why oppression is wrong

8/7/2019 Why oppression is wrong

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WHY OPPRESSION IS WRONG

T. J. DonahueDepartment of Political Science

The Johns Hopkins University

[email protected]

Website: tjdonahu.googlepages.com

Working Paper

Version of 4 November 2007

10,385 words (including notes)Comments Welcome!

ABSTRACT: It is widely agreed that oppression is wrong. But what, above all, makes it

wrong? What is its chief wrong-maker? This paper argues that what chiefly makes

oppression wrong is that it violates two principles of political morality. The first is the

principle of wrongful benefit: no one should benefit from her own wrong. The second is

the principle of institutionalized harm: no social group should be subjected to an

unjustified institutionalized harm. Let us call this explanation of oppressions wrongnessthe two principles thesis.In arguing for this thesis, I give an account of the nature of

oppression, explicate the two principles, prove that they both exist, and then show how

oppression violates them and thus is wrong. I then defend the thesis on the grounds that it

better explains oppressions wrongness than do two rival explanations. First, the view

that oppression violates a principle of non-domination. Second, the view that it violates a

principle of equal respect. I show that my explanation better satisfies the nine criteria for

choice among explanatory theories: evidential adequacy, simplicity, unifying power,

falsifiability, testability, neatness, conservativeness, fecundity, and mechanism-informativeness. 189 words

KEY WORDS: oppression, wrong-maker, wrongful benefit, institutionalized harm,

domination, equal respect, theory choice
mailto:[email protected]


2/32Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027481

Tom Donahue Why Oppression Is Wrong 1

WHY OPPRESSION IS WRONG*

1. THE PROBLEM.It is widely agreed that oppression is wrong. We take it to be a serious objection to a

social practice that it is oppressive. But what, above all, makes oppression wrong? What is its

chief wrong-maker? These questions are important for two reasons. First, if we dont answer

them, we shant know what the reasons are for combating oppression; for you cant understand

what the reasons for combating a wrong are until you understand why that wrong is a wrong.

Second, if we dont answer the question, we shant know how best to eliminate oppression; for

you cant eliminate a widespread wrong until you understand what makes it wrong, and can get

the public to understand this too.

This paper argues that what, above all, makes oppression wrong is that it violates two

principles of political morality. The first is the principle of wrongful benefit: no one should

benefit from her own wrong. The second is the principle of institutionalized harm: no social

group should be subjected to an unjustified institutionalized harm. Let us call this explanation of

oppressions wrongness the two-principles explanation. Let us call the view that the two-

principles explanation gives the best explanation of oppressions wrongness the two principles

thesis.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 2 gives an account of the nature of oppression, to

which the argument that follows will appeal. Part 3 presents and explicates the principles of

wrongful benefit and institutionalized harm. Part 4 then tries to prove that the two principles

exist and impose moral requirements. Part 5 then begins the argument for the two princ iples

thesis. It shows how oppression violates the two principles, and how this makes oppression

wrong. Part 6 then argues for the view that the two-principles explanation better explains

oppressions wrongness than do the two leading rival explanations. First, the view that


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oppression violates a principle of non-domination. Second, the view that oppression violates a

principle of equal respect. I shall argue against these alternative explanations that the two-

principles explanation and the theory backing it better satisfy the nine criteria for explanatory

theory choice: evidential adequacy, simplicity, unifying power, falsifiability, testability,

neatness, conservativeness, fecundity, and mechanism- informativeness. Part 6 concludes the

paper by considering some new questions the inquiry has broached.

2. WHAT IS OPPRESSION?Our intuitive sense of oppression is that x oppresses y just in case x keeps y in subjection

and hardship by the unjust exercise of force or coercion. But what, more exactly, is oppression ?

What is its nature?

In this Part, I shall give an institutional-practice account of oppressions nature. The

account draws on Ann E. Cudds important analysis of oppression.1 My account follows Cudds,

with a few modifications. The institutional-practice account maintains that X oppresses Y just in

case there is an institutional practice in a social group X by which unjustified harm is perpetrated

by members of X on a social group Y whose identity is not dependent on the occurrence of the

harm, where the harm is brought about by unjustified limitation of choice, or unjustified

coercion, or unjustified force, and X benefits from the institutional practice, and the harm

continues to be perpetrated over some significant interval.2 I shall call this the Institutional

Practice Thesis. In this Part, I shall explicate the Thesis by showing how it applies to a case. I

lack the space here to argue for the Thesis; so I shall instead assume that Cudds arguments for

the Thesis succeed.

2.1. On the institutional-practice account of oppression, oppression occurs if, and only

if:


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1. there is an unjustified harm (the Harm Condition);2. the harm comes out of an institutional practice (The Emergence from Institutional PracticeCondition);

3. the harm is perpetrated, through a social institution or practice, on a social group whoseidentity is not dependent on the occurrence of the harm in (1) (the Social Group Condition);

4. there is another social group that benefits from the institutional practice in (2) (the BenefitCondition);

5. the harm is brought about by unjustified limitation of choice, or unjustified coercion, orunjustified force (the Unjustified Constraint Condition);

6. the harm continues to be perpetrated over some significant interval (the ContinuanceCondition).3

I shall discuss each of these six conditions in turn. To fix ideas, let us consider the case of

the Nazarim and the Wasatchi. Each of these is a cultural group, whose members are bound

together by a set of common customs, conventions, practices, and norms. Among the Wasatchi,

there is a longstanding practice whereby young Wasatchi men drive into Nazar towns at night,

whooping and throwing rocks at the windows of houses. The practice is widely pursued by

Wasatchi young men, and it is governed by certain accepted rules and conventions. Suppose that

there is no justification for the practice; that is, all things considered, the practice is quite

unjustified. Now the Wasatchi value derring-do and boisterousness in their young men, and they

believe that the rock-rides, as they are called, cultivate these attributes. Not infrequently, the

young men encounter Nazar pedestrians, and throw the rocks at them, sometimes injuring them

badly. Moreover, to curb the practice, the Nazarim have to ask Wasatchi officials to send th eir

own law enforcement officials to Nazar towns to help keep the peace. This then gives the

Wasatchi officials power over the Nazarim.

Now this case satisfies the Harm Condition. The young men harm Nazarim by smashing

their windows and doing them physical injury, and the harm isex hypothesiunjustified.

Moreover, the Nazarim as a group are harmed by the practice of rock-rides. For the practice, the


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fact that it is unjustified, and their knowledge that they are subject to it instills in them feelings of

powerlessness and inadequacy. Moreover, the practice sends to the Nazarim the message that the

Wasatchi view them as subordinate.

The case also satisfies the Emergence from Institutional Practice Condition. The rock-

rides are an institutional practice among Wasatchi young men. That is to say, there is a custom

among Wasatchi young men of going on rock-rides, and this custom is backed up by customs

and conventions which make sense of it; which give a reason for it. Moreover, the harm the

Nazarim suffer comes out of the practice. That is, the Nazarim would not suffer this particular

harm if the practice did not exist.

The case also satisfies the Social Group conditionthe group harmed is the Nazarim,

whose identity does not depend on the existence of the Wasatchi rock-rides. The Nazarims

group identity rather depends on their own customs, conventions, practices, and norms.4

The Benefit Condition is also satisfied by the case. The Wasatchi as a whole benefit from

the rock-rides, because it cultivates in their young men attributes that they value, and it gives the

Wasatchi power over the Nazarim. Power-over is obviously valuable.

The case also satisfies the Unjustified Constraint Condition. That Condition requires that

there be unjustified limitation of choice, or unjustified coercion, or unjustified force. The harm in

this case is brought about by unjustified forcethe throwing of rocks. But the harm is also

brought about by unjustified limitation of choicethe rock-rides unjustifiedly limit the choices

of the Nazarim, for they compel them to forgo walking the streets when the rock-rides are on. So

this condition is doubly satisfied.

Finally, the case satisfies the Continuance Condition. Going on rock-rides is a

longstanding practice among the Wasatchi. So in this case, the Nazarim are oppressed by the

Wasatchi, because of the long period over which the rock-rides practice has continued.


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This, then, is the nature of oppression. We shall appeal to this analysis in arguing for the

two principles thesis.

3. THE PRINCIPLES OF WRONGFUL BENEFIT AND INSTITUTIONALIZEDHARM.

I am going to argue that what makes oppression wrong is that it violates principles of

wrongful benefit and institutionalized harm. But these principles are relatively unfamiliar, so I

shall first say something about their meaning and implications.

The wrongful benefit principle holds that no one should benefit from her own wrong. It is

a principle familiar in equity, but less so in moral and political theory.5 The idea behind the

principle is that no one should, as a result of a wrong for which she is responsible, enjoy

consequences which provide her with significant social goods. Suppose, for instance, that I

blackmail the worlds greatest cosmetic surgeon into performing on me an operation which

makes me one of the worlds most attractive men. I use my newfound attractiveness to become a

star television presenter for the Tiffany network, enjoying the prestige and riches that come with

the position. These last are, of course, significant social goods. My enjoying them as a result of

the blackmailing violates the principle of wrongful benefit. And the principle entails that if

society or somebody knows that I got these goods as a result of the blackmailing, they ought to

do something about it.

Another clear violation of this principle was considered in the famous case ofRiggs v.

Palmer. Elmer had murdered his grandfather, whom he knew had willed him much of his estate.

Elmer intended by the murder the more quickly to enjoy his inheritance. Let us suppose that the

intended legacy was substantial. So had the courts then awarded it to Elmer, he would have

enjoyed a significant social good as a result of his own wrong. This would have violated the

principle, with Elmer, society, and especially the courts being the chief violators.


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Even less familiar than the wrongful benefit principle is the principle of institutionalized

harm. This principle holds that no social group should be subjected to an unjustified

institutionalized harm. What social groups and unjustified harms are we discussed in Part 2. A

harm is an institutionalized harm just in case it is a harm which regularly results from a practice

conducted by a particular social group, where this social group entertains collective beliefs which

make sense of the practice.

A clear violation of the institutionalized harm principle is the United Statess policy, from

the end of the Civil War until the 1920s or so, of assimilative education of Native American

children. A major goal of this policy was to rid Native American children of any commitment to

customs and practices indigenous to Native Americans and not accepted by White America.6

This practice resulted in a harm because it instilled in the children who underwent it, and their

families, a sense of unchangeable inferiority because (i) they saw that they could not so easily

discard these customs and practices, and (ii) they felt powerless to oppose the policy. The

practice was institutionalized because it was supported by the collective beliefs of White

Americans that Native Americans, as well as their customs and practices, were uncivilized, that

the Natives needed to adopt White customs and practices, and discard all incompatible Native

customs and practices. Too, it was supported by laws of the several states and the United States,

as well as the policy of the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs. The harm done was unjustified

because the reasons for educating Native American children so as to rid them of any

commitment to customs and practices indigenous to Native Americans and not accepted by

White America did not outweigh the reasons for not so educating them. Hence this educational

practice violated the institutionalized harm principle.

4. PROOFS OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES.


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I have explicated the wrongful benefit principle and the institutionalized harm principle. I

need now to prove that the two principles exist and make genuine ethical requirements of us.

I begin with the argument for the wrongful benefit principle: no one should benefit from

her own wrong. This principle is justified by the following line of thought. Ethics (part of which

is political morality) includes a principle holding that no one should accept a wrong. To accept a

wrong is to act so as to suggest that the wrong is not worth bothering about; that it is not a matter

of genuine concern. But if everyone accepted most wrongs, in this sense of accept, then people

would be in serious doubt about whether common-sense wrongs are really wrongs. This would

undermine their commitment to ethics generally and to morality specifically. In order to avoid

this undermining, there must be an ethical principle holding that no one should accept a wrong.

So, since ethics is structured such as to avoid its own undermining, we may infer that there is

such an ethical principle. Let us call this the principle of non-acceptance.

Now from the existence of this latter principle, we may infer that the principle of

wrongful benefit exists and has ethical force. For if we allow someone to benefit from her own

wrong, we have thereby accepted that wrong (in this sense of accept). For, in general, to allow

someone to benefit from her own wrong is to act so as to suggest that the wrong is not worth

bothering about; that it is not a matter of genuine concern. Suppose, for example, that I know that

my neighbor has committed insurance fraud. She has had her cousin steal her car from her, and

then return it to her after she had reported the theft and collected the insurance money. I do

nothing about the fraud, even though it would cost me little to tell my neighbor to come clean, or

to report the fraud to the insurance company. As a result, my neighbor recoups all the insurance

money and the car, and uses the money to improve her house. In such a case, I have allowed my

neighbor to benefit from her own wrong. By so doing, I have acted so as to suggest that the

wrong is not worth bothering about; that it is not a matter of genuine concern. So the principle of


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non-acceptance entails the wrongful benefit principle. Hence, since the non-acceptance principle

exists and is valid, we may infer that the same holds true of the wrongful benefit principle.

Let us turn to the argument for the institutionalized harm principle. The principle is

generated by a more general principle and an empirical fact. The general principle is that no

individual should be subjected to an unjustified harm. I take it that we should all agree that this

principle holds good.

The fact is more controversial. It is that if a social group is subjected to an unjusti fied

institutionalized harm, then its individual members will all be subjected to an unjustified harm.

The argument for this claim runs as follows. One group G subjects another H to an

institutionalized harm just in case G harms H, and the harm is done on a regular basis as a direct

result of a practice or custom ofG. Now ifG does Hsuch a harm, and the harm is unjustified,

then all the individual members ofHwill be harmed. The reason is that the regularity of the

harm, the fact that it is done as a result of a practice or custom of another group, and its being

unjustified together convey to all the members ofHthe message that they are weaker than the

members ofG, that they are victims of a wrong, and that G strongly disrespects them. This

threefold message will undermine the self-esteem ofHs members, bedevilling them with

feelings of inferiority and incapacity. This suffices to constitute a harm. For a harm is simply a

setback to ones interests. Pari passu, to move to a state in which you have your self-esteem

undermined, and are bedeviled by feelings of inferiority, is to suffer a setback to your interests.

So if a social group is subjected to an unjustified institutionalized harm, then its individual

members will all be subjected to an unjustified harm.

We have thus established the existence and validity of the principles of wrongful benefit

and institutionalized harm. Let us now how they explain why oppression is wrong.


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5. OPPRESSION AND THE TWO PRINCIPLES.I now begin the argument for the two principles thesis. That thesis holds that what, above

all, makes oppression wrong is that it violates the principles of wrongful benefit and

institutionalized harm. I shall break the argument for this thesis across two of this papers Parts.

In this Part, I show why violating the two principles explains why oppression is wrong. That is, I

shall show why this violation is one of oppressions wrong-makers.Call this the two-principles

explanation.In the next Part, I argue that this violation gives the bestexplanation of why

oppression is wrong. That is, I shall argue that this violation is oppressions chief wrong-maker.

This we shall continue to call the two principles thesis.

The two-principles explanation derives from three propositions. First, that if something x

violates a valid ethical principle p, then x is wrong. Second, that the principles of wrongful

benefit and institutionalized harm are valid ethical principles. Third, that oppression violates the

two principles. The second proposition I proved in Part 4. The first and third require argument.

5.1. Let us call the first proposition principle-violationism. This proposition we may

support as follows. The idea in the proposition is that violating a valid ethical principle is

sufficient for wrongness. The line of thought backing the proposition runs as follows. Valid

ethical principles aim to promote and protect the well-being of persons.7 To violate such a

principle is to both (a) reliably diminish and detract from persons well-being, and (b) show that

one has little respect for such well-being. To do (a) and (b) together is to do wrong. So violating

a valid ethical principle suffices for wrongness.

5.2. With principle-violationism proved, we turn to proving that oppression violates

the principles of wrongful benefit and institutionalized harm. We prove this as follows. To

violate a principle is to do something which the principle forbids. Now the wrongful benefit

principle forbids that anyone should benefit from her own wrong. We know from our analysis of


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oppression that when one group G1 oppresses another G2, that G1 engages in an institutional

practice which does an unjustified harm to G2; that G1 benefits from the harmful institutional

practice; and that the harm is brought about by unjustified limitation of choice, or unjustified

coercion, or unjustified force. So, when G1 oppresses G2, G1 unjustifiedly harms G2, and G1

benefits from causing the harm. But to unjustifiedly harm someone is to do wrong. So whenever

there is oppression, someone benefits from her own wrong. Since this is precisely what the

wrongful benefit principle forbids, any instance of oppression violates the principle.

Turn then to the institutionalized harm principle. Oppression violates this principle for

the following reasons. The principle forbids that any social group should be subjected to an

unjustified institutionalized harm. Now we just saw that when G1 oppresses G2, G1 engages in

an institutional practice which unjustifiedly harms G2. And from our analysis in Part 2, we know

that the harm is perpetrated through a social institution or practice, where a social institution or

practice is a custom backed up by other customs and conventions which make sense of it. As we

saw in Part 3, a harm is an institutionalized harm just in case it is a harm which regularly results

from a practice conducted by a particular social group, where this social group entertains

collective beliefs which make sense of the practice. Now G1s custom c2 makes sense of another

custom c1 only ifc2 is partly composed of collective beliefs making sense ofc1. So the harm

done in oppression is an institutionalized harm. And since that harm is also unjustified,

oppression does what the institutionalized harm principle forbids. So oppression violates the

principle.

5.3. We have thus shown that oppression violates the principles of wrongful benefit

and institutionalized harm. From this, from principle-violationism, and from the claim that the

two principles are valid ethical principles, it follows that violating the two principles is one of


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oppressions wrong-makers. That is the two-principles explanation, which this Part sought to

provide.

6. ARGUMENT FOR THE TWO PRINCIPLES THESIS.We now turn to arguing that violating the two principles affords the best explanation of

oppressions wrongness. I shall argue for this thesis by proposing a choice among the strongest

alternative explanations of oppressions wrongness. The overall argument runs as follows. The

two-principles explanation held that violating the principles of wrongful benefit and

institutionalized harm makes oppression wrong. If that thesis can better explain oppressions

wrongness than can the leading alternative explanations, then the two principles thesis is

probably true. Now the leading alternative explanations are (1) that oppression violates a

principle of non-domination and (2) that oppression violates a principle of equal respect. But the

two-principles explanation can better explain oppressions wrongness than can these alternative

explanations. Hence the two principles thesis is probably true.

This arguments devil lurks in its details, especially in the details of the third premise. So

let us turn to arguing for that premise.

6.1. The structure of my argument for the premise runs as follows. I shall specify and

describe nine equally-weighted criteria for choosing among explanations; nine explanatory

virtues. I shall claim that if an explanation better satisfies these criteria than do the best rival

explanations, then it is superior to all rivals. I shall then show that the two -principles explanation

better satisfies those criteria than does the non-domination explanation. I shall then do the same

for the equal-respect explanation. This argument will give us a well-supported inference to the

best explanation of oppressions wrongness.


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6.2. To my mind, there are nine equally-weighted criteria for determining whether an

explanation is superior to rival explanations. The criteria are: evidential adequacy, simplicity,

unifying power or consilience, falsifiability or refutability, testability, neatness or precision,

conservativeness, fecundity, and mechanism- informativeness or explanatory depth. If a theory

better satisfies one of these criteria than do its competitors, that is a consideration in its favor. If a

theory better satisfies more of these criteria than do any of its competitors, that is a decisive

reason for deeming it the best theory available. In what follows, I specify and describe these

criteria.

What I am calling evidential adequacy is a widening of the familiar theoretical virtue of

empirical adequacy. One theory is more empirically adequate than another, it is usually said, if it

has fewer false observable implications than its rival.8 But since the question this paper tackles is

a normative question, and it is widely held that one cannot (uncontroversially) observe that an

object possesses normative properties, I am going to widen this criterion to make it relevant to

our question. I think this widening is true to the criterions spirit. I shall say, then, that evidential

adequacy is an explanatory virtue or criterion of theory choice. One theory is more evidentially

adequate than another if its propositions or implications are, taken as a whole, more compatible

with what all reasonably informed observers could agree is the relevant evidence.

Simplicity is a familiar criterion of theory choice. We may say that one theory is simpler

than a competitor theory if either (a) the first theory makes fewer hypotheses or claims than the

second, or (b) the first theory entails fewer ontological commitments; that is, it is committed to

the existence of fewer entities than is its competitor.9 Take an example. Insofar as it tries to be an

explanatory theory of the rules of common-sense Western morality, a great advantage that act-

utilitarianism has over a moral theory which, like Bernard Gerts, claims that there are 10 basic

moral principles, is that the former postulates only one basic moral principle.10 Hence act-


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utilitarianisminsofar as it tries to explain the same things that Gerts theory doesis simpler

than Gerts theory.

Unifying power or consilience is almost as familiar a criterion as simplicity. One theory

has more unifying power than a competitor if the first can explain (and thus unify) a greater

number of facts than the second.11 If a theory can give plausible explanations of a greater range

of facts than any of its competitors, it has more unifying power than the rest. For example, in the

Origin of Species,Darwin gave lengthy argument to show that his evolution-by-natural-selection

theory of the origin of diverse species could explain many more facts than could the theory that

God independent created all current species.12

Falsifiability or refutability is also a familiar criterion. One theory is more falsifiable than

another if it is easier to specify an event that would conclusively refute the first theory than an

event that would conclusively refute the second. Such events could either be direct contradictions

of one of the theorys propositions, or direct contradictions of one of the theorys implications

(the theory would then be contradicted by modus tollens). For example, consider Galileos law of

free fall, which, in its modern version, holds that, The distance fallen by a body in free fall close

to the earth equals one half the product of the bodys acceleration and the square of the time

fallen; in symbols,

d = at2 (1)

where d is the distance fallen by the body in free fall, a is the bodys acceleration (i.e., the

bodys acceleration due to the earths gravity), and tis the time spent falling. We can easily

specify an event that would conclusively refute the law. Were we to drop a pickup truck from an

airplane and find that it fell at a different rate than that specified in (1), we should think that the

law was conclusively refuted. The law is thus more falsifiable than, say, Heideggers statement

that the nothing itself nihilates.13 For what event could conclusively refute that statement?


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Testability is often run together with falsifiability. But the two importantly differ. One

theory is more testable than another if it is more feasible to test at least one of the theorys more

controversial propositions or entailed propositions. The test would seek to determine whether the

proposition was contradicted or confirmed by the events produced by the test. Testability is thus

relative to our current knowledge and resources, as falsifiability is not.14 For example, the theory

that dinosaurs went extinct because a massive meteor strike caused a deadly climate change is

more testable than the theory that they went extinct because they were suddenly consumed by a

paralyzing fear of one another. The first theory seems to entail that there would be discoverable

traces of the meteor in the earths crust, and we now know how to search for such traces. The

fear theory seems to entail that the dinosaurs nervous systems underwent a biochemical change.

But we dont, I think, yet know how to search for evidence of such a change.

Neatness or precision is, like testability, a pragmatic criterion of theory choice. One

theory T is neater than another T' if either (a) T leaves us with fewer urgent questions about the

meaning of its key terms or about the essential properties of the entities whose existence it

postulates than does T', or (b) T leaves us with fewer questions about what it entails than does

T'.15 For example, the folk psychological theory of human action, which most of us accept as a

practical matter, roughly explains most ordinary human actions by appeal to beliefs and desires.

One emerging rival to this theory is to be found in neuroscience; it would explain human actions

by appeal to biochemical changes in the brain and nervous system, which in turn caused

biochemical changes in the rest of the body. Now just what the essential properties of beliefs and

desires are are urgent questions; whereas (it might be argued) the analogous questions about

biochemical changes in the brain and body generally are not so urgent. If so, then the

neuroscientific theory is neater than the folk psychological theory. I think this line of thought

helps motivate current calls to eliminate folk psychology.16


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Conservativeness or coherence with other theoretical commitments is an intuitive

criterion of theory choice. A theory is more conservative than another if it fits better with widely-

held beliefs about matters other than the theorys target entities.17 For example, we are unlikely

to accept the theory that earthquakes occur because hobgoblins dance on hilltops an hour before

the quake. This is because we justifiably believe that there are no hobgoblins. The theory that

earthquakes occur because of shifts in tectonic plates fits better with our justified beliefs.

Fecundity is an often-overlooked theoretical virtue. But it is often appealed to or latent in

scientific debates over questions of theory choice. One theory is more fecund than its

competitors if it either (a) suggests more new and potentially fruitful research hypotheses than its

competitors, or (b) suggests more new, worthwhile research problems than its competitors. It is

arguable that one reason why Darwins theory of the origin of species triumphed over the divine

creation theory in scientific circles is that Darwins theory suggested more hypotheses and

research problems which life scientists considered worthwhile. The theory was more

scientifically fecund than the divine creation theory.

The final explanatory virtue is mechanism- informativeness or explanatory depth.

Following Bechtel and Abrahamsen, we may say that a mechanism is a structure performing a

function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization.18

Mechanisms can be either etiological or constitutive.19 An etiological mechanism is a mechanism

which produces a subsequent event. Darwins mechanism of species evolution by natural

selection of adaptive traits is an example. In turn, a constitutive mechanism is a mechanism out

of which a contemporaneous effect is composed. An example might be the activities of the

United States government: these are composed out of the workings of the U.S. Congress, the

U. S. federal courts, the executive branch and administrative agencies. The workings of all


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these organizations are the constitutive mechanism of the workings of the United States

government.

We can see, then, that a theory is more mechanism- informativehas more explanatory

depththan another if it specifies with more precision and detail a mechanism by which the

explanandum is either caused or constituted. So, for example, Darwins theory of evolution by

natural selection has more explanatory depth than earlier evolutionary explanations of the

diversity of species. Several writers before Darwin had explained the present diversity of species

by appeal to evolution, but they did not specify with precision and detail a mechanism by which

that evolution occurred.20 A great strength of Darwins theory was that it did so specify the

mechanism by which (as he thought) evolution worked: natural selection.21 Darwins theory aims

to explain why there now is such a variety of species: it does so by appeal to evolution, it claims

that the mechanism by which evolution occurs is natural selection, and it gives a detailed account

of that mechanism and its workings.

6.3. We are almost in a position to begin considering the issue of theory choice. Butwe need first to consider the rival theories. I will present the non-domination explanation first,

and then turn to the equal-respect explanation.

6.3.1. The non-domination explanation is based in a theory of non-domination,

suggested by the republican theory of Philip Pettit. The non-domination theory makes three

claims. First, that there is a valid principle of political morality holding that we should, in

general, never act so as to dominate anyone.22 Second, that social freedom is best understood as a

condition of non-domination. Third, that the non-domination principle is the fundamental

principle of political morality. All the other principles of political morality may be seen as

derived from it.


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Domination the theory analyzes as follows. Jonesdominates Smithat tif, and only if,

Jones has the capacity to intentionally or negligently worsen Smiths choice situation at t, and

Jones is not forced to track the interests and ideas of Smith if she Jones does intentionally or

negligently worsen Smiths choice situation at t.23

The non-domination explanation then gives the following argument to show that

oppression violates the principle of non-domination. Oppression requires a harm done to some

group, where the harm is brought about by unjustified limitation of choice, or unjustified

coercion, or unjustified force (call these unjustified constraints). Moreover, the harm must

continue to be perpetrated over some significant interval. So, since the harm must be brought

about by unjustified constraints, oppression requires that unjustified constraints must be levied

on some group over some significant interval. But the unjustified constraints mentioned

obviously count as worsenings of ones choice situation; limitation of choice, coercion, or force

would all of them worsen your choice situation. Further, since these choice-limitations must

continue to be perpetrated over some significant interval, and since these particular choice-

limitations always do harm, and since no one can have an interest in being harmed, we may

presume that the oppressorsat most points during the oppressionare not forced to track the

ideas and interests of the oppressed. So oppression suffices for domination. Hence to oppress

some group is to do what the principle of non-domination forbids. So oppression violates the

principle of non-domination. From this result, and by appeal to principle-violationism, the non-

domination explanation concludes that what makes oppression wrong is that it violates the

principle of non-domination.

6.3.2. The second rival explanation is inspired partly by the end-in- itself formulation of

Kants categorical imperative, and partly by Ronald Dworkins account of the fundamental

principle of political morality.24 This explanation appeals to a principle of equal respect. The


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truth or falsity of normative theories. So, absent a justified theory of normative evidence (which I

will not attempt to offer here), we may conclude that the two theories have exactly the same

amount of evidential adequacy.

Turn then to the simplicity criterion. I think it will be agreed that the non-domination

explanation better satisfies this criterion than does the two-principles explanation. We said that

one theory is simpler than a competitor theory if either (a) the first theory makes fewer

hypotheses or claims than the second, or (b) the first theory entails fewer ontological

commitments; it is committed to the existence of fewer entities than is its competitor. Now the

non-domination explanation postulates only the principle of non-domination and principle-

violationism. The two-principles explanation postulates the wrongful benefit principle, the

institutionalized harm principle, and principle-violationism. So the non-domination explanation

postulates one less entity than does the two-principles explanation. So it has fewer ontological

commitments; hence it is simpler than the two-principles explanation.

The question of unifying power or consilience is next. Here it is clear that the non -

domination explanation prevails. We said that one theory has more unifying power than a

competitor if the first can explain (and thus unify) a greater number of facts or phenomena than

the second. Clearly, the non-domination principle can be used to explain a greater number of

facts than can the principles of wrongful benefit and institutionalized harm. For example, the

non-domination principle can explain why we should be committed to the rule of law. For only

by respecting and upholding the rule of law can we avoid situations in which persons are

frequently dominated. But neither the wrongful benefit principle nor the institutionalized harm

principle can explain this. Again, the non-domination principle can explain whyinsofar as we

are committed to the existence of the statewe should be committed to some kind of welfare

state. For, given an antecedent commitment to the state, it is only by upholding some kind of


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welfare state that we can avoid situations in which persons are frequently dominated. But neither

the wrongful benefit principle nor the institutionalized harm principle can explain this. To take a

final example: the non-domination principle can explain why at least some form of judicial

review of legislation is a good thing. For it helps prevent the legislator from dominating the

citizenry.25 But our two principles cannot explain this. In addition, there are a host of other facts

of political morality which the non-domination principle can explain but which our two

principles, either separately or together, cannot. So the non-domination principle, which is the

background theory for the non-domination explanation, has more unifying power than the two-

principles explanation and its background theory.

We turn, then, to the question of falsifiability. I shall argue that the two -principles

explanation is more falsifiable than the non-domination explanation. We said above that one

theory is more falsifiable than another if it is easier to specify an event that would conclusively

refute the first theory than an event that would conclusively refute the second. Recall that the

non-domination principle holds that we should, in general, never act so as to dominate anyone.

By contrast, the wrongful benefit principle holds that no one should (be allowed to) benefit from

her own wrong; the institutionalized harm principle, for its part, holds that no social group

should be subjected to an unjustified institutionalized harm. Now it is easier to specify an event

that falsifies our two principles than it is to specify an event that falsifies the non -domination

principle. For suppose that there is some event in which someone was allowed to benefit from

her own wrong, and in which a social group was subjected to an unjustified institutionalized

harm. Suppose further that for some reason, we should still see to it that this event occurs (say,

the consequences of its not occurring would be disastrous). This is an event which clearly

falsifies the two principles. But it is much more difficult to specify an event which falsifies the

non-domination principle. For that principle holds only that we should, in general, never act so as


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to dominate anyone. It does not universally prohibit dominating actions. So a dominating action

which (for consequentialist reasons) a person should do anyway need not falsify the principle.

But then we must ask: what event would falsify it? It is hard to specify one, whereas it is quite

easy to do so for our two principles. So it seems that the theory backing the two-principles

explanation is more falsifiable than the theory backing the non-domination explanation.

Advantage: two-principles explanation.

Next comes testability. We said above that one theory is more testable than another if it is

more feasible to run a test of at least one of the theorys more controversial propositions or

entailed propositions. The test would seek to determine whether the proposition was contradicted

or confirmed by the events produced by the test. It is fairly easy to think of a feasible test that

would contradict or confirm the two-principles explanation: we go out and find cases of a

persons being allowed to benefit from her own wrong, or a social groups being subjected to an

unjustified institutionalized harm, and ask whether those actions-cum-events are wrong. If either

kind of case is not wrong, the theory is contradicted. However, it is not so easy to think of a

feasible test that would contradict or confirm the non-domination principle. For we run into the

same problem with the falsifiability issue. What event would contradict the principle? It is hard

to think of one. So it seems that testing the two-principles explanation is more feasible than

testing the non-domination explanation. Advantage: two-principles explanation.

We turn then to the issue of neatness or precision. Recall that one theory T is neater than

another T' if either (a) T leaves us with fewer urgent questions about the meaning of its key

terms or about the essential properties of the entities whose existence it postulates than does T',

or (b) T leaves us with fewer questions about what it entails than does T'. Here I shall argue that

the two explanations are equal. Both the non-domination explanation and the two-principles

explanation are equally clear about what they entail. As for the urgency of the questions about


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the meaning of their key termsdomination, wrongful benefit, unjustified institutionalized

harmI take it that they have about the same level of urgency. Each theory, as I have presented

them, gave plausible analyses of these terms. And the same holds for the urgency of the question

about the essential properties of the entities the theories postulate; neither presents more urgent

questions than the other. So here we have a draw.

Next comes conservativeness. We said earlier that a theory is more conservative than

another if it fits better with widely-held beliefs about matters other than the theorys own target

entities. I want to argue that the two-principles explanation is more conservative than the non-

domination explanation. My reason is that it is widely believed that the animating values of

politics and the law areor ought to befreedom, equality, and individual rights. Call this the

liberal animating-value thesis.The non-domination theory does justice to freedom; it puts it at

the core of political morality. But it does not do so for individual rights. So it seems not to fit

with the liberal animating value thesis. By contrast, the principles of wrongful benefit and

institutionalized harm seem relatively conservative and innocuous. Partly because they are more

limited than the non-domination principle, they dont seem to clash with many widely-held

beliefs. So it seems that the two-principles explanation is more conservative than the non-

domination theory. Advantage: two-principles explanation.

Turn then to the issue of fecundity. One theory, we said, is more fecund than its

competitors if it either (a) suggests more new and potentially fruitful research hypotheses than its

competitors, or (b) suggests more new, worthwhile research problems. Here I think it clear that

the non-domination explanation trumps the two-principles explanation. The non-domination

principle, because it is more general than the principles of wrongful benefit or institutionalized

harm, and because it is relatively new in the practical philosophy of the last two centuries,

certainly generates more new and fruitful research hypotheses and problems than the two


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principles. This is one reason why so many political theorists are currently giving republican

theories of this or that.26

The last issue is that of mechanism- informativeness or explanatory depth. Here I want to

argue that the two-principles explanation prevails over the non-domination explanation. A

mechanism, we said, is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts,

component operations, and their organization. And recall that a theory is more mechanism-

informativehas more explanatory depththan another if it specifies with more precision and

detail a mechanism by which the explanandum is either caused or constituted. Now compare the

mechanism specified by the two-principles explanation in sections 5.1 and 5.2 with the

mechanism specified by the non-domination explanation in section 6.3.1. The first gives the

more precise and detailed specification of a mechanism. For the two-principles explanation gives

us a mechanism which moves on two tracks: first, from (1a) oppression to (2a) unjustified harm

and benefitto (3a) wrongful benefitto (4a) forbidden by a principle to (5a) principle-violationism

to (6a) oppressions wrongness. On the second track, it goes from (1b) oppression to (2b)

unjustified institutionalized harm to (3b) forbidden by a principle to (4b) principle-violationism

to (5b) oppressions wrongness.

Contrast that with the non-domination mechanism. It goes from (1) oppression to (2)

harm brought about by unjustified limitation of choice, or unjustified coercion, or unjustified

force andperpetrated over some significant interval to (3) worsening of choice situation and not

forced to track oppresseds ideas and interests to (4) domination to (5) forbidden by a principle

to (6) principle-violationism to (7) oppressions wrongness. I think it will be agreed that the two-

principles explanation gives the more precise and detailed mechanism-specification. For its

mechanism invokes more parts and more operations.So the two-principles explanation is more

mechanism- informative than the non-domination explanation.


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If my arguments thus far are right, then the non-domination explanation has the

advantage in simplicity, unifying power, and fecundity. The two-principles explanation, in turn,

has the advantage in falsifiability, testability, conservativeness, and mechanism- informativeness.

The two explanations are tied on the issues of evidential adequacy and neatness. So the non-

domination explanation better satisfies three of our criteria of theory choice, while the two-

principles explanation better satisfies four. If I am right in thinking that all nine criteria have

equal weight, and that the nine exhaust the criteria for theory choice, then it seems we should

accept the two-principles explanation over the non-domination explanation.

6.5. I want now to press the issue of theory choice against the equal-respectexplanation of oppressions wrongness. I shall argue that the two-principles explanation better

satisfies my nine criteria of theory choice than does the equal-respect explanation. From this

claim and the argument in 6.2, it follows that the two-principles explanation better explains

oppressions wrongness than does the equal-respect explanation.

Take first evidential adequacy. Here we have a tie, for the same reasons considered in the

argument against the non-domination explanation. There is no agreement among reasonable

observers on which evidence is relevant to deciding normative questions.

So let us then turn to simplicity. Here it will be agreed that the equa l- respect explanation

prevails. For it appeals only to the equal respect principle and to principle -violationism. The two-

principles explanation, by contrast, appeals to the principles of wrongful benefit and

institutionalized harm, as well as principle-violationism. So the equal-respect explanation

postulates fewer entities and makes fewer hypotheses than the two-principles explanation. Hence

it is simpler than the two-principles explanation.

Unifying power is next. Here the advantage lies with the equal-respect explanation. For

the theory backing itthe equal respect principlecan be used to explain most principles of


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political morality. For example, Ronald Dworkin has derived from it a claim that the state should

be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life. He has then derived from both the

principle and this claim standard egalitarian liberal principles of political morality: inequalities of

wealth should be reduced by redistribution, government should intervene in the economy to

promote achieve full employment and economic stability, government should intervene in

society to promote equality among social groups, there should be robust freedom of expression,

and the like.27 By contrast with this marked consilience, the two-principles explanation has much

less unifying power. The principles of wrongful benefit and institutionalized harm cannot be

used to explain so many other principles. So the theory backing the equal-respect explanation has

more unifying power than the two-principles explanation.

Let us turn then to falsifiability. Here the two-principles explanation prevails. The reason

is that it is much more difficult to specify an event that would conclusively refute the equal

respect principle than it is to specify one that refutes the principles of wrongful benefit or

institutionalized harm. For the equal respect principle holds (a) that we should in all things treat

people as equals; (b) that this requires treating all people with equal respect. The difficulty comes

in specifying an event in which (i) people were not treated as equals and (ii) we should

nevertheless see to it that that event occurs. For it is very unclear what treating people as equals

comes to. Practical philosophers hotly debate the partly conceptual and partly normative

question: what criterion should we use to decide whether we are treating people as equals? The

answers range from equality of welfare to equality of resources28 to equality of capabilities29 to

equality of opportunities for welfare30 to equality of access to advantage.31 There is no agreement

on which is the right answer. All answers are intensely controversial. It is of course true that

there is controversy over how best to answer the questions: how do we determine when someone

benefited from her own wrong? How do we determine someone suffered unjustified


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institutionalized harm? But those are much less heated and widespread controversies, than that

over how to determine what treating people as equals comes to. So it is easier to specify events

which would refute the principles of wrongful benefit or institutionalized harm than it is to

specify an event that would refute the equal respect principle. So the two-principles explanation

is more falsifiable than the equal-respect explanation.

Testability comes next. Here the advantage lies with the two-principles explanation, for

much the same reasons. If it is more difficult to specify an event which refutes theory T than it is

to specify an event which refutes theory T', then it is obviously less feasible to test T than it is to

test T'. Advantage: two-principles explanation.

Turn then to the question of neatness. Here the two-principles explanation prevails over

the equal-respect explanation. The reason is again much the same. A theory is neater than

another if either (a) the first theory leaves us with fewer urgent questions about the meaning of

its key terms or about the essential properties of the entities whose existence it postulates than

does the second, or (b) the first theory leaves us with fewer questions about what it entails than

does the second. Now as we saw above, it is an urgent question in political philosophy just what

treating people as equals comes to. So the analysis of the concept equality and the identification

of its essential properties are hotly controverted. This is less true of concepts like benefit from

her own wrong or unjustified institutionalized harm. So the two-principles explanation is neater

than the equal-respect explanation.

Conservativeness is next. Here we have a tie. Both explanations seem to fit equally well

with widely held beliefs about matters other than their own target entities. The equal respect

principle has by now shaped so much thought and argument in practical philosophy that it fits

fairly well with widely held beliefs. In turn, the principles of wrongful benefit and


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institutionalized harm are too specific to conflict with widely held beliefs about matters other

than oppression, wrongful benefit, or institutionalized harm. So neither theory prevails here.

Consider then the issue of fecundity. Recall that a theory is more fecund than its

competitors if it either (a) suggests more new and potentially fruitful research hypotheses, or (b)

suggests more new, worthwhile research problems. Here the equal-respect explanation prevails

over the two-principles explanation. For the equal respect principle backing that explanation has

generated all kinds of fruitful research hypotheses. It has been used to build theories of

distributive and political equality,32 of how to treat minority cultures,33 or of when respect for all

should trump fairness for all.34 By contrast, the principles of wrongful benefit and

institutionalized harm, because they are less general and have less explanatory scope, are not and

probably will not be so fruitful. So the equal-respect explanation and the theory backing it are

more fecund.

Let us turn finally to mechanism- informativeness. Consider again the mechanism

specified by the two-principles explanation. It moves on two tracks: first, from (1a) oppression to

(2a) unjustified harm and benefitto (3a) wrongful benefitto (4a) forbidden by a principle to (5a)

principle-violationism to (6a) oppressions wrongness. On the second track, it goes from (1b)

oppression to (2b) institutionalized harm to (3b) forbidden by a principle to (4b) principle-

violationism to (5b) oppressions wrongness.

Now consider the mechanism specified by the equal respect explanation. (1) oppression

to (2) unjustified harm, unjustified limitation of choice, unjustified coercion, or unjustified force,

to (3) undermining rational agency (because (4) rational agency requires security from

unjustified harm, limitation of choice, coercion, or force)to (5) failing to show equal respect

(because (6) showing equal respect requires not undermining rational agency), to (7) failing to


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treat as an equal to (8) forbidden by a principle to (9) principle-violationism to (10)

oppressions wrongness.

If we tally up the parts and operations in these two mechanisms, we find that the

mechanism specified by the two-principles explanation invokes more parts and operations, even

if only by a small margin. So it seems that the two-principles explanation gives the more precise

and detailed specification of a mechanism. So it is more mechanism- informative.

If my arguments on these heads are right, then the equal-respect explanation has the

advantage in simplicity, unifying power, and fecundity. The two-principles explanation, in turn,

has the advantage in falsifiability, testability, neatness, and mechanism- informativeness. The two

explanations are tied on the issues of evidential adequacy and conservativess. So the equal-

respect explanation better satisfies three of our criteria of theory choice, while the two -principles

explanation better satisfies four. So if all nine criteria have equal weight, and if they exhaust the

criteria for theory choice, then it seems we should accept the two-principles explanation over the

equal-respect explanation.

6.6. If the arguments thus far are right, then the two-principles explanation better

explains oppressions wrongness than does either the non-domination explanation or the equal-

respect explanation. So if I am right in thinking that these two are the chief alternative

explanations of oppressions wrongness, then what, above all, makes oppression wrong is that it

violates the principles of wrongful benefit and institutionalized harm. That is the two principles

thesis, which this paper sought to prove.

7. CONCLUSION.

I have argued that what, above all, makes oppression wrong is that it violates two

principles of political morality. The first is the wrongful benefit principle: no one should profit


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from her own wrong. The second is the institutionalized harm principle: no social group should

be subjected to an unjustified institutionalized harm. If my theory-choice arguments are right,

then the fact that oppression violates these two principles best explains its wrongness.

Of course, the argument here broaches more questions than it answers. First, can we or

should we apply wholesale the explanatory virtues for empirical theories to questions of choice

among normative theories? Is there some decisive argument against doing so? I doubt it, but I

lack a decisive argument for that doubt. Second, should we weight the nine criteria for theory

choice equally, or should some be accorded more weight than the others? Should we weight

them differently when choosing among normative theories than when choosing among empirical

theories? Third, do these nine criteria exhaust the criteria for rational theory choice, or are there

others which would give the advantage to the explanations I rejected? These are only some of the

questions that arise when we begin to ponder why oppression is wrong.

NOTES.

*

AUTHORS NOTE: For helpful discussion of these issues, I thank Paulina Ochoa, Andrs Szigeti, Neil Roberts,Nobutaka Otobe, and Iris Marion Young.

1 Given in Ann. E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 3-54, see especially p. 25.

2For an alternative analysis of oppression, see T. L. Zutlevics, Towards a Theory of Oppression, Ratio 15 (2002): 80-

102, arguing that oppression is the unjust denial of the opportunity for resilient autonomy. For argument to the view thatoppression has no fixed necessary and sufficient conditions, see Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 40-42.

3 Conditions (1)-(5) are Cudds, slightly revised. Condition (6) is my addition.

4Compare the account of the existence conditions of a social group in Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, pp.

42-48, 186. For another view, see Tony Honor, What Is a Group? in Honor, Making Law Bind(Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1987).

5It was famously used by the New York Court of Appeal to decide Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889),

and is discussed in Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 20.

6See for discussion David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School

Experience, 1875-1928 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1997), and the relevant chapters in Francis PaulPrucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians (Lincoln, NB: University ofNebraska Press, 1984).


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7For a defense of this claim, see Chapter One of Thomas J. Donahue, The Structure of Political Theories: Why

Normative Theories of Politics and Economics Depend on Ethics, Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 2007.

8See, for discussion of empirical adequacy, Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p.

12.

9For a defense of taking simplicity to count in a theorys favor, see Roger White, Why favour simplicity? Analysis 65

(2005): 205-210.

10More precisely, Gerts moral theory holds that that act is right which and only which follows all ten of these rules:

1. Do not kill. 2. Do not cause pain. 3. Do not disable. 4. Do not deprive of freedom. 5. Do not deprive of pleasure. 6. Donot deceive. 7. Keep your promises. 8. Do not cheat. 9. Obey the law. 10. Do your duty, except under such circumstancesthat a fully informed, rational person can publicly allow violating one or more of the rules. See Bernard Gert, Morality: Its

Nature and Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), especially Chapters 7 and 8.

11For attempts to reduce explanatoriness to unifying power, see Michael Friedman, Explanation and Scientific

Understanding, Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 5-19; Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification, Philosophy of Science48 (1981): 501531; Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World, in MinnesotaStudies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIII: Scientific Explanation, ed. Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989): 410505.12

See, for example, Chapter Six, Difficulties on Theory, in Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (London: Penguin,1968).

13See Martin Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics? in Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York:

Harper Collins, 1993): 93-110, p. 103.

14For a useful discussion of testability, see Elliott Sober, Testability, Proceedings and Addresses of the American

Philosophical Association 73 (1999): 47-76.

15For an illuminating discussion of precision, see Roy A. Sorensen, The Ambiguity of Vagueness and Precision, Pacific

Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 174-183.

16

See, for example, Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1983), demonstrating in Part I the difficulties of analyzing the concept of belief, and concluding partlyfrom this in Part II that we should jettison folk psychology. See also Paul Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and thePropositional Attitudes, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 67-90.

17What I call the target entities of a theory are those the theory seeks to inform us about.

18William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative, Studies in History and Philosophy of

Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2005): 421-441, pp. 423-4.

19I draw this distinction and examples from Carl F. Craver, Structures of Scientific Theories, The Blackwell Guide to

the Philosophy of Science, ed. Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002): 55-59, pp. 67-73.

20See Samir Okasha, Darwin, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, ed. W. H. Newton-Smith (Oxford:

Blackwell, 1991): 68-75, p. 69.21

See Chapter Four, Natural Selection, in Darwin, The Origin of Species.

22This principle seems to follow from Pettits claims that non -domination is a value that the state ought to promote, that

non-domination is a personal value, and the general egalitarianism that Pettit says both motivates and results from the idealof non-domination. See Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government(Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1997), pp. 91-106, 81-91, and 110-119. Compare Pettits claim that non-domination should be a central ideal of politics, inPettit, The Domination Complaint, NomosXLVI: Political Exclusion and Domination, ed. Melissa Williams and Stephen

Macedo (New York: New York University Press, 2005): 87-117.


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23See Pettit, The Domination Complaint, and compare the account of domination in Pettit, Republicanism, pp. 52-64.

24See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1985): 181-204.

25

For a presentation of this explanation, see Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Endsof Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 9.

26See, e.g., Hanasz Waldemar, Toward Global Republican Citizenship? Social Philosophy and Policy 23 (2006): 282-

302; James Bohman, Republican Cosmopolitanism, Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 336-352; RichardBellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2007).

27For the derivation, see Dworkin, Liberalism, pp. 192-198.

28See Ronald Dworkin, Equality of Resources, in Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2000): 65-119.

29See Amartya Sen, Equality of What? in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures in Human Values, ed. Stephen

Darwall (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). 30

See Richard Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93.

31See G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, Ethics 99 (1989): 906-944.

32 See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

33 See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

34See Jonathan Wolff, Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998): 97-122.

why oppression is wrong

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