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FIRE MANAGEMENT ON PUBLIC LAND - VICTORIA

BURNS WHILE ITS BUREAUCRACY FIDDLES

Will Recent Legislative Changes to Crisis and Emergency Management Improve Fire Management on Victoria’s Public Lands?

Dexter, B.D; A. Hodgson AM. January 2015.


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Fire Management on Public Land – Jan’15 Page 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Donald Macleod for his on-going encouragement and incisive comments spanning all three reports in the series. Mike Leonard, Mark Poynter and Tony Manderson for their material assistance, constructive and robust discussion in the interests of all Victorians and the conservation of the forest environment. Lois for enduring patience, word-processing/formatting and last but not least Anon.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Barrie Dexter. MScFor(Melb), BScFor(Melb), DipFor(Cres), MIFA, has over 55 years of experience in natural resource management including research and development in the silvics and silviculture of native and exotic forests, factors affecting bushfire behaviour, the planned use of fire, with experience that ranged from the fire-line to state level co-ordination and policy development and practice in management of state forests and national parks. A. Hodgson AM. BScFor. DipFor. has more than 60 years experience in fire management and forest fire research in Australia, USA, Canada, France, Spain and China. He was formerly Commissioner of Forests, Forests Commission of Victoria and Chief Fire Officer Department of Conservation, Forests and Lands, Victoria. He was a Member of the Board of the Country Fire Authority and a Member of the State Disaster Committee. He was awarded a Winston Churchill Fellowship to study fire management in North America and is a graduate from the National Advanced Fire Behaviour School, Marana, Arizona. He was made a Member (AM) of the Order of Australia in 2012 for service to forestry science, particularly the development of land management and bushfire risk reduction strategies, to emergency service organisations and to the community of rural Victoria.

Barrie Dexter

Athol Hodgson AM

ISBN 978-0-9942531-0-1 (Spiral bound with Part 3 CD) ISBN 978-0-9942531-1-8 (Compact Disk) © 2015 Dexter, B.D & Athol Hodgson AM.


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FIRE MANAGEMENT ON PUBLIC LAND - VICTORIA BURNS WHILE ITS BUREAUCRACY FIDDLES

Will Recent Legislative Changes to Crisis and Emergency Management Improve Fire Management on Victoria’s Public Lands?

Dexter, B.D; A. Hodgson AM. January 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 1

PREFACE .................................................................................................................................................... 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. 6

CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 8

RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................................. 11

1 Structural Arrangements for the Management of Fire on Victoria’s Public Forests. .............. 11

2 Office of Chief Fire Officer and Status of Chief Fire Officer. ................................................... 11

3 Appoint an External Independent Panel to Review and Report on Options For Effective and

Efficient Fire Management on Victoria’s public Land. ............................................................ 11

4 Amendments to the Forests Act 1958 .................................................................................... 12

5 Modify application of the Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System ................ 13

PART 2

1 BACKGROUND: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODELS ...................................................................... 16

1.1 State Crisis and Resilience Council .......................................................................................... 16

1.2 Emergency Management Victoria ........................................................................................... 17

1.3 Emergency Management Commissioner (EMC) ................................................................... 19

1.4 Inspector General for Emergency Management (IGEM) ........................................................ 19

2 BUSHFIRE ON VICTORIA’S PUBLIC LAND – FAILING TO HEED HISTORIC LESSONS ............................... 20

2.1 Stretton Royal Commission ..................................................................................................... 20

2.2 Esplin Inquiry 2002/03 Victorian bushfires ............................................................................. 21

2.3 Harrietville fire 2013 ............................................................................................................... 23

2.4 East Gippsland fires 2013/14 .................................................................................................. 23


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3 KEY FEATURES OF LEGISLATION GOVERNING FOREST FIRE MANAGEMENT ....................................... 24

3.1 Chief Fire Officer ..................................................................................................................... 24

3.2 Role of Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries ................................. 24

3.2.1 Section 61D Collaborate and Consult with Emergency Management Victoria ..................... 24

3.2.2 Section 61E Compliance with Operational Standards ........................................................... 24

3.2.3 Section 61EA Report on Compliance with Operational Standards ....................................... 25

3.2.4 Section 61EB Strategic Action Plan........................................................................................ 25

3.2.5 Section 61F Compliance with Incident Operating Procedures ............................................. 25

3.2.6 Section 62 Duties and Powers for Prevention, Suppression and Planned Use of Fire and

Application of Fire on Public Land ........................................................................................... 26

4 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REFORM, LAND USE CHANGES, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM and

ORGANISATIONAL SILOS ................................................................................................................... 27

4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 27

4.2 Assessment of the new emergency management model ....................................................... 28

4.2.1 Risk and Resilience .................................................................................................................. 28

4.2 .2 Capability and Response ......................................................................................................... 38

4.2.3 Relief and recovery ................................................................................................................. 58

5 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONEMENT AND PRIMARY INDUSTRIES DISCUSSION PAPER ......................... 62

6 INSPECTOR-GENERAL FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ................................................................... 65

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................ 74

PART 3

DOCUMENTS [pdf] CONTAINED ON COMPACT DISC. .............................................................................. 78


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PART 1

PREFACE

This report is the third in a series concerning forest fire management on public land in Victoria. The first [2005]: “The Facts Behind the Fire – A Scientific and Technical Review of the circumstances surrounding the 2003 Victorian Bushfire Crisis”1 placed on record Forest Fire Victoria Inc’s opinion that the Victorian Government Inquiry (The Esplin Inquiry) into the 2003 Alpine fires failed to rigorously investigate and address concerns of many knowledgeable individuals, communities and organisations on underlying problems with Victoria’s forest fire management policy and practice, which had progressively developed under successive State Governments over two decades. Serious deficiencies were identified and recommendations made to address problems. It was argued that if not effectively addressed, Victoria would remain exposed to an unacceptable risk of widespread and destructive bushfires. The second [2012]: “Forest Fire Management in Victoria – Is the State Coping? Concerns about the organisational arrangements and related matters for forest fire management in Victoria”2 placed on record that, notwithstanding the wide-ranging nature of the Royal Commission into the 2009 Victorian bushfires during 2009 – 10, and government acceptance of the Inquiry’s recommendations, fundamental issues remained unaddressed. The level of expertise and resources available to combat the fire threat remained in a worse condition than at any time since the early 1980s. Within the responsible agency, rampant empire building in central administration, numerically depleted work centres and lack of accredited fire-ground personnel substantially diminished fire prevention, particularly fuel reduction burning, and fire first attack to quickly bring fires under control. The report was referred to the then responsible portfolio ministers who “noted it with interest” and passed it on to the then Fire Services Commissioner for his consideration. This report [2015]: “FIRE MANAGEMENT ON PUBLIC LAND - VICTORIA BURNS WHILE ITS BUREAUCRACY FIDDLES - Will Recent Legislative Changes to Crisis and Emergency Management

Improve Fire Management on Victoria’s Public Lands?”, briefly compares and contrasts governance, policy and practice of forest fire management in Victoria spanning three decades. The appropriateness of a massive command and control bureaucracy now governing crisis and emergency management, including bushfire, in Victoria, is considered in the context of forest fire management on public land. The report is in three parts: Part 1 includes this Preface, Table of Contents, Executive Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations. As always the devil is in the detail and Part 2 provides more in-depth analysis and supporting documentation. Part 3, in the form of a compact disk [CD] contains some significant papers to further inform those readers interested to delve deeper into the subject.

1 The full report - see Part 3.

2 The full report - see Part 3.


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is the third in a series which analyses the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire on the one-third of Victoria that is public land. It identifies on-going failure, since the mid-1980s, in government policy and strategic direction to cope with the State’s major natural hazard – bushfire3. Victorians benefited from the reforms enacted as a result of Judge Leonard Stretton’s inquiry into the 1939 Black Friday bushfires, and from emergency management reform (1986) following the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. However, five years on, they have yet to benefit from many of the key recommendations of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. This report identifies lessons now unheeded from previous reforms, and problems which successive Ministers and their Departmental Heads have either not addressed or worse, have resisted. Successive governments have also failed to maintain forest fire management as a primary core business of the State. In the meanwhile, over the past three decades costs associated with public land fire suppression have increased more than sevenfold while the effectiveness and efficiency of fire management has progressively declined. A combination of the misuse of science by ideologically-driven interest groups, and bureaucratic acquiescence/indifference, has seen successive governments become disengaged from the practice of landscape-scale fuel management. This development appears to have been aided by the 2009 Bushfire Royal Commission’s Implementation Monitor, and by the current Emergency Management Commissioner. As a consequence of the failure to adequately manage fuels, both the community and the environment have paid a heavy penalty with the increases in destructive bushfires, particularly since 2000. The report examines, in the context of forest fire management on public land, the recent creation of what is argued is a large new government ‘silo’ - Emergency Management Victoria – that now has ‘oversight’ [control] of crisis and emergency management, including bushfire, under an ‘all agencies / all hazards’ model. The appropriateness of the increasingly mandated ‘top-down’ command and control system which now exists under the ‘generalship’ of the Emergency Management Commissioner is evaluated in the context of the concurrent existence of a State Crisis and Resilience Council and its three standing sub-committees: risk and resilience; capability and response; and relief and recovery. The report exposes:

The new and significantly more costly, while less effective way of managing bushfire in Victoria;

A failure to implement the 2009 Bushfire Royal Commission’s recommendation on fuel management;

A failure to ensure an adequate state of preparedness commensurate with the known risk; and

An increasing failure to aggressively attack and quickly bring bushfires under control.

3 Within the international wildland fire [bushfire] community a consensus exists that sees south-eastern Australia, together with southern California and the southern Mediterranean, as the most fire-prone landscapes on Earth.


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The report argues that successive Executives of the agency responsible for the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire on public land have failed to maintain an effective and efficient organisation. As such, the agency appears to be incapable of re-organising itself. The report recommends the creation of a Forests and Lands Conservancy with a dedicated mission to conserve the sustainability of soils, catchments, flora and fauna and uses and values of the forest environment for present and future generations. A core task of such a Conservancy is to protect the public land estate from Victoria’s major natural hazard – bushfire. The planned use of fire in the landscape is a major component of that task. Finally, the report recommends the appointment of an external, independent panel to advise the government on appropriate structural arrangements and resourcing for the Forests and Land Conservancy to manage fire on Victoria’s public land and related matters under the provisions of the Forests Act 1958.

The report poses a significant political challenge for the Andrews’ Government, while offering a reward whereby all Victorians would again have a nationally and internationally recognised agency [Forests and Lands Conservancy] dedicated to forest, woodland and public land management more generally, and to environmental conservation. An agency that would again take seriously the development and implementation of strategies and programs for the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire in the landscape.


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CONCLUSIONS

Victoria benefitted from emergency management reform in 1986 following the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. The need for further reform following the February 2009 bushfires (and 2010-11 flood warning and response) is based on the premise that the then legislation and its administration was not sufficiently strong or focused to ensure that the directly responsible agency, and those in support, could respond effectively to an emergency that had or had the potential to overwhelm the key agency and attain crisis proportions. The model applying to emergency management of crises arising from Victoria’s major natural hazard, bushfire, in the early 1980s was similar in intent and planned outcomes as the recently enacted model that replaced it. The Forests Commission Victoria (Department of State Forests) of the early 1980s, though not without fault, was recognised nationally and internationally for its forest fire management prowess, progressively honed since 1939. However, from the mid 1980s, bushfire management on Victoria’s public lands has been in serious decline. The narrative in Part 2 demonstrates that the creation of increasingly complex mega-departments has resulted in competing and conflicting demands on staff, with the agency’s Secretary (permanent head) sometimes required to report to two government Ministers. The Office of the Chief Fire Officer has been progressively downgraded and is now not part of the senior executive group. Clearly, the high priority formerly given to forest fire management is much diminished. Concurrently, the community’s increasing awareness of the importance of the natural environment to its welfare and well-being has led to the use, among some community-based groups, of quasi-science and related environmental activism to restrict the use of prescribed fire. As a consequence, the unrestrained build-up of fuel is making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, even under moderate fire danger ratings, to control bushfires on public land. Greatly underestimating the quantity of highly flammable fuel created by more frequent high intensity bushfires further complicates the problem. The incorrect notion that only ‘national park’ land tenure can protect forest environments has led inevitably to excessive passive management across significant areas. The consequent down-sizing of the native forest timber industry has further significantly reduced a major resource traditionally available to assist in forest fire suppression. These factors, combined with the loss of bushfire expertise within DEPI/PV and their predecessor agencies, have all contributed to the present predicament. Matters further complicating the current situation include:

A failure of the previous Bushfire Sub-committee of the State Co-ordination and Management Committee to ensure the continued relevance of emergency management reforms of 1986, following major machinery of government and departmental re-organisations;

Failure of Government, and particularly due diligence of portfolio ministers over their departments, to ensure that forest fire management remained a major core business;


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Changed priorities of departmental senior executive groups and their lack of depth and breadth of experience, if any at all, in forest fire management;

The movement of around half the forested estate to PV’s responsibility and the subsequent significant underfunding of PV, which has led to major cultural change;

The fact that only 57% of personnel are accredited for a ‘fire role’ but only 14% of these people are accredited to serve in a senior capacity (Level 2 or Level 3) or 8% of total staff.

Failure of recent departmental heads to ensure the overall state of preparedness was commensurate with the known risk;

Changed social mores that have seen the rise of OH&S regulation to an extent that now inhibits effectual and efficient fire suppression; and

Changed demographic patterns coupled with poor planning whereby more people are living adjacent to or within bushland settings creating greater challenges for fire managers.

These further matters have all contributed to the parlous state of fire prevention and suppression now acknowledged within sections of DEPI and clearly identified in dispatches by the Inspector-General for Emergency Management.

The key question is whether recently enacted legislative changes governing crisis and emergency management, accompanied by a plethora of newly minted directives from the Emergency Services Commissioner/Emergency Management Commissioner, lead to more effective and efficient forest fire management? A strong positive of the new reform is the creation of the State Crisis and Resilience Council [SCRC] which has been set up to streamline emergency management committee structures. Given the propensity for cost blow-outs and the prolificacy of departmental spending on fire suppression, it would perhaps be prudent to have Secretary Treasury as Deputy Chair of the State Crisis and Resilience Council. The creation of a new large command and control ‘silo’ - Emergency Management Victoria - as a permanent statutory authority is another matter. On the one hand, it has been set up to cater for a level of emergency/full blown crisis that, thankfully, is not or should not be regular events in this State. It is the massive fuel build up, (for which something can done), and adverse fire weather that conspire with a source of ignition that potentially produces the crisis rather than a routine emergency. On the other hand, it is said to be “business as usual” for Level 1 and Level 2 bushfires, although the Emergency Management Commissioner’s definition of a major fire includes: (a fire) “will, if not suppressed, burn for more than one day” – potentially most of the 650 forest fires that on average occur each year – thus keeping the Emergency Management Commissioner and his entourage in business. The fact is that the Forests Act 1958 version 112, 1st July 2014, is explicit in the duties required of the Secretary DEPI for the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire on State forest, national park and protected public land. In the early 1980s the then responsible agency was considered nationally and internationally, to be highly competent in carrying out these duties.


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This is not now the case. Recent sections of the Act obfuscate the duties of the Secretary, and the powers of the Emergency Management Commissioner and thus weaken accountability. The plethora of directives issued by the Emergency Services Commissioner/Emergency Management Commissioner is long on process but, as identified by Inspector-General for Emergency Management, short on delivery. Department of Environment and Primary Industries by its own admission, does not currently have sufficient capability to carry out its duty under the Act. The heavily mandated top down control and command system employed by the Emergency Management Commissioner and, in many cases, the way in which the Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System is applied by Incident Controllers in Incident Management Teams is highly unlikely to ensure more effective and efficient forest fire suppression. Fire suppression is analogous to warfare, drawn to attention by Leonard4.

“In other evidence given to the [Bushfire] Royal Commission, Professors Herman Leonard and Paul ‘t Hart, and Major General (Rtd.) Jim Molan made what were arguably some of the most pertinent comments about the nature of wildland fire-fighting, and particularly first-attack. Molan for example, suggested:

‘…If there are a vast number of fires on a particular day, the best people to handle it and the way they know to handle it is through a decentralised system within an overall general guidance from the top ... being command centric doesn’t mean the whole organisation is centralised and only ever one person makes a decision. It means that the commander at each level is the boss and he has as many obligations going up as he has going down..’ 5”.

The 1980s model operated accordingly and successfully. The lessons learnt remain relevant despite the substantial social and demographic changes that have been visited on Victoria since then. Since 2009, Secretaries DSE/DEPI, Emergency Services Commissioner and Fire Services Commissioner/Emergency Management Commissioner have had the time but failed to develop and implement an effective and efficient organisation for forest fire management on Victoria’s public land. The task should be taken out of their hands and steps taken to create an effective and efficient agency that will treat forest fire management as a major part of its core business

4 Leonard, M.L. (October 2014) Forest fire management in south-eastern Australia: for better or worse? Oct 25

th

2014. [In press] See Part 3. 5 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission evidence transcript – April 28th 2010 (140th day) and April 30th 2010.

See: http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/getdoc/fbcb1aac-5749-4b38-8c30-439422740c84/Transcript_VBRC_Day_140_28-Apr-

2010.PDF


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RECOMMENDATIONS

1 STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF FIRE ON VICTORIA’S PUBLIC

FORESTS.

Create a FORESTS and LAND CONSERVANCY with a dedicated mission to conserve the sustainability of soils, catchments, flora and fauna and uses and values of the forest environment for present and future generations. A core task of such a Conservancy is to protect the public land estate from Victoria’s major natural hazard – bushfire. The planned use of fire in the landscape is a major component of that task. [These changes can be implemented with minimal disruption to these activities currently incorporated within DEPI or its successor.]

The Office of the permanent head of the new Conservancy be titled Conservator.

Create two Deputy Conservators—one designated General Manager, Office of Land and Fire Management, the other designated General Manager, Office of Climate Shift Response.

The General Manager, Office of Land and Fire Management be assigned the duties of Chief Fire Officer for the purposes of the Forests Act and the Emergency Management Act.

This structure creates a single Authority to manage the States public lands. It requires fewer people than the massive centralised bureaucracy built up by previous Governments and importantly, it can be effected immediately.

2 OFFICE OF CHIEF FIRE OFFICER AND STATUS OF CHIEF FIRE OFFICER.

All fire related matters, including Altona workshops, must come under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Chief Fire Officer. This is justifiable in terms of his responsibilities to:

the State;

his interaction with like Chiefs of other agencies;

his delegated role by the Conservator of the Forests and Lands Conservancy to act for the Conservator on all fire related matters (and other matters as required);

o and

during the fire season, his authority after consulting and collaborating with OIC Regional Services in deploying Departmental staff as required for fire suppression, fire prevention and planned use of fire in the landscape.

3 APPOINT AN EXTERNAL INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW AND REPORT ON OPTIONS FOR

EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT FIRE MANAGEMENT ON VICTORIA’S PUBLIC LAND. Appoint an external, independent panel experienced in organisations and management, including high level expertise in forest fire management to provide the government with three (3) options identifying with reasons their preferred option for the Conservancy’s resourcing arrangements to most effectively and efficiently meet its forest fire management obligations under an amended Forests Act 1958 ( REC 4).


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The task would involve a thorough consideration of the required leadership skills and experience, definitive job descriptions and key selection criteria for proposed staff in head office and regional Victoria. The analysis of the options would identify the total number of accredited, fire-skilled categories required, including for the fire ground, their employment conditions in the new Conservancy, related organisations and ‘exempt’ [from Public Service Act] personnel [Project Fire Fighters] and capital and recurrent expenditure for effective and efficient fire management on public land. The options would also identify:

Number and location of work centres and other means to optimise travel time for first attack crews;

Appropriate number of fire districts to better serve communities and for staff to have more intimate knowledge of the land and resources;

Pros and cons of providing a dedicated Australasian elite force available to all States to assist in planned fuel reduction and fire suppression in accordance with the varied progression of seasonal conditions over Australasia.

The Panel should report to the Government by June 2015 so that the Government can put in place its preferred option for the 2015-16 fire season.

4 AMENDMENTS TO THE FORESTS ACT 1958

2.1 Section 61D. The Secretary must, in performing its functions and exercising its powers under section 62(2)(a) “Despite anything to the contrary in any other Act or law, the Secretary must carry out proper and sufficient work in State forests, national parks and on protected public land— (a) for the immediate prevention and suppression of fire;...” COLLABORATE AND CONSULT WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT VICTORIA.

(Emphasis added)

The inclusion of “collaborate and consult with EMV” is a nonsense designed to give Emergency Management Victoria a role when DEPI’s successor should be focused on quickly bringing bushfires under control and making them safe. Delete 61D and place a clause in 61EB for the Conservator [Permanent Head] to include in the agency’s written Annual Report to the State Crisis and Resilience Council, copy to Inspector-General for Emergency Management and Emergency Management Commissioner any particular actions critically essential to the suppression of a bushfire that were necessarily at variance to the strategic action plan including necessary variations to State Operating Plans and Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System functions. 2.2 Section 61E. Delete – self evident unless ops standards are deficient. See proposed additions to 61EB.

2.3 Section 61EA. This too is nonsense. It is simply paper shuffling to make Emergency Management Victoria appear operationally relevant. The Conservator [Permanent Head] should report in writing to the Emergency Management Commissioner, copy Inspector-General for Emergency Management, once a year of any action that did not comply with operational standards giving reasons and recommendations for any necessary addition, deletion or modification to improve effectiveness and efficiency.


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2.4 Section 61EB. Secretary is already required under the Forests Act to prepare management plans and fire operations plans which presumably should be compatible with/underpin the Strategic Action Plan. Also see 2.1 above.

2.5 Section 62(3). Remove requirement of Secretary to seek ‘prior agreement’ of the land manager for the use of any fire on NP of PPL and change to ‘consult’. If there is dispute that cannot be resolved between parties it goes to the State Crisis and Resilience Council whose decision is final.

5 MODIFY APPLICATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN INTER-SERVICE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

SYSTEM to improve effectiveness and efficiency in forest fire suppression.

There are some serious flaws involving the roles of Incident Controllers (ICs), the Emergency Management Commissioner and Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ other responsibilities. [These are described in Part 2.] In the ‘response’ stage the fire boss (nee ‘fire operations officer’), in the case of a major forest fire on public land, a highly experienced officer of the relevant land manager, should call all the shots, at least until the fire is declared ‘under control’ and, even then is still responsible for making the fire ‘safe’. In the response phase an Incident Controller should have the role of an incident co-ordinator (not controller) to facilitate the co-ordination of resources for the fire boss. It is only when the fire boss with prior agreement of the State public land fire boss (Chief Fire Officer), is satisfied that the fireground action is in caretaker mode that the fire boss hands control over to the Incident Co-ordinator who then calls the shots on the recovery phase. The requisite numbers of fireground resources continue to mop up and the crews make ready for the next bushfire event. They may be used in the recovery phase under the Incident Co-ordinator depending on the State-wide fire situation.


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Part 2


PART 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 2

1 BACKGROUND: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODELS ...................................................................... 16

1.1 State Crisis and Resilience Council .......................................................................................... 16

1.2 Emergency Management Victoria ........................................................................................... 17

1.3 Emergency Management Commissioner (EMC) ................................................................... 19

1.4 Inspector General for Emergency Management (IGEM) ........................................................ 19

2 BUSHFIRE ON VICTORIA’S PUBLIC LAND – FAILING TO HEED HISTORIC LESSONS ............................... 20

2.1 Stretton Royal Commission ..................................................................................................... 20

2.2 Esplin Inquiry 2002/03 Victorian bushfires ............................................................................. 21

2.3 Harrietville fire 2013 ............................................................................................................... 23

2.4 East Gippsland fires 2013/14 .................................................................................................. 23

3 KEY FEATURES OF LEGISLATION GOVERNING FOREST FIRE MANAGEMENT ....................................... 24

3.1 Chief Fire Officer ..................................................................................................................... 24

3.2 Role of Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries ................................. 24

3.2.1 Section 61D Collaborate and Consult with Emergency Management Victoria ..................... 24

3.2.2 Section 61E Compliance with Operational Standards ........................................................... 24

3.2.3 Section 61EA Report on Compliance with Operational Standards ....................................... 25

3.2.4 Section 61EB Strategic Action Plan ....................................................................................... 25

3.2.5 Section 61F Compliance with Incident Operating Procedures ............................................. 25

3.2.6 Section 62 Duties and Powers for Prevention, Suppression and Planned Use of Fire and

Application of Fire on Public Land ........................................................................................... 26

4 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REFORM, LAND USE CHANGES, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM and

ORGANISATIONAL SILOS .................................................................................................................... 27

4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 27

4.2 Assessment of the new emergency management model ....................................................... 28

4.2.1 Risk and Resilience .................................................................................................................. 28

4.2 .2 Capability and Response ......................................................................................................... 38

4.2.3 Relief and recovery ................................................................................................................. 58

5 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONEMENT AND PRIMARY INDUSTRIES DISCUSSION PAPER ......................... 62

6 INSPECTOR-GENERAL FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.................................................................... 65

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 74

PART 3

DOCUMENTS [pdf] CONTAINED ON COMPACT DISC. .............................................................................. 78


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Part 2


1 BACKGROUND: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODELS

”We need to learn from the findings of recent reports on the bushfires (2009 Royal Commission) and floods (Review of the 2010-11 flood warnings and response) and develop an emergency management model that sees all agencies working together to respond effectively to all hazards, regardless of the intensity or scale.” .. work is often hampered by administration and legislation that does not have a sufficiently strong or clear focus on serving all within the community or achieving a genuine ‘all hazards, all agencies’ approach”. The Green paper: Options and Issues – Towards a More Disaster Resilient and Safer Victoria, Sept 2011.

In October 2013 the first part of legislation governing Victoria’s emergency management arrangements, the first major overhaul since 1986, was introduced to parliament. It established two new bodies, the State Crisis and Resilience Council and Emergency Management Victoria. A summary of the important responsibilities of each group now follows:

1.1 STATE CRISIS AND RESILIENCE COUNCIL The State Crisis and Resilience Council6 (SCRC) was set up to simplify and streamline emergency management committee structures. It is the peak emergency management policy body responsible for developing, co-ordinating and implementing emergency management policy and strategy across the emergency management spectrum and overseeing its implementation. It does not make operational or tactical decisions. Ministers retain their responsibilities for delivering emergency management-related functions within their own portfolios. State Crisis and Resilience Council is supported by three standing subcommittees covering risk and resilience, capability and response and relief and recovery. These subcommittees replace the State Emergency Mitigation Committee, the State Emergency Response Planning Committee and the State Relief and Recovery Committee and some other limited–term committees such as the Bushfire Sub-committee of State Co-ordination and Management Committee and the Secretaries Flood Recovery Group. Structural arrangements are shown in Figure 1 below.

6 Extract [summarised] from Victoria’s Emergency Management Reform White Paper.


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Figure1 State Crisis and Resilience Council and relationship with Security and Emergencies Committee of Cabinet and responsible Ministers.

1.2 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT VICTORIA, the new overarching statutory body responsible

for co-ordinating emergency management policy and the implementation of emergency

management reform.7

Structural arrangements are shown in Figure 2.

7 Victorian Government media release 17 October 2013 / Victorian Emergency Management Reform White Paper.


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The Victorian Parliament passed the Emergency Management Act in December 2013. The new legislation established two new positions;

1.3 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMISSIONER (EMC) [with the then Fires Services Commissioner Craig Lapsley, as the Emergency Management Commissioner designate until formally taking up the role on 1st July 2014.

During major emergencies “the EMC has an over-arching management role to ensure a systematic and co-ordinated response so that the State’s resources are deployed to lessen the negative consequences of a major emergency”8.

1.4 INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (IGEM), Mr Tony Pearce (a former Director General for Emergency Management Australia and, prior to that, a Deputy Commissioner in the Office (Vic) of the Emergency Services Commission) who took up the position on 1st August 2014.

The Inspector General for Emergency Management operates independently of Emergency Management Victoria monitoring overall performance and opportunities for improvement3. The architects of the model, which not unreasonably, is based on all agencies better working together to respond effectively to all hazards, presumably saw sufficient commonality between Victoria’s main natural hazards, fire and flood, and other causes of significant incidents for it to work effectively and efficiently across all three major components:

assessment and minimisation of the risk of a major crisis/incident, and increasing/reinforcing community resilience to hazards;

response to the emergency/incident; and

recovery of communities and attendant infrastructure/environment once the emergency is under control/over.

8 Extract from media release, Minister for Police and Emergency Services, Minister for Bushfire Response, Hon. Kim

Wells 28th

July 2014.


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Part 2


2 BUSHFIRE ON VICTORIA’S PUBLIC LAND – FAILING TO HEED

HISTORIC LESSONS

Native forests and woodlands occupy about one third of Victoria’s total land area [238,000 km2]. Broad forest types on public land in Victoria [Duncan 1982]9 and how they are now depicted in Australia’s Forests at a Glance10 are shown in Part3.

2.1 STRETTON ROYAL COMMISSION Under the Forests Act 1958, the Department of Environment and Primary Industries [DEPI] is

responsible for the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire on public land. DEPI is

assisted by both Parks Victoria [PV] who is the land manager for about half of the forested estate

mostly classified as National Park; and VicForests, a separate entity for the commercial

management of that portion of State forests set aside for timber production.

DEPI, PV and VicForests work in collaboration with the Country Fire Authority [CFA] at the public/private land interface. The Royal Commission into the January 1939 Black Friday bushfires11 was highly critical of the

then Forests Commission Victoria [Department of State Forests] which was responsible for

protecting the State from forest fires. Judge Leonard Stretton’s succinct but comprehensive

inquiry led to a complete overhaul of bushfire policy and practice which radically changed it from

being essentially based on summer bushfire control to one based on the year-round management

of fire [i.e. The prevention, suppression and planned use of fire in the landscape].

Over the next 20 years there was progressive evolution of legislation which eventually resulted in

a comprehensive Forests Act 1958. Subsequent Improvements in forest fire management over the

next several decades were widely acclaimed nationally and internationally.

In the early 1980s, significant changes were made to land and natural resource management with

the creation of a mega-department created by combining the Forests Commission with several

other land and resource management departments. This radically altered the

structural/organisational arrangements and, over time, it is argued, led to a changed

departmental culture.

Under this much larger entity, fire management became a significantly lower priority. As a result, Victoria’s state of preparedness and ability to manage fire on public land has been in a demonstrable decline for the past three decades. This has been confirmed by case studies12,

9 Atlas of Victoria edited by J.S. Duncan. Victorian Government Printing Office 1982. ISBN 0 7241 8255 1

10 ABARES 2014: Australia’s Forests at a Glance with data to 2012-13. ABARES project 43514. Canberra.

ISBN 978-1-423-207-1 11

Government of Victoria (1939). Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to prevent the bushfires of 1939, and to protect life and property in the event of future bushfires. The Stretton Report – Judge Leonard Stretton.

12 *The Facts Behind the Fire – A Scientific and Technical Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the 2003 Bushfire

Crisis – Dexter, B and A. Hodgson (2005). ISBN 9780980314915. A publication of Forest fire Victoria Inc. * Forest Fire Management in Victoria – Is the State Coping? Concerns about the organisational arrangements for

forest fire management in Victoria. Part 1 and Part 2. Dexter, B and A. Hodgson, March 2012. forestfirevictoria.org.au


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Auditors’ – General reports (April 1992 and May 2003), and by highly respected national13 and international forest fire experts14. Notwithstanding these independent evaluations and other major inquiries, nearly half of Victoria’s native forest on public land (over 3 million hectares or some 15% of the State) have been burnt since 2002, mostly by severe bushfires; an unprecedented amount over such a short period in the State’s bushfire history since European settlement. A recent review by Mike Leonard, a former strategic adviser with the Bushfire CRC, raises serious questions about the ability and will of agencies to aggressively attack and control bushfire in its incipient stage15. The Royal Commission into the February 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires, like its predecessor in 1939, has again led to significant changes in legislation and organisational arrangements designed to improve risk management, community resilience to natural hazards, a response to and recovery from ‘incidents’ including bushfires. While serious problems began to emerge in the late 1980s, it is only since mid-2014 that a radical new order, trialled to some extent in 2013, started formerly operating. However, hard won lessons pre and post 2009 continue to be ignored. The new order shows little sign of learning lessons from history; and, it is demonstrated, serious problems remain and some new ones may have been created. These concerns are exemplified by the Esplin Inquiry into the 2002/03 Victorian bushfires, an

Emergency Services Commissioner’s inquiry into the January 2013 Harrietville fire, and an

Inspector General for Emergency Management’s [IGEM] investigation of key issues associated

with two serious East Gippsland fires during the 2013/14 fire season.

2.2 ESPLIN INQUIRY 2002/03 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES The Esplin Inquiry’s16 final Report on the 2002/2003 Victorian Bushfires was released on 14th October 2003. The Panel conducting the Inquiry informed the Premier and the Victorian public on the nature of the Inquiry, viz:

“The issue that differentiates this Inquiry from those of our predecessors is that we were not inquiring into a major disaster in terms of deaths, injuries and homes and properties lost. On the contrary a critical review of recent experience in Australia and overseas points to a high degree of professionalism in emergency response that is assessed as equal to ‘world’s best practice’. In saying this, however, community expectations of Government and its emergency services have also changed and there is an understandably higher expectation of the quality of fire mitigation/prevention, emergency response and recovery. Lessons have been learnt, fire

13 An evaluation of ESC Hallowes’ report into the Harrietville fire, January 2013. Are the findings consistent with all the

facts? Phil Cheney, Barrie Dexter, Athol Hodgson AM, David Packham AOM. 8th

June 2013. 14

The Still–Burning Bush. Stephen J Pyne 2006. ISBN 1 920769 75 7. 15

Leonard, M.L. (October 2014) Forest fire management in south-eastern Australia: for better or worse? Oct 25th

2014. [In press]

16 Esplin, Bruce: Dr. M. Gill and Prof. N. Enright (2003). Report of the Inquiry into the 2002 – 2003 Victorian Bushfires.

ISBN: 0731114884 State Government of Victoria, 2003. http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au It was convened to assess the effectiveness of preparedness, the effectiveness of response and recommend future bushfire management strategies.


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prevention/mitigation can be enhanced and organisational structures and systems can be further improved. …” “We wish to report to you that, in response to the fires, we found no evidence of major systemic failure.” [Authors’ emphasis]

The Inquiry and its Report was challenged in a pro bono opinion17requested of Mr. A J Myers QC by the Stretton Group. Mr A J Myers QC – in the matter of a Report of the Inquiry of the 2002 -2003 Victorian bushfires concluded:

“The establishment of the Esplin Inquiry and the procedures followed in the conduct of the Esplin inquiry were seriously flawed. The Esplin Report is correspondingly flawed in its conclusions and recommendations. It is open to the Coroner to hold a Coronial inquiry into the 2003 north east Victoria fires or for the government to establish a board of inquiry or Royal Commission to undertake an adequate, public examination of the 2003 north east Victorian fires and related issues.”

Mr. Myers opinion can be found in Part 3. The Coroner declined to hold an inquiry and the State Government continued to refute the need for any additional inquiry. Forest Fire Victoria Inc18 believed that the 2003 alpine fires were the most disastrous and most contentious forest fire prevention and suppression failure since Black Friday 1939. They were incredulous that the “emergency response” could be assessed as equal to ‘world’s best practice’ and could not accept that there was “no evidence of major systemic failure”19. Quite to the contrary, it appears from the Esplin Report, the then Department of Sustainability and Environment’s own narrative of the 2003 Victorian Alpine Fires20, the Victorian State Auditor-General’s report on Victoria’s Fire Prevention and Preparedness (May 2003)21 and Mr. A. J. Myers QC opinion 15 July 2004(11) that there were serious deficiencies in:

the application of statutory responsibilities;

the level of preparedness commensurate with the risk;

fire prevention;

initial attack;

allocation and adequacy of resources It was contended that all of these issues had a significant influence on the initial response to these fires and on the final outcome.

17 A. J. Myers QC (15 July, 2004). In the Matter of a Report of the Inquiry of the 2002 – 2003 Victorian Bushfires. A

report commissioned by the Stretton Group. 18

forestfirevictoria.org.au/ 19

*The Facts Behind the Fire – A Scientific and Technical Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the 2003 Bushfire Crisis – Dexter, B and A. Hodgson (2005). ISBN 9780980314915. A publication of Forest fire Victoria Inc.

* Forest Fire Management in Victoria – Is the State Coping? Concerns about the organisational arrangements for forest fire management in Victoria. Part 1 and Part 2. Dexter, B and A. Hodgson, March 2012. forestfirevictoria.org.au

20 Department of Sustainability and Environment (2003). The Victorian Alpine fires January – March 2003. Wareing, K.J

and D.W. Flinn. ISBN 1 74106 624 7 www.dse.vic.gov.au/fires 21

Auditor-General’s Fire Report tabled in the Victorian Parliament May 8, 2003. This audit commenced prior to the fires of summer 2002-2003, and did not examine suppression operations. The audit focused on the planning, prevention and preparedness measures that can prevent or reduce the severity of Victoria’s seasonal wildfires and on whether those essential planning and prevention measures are being effectively implemented.


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2.3 HARRIETVILLE FIRE 2013 Similarly, an inquiry into the first 72 hours of the Harrietville fire, 21 January – 16 March 2013, by Emergency Services Commissioner Hallowes made the unsubstantiated key finding that “in my opinion there was no information to support the view that an increased weight of attack or a change in strategy and tactics on 21 and 22 January would have altered the outcome of the fire on 22 January 2013”. This finding was not supported by bushfire experts nor, indeed, the then Fire Services Commissioner, Craig Lapsley, who publicly acknowledged that opportunities were lost in attempts to contain and control the fire in its incipient stage (2-4ha in the first 24 hours rather than 37,000ha, 55 days later). It remains to be seen if a Coronial investigation into the Harrietville fire will reveal the true state of affairs.

2.4 EAST GIPPSLAND FIRES 2013/14 The 2013/2014 fire season was also beset with problems extensively reported in regional media22. East Gippsland communities, following unsatisfactory visits by the Fire Services Commissioner, the Country Fire Authority Chief Officer and Department of Environment and Primary Industries (Secretary and Chief Fire Officer), gathered to demand that local managers control all future operations. They included forestry experts, farmers and landowners.

[Editorial Bairnsdale Advertiser Monday 17th November 2013] The Editorial describes their demands as “A rural counter-attack against failed policies has been declared. It is an indictment of official theories that have presided over decades of failure and destruction”.

Widespread community unrest eventually forced the Minister for Police and Emergency Services and Bushfire Response to instruct the newly appointed Inspector General for Emergency Management [IGEM] to investigate some key issues including those of just two of the East Gippsland fires. The Inspector General for Emergency Management’s findings (released 13 10 14), in the context of this report, are discussed in Section 6. The following section outlines the salient features of key legislation23 and Code of Practice for Bushfire Management on Public Land that now applies in the State of Victoria. It will be seen that embracing an ideology that encompasses an ‘all-agency all-hazards’ approach to responding to all natural hazards regardless of size and likely frequency, apparently requires a large permanent hierarchical statutory organisation currently known as Emergency Management Victoria [Figure 2]. The body is understood to be costing the taxpayer around $12.75 - $16.4m annually24 and, it is reported, imposing a heavy burden of compliance on personnel on the fireground and in incident control centres.

22 * Regional radio and newspapers: Snowy River Mail and Bairnsdale Advertiser – April, May, June, August 2014.

* Online Opinion – Mark Poynter, 2nd

June, 2014. 23

Extracts from various Acts - see Part 3. 24

Conservative estimate of salaries (VPS remuneration bands as at 1st

July 2014), plus on-costs of (33%).


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3 KEY FEATURES OF LEGISLATION GOVERNING FOREST FIRE

MANAGEMENT

Key sections of Victorian legislation covering forest fire management can be found in the Forests Act 1958 No, 6254, Version 112 which incorporates amendments as at 1 July 2014. They are covered under the heading “Prevention and Protection from Fire”. Sections 61A, 61B and 61C provide for the position of Chief Fire Officer, define the position’s functions and offer immunity. Sections of the Forests Act under “Prevention and Protection from Fire” plus extracts from various other Acts are reproduced in Part 3.

3.1 CHIEF FIRE OFFICER The Chief Fire Officer can exercise any functions authorised by the Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries concerning fire related activities and any other functions conferred on the Chief Fire Officer under the Forests Act or any other Act. It appears that since appointment the Chief Fire Officer has had an on-going authorisation from Secretary DEPI that covers all the Secretary’s fire-related obligations under the Act. Both the Secretary and Chief Fire Officer are not personally liable for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith …; which raises the question ‘Who and how then, is anyone held accountable in law for Secretary’s obligations under Section 62(2) of the Act?’ The Fire Services Commissioner [now Emergency Management Commissioner] requires the Chief Fire Officer, under a standard process for communication (FSCSOP/01/2011 – CD/11/588441) issued 09 12 11, to provide up-to-date lists of individual Department of Environment and Primary Industries personnel who are approved for the appointment of Regional Controller and Level 3 Incident Controller and may also consult the Chief Fire Officer concerning the listing and respective qualifications and experience of listed individuals.

3.2 ROLE OF SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND PRIMARY INDUSTRIES The responsibilities of the Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries must be judged against Sections 61D, 61E, 61EA, 61EB, 61F and 62 of the Forests Act. Each section is now examined in turn:

3.2.1 SECTION 61D COLLABORATE AND CONSULT WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT VICTORIA The Secretary must, in performing its functions and exercising its powers under section 62(2)(a)

“Despite anything to the contrary in any other Act or law, the Secretary must carry out proper

and sufficient work in State forests, national parks and on protected public land—

(a) for the immediate prevention and suppression of fire;…” collaborate and consult with Emergency Management Victoria.[Authors’ emphasis]

3.2.2 SECTION 61E COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL STANDARDS Deals with the compliance with operational standards of the Emergency Management Commissioner. Under Emergency Management Act Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries must use its best endeavours to comply with operational standards.


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3.2.6 SECTION 62 DUTIES AND POWERS FOR PREVENTION, SUPPRESSION AND PLANNED USE OF

FIRE AND APPLICATION OF FIRE ON PUBLIC LAND This section includes the most important duties that the Secretary must carry out in the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire across State forest [SF], national park [NP] and protected public land [PPL].

62 Declaration of protected public lands … on the recommendation of the Minister, the Governor in Council … may declare any crown land not being within State Forest or National Park to be Protected Public Land.

62(2) Despite anything to the contrary in any other Act or law, the Secretary must carry out proper and sufficient work in State forests, national parks and on protected public land …

(a) For the immediate prevention and suppression of fire; and (b) For the planned prevention of fire.

62(3) The Secretary must not carry out work of a kind specified under subsection (2)(b) on protected public land not managed and controlled by the Secretary, unless the Secretary has consulted about the work proposed to be undertaken with the person or body responsible, under the Act under which the land is managed and controlled for the management and control of the land.

62AA Duty to warn the community … must issues warnings and provide information in relation to fires in State Forest, National Park and Public Private Land.

62A Secretary may apply and use fire for land and resource management on State Forest, National Park and Public Private Land for specific purposes and, in doing so must have regard for any relevant Code of Practice.

62B Agreement required for Secretary to apply or use fire in national parks or on protected public land – specific purposes are set out in 62A(1) viz: silviculture, pest plant and animal control and ecological purposes.

62C Secretary may enter into agreements and arrangements in Victoria and elsewhere relating to the prevention and suppression of fires including for: assistance, research, training, supply of equipment and goods and services.


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4 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REFORM, LAND USE CHANGES,

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND ORGANISATIONAL SILOS

4.1 INTRODUCTION There has been a significant increase in landscape-scale/mega fires in Victoria [and other parts of Australia] since Year 2000 with several million hectares of public forests on Crown land, State forest and national park being severely affected. In addition, many fires which originated on public land have had substantial impacts on urban, regional and rural communities at the public/private land interface. It must be acknowledged that the complexity of forest fire management has significantly increased since the last review of emergency management arrangements triggered by the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires25. Problems have arisen because of inappropriate development in naturally and artificially created bushland settings. Without proper regard for the known, but largely ignored, risk created by high fuel loads and highly flammable vegetation on adjacent public land and dwellings closely intermingled with bushland on private property, life and property is in grave danger of incineration. Changes in land tenure whereby about half of the State’s public forests are now in national parks, the changed culture of the bureaucracies, the large reduction in the timber industry [a significant fire fighting resource as a condition of licensed harvesting], and reduced priority given to forest fire management including changed tactics in fire suppression, have all contributed to the State’s reduced preparedness and capability. The result has been a dramatic increase in area burnt. Environmental enthusiasts/activists, often employing quasi-science, in both the public and private sectors, including academia, have also been directly and indirectly influential in curtailing fuel reduction burning [FRB] programs on public land as successive governments have chased second preference urban green votes. These influences remain a significant threat to the government’s implementation of the key recommendation from the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission to triple the annual fuel reduction burn program on public land to a minimum of 390,000ha as a major fire mitigation measure. In view of these problems the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission’s Implementation Monitor, Neil Comrie neatly summed up the need for emergency management reform. “The findings of both the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission and the Victorian Floods Review show that Victoria’s existing legislation, policy, governance and operational arrangements for crisis and emergency management need modifying and upgrading to meet the challenges ahead. Victoria manages smaller emergencies relatively well, but needs legislative, administrative and cultural change to break down the organisational ‘silos’ that inhibit an ‘all hazards, all agencies’ approach to managing major emergencies.26……”

25 Miller,S.I., Carter,W & Stevens,R.G. (1984) Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on Bushfire Disaster

Preparedness and Response in Victoria, Australia following the Ash Wednesday fires. 16 Feb 1983. 26

Neil Comrie AO APM, Review of 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response: Interim Report, 30 June 2011, p. 28.


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It is interesting that a former senior public sector bureaucrat calls for legislative, administrative and cultural change to break down “organisational silos”. It is also fair to ask how these ‘silos’ and cultural change were allowed to develop in the first place. Invariably, departmental silos have their genesis at senior executive level in central administration and are aided and abetted equally by ambitious or disinterested politicians. In the writers experience ‘Turf wars’ rarely exist in regional Victoria where field officers usually work co-operatively. The government is to be commended for introducing emergency management reform. The appropriateness of the chosen model however, with respect to forest fire management, whereby one of the so-called ‘silos’ - the Department of Environment and Primary Industries and its predecessors, has, for many decades and still has, explicit legislated duties and governance that now appear to come under the jurisdiction of one even larger silo – Emergency Management Victoria, commanded by a single [-minded], multi-tasked ‘General’ – the Emergency Management Commissioner.

4.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODEL The following assessment considers some of the provisions of the new emergency management model in terms of the State Crisis Resilience Council’s three standing sub-committees covering:

risk and resilience

capability and response

relief and recovery with respect to forest fire management.

4.2.1 RISK AND RESILIENCE Following an unprecedented number of floods, storms and bushfires that have devastated life and property across Australia in recent years Deloitte Access Economics was commissioned to prepare a paper – “Building our Nations’ Resilience to Natural Disasters” – for the Australian Business Round Table for Disaster Resilience and Safer Communities27; this in response to the call in the Australian Government National Strategy for Disaster Resilience for greater collaboration between government, business and community to reduce Australia’s vulnerability to natural disasters. Deloitte Access Economics’ paper focuses on pre-disaster resilience measures to resist the impacts of natural disaster. Opportunities are identified where changes in policy, organisation and management can generate high benefit: cost ratios [BCR]. For example, comments attributed to Dr Chris Richardson; “in Victoria bushfire mitigation aimed at reducing fuel loads could have a BCR of 3:1. Similar ratios are generated for building more resilient housing in bushfire risk areas and undergrounding electricity wires”. (Australian Financial Review 21 06 13). While increasing pre-disaster resilience is a critical strategy, bushfire is a natural hazard that frequently occurs in Victorian landscapes. The problem with restricting benefit: cost ratios to pre-disaster measures is that it neglects the effectiveness and efficiency of measures that were or could have been implemented in bringing bushfires under control.

27 Deloitte Access Economics – Building our Nations’ Resilience to Natural Disasters – for the Australian Business

Round Table for Disaster Resilience and Safer Communities. June 2013


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There are other documented examples that demonstrate how the effectiveness of quickly bringing forest fires under control dramatically reduces the risk of a major conflagration that can overwhelm even the most resilient communities and also lead to extreme environmental damage. It is the opinion of bushfire experts that there was a window of opportunity lasting up to 9 days from ignition on 7th January 2003 to bring the Alpine fires under control28. At 9 days these fires covered 34,000ha, at 14 days 122,600ha and at 59 days 1.09mha. Benchmarked against fairly similar circumstances in 1985 the BCR was conservatively estimated at 7:1 as a result of effectively resourcing and aggressively bringing such fires under control. The January 2013 Harrietville fire is also a classic example where the BCR was (conservatively) 80:1 if the fire had been controlled at 5ha rather than 37,000ha 55 days later.29 Bennetton et al 199730 demonstrated the importance of considering both bushfire prevention and suppression. The following draws extensively from their working paper. Of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment total budget for the Fire Management Program, about $29 million, ($44.9 million in 2013 $), some 50 percent is allocated to fire suppression (the control of existing fires in the shortest possible time with due regard to financial and environmental constraints) and 40 percent to fire prevention (the minimisation of the number and severity of fire outbreaks through fuel management, education and enforcement). On role of government grounds it is clear that fire management is an appropriate activity of government, as the nature of fire management services makes it very likely that any potential private sector providers would supply less than the socially-optimal quantum of such services. In conducting the economic evaluation of the Fire Management Program, the net benefits to Victoria were calculated by first generating a non-intervention scenario, to quantify the extent of burned area in the absence of any intervention by public or private fire management services. The non-intervention scenario was generated using actual ignition points from an average fire season (1991-92), the SiroFire fire simulation model, and data on the value of capital improvements, agricultural production and forest timber. The value of assets lost from the actual burn pattern and the cost of the Fire Management Program were then subtracted from this figure, to derive the net benefits of the Fire Management program to Victoria in terms of the value of assets saved. The second stage of Bennetton et al’s economic evaluation of the fire management program builds upon the first stage by allowing for the private provision (through private landholders and volunteer groups) of fire management services (the intervention scenario). Using conservative valuations of both the assets burned and the asset classes included in the evaluation, a simulation model which under-predicts likely burn patterns, and assuming that the fire management activities of private landholders and volunteer groups are half as effective as those provided by the Fire Management Program, the ratio of benefits to costs in

28 The Facts Behind the Fire: A Scientific and Technical Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the 2003 Victorian

Bushfire Crisis. Compiled by Barrie Dexter and Athol Hodgson. A Publication of Forest Fire Victoria. forestfirevictoria.org.au/

29 An evaluation of ESC Hallowes’ report into the Harrietville fire, January 2013. Are the findings consistent with all

the facts? Phil Cheney, Barrie Dexter, Athol Hodgson AM, David Packham AOM. 8 June 2013 30

An economic evaluation of bushfire prevention and suppression in Victoria. Working paper 9703: Julia Bennetton, Paul Cashin, Darren Jones and James Soligo – Performance Evaluation Division, Department of Natural Resources and Environment (Vic) June 1997. ISBN 0 7306 6711 1


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the average fire year is about 22 to one, that is, for every $1 of public resources allocated to the Fire Management Program, the State benefits by $22 in terms of assets not destroyed by wildfire. Overall, Victoria has received high benefits from its allocation of resources to the FMP to carry out its important fire suppression and fire prevention activities.

Public/private land interface The interface between public land and private land (both rural and urban) poses special problems for fire managers. The Report of the Bushfire Review Committee following the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires in Victoria (S I Miller Inquiry) says of the problems: “Communities, often commuter-orientated, have chosen to live cheek by jowl with an enormously hostile and dangerous environment. Often dwellings are left vacant by day as man and wife go out to work, or a wife and small children are left on their own. The risk to life and property does not end there. Other major factors are involved. They include, for instance that many such communities have no background of living in the bush and are generally unused to fending for themselves under fire conditions. Additionally, some of those with an interest in preserving the environment resist measures designed to remove hazards. However perhaps the worst of all, the fire fighting problem in these areas where high fuel levels and relatively crowded populations co-exist is probably the most difficult to manage”. [Authors’ emphasis] Demographic changes continue today and are increasing the problems as more people choose to live in fire prone environments. Also primary and secondary industries including some multi-million dollar enterprises have established assets close to and sometimes on public land. The potential for deaths and destruction of community assets by fire at the interface between public land and private property is enormous and no fire management agency will survive long if it fails to give priority to the protection of life and high value assets. In order to minimise losses from fire on both sides of the forest/private property interface, there will be places where the dual objectives of protecting life and high value assets and sustaining some native forest values cannot be met simultaneously. In those areas management priority is given to protecting life and high value assets. Forest Fire Victoria has suggested31 those places be called Community Protection Areas (CPA’s). CPAs incorporating assets at the public land/private land interface should be defined by a community/ municipal based forum and include input with other stakeholders, such as local government, agencies managing transport, communication and power infrastructure, rural fire brigades, landowners, and local community groups. Stakeholders identify the bushfire risk they pose to others and the bushfire risk others pose to them. Someone independent of Department of Environment and Primary Industries and the Emergency Services must chair the forum. This process would require a new focus within current municipal planning. Management of the fire risk and fire suppression on CPAs including public roads thereon should be the responsibility of the Country Fire Authority.

Fire suppression tactics and priorities, fuel reduction burning targets and forest fuels - Suppression tactics and priorities

There is now an increasingly apparent tendency, by DEPI and its support agencies, to wait for forest fires to come out of the bush. This development is perhaps driven by OH&S concerns associated with fire crews going off-road. Such an approach however, that implies that such fires can be controlled in this way, even under moderate fire danger ratings, when there are heavy

31 Forest Fire Victoria Inc submission and recommendations to the Environment and Natural Resources Committee,

May 2007


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fuel loads adjacent to assets, betrays an ignorance of fire behavior in eucalypt forests. Furthermore, even on days of moderate to high fire danger, these areas invariably come under severe ember attack many kilometres downwind of the main fire front greatly increasing the risk of farmland and adjacent settled areas being destroyed when ember-ignited spot fires coalesce into high intensity conflagrations. Fuel reduction burning targets The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission FINAL REPORT32 VOL ll. [from page 292 ->] says: In his evidence Mr Wilson (Secretary, Department of Sustainability and Environment) retreated from the target and the need for the increased prescribed burning identified in the corporate plan. He stated that DSE ‘ought to have strategies that build the capability to head towards that type of scale’ and that ‘a lot more of the work’ was necessary. Mr Wilson was unable to comment on the basis behind the target of 4–6 per cent on public land. He indicated the advice he received was to the effect ‘that 3, 4, 5 per cent’ was what ‘may ultimately’ be achieved but that DSE does not have the confidence to convert that to a target because ‘we need to get more feedback from the science, we need to bring the community along …’Mr Wilson was not even sure if the document remained the corporate plan. He advised there was ‘… some doubt about that’. This answer from the person responsible for ensuring sufficient work for the prevention and suppression of fire on the public land estate highlights the lack of direction in Victoria on this vital matter. At the end of 2001–02 the three-year rolling average for area burnt was 66,390 hectares; at the end of 2008–09 it had risen to 146,141 hectares. The reason provided for this increase was that ‘… risk factors (such as, climate change, land use and development in rural areas and increased fuel hazards) had been escalating relatively unchecked for approximately 20 years in the State’. The 146,141 hectares equates to 1.9 per cent of the total public land estate. Forest Fire Victoria, a group describing itself as comprising ‘like-minded and concerned practitioners and scientists’, are also strong supporters of a target for prescribed burning in Victoria. The group stated that ‘an annual target of prescribed burning 460,000 hectares of public land is necessary to ensure the long-term wellbeing and safety of forest ecosystems and their surrounding rural and urban communities’. The group also called for the government to fund DSE to enable it to increase its workforce and skill levels to enable it to carry out higher levels of prescribed burning. Similarly, the Australian Workers Union supports increased prescribed burning. Mr Caesar Melhem, the State Secretary, described it as an important tool for reducing fuel loads and minimising the incidence and intensity of bushfires. The union strongly supports an annual 385,000-hectare rolling target. DSE has continued with a 130,000-hectare target for prescribed burning, despite the recognition by it and others that a substantial increase in such burning is necessary for community

32 Chapter 7, Land and Fuel Management, 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report Vol.II


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protection. DSE has not been held accountable for this. The State has failed to respond to numerous recommendations and provide the necessary resourcing for increased prescribed burning. This reflects a general lack of will to do the level of burning necessary for community and environmental protection by reducing the risk of large and intense bushfires. The Commission considers that a target of 5 to 8 per cent prescribed burning of public land is necessary for community safety and would not pose unacceptable environmental risks, particularly if priority is given to the dry eucalypt forests referred to by the expert panel. RECOMMENDATION 56 The State fund and commit to implementing a long-term program of prescribed burning based on an annual rolling target of 5 per cent minimum of public land. More detail can be found in Chapter 7, Land and Fuel Management, 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report Vol.II. [See Part 3 of this report.] Government policy based on the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission’s recommendations continues to be undermined by the Bushfires Royal Commission Implementation Monitor, Mr Neil Comrie in his 2013 (page 63) and 2014 (page 47) Annual Reports. “Although the amount of planned burning now being conducted is higher than for many years, the BRCIM is not convinced that the proposed annual rolling target of five percent minimum of public land(390,000 ha) is achievable, affordable or sustainable.” (p. 63. 2013 Bushfire Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Annual Report.) The Bushfire Royal Commission Implementation Monitor’s 2012 Final Report advocated that the State reconsider the planned burning rolling target of five per cent and replace it with a risk based approach focused on the protection of life and property. In 2013, the Bushfire Royal Commission Implementation Monitor went further stating concerns that the 390,000 ha target may not be achievable, affordable or sustainable. The Bushfire Royal Commission Implementation Monitor’s view in relation to this target is unchanged. Area based hectare targets alone will not necessarily reduce the bushfire risk to life and property in Victoria and may have adverse environmental outcomes. (p47. 2014 Bushfire Royal Commission Implementation Monitor Annual Report.) It appears that Mr Comrie is not alone in disagreeing with Government policy on a fuel reduction burning target which was based on an expert panel’s advice sought by the Bushfires Royal Commission. The State’s Fire Services Commissioner, Mr Craig Lapsley, in responding to a question from Celine Foenander, the ABC’s Gippsland morning program, concerning Mr Comrie’s comments (2 August 2013) replied, “There will be people in Gippsland that will have very, very, very serious and well thought through considerations about planned burns. And it is a very connected issue to the community and rightly so. What I think Neil is saying is if it’s only a target and we are burning large masses to achieve a target what are we doing, and it needs to be strategic and we would agree with that. My understanding is the Government will take on that comment of Neil’s, and certainly work closely with DEPI to work out what is the best way forward, but to be fair to the Royal Commission I think they saw that there wasn’t enough burning and they’ve come to a figure, a 5% figure, which is close to 400,000 hectares annually. I think we can now in a mature way to look at that and say, well, if we burnt 400,000 or 395,000, would it be the safest thing for communities? And some would say yes it is, but if are only burning the big desert and the little desert and some of the deep seated Alpine Parks, and we are not burning it close to communities, we might question, why are we doing that?”


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Quite apart from the fact that both Mr Comrie and Mr Lapsley would appear to have somewhat limited experience in forest fire management, the basis of their authority to contradict the Bushfires Royal Commission’s findings, and subsequent government policy is at least open to question. Removal of the FRB target and replacing it with a risk-based approach focused on the protection of life and property (such ‘risk’ models currently constituting very much a ‘work in progress’) fails to recognise the huge potential threat fires burning in heavy fuels in the hinterland can pose to life and property at the interface with private property; not to mention the forest environment and uses and values. Furthermore, the absence of a target greatly reduces the accountability of the Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ and the Emergency Management Commissioner’s performance – a situation that has been adversely exposed in 2012/13 and 2013/14 fire seasons. In effect Mr Comrie and Mr Lapsley appear to be saying that the responsible agency does not know where to burn to mitigate risk. Something Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries might ponder vis-à-vis Section 62(2) of the Forests Act. Certainly the risk to life and property at the interface must be mitigated and clearly on the evidence of the past fire seasons this matter requires much more attention. However, any renewed focus at the interface must not be achieved by diverting resources from landscape-scale fuel reduction burning in the hinterland forests. Part of the problem seems to arise from Department of Environment and Primary Industries increasingly underestimating fuel build up and not aggressively attacking forest fires day and night in their incipient stage. Rather, failed first attack or, worse, no suppression action, results in fires becoming larger and burning out to more populous, more accessible country where multiple forces can supposedly be better located to focus on the protection of life and assets. This strategy appears to fit the “all agencies all hazards model”, being marketed by the Emergency Management Commissioner and Neil Comrie, but places a much greater risk and onus on Country Fire Authority volunteers and local communities. With respect to forest fuels, Hodgson33 has drawn attention to Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ misconceptions about fuel loads34 : “The most recent assessment of bushfire risk for Victoria, by Department of Environment and Primary Industries in 2013, indicates that: • bushfire risk in the Alpine and North East Bushfire Risk Landscape was relatively high through the 1990s and has decreased since 2003 via reduction in fuels through bushfires and increased planned burning • bushfire risk in the Alpine and Greater Gippsland Bushfire Risk Landscape was moderate during the 1990s but increased significantly between 1997and 2003, and has decreased since 2003 via reduction in fuels through bushfires and planned burning.” (Emphasis added) . This statement is seriously flawed because it exclusively relies on fine fuel loads to model changes to bushfire risk following planned burning and bushfires.

33 Athol Hodgson AM. A Paper prepared by Forest Fire Vic.Inc. for a public meeting at Bairnsdale organised by East

Gippsland Wildfire Task Force Inc. Wednesday 5th

November 2014. See Part 3 for further details. 34

Victorian Bushfire Risk Profiles: A foundation framework for strategic bushfire risk assessment. DEPI 2013


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From the available evidence the Department of Environment and Primary industries supports its modelling process with the statement “most of this reduction was due to reduced fuels from major bushfires in 2002/3, 2006/7 and 2008” (DEPI, 2013). This amounts to blatant misinformation. It suggests that major bushfires are a benefit because they reduce fine fuels. This ignores the fact that high intensity fires do an immense amount of damage in a very short time; produce extreme temperatures that kill standing vegetation, destroy soil structure, reduce fertility and in both the short and long term increase the total fuel load. What they do to birds and other wildlife is another sad story told elsewhere; see Dexter B and Hodgson A, (2005) The Facts Behind The Fire. Department of Environment and Primary Industries, relying on modelling rather than extensive field investigation, has failed to understand what happened on just 7 days and 1 night during the 128 days the 2003 Alpine Fires and 2006-07 Great Divide Fires burned. The 2003 Alpine Fires burnt 1.09 million ha. of public land and 90,000 ha of private land. The fires burned for 59 days. However about half of the public land (527,000 ha) was severely burnt on only 4 of the 59 days (Flinn, D and Wareing, K, 2003). The 2006-07 Great Divide Fires burnt 1.113 million ha of public and private land. The fires burned for 69 days and more than half the public land—perhaps as much as 600,000 ha, was severely burnt on only 3 days and 1 night (Flinn D, Wareing K, and Wadsley D, 2007). On the 1.1 million+ ha of public land burnt severely in those two fire events, the fires consumed all the fine fuel and killed or damaged the living trees. When a severe bushfire burns a mixed species eucalypt forest it removes all the fine fuels, kills some trees and damages the others. Within a year these dead and damaged trees start to drop coarse and large fuels. Two years after a severe fire the net gain in flammable fuel load is more than 30 t/ha. After 8 years the net gain increases rapidly as coarse fuels fall from self pruning coppice and regeneration. The dead trees eventually fall over adding to the total fuel load and bushfire risk in the longer term. The fuel profile also changes with significant amounts of loose bark and rotting limbs elevated to tree top height. Rotting wood in trees still standing ignites easily and promotes a fire vertically which then promotes a hotter fire and increased spotting. Additionally, these forests are now more open which allows the prevailing wind to impact on all dead fuels created by recent severe fires and fine fuels produced by regrowth and developing understorey. Photo One shows coarse and large fuels dropped soon after a mixed species eucalypt forest was severely burnt in the 2006 -07 Great Divide fires. In woodlands the net gain in flammable fuel will be about one quarter the gain in a mixed species eucalypt forest but still significantly greater than the pre-fire fine fuel load (Photo 2). The net gain of flammable fuel in Mountain Ash and Alpine Ash forests will be 5 - 20 times greater than in a mixed species eucalypt forest because all the Ash trees die in a severe fire, see Photo Three.


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Photo One: Trees in a mixed species forest burnt severely in the 2006-07 Great divide fires that are increasing bushfire risk.

Photo: Jim Stewart.

Photo Two: Trees in a woodland forest killed in the 2003 Alpine Fires that are increasing bushfire risk. Photo: Wallace Bruce.

Photo Three: Coarse and large fuels in a 300 + year old over-mature Alpine Ash forest 2 years after the 2003 Alpine fires. Photo: Athol Hodgson.

There is incontrovertible evidence that fuel created by recent severe fires, was the main driver of the 2006-07 fires that caused enormous damage within the Greater Alpine National Park and beyond to the Gippsland rivers, lakes and plains in June/July 2007 (Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2008, Page 136). The same can be said about the fire that started near Aberfeldy on 17 January 2013. It was reported at 11.30am and in the late afternoon it entered mixed species eucalypt forest severely burnt in 2007. In the next 9 hours it travelled about 20 km and caused spot fires on private property near Seaton and Glenmaggie where 21 houses, more than 300 livestock and farm infrastructure was destroyed. The infra-red scan clearly shows the intensity and spread of the Aberfeldy fire in the late afternoon.


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The strategic control priorities underpin the planning and operational decisions made by Regional Controllers and Incident Controllers when managing fire. The priorities are:

Protection and preservation of life is paramount – this includes:

Safety of emergency services personnel and

Safety of community members including vulnerable community members and visitors/tourists located within the incident area

Issuing of community information and community warnings detailing incident information that is timely, relevant and tailored to assist community members make informed decisions about their safety

Protection of critical infrastructure and community assets that support community resilience

Protection of residential property as a place of primary residence

Protection of assets supporting individual livelihoods and economic production that supports individual and community financial sustainability

Protection of environmental and conservation assets that considers the cultural, biodiversity, and social values of the environment.

Note that although the fire services agencies draw authority from the following legislation:

Sections 16, 16A and 16B of the Emergency Management Act 1986

Sections 6E, 20, 33, 50B and 93B of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958

Sections 10, 11 and 21 to 26 of the Fire Services Commissioner Act 2010

Sections 61F, 62 and 62AA of the Forests Act 1958

Sections 7, 7B, 32A and 55E of the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958

State Emergency Response Plan (Part 3 of the EMMV) as far as forest fire prevention and suppression is concerned the Forests Act 1958 Section 62(2) has primacy over all other legislation. Section 62(2)(a) of the Forests Act: “Despite anything to the contrary in any other act or law, the Secretary [ ] must carry out proper and sufficient work in State forest, national parks and on protected public land (a) for the immediate prevention and suppression of fire; and (b) for the planned prevention of fire. However, accountability of Department of Environment and Primary Industries and the Emergency Management Commissioner has been further eroded by changes to the Code of Practice for Bushfire Management on Public Land. The first Code (1995) contained the requirement “… upon detection of a wildfire, control action will be fast, determined, safe and thorough with the primary objective of controlling the fire in the shorted possible time with due regard being given to management objectives, environmental values and economy…”. Despite submissions to relevant Ministers this requirement has been deleted from the latest version of the Code. This sends the wrong message to the community and diminishes accountability on the responsible agency and government. The term ‘protection’ is not synonymous with suppression and does not necessarily lead to minimizing risk nor increasing community resilience as far as forest fire management is concerned under the current emergency management model.


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4.2 .2 CAPABILITY AND RESPONSE Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ current capability and response to forest fire management under the Emergency Management Victoria model is benchmarked against its predecessor in the early 1980s. Victoria has almost 8mha of native forest of which 6.615mha are on public land. For all practical purposes Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ fire management responsibilities for these forests, about 1/3 of the State, and duty/governance under the Forests Act 1958 have not changed from that of its predecessors. Key factors that, it is argued, have changed include:

The lower priority given to forest fire management;

The culture and leadership of the organisation;

Land tenure whereby about 50% of the 6.6m ha of public forested land is now in national parks;

Increased complexity of fire prevention and suppression at the public /private land interface;

The greatly reduced timber industry presence on public land;

The competing and sometimes conflicting demands that arise as a result of imbedding a former primary core business in a mega-department.

The Bushfires Royal Commission Implementation Monitor (BRCIM), Neil Comrie, considers that “Victoria manages smaller emergencies relatively well”. For example, Level 1 and Level 2 bushfires35 it is business as usual for Department of Environment and Primary Industries (public land) and Country Fire Authority (private land) in their respective jurisdictions. The line of control for a Class 1 emergency, a major bushfire, is shown in Table 1 below. A major fire is defined as:

(a) Has the potential to cause or is causing loss of life and extensive damage to property, infrastructure or the environment; or

(b) Has the potential to have or is having significant adverse consequences for the Victorian community or a part of the Victorian community; or

(c) Requires the involvement of 2 or more fire services agencies to suppress the fire; or (d) Will, if not suppressed, burn for more than one day.

Under this definition most of the 650 fires that on average occur each year in Victoria’s national parks, State forests and on protected public land have the potential to become major fires.

35 Level 1 fire. “A small, simple fire (or group of fires) which is controlled with local resources (may include other

agencies) ... second shift unlikely to be required. Approximately 0-5 hectares with no complex problems.” Level 2 fire. “When an incident cannot be contained by the first attack of local resources and becomes more complex. A Level 2 is characterised by the need for:

The deployment of resources beyond initial response

Sectorisation of the incident

The establishment of functional sections due to the levels of complexity; or

A combination of the above; e.g. expected that incident will be controlled within twenty-four hours. Approximately 5-20 hectares (or much larger if there is little complexity or problem), or with some complexity and control problems.”


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However, it is axiomatic that if Department of Environment and Primary Industries cannot effectively and efficiently combat Level 1 and Level 2 bushfires, then it is not competent to cope with periodic larger scale bushfires in an integrated structure with other emergency services - services that have their own onerous duties and are not specifically trained nor equipped to deal with forest fires in remote locations.


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Table 1 Line of Control for Bushfires on Public Land

Emergency Management Victoria 2014 STATE State Forest Department 1982

Emergency Management Commissioner STATE Forests Commission [3 Commissioners. ‘Displan’ may be requested to have come into force for a major emergency to provide and co-ordinate additional support for fire suppression.]

State Response Controller STATE Chief of Division of Forest Protection

Regional Controller [where appointed] REGION Divisional and Assistant Divisional foresters [7 field Divisions-State wide]

Incident Controller Incident District and Assistant Foresters [44 districts State-wide]

The Emergency Management Commissioner and a rostered State Response Controller are available on a continuing basis.

Regional Controllers are appointed for the duration of the bushfire season (1 October to 31 May) and as required outside of this period. Where a Regional Controller is required but has not yet been appointed, the State Response Controller will exercise the responsibilities of the Regional Controller.

In first response to an incident, the control agency appoints an Incident Controller, who is generally field-based.

For an incident that is or that may become a major emergency, the Regional Controller will appoint an Incident Controller from a list of Incident Controllers endorsed by the Emergency Management Commissioner, appointed regardless of their agency. [Authors emphasis]

The Emergency Management Commissioner, State Response Controller and Regional Controller maintain an overview of the emergency situation, through contact with agency commanders. Their level of involvement in the management of an incident relates to the likelihood of it becoming a major emergency.

Fire management was a major core business of the organisation year round. 25% of the departmental budget was committed to the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire with additional funding provided by Treasury in severe fire seasons. In a ‘normal’ year about 11% of the district forester’s time was devoted to fire management. [Prevention, suppression and planned use of fire in the landscape.] Failure in these activities results in severe disruption to communities, industries/infrastructure and widespread environmental degradation with adverse effects on water quality and yield, flora and fauna and capture and storage of green house gases by vegetation36. The impact of a single severe landscape-scale fire can last for many decades with permanent damage from frequent fires. Fire management activities were carried out at the district level. As the level of complexity of fire suppression increased, several districts were co-ordinated within the field division with support from central administration requested as circumstances required. Support and co-ordination from central administration increased as bushfire situations multiplied State-wide and the central fire operations room functioned 24/7. It is highly significant that the majority of professional staff in head office, including the three Commissioners, had all come up through the ranks with extensive field and fire experience over some ten to twenty plus years. In short, they were ‘blooded’ over many and varied fire experiences – from the relatively benign to extreme fire season cycles. In 2014 terminology the Forest Department year round had in the field: 14 co-ordinating incident controllers [divisional and assistant divisional foresters]; 44 senior incident controllers/major fire bosses [district foresters] usually with ten to fifteen plus years experience together with an equal number of assistant foresters with five to ten plus years experience capable as fire bosses commensurate with their experience. These officers were supported by 123 technical staff often with ten to twenty plus years experience. Many of these were capable fire bosses and, crucially fulfilled the critical role of sector boss at larger, more complex fires. These officers also managed the “exempt” workforce in fuel reduction burning, ecological burning and bushfire control. The stable, year round AWU workforce totalled about 850, was well trained in fire prevention and suppression and was supplemented in the fire season with a similar number of temporary workers depending on seasonal conditions. As well as in each divisional and district HQ, the Division of Forest Protection maintained and analysed a comprehensive statewide system of fire reporting which included for each bushfire such details as time of discovery and first report, time initial crew dispatched, time of arrival at fire, size, fuel by type, prognosis with follow up on time to bring under control and ultimately declared safe. The system came into force as soon as a fire was reported and was crucial to monitoring and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation’s forest fire management.

36 Volkova Liubov, Meyer C. P. (Mick), Murphy Simon, Fairman Thomas, Reisen Fabienne, Weston Christopher (2014) Fuel reduction burning mitigates wildfire effects on forest carbon and

greenhouse gas emission. International Journal of Wildland Fire 23, 771-780 http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/WF14009.


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Figure 3 Office of Chief Fire Officer – Final Organisation Structure – 14.04.2014 (post EDI Stage 2)


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Figure 4 State Forests Organisational Chart – March 1982 – reporting relationships for Division of Forest Protection and Field Divisions and Districts


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The respective organisational/structural arrangements for the Office of the Chief Fire Officer and FCVic’s Office of the Chief of Division of Forest Protection are shown in Figures 3 & 4 respectively. Organisational structure is one thing but leadership of and availability and disposition of trained resources are even more important. The following sections contrast fire fighting resources in 1983 with those applied in 2013/14. It covers the key resources of:

Fire protection installations

Forest roads and tracks

Personnel

Fire prevention

Training

Aircraft operations

Fire suppression

Expenditure Fire fighting resources 1983 The following extracts from the Forests Commission Victoria’s 1982-1983 Annual Report provide the foundation to better enable the reader to evaluate the current situation in an historical context. The following section then draws upon the respective 2013-2014 Annual Reports from the Department of Environment and Primary Industries, Parks Victoria and VicForests. These reports provide an insight into their respective capability and response for forest fire management compared with those of the responsible agency in 1982/83.


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Report of the Forests Commission Victoria for the Year ended 30 June 1983 Government Printer No. 112.

Fire Protection Installations The construction and maintenance of firebreaks helipads, water storages

and refuges and the maintenance and operation of airstrips, fire towers

and fire lookouts continued.

Major statistics for 1982-83 are: Firebreaks- Length of firebreaks constructed 176 km Length of firebreaks maintained 1 965 km Total in use 2 157 km Area of fuel reduction 62 35ha Helipads- Number constructed 17 Number maintained 141 Total in use 262 Airstrips (for fire protection purposes)- Number constructed 2 Number maintained 14 Total in use 19 Towers and Lookout Cabins- Number constructed 2 Total in use 85 Refuges (dugouts and shelters)- Constructed by Commission 3 Total in use 32 Constructed by other interests 2 Total in use 18

Major mechanical plant … At 30 June 1983, there were 644 motor vehicles in the Commission’s fleet of which 107 were replaced during the year. These included 22 administrative vehicles, 54 four-wheel-drive vehicles, 18 commercial vehicles and 13 heavy vehicles. Fire Equipment Construction work on fire equipment at the North Altona workshop was interrupted by the need to service and repair equipment in the field particularly during the Ash Wednesday fires. Workshop staff spent 40 days at major fires and considerable time repairing and servicing fire equipment in the workshop.


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Forest Roads and Tracks

Kilometres Constructed Length of Commission

roads as at 30 June 1983 (km)

Type 1982-83 1981-82 1980-81 Native forests Primary roads 6 4 4 2 898 Secondary roads 13 29 35 10 273 Fire protection and access tracks 215 184 364 20 376 Sub-totals 234 217 403 33 547 Statement of Forests Commission Personnel [excluding 610 men engaged during the summer to supplement the suppression forces]. Statement of Personnel as at June 1983

Division First

Division Second Division

Third Div

Temp

Exempt Full

Time

Exempt Part time

Total

Admin Prof Central Administration Administration 1 56 2 32 9 21 121 Forest Management 15 52 14 2 7 90 Forest Operations 1 7 24 29 2 1 64 Economics and Marketing

1 5 11 2 4 23

Forest Protection 1 2 11 25 1 8 48 Forestry Education And Research

1 3 3 23 1 5 72

Field Administration Central 23 36 2 103 11 175 Eastern 19 35 5 90 7 156 Northern 12 28 2 59 3 104 North-eastern 3 24 41 5 191 21 285 Southern 22 28 4 105 9 168 South-western 20 46 3 158 6 233 Western 1 17 35 1 97 4 155 Secondments 1 3 4 University 24 24 Totals 5 93 300 377 37 849 61 1 722

Fire Prevention In accordance with the Commission’s fire prevention plans, prevention works including the construction and maintenance of firebreaks, fire control lines, forest roads, fire access tracks, water storages, helipads, airstrips, firebombing installations, refuges, fire towers, fire fighting and communications equipment were undertaken in all forest districts. In addition, fuel reduction burning was carried out on 62 345 hectares of State forest, which was about one-third of the fifteen year average of 190 000 hectares. The relatively small area of fuel reduction burning was due to the very limited opportunities for such work because of the drought and fire-hazardous conditions from August to November 1982 and the later autumn rainfall.


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Training During the year, six residential training courses were held in fire administration, fire management techniques, basic fire control, fire operations and basic instructors’ and air observers’ procedures. A total of 155 persons attended the courses, comprising 95 departmental officers and 60 representatives from other organizations, including the National Parks Service (Victoria), the Country Fire Authority, the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, APM Forests Pty Ltd, Softwood Holdings Ltd, Victree Forests Pty Ltd, the Fisheries and Wildlife Division (Victoria), the National Parks and Wildlife Services of South Australia and New South Wales and the forest services of Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, New South Wales and Queensland. In addition, an aerial incendiary bombardier’s course was conducted for 23 departmental staff. A total of 177 field fire-training schools were conducted throughout the State, involving 343 staff and over 1 000 exempt employees. Personnel, totalling 294, from other fire fighting and support organizations also attended the schools. These schools fulfilled an important function by promoting liaison between the Commission and other organizations. The training covered various topics related to fire suppression and the methods used comprised lectures, demonstrations, practice and competitive activities. Aircraft Operations The mildness of the 1981-82 fire season prevented a thorough evaluation of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Hercules aircraft fitted with the MAFFS for “bombing” fires with fire retardant Accordingly, arrangements were made with the Commonwealth Government for a second trial period during the 1982-83 fire season and a MAFFS unit was again borrowed from the United States Forest Service and fitted to a RAAF Hercules in January 1983. A review of the effectiveness of various systems of aerial attack was conducted over the fire season. The continued evaluation of the MAFFS showed that a large fire bombing aircraft could be successfully incorporated into Victorian forest fire suppression operations. The retardant “lines” produced by the MAFFS were as effective as lines built by several agricultural aircraft, but the former could be made with one bombing attack. The cost of delivering retardant using the Hercules was substantially higher than the cost of using agricultural aircraft. Fire Suppression Fire suppression expenditure for the year [1982] totalled $16.20 million [$52.16 million, 2013 dollars]. Comparable suppression expenditure for the previous two fire seasons was $6.09 million in 1980-81 [$21.86million, 2013 dollars] and $4.17 million in 1981-82 [$13.43 million, 2013 dollars]. The extended fire season placed very heavy demands on the Commission’s 450 field staff and 604 regular employees, as well as the additional 610 men engaged during the summer to supplement the suppression forces; in total 1664 departmental field staff available for fire-ground duties. In addition, many of the Commission’s head office staff were called on to assist including on the fire ground. Close co-operation was maintained with the Country Fire Authority and very valuable assistance was received from the rural fire brigades in the control of many fires. Valuable assistance was also received from the staff of the National Parks Service, the Crown Lands and Survey Department, the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works (MMBW), the State Electricity


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Commission, the Country Roads Board, interstate forest services, private forestry companies, sawmillers and logging contractors, individual forest workers, adjoining landowners and Local Government authorities. The Victorian State Emergency Service, Australian Red Cross Society, Salvation Army, St John Ambulance Brigade and other volunteer organizations assisted greatly by taking over the task of feeding and looking after the welfare of the hundreds of fire fighters, particularly after the 16 February, “Ash Wednesday”, emergency. The Commission was appreciative of the skills and equipment that the personnel of the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force were able to provide during the fire emergency, and was grateful to the personnel of the Air Force 36th Tactical Squadron who operated the Hercules aircraft and the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) unit borrowed from the United States Forest Service. Major outbreaks of fire occurred from November to March inclusive with the most disastrous fires occurring on Ash Wednesday. The principal losses and damage caused by all fires, with 1938-39 data shown in brackets, included:

• 360,430 hectares of State forest burnt (1 348 000); • 49 persons killed (71); • 5 sawmills destroyed (69); • 2,145 homes destroyed (many hundreds); and • a considerable number of township facilities burnt, many farm buildings destroyed

and livestock killed, and large quantities of fodder, fencing and other equipment destroyed.

Additional fire damage included:

• 74,725 hectares of national park; • 158 hectares of protected public land; • 16,303 hectares of other public land, including land managed by the MMBW; • 2,558 hectares of State pine plantations; and • 251 hectares of private pine plantations.

On Ash Wednesday severe fire weather conditions developed. During the day Melbourne experienced a maximum temperature of 43 degrees centigrade, a minimum relative humidity of five per cent and maximum wind gusts (from the north-north west) of 70 kilometres per hour. In the evening the wind shifted and strengthened, gusting up to 100 kilometres per hour for about two hours. Sixteen major fires started progressively during the afternoon and early evening in southern and central areas of the State; ten of these developed into major fires. Forty-seven persons died and about 2 080 homes were destroyed. Seven fires were wholly or partly within the fire protected area; the areas burnt totalled 122 032 hectares, including 85 262 hectares of State forest, 238 hectares of national park and 1 932 hectares of MMBW land. In the evening of Ash Wednesday the Commission requested the Chief Commissioner of Police, in his capacity as Co-ordinator of the State Disaster Plan (DISPLAN), to arrange the supply of additional resources of men and equipment from the Commonwealth defence services.


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Stage 3 of DISPLAN operated for the next seven days during which 602 personnel from the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force, utilizing equipment such as helicopters and tankers, made a very significant contribution to fire suppression operations.

Statement 1: FIRE SUPPRESSION EXPENDITURE 1982 – 83

Item $ 2013 $ [X 2.93] Wages and overtime (exempt personnel) 10 681 360 31,296,384 Plant and vehicle hire 2 278 384 6,675,665 Aircraft hire 970 889 2,844,705 Stores and materials and other expenses 1 085 256 3,179,800 Fire damage rehabilitation 736 308 2,157,382 Modular airborne fire fighting systems 447 394 1,310,864 16 199 591 47,464,801 Less: Transfers to natural disaster relief account - Estimated costs of fire suppression, February 1983 4 365 541 12,791,035 Fire damage rehabilitation 736 308 2,157,382 5 101 849 14,948,418 Net works and services expenditure 11 097 742 32,516,384 Statement 2: NATURAL DISASTERS RELIEF ACCOUNT 1982 – 83 Item $ 2013 $ [X 2.93] Transfer of works and services expenditure (see previous statement)

5 101 849 14,948,418

Add: Overtime (salaried staff), February 1983 602 968 1,766,696 Total expenditure 5 704 817 16,715,114

The foregoing sets down the fire suppression capability of the Forests Commission and how, at its request, that capability was reinforced by other agencies in combating a major bushfire emergency. However, Hodgson37 noted that the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires although a reflection on the agency’s capability and response to bushfire were not a valid benchmark for assessing capability and response to landscape-scale [mega] forest fire. Hodgson compared the resources marshalled in 1985 to wage war on forest fires with those deployed on the Victorian alpine fire of 2003. Lightning did not cause the Ash Wednesday fires. They started when the fire weather was extreme and most of the damage they caused occurred on the day they started. The numbers for 1983 and 2013 present a “now and then“ comparison. However, a better benchmark is the 1984/85-and the 2002/03 fire seasons. Both these seasons were preceded by a long drought although enough rain fell in the winter and spring immediately prior to each fire season to promote the growth of grass on private properties. Lightning caused a similar number

37 Hodgson, Athol (2003) submission to the Bushfire Inquiry 2003 – addressing Terms of Reference No. 1. “Examine

the effectiveness of preparedness for the 2002/03 bushfire season, including fuel reduction.”


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of fires in the same areas on both occasions. The events of the 1984/85-fire season are summarised in a Departmental Report38 that says in part: In mid-January an unprecedented number of fires started from lightning strikes. One hundred and eleven [111] such fires started on public land between late afternoon on 14 January and 0900 hours the next day. At the time these fires occurred the Department was heavily involved in assisting the Country Fire Authority with major fires at Anakie, Werribee Gorge, Avoca, Broadford and Beechworth. As well as the fires which started in Victoria, a large fire at Dora Dora in New South Wales entered Victoria on a wide front near Mt.Lawson between Thologolong and Burrowye and burnt 7600 ha before being brought under control on 19 January. Another large fire at Khancoban, NSW, threatened Victoria for several days. Many of the lightning fires in forest areas started in remote, inaccessible mountain country where firefighting was difficult, hazardous and time-consuming. They burnt more than 150,000 ha and had a perimeter in excess of 1,000 km before they were controlled. About one-third of the perimeter had to be established and held in steep mountain country where there was no conventional access. Whilst the mega-department of Conservation, Forests and Lands had been created by 2nd November 1983, the resources, fire management skills and networks that existed in 1982 were substantially intact at the outbreak of the 1983 fires. In 1985 accumulated skills over 45 years and the lessons from 1983 were still fresh in the minds of the Executive and throughout the entire organisation. Many fire-experienced senior officers both in central administration and Statewide, including the “Exempt” (from the provisions of the Public Service Act) workforce were available for immediate mobilisation and quick deployment. This is evidenced by the level of competency and numbers of personnel that quickly located and controlled the large number of lightning–caused fires in January 1985. The value of prompt and aggressive attack, making the most of window/s of Opportunity and effectively deploying resources to quickly bring bushfires under control is shown in Table 2.

38 Department of Conservation, Forests and Lands (1985). Summary of Significant Events 1984/85 Fire Season.

Presented to Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities. Perth 6-9 May 1985. See Part3


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Comparison of deployed resources 1985 and 2003

Table 2 Comparison of resources deployed on multiple ignitions in 1985 and 2003

Note: * The Department of Conservation Forests and Lands (CFL) was an amalgamation of the Forests Commission, Lands Department (part), Fisheries and Wildlife (part), National Parks Service, Soil Conservation Authority and Ministry of Conservation (part). ** Numbers exclude personnel and resources working on the Eldorado and Stanley fires reported 1300hrs and 1545hrs respectively on 21

st January 2003 with the CFA as the lead agency.

*** Excludes contribution by armed forces. CPI adjusted to 2004 ≡ $14.8m. CPI adjusted to 2013 ≡ $18.48m.

It is notable that the report by the Emergency Services Commissioner (The Esplin Report, 2003) made no mention of the 1985 report notwithstanding that it was specifically drawn to his attention. The effectiveness and efficiency of response to bushfires is dependent on the capability/preparedness of the agency which includes leadership, human and physical resources and how they are deployed. Time taken to initiate attack is usually critical; influenced by location of the fire, readiness and disposition of resources and access for their deployment. The foregoing extracts provide a snapshot of what existed in the early 1980s. Typically, and reflecting the now different priorities within the mega department, the annual reports of Department of Environment and Primary Industries, Parks Victoria and VicForests do not provide readily comparable information. However, the following extracts from 2013/14 annual reports of these agencies provide some insight into their current focus on forest fire management.


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Insights into current focus on forest fire management by department of environment and primary industries, Parks Victoria and VicForests Department of Environment and Primary Industries Department of Environment and Primary Industries is the responsible agency for the prevention, suppression and planned use of fire on State forests, national parks ad protected public land. Its responsibilities are clearly set out in the Forests Act 1958. The 2013/14 inaugural annual report provides little substantive information by which its overall capabilities in forest fire management can be compared with that of its predecessors. DSE’s final annual report 2012/13 is likewise deficient. It is clear from the content of both these reports that forest fire management is still not regarded as a major core business at least in the eyes of the Executive Group and the relevant portfolio ministers. Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ Secretary, Mr Adam Fennessy ‘message’ includes: Our mandate was clear: drive local decision making in regional Victoria and boost capacity in rural and regional areas in support of productive and competitive industries and a resilient and healthy environment. … By bringing together stronger ties with our portfolio partners and with communities, Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ approach ensures we all benefit from and have a role to play in caring for Victoria’s land assets. … I am very proud of DEPI’s work in creating a strong regional network. … Our first year achievements are testament to the breadth and depth of Department of Environment and Primary Industries across Victoria,… … All of this was achieved despite one of the most prolonged fire seasons in the past few years. Over the 2013-14 Summer period, Department of Environment and Primary Industries attended more than 800 fires, well above the 30-year average. [It] is a great credit to Department of Environment and Primary Industries staff across the state as we delivered a more mobile and flexible capacity to respond to emergencies and to programs such as planned burning… In stark contrast to the State Forest Department, there is no one in the executive who has any depth and breadth of experience in fire suppression. Deputy Secretary Regional Services Bernie O’Sullivan, in his former executive positions with the NSW Farmer’s Association was directly involved in the aftermath of bushfire on behalf of his members. Deputy Secretary, Land, Fire and Environment, Paul Smith’s claim is that he, ‘successfully’ led the former DSE’s response to the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (Secretary DSE avoided responding to key searching questions by claiming ‘cabinet in confidence’). In listing Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ key programs and achievements there is scant mention of forest fire management. (Land and Fire Management - covers activities under an integrated land and fire management framework for the effective planning and management of fire across public land.) Page 16 of the Annual Report shows that for ‘Payments for outputs (controlled)’ for Land and Fire Management totalled $382.3m, 24.2% of a total $1.25b. Page 149 provides data on DEPI’s objectives to reduce the impact of major bushfires on people, infrastructure and the environment. This includes:

Fires controlled at first attack to suppress fires before they become established, minimizing impact – target 80% - actual achievement 74.20%;


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Fire controlled at less than five hectares, to suppress fires before they become established, minimizing impact – target 80% - actual achievement 79.50%; Note: This compares with target in previous fire protection plans late 1990s/early 2000 – “control of all wild fires at less than 5 ha in size”39.

Since the late 1990s it appears that the efficiency of forest fire management and particularly the first attack phase is in decline. Alarmingly, many fires in remote areas are not attacked quickly or worse not attacked at all. The result is that these fires subsequently become unmanageable on blow-up days, coalesce and become landscape-scale [mega] fires. Consequently, the 20% of fires exceeding 5 ha and 25% of fires that were not controlled at first attack should be thoroughly investigated for the cause – likely to identify a capability and response problem which ends up costing the State many millions of dollars in aggregate. The parliament and the public should be informed including formally in Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ annual reporting to Parliament.

Area of public land treated through planned burning – target 260,000ha – actual achievement 82,022ha. “These outcomes are achieved by ensuring that the workforce is effectively trained and prepared for fire suppression events and fuel management activities”.

Training courses listed on page 18: Hazardous substances and Dangerous Goods (100 people); implementation of Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ online chemical inventory database (42 staff); Voluntary Safety Management; hearing conversation and noise awareness; Contractor Safety Management; Leadership Safety in Department of Environment and Primary Industries and Job Safety Planning. There was no listing of either internal or external training courses in fire behaviour, fire suppression and planned burning, again in stark contrast to when forest fire management was treated as a major core business.

Community engagement plans developed and implemented in response to social research findings on community consultation needs of the planned burning programs – target 6 plans, actual achievement 6.

Fuel reduction burning to protect key assets – target 260,000ha – actual achievement 82,022ha. To maximise planned burning opportunities, all Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ regions ensured that multiple options for planned burning were prepared for implementation as weather conditions allowed; this totalled 450,000ha.

As at June 2014, Department of Environment and Primary Industries employed 3,470 [full time equivalent] staff across Victoria. Personnel with accreditation in a fire role totalled 1983 (57%). Personnel to serve in a senior capacity [Level 2 or3} in a fire role total 278 (14% of personnel with accreditation in a fire role, 8% of total staff). There is no data given for the number of personnel accredited to actually work on the fire ground. There is no data provided on the number of seasonal personnel (project firefighters [PFF]) engaged for a fire role including fire ground duty.

The depreciated replacement cost for roads, crucial to DEPI’s capability to access its estate, is given as $41,011 to $583,511 per km with a useful life of roads, 80 years. No figures are given for the total kms of roads and tracks network, nor for their maintenance. No figures given for maintaining fire bombing bases, helipads and fire detection assets all crucial to DEPI’s overall fire management capability and response.

39 Leonard, ML (2014) Forest fire management in south-eastern Australia: for better or worse? See Part 3


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Regional forest management plans and fire plans are not sufficiently detailed (or even recently revised) as an alternative source to construct a comprehensive state-wide report. Annual reports should include these statistics so that Parliament and the community can independently evaluate the capability and response of the agency to bushfire and the total cost of forest fire management. A detailed forensic examination of Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ overall costs for forest fire management was beyond the scope of this report. However, DEPIs’ 2013/14 ‘total output cost’ (not defined) expenditure of $381.5m is significant relative to some past expenditure expressed in 2013 dollars. For example, 1997 Department of Natural Resources and

Environment’s total budget [2013 $] for the Fire Management Program was $44.9m (50% allocated to fire suppression)40.

Fire suppression costs expressed in 2013 $:

1982/83 Includes Ash Wednesday fires $ 47.5m 1985 NE fires; area 150,000ha $ 18.5m 1997 DNRE; all fire suppression $25m 2003 Alpine fires; area 1.09mha $ 150m - $200m+ 2013 Harrietville fire; area 37,000ha $ 80m - $ 100m

It is interesting, considering their respective contributions in 2013/2014 fire season, which VicForests charged Department of Environment and Primary Industries at cost $1.97m for its services mainly fire related, while Parks Victoria received from Department of Environment and Primary Industries $10.66m for fire suppression costs. A leaked draft discussion paper (June 2013) published on the Weekly Times website 30th April 2014 indicated that there were problems (among others) with Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ method of contracting works leading to some contractors being paid exorbitant rates. This is discussed in Section 6. The huge increase in the overall cost of forest fire management particularly fire suppression, from the late 1990s, the failure in first attack or, worse, no suppression action, warrants a searching independent inquiry into forest fire management. The current expenditure for the outcomes achieved is unsustainable and clearly not attracting the attention of the Secretary DEPI, Emergency Management Commissioner, responsible portfolio ministers nor Treasury. Where is the scrutiny of Treasury? Parks Victoria Parks Victoria manages an expanding estate covering more than 4.1mha or about 17 percent of Victoria including about 3.4mha of public forests; 45 national parks, 26 state parks, 3 wilderness parks and other reserves. Its built assets include 14,000 kms of roads but their category is not specified. It is fair to say that a significant number of roads and tracks acquired as its estate expanded are now closed and/or not properly maintained.

40 Bennetton, Julia and Paul Cashin, Darren Jones and James Soligo (1997): An Economic Evaluation of Bushfire

Prevention and Suppression. Research Paper 598, Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, November 1997. See Part 3.


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While Department of Environment and Primary Industries has responsibility for fire prevention, fire suppression and the planned use of fire on State forest, national parks and protected public land, DEPI must consult Parks Victoria (and other land managers) about any fire prevention work proposed and agreement for any other planned use of fire. Bushfire response The report identifies an on-going workforce of 906 with 711 delivering field based services. 811 are accredited to support bushfire preparedness and suppression. 23.6 percent of total organisation capacity was provided to DEPI in 2013/14 for fire. However, on page 25 of the annual report “during the reporting period, Parks Victoria’s fire accredited staff [811] contributed the equivalent of only 126 full-time staff (15.5%) to bushfire response”, said to be the worst fire conditions since Black Saturday. There is no record of the number of personnel employed in incident control centres and on the actual fireground. Bushfire prevention Parks Victoria employed 198 seasonal fire fighters, not specified if accredited for fireground duties, to support bushfire response and prevention activities such as slashing, clearing roads and tracks and planned burning. The total length of Parks Victoria’s road and track network, or the kilometres treated, is not given. In 2013/14 Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ planned burn program target was 260,000ha. A total of 82,022ha was treated, including 36,782ha [1%] of land managed by Parks Victoria. 5km of new fire breaks were constructed, 22km of fuel breaks in urban interface parks were upgraded, 43km of roads and tracks were upgraded for improved access to fire vehicles and 53ha of high risk fire management zones, unsuitable for planned burning were mechanically treated. There is no record of the number of fire detection lookouts or helipads constructed and/or maintained. Bushfire recovery Parks Victoria commenced planning and implementing recovery programs following bushfires in January and February 2014 that impacted large areas of Snowy river and Erinunderra NPs and Mallee and Grampians NPs. Ecological fire Parks Victoria worked with Department of Environment and Primary Industries developing and updating landscape-scale bushfire management programs. Environmental assets which may be vulnerable to bushfire or fire suppression activities in Alpine parks were identified in previous years including the destruction of Alpine ash forests as a result of repeated high intensity bushfire in 2003 and 2006/07. Parks Victoria only recently has indicated that it has developed a policy to actively regenerate some of these forests.41 It is so doing in collaboration with the Department of Environment and Primary Industries and VicForests, using technology researched and developed by the Forests

41 “Earth on Fire”. Reported & produced by Mark Horstman & Anja Taylor. Edited by Vaughan Smith. ABC Catalyst, 3

June 2014


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Commission and the University of Melbourne in the mid 1950s and early 1960s; evolved and successfully applied to thousands of hectares of State forest over the past 5 decades. VicForests VicForests was established on 28th October 2003 as a separate entity for the commercial management of Victoria’s State forests. Its role is to undertake the sale, harvest and regeneration of timber resources from State forests set aside for timber production. It has helped secure a profitable long-term future for the native hardwood industry and improve the ecological management of Victoria’s native forests. For over 70 years the timber industry has had a significant role in fire management in public native forests and the value of its contribution is greatly underestimated. It is perhaps curious that VicForests’ 2013/14 report makes little mention of bushfire which has had and will continue to have a major influence on the sustainability of the forest industry’s resource. VicForests collaborates with the Department of Environment and Primary Industries and Parks Victoria on fire suppression, applies moderate to high intensity prescribed fire for the regeneration of fire-climax eucalypts on harvested coupes; a valuable training exercise for both Department of Environment and Primary Industries and Parks Victoria staff in gaining experience of fuels and fire behaviour that can be used in fire suppression. Services rendered to government agencies in 2013/14, Department of Environment and Primary Industries, charged at cost totalled $1.19m. There is no breakdown but it is assumed that most of this was associated with VicForests costs assisting Department of Environment and Primary Industries in suppressing East Gippsland fires. Over two months, about half of VicForests 98 (full time equivalent) staff assisted firefighting efforts. VicForests also assisted Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ Bushfire Rapid Risk assessment of the impact of fires on forest and other values. No information is provided on the total road network nor kilometres constructed and maintained. The network is vital for access for fire management in remote forest areas. Roading maintenance expenses were $2.9m and their ‘fair value’, not including their overall value to fire management, at 1.9m. The ‘at cost’ value of eucalypt seed for regenerating native forests was $6.8m; a valuable resource which after internal requirements, can be made available to Parks Victoria for direct seeding areas of fire-killed ash species. From a forest fire management perspective, VicForests appears to greatly undervalue its role and contribution, perhaps understandably, because it is not its core business. It was not asked to provide information on its assets to better enable a comparison with the detail available in the Forests Commission 1982/83 Annual Report. Need For Independent Examination of Department of Environment and Primary Industries Cost and Effectiveness of Fire Management Operations. Following on from the brief discussion on the cost of fire suppression and fire management over the previous three decades, this section reviews recent Department of Environment and Primary Industries fire management operations concentrating upon the use of aircraft for fire suppression and the impossibilities posed by high fuel loads.


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Use of aircraft in forest fire suppression Recent media releases42 promoting a boost to Victoria’s bushfire suppression capability: Additional aircraft (09 10 14) this fire season (2014/15) “.. $7.15m additional funding has ensured:

$6.65m for two large fixed wing air tankers with a load capacity of 12,000 and 17,000 litres and speed around 700 kph... based at Avalon near Geelong

$588,000 for a firebombing helicopter that can carry about 1,600 litres of water ... based in the Latrobe Valley

A fixed wing aircraft with an on-board attack supervisor to support the large air tankers These aircraft will ensure a stronger and quicker initial attack and the targeted aviation resources in the Latrobe Valley will ensure the rapid response across the whole Gippsland region”. The Minister says “We have listened to some of the feedback from people across Victoria in fire-affected areas, especially people in East Gippsland, and the comments they made were all around the initial attack”. The lessons learnt from the use of aircraft in forest fire management since 1948 and the value of fire-bombing aircraft in support of ground troops has been well documented for over 50 years. Effectively and efficiently deployed, aircraft have a highly significant role in forest fire management. Technological advances, particularly over the past decades include:

The ability to conduct aerial ignition ‘burnouts’ at night using sophisticated navigational aids and night vision goggles;

The ability to accurately drop napalm to conduct planned burns including backburns;

Provision of real time intelligence to fire behaviour strategists and crews on the fireground – infrared scanning producing full topographic maps of the fireground and environs in five minutes. Using laser technology, the latitude and longitude of hot spots is identified and transmitted to GPS equipped vehicles and crews with smart phones.

The use of aerial application of fire-retardant has massively escalated. Batch mixing retardant from:

25 kg bags – 500-600 litres for a Piper Pawnee, 1970; De Havilland Beaver, - 900 litres in 1980 to

1 tonne bins – 15,000 litres into large aerial tankers in 10 minutes. At one site in 2013, 200,000 litres of retardant was mixed, loaded and delivered in one day. Numerous studies published and unpublished, on the effectiveness and efficiency of large versus small aircraft consistently show the fire-retarding lines produced were as effective as lines built by several smaller aircraft, but the former could be made with one bombing attack. However, the cost of delivery using large aircraft is significantly higher than the cost of using smaller more flexible aircraft, particularly in more remote forest locations. Curiously, reports of evaluations conducted by the Bushfire Co-operative Research Centre in recent years, of trials of very large aircraft in south-eastern Australia, have not generally been made public.

42 Media Releases: The Hon Kim Wells, 9 October 2014; The Hon Ryan Smith, 10 October 2014. See Part 3.


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The importation of large aircraft for the 2014/15 fire season will be a valuable addition to the fleet but it is another “experiment” and their effectiveness and efficiency for a wide range of applications should be independently assessed to establish their benefit cost ratio. The role of aircraft, including for real-time intelligence gathering, is a major step forward in enabling the fire boss to quickly bring fires under control. However, the injudicious use of fire-bombing aircraft in inappropriate situations seems to be growing. For example, it is understood ineffective use on the 2013 Harrietville fire wasted $40m until it was called off. The cost of fire retardant runs into millions of dollars. It is also understood that the current annual cost of just having aircraft available for the fire season is now about $25m. Last fire season [2013-14] 75 aircraft flew 11,000 hours in four months. In 1996, 1900 hours were flown utilizing 17 aircraft. This has resulted in a huge increase in expenditure. The benefit:cost ratios for these operations should be separately quantified for the Country Fire Authority, including at the public land/private land interface and for fire prevention and suppression on forested public land. In the practice of forest fire management, aircraft are invaluable for intelligence gathering, transportation of crews, fuel reduction burning, and fire burn outs, back-burning and fire-bombing in support of ground crews for fire suppression. However, aircraft have not been and are not a substitute for people on the fireground. Further, their presence should not be used as a ‘smokescreen’ by the Emergency Management Commissioner, the Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries and by portfolio ministers for not addressing the serious lack of personnel available for fire prevention, suppression and the planned use of fire in the landscape.

4.2.3 RELIEF AND RECOVERY The Code of Practice for Bushfire Management on Public Land 45 documents DEPI’s responsibilities for these phases of forest fire management; these are summarised below from the Code. Overview.

The Department is responsible for recovery of public land and will support the coordinating agency at the State and regional level in accordance with the Emergency Management Act 1986. The Department will also work in collaboration with municipal councils who have recovery responsibilities at a local level.

If requested, the Department may contribute to broader community recovery managed by other government agencies.

Recovery of public land may be integrated with recovery activities on private land as appropriate, acknowledging that legislation and incident-specific initiatives will direct recovery activities.

Facilitating recovery and re-establishing safe access to public land supports regional communities return to normal function.

The bushfire recovery phase on public land follows the response phase and emergency stabilisation and initial recovery phases (see Figure 6). It is the responsibility of the public land management entity and is specific to longer-term recovery activities. Relevant procedural guidelines provide the specific instruction in relation to these activities.

45 Published by the Victorian Government Department of Sustainability and Environment (now DEPI), June 2012.


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Strategies

Protect human life, property, natural and cultural values by stabilising public land, repairing damage and treating impacts that have resulted from bushfires.

Treat risks in priority order to re-establish access to public land in a timely manner to support fire impacted communities’ return to normal daily life.

There are two main recovery phases specific to bushfires on public land.

Figure 6 Phases of recovery from bushfires on public land

1. Emergency stabilisation and initial recovery.

The Incident Controller is responsible for managing the response to bushfire on public land, until the public land management entity resumes day-to-day management. The Incident Controller will initiate bushfire response actions, emergency stabilisation and initial recovery actions.

Where appropriate, the Incident Management Team (IMT) will remain active during the emergency stabilisation and initial recovery phase to support emergency services personnel and manage fatigue.

The transition from response to emergency stabilisation and initial recovery will commence as soon as practicable and after the risk to human life has been minimised. Emergency stabilisation and initial recovery includes:

identifying, assessing and treating emerging risks to human life, property, natural and cultural values

Identifying risks to public land values (including natural and cultural values) and properties adjoining public land are addressed

Rehabilitating damage caused by suppression works

commencing emergency stabilisation activities

understanding loss and damage to public land

This process will form part of the Incident Controller’s handover to the public land management entity and will detail works completed to date around safety, rehabilitation of fire suppression activities and risk to public land values and adjoining land.


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2. Longer term recovery.

The land management agencies, Department of Environment and Primary Industries, Parks Victoria, VicForests, resume day-to-day management responsibilities by agreement with the incident controller.

Comment. There are some serious flaws with this process particularly concerning the roles of

incident controllers (ICs), the Emergency Management Commissioner and Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ other responsibilities.

The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System [AIIMS (ICS)], the system of incident management, now in widespread use by land management and fire and emergency service agencies, is said to be “necessary for the establishment of effective standing protocols for liaison and co-ordination across agencies having different jurisdiction roles through all stages of pre-planning, preparedness, response and recovery”. The Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System has progressively established its own officialdom and, at least in Victoria, the Incident Controller has control over the fire operations’ officer. Further, under the Emergency Management Act 1986 (Vic), the Fire Services Commissioner/ Emergency Management Commissioner may take overall control of response activities in relation to a fire, if the Emergency Management Commissioner considers the fire has become, or reasonably believes it has the potential to become a major fire. When responding to bushfires on public land, State control priorities, set by the Emergency Management Commissioner, guide planning and operational decisions made by command and control staff. For a major fire a Regional Controller appoints an Incident Controller from a list of Incident Controllers endorsed by the Emergency Management Commissioner, regardless of their Agency. This is problematic if the appointed IC is not part of the responsible fire suppression agency, and, not withstanding any paper qualifications, has no depth and breadth of experience of fireground, nor knowledge of the particular locale or forest environment. An intimate knowledge of the local/regional area is critical for developing strategies to bring the fire under control. In the ‘response’ stage the ‘fire boss’ (nee ‘fire operations officer’), in the case of a major forest fire on public land, a highly experienced officer of DEPI/PV, should call all the shots, at least until the fire is declared ‘under control’ and, even then the ‘fire boss’ is still responsible for making the fire ‘safe’. In the response phase an Incident Controller should have the role of an Incident Co-ordinator (not Controller) to facilitate the co-ordination of resources for the Fire Boss. It is only when the Fire Boss with prior agreement of the State public land fire boss (Chief Fire Officer), is satisfied that the fireground action is in caretaker mode that the Fire Boss hands control over to the Incident Co-ordinator who then calls the shots on the recovery phase. The requisite numbers of fireground resources continue to patrol and mop up and the crews make ready for the next bushfire event. They may be used in the recovery phase under the Incident Co-ordinator, with the concurrence of the Chief Fire Officer, depending on the State-wide fire situation. For some time now, usually reliable sources believe there is considerable disquiet in various fire and emergency service agencies in some States concerning the way the Australian Inter-Service Incident Management System has evolved. In Victoria, with the steep rise in the number of


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landscape-scale fires there are times when personnel in Incident Management Teams (IMT) have outnumbered the number of personnel actually engaged on the fireground, a ridiculous situation which highlights the urgent need to re-order the system with the primary objective of quickly putting the fire out; thereby enabling relief and recovery to be expedited. The recent insertion of clauses in sections 61D, 61E and 61EA of the Forests Act can be interpreted, and certainly are by the Fire Services Commissioner/Emergency Management Commissioner, as giving over-arching powers to the latter office over the Secretary DEPI’s forest fire management responsibilities. This is untenable and questionable in law under section 62(2) of the Forests Act i.e. the Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries is accountable to the responsible portfolio minister on forest fire matters, protocols that worked when portfolio ministers adhered to the Westminster system of accountability to the parliament and the people, rather than the layers of insulation and obscuration now in place. The Emergency Management Commissioner’s “over-arching management role (is) to ensure a systematic and co-ordinated response so that the State’s resources are deployed to lessen the negative consequences of a major-emergency”. In practice, the job of the Emergency Management Commissioner should be to facilitate and co-ordinate the provision of additional resources requested by the responsible agency, in this case, Secretary DEPI. As such, the Secretary would have sought prior agreement from his portfolio minister, who would have, in turn, consulted the State Crisis and Resilience Council. The Emergency Management Commissioner has at his disposal a substantial new ‘silo’ to perform this function. DEPI’s Secretary has unequivocal responsibility under the Forests Act to quickly and safely contain, control and make the bushfire safe. This is the most effective and efficient way to “lessen the negative consequences of a major [bushfire] emergency”. Another major flaw in the current arrangements is, it is argued, the mega-department itself. Like some of its predecessors the Secretary DEPI reports to two Ministers. Notwithstanding his having access to several Deputy Secretaries, their depth and breadth of experience in forest fire management is minimal. As such, forest fire management appears to receive limited attention for what should be a core business. Again, like its predecessors, the Office of the Chief Fire Officer remains buried down the hierarchy when it should, surely, rate Deputy Secretary status. There are conflicting demands on the organisation’s staff in fire emergencies. On the one hand ‘primary industries’ personnel are particularly concerned with assisting in recovery and relief to rural communities, while on the other hand a much greater proportion of staff should be available for fire ground duties as part of their job description. The relatively small number of persons with sufficient skills for fireground duties (and how they are deployed) is a major reason why some multiple-fire ignitions in the forest are not attended to promptly. Over the past decade or so, ‘not attended’ fires have coalesced into landscape-scale fires. The creation of the mega-department in 1983 has progressively proved to see an inadequate focus on forest fire management. Victoria’s major natural hazard, bushfire, is ever present. Serious consideration should be given to the pros and cons of creating a Department with less conflicting demands and one that will treat forest fire management as a major core business.


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5 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONEMENT AND PRIMARY INDUSTRIES

DISCUSSION PAPER

CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN MEETING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND PRIMARY

INDUSTRIES’ INCREASED PLANNED BURNING ACCESS, PREPARATION, SUPPORT AND REHABILITATION

WORKS REQUIREMENTS (JUNE 2013)

A leaked Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ draft Discussion Paper: Current and Future Challenges in Meeting DEPI’s Increased Planned Burning Access, Preparation, Support and Rehabilitation Works Requirements (June 2013) reported on by Emma Field and published on the Weekly Times website April 30th 2014 is a damning indictment of DEPI’s organisation and governance. It was not reported on by either the Fire Services Commissioner nor Inspector-General for Emergency Management, although it would have greatly impacted on the efficiency and effectiveness on 2013 – 14 fuel reduction burning and fire suppression operations. Some extracts from the paper are reproduced below. The full report from the Weekly Times website can be found in Part 3.

. Selected extracts from:


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Little wonder that the Emergency Management Commissioner in concert with the Bushfire Royal Commission Implementation Monitor is trying to back off on the Government’s minimum annual 390,000ha target for fuel reduction burning; a target which is acknowledged by forest fire experts as only 50% of what is really required to reduce risk and increase resilience of communities and the forest environment to the ravages of landscape-scale bushfires. Another


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item on which Secretary DEPI might ponder viz-a-viz is his obligation under 62(2) of the Forests Act. The serious difficulties Department of Environment and Primary Industries and its predecessors were experiencing (and what was being done to rectify them) should have been recorded in the 2013/14 Annual Report. The Inspector-General for Emergency Management in his 2013-2014 Fire Season Compliance Report (see Section 6) said that he understood Emergency Manager Victoria was leading a review of the overall [State ?] emergency management system which is now under the control of the Emergency Management Commissioner. The terms of reference have not been publicly released and it remains to be seen what such a review will accomplish. However, the review is not a substitute for a detailed independent evaluation of what is required of the agency responsible for forest fire management on public land. (See Part 1. Recommendations.) The June 2013 Discussion Paper indentified several areas where Department of Environment and Primary Industries could greatly improve its effectiveness and efficiency in forest fire management [and other operations]. The Inspector-General for Emergency Management 2013-2014 Fire Season Compliance Report also identified some of these problems which still need to be rectified. These are discussed in Section 6.


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6 INSPECTOR-GENERAL FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management (IGEM) was established on 1st July 2014 under the Emergency Management Act 2013 and is located in the Department of Justice. The Office of the IGEM supersedes the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner. The IGEM works independently of Emergency Management Victoria with the objective of providing assurance to the government and the community in respect to emergency management arrangements. Mr Tony Pearce, inaugural IGEM, took up the post on 1st August 2014 and commenced a brief from the then Minister for Police and Emergency Services and Minister for Bushfire Response to investigate and prepare a compliance report on the progress and implementation of identified actions from the 2013-14 fire season reports. Identified actions related to:

road traffic management

community involvement in fire preparedness, response and recovery

initial attack and utilisation of resources

cross border fire arrangements

other systemic issues identified from the 2013-14 fire season reports. To assess the progress of improvements to emergency management arrangements, the modus operandi of the IGEM, in concert with that of the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission, is not about laying blame, but to constructively evaluate and progressively improve Victoria’s emergency management arrangements; in this case: risk and resilience, capability and response and relief and recovery with respect to bushfire. It is right that the IGEM does not play a blame game. Victoria’s bush-firefighters are greatly undervalued at least in the metropolis, unsung heroes outside the heat of the moment. Amendments to the Forests Act set down that both the Secretary Department of Environment and Primary Industries and Chief Fire Officer are not personally liable for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith. While that is also right and proper, no blame/no fault should not be confused with holding people accountable for non-performance of their duties under the Act. The past four Secretaries of Department of Environment and Primary Industries’ predecessors, by any reasonable measure, did not ensure that their department was in a proper state of preparedness for the known risk confronting Victoria each fire season and were not held accountable. Neither were the former Emergency Services Commissioners, respective portfolio Ministers and, particularly, the Bushfire Sub-committee of State Co-ordination and Management Committee. Victoria has consequently paid a heavy social, economic and environmental penalty. Portfolio Ministers, Risk and Resilience and Capability and Response sub-committees of the State Crisis and Resilience Council and the Emergency Management Commissioner in the new order must do, and be seen to do, much better than their predecessors. Secretaries DSE/DEPI and the Fire Services Commissioner had time to evaluate problems, implement solutions and monitor outcomes before the 2013-14 fire season. The then Minister for Police and Emergency Services and Minister for Bushfire Response saw fit in May 2012 to


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forward an independent report46 for the Fire Services Commissioner’s consideration but there are still many deficiencies identified in that report that have not been addressed. In fairness, there was a flurry of directives/State Operating Plans but many of these were not effectively implemented in 2012-2013-14. Like any incoming Chief Executive/Inspector General with no baggage, no obligations, the Inspector-General for Emergency Management had the opportunity to set the scene in his inaugural report: The Inspector-General for Emergency Management’s 2013-14 Fire Season Compliance Report47 considered community concerns and other issues identified as part of the emergency management sector’s debriefing and observation’s recorded in the following three reports:

Post Season Operations Review Fire Danger Period 2013-2014 – undertaken by the State Review Team which consists of representatives from Emergency Management Victoria, Country Fire Authority, Department of Environment and Primary Industries, Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB), Victoria Police and Victorian State Emergency Service.

Goongerah-Deddick Trail Fire January-March 2014 Community Report – undertaken by the Emergency Management Commissioner and Emergency Management Victoria

Mt Ray-Boundary Track Fire January-March 2014 Community Report – undertaken by the Emergency Management Commissioner and Emergency Management Victoria.

The Post Season Operations Review Fire Danger Period 2013-14 report reviewed the management of fires across the state during the 2013-14 season, while the two community reports presented a range of issues identified by community members on the management of those specific fires. All three reports identified opportunities for major improvements through specific actions for the emergency management sector. The IGEM specified that: “The scope of this report precluded IGEM from assessing the appropriateness of the actions outlined in the 2013-14 fire season reports. However, where possible and relevant, IGEM has provided commentary on the sustainability of certain actions”; one might also add non-actions. During the 2013/14 fire season two major East Gippsland fires, the Goongerah-Deddick Trail fire and the Mount Ray-Boundary Track fire burnt for 70 and 67 days respectively; the former resulting in 165,806 hectares of private and public land being burnt, and the latter 6,700 hectares of private and public land with 3 homes plus outbuildings, live stock and fencing being destroyed. Affected communities expressed strong views, well documented by local media 48 and documented in Emergency Management Victoria reports, that response to the fires was highly deficient in many respects. This review concentrates on just one key factor: Initial attack/utilisation of resources [3.3] and draws extensively from the Inspector-General for Emergency Management’s report.

46 Forest Fire Management in Victoria – Is the State Coping? Concerns about the organisational arrangements for

forest fire management in Victoria. Part 1 and Part 2. Dexter, B and A. Hodgson, March 2012. forestfirevictoria.org.au. In Part 3.

47 2013-2014 Fire Season Compliance Report.

Inspector-General for Emergency Management, October 2014. See Part 3. 48

* Regional radio and newspapers: Snowy River Mail and Bairnsdale Advertiser – April, May, June, August 2014. * Online Opinion – Mark Poynter, 2

nd June, 2014.


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Problems with initial attack that have been exposed include: reduced numbers of fire fighters and reduced fireline expertise which had been allowed to run down by senior management, are highlighted in Table 4 below. Initial Attack/Utilisation of Responses - extracts from IGEM’s 2013-14 Fire Season Compliance Report – Section 3.3, pages 33-39 of 105. While many policies and procedures are laid down on paper there is an over concentration on process rather than delivery. The constant reference that these matters will be addressed in 2014-2015 pre-season briefings points to deficiencies in training programs and, particularly, practical experience. This is in stark contrast to the attention given to forest fire management described in Section 4.2.3. Aggressive and prompt initial attack is vital to controlling fires in the early stages. Aircraft can play an important role in transporting crews, providing intelligence and fire bombing. Historically49, responder agencies have successfully achieved integrated initial attacks in areas where agency personnel:

were familiar with one another, had good local relationships and understood and respected each other’s roles and capabilities

integrated and applied local knowledge

exercised together and attended previous incidents together. Post season reports50 acknowledge that while progress has been made in this area, this aspect of emergency management requires ongoing reinforcement. This finding by the IGEM is code for the fact that the above three matters in bushfire management had seriously deteriorated and require urgent remedial action.

Key issues outlined in the 2013-14 East Gippsland community reports

There was a lack of an integrated initial attack, due to resource constraints as a result of significant fire activity across the state.

Local knowledge was not used to inform the initial attack.

Inefficient utilisation of resources. Key issues outlined in the Post Season Operations Review

Different initial firefighting strategies and tactics (immediate aggressive direct attack compared to indirect attack).

Understanding of each agency’s expectations and needs and how they may impact on response outside their respective areas of responsibility.

Understanding of and application of pre-determined arrangements that are necessary when working across the various agency boundaries.

Individual personnel knowledge and experience.

Local relationships between agency personnel.

Differing agency doctrine in relation to where the Incident Controller is located.

49 Post Season Operational Review 2012-13

50 Post Season Operational Reviews 2012-13 and 2013-14


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Table 4 Progress of Initial Attack/Utilisation of Resources Actions. Modified from IGEM’s Compliance Report

Action No.

Action, Recommendations, Observations & Findings.

3.1

Incident and regional control Teams support initial attack resources to control fires at the earliest opportunity by deploying [applicable] ground and air resources to all fires Findings on actions 3.1 to 3.10 CFA and DEPI have advised that actions 3.1 to 3.10 are currently fulfilled through existing policies and procedures. Consequently, IGEM considers that these operational processes should be actively monitored to ensure that they are effective.

3.2

For remote area fires that are not controlled / suppressed in initial attack, Incident and Regional Control Teams to complete an operations analysis to determine the type of resources and the operational period to achieve suppression at the earliest opportunity. Observations & findings CFA and DEPI have advised that actions 3.1 to 3.4 are currently fulfilled through existing policies and procedures.

3.3

Cross land tenure fire control which maximises all the available resources to achieve initial attack will be deployed under a single control structure – this will include all resources - fire services resources (Victoria and NSW) and forest industry brigades (where established). Ensure that cross land tenure issues do not impact on timely and appropriate first attack.

3.4

Initial attack and ongoing fire control to operate 24 hours a day to maximise lulls in weather and fire behaviour to maximise fire control tactics and strategy including effective use of fire fighting resources during lulls in weather and during evening, night, and early morning periods.

3.8 Ensure that the training and deployment of CFA and DEPI personnel includes the need to extinguish fires in initial attack to keep fires small.


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3.9 Reconsider initial attack from aircraft to fires in remote areas.

3.1

To

3.4,

3.8

and

3.9

Observations & findings IGEM understands that EMV is leading a review of the overall resource management system (refer to Section 3.5 of this report). Furthermore, IGEM have been advised that the allocation of resources (ground and air) is not controlled by CFA and DEPI. Rather, it is dependent on the state control priorities determined by the EMC and managed by the State Controller51. The State Response Controller or the Regional Controller may vary the allocation in accordance with procedures and policies established by the EMC, however there will be circumstances where ground and/or aerial first attack will not be possible on all fires within the first planning period (generally 24 hours)52. Aircraft operations are determined by the Fire and Emergency Aviation Management Group and underpinned by a number of existing policies53. To ensure that there are provisions in place to vary resource allocation, existing procedures54 dictate that established IMT structures are necessary in order make appropriate decisions related to resourcing. Assessments of resourcing requirements and allocation are regularly undertaken at both the IMT level for individual incidents and at the regional level when there are multiple incidents competing for resources. Local resources are able to be activated immediately using existing protocols. However, a barrier to effective support in initial attack is the time required to activate the full interstate arrangements and the subsequent time required to assemble and deliver resources to the incident, which may take up to 48 hours. In terms of 24-hour initial attack and ongoing fire control, CFA and DEPI have advised that there will be circumstances where fire control cannot operate 24 hours each day due to safety and other considerations. The state control priorities determine strategy and tactics, which also consider fatigue management and other OHS issues for firefighters. Pre-season briefings will also be used to reiterate the need for initial attack on all fires with local District Duty Officers and Regional Controllers. This will also provide an opportunity to remind Initial Attack lncident Controllers to submit resource requests at the earliest opportunity.

51 Appointment of a State Response Controller reflects new emergency management arrangements from 1 July 2014.

During the 2013-14 fire season the role was fulfilled by the State Controller. 52

CFA and DEPI indicated that this occurred in 2002-03, 2006-07, and 201 3-'l 4. 53

Such as State Aircraft Unit Policy, Use of Aircraft Guidelines, and Factors to Consider When Allocating Aircraft to Bushfires. 54

SOP J2.03 (Gippsland Readiness and Response Plan), CFA SOP 9.25 (Resource Management and Tracking)


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Most medium to large fires involve the use of Divisions, with time and space identified as key drivers to enable resources to be managed in a way that minimises travel time and maximises time spent controlling the fire. The level of management at the Divisional Command Centre is determined by the lncident Controller, which is based on a number of considerations including available facilities and resources. The use and performance of Divisional headquarters remote from lMTs is monitored on a daily basis by the Regional Controller55, which ensures that the role is working in place in accordance with the Australasian lnter-Service lncident Management System. This can be reiterated at actual deployments and exercises.

3.7

Deliver timely assessment of remote areas from ground and air to ensure an appropriate and timely initial attack occurs. Observations & findings Existing policy regarding fire assessment is contained within Gippsland Readiness and Response Plans. Detection of fires is primarily through fire lookouts. During the fire season, these lookouts are occupied as necessary for a period determined by the fire danger level. Reports are made to the District Office every hour and fire lookout observers are to be notified by 6pm of the requirements of the following day. This is to ensure that planning and preparedness of resource requirements for the following day is adequate. IGEM have been advised that agencies utilise a range of techniques to monitor and assess fires. These include Fire Towers, fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, infra-red technology, and if safe, ground observation. All of these techniques are used to provide the most accurate information to lMT. All techniques available to initial attack teams will be re-iterated at the preseason briefings.

3.10

Ensure that major fire operations review the role and functional resourcing of Divisional Command to achieve a more effective result. Observations & findings CFA and DEPI have advised that existing policies and procedures are adequate to meet the intent of this action, however acknowledge that response agency personnel need to maintain or enhance their skill through actual deployments or exercises. This involves managing resources in such a way as to minimise travel time and maximise time on the fire line.

55 SOP J. 12.01 (Real Time Monitoring Performance)


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The level of management at the Divisional Command Centre is determined by the lncident Controller based on considerations, which include:

available facilities at the Divisional headquarters capacity to properly manage and brief crews number of resources logistics existing community facilities to support operations. the use and performance of Divisional headquarters that are remote from lMTs are monitored daily by the Regional Controller to ensure they do not operate independently and in a manner that is inconsistent with overall strategy the effectiveness of Divisional Command may be enhanced through the incorporation of scenarios into IMT Exercise regimes and as an element of real time performance monitoring.

3.11 Include local knowledge, local leadership, and local community in incident management In strategy and IMTs.

3.12

Incident Controllers be encouraged to utilise the local knowledge within council, particularly when local agency representation is minimal. This should be incorporated into preseason activities prior to the 2014-15 Fire Danger Period.

3.11 & 3.12

Recommendation 7 That the EMC monitor the application and effectiveness of policies and processes with regard to initial attack and utilisation of resources at the local level during the 2014-15 fire season. The revised EMT Arrangements are expected to be finalised by October 2014. Once finalised, the Arrangements will be distributed to all Level 2 and Level 3 Incident Controllers, Regional Controllers and Regional Agency Commanders. EMV has advised IGEM that it will communicate this change to emergency management personnel across the regions as part of its pre-season briefing program. IGEM has sighted an email dated 29 August 2014 from the EMC to Regional and Incident Controllers, advising that local governments are to be invited to pre-season briefings and involved in all EMT activities. In addition, CFA and DEPI have also advised IGEM that their Regional Directors plan to engage with local government leaders through the


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Regional Managers Forum to reinforce ongoing collaboration between agencies and community representatives. Findings on actions 3.11 and 3.12 IGEM considers that these actions are being adequately addressed through the update of EMT arrangements documentation, the pre-season briefing program and communications from senior emergency management representatives.

3.13

Include local knowledge, local leadership, and local community in incident management October 2014 In strategy and IMTs. Observations & findings Recommendation 8 That DEPI leads a multi-agency review of the factors that Incident Controllers take into account when determining the location of control lines for indirect attack on a fire and the impact that decision making has on the effective utilisation of heavy plant in their construction

3.16

The enhancement of local relationships and understanding of each agencies capacity, capabilities, knowledge and tactics remains the responsibility of State, Regional and local agency people to develop and enhance. Observations & findings EMV plans to address these three actions through its pre-season briefings... ... IGEM notes that initial attack is included as a key message in the exercise component of the pre-season briefing. More specifically, it emphasises the need to support and promote integrated initial attack and the Transfer of Control through effective control and command structures established early in developing incidents.


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The practice of forest fire management is both an art and a science. The art is now seriously diminished with the erosion of expertise and past and evolving science providing the technology to refine the art is not always being effectively and efficiently deployed. The 2003 Alpine fires provided a wake-up call reinforced by the 2006-07 Great Divine fires. The tragic lessons from 1939, 1967, 1983 and 2009 should not have to be re-learnt. The Harrietville fire of January 2013 and East Gippsland fires January 2014 are testimony that Department of Sustainability and Environment/ Department of Environment and Primary Industries and the Fire Services Commissioner/Emergency Management Commissioner were too slow to rectify obvious problems with forest fire management that had been previously drawn to their attention. The DEPI internal Discussion Paper (June 2013) “Current and Future Changes in Meeting of Department and Primary Industries’ Increased Planned Burning Access, Preparation, Support and Rehabilitation Works Requirements” also drew attention to several of these on-going problems. They have now been put on notice by the Inspector-General for Emergency Management.


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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission evidence transcript – April 28th 2010 (140th day) and April 30th 2010. http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/getdoc/fbcb1aac-5749-4b38-8c30-39422740c84/Transcript_VBRC_Day_140_28-Apr-2010.PDF 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report Vol.II Chapter 7, Land and Fuel Management. 2013-2014 Fire Season Compliance Report. Inspector-General for Emergency Management, October 2014. Adams, Mark A, and Peter Attiwill (2011). Burning Issues: sustainability and management of Australia’s southern forests. CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood. ISBN 9780643094437. A. J. Myers QC (15 July, 2004). In the Matter of a Report of the Inquiry of the 2002 – 2003 Victorian Bushfires. A report commissioned by the Stretton Group. Athol Hodgson AM (2014) on behalf of Forest Fire Victoria Inc. Submission on Great Alpine National Park Draft Management Plan. 29 July 2014. Atlas of Victoria (1982) edited by J.S. Duncan. Victorian Government Printing Office 1982. ISBN 0724182551 Auditor-General’s Fire Report tabled in the Victorian Parliament May 8, 2003. Australia’s Forests at a Glance (2014). ABARES 2014, ABARES project 43514.Canberra. ISBN 978-1-74323- 208-8 Bennetton, Julia and Paul Cashin, Darren Jones and James Soligo (1998): An Economic Evaluation of Bushfire Prevention and Suppression. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 42:2, pp149-175. Bill Gammage, (2011). The Biggest Estate on Earth. How Aborigines Made Australia. ISBN 978 1 74331 1325 Bren, Leon (2014) Forest Hydrology and Catchment Management: An Australian Perspective. ISBN: 978-94-017-9336-0 (Print) 978-94-017-9337-7 (Online) http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-017-9337-7 David Packham, (2014) Australia Felix not Australia Fear. Paper presented to East Gippsland Fire Taskforce Public Meeting. Bairnsdale, Victoria, 5 November, 2014 [Unpublished] Deloitte Access Economics (2013) Building our Nations’ Resilience to Natural Disasters – for the Australian Business Round Table for Disaster Resilience and Safer Communities. Department of Conservation, Forests and Lands (1985). Summary of Significant Events 1984/85 Fire Season. Presented to Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities. Perth 6-9 May 1985.


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Department of Environment and Primary Industries, East Melbourne. (2013). Victorian Bushfire Risk Profiles: A foundation framework for strategic bushfire risk assessment. Department of Sustainability and Environment (2003). The Victorian Alpine fires January – March 2003. Wareing, K.J and D.W. Flinn. ISBN 1 74106 624 7 www.dse.vic.gov.au/fires Dexter, B and A. Hodgson (2005) The Facts Behind the Fire: A Scientific and Technical Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the 2003 Victorian Bushfire Crisis. A Publication of Forest Fire Victoria. forestfirevictoria.org.au Dexter, B and A. Hodgson, (2012). Forest Fire Management in Victoria – Is the State Coping? Concerns about the organisational arrangements for forest fire management in Victoria. Part 1 and Part 2. forestfirevictoria.org.au. Dick Johnson, (1974) The Alps at the Crossroads. The Quest for an Alpine National Park in Victoria. Published by the Victorian National Parks Association. ISBN 0 9599 428 1 5 “Earth on Fire”(2014). Reported & produced by Mark Horstman & Anja Taylor. Edited by Vaughan Smith. ABC Catalyst, 3 June 2014. Environment and Natural Resources Committee Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, June 2008. Esplin, Bruce: Dr. M. Gill and Prof. N. Enright (2003). Report of the Inquiry into the 2002 – 2003 Victorian Bushfires. ISBN: 0731114884 State Government of Victoria, 2003. http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au It was convened to assess the effectiveness of preparedness, the effectiveness of response and recommend future bushfire management strategies. Forest Fire Vic Inc (2014). Severe Forest Fires Increase Fuel Loads and Bushfire Risk. A Paper prepared by for a public meeting at Bairnsdale organised by East Gippsland Wildfire Task Force Inc Wednesday 5th November 2014. Forest Fire Victoria Inc (2007) Submission and recommendations to the Environment and Natural Resources Committee, May 2007. Geoff Walker (2014) Why We Burn Again and Again. Quadrant, 22 October, 2014. http://quadrant.org.au/opinion/doomed planet/2014/10/burn Gould J S, McCaw WL, Cheney NP, Ellis PF, Knight IKI, Sullivan AL. (2007). Project Vesta – Fire in Dry Eucalypt Forest: Fuel Structure, fuel dynamics and fire behaviour. Ensis-CSIRO, Canberra ACT, and Department of Environment and Conservation, Perth WA. ISBN 0 6430 6534 2. Government of Victoria (1939). Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to prevent the bushfires of 1939, and to protect life and property in the event of future bushfires. The Stretton Report – Judge Leonard Stretton. Griffiths, Tom (Reprinted 2002). Forests of Ash: an environmental history. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0 521 01234 1


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Hateley, Ronald Francis (2010) The Victorian Bush: its ‘original and natural’ condition. Polybractea Press. South Melbourne. ISBN 97809775247075 Hodgson, Athol (2003) Submission to the Bushfire Inquiry 2003 – addressing Terms of Reference No. 1. “Examine the effectiveness of preparedness for the 2002/03 bushfire season, including fuel reduction.” Judith Frankenberg (1971) Nature Conservation in Victoria. A Survey by Judith Frankenberg, M.Sc. Edited by John. S. Turner, MA, PhD, F.A.A. ISBN 0 9599428 0 7 Learning to coexist with wildfire (2014) Max A. Moritz, Enric Batllori, Ross A. Bradstock, A. Malcolm Gill, John Handmer, Paul F. Hessburg, Justin Leonard, Sarah McCaffrey, Dennis C. Odion, Tania Schoennagel & Alexandra D. Syphard. Nature international Weekly Journal of Science. 515, 58–66. Published online 05 November 2014 Leonard, M.L. (October 2014) Forest fire management in south-eastern Australia: for better or worse? Oct 25th 2014. [In press]. Libby Robin, (1974). Building a Forest Conscience. An Historical Portrait of the Natural Resources Conservation League of Victoria. Published by the Natural Resources Conservation League of Victoria. ISBN 0 909344 07 9 Luke, R.H. and McArthur, A.G. (1978). Bushfires in Australia. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. ISBN 0 642 02341 7 McCarthy, G.J. and Tolhurst, K.G (1998). Effectiveness of Fire-fighting First Attack Operations, NRE Victoria 1991/92-1994/95. Research Report No. 45. Fire Management. Dept of Natural Resources and Environment, Vic. 32pp + appendices. Mark Poynter, (2014). When the 'green dream' becomes a bushfire nightmare Online Opinion. 2nd June, 2014. Miller,S.I., Carter,W & Stevens,R.G. (1984) Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria, Australia following the Ash Wednesday fires. 16 Feb 1983. National Bushfire Management – Policy Statement for Forests and Rangelands (2014). Prepared by the Forest Fire Management Group, bushfire Cooperative Research Centre, for The Council of Australian Governments. ISBN: 978-0-646-58481-2 Neil Comrie AO APM (2011), Review of 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response: Interim Report, 30 June 2011, p. 28. Noble, W.S. (1977). Ordeal by Fire. The Week a State Burned Up. The Hawthorn Press. Melbourne. ISBN 0 7256 0202 3 Our disaster avoidance and response still leaves a lot to be desired. The long slow burn in learning to live with nature. By Tony Barrass; from The Australian.


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People's Review of Bushfires, 2002-2007, in Victoria; Final Report 2009. Peter Attiwill & David Packham, Tim Barker, Ian Hamilton ISBN 9780646510392 Phil Cheney, Barrie Dexter, Athol Hodgson AM, David Packham AOM. (2013). An evaluation of ESC Hallowes’ report into the Harrietville fire, January 2013. Are the findings consistent with all the facts? Stephen J Pyne (1998). Burning Bush. A Fire History of Australia. University of Washington Press. ISBN 0-295-97677-2 Stephen J Pyne (2004). Tending Fire. Coping with America’s Wildland Fires. Island Press/Shearwater Books. ISBN 1-55963-565-7 Stephen J Pyne (2006). The Still–Burning Bush. Scribe Short Books. Melbourne. ISBN 1 920769 75 7 Stuart Ellis* AM (October 2005). Report to the Secretary Department of Sustainability and the Environment. Advice on Operational fire Management [internal advice to the Department – unpublished]. * Director, Leading Emergency Services P.O. Box 217. Stepney S.A. 5069. The Mega-Fire Phenomenon: Towards a More Effective Management model. A Concept paper, Approved by the National Fire and Aviation Executive Board. 20th September 2005. The Brookings Institution Centre for Public Policy Education. Washington D.C. Victorian Government media release 17 October 2013 / Victorian Emergency Management Reform White Paper. Volkova Liubov, Meyer C. P. (Mick), Murphy Simon, Fairman Thomas, Reisen Fabienne, Weston Christopher (2014) Fuel reduction burning mitigates wildfire effects on forest carbon and greenhouse gas emission. International Journal of Wildland Fire 23, 771-780 http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/WF14009


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PART 3.

DOCUMENTS [PDF] CONTAINED ON COMPACT DISC.

2013-14 Fire Season Compliance Report. Inspector-General for Emergency Management. Department of Justice.

[IGEM2013 14FSCR] Additional aircraft to strengthen firefighting response this fire season. Media Release - The Hon Kim Wells MP. Minister for Police and Emergency Services Minister for Bushfire Response. Thursday 9 October 2014

[Wells Media aircraft] An evaluation of ESC Hallowes’ report into the Harrietville fire, January 2013. Are the findings consistent with all the facts? Phil Cheney, Barrie Dexter, Athol Hodgson AM, David Packham AOM. 8 June 2013.

[An evaluation of ESC Hallowes] Bennetton, Julia and Paul Cashin, Darren Jones and James Soligo (1997): An Economic Evaluation of Bushfire Prevention and Suppression. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 42:2. Pp 149-75.

[Economic Evaluation Bushfire Prev Supp] Broad forest types on public land in Victoria as mapped in the Atlas of Victoria (Duncan 1982). Victoria: Forest and Land Area, (2012–13); Native forest area, by tenure (2011).

[Atlas1982 and Extracts Forests at a Glance 2014] Discussion paper: Current and Future Challenges in Meeting DEPI’s Increased Planned Burning Access, Preparation, Support and Rehabilitation Requirements.

[DEPI draft wt nn burns] Environment and Natural Resources Committee Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria June 2008. Parliament of Victoria.

[ENRC Inquiry Victoria June 2008] Fire Services Agencies Performance Standards – Interim. Incident Management.

[Fire Services Agencies Performance Standards]

Forest Fire Management In Victoria – Is The State Coping? Concerns about the Organisational Arrangements and Related Matters for Forest Fire Management in Victoria. March 2012 Barrie Dexter & Athol Hodgson.

[Fire Report Parts 1&2.2012] Forest fire management in south-eastern Australia: for better or worse? Mike Leonard. October 2014.

[ML Forest.FM in SE Australia]


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Forests Commission Victoria. Annual Report 1982-93. No. 112.

[VPARL FCV 1982 83 No112] In the Matter of a Report of the Inquiry of The 2002 – 2003 Victorian Bushfires.

[Alan Myers QC 15 July’04] Key sections of the Forests Act coming under the heading: Prevention and Protection from Fire plus Extracts from various other Acts.

[Key Sections Forests Act and extracts from other Acts] Land and fuel Management 7. Pages 278-320.

[VBRC Vol2 Chapter7]

Liubov Volkova, C. P. (Mick) Meyer, Simon Murphy, Thomas Fairman , Fabienne Reisen, Christopher Weston (2014) Fuel reduction burning mitigates wildfire effects on forest carbon and greenhouse gas emission. International Journal of Wildland Fire 23, 771-780 http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/WF14009

‘Bushfire greenhouse gas emissions – from mild to wild.’ [Jan 12 2015. The Age] Fuel reduction burning mitigates wildfire effects on forest carbon and greenhouse gas emission.

[The Age MelbUni research greenhouse gas emissions bushfires] Plenary Paper 2 Findings and Implications from a Coarse-Scale Global Assessment of Recent Selected Mega-Fires. Williams, Albright, Hoffmann, Eritsov, Moore, De Morais, Leonard, San Miguel-Ayanz, Xanthopoulos, van Lierop. Fire Management Working Paper. FAO at the Vth International Wildland Fire Conference. Sun City, South Africa. (9-13 May 2011) Forestry Department -Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

[Mega-fires Plenary Paper 2] Rollout of new firefighting fleet begins. Media Release. The Hon Ryan Smith MP. Minister for Environment and Climate Change, Minister for Youth Affairs. Friday 10 October 2014

[Smith Media Rollout] Severe Forest Fires, Fuel Loads and Bushfire Risk. A Paper prepared by Forest Fire Vic Inc. for a public meeting at Bairnsdale organised by East Gippsland Wildfire Task Force Inc Wednesday 5th November 2014.

[Severe Forest Fires, Fuel Loads and Bushfire Risk] Submission of Forest Fire Victoria Inc. To the Parliament of Victoria Environment and Natural Resources Committee. Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria. May 2007. Addressing the Terms of Reference. 1. The extent, timing, resourcing and effectiveness of prescribed burning on both crown land and freehold land. [TofR1 FFVic Sub]


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Submission of Forest Fire Victoria Inc. To the Parliament of Victoria - Environment and Natural Resources Committee Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria. Reference Term of Reference 14. The consequent impact of bushfires on the June/July 2007 Gippsland flood. September 2007. [TofR 14 FFVic Submission] Summary of Significant Events – 1984/85 Fire Season. Department of Conservation, Forests and Lands Victoria. Presented to the Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities. Perth 6-9 May 1985.

[1985 season summary] The Facts Behind the Fire A Scientific and Technical Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the 2003 Victorian Bushfire Crisis. Compiled by Barrie Dexter and Athol Hodgson. 2nd Edition, June 2005. A Publication of Forest Fire Victoria.

[The Facts Behind the Fire -2nd Ed] Victorian Bushfire Inquiry 2003 Submission by A. Hodgson. This submission addresses part only of Term of Reference No.1 viz; “Examine the effectiveness of preparedness for the 2002/03 bushfire season, including hazard reduction”

[Hodgson, Athol sub to Bushfire Inquiry 2003] Victorian Bushfire Risk Profiles. A foundational framework for strategic bushfire risk assessment. November 2013. The State of Victoria Department of Environment and Primary Industries.

[Victorian Bushfire Risk profiles]


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Fuel reduction burning in southern

Australia’s forests:

A review of its effectiveness as a bushfire

management tool

January 2010


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Fuel reduction burning in southern Australia’s

forests:

A review of its effectiveness as a bushfire

management tool

Prepared by the

Victorian Lands Alliance

Contact: Max Rheese (Secretary)

Email:

Web: www.landsalliance.org

in association with

Mark Poynter

Dip Forestry (Creswick, 1997) Bach Forest Science (Melbourne 1980)

Fellow, Institute of Foresters of Australia

Member, Association of Consulting Foresters of Australia

Forest & Natural Resource Services

PO Box 2102, East Ivanhoe VIC 3079

January 2010

Cover: Main Ridge Flora Reserve, Mornington Peninsula, Victoria

Top: Long unburnt forest with ‘extreme’ overall fuel hazard

Bottom: Forest with reduced fuel load from previous prescribed burn

Ref: Overall Fuel Hazard Guide, (Third Edition) by McCarthy, Tolhurst,

and Chatto, Fire Management Research Report No. 47, Department of

Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria (May 1999)


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Table of Contents Executive Summary

Background 1

Fire in the southern Australian landscape 2

A brief history of fuel reduction burning in Victoria 3

Studying prescribed fire and the notion of what constitutes acceptable evidence 5

Brief review of supporting evidence for fuel reduction burning as a bushfire management tool 7

Empirical scientific study including scenario modelling 7

Case studies: Victoria 9

Case studies: Western Australia 11

Landscape-scale remote sensing of fire severity 12

Statistical trends and analysis 13

The effectiveness of prescribed burning in improving the outcome of bushfires burning under extreme conditions 15

Discussion 17

Expanding prescribed burning in Victoria 17

Environmental values and prescribed burning 19

Conclusions 23

References 24


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Executive Summary

This report challenges the misconception that there is little evidence that prescribed fuel

reduction burning is an effective bushfire management tool. It also examines the potential

for improving Victorian bushfire outcomes if a substantially expanded program of

prescribed burning was to be implemented.

A review of Victorian and Western Australian land management literature identified a

range of information which details the benefits of fuel reduction burning. This includes:

o 27 case studies where prescribed burning has improved bushfire outcomes;

o scientific research into the relationship between forest fuel loads and fire

behaviour, including retrospective scenario modelling under hypothetical fuel

management regimes;

o bushfire severity analysis under differing fuel loads; and

o analyses of past wildfire and prescribed burning statistics in WA.

Although it was not reviewed for this report, there is a likelihood that similar information

resides amongst the NSW, Tasmanian, SA, and southern Queensland land management

literature.

Most of the above-mentioned information has been prepared by land management

agencies and remains ‘unpublished’ (in the academic sense). Opponents of prescribed

burning have used this to justify either ignoring it or dismissing its significance.

Nevertheless, it provides compelling evidence that extensive fuel reduction burning is a

critically important bushfire management tool.

Fire researchers agree that reduced fuel loads are highly effective in limiting bushfire

behaviour and spread under fire danger conditions varying from ‘low’ to ‘very high’.

There are varying views about the respective influence of fuel loads and prevailing

weather on the behaviour of bushfires burning under ‘extreme’ conditions.

As an estimated 95% of Victorian bushfire burns under less than ‘extreme’ conditions

when fuel loads are a significant determinant of fire behaviour, prescribed burning can

play an important role in reducing the bushfire threat by enabling the vast majority of

fires to be quickly and safely controlled. This is illustrated by the more proportionally

extensive prescribed burning program in the forests of south west WA which has been

integral to the region’s 50-year avoidance of the sort of mega-fires that have afflicted

Victoria three times in the past seven years.

The WA experience shows that to be most effective, prescribed burning programs must be

sufficiently extensive that a substantial portion of the forest is maintained in a low fuel

state. Victoria would need to substantially increase its current prescribed burning

program if it is to attain a similar level of protection and significantly improve on recent

bushfire outcomes.


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Victorian Lands Alliance The effectiveness of fuel reduction burning in bushfire management

1

Background

The practice of fuel reduction burning in Australian forests has polarised emotions and opinions within the community for decades. In the aftermath of Victoria‟s “Black Saturday” bushfires in February 2009, public discourse about the merits of fuel reduction burning has reached new heights. Reportedly, it is by a large margin, the most discussed topic in public submissions made to the ongoing Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. In broad terms, community attitudes to forest fuel reduction burning can be grouped into three categories:

Strong support – including support for increasing the area burnt each year as part of a professionally conducted program.

Conditional support – subject to small, targeted burn areas with a lengthy time between burns and increased research into its environmental impacts.

Opposition – based on a view that prescribed burning is environmentally destructive, unnecessary, and ineffective.

It is significant that support for fuel reduction burning is strongest amongst those who work within or who have lived in close proximity to forests for many years and have a practical appreciation of the link between fuel level and fire threat. This includes bushfire scientists, and forest and farm land managers. Conversely, enthusiasm for fuel reduction burning is lowest amongst those who live in places where there is little or no bushfire threat. This includes those actively working for or supporting environmental groups. While some within this demographic are totally opposed to fuel reduction burning, the formal position adopted by Australia‟s most prominent environmental NGOs is one of „conditional support‟ for limited burning. However, they have almost always advocated this position alongside qualifying statements deriding the effectiveness of the practice as a bushfire management tool.1 While such questioning of the benefit of fuel reduction burning has been around since the mid-1980s, it has been resurrected in recent public discussion about the bushfire threat since „Black Saturday‟. Invariably, those who dismiss prescribed burning irrationally deride it for not preventing bushfires, and then claim that:

there is little or no documented evidence that it is an effective bushfire management tool; and that

it cannot significantly improve outcomes under extreme conditions such as those experienced on „Black Saturday‟.

This paper examines the veracity of these assertions by drawing on the available body of documented evidence for a variety of forest types in southern Australia.

1 Planned burns and clearing will not stop catastrophic fire events: report, September 10th 2009. Media Release by the

Victorian National Parks Association to launch a report jointly commissioned by the VNPA, The Wilderness Society, and the Australian Conservation Foundation entitled ‘Victorian February 2009 Fires – A Report on Driving Influences and Land Tenure Affected’, by Chris Taylor.


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Fire in the southern Australian landscape

Fire has been a feature of the Australian landscape for tens of thousands of years. It is generally accepted that Aboriginal burning (or „firestick‟ farming as it is often referred to2), together with lightning-ignited „natural‟ fire, has meant that most Australian ecosystems have evolved in an environment subject to regular or periodic fire. Indeed, many elements of the flora appear to have developed a dependency on fire for their long term renewal and survival.3 Prior to European settlement, frequent and extensive natural fires and Aboriginal burning created a mosaic of frequently burned areas carrying light fuels that limited the intensity and spread of fire even under severe weather conditions. Since European settlement began more than 200 years ago, vast changes have been visited upon the southern Australian landscape. These include the:

loss of Aboriginal influence over land management;

the replacement of huge swathes of forests and other vegetation with farmed pastures and crops; and

the replacement of the Aboriginal culture of nomadic wandering with the Western culture of land ownership, permanent settlement, and institutionalised land management.

These changes have had a profound influence on forest fire – how it is regarded, and the need for it to be managed. With millions of people now living in permanent dwellings located in and around forests where there were previously few or none, fire can no longer be left to take its own course as it did prior to European settlement. So, while there is now a societal imperative to quickly extinguish all potentially damaging forest fires, this actively excludes the natural agency of renewal and survival for the remaining native vegetation (mostly on public lands); and, not withstanding that there will always be summer fires that cannot be quickly extinguished, it allows forest fuels to accumulate to levels that inevitably drives intense summer conflagrations in large tracts of long-unburnt forest. Accordingly over time, the threat of fire to Australian communities and ecosystems has progressively increased as a consequence of the thickening of formerly open forests with regrowth encouraged by a lack of regular fire, plus the associated accumulation of flammable fuels. Prescribed burning aims to redress this threat by deliberately re-introducing fire under mild weather conditions at cooler times of the year, when it can be more easily controlled. This mimics the natural process of burning required to maintain (or restore) environmental integrity. It also reduces the potential intensity of unplanned summer bushfires by lessening the quantity of fuel available to be burnt, thereby improving the protection of human life and property in adjacent farming lands and settlements.

2 Burning Bush – A Fire History of Australia, by Stephen J. Pyne, Henry Holt and Co (1991), Chapter 6, pp. 85-104.

3 Bushfires in Australia, by R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur, CSIRO Division of Forest Research (1978), Chapters 1 and 2,

pp. 1-22


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A brief history of fuel reduction burning in Victoria

Since the earliest days of European settlement in the early to mid-1800s, uncontrolled forest fire has been feared for its destructive potential. However, early pastoralists also appreciated fire as a management tool that could help clear the land and promote favourable grazing for their stock. Indiscriminate burning of pastoral lands and adjacent forests became a problem that extended beyond the ratification of the Forests Act in 1907. With the establishment of the Forests Commission in 1918, major efforts were made to exclude fire from publicly reserved forests and educate the public in its safe use on adjacent lands, but with only moderate success. As early as 1923, Victorian foresters were warning that fire would always be a major threat and was indeed “a tragedy waiting to happen”. Nevertheless, small advances were being made to fire management, but these were focused on improving the capability to locate fires (including from the air) and develop effective fire-fighting tactics using the best available technology of the time.4 Around this time, there were two schools of thought regarding the use of fire as a forest management tool. Most field-based forestry personnel believed that regularly using fire to „clean up‟ the forest floor and maintain a light fuel load was the key to controlling bushfires. However, this was heresy to the academically-trained professional foresters – particularly those with European training and experience – who believed that bushfires would largely vanish when the tangled wilderness was converted to an organised, tended forest.5 The result of this confusion was that some burning was done but not in accord with any strategic plan or organised approach. This ineffectual strategy continued until 1939, when the huge „Black Friday‟ conflagrations burnt over 1.5 million hectares of Victorian forest, razing many settlements and killing 71 people. The subsequent Stretton Royal Commission placed the blame for these fires squarely on the human mismanagement of deliberately lit fires, especially those lit at the most inopportune times. Judge Stretton recognised the absurdity of claims that fire could ever be excluded from Victoria‟s forests and saw the sense in using fire against itself. He concluded that the problem was not controlled burning itself, but poorly done controlled burning.6

The Forests Act was subsequently revised and strengthened thereby increasing the powers of the Forests Commission in regard to fire protection.7 But, it was not until after WWII, under a new generation of foresters, that there was real reform. Noted fire historian Stephen Pyne credits the 1951-52 fire emergency in the NSW Snowy Mountains as the catalyst for forestry authorities in eastern Australia to firmly adopt preventative controlled fuel reduction burning – rather than emergency bushfire suppression – as the basis for protecting its forests and wildlands.8 So began the modern era of prescribed burning which was rooted in a sensible recognition and acceptance of:

the adaptation to fire of the country‟s indigenous flora and fauna;

4 The Dynamic Forest: A history of forestry and forest industries in Victoria, by FR. Moulds, Lyndoch Publications (1991).

5 The Still-Burning Bush, by Stephen Pyne, Scribe Publications (2006), pp.54-56

6 The Still-Burning Bush, by Stephen Pyne, Scribe Publications (2006), p.57

7 The Dynamic Forest: A history of forestry and forest industries in Victoria, by FR. Moulds, Lyndoch Publications (1991).



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the long tradition of Aboriginal burning;

the on-going use of burning in other rural land uses; and

an admittance that Australia could not afford a paramilitary campaign against fire such as was then emerging in North America.9

In Western Australia, a similar path was trodden after decades of serious fires culminated in the bushfire disaster of 1960-61 which led to the subsequent adoption of fire management policies incorporating broadacre prescribed burning to reduce forest fuels. As integrated bushfire management programs were adopted around the country, the development and use of aerial incendiaries was, by the mid-1960s, enabling large areas to be lit quickly and inexpensively when conditions were right. In Victoria by the early 1980s, prescribed fuel reduction burning had become a finely-honed core activity of the state‟s foresters who at that time were responsible for the management of nearly all of the public forests. Since then, the annual area burnt for fuel reduction has significantly declined due to a variety of political, social and demographic factors.10 During the prolonged drought of the past decade, this decline has coincided with a dramatic increase in the area burnt by hot summer wildfires (see Figure 1). The Victorian Government‟s Inquiry into the 2002-03 Victorian Bushfires acknowledged this decline, particularly during the 1990s, but would do no more than ponder that it may have been due to „either a reduction in resources available for the delivery of burn programs (for example, a reduction to staff numbers and budget) and/or a strategic diversion of resources to other activities deemed to be more important.‟11 Figure 1: Fire in Victorian public forests during the modern era of prescribed burning

0

50000

100000

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1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09

Five-year periods

Ave

rage

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Prescribed Burn Wildfire

Notes: Plotted lines are based on the approximate average area burnt per year within each of the specified five-year periods.

The data of areas burnt by wildfire and prescribed burn are approximations derived from Figures 1 (p.6) and 2 (p.7) of the Submission by Dr Kevin Tolhurst, School of Forest and Ecosystem Science, University of Melbourne to the Inquiry into the Impact

of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, conducted by the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural

Resources Committee (May 25th 2007). More recent data obtained from DSE Annual Reports


10 Institute of Foresters of Australia - Submission to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, May 2009, pp. 7-12. It can be accessed at www.forestry.org.au > Submissions

11Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-03 Victorian Bushfires, chaired by Bruce Esplin, Emergency Services Commissioner, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Victorian Government (October 2003), p.96 s.10.36.


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Studying the effectiveness of prescribed fire and the notion of what

constitutes acceptable evidence Anyone who has fought an Australian bushfire knows that low intensity fires burning in light fuels are far easier and safer to control than fires burning in heavy fuel accumulations. However, while the principle of fuel reduction burning as a bushfire management tool is well established, scientifically quantifying and formally documenting its effectiveness has been problematic.12 This is due to an array of inter-related variables which both determine the effectiveness of fuel reduction burning yet present difficulties for controlled experimental study (see p.7).13 Accordingly, there is a relative paucity of academic papers on this topic. In the public discussion about fire management following „Black Saturday‟, those who lack enthusiasm for, or are opposed to fuel reduction burning, have seized on this problem to claim that there is little evidence that it improves the suppression of bushfires or their outcomes. This view was articulated in recent statements from several mainstream environmental NGOs:

“Environmental groups want to see the science that supports the current fuel reduction program, including a scientific justification for so-called hazard reduction burns ……. Environmental groups are particularly concerned about the lack of impact assessment of these programs on biodiversity, particularly given their uncertain benefits to reduce the extent, frequency and severity of fire” – The Wilderness Society 14

Referring to Victoria‟s current annual fuel reduction burning target – “Indeed, the current target of 130,000 hectares per year, so far as we know, is also not derived from any clear scientific analysis” – Phil Ingamells, Victorian National Parks Association15

“In particular, the suggestion that having had more fuel reduction burning over larger areas more frequently during the drought of the last decade in Victoria would have prevented these fires – and by extension that doing even more of it is essential in the hotter, drier climate we are moving into – is not backed up by the best available science” – Andrew Campbell, quoted by the Australian Conservation Foundation16

The veracity of these views depends largely what is perceived to be acceptable evidence. If the criteria is limited only to independent, peer-reviewed papers prepared by university academics and published in prestigious scientific journals, then there may be merit in claims that the benefits of prescribed burning are as yet unproven. (Conversely, it should be acknowledged that there is no published research showing that prescribed burning has no impact on bushfire intensity or spread).

However, reliance on such a purely academic definition of what constitutes acceptable evidence is narrow-minded and dangerous. It effectively dismisses decades of unpublished in-house applied research and documented case studies by government scientists working for Australian forest and fire agencies (including the CSIRO), and unfairly denigrates its integrity. If applied research and case studies are accepted as evidence, it becomes clear that there is a considerable body of knowledge within land management agencies which shows that prescribed burning plays a critical role in

12 Report of the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, Chapter 2:

Prescribed burning in Victoria – The effectiveness of fuel reduction burning (p. 81), Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (June 2008)

13Quantifying the effectiveness of fuel management in modifying wildfire behaviour, by WL. McCaw, JS. Gould, and NP. Cheney, presented at the International Bushfire Research Conference, Adelaide Convention Centre, September 2008.

14 A Bushfire Action Plan which protects people, property and nature – The Wilderness Society website:

http://www.wilderness.org.au/articles/bushfire-action-plan 15

Rethink fuel reduction burns, by Phil Ingamells, The Weekly Times, August 26th 2009 16

ACF Submission to the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (May 2009). Can be accessed at the ACF website: www.acfonline.org.au/


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mitigating bushfire extent and damage.17 Furthermore, this evidence supports the observations of every experienced fire-fighter. Having developed and honed the practice of prescribed burning, it has been entirely logical for Australian forest agencies to take the lead in investigating and documenting the science, particularly given their responsibility as custodians of the public lands on which damaging bushfires occur. Conversely, the very nature of fire and where and when it occurs has traditionally presented difficulties for university-based academic study. This situation has changed to some extent in recent years with the creation of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (Bushfire CRC) which is fostering and coordinating research partnerships between universities and responsible government agencies. This should result in more academic papers about fire being added to the public record over time.18

Not withstanding the lack of pure academic papers, the evidence for prescribed burning as an effective bushfire management tool has been garnered over a lengthy period and comes in a variety of forms. Some of Australia‟s leading fire researchers recently concluded that drawing on this broad range of information was necessary to quantify the effectiveness of fuel management programs, including fuel reduction burning.19 They categorised this available information into four forms:

Empirical scientific study of the relationship between fuel characteristics and fire behaviour, and associated scenario modelling.

Case studies illustrating the effects of different fuel conditions on bushfire behaviour, environmental values, and suppression difficulty.

Landscape-scale remote sensing monitoring the varying severity of bushfires on vegetation in areas subject to recent and older prescribed burns or areas that have been long unburnt.

Statistical trends and analysis. The value of such a comprehensive analysis accords with the Esplin Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-03 Victorian Bushfires which noted that there is currently no one “unequivocal and immediate choice of an appropriate measure for (quantifying) the effectiveness of prescribed burning”20 As shall be shown in the following pages, the sum of the various forms of available information suggests that there is considerably more underpinning evidence of the benefit of prescribed burning than most of its critics are aware of or care to admit.

17

Report of the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, Chapter 2: Prescribed burning in Victoria – The effectiveness of fuel reduction burning (p. 79), Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (June 2008)

18 Bushfire CRC website: www.bushfirecrc.com/


20 Report of the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, Chapter 2: Prescribed burning in Victoria – The effectiveness of fuel reduction burning (p. 83), Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (June 2008)


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Brief review of supporting evidence for fuel reduction burning as a

bushfire management tool

The following review of existing Australian research findings and case studies is by no means exhaustive. However it clearly demonstrates that fuel reduction burning plays a key role in bushfire mitigation and that this view is supported by far more than just casual observations and anecdotes. Empirical scientific study of the relationship between fuel conditions and fire behaviour, including scenario modelling

Australia‟s most comprehensive scientific study of forest fire behavior was known as Project Vesta. It was a collaborative research project undertaken by the CSIRO in partnership with the WA Department of Environment and Conservation, with support from most of Australia‟s other land management and emergency services agencies.

Project Vesta began in 1996 and ended with the release of a final report in 2007.21 Its findings are based on data generated from lighting and monitoring over 100 experimental fires in eucalypt forests in south western WA during the summers of 1998, 1999 and 2001. These fires were lit in 4 hectare plots under dry summer conditions of moderate to high forest fire danger. These experimental burn plots were located at two sites with differing understorey fuels ranging in age from 2 to 22 years.

The key findings of Project Vesta with regard to the effectiveness of prescribed burning were that:

Hazard reduction by prescribed burning will reduce the rate of spread, flame height and intensity of a (subsequent) bushfire and its potential for spotting, by changing the structure of the fuel bed and reducing the total fuel load.

The persistence of this effect will be determined by the rate of change in fuel characteristics over time, but a measurable benefit may last for up to 20 years in some forest types.

Stimulation of understorey shrub regeneration after burning will not increase the rate of spread of a fire until such time as a significant near-surface fuel layer accumulates.

Younger fuels produce fewer firebrands (i.e. flying pieces of burning bark) because fire intensities are low and less bark is consumed than in older fuel types.

Project Vesta researchers have since acknowledged the inherent difficulties of measuring the relationship between fire behaviour and fuel loads during wildfires. These include uncertainty about actual pre-fire fuel loads, absence of accurate records of previous wildfire and its intensity. In areas previously burnt by prescribed fire, the date of the burn is usually known but there is usually no record of the extent to which the prescribed burn has actually reduced fuels across the treated area, or the subsequent rate of fuel accumulation in the interval between the prescribed burn and the bushfire. Also, accurate measurements of prevailing climatic conditions during bushfires are rarely obtained. This has made accurate determinations of the rate of fire spread in relation to fuel quantity extremely difficult.22

Despite its imperfections, empirical study of fuel dynamics and fire behaviour has enabled the creation of predictive models that have been applied retrospectively to past major fire events to examine likely outcomes under various fuel management regimes. Two examples are examined:

21

Project Vesta – Fire in Dry Eucalypt Forest: Fuel Structure, Fuel Dynamics, and Fire Behaviour, by Jim Gould (Ensis Bushfire Research), Lachie McCaw (WA Department of Environment and Conservation), Phil Cheney, Peter Ellis, Ian Knight, and Andrew Sullivan (October 2007) 218 pp.. Can be accessed from the CSIRO website: www.csiro.au/resources/VestaTechReport.html



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Deans Marsh fire (1983)

Tolhurst (2007) has briefly summarised the restrospective application of his Bushfire CRC-funded PHOENIX fire characterisation model to the Deans Marsh fire which burnt through the eastern Otway Ranges on „Ash Wednesday‟, February 1983.23 This fire ultimately burnt more than 40,000 hectares of forest, destroyed 780 structures and took three lives.24 Prior to „Ash Wednesday‟, less than 1% of the eastern Otway forests had been burnt in the 44 years since the 1939 „Black Friday‟ fires, so the Deans Marsh fire represents a bushfire outcome achieved on an area almost entirely burdened with a heavy pre-fire fuel accumulation. The PHOENIX model simulated the path of the fire burning under the same weather conditions but using three other fuel management regimes as follows:

Forests fuel reduced on a 10-year burning cycle, i.e. 10% of their area is prescribed burnt per annum. Under this scenario, the modelling suggests that the Deans Marsh fire would have been only about 50% as extensive, with the forests burning at a significantly lower and patchy intensity, thereby inflicting far less environmental damage.

Forests fuel reduced on a 20-year burning cycle, i.e. 5% of their area is burnt per annum. Under this scenario, the extent of the Deans Marsh fire would have been reduced by about 33% – with significantly less severely burnt areas.

Forests fuel reduced on a 40-year burning cycle, i.e. 2.5% of their area is burnt per annum. Under this scenario, the extent of the Deans Marsh fire would have been reduced by about 20% with significantly more of the affected area burnt at low intensity by patchy fire compared to what actually occurred.25

This simulation clearly demonstrated the benefits of regular fuel reduction burning, even on a lengthy cycle, compared with the spectre of long unburnt forests with heavy fuel accumulations.

Mundaring-Karragullen fire (2005)

A similar retrospective analysis was undertaken by Cheney on the Mundaring-Karragullen fire which burnt nearly 30,000 ha of forest near Perth in January 2005 (see also the case study, p.12). This fire was prevented from entering Perth‟s outer eastern suburbs largely by the presence of low fuels from recent fuel reduction burning which transformed an unmanageable headfire to a controllable intensity. Using fire spread equations developed during Project Vesta, Cheney was able to reconstruct the path of the fire under an alternate scenario where the forest fuels had been left unburnt for 20 years. He found that under the weather conditions that prevailed at the time, the fire would have been uncontrollable and predicted that it would have burnt deep into the residential suburbs of Roleystone and Gosnells with a likelihood of severe impacts on human life and property.26

23

Dr Kevin Tolhurst, School of Forest and Ecosystem Science, University of Me bourne, May 25th 2007 - Submission to the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria conducted by the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee. Submissions can be accessed at: www.parliament.vic.gov.au/enrc/inquiries/bushfires/default.htm

24 Burning Bush – A Fire History of Australia, by Stephen J. Pyne, Henry Holt and Co (1991), Epilogue, pp. 410-419.

25 Dr Kevin Tolhurst, School of Forest and Ecosystem Science, University of Melbourne, May 25th 2007 - Submission to the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria conducted by the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee, pp. 11-13. Submissions can be accessed at: www.parliament.vic.gov.au/enrc/inquiries/bushfires/default.htm

26Prescribed burning: How effective is it in the control of large bushfires? by Rick Sneeuwjagt (2008). In: Fire, Environment and Society: From Research to Practice, Bushfire CRC; The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Adelaide, SA, pp. 419-435


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This analysis again demonstrates the effectiveness of fuel reduction burning in reducing bushfire intensity and making them more controllable, particularly where regular burning is undertaken over areas of sufficient size to constitute a genuine barrier to running headfires. Case studies

Opponents of fuel reduction burning have tended to dismiss case studies for being observational rather than scientific. However, veteran WA forest fire manager, Rick Sneeuwjagt, believes that the difficulties associated with empirical scientific study have heightened the importance of case studies in developing an understanding of fire behavior under different fuel types and ages despite them being descriptive and lacking replication.27 Victorian case studies There are documented case studies of past forest fires in Victoria which deal specifically with the role of past prescribed burning in assisting bushfire suppression. Several are summarised below. Ten significant Victorian fires (1978 – 83)28

Rawson et al (1985) examined ten significant Victorian bushfires which occurred from 1978 – 83. Their paper was prepared immediately after a decade of the most extensive prescribed burning recorded thus far when the annual fuel reduced area averaged almost 100,000 hectares more than the current burn target. Presumably, the influence of this burning on bushfire mitigation would have been more apparent than now. They documented five cases (Lorne-Anglesea, 1983; Mt Macedon, 1983; Stawell, 1980; Barkstead, 1980; and Dimboola, 1980) where private assets directly threatened by bushfire were saved when fire-fighting was assisted by the presence of fuel reduced areas. In some of these cases, fuel reduced areas had stopped bushfire spread, while in other instances it reduced fire intensity to an extent that allowed firefighters to undertake effective asset protection work. These benefits occurred despite these fires being uncontrollable in adjacent areas carrying heavier fuel loads.

Rawson et al (1985) also nominated the inter-related factors which determine the effectiveness of a previously fuel-reduced area in mitigating a subsequent bushfire threat. These include:

the nature of the fuel reduction treatment in terms of:

o the proportion of the treated area that has actually burnt; and

o the degree to which it reduced fuel quantities and other hazardous fuel properties.

the size and distribution of fuel reduced areas;

the time since they were fuel reduced (and therefore the extent to which new fuel has accumulated); and ultimately

the intensity and size of the approaching bushfire.

They also noted that, compared to instances of private asset protection, it has been more difficult to quantify the impact of extensive fuel reduction treatments in bushfire mitigation. However, they

27

Prescribed burning: How effective is it in the control of large bushfires? by Rick Sneeuwjagt (2008). In: Fire, Environment and Society: From Research to Practice, Bushfire CRC; The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Adelaide, SA, pp. 419-435

28 Effectiveness of fuel reduction burning (10 Case Studies), by R. Rawson, P. Billing, and B. Rees, Department of Conservation Forests and Lands, Research Report No. 25 (October 1985). Can be accessed from the Department of Sustainability & Environment website: www.dse.vic.gov.au >Fire and other emergencies>Publications and Research> Fire research reports


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noted several instances where extensive fuel reduced areas played an important role in mitigating the spread of multiple fires in remote country. One example cited was when more than 60 fires were simultaneously ignited by lightning in rugged country in the Eastern Highlands during January 1978. Extensive areas of fuel reduced forest minimised the spread of many of these remote fires during the lengthy period before suppression forces could reach them. Extensive fuel reduced areas also assisted the control of fires burning under „moderate‟ to „high‟ fire danger conditions near Cann River in 1982/83, by:

reducing fire intensity and spread to a level that allowed direct control work to be undertaken close to the fire edge; and

creating low fuel zones where control lines for back-burning could be safely constructed. They also acknowledged several instances (at Mt Disappointment and Mt Elizabeth in 1982) where extensive fuel reduced areas had had no substantial impact on bushfire mitigation and speculated that this was related to an unsatisfactory level of fuel-reduction achieved in the first instance. Four fires in western Victoria (1990 – 91)29

Grant and Wouters (1993) examined the effects of fuel reduction burns on four bushfires ignited in the Little Desert and Grampians area of western Victoria during the 1990/91 fire season. They noted that fuel reduction burns conducted from several months to 3-years earlier had prevented each of these fires from attaining a much larger size, thereby saving considerable suppression resources and, in one case, avoiding damage to private property. Also, as three of the studied bushfires were burning on a day when there were 17 going fires, the fuel reduction burns provided a considerable strategic benefit by freeing-up suppression resources which could be diverted to other, more dangerous fires. Their paper also noted that:

the successful containment of each of the four studied bushfires showed that, for at least two years, a fuel reduced area in heath and heathy woodland can be effective in restricting fire spread under a Fire Danger Index (FDI) of up to 40 (i.e. „very high‟); and that

a fuel reduction burn in Brown Stringybark (E.baxteri) woodland can reduce bark hazard for up to 10 years thereby reducing spotting potential, which greatly assists bushfire suppression.

Bemm River fire (October 1988)30

Buckley (1990) examined a 5,700 hectare bushfire in East Gippsland which burnt under „very high‟ to „extreme‟ fire danger conditions (i.e. FDI up to 82 with measured rates of fire spread of up to 4 km/hr) in mixed eucalypt forest with an aerated, highly flammable shrub layer, and a total fine fuel load of ~ 20 tonnes per hectare.

29

The effect of fuel reduction burning on the suppression of four wildfires in western Victoria, by S.R. Grant and M.A. Wouters, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Research Report No. 41 (December 1993). Can be accessed from the Department of Sustainability & Environment website: www.dse.vic.gov.au >Fire and other emergencies>Publications and Research> Fire research reports

30Fire behaviour and fuel reduction burning – Bemm River wildfire, October 1988, by A. Buckley, Department of Conservation & Environment, Research Report No. 28 (September 1990). Can be accessed from the Department of Sustainability & Environment website: www.dse.vic.gov.au >Fire and other emergencies>Publications and Research> Fire research reports


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Several fuel reduced areas were impacted by the 1988 Bemm River bushfire. This enabled the following conclusions to be drawn:

Dramatic protection of forest was achieved under „very high‟ fire danger conditions in areas which had been prescribed burnt one-and-a-half years earlier.

Similar protection was achieved under „high‟ fire danger conditions in areas which had been prescribed burnt 6 months and two-and-a-half years earlier.

A measurable protective effect was still apparent in areas which had been prescribed burnt seven years earlier compared to areas which had been unburnt for long periods.

To provide a protective benefit, fuel reduction burns conducted in East Gippsland‟s coastal forests need to achieve more than 50% coverage of treated areas.

Buckley‟s conclusions were reached by comparing documented fire history against the level of crown scorch mapped in the aftermath of the bushfire. Western Australian case studies There have been numerous WA examples where the fuel reduction program has assisted in the control of major bushfires. This has prevented or minimised impacts to lives, properties and environmental values. Nine WA fires (1969 – 84)31

Underwood et al (1985) documented nine case studies of fires in south west WA during the period from 1969 to 1984. These fires varied in size from 40 to 8,000 hectares and were selected for detailed analysis based on providing a representative sample of forest and fuel types, fire behaviour, and damage potential. The control of all fires had been advantaged by the presence of areas which had been prescribed burnt within the previous six years. The paper concluded that in each case these fires would have had serious social and economic consequences in the absence of extensive fuel reduced areas. It also noted that an extensive program of fuel reduction is needed to optimise its benefit in bushfire mitigation. In the forests of south west WA, it suggested an eight-year rotational program to ensure that at any time, 50% of the forest fuels are four years old or younger. This would provide an excellent aid to bushfire suppression under „difficult‟ conditions. Cyclone Alby fires (1978)32

A celebrated example of the effectiveness of fuel reduction burning occurred in 1978 when 92 fires burned out-of-control in south west WA. These fires were associated with the passage of Cyclone Alby and were pushed by winds of up to 130 km/hr with rates of spread of up to 8 km/hr being recorded with extensive spotting. Although more than 54,000 hectares was eventually burnt, only 7,000 hectares of this was in State Forest due to low fuel levels maintained by earlier prescribed burning. The fire intensity and rate of spread was so reduced in these forests that suppression resources were able to be freed-up for deployment to other more threatened areas.

31

The contribution of prescribed burning to forest fire control in WA: Case Studies, by R.J. Underwood, R.J. Sneeuwjagt, and H.G. Styles (1985). In: Fire Ecology and Management of Western Australian Ecosystems, WA Institute of Technology, Environmental Studies Group Report No. 14 of Symposium Proceedings, Perth, WA (May 1985)



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Mt Cooke fire – January 200333

This 18,000 hectare fire was ignited by lightning in a forested Conservation Park where fire had been

excluded for 17 years. Under severe weather conditions (maximum temperature – 36o, low humidity,

and gusty winds of 25 – 35 km/hr) the blaze quickly escalated into a crown fire which killed the vast majority of mature jarrah and marri trees it encountered within long unburnt forests. Eventually the fire slowed when it reached forest blocks which had been prescribed burnt 7 years earlier. Even though the severe weather conditions persisted, the fire was able to be directly attacked in these fuel reduced forests and was eventually contained when it reached areas that had been fuel reduced from three to five years earlier. Mundaring-Karragullen fire – January 200534

This fire arose from seven deliberately lit (arson) ignition sites on public lands within 20 km of the Perth Hills suburbs. A detailed analysis of its behaviour was undertaken by CSIRO fire scientist Phil Cheney who found that the fires burned vigorously in forest fuels varying from 16 to 26 years since last burnt. Rates of spread in the first 24 hours after ignition varied from 600 to 1600 metres per hour. Some 36 hours after ignition the fire came under the influence of a strong north east wind which pushed it towards several outer Perth suburbs at a rate of spread of 900 metres/hr. Fortunately it soon ran into two to four year old fuels resulting from recent prescribed burning. In these lighter fuels, the fire was either stopped completely or slowed to a degree that made it easy to control. In addition, other parts of the fire were slowed by a landscape-scale mosaic of low fuel zones created by fuel reduction burning conducted during the previous six years. As a result of past fuel reduction burning, a fire that could have destroyed hundreds of homes and threatened lives was able to be contained with minimal property loss or damage. Landscape-scale remote-sensing of fire severity

Following each of the three major Victorian bushfires that have occurred since 2002, the Department of Sustainability and Environment has used remote sensing data to undertake landscape-scale mapping of fire severity based on levels of tree crown scorch. Tolhurst and McCarthy used this mapping to study the effect of previous fires on areas burnt by the 2003 bushfires. They found that bushfire intensity was significantly lower in recently burnt areas where fuels were relatively light, and noted a measurable reduction in fire severity in areas that had been burnt up to 10 years earlier.35 In addition, they found that the effect of recent burning in reducing bushfire severity extends beyond the treated areas themselves in the form of downwind „shadows‟ which also burn at a relatively low intensity. These can be quite large areas – they identified low fire intensity „shadows‟ from 15 to 30 km long and 10 km wide.

33

Prescribed burning: How effective is it in the control of large bushfires? by Rick Sneeuwjagt (2008). In: Fire, Environment and Society: From Research to Practice, Bushfire CRC; The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Adelaide, SA, pp. 419-435


35Effect of prescribed burning on wildfire intensity – a case study from the 2003 fires in Victoria, by K.G.Tolhurst and G.J.McCarthy for the Department of Sustainability & Environment (unpublished)


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These findings strongly emphasise the value of fuel reduction burning in lessening the damage to environmental values by reducing fire intensity. Statistical trends and analysis

Statistical trends have long been cited as evidence of the effectiveness of fuel reduction burning in bushfire mitigation.

One of the earliest and most compelling statistical trends to support the effectiveness of prescribed burning was noted in a Western Australian comparison of forest fire activity before and after the disastrous 1960-61 fire season. The exceptional severity of that season sparked a revision of WA forest fire management which was largely reflected in a dramatically increased rate of annual prescribed burning. This resulted in a significant reduction in the number of unplanned bushfires, and a huge fall in the average area which they burnt each year (see Table 1).

Table 1: Comparison of forest fire activity in south west WA before and after the revision of fire management in

response to the disastrous 1960-61 bushfires 36

Pre-1960-61

(1953 – 1960) Post-1960-61

(1961-70) Change (%)

Average area of prescribed burning 148,000 ha/yr 360,000 ha/yr + 140%

Average number of bushfires 350 per year 290 per year – 17%

Average area burnt by bushfire 24,000 ha/yr 7,000 ha/yr – 250%

The findings shown in Table 1 were reinforced in the mid-1980s when Tasmanian fire scientist, Tony Mount, compared wildfire statistics for similar forest types in WA and Tasmania over the previous thirty years. He found that whilst WA bushfires averaged just 15 hectares in size, Tasmanian fires averaged 270 hectares. He presumed this was primarily due to the far more extensive use of prescribed burning in WA.37

The effectiveness of WA‟s extensive use of prescribed burning was also supported by Underwood et al (1985) who noted that the average sizes of Victorian and NSW bushfires up to the mid-1980s was respectively 12 and 13 times greater than the average WA bushfire in comparable climate, terrain, and forest types.38

Lang, who analysed fire patterns in the jarrah forests of the Collie District in south west WA from 1937 to 1987, also found that there was a rapid decline in unplanned bushfires once the prescribed burning program began to treat more than 10,000 hectares per year (or 6% of the district‟s forest).39

Similarly Abbot (1993), in studying the history of prescribed burning and wildfire in an area near Manjimup in south west WA from 1940 to 1990, found that there was a dramatic decline in the size

36

Data taken from Bushfires in Australia, by R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur, CSIRO Division of Forest Research (1978), Chapter 18, pp. 244-245

37 The case for fuel management in dry forests, by A.B. Mount (1985) Paper prepared for Research Working Group No. 6 ON Fire Research, Hobart 1985

38 The contribution of prescribed burning to forest fire control in WA: Case Studies, by R.J. Underwood, R.J. Sneeuwjagt, and H.G. Styles (1985). In: Fire Ecology and Management of Western Australian Ecosystems, WA Institute of Technology, Environmental Studies Group Report No. 14 of Symposium Proceedings, Perth, WA (May 1985)

39 Prescribed burning: How effective is it in the control of large bushfires? by Rick Sneeuwjagt (2008). In: Fire, Environment and Society: From Research to Practice, Bushfire CRC; The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Adelaide, SA, pp. 419-435


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and number of serious bushfires after the introduction of prescribed burning by the Forests Department in 1958.40

Arguably, one of the most comprehensive examinations of fire statistics to support the effectiveness of prescribed burning has been undertaken by Boer et al (2009).41 They examined wildfire and prescribed burning records dating back to the early 1950s in the ~1 million hectares of forest in the Warren Region of south west WA.

Their principal finding was that the area treated annually by prescribed fire had had a significant effect on the annual number and extent of unplanned bushfires over a 52-year period. During this period, an average of more than 80% of the annual burnt area was attributable to prescribed fire. They also concluded that a six-year cycle of prescribed burning significantly reduced bushfire hazard.

Figure 2: Low intensity prescribed burn in the Wombat State Forest (DSE/K. Tolhurst)

40

Ecology of the pest insect jarrah leaf miner (depidoptera) in relation to fire and timber harvesting in jarrah forest in WA, by I. Abbot (1993), Australian Forestry 56(3)

41 Long term impacts of prescribed burning on regional extent and incidence of wildfires – Evidence from 50 years of

active fire management in SW Australian forests, by M.M. Boer, R.J. Sadler, R.S. Wittkuhn, L. McCaw, and P.F. Grierson, Forest Ecology and Management 259 (2009) 132-142


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The effectiveness of prescribed burning in improving the outcome of

bushfires burning under ‘extreme’ fire danger conditions

In view of the range of evidence cited in previous pages, prescribed fuel reduction burning is indisputably a valuable bushfire mitigation tool. However, recent public discussion about its merits has focused on whether or not it improves bushfire outcomes under the „extreme‟ fire danger conditions which drove the „Black Saturday‟ catastrophe.

While many experienced forest fire experts and a range of community groups are advocating increased levels of fuel reduction burning in Victorian forests, this is being opposed by others, including the mainstream environmental groups and some academics, who claim this would do little to protect human life and property from future catastrophic fires. There is general agreement amongst fire researchers that light fuel loads created by recent prescribed burning are highly influential in limiting bushfire behaviour and improving controllability under „low‟ to „very high‟ fire danger conditions.42 Tolhurst estimates that for around 95% of the time, Victorian bushfires burn under these conditions meaning that low fuel loads can greatly assist the vast majority of bushfires to be quickly and safely controlled.43 However, there are slightly divergent views about the influence of fuel loads on the behaviour of bushfires burning under „extreme‟ conditions. Tolhurst believes that there are some „extreme‟ fire conditions where fuel modifications have little effect as fire behaviour becomes driven by the prevailing weather conditions.44 On the other hand, Cheney and others believe that fuel (rather than weather) provides the energy for a fire and is therefore always the main driver of its intensity, not withstanding that weather (i.e. wind) can certainly increase its rate of spread.45 While the Cheney view strengthens the case for more prescribed burning, some have seized on the Tolhurst view to undermine the value of the practice. However, this is extremely short-sighted because:

By improving the ability to quickly control the vast majority of fires, low fuel loads created by prescribed burning can minimise the likelihood of there being active, going fires when „extreme‟ fire danger conditions arise. For example, the presence of extensive low fuel areas in the Bunyip State Park may have enabled the Bunyip Ridge Track fire (which was ignited several days earlier) to be made safe prior to „Black Saturday‟ rather than being still active when extreme conditions arose on that day. This may have averted property losses at places like Labertouche and freed-up a substantial array of suppression resources for deployment elsewhere.

The presence of extensive areas of light fuels throughout the forested landscape can help ease demands on suppression forces and thereby, even on days of „extreme‟ fire danger, can enable their efforts to be concentrated in areas of greatest threat to life and property. An example from „Black Saturday‟ is the White Timber Spur fire near Dargo which was ignited

42

The effectiveness of fire-fighting first attack operations, DNRE (Victoria), 1991-92 to 1994/95, by G.J. McCarthy and K.G. Tolhurst, Fire Management Branch Research Report No. 45, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria

43 Dr Kevin Tolhurst, School of Forest and Ecosystem Science, University of Melbourne – Submission to the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, conducted by the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (May 25th 2007), p.11

44 Dr Kevin Tolhurst, School of Forest and Ecosystem Science, University of Melbourne – Submission to the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, conducted by the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (May 25th 2007), Figure 8, p.11

45 Roger Underwood, pers comm based on discussions with CSIRO fire researcher Phil Cheney.


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the previous day and burnt through low fuel areas previously burnt by wildfire several years earlier. Although this fire eventually burnt 13,000 hectares of forest, it required only minimal suppression effort and freed-up resources for deployment to more troublesome places.

In lighter fuels created by prescribed burning there is less spotting and this reduces the rate of fire spread compared to fires burning in long unburnt forests with heavy fuel accumulations.

Insufficient fuel reduction burning which allows the development of heavy fuel loads, makes fires burn more intensely under any conditions and thereby increases risks to human life and property on days when conditions are less than „extreme‟.

It must be acknowledged that not all prescribed burning is equally as effective in bushfire mitigation as it is subject to a range of variables (see p.9). The experience from south west WA suggests that to be most effective, prescribed burning programs must be extensive enough that there is always a substantial proportion (i.e. 25-50%) of the forest estate carrying light fuels from recent prescribed burning.

That this was far from the case in the huge areas burnt by Victorian bushfires since 2003, may partially explain the doubts being expressed in Victoria about the value of prescribed burning. Since „Black Saturday‟, critics have put forward several examples where recent fuel reduction burns (conducted only one to two years previously) had no obvious effect on that fire. However, if fuel reduced areas are small and isolated, and surrounded by long unburnt areas with heavy fuel loads, intense wildfires will easily pass over or around them..

The proportionally more extensive WA prescribed burning program in which around 8% of the forest is targeted for treatment each year, has been found to substantially reduce the extent and threat of the vast majority of unplanned summer bushfires, and through this, has provided demonstrable assistance in reducing the threat of unplanned fires occurring under „extreme‟ fire danger conditions. Despite this, it must be stressed that not even extensive prescribed burning on such a scale is a „silver bullet‟ which can prevent damaging bushfires. This is particularly the case in relation to Victorian forest types (such as tall wet sclerophylle ash forests) which are difficult to fuel reduce under mild conditions, yet will periodically burn with tremendous ferocity in hot summer conflagrations generally during drought years. Townships and suburbs located within or adjacent to such forests are bound to ultimately experience a catastrophe. Some of these areas have just been affected by the 2009 fires, and others remain under constant threat in or adjacent to high rainfall parts of the Dandenong, Otway, and Strezlecki Ranges, as well as remaining unburnt parts of the Central Highlands.


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Discussion

There is no doubt that a significant expansion of Victoria‟s program of annual prescribed burning is integral to improving bushfire outcomes. Indeed, this was a key recommendation of the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee which released its Report of the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria in June 2008.46 The report‟s recommendation that the prescribed burning program be tripled from the currently targeted 130,000 ha/annum up to around 385,000 ha/annum, was subsequently accepted only in principle (with no commitment made to act) by the Victorian government just two months prior to „Black Saturday‟.47 Given our recent bushfire history, there is now an urgent need to act on this recommendation. Expanding prescribed burning in Victoria

The south west WA experience suggests that constantly maintaining a substantial part of the forest estate under light fuel loads can significantly decrease the annual extent and damage caused by unplanned summer bushfires. This is being achieved by targeting about 200,000 hectares (or 8%) of the region‟s forests for prescribed burning each year.48 49

Undertaking a similarly proportioned program in Victoria would be more difficult. Not all Victorian forest types are suited to fuel reduction burning, but after accounting for these, Tolhurst estimated that around 6.2 million hectares should be included in the prescribed burning program.50 This is around 2.5 times larger than the public forest estate in south west WA. In addition, there is a greater degree of landscape variability in Victorian forests which would presumably further increase the difficulty of burning on a cycle similar to that which used to be regularly achieved in WA.

Consequently, some of the doubt surrounding the capability of prescribed burning to improve bushfire outcomes in Victoria may not so much be questioning the effectiveness of the practice, but instead reflect doubts about whether the physical and logistical practicalities of undertaking a sufficiently extensive burning program can be overcome.51

Clearly, Victoria‟s current prescribed burning program is of insufficient size to consistently aid in suppressing major bushfires, although it is undoubtedly randomly beneficial in helping to prevent some fires from growing to larger size. The current annual burning target of 130,000 hectares per year equates to just 2% of the suitable Victorian forest. This is just a quarter of what is proportionally being targeted to optimise fuel reduction effectiveness in south west WA.

46Report of the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, Victorian

Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (June 2008) 47

Victorian Government’s response to the Environment and Natural Resources Committee’s Inquiry into the Impact of

Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, Department of Sustainability and Environment, 4th December 2008. Can be viewed on the DSE website: www.dse.vic.gov.au

48 Prescribed burning: How effective is it in the control of large bushfires? by Rick Sneeuwjagt (2008). In: Fire, Environment and Society: From Research to Practice, Bushfire CRC; The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Adelaide, SA, pp. 419-435

49 This target was being regularly met in the past, but for a range of reasons during the past decade it has been more common for only around half of it to be achieved. When the target was being met, it was maintaining around a third of the forest under very light fuels loads – Roger Underwood, WA Bushfire Front, pers comm., January 2010

50 Report of the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, Chapter 2: Prescribed burning in Victoria – The effectiveness of fuel reduction burning (p. 30), Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (June 2008)

51Fire risk will never be eliminated, by Professor Ross Bradstock, Director of the Centre for Environmental Risk Management of Bushfires, University of Wollongong. In: The Sydney Morning Herald, February 18th, 2009.


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The value of the prescribed fire to unplanned wildfire ratio as an indicator of the success of bushfire management is further emphasised by NSW experience documented over the 10-year period from 1993-94 to 2002-03 (see Table 2). Table 2: Comparative success of bushfire management in NSW State Forests and National Parks during the 10-

year period from 1993-94 to 2002-0353

NSW public lands

National Parks State Forests

Average % of total area prescribed burnt per year 0.4% 3%

Average area prescribed burnt per year 20,500 ha/yr 73,000 ha/yr

Average area burnt by wildfire per year 250,000 ha/yr 70,000 ha/yr

Prescribed burn : unplanned wildfire ratio < 10:90 ~ 50:50

This stark difference in the success of bushfire management between NSW State Forests and National Parks aligns with respective land management philosophies. In NSW National Parks, prescribed burning during that period was primarily focused on community protection and restricted to boundary areas in close proximity or adjacent to urban and rural communities. Conversely, in State Forests, prescribed burning was undertaken for a broader range of values and was both more extensive and more widely spread across the landscape.54 It could be argued that a far lower than optimal amount of prescribed burning was being undertaken in the NSW State Forests during this period. Nevertheless, more than half of the fire which occurred in the State Forests each year was applied with a degree of planning and control. Conversely, less than 10% of the annual fire in National Parks was controlled, meaning that over 90% was unplanned wildfire burning out of control, often in hot summer conditions, when threats to both neighbouring communities and in-park infrastructure and environmental values was maximised. The fact that far better bushfire outcomes were achieved in the NSW State Forests compared to adjacent National Parks under the same weather conditions and over the same period, is another powerful indicator that a land management philosophy which minimises the area and extent of fuel reduction burning is incapable of effectively managing bushfire threat. Environmental values and prescribed burning

A detailed consideration of the environmental issues associated with prescribed burning lies outside the primary scope of this document. However, it is worth at least a passing mention because environmental concerns seem to be the primary motivation of most of those opposed to an expansion of prescribed burning; and it is another case where they have downplayed the level of existing knowledge. In so doing, they are seeking to suspend prescribed burning at current (or lesser) levels until more research is undertaken. There is probably no limit to what can be learned about the environmental implications of both wildfire and prescribed fire given the hugely variable array of Australian ecosystems. Accordingly, there is an ongoing need for research. However, there is also much that is already known after almost

53

Fire management in Australia: the lessons of 200 years, by V. Jurskis, B. Bridges, P. de Mar. In: Proceedings of the Joint Australia and New Zealand Institute of Forestry Conference, 27 April–1 May 2003, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington/ Queenstown, New Zealand, pp. 353–368.

54Fire management in Australia: the lessons of 200 years, by V. Jurskis, B. Bridges, P. de Mar. In: Proceedings of the Joint Australia and New Zealand Institute of Forestry Conference, 27 April–1 May 2003, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington/ Queenstown, New Zealand, pp. 353–368.


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40 years of study and arguably this is more than enough on which to base a responsible fire management policy.55 There are several other observations to be made about concerns for the environmental impacts of prescribed burning:

Many in the wider community seem to have a mistaken perception of prescribed burning as being akin to the images of black devastation regularly shown after events like „Black Saturday‟. Fuel reduction is not akin to total fuel removal.

There is clearly an under-appreciation of the reality that prescribed burns are planned as low intensity, slow-moving fires lit within nominated boundaries at cooler and wetter times of the year. They generally burn in a patchy manner and therefore leave scattered remnant habitat from which flora and fauna can recolonise adjacent burnt ground. This is very different to unplanned summer bushfires which can be hugely more intense and fast-moving, quickly burning everything in their path over extensive areas.

There is insufficient community understanding of the benefits of prescribed fire in reducing the environmental disturbance of hot summer fires. Some of the impacts of the series of Victorian mega-fires since 2003 will take decades to repair – if they are repairable – particularly disturbance to soil values, and biodiversity. Yet few seem to appreciate that areas within these fire areas which had been prescribed burnt in the previous ten years were much less damaged.

If the community was better educated in these matters there may well be far more support for an expanded prescribed burning program in Victoria. On the other hand it seems likely that some „environmentalists‟ are unlikely to ever be convinced that there is ecological benefit in deliberately disturbing Australian forests by regularly burning them. One of the most comprehensive studies dealing with these concerns is the ongoing Wombat Fire Effects Study. The Summary Report prepared after the first 15-years of research in central Victoria‟s mixed species foothill forests, provides a range of findings about the ecological impacts of prescribed burning.56 These findings include:

Over a 14-year period, no plant species were either lost or gained as a result of up to four successive spring or three successive autumn fires (Note: This is a far greater fire frequency than that being proposed in most Victorian forests under an expanded prescribed burning program).

In the absence of fire there were subtle changes to forest understoreys. Whilst only small on a year-to-year basis, they can amount to significant changes over a period of a decade or more.

No long term changes were noted in the activity or abundance of invertebrates following a single low intensity prescribed burn.

Three low intensity prescribed spring burns within eight years had no impact on litter arthropods.

None of several studied reptile species was favoured by a particular burning treatment.

55

Ecological effects of repeated low-intensity fire in a mixed eucalypt foothill forest in south eastern Australia: Summary

Report (1984 – 1999), Fire Research Report No. 57, Department of Sustainability and Environment (December 2003) 56

Ecological effects of repeated low-intensity fire in a mixed eucalypt foothill forest in south eastern Australia: Summary

Report (1984 – 1999), Fire Research Report No. 57, Department of Sustainability and Environment (December 2003), Executive Summary. This report can be accessed from the DSE website: www.dse.vic.gov.au


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Unburnt microhabitats (particularly logs, deep beds of leaf litter and areas frequently not burned by low intensity fire such as damp gullies) provide important refuges and food, shelter and oviposition sites in the post-burn period.

No particular burning treatment favoured either of two small mammal species which were studied.

Populations of the Brown Antechinus (Antechinus agilis) were significantly higher two to three years after prescribed burns than in long unburnt areas.

Some birds respond positively to fire and some species may depend on it. Fuel reduction burning provides ephemeral patches of bare ground habitat at the landscape scale which may be advantageous.

Low intensity prescribed fires repeated at intervals of ten years can be expected to lead to a decline in soil organic matter and soil fertility. At intervals of 10 years or greater, there was little if any change in carbon and nitrogen levels, indicating that such a strategy would maintain soil organic matter in the long term.

Whilst the trial found that prescribed burning on three to five year frequencies could be ecologically undesirable, regular burning on frequencies in excess of ten years appears to have no adverse implications given the rate of ecosystem recovery after low intensity fire. Indeed, there are likely to be more adverse ecological implications if forests are left unburnt for considerable periods. This supports the expansion of Victoria‟s prescribed burning program to a 16-year cycle in which around 6% of the suitable forests are treated each year as recommended by the government‟s Environment and Natural Resources Committee in June 2008. Arguable, the study‟s most pertinent finding was that post-fire recovery of flora, fauna and soils is far more rapid and complete following low intensity fires (such as prescribed burns) compared to high intensity fires (such as unplanned, hot summer bushfires). This is because high intensity fires tend to remove a greater proportion of the tree canopy, a much greater part of woody debris from the forest floor, more of the tree bark, and more of the potential refuge areas such as damp gully vegetation. In addition, they induce greater soil heating and plant death, and by moving faster, can cause higher fauna mortality. Supporting this finding about the far greater destructiveness of hot summer bushfires is that the 2003 Alpine fire, which burned around 1.7 million hectares of land in Victoria, NSW and the ACT in just 59 days, killed an estimated 370 million reptiles, birds, and mammals.57 In addition, it killed substantial areas of forest, some of which will not regenerate back to its pre-fire form. It was also predicted that post-fire forest regeneration in the most severely affected half of the burnt area will reduce inflows to the Murray River headwaters by 430 billion litres per year until 2050.58 In so far as low intensity prescribed burning plays a significant role in mitigating the severe ecosystem damage of high intensity summer bushfires, those who would oppose it are hardly acting in the best interests of the environment.

57

Former CSIRO scientist, Noeline Franklin 58Predicted water loss attributed to the CRC for Catchment Hydrology (2003) in the National Association of Forest

Industries / Timber Communities Australia joint submission to the National Water Initiative, April 2004.


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Figure 4: Demonstrated impact of extensive low fuel loads on wildfire control. Forest at North Kinglake burnt on February 7

th 2009 (on the right of the photo). Green forest canopy (on the left) is area that was burnt in

the 2006 Kinglake fire which provided an extensive barrier to the spread of the 2009 fire (MF Ryan, IFA).


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Conclusions

There is an abundance of Victorian and Western Australian evidence that fuel reduction burning is a critical bushfire management tool. However, to be optimally effective it needs to be applied throughout the forest at a sufficient scale to ensure that a substantial portion of the landscape is maintained under a low fuel state. In south west WA where forest management has been demonstrably more successful in avoiding the sort of mega-fires that have recently afflicted Victoria, this has been achieved by targeting 8% of the forest for prescribed burning each year. Currently in Victoria, just 2% of the forests regarded as being suitable for prescribed burning are planned for treatment each year. That this is insufficient was identified by the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee, who in June 2008, recommended a tripling of the burn target which would see around 6% of the suitable forests treated each year on an approximately 16-year cycle. This substantially upgraded program now needs to be implemented. It is inevitable that a substantial area of Victorian forest will burn each year. However, the WA experience shows that to a large extent we have the capability to influence how and when it burns and its consequent environmental and human impact – notwithstanding that there will always be occasional fires which are simply uncontrollable and very damaging. We can either burn more forest under prescribed conditions at cooler times of the year when fires burn slowly at low intensities causing little damage; or we can allow fuels to build and consequently consign our forests to greater areas burnt by periodic unplanned wildfires during hotter times of the year when they move quickly with high intensity and are infinitely more damaging to both ourselves and the environment. After recent disastrous bushfire seasons and including recent prescribed burning, Victoria currently has over 3.5 million hectares of public forest (or more than 50%) with fuels of seven years old or younger. This should provide an excellent platform on which to build a significantly expanded prescribed burning program which would be expected to significantly improve bushfire outcomes. How to address the logistical and resourcing issues associated with a substantially expanded prescribed burning program is an important and difficult question. However, it cannot begin to be answered until:

(i) the Victorian community embraces the concept of prescribed burning as an effective bushfire management tool and accepts the need to do far more of it; and

(ii) the Victorian government demonstrates leadership by adopting a policy which commits it to a far more extensive prescribed burning program.

References


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Abbot (1993) Ecology of the pest insect jarrah leaf miner (depidoptera) in relation to fire and timber harvesting in jarrah forest in WA, by I. Abbot (1993), Australian Forestry 56(3) ACF (2009) ACF Submission to the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (May 2009). Can be accessed at the ACF website: www.acfonline.org.au/ Boer et al (2009) Long term impacts of prescribed burning on regional extent and incidence of wildfires – Evidence from 50 years of active fire management in SW Australian forests, by M.M. Boer, R.J. Sadler, R.S. Wittkuhn, L. McCaw, and P.F. Grierson, Forest Ecology and Management 259 (2009) 132-142 Bradstock (2009) Fire risk will never be eliminated, by Professor Ross Bradstock, Director of the Centre for Environmental Risk Management of Bushfires, University of Wollongong. In: The Sydney Morning Herald, February 18th, 2009 Buckley (1990) Fire behaviour and fuel reduction burning – Bemm River wildfire, October 1988, by A. Buckley, Department of Conservation & Environment, Research Report No. 28 (September 1990). Can be accessed from the Department of Sustainability & Environment website: www.dse.vic.gov.au >Fire and other emergencies>Publications and Research> Fire research reports CSIRO (2007) Project Vesta – Fire in Dry Eucalypt Forest: Fuel Structure, Fuel Dynamics, and Fire Behaviour, by J. Gould (Ensis Bushfire Research), L. McCaw (WA Department of Environment and Conservation), P. Cheney, P. Ellis, I. Knight, and A. Sullivan (October 2007) 218 pp. Can be accessed from the CSIRO website: www.csiro.au/resources/VestaTechReport.html

DSE (2003) Ecological effects of repeated low-intensity fire in a mixed eucalypt foothill forest in south eastern Australia: Summary Report (1984 – 1999), Fire Research Report No. 57, Department of Sustainability and Environment (December 2003). Can be accessed from the DSE website: www.dse.vic.gov.au ENRC (2008) Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, Chapter 2: Prescribed burning in Victoria – The effectiveness of fuel reduction burning, Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee (June 2008)

Esplin (2003) Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-03 Victorian Bushfires, chaired by Bruce Esplin, Emergency Services Commissioner, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Victorian Government (October 2003)

Grant and Wouters (1993) The effect of fuel reduction burning on the suppression of four wildfires in western Victoria, by S.R. Grant and M.A. Wouters, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Research Report No. 41 (December 1993). Can be accessed from the Department of Sustainability & Environment website: www.dse.vic.gov.au >Fire and other emergencies>Publications and Research> Fire research reports IFA (2009) Institute of Foresters of Australia - Submission to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, May 2009. It can be accessed at www.forestry.org.au > Submissions

Ingamells (2009) Rethink fuel reduction burns, by Phil Ingamells, Victorian National Parks Association, The Weekly Times, August 26th 2009

Jurskis, V., Bridges, B., de Mar, P. (2003) Fire management in Australia: the lessons of 200 years. In: Proceedings of the Joint Australia and New Zealand Institute of Forestry Conference, 27 April–1


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May 2003, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington/ Queenstown, New Zealand, pp. 353–368. Luke and McArthur (1978) Bushfires in Australia, by R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur, CSIRO Division of Forest Research, 1978, 359 pp.

McCarthy and Tolhurst (1996) The effectiveness of fire-fighting first attack operations, DNRE (Victoria), 1991-92 to 1994/95, by G.J. McCarthy and K.G. Tolhurst, Fire Management Branch Research Report No. 45, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria McCaw et al (2008) Quantifying the effectiveness of fuel management in modifying wildfire behaviour, by WL. McCaw, JS. Gould, and NP. Cheney, presented at the International Bushfire Research Conference, Adelaide Convention Centre, September 2008.

Moulds (1991) The Dynamic Forest: A history of forestry and forest industries in Victoria, by FR. Moulds, Lyndoch Publications (1991) 232 pp. Mount (1985) The case for fuel management in dry forests, by A.B. Mount (1985) Paper prepared for Research Working Group No. 6 ON Fire Research, Hobart 1985 Pyne (1991) Burning Bush – A Fire History of Australia, by Stephen J. Pyne, Henry Holt and Co (1991), 520 pp.

Pyne (2006) The Still-Burning Bush, by Stephen J. Pyne, Scribe Publications (2006) 137 pp. Rawson et al (1985) Effectiveness of fuel reduction burning (10 Case Studies), by R. Rawson, P. Billing, and B. Rees, Department of Conservation Forests and Lands, Research Report No. 25 (October 1985). Can be accessed from the Department of Sustainability & Environment website: www.dse.vic.gov.au >Fire and other emergencies>Publications and Research> Fire research reports Sneeuwjagt (2008) Prescribed burning: How effective is it in the control of large bushfires? by Rick Sneeuwjagt (2008). In: Fire, Environment and Society: From Research to Practice, Bushfire CRC; The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council, Adelaide, SA, pp. 419-435 Tolhurst (2007) Submission to the Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria conducted by the Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee, by Dr Kevin Tolhurst, School of Forest and Ecosystem Science, University of Melbourne, May 25th 2007. Tolhurst and McCarthy (2004) Effect of prescribed burning on wildfire intensity – a case study from the 2003 fires in Victoria, by K.G.Tolhurst and G.J.McCarthy for the Department of Sustainability & Environment (unpublished) Underwood et al (1985) The contribution of prescribed burning to forest fire control in WA: Case Studies, by R.J. Underwood, R.J. Sneeuwjagt, and H.G. Styles. In: Fire Ecology and Management of Western Australian Ecosystems, WA Institute of Technology, Environmental Studies Group Report No. 14 Symposium Proceedings, Perth, WA (May 1985)

VNPA (2009) Planned burns and clearing will not stop catastrophic fire events: report, Media Release by the Victorian National Parks Association on September 10th 2009 to launch a report jointly commissioned by the VNPA, The Wilderness Society, and the Australian Conservation Foundation


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entitled „Victorian February 2009 Fires – A Report on Driving Influences and Land Tenure Affected‟, by Chris Taylor.

Wilderness Society (2009) A Bushfire Action Plan which protects people, property and nature – The Wilderness Society website: http://www.wilderness.org.au/articles/bushfire-action-plan


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