a glance to nationalism reflections and solutions in balkans

8/12/2019 A Glance to Nationalism Reflections and Solutions in Balkans

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7lo!enia3 and -reekF%6O=?, not because of a lack of @ualifications, rather than internal political reasons and

nationalistic agenda;.

he economic and political crisis that is afflicting Europe could destabili$e the unification process,

gi!ing more chances of success to nationalistic mo!ements and separatist applications, !ery

dangerous for Europe, especially in the Balkans.

With the present paper we try to analyse the nationalistic phenomenon, after gi!ing a glance to the

different theory on nationalism and, in succession, we consider the birth of Aationalism in Western

Europe, as a first step for the e!aluation of AationBuilding in #entral, 7outhern, and Eastern

Europe.

his e(am will allow us to estimate the nationalistic phenomenon in the Balkans and particularly in

Former %ugosla!ia.

Cfter a brief e!aluation of different perspecti!es on the Balkans, we will try to offer !ision about

some proposed solutions to the nationalistic problem of that region.

One hundred years after the Balkans Wars finally took the region out from under the Ottomans, the

region remains unsettled. BosniaDer$ego!ina >BiD? remains a work in progress and &oso!os status

is undefined. he E' reportedly is losing patience with the inability of Bosnias entities to mo!e

toward a more perfect union. 7erbia is trying desperately to find a way to get past the &oso!o issue

so it can enter the E' and impro!e its economic prospects.

2. State and ation

It appears useful, as a first step, to e(press some definition of 7tate, Aation, 6egionalism, and Ethnic

group, terms normally used in the analysis of nationalism.

heStateis the institution that maintains the monopoly on the use of coerci!e force within a society.

Behind this definition, ob!iously, there is theHobbesiannotion of the social contract by which the

population depri!e, !oluntarily, herself of the right to use force" this right is gi!en to the 7tate withthe spoken >constitution? or unspoken >social con!ention? understanding that, the 7tate, will act on

behalf of the interests of the population within its territory.

3 here are se!eral issues of contention between #roatia and 7lo!enia" first of all, the iran bay @uestion, about

the definition of the border and maritime boundary. Cnother dispute is connected to )ubl)anska Banka problem

related to a credit of


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he state, as an agent for the people, allowed to retain the use of force, must be organi$ed along

institutional lines that facilitate some degree of efficiency.

Following =a( Weber, Heff -oodwin offers a description of the state when he obser!es that it

consists of0 t$ose core ad*inistrati-e. policing. and *ilitar+ organizations. *ore or less

coordinated b+ an e,ecuti-e aut$orit+. t$at e,tract resources "ro* and ad*inister and rule /t$roug$

-iolence i" necessar+0 a territoriall+ de"ined national societ+G2.

he nation differs from the state because state refers to the institutions of go!ernment while nationis

about the people who comprise the state, in all the significant factors, such as, common language,

common culture, and a common history.

Aationalism is a process by which people seek to define who they are in terms of a national identity.

his demarcation between the nation and the state is e(tremely helpful in that it highlights the two

key aspects of the nationstate.

It points to the idea that the, state, in other words, is primarily a politicallegal concept, whereas

nationis primarily psychocultural

7tates may e(ist when there is no nation" con!ersely, a nation may e(ist where no state does .

On this point, Ernest -ellner claims0 nationalis* is pri*aril+ a political principle. $ic$ $olds t$at

t$e political and t$e national unit s$ould be congruentG5.

he nationstate then is the ideal form of a political organi$ation, when the political boundaries >the

state? are congruent with the ethnographic or linguistic frontiers >nation?.

Ethnic groupis a small part of an e(isting nation that li!es in subordination to another state power.

Regionalism is a term used to describe a group of people within a broader nation. 6egionalism

describes a group of people with some or many of the characteristics of the nation, in which it is

enclosed. 6egionalist mo!ements do not usually seek to form their own national states, but their

demands range from a cultural autonomy to the federalist restructuring of an e(isting state in the

e(treme cases.

3. ationalism/+

2 -oodwin Heff,%o 1t$er !a+ 1ut: States and 2e-olutionar+ Mo-e*ents, #ambridge 'ni!ersity ress, *++/,

p.//. alestine for e(ample.5

-ellner Ernest.%azioni e nazionalis*i. Editori 6iuniti, 6oma, /52, p./. ibid. p. ;//./+

C !ery useful and interesting site can be found athttp011www.nationalismpro)ect.org1.
http://www.nationalismproject.org/http://www.nationalismproject.org/http://www.nationalismproject.org/http://www.nationalismproject.org/


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his is one of the most ambiguous concepts in the presentday !ocabulary of political and analytical

thought.//It is !ery hard to find a generally acceptable definition for nationalismG, nationG, and

nationalityG e!en among the academic world/*.

he same difficulty e(ists in the determination of some other relati!e concepts like ethnicityG,

ethnic groupG and regionalismG.

%ationalis* is a system of ideas, !alues and norms, an image of the world and society, which makes

a large social group aware of where it belongs and in!ests this sense of belonging with a particular

!alueG/3" therefore, nationalism is both an ideology and a political mo!ement

C typology of nationalism is the one presented by eter Clter" according to this author, we can

classify nationalism into two main groups or basic types0 Risorgimento nationalism andIntegral

nationalism14.

6isorgimento nationalism was a political mo!ement, which sustains the principle of solidarity of the

oppressed citi$ens1people against the oppressors. 6isorgimento nationalism supported the European

mo!ements for national liberation and it had e!en se!eral distinguished categories >i.e. liberal,

reformist, political, cultural, linguistic and religious nationalism?. Cll these !arious forms of

nationalism were interdependent.

Cround /55+, French writer #harles =aurras/;used the term Integral nationalism, as opposed to the

6isorgimento nationalism >which uphold the idea of the e@uality of all nations and national

mo!ements?, defining the nation as the absolute.

he philosophical foundation of Integral nationalism is 9arwins theory of natural selection, it

asserts the interests of the one nation at the e(pense of others, and e!erything can be )ustified as

ethical and moral if it ser!es the nation and its power.

Because of this distincti!e characteristic of the Integral nationalismG, there ha!e been many

ad)ecti!es attached to this term, like radical, e(treme, militant aggressi!ee(pansionist, right wing,

reactionary, or e(cessi!e/2" today nationalism is considered, normally, in the form of integral

nationalism.

// Clter eter,%ationalis*, 7econd Edition /< by C6AO9 a =ember of the Dodder Deadline -roup, ondon

Aew %ork7ydneyCuckland, /


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Cccording to -reenfeld0 %ationalis*. in s$ort. is t$e *odern culture( It is t$e s+*bolic blueprint o"

*odern realit+. t$e a+ e see. and t$ereb+ construct. t$e orld around us. t$e speci"icall+ *odern

consciousnessG./

Aationalism is both an ideology, whose central !alues are the nation and the so!ereign nation state,

and a political mo!ement that aims to mobili$e the political will of the people in order to achie!e a

common goal.

It is important to mention other distincti!e !iewpoints" indeed, any approaches to ethnicity,

nationalism and other cultural identities, howe!er differentiated from each other, can be di!ided into

two basic categories0primordialist, and constructionist/5.

he first category is based on the assumption that people who share a culture also share a common

identity and sentiments that are the basis for their groups interests and claims. he second category

sees national or ethnic consciousness as an entirely situational matter, being a response to certain

practical circumstances.

here are many other definitions of nationalism in the literature, and as Hohn Breuilly reminds us,

new one elicits the least agreement/.

Cs suggested by ucas*+, a complete classification of e(isting theories is offered by Hames

-oodmans fi!e categories classification of nationalism, useful for focusing on contemporary

debates. -oodman discriminates the following approaches*/0

/. !lass"centered theories, which relate class relations and the impact of industrial capitalism on

nationalist mo!ements, main author are #ric $o%s%a&m, Samir Amin, and Jim Blaut'

*. (ne)en de)elo*ment theories, which focus on the wider international and transnational

setting in which nationalism is reproduced and which integrate a broad range of economic,

cultural, and political relationships within and between societies. eading e(ponents are

Benedict Anderson, !+arles illy, -irosla)$roc+, and omairn"

3. State"centeredtheories that link nationalism to the state system and international relations,

represented by Jo+n Breuilly"

/ -reenfeld iah,%ationalis* and t$e Mind, in Aations and AationalismG. Kol. //, art


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social units from family and tribe to county and canton, from the local to the regional, the national

and e!entually the global*;.

On this model, not only would all -reeks or Italians or -ermans melt together in one state but also

7erbs would merge with #roats into a single %ugosla!ia and #$echs with 7lo!aks.

=ultiethnic, multilingual, and multinational forms of interaction were identified as characteristics of

these nation states and the oldest Western European nationstates, such as Britain, France, and 7pain.

In addition to the territorial Lthreshold principle, there were, according to Dobsbawm, three criteria,

which allowed people to be classified as a state. he first was their $istoric association it$ a

current stateor one with a lengthy and recent past. he second was the e,istence o" long establis$ed

cultural elitepossessing a written national literary and administrati!e !ernacular. he third criterion

was apro-en capacit+ "or conuest.

Dobsbawm uses his historical sur!ey of the classical period of liberal bourgeois nationalism and the

formation of the liberal state to critici$e the notion of pure nationstates. Cccording to this notion,

ethnically homogenous dominant group is coe(tensi!e with the national territory.

While this notion defines theoretically, what the nationstate is supposed to be, it has e(isted in

practice !ery rarely.*2

De argues that ethnically homogenous states did not really e(ist in the /th century, and ethnically

pure states are not possible today, despite the efforts towards different forms of Lethnic cleansing

and unmi(ing of peoples. By citing urbani$ation and industriali$ation, the massi!e mo!ements and

transfers of people across borders and continents, he reiterates the point that such forces undermine

the basic nationalist assumption of a territory inhabited essentially by an ethnically, culturally and

linguistically homogeneous populationG*.

.2. (ne)en de)elo*ment 3$roc+4s +istorical analysis5

In his discussion of the origins of postcold war mo!ements for selfdetermination, =irosla! Droch

is circumspect about calling these mo!ements nationalistG because such mo!ements in the /thcentury did not aim at independent statehood >while so many ethnonationalist mo!ements today

pose statehood as their primary demand?. *5

De defines nationalism as that state of mind which gi!es an absolute priority to the !alues of ones

own nation o!er and abo!e all other !alues and interest groupsG*.

*; ibid., 33*2

ibid.* ibid., p. 3ed.?,%otionso" %ationalis*, #entral European 'ni!ersity ress, Budapest and Aew %ork, /;, pp. 2;22..

* ibid., p. 2;


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he established nationstates of Europe, whose de!elopment goes back to the =iddle Cges England,

France, 7pain, 7weden, 9enmark, ortugal, and the Aetherlands, were ruled by homogenous elites

and wellde!eloped social strata that included the aristocracy and the emerging industrial and

commercial bourgeoisie. hey had a highly de!eloped national culture and language. In contrast to

those states, more than twenty nondominant ethnic groups were spread throughout the European

continent in /5++, including the relati!ely homogenous nationstates.

hese groups had Le(ogenous ruling classes and occupied a compact territoryG but lacked their

Lown >that is, belonging to their own ethnic group? ruling class and continuous cultural tradition in

their own literary languageG3+.

Ct a certain point, some members of the ethnic group began to focus on their own ethnicity and to

see their group as a potential nation. hey asked for the impro!ement of their national culture,

focusing on language, the creation of a complete social structure, including their own educated

elites, and the achie!ement of e@ual ci!il rights and political selfdetermination.

Aational mo!ements in both Western and Eastern Europe de!eloped, according to Droch, in three

structural phases.

In +ase A, acti!ists researched the linguistic, historical, and cultural attributes of their ethnic group.

In +ase B, a group of patriots emerged o!er members of the ethnic group, planning to form a

nation.

In +ase !, the national idea spreads, and a mass mo!ement takes shape.

Cn important difference between Western and Eastern Europe lay in the fact that Western national

mo!ements started their hase B under constitutional regime. hase B in Eastern mo!ements, in

contrast, was carried out within the late absolutist regimes, the Dapsburg Empire, the Ottoman

Empire, sarist 6ussia, russia and 9enmark.

Droch argues that different types of national mo!ements, whether they e!entually achie!ed nation

statehood or merely one form of autonomous status, depend on a number of factors. hese factors

include the political system under which the national mo!ement proceeded during hase B and hase

#, and the social structure of the nondominant ethnic group.

C third factor is the groups historical de!elopment.

Droch distinguishes three le!els or stages of national political programs that describe different types

of demands for selfdetermination3/.

he first is substitution. an elementary le!el of political programs, in which only partial elements of

politics entered into the national programmeG3*.

3+

ibid., p. 223/ ucas =ichael 6.,%ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. 32.3* Droch, =irosla!,%ational Sel");eter*ination "ro* a Historical 5erspecti-e, p. +.


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here are attempts to maintain the unity of the ethnic territory and thus to culti!ate the image of the

fatherlandG.

Drochs point here is that linguistic and cultural demands, sometimes, only temporarily replaced

some functions of e(plicit political aims.

he second le!el consists in demands for participation, for e(ample, in local >municipal?

administration, in elected bodies at different le!els of go!ernment.

he third le!el or type of selfdetermination mo!ements was secessionbased on the aim of the

leaders of the national mo!ement to achie!e greater autonomy in what they considered Ltheir

territory.

With this historical e!idence, theories of nationalism that define national goals e(clusi!ely as the

effort for independence are not empirically well grounded. Clthough a great part of national

mo!ements in #entral and Eastern Europe achie!ed independent statehood, this goal was not in their

national programs, which aimed at less ambitious goals.

E(ternal factors, namely, World War I and the 6ussian 6e!olution in //, were responsible for the

shift of direction and later goals of these mo!ements. Once independence was achie!ed, only then it

became the political bottom line for these new independent states.

'nder fascism and later under 7o!iet dominance >for what it concerns #entral and Eastern European

states? independence was lost, but remained the core demand that would reemerge with the end of

the #old War.

Droch also points out that some mo!ements did not achie!e full independence in the interwar

period, like 7lo!enes, 7lo!aks, #roatians, 'krainians, =acedonians and Byelorussians" they became

independent only with the end of 7o!iet communism.

In the new international setting, in which the traditional multinational, multiethnic empires

disappeared and the nationstate was the primary and most powerful actor in the international

system, the demand for statehood, by selfdetermination mo!ements, became much more

widespread.

.. +e state"centered a**roac+

For authors supporting the statecentered theory, nationalism is linked to the emergence of the

modern state and its interaction with the international system of states.33

Breuilly >one of the leading e(ponents of this approach? considers wrong to relate nationalis* to

particular class interests or to t$e pursuit o" large scale social and econo*ic c$angeG.

33 ucas =ichael 6.,%ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. 3.


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On the other hand, re"erence to t$e role o" t$is or t$at class. or to t$e atte*pt to create a *odern

econo*+. s$ould not be *ade central to an understanding o" nationalis* generall+G3


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De defines people in terms of communication, as a group of indi!iduals linked by specific

complementary habits and facilities of communicationGfor e(ample, through transport, radio, and telecommunications?.

9eutsch !iews nationalism through the lens of moderni$ation, he sees the effects on traditional social

ties, and the sense of security and belonging destroyed by industrialism and the progress of market

relations. he nationstate has the role of helping to create a new community and culture to replace

what industrialism destroys.

Aationality is achie!ed through ad!ancing means of communication, that is, by creating a

community of complementary habits and facilities of communicationG.

he nationstate, nationality, the increasing efficiency and functionality of infrastructures of

communication are for 9eutsch motors of moderni$ation and progress, which are scientifically

measurable. De was optimistic about nationalism as a force of moderni$ation. De claims that in the

mid/2+s the mobili$ation of precommercial, preindustrial peasant peoples and their transition to

an industrial economy should be substantially completed within the ne(t two generationsGor in his

terms, cybernetic? logic. De considers the end of the #old War and the contemporary re!olution in

computer, communication and other technologies, and their application at the state and supranational

le!el, as a reali$ation of his theory


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he ma)ority of the nationalist mo!ements in the Balkans ha!e long histories that predate their

resurgence in late /5+s and /+s. 7ome of these mo!ements are traceable back to the /th century

and in a few cases much earlier.

.8. ost"modernist

he postmodernist approach to nationalism would necessarily ha!e to integrate both the ethno

nationalist approach and the modernist school.

Ernest -ellner pro!ides a postmodernist synthesis, focusing on economic, social, and cultural

elements of industrial moderni$ation, which include the notion of a profound historicalcultural

di!ision between agrarian and industrial society.;/

In feudal and agrarian societies, a gi!en social structure predetermined the indi!iduals social

identity, social position, and life path;*" indi!idual e(istence was fi(ed and static.

In industrial society, in contrast, with its need for an educated work force and labour mobility,

citi$ens assume different roles in their lifetime;3.

he indi!idual must ad)ust to a condition of substitutableG within the workforce" Cd)ustments are a

constant of the social and working life.

In this situation, culture and nationalism become more important for the indi!iduals identity, for his

identification with the imagined communityG of the nation, and for the reproduction of a socially

coherent, industrially functioning society.

he state with its control o!er education and other infrastructures tries to create a nationally

homogeni$ed culture capable of assimilating different cultures and groups, reducing social tensions

between rulers and ruled, and integrating nationalist and other oppositions.

#ulture is also the tool used by the indi!idual to identify himself with the different roles and

identities he will assume in his lifetime.

he society tries to pro!ide a structure to assimilate different groups and oppositional nationalist

mo!ements. Cs long as this situation is not reali$ed1does not happen, the personal and cultural

aspects of identity become more needed and pronounced.

he state compensates for the depersonali$ing forces of moderni$ation by resociali$ing the

indi!idual into the imagined community of its national culture.

he current postmodern, multicultural and multinational trends are more pronounced in ad!anced

liberal, constitutional democracies and ci!il societies in Aorth Cmerica and Europe, but they are also

an e(ample of une!enly e!ol!ing trend throughout the world

;/

ucas =ichael 6.,%ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p.


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In the domesticglobal cultural en!ironment of the late *+th century, the appeal of @uasimonoculture

national narrati!es imposed by established elites has become less fascinating, legitimate, or

politically unifying and selfsustaining.

7uch dominant national narrati!e has gi!en way to a political space into nationstates and created

homogeneous national cultures.;


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he French elite belie!ed that using the schools and the army as !ehicles would dismiss the e(istence

of any different ethnic group within the French nation and would finally lead to the French nation

state formation.

Cs the French had no uniform conception of patriotism at the time of the 6e!olution or at any other

time, the patriotic feeling on the national le!el had to be learned, at different speeds in different

places, mostly through the later part of the nineteenth century.

Finally, the -erman e(perience under different historical and geographical conditions formed a

different nationstate.

'sing the conception of the imagined community of the nation, not as a nation of citi$ens, but as a

Kolk nationG bound together by ties of blood, descent and culture, -ermans built another type of

nationstate.

he -erman understanding of nationhood re!ol!ed around an ethno cultural community of descent,

which was and it still is e(tremely resilient to the assimilation of new members.

he result was a conception of the nation, not as a nation of citi$ens, but as a Kolk nation, bound

together not by shared citi$enship rights within the state, but by ties of blood and culture.

his conception of the nation was also spread around in the neighbouring countries and in #entral,

Eastern and 7outhern Europe, affecting the creation of nation there.2+

7. ation"Building in !entral, Sout+ern, and #astern #uro*e

he Dabsburg, Ottoman and 6omano! Empires occupied the region of #entral, Eastern and 7outhern

Europe in the nineteenth century" those Empires were polyethnic, polyreligious and polylinguistic

and were disappro!ed as *ultinationalby the more compact, consolidated and integrated states of

Aorthern and Western Europe.

Cs was mentioned abo!e, there were differences in nation building and in state building between the

Western Europe and #entral, Eastern and 7outhern Europe. hese differences mainly occurred due

to two basic reasons0 the difference in relations between state and church in the East and the absenceof the Enlightenment ideas in this area.

In Western Europe, it was the state that created the nation >in France, the =onarchy built the

Frenchman?, while in #entral Europe the nation created the state >the -ermans belonging to different

7tates created a unified -erman 7tate?.

-eography played a critical role in these differences. rior to the nineteenth century, geography

usually determined the international borders, which were only appro(imately known.

2+ =a$ower =ark,


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he principle of selfdetermination of nations became linked with so!ereignty, and created disputes

and fights o!er territorial claims, especially where historical places or territories rich in natural

sources were in!ol!ed.

In the nineteenth century, these multinational Empires reorgani$ed themself along apparently

national lines, beginning with the gradual erosion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

7ince /5/2, 7erbia had gained rights of internal selfgo!ernment, but not a fully autonomous regime.

he -reek case was actually the first in line of state building in the Balkans. Cfter many

unsuccessful attempts in the past, finally -reek became partly independent after a long and bloody

independence war, which started in /5*/.2/

7imilarly, hundred years after the -reek emancipation a whole belt of east European states, from

Finland, through the Baltic 7tates, oland, #$echoslo!akia, 6omania, Bulgaria, Clbania and 7erbia

came into e(istence by secession from the great Empires.

=emories of heroic eras were used in all these countries to bolster national consciousness and the

boundary between scholarship and national mythology became fluid2*

In spite of all these efforts, national states with a homogeneous population were hard to find in East

#entral Europe and the Balkans, where nationalities o!erlap until today.

8. ationalism in Balkans And ormer ;ugosla)ia

he period after WWI, could be considered the peak of nationalism and the demonstration of its

huge potential and its limitations, especially in Balkans.

9uring the period between //5 and /


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most of them, united to the pressures from the -reat owers, all led to the failing of nation building

and internal solidarity.

=oreo!er, in the Balkans, there were additional factors that complicated the situation" first of all the

Balkan eninsula was the border between the former empires and was often a place of competing

influences.

he dispositions of the reaty of Kersailles were not satisfactory" abo!e all, the artificial creation of

%ugosla!ia caused the formation of a new problematical state, made up by the largest and most

di!erse number of pre//5 units.23

he real challenge was to unite in a single nation all the different ethnic and religious groups" groups

of di!ergent cultures, se!eral different languages, different legal systems, di!erse e(periences in state

and political affairs, and mutual historical hostility .

For this reason, the most important factor shaping the future de!elopment of the newly comprised

state was 7erbian domination in its political life, administrati!e and legal procedures and

organi$ation.

his domination was based on four important arguments2one

fifth of the population had perished? and the large wealth loss during the war


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In Italy and -ermany, for e(ample, nationalism was integrati!e" it united the same peoples li!ing in

different states and principalities, by contrast, in Eastern Europe and %ugosla!ia >particularly?,

nationalism was separatist.

9uring the communism, the nationalist ideology did not disappear o!erall, being only suppressed by

the ruling elites.

%ugosla!ias narration, on its part, was dominated by clashes between the wealthy 7lo!enes and

#roats, who struggled for more autonomy within the federation, and the 7erbs who were

economically less ad!anced but greater in number and were stri!ing towards increased centralism in

the state.

he collapse of #ommunism, with the re!olutions of /5, howe!er, brought about a number of

changes in the region and thus se!eral factors appeared to ha!e a simultaneous catalytic influence on

the reemergence of nationalism.

he diminishing 7o!iet influence and its deterrent role, the destabili$ing political effect of mass

media, with freedom of e(pression and nationwide audience >due to political liberali$ation?, the

search for a new ideology with populist politicians employing nationalism to fill the !oid.

In %ugosla!ia there were, also, two other e(tremely important factors such as the e(istence of

historical grie!ances and the presence of strong ethnic stereotypes.

Internal nationalism was certainly the most important political factor throughout the e(istence of

%ugosla!ia. he pre!ious regimes identification with the 7erb people and its attempts to manipulate

the ethnic mi( in parts of the country had also contributed to the e(acerbation of ethnic grie!ances.

he ethnic ties across state borders and the support that the 7erbs in #roatia and Bosnia recei!ed

from =ilose!ics go!ernment, united to the e(treme positions of the leaders of all the ethnic groups

>and their unwillingness of to agree on compromises? were certainly a ma)or reason for the conflicts

to escalate and become so de!astating.

he 7erbs saw the reemerging identities of the other republics as security threats for the e(istence of

the federation and conse@uently 7erbias domination within it.

In the first phase of the conflict, against 7lo!enia and #roatia the go!ernment of Belgrade used, as a

tool, the iconography of the e(istence of a federalG %ugosla!ia, as 7erbians dri!e to rule the other

7outh 7la!ic, and this was the ma)or cause of the countrys break up.

Cnother iconography, that also pro!ed to be decisi!e, was the ethnic ties between 7erbs across state

borders and the support that they recei!ed in #roatia and Bosnia from =ilose!ics go!ernment, in

the name of 7erbian unity.

he fact that the federal troops demonstrated their loyalty to 7erbian leadership, when 7lo!enia and

#roatia chose the independence, also had a great impact.


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Dowe!er, it can be argued that the first and foremost reason for the %ugosla! crisis was the fact that

ethnic grie!ances were not addressed at all. In the name of 7erbian iconography, instead of accepting

the proposal of 7lo!enia and #roatia to restructure %ugosla!ia as confederation, which would ha!e

pro!ided more autonomy for them, =ilose!ic resorted to direct military inter!ention using the

federal army to keep control of both republics by force.

he deepseated conflicts between ethnic communities emerge primarily from ri!al >and sometimes

incompatible? myths, symbols and memories that define the tradition and !alue systems of those

communities, different iconographies come out, especially when there are une@ual relations.

'ne@ual relationships will not lead to an ethnic conflict unless there is a sense of ethnic difference,

and similarly, ri!al myths will not bring two communities into a conflict if the two communities ha!e

not entered into competiti!e relationship2.

he une@ual footing of the republics in the %ugosla! Federation, and abo!e all 7erbian pretensions

for domination were the dri!ing forces behind the rise of ethnic conflicts.

Barry osen has presented an interesting theoretical !iewpoint on the emergence of ethnic conflicts

that draws on international relations theory.25

Employing the concept of the security dilemma, he applies it to the special conditions that arise after

the disintegration of multinational states like former 7o!iet 'nion and former %ugosla!ia.

o the une@ual relationships between pro(imate groups proposed by 7mith, osen adds the idea that

these groups o" people suddenl+ "ind t$e*sel-es nel+ responsible "or t$eir on securit+.G

heir security dilemma affects relations among these groups, )ust as it affects relations among states,

and so it becomes the dri!ing force behind their conflicts.

he essence of the security dilemma is that $at one does to en$ance ones on securit+ causes

reactions t$at. in t$e end. can *ake one less secureG.2

If we adopt this !iew, we could partially e(plain the military conflicts between 7erbs and 7lo!enes

and between 7erbs and #roats.

In both cases the slower progress in the formation of state structures and the lesser power of the new

republics, created opportunities for the 7erbs to use force against the 7lo!enes and the #roats.

he strength of their offensi!e capacities encouraged a preempti!e first strike, while they still

en)oyed their superiority.

2 7mith Cnthony 9, 9$e Et$nic Sources o" %ationalis*. in =ichael E. Brown >ed.?, Et$nic Con"lict and

International Securit+, rinceton 'ni!ersity ress, rinceton /3, pp. *5*25 osen Barry. 9$e Securit+ ;ile**a and Et$nic Con"lict, in 7ur!i!alG, !ol. 3;, no. /, spring /3, pp. *


21/35

he federal premier =arko!ic, in Hune //, right after 7lo!enias declaration of independence,

hastily authori$ed the use of force against 7lo!enia, the Federal armys inter!ention was poorly

planned and badly e(ecuted and the short war ended with the defeat of the Federal army.

In the case of #roatia, the offensi!e started a month later, and was preceded by a number of hostile

acti!ities on both parts signalling their intention to fight, 7erbias withdrawal of all hea!y weapons

stored in #roatia >used for the territorial defence forces?, and the #roats acceleration of military

preparations.

he war of aggression of 7erbia against #roatia, howe!er, was based on the calculation that the ill

e@uipped #roatian defence forces would @uickly collapse when faced with the superior firepower of

the federal army and 7erbian irregularsG, and on the belief in the seemingly wide window of

opportunity for 7erbian success.

ed.?, 9$e &olatile 5oder @eg) Balkan Securit+ #"ter t$e Cold !ar, 6CA9 7tudy, heCmerican 'ni!ersity ress, Washington 9.#., /


22/35

It was only after the horror of the two World Wars and the #old War period that Western Europe has

come to en)oy the longest period of peace in its history.

he !iolence and hatred in the area, where!er it e(ists, is not something inherent to Balkan peoples,

but fre@uently the product of the inter!ention of the -reat owers, which ha!e been continuously

in!ol!ed in Balkan affairs in their effort to support their interests in the strategic region.

he Balkan nationalistic dreams for resurrecting ancient empires like a -reater Clbania, Bulgaria,

-reece or 7erbia, are in the minds of only few people li!ing in the area.

Cs for the solution, one option could be the cultural legitimation of the historic heritages of the

different ethnic communities, so that a condition of dialogue and mutual respect could be brought

about.

his implies the reciprocal recognition of different iconography, but it is essential a long time and a

peaceful en!ironment.

Cnother solution is the creation and dissemination of an o!erarching unifying symbolism and

ideology. his is e(tremely difficult to achie!e in practice. It could be argued that this is what the

former state of %ugosla!ia had tried to produce, but the total failure to create an ideology unifying all

ethnic groups is demonstrated by the fact that once authoritarian rule, which kept the country

together through the state and the army, ended, the country began to disintegrate.

#reating a new and o!erreaching iconography is !ery difficult and re@uires great care, time and

energy because of the local and ethnical iconographies, deeply rooted.

C possible answer is also a federal system di!iding the realm of cultureG from politics.

he go!ernments are particularly reluctant to allow this, as many belie!e >with some )ustification?

that federalism could be a first step to future secessionism. he de!elopment of the relations between

7erbia and =ontenegro is a good e(ample.

When all other former republics of Federal %ugosla!ia ha!e succeeded in one way or another, many

analysts predicted that the loose confederation and the uneasy stateunion of 7erbia and =ontenegro

would not sur!i!e for too long, despite being partially fostered by and ad!ocated by the E' and other

international organi$ations. Indeed, ac@uiring more rights for selfdetermination >including the

acceptance of the Euro as an official currency, the introduction of internal tariffs in the economic

system and the establishment of pro!isions for regional go!ernment and parliament? meant that

=ontenegro was embarking on a separate path of states and economic de!elopment.

Clthough a federal president, parliament, one army and a number of common offices and ser!ices

ha!e kept the federati!e formation together o!er /3 years, it was no surprisingly that the authorities

in =ontenegro declared they wanted full independence and conducted a referendum to obtain it.

9espite the e(istence of pro7erbian forces, the people of =ontenegro !oted, though with a small


23/35


24/35

present fragile stability to the country, which cost about a @uarter of a million li!es and a dramatic

displacement of people.

he last solution could be defined as cooling the conflict and waitG, since it tries to limit the conflict

between ethnic groups, finding new ideas and solution to a!oid partition of territory, redrawing the

map and mo!ement of people.

he central issue is relate to different claim of so!ereignty and to conflicting iconographies" the point

is to de!ise a legal framework that permits to reach positi!e agreement between the parts, a!oiding

the $ero sum game of so!ereignty claim, waiting for impro!ement and better time .

>.1. Su**orting t+e Status ?uo 3-ulti"#t+nic States5

his solution re@uires the formation of a new iconography that allows o!ercoming the single ethnic

and national one. In this case, the European supranational iconography, as aim to achie!e, is

functional to circulation.

he solution to be discussed is the preser!ation of the status @uo and the in!iolability of the

international borders" it is the most popular among obser!ers and analysts.

he -reat owers and the leaders of the in!ol!ed states also fa!our this solution, because in general,

they disappro!e any changes to a!oid the risk of losing their interests or their power respecti!ely.

hose opposed to this solution argue that the status @uo is a myth and a photographic moment of

reality, and accordingly they ask what the status @uo that we must support is.

Focusing on the Balkans, the borders there ha!e been changed many times throughout their long

history of wars. 9uring the *+th century and before the /+s, the rearrangements of the borders had

been agreed upon after the Balkan Wars >//*//3?, after the First World War >////?, after

the -recourkish War >/*3? and after the 7econd World War >/


25/35

Where religious differences or the absence of a dominant ethnic group e(isted, assimilation was

significantly harder, as in %ugosla!ia.

he problem in %ugosla!ia and in other states in the Balkans was and still is the borders between

communities within the internationally recogni$ed borders, because of the peoples mobili$ation,

!oluntary or not, and the distinct demographic growth of the !arious ethnic groups.

he most recent e(periment to create and support an independent, multiethnic and multireligious

state in the Balkans >BosniaDer$ego!ina? with a mi(ed population of Bosnian =uslims, #roats and

7erbs, has been unsuccessful after almost fifteen years. he people who belong to ethnic groups

with a national homelandG are not so willing to cooperate with the new state and they usually aspire

to the unification with their coethnics. In BosniaDer$ego!ina, #roats and 7erbs would prefer that

their pro!inces secede, and be united with #roatia and 7erbia respecti!ely. It is important to keep in

mind that some of these ethnic tensions are inherent to newly democrati$ing and multiethnic

societies where political, economic, and social institutions are still weak and ci!il society is not yet

fully de!eloped;G.

here are se!eral prere@uisites for a multiethnic and multicultural country to increase cooperation

among ethnic groups and to create a !iable state. First, a strong central go!ernment is needed as well

as a charismatic leader, as it was %ugosla!ia under ito, to unite the people and to promote loyalty

towards the state and its institutions rather than to onePs own group.

hen, a longterm process must be set in motion in order to create trust among the !arious ethnic

groups with guarantees for political power sharing, mutual respect for languages, religion and

culture.

In the case of %ugosla!ia, the predominance of the 7erbia and the imposed 7erbian iconographies

did not function at all.

Old and new resentments o!erlap each other" the 7erbs remembered the atrocities committed by

#roatian 'stasha under the go!ernment of Cnte a!elic, during the 7econd World War, #roatian and

7lo!enian feared of renewed 7erbian centralist go!ernment2.

In &oso!o appeared old iconographies like the myth of &oso!o ol)e battle against the urks.

In this process, the Western de!eloped countries and the international organi$ations could help with

a military presence or with their ability to impose sanctions. Furthermore, the principle of non

discrimination and e@ual treatment of all under the law, and legislation regulating employment in

; ibid.2 ibid. he Battle of &oso!o ol)e is seen as a symbol of 7erbian patriotism and desire for independence in the /th

century rise of nationalism under Ottoman rule, and its significance for 7erbian nationalism returned to prominenceduring the breakup of %ugosla!ia and the &oso!o War when 7lobodan =ilose!ic in!oked it during an importantspeech. 7ource0www.Wikipedia.eng
http://www.wikipedia.en/http://www.wikipedia.en/


26/35

public administration and the proportional representation of all groups in the )udicial system must be

supported, in order to cancel ethnical resentments.

hen, ci!ic and human rights of the minorities ha!e to be protected by the central go!ernment.

Finally, the imposition or application of a supranational identity, >the European one today?, could

make people inclined towards the idea of multi identity and make them willing to belong to a wider

group of people5.

#reate a new European iconography is not a simple task, but it appears the only possible and !iable

solution, if we assume that the borders are untouchable.

o sum up, the future of the multiethnic states in the Balkans has a long way to go mainly because

the re!i!ed nationalism in the Balkans has created fear among the people of the different ethnic

groups. he best way to achie!e regional stability, sa!ing at the same time the status @uo, is to

support and acti!ely promote the European orientation of the Balkan countries. he degree, to which

the European integration process e(tends to the region, and the achie!ement of the longterm goals

of economic and political rapprochement with the European institutions, will probably ha!e the most

crucial effect on the fortunes of nationalism in the Balkans and on peace in the area.

>.2. !reation of ation"States

he second proposed solution is the creation of nationstates by redrawing the borders.

he radical solution that probably demands a smaller or larger mobili$ation of people is the least

fa!oured in the West, but hypothetically could bring a longpeace to the Balkans.

In this case, it would be necessary to strengthen the nationalistic and ethnic iconographies in order to

o!ercome the problem of people redistribution.

Clthough the idea of redrawing the borders is confronted with fear from the West, it also has se!eral

supporters, such as ord 9a!id Owen, who supports the idea of read)usting the international

boundaries in the Balkans.

7ocieties in the Balkans are formed along ethnic lines, which is e(plainable in historical terms. he

lack of ci!ic society and tolerance for other points of !iew holds true for all the states in the region

and accordingly this proposed solution appears to ha!e a significant hold today. Cccording to the

political culture of the Balkan states, the concepts of nationhood and state coincide because of the

wars of independence in the /th century and their irredentist !iewpoints, which created the

nationalism and the separation between the ethnic groups.

5 he multiethnic identities of the past such as %ugosla!ism, Ottomanism or Dasburgism had failed because they

had been imposed by force. If Europeanism will be implemented in peace then it will be the first successful supranational identity for the Balkans.

Owen, 9a!id, 9o Secure Balkan 5eace. 2edra t$e Map, p. *2"


27/35

herefore, all other groups pose potential threats to the homogeneity of the state and, by e(tension,

to its so!ereignty and territorial integrity.

In the past, all the attempts at unifying people under a multiethnic and multicultural regime were

unsuccessful.

Ottomanism, Dabsburgism or #ommunism has not been pro!ed powerful enough to hold the

competing nationalisms in check and create a !iable multiethnic state.

he support of nationstate building in the area, and a possible rearrangement of the borders after

negotiations between the Balkan states is the only lasting solution.

Finally, the creation of a homogenous nation state, e!en if it happened in a radical and bitter way,

was pro!en successful in the case of -reece.

Distorically, the series of Balkan population shifts, which had begun before the Balkan Wars and

in!ol!ed a mass migration of the population, continued after the end of the 7econd Balkan War in

//A, E9 Edi$ioni 'ni!ersitarie, =ilano, /5, p.


28/35

Finally, the critics to this solution argue that any changes to the e(isting Balkan map would be akin

to opening andoraPs bo(, because a re!i!ed nationalism in some Balkan states will ha!e a domino

effect in the nationalistic uphea!al in the whole region and possibly elsewhere.

he critics of this idea belie!e that it is !ery costly and hard to be implemented and that any changes

to the e(isting borders could result in chain reaction in other countries as well.

>.. !ooling t+e conflict and &ait

7idestepping the so!ereignty issue and a!oiding partition could be the third applicable solution to

Balkan problems.

Aormally, so!ereignty is indi!isible, a $ero sum game between different and opposite ethnic group,

claiming control and power on the same land.

7o!ereignty is the @uality of ha!ing supreme, independent authority o!er a territory, it can be found

in a power to rule and make law o!er a place that has as its basis the assertion of that claim 5/.

he &oso!o status is a not sol!able problem, 7erbian and Clbanian, want to rule the same territory,

but they cant get what they want.

he core issue is so!ereignty, and the possible solution could be seen in sidestepping the so!ereignty

issue and a!oid partition" with increased autonomy for the 7erbs north of the Ibar and a role for

7erbia concerning the southern 7erbs and the #hurch.

For the north, links to ristina would probably ha!e to be kept minimal while in the south, where the

7erbs must li!e in the midst of independent &oso!o, such links would ha!e to be somewhat more

organic.

he role of Belgrade would be a mirror image of this. In the north, local institutions would function

in practice as part of 7erbia while in the south" Belgrade would ha!e defined access and the ability to

support local 7erb communities but no role in go!erning them.

O!ersight of the #hurch >and #hurch land? might be done simply as a matter of the recogni$ed

authority of the 7erbian Orthodo( #hurch. Cll of this would re@uire agreed and clear rules of the

road J and the de!il is always in the details J and close monitoring and super!ision by the

internationals.

Cutonomy itself is not the problem, its a way of a!oiding creation of autonomous ethnic regions,

such as was done in BosniaDer$ego!ina, that ha!e led to continuing problems.

Increased autonomy, within the boundaries of &oso!o, where both Belgrade and ristina agree that

its boundaries are not in @uestion and both continue to re)ect partition, could offer real grounds for

compromise.

5/www.wikipedia.en"
http://www.wikipedia.en/http://www.wikipedia.en/http://www.wikipedia.en/


29/35

Belgrade could continue to claim that all of &oso!o remains part of 7erbia but limit itself to

e(ercising some form of control o!er the north and only access in the south" ristina could maintain

that its borders and independence are in!iolate.

7erbia would not ha!e to recogni$e &oso!o independence >nor would the E' insist? but ristina

would presumably also get 7erbias @uiet ac@uiescence to &oso!o being further incorporated into the

international system >including the 'A?.

Cn agreement along these lines is certainly concei!able and could be achie!ed if the parties both

understood that they were e(pected to reach a mutually acceptable solution in which neither would

necessarily recei!e all they want.

Both sides could see the issue of so!ereignty o!er &oso!o in their own way and be left to do so.

7erbia could continue to claim so!ereignty o!er all of &oso!o, as could the go!ernment in ristina.

he 7erbs would ha!e a high degree of local selfrule within what e!eryone recogni$ed as &oso!o.

he Clbanians would be able to take comfort in the fact that 7erbia would not formally rule any part

of &oso!o.

With both sides getting the international support, re@uired to make this complicated formula work,

and o!er time, perhaps the issue of &oso!o status could be subsumed within membership in the E'.

erhaps some will still say that this would only free$eG the &oso!o conflict and not resol!e it.

But this misses the point that the conflict between 7erbs and Clbanians o!er &oso!o remains at this

time irresol!able, e(cept perhaps through using force to dri!e one or the other side off the field.

C detailed and practical agreement to disagree on so!ereignty may be the best outcome for now.

he conflict between 7erbs and Clbanians in &oso!o was and remain tribal0 groups differing in

language, religion, history and culture, unwilling to li!e with each other and wishing the other would

disappear.

he problem lies in the fact that Western Europeans seemed not to understand this, treating the

Balkans as a chess game and misplayed the breakup of %ugosla!ia from the start.

%ugosla!ias chaotic and bloody end resulted from a collision between three worlds and three

iconographies0 the premodern, multiethnic empires >Ottoman, CustroDungarian and %ugosla!ia

itself?" the modernG rise of nation states" and the Western European elites dream of a postmodern

Europe mo!ing away from nation states.

he last /++ years of Balkans history saw ethnic communities formerly li!ing within the confines of

imperial order coming to terms with issues of e(istence and stability within the international state

system. he empires had allowed great mi(ing of peoples within their borders.

#ommunities nestled within and ne(t to each other. Cs the Ottoman imperial peace dissipated,

competing nationalisms helped ignite World War One. Cfter the war, the Western creation of


30/35

%ugosla!ia sought to preser!e imperial order by throwing the se!eral tribes into an oldfashioned

monarchy. World War wo cut off its possible e!olution into a stable multiethnic state. itos

approach of playingoff and payingoff the constituent groups largely e(hausted itself by the time he

left the scene. Cnimosities between the Balkans tribes, old e!en when they didnt lead to !iolence

under imperial rule, made breakup after ito almost ine!itable.

Western Europe misplayed the end badly, allowing e!ents to be carried forward in the hands of the

first wa!e of tribal politicians.

Western countries supporting &oso!o sought to settle the issue by entrusting succession there to the

Clbanians. he Clbanians saw this as their opening to grab it all.

he other Balkans tribes now ha!e their own states" they!e become nations.G But in Bosnia

Der$ego!ina, neither 7erbs, #roats nor Bosnians want to gi!e power to a center they do not control.

In &oso!o south of the Ibar J with E'EQ and I#O help J ristina pushed the remaining >and

surrounded? 7erb encla!es to accept coming under its rule.

But the Aorth resisted its local 7erbian institutions and links to Belgrade ne!er challenged by ACO.

It would ha!e taken force to try and the Muint pressure to ne!ertheless impose ristinas rule in the

north led to the =itro!ica courthouse debacle of =arch *++5 and repeated efforts since to bully the

northerners into submission, and failed.

#hange cannot be forced. he premodern politics that still define the Balkans adaptation to the end

of empire cannot simply be pushed aside by !isions of postnational Europe. It will take time,

patience and real compromise.

ime and patience for people to become comfortable with )ust li!ing ne(t to each other in peace

rather than being forced to share one bed" a compromisethat does not seek to gi!e the ma)ority

e!erything.

@. !onclusions

9ue to its strategic position during the long history of the Balkan eninsula, many con@uerors passedthrough the area for a shorter or longer period. 'nder the multinational 6oman, By$antine, and

Ottoman Empires, which were multireligious and multilinguistic, the Balkan population became

intermi(ed in most areas of the region.

he ethnic wars for independence from the Ottoman Empire in the /th century and the conse@uential

disputes o!er territorial claims among the different ethnic groups in the region, determined the recent

history of repeated wars and ethnic conflicts.

In the Balkan eninsula, the seeds of nationalism and the creation of nation states were sown with

the 7erbian and the -reek Wars for Independence in the beginning of the / th century.
http://www.transconflict.com/2012/04/kosovo-now-and-in-the-future-184/http://www.transconflict.com/2012/04/kosovo-now-and-in-the-future-184/


31/35

Clthough nationalism and indeed national cultures were artificially created, mostly in the / th and

*+th centuries, nationalism has been pro!en a powerful ideology and force o!er the last two centuries

in the Balkans.

he nationbuilding process has pro!en to be a long and laborious procedure for the people,

especially when the interests of the -reat owers in the region were.

Cs a result, the problems related to the e(istence of minorities became a central issue in most Balkan

countries.

=oreo!er, national minorities became the main source of instability in the Balkans mainly because

of the lack of trust between the host country and the national minority concerning national security

issues.

Cssimilation, e(pulsion or li@uidation, in accordance with the principle of nationality, were the

strategies to sol!e the minority problem in the Balkans during the end of the / th and the *+th

centuries, and caused the con!ersions, assimilations, mass e(ecutions and the flight of tens of

thousands of refugees from the Balkan countries.

oday the Balkan nationalistic dreams of resurrecting ancient empires are in the minds of a !ery

small percentage of the Balkan people. In contrast, the ma)ority of the people in the area is seeking

peace, stability, democracy and economic prosperity, and is trying to eliminate the integral

nationalistic ideas from the past.

We belie!ed that two alternati!e solutions might eliminate nationalism, and pro!ide stability in the

area0

7upport the status @uo >=ulti Ethnic 7tates?.

6edraw the borders >#reation of Aation7tates?

Free$e the so!ereignty issue.

he first solution, the support of the status @uo, is relati!ely difficult to implement in the Balkans

today, e!en if the West is fa!ourably disposed towards it.

Cfter the dissolution of %ugosla!ia and the recent problems of BosniaDer$ego!ina to sur!i!e as a

multiethnic state, the future of multiethnic states in the Balkans seems more distant, mainly because

re!i!ed nationalism has created fear among those of the different ethnic groups, and the treatment of

minorities became a key issue.

he best way to achie!e regional stability, while at the same time maintaining the status @uo, is to

support and acti!ely promote the European orientation of the Balkan countries.

If the European identity is applied on top of national identities, it is possible to weaken nationalism.


32/35

he degree to which the European integration process e(tends to the region, and the achie!ement of

the longterm goals of economic and political rapprochement with the Western institutions, will

probably ha!e the most crucial effect on the fortunes of nationalism in the Balkans and on peace in

the area.

he second solution is redrawing the borders and creating homogenous nation states.

he failure of all the supranational ideas in the Balkans >Ottomanism, Dabsburgism, and

#ommunism? and the recent difficulties in the e(periment in BosniaDer$ego!ina, which aims at

creating a multiethnic state in the Balkans, make this solution possible e!en if it is difficult to

implement.

he ma)or problem in putting into effect this solution is the dispersion of the ethnic minorities and

conse@uently the necessary mobili$ation of people in order to achie!e the homogeneity of the state.

For the peaceful implementation of this solution, the borders should be ad)usted by consent"

agreements must be made between go!ernments and communities, and !iolence must be a!oided at

all costs. he attempt to create traditional, so!ereign, nationstates will potentially decrease much of

the !iolence in Balkan politics and will further normali$e the interethnic relations in the region. Cs

9a!id Owen belie!es, the international boundary read)ustment is the best hope of securing a lasting

peace in the regionG.5*

he critics of this idea, howe!er, belie!e that this potential solution is !ery costly and hard to

implement and also that any changes to the e(isting borders in the area would be akin to opening

andoraPs bo( and could ha!e a domino effect in the nationalistic conflict in the region.

he role of the international community will be crucial, in order to reali$e these solutions and to help

build stability in the region, which can be achie!ed mainly by weakening nationalism, and impro!ing

the treatment of minorities and democratic and economic de!elopment of the countries.

he last solution suggested is about a temporary free$e of the issues in!ol!ed in ethnic claim. In this

case, the aim is to achie!e more time to create a friendly en!ironment, allowing different ethnic

groups to li!e in the claimed territory, hoping for a supranational solution like E' admission,

capable of dilute ethnic tension, with new iconographies to attenuate the old ones.

-aining time could be a good solution, to create closer links and full membership in the Western

organi$ations, such as ACO and the E', to reduce the security dilemma of the Balkan countries

and secure peace in the region.

he stability of these organi$ations guarantees democracy, the protection of human rights and of

ethnic minorities, and the de!elopment of the rule of law. Economic de!elopment is considered !ital

5* Owen 9a!id, 9o Secure Balkan 5eace. 2edra t$e Map, p. *2"


33/35

for the sur!i!al and prosperity of the Balkans, as it will create the societal de!elopment needed to

transition to democracy.

he problem, howe!er, is about iconographies" it is necessary to find, alternati!ely, an iconography

that could replace the nationalistic with a supranational European one.

Otherwise, it would be re@uired to strengthen the national iconographies in order to o!ercome the

ethnic demands, with population e(change between different states, to reach an ethnical

homogeneity.

he two hypothetical resolutions, in any case, are a concrete and deep challenge to European

integration, especially during time of political and economic crisis.

herefore, free$ing the conflict and waiting for better time could be the only solution

1. Bi%liogra*+y

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-ellner Ernest.%azioni e nazionalis*i, Editori 6iuniti, 6oma, /52.

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Droch =irosla!, %ational Sel");eter*ination "ro* a Historical 5erspecti-e in eriwal, 7ukumar,

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