andother modern financial institutions? is there a free market?organisation of production: is it competitive-entrepreneurial, or centrally planned, or bysome form of non-competitive organisations?taxation: is there a unitary tax system? is control of expenditure centralised or can theindividual influence it? does the tax system allow conscientious objection to, for instance,military expenditure?military organisation: is there any armed force at all? is there a centralised army, or acitizen militia?ownership and property rights: is there any restraint on transfer and use of property? iswealth systematically redistributed?constitutional structure: is the state centralised, federal, or confederal? is there anyseparation of powers? is there any separation of church and state?public administration: is it bureaucratic, etatist, interventionist, arbitrative or traditionalistin style?parliamentary and electoral systems: is there a parliament? does it have more than onechamber? which electoral system is used?external relations: is the state pragmatic or 'idealist' in its dealings with other states? doesit recognise other states? does it trade - or strive for autarky?

A society could be, for example, a centralised theocracy with a professional standing army and aclosed economy based on subsistence peasant agriculture. It could be a libertarian federationwith local citizens militias and an export-driven economy. But no society can be both of these atthe same time, and neither can any state. Whatever arrangement such incompatible societiesmight enter into, would not be a state in standard terms - but two separate states are entirelyfeasible. One purpose of compiling such a list is to indicate the huge gap between the number ofexisting states, and the number of possible states. The reservoir of territorial alternatives todemocracy is vast.

Again, many of these options are related to familiar political controversies. However, an entirelydifferent factor would probably be the main driver of new state formation, in a post-democraticworld. It is a factor generally ignored in state theory and political geography: technology. Thecommon view is that technology is a unit, developing in a linear fashion through history. Thispicture of unity is false: there are technologies, in the plural. Technologies contradict each other,they are opposed to each other, they compete with each other. And in principle, each technologyrequires its own state, to guarantee its existence.

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In existing nation states, there is a tendency to standardise not only national culture andlanguage, but technology. This tendency will in the long term produce a world order of nationaltechnologies, parallel to the world order of nation states. There is no guarantee, that thesenational technologies will differ among themselves: they might be only superficially different.They are in any case limited by the number of nation states. In the long term that will limit orblock technological change. Technological state formation does for a 'dissident' technology, whatthe technology can not do itself - secede.

Energy technologies in Europe are a good example. The trend at present is to co-ordinatenational policies involving a 'mix' of technologies - coal, natural gas, oil, solar energy, wind,nuclear energy. In reality, the mix is dominated by some technologies, and others aremarginalised. Creating a plurality of states, to guarantee a plurality of energy technologies,would produce a totally different Europe. It would be a continent divided into the states ofCarbonia, Methania, Petrolia, Solaria, Aeolia, and Nuclearia, among others. Such possible states,with a specific technology as core value, are alien to conventional political theory - yet this list isonly one possible division. There are many technologies, and many possible combinations.

Such a spatial order does not necessarily consist of closed blocks. In the case of energytechnologies, it is possible to apply a technology with extra intensity in a core zone. (This appliesto any characteristic which can be graded across territory). Each of the hypothetical states listedabove could consist of a core zone where only one technology is applied, an outer zone where itis dominant, and a border zone of transition to an adjoining state with a different technology.This principle - cores and transitional areas - is familiar in cultural and linguistic geography. Ithas an unrealised potential as a 'design principle' for a new system of states.

The word 'technology' can itself be broadly interpreted, including, for instance, infrastructure,construction, architecture, and urban design. States based on a specific urban form are anexample of a new state of this kind. Existing cities in nation states tend to reflect the nationalurban culture: one French city looks like another French city. A post-democratic urban policycould mean the creation of a plurality of new city-states, on the basis of possible urban forms.And here consideration of a post-democratic world returns to the issue of the 'ideal city' - an oldvalue conflict between liberals and utopians.

Were the ideal cities of early-modern Europe wrong? The theoretical answer of liberaldemocracy is "yes, they were wrong because they were not the outcome of democratic process,but of autarchic will". The historical answer is also clear: Europe did not evolve into a multitudeof ideal cities, but into a collection of nation states. In historical perspective, it is hard to avoidthe impression, that the liberal-democratic nation state evolved to limit innovation. The abolitionof the present liberal market democracies might bring the multitude of ideal cities into existence.

justification of non-democracy

Abolition of democracy, and a subsequent non-democratic state, can be justified on groundssurprisingly similar to those used to justify democracy. A few justifications are specific to non-democracy.

Abolition of democracy can be justified on grounds of individual sovereignty and politicalfreedom. Specifically, destruction of the unity of the demos creates at least temporary individualsovereignty. (This is the 'anarchist justification' of non-democracy).

A non-democratic state can be justified on grounds of individual moral autonomy: theindividuals political choice is not mixed with thousands or millions of others. It is characteristicof liberal democracies that they have complex procedures for ordering, weighing or summing

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preferences. Cyberliberal theorists of democracy see the Internet as a means to further increasethis complexity (allowing multiple iterations, for example). The more complex the process, theless chance that the outcome will correspond to any individual moral choice at the start of theprocess. By definition, this is not moral autonomy: abolishing the democratic process (includinge-democracy) would correct this.

A non-democratic state can be justified on instrumental grounds of protection - protection of theindividual and minorities from the democratic process. As with illegal immigrants, thedemocratic majority often subjects 'despised minorities' to treatment which is harsh andhumiliating, even if it is legal. In market democracies, abolition of the market democracyprotects individuals and groups from market forces.

A non-demos (and therefore non-democratic) state is necessary to implement sovereignty andliberation of minorities, which can not meet accepted democratic criteria for secession (that is,they are not a demos).

A non-democratic state is the only way to separate of the state from the population ('the people').In the hypothetical case that a democratic state declared all its residents illegal aliens, includingits own employees, it would no longer have 'a people'. It would simply be a bureaucracy,administering a territory with residents. This is not inherently wrong: it would allow the state toadopt fundamental values different from those of the people. However, by definition, it wouldno longer be a democracy: the demos is gone. Such a separation is impossible in a democraticnation state - where the state is intended to express in some way the 'will of the people', and thenational culture.

A non-democratic state can be justified by the necessity of creating 'consent' to options which donot have democratic majority support. In more abstract terms, 'to create the political conditionsfor utopia' - the utopian justification of non-democracy. Many possible projects, and entirepossible societies, do not come into existence because there is no corresponding democraticdecision to support them. So long as some of these possibilities have intrinsic value, theyconstitute an instrumental justification for non-democracy - in order to bring them into existence.This justification applies especially to reconstitution of the system of states, and redistribution ofterritory, to form new non-democratic states. Specifically, a non-democratic state can be justifiedfrom the intrinsic value of innovation. If it innovates or facilitates innovation, where democracydoes not, can not, and will not, then it is justified. This is probably the most fundamentaljustification of non-democracy.

Conclusion

This concluding list summarises the arguments given in all the other sections. Implicitly, theyform a program to abolish democracy. Why do that?

To start with, because it is time for a change. The western democracies have been democratic,depending on the definition, for 50 to 150 years, and most people there have no experience ofnon-democracy. Democracy should disappear, to facilitate the end of global inequality, famineand avoidable disease, by the introduction of global transfer taxes. The end of democracy wouldend the legitimisation of the nation state from democratic principles, and allow innovative typesof state to be formed. It would facilitate social innovation, end conformist suit-and-tie societies,and prevent the emergence of a uniform global society. The construction of utopias and idealcities (without the consent of the people) requires the end of democracy. Its abolition would alsoallow construction and implementation of projects - especially infrastructural projects - whichare unpopular and uneconomic.

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Abolition of democracy would prevent, or reverse, morally wrong decisions of democraticgovernments. This applies especially to policies targeted at unpopular minorities (witch hunts),which are a regular feature of democratic regimes. It would end the political and socialmarginalisation of anti-democrats, and the 'democracy-only' mentality of democratic societies,and allow a society with multiple attitudes to democracy. In short, the end of democracy wouldcreate at least the possibility of a different world, and a different world order.

And last but not least, the end of democracy would mean the removal from office of Jörg Haider,in March 2004 again the winner in the democratic election in Carinthia, and the negativeinspiration for this critique of democracy.

Why is NATO wrong?The ethics of secession

Nation Planet